The United States and German Demilitarization, 1942- 1947

FROM ENMITY TOWARDS ALLIANCE: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMAN DEMILITARIZATION, 1942- 1947 Oliver Haller B.A., Wilfrid Laurier University, 199 1 M.A. Thesis Submitted to the Department of History in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Master of Arts Degree Wilfrid MerUniversity 1996 @ Oliver Haller 1996 National Library Bibliothèque nationale du Canada Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bibliographie Seivices seMces bibliographiques 395 Wellington Street 395, rue Wellington Ottawa ON K1A ON4 Ottawa ON KIA ON4 canada Canada YovrW voarrréfefmce Our Ne NonerrlHhena, The author has granted a non- L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive licence allowing the exclusive permettant à la National Library of Canada to Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduce, loan, districbute or sell reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou copies of this thesis in microforni, vendre des copies de cette thèse sous paper or electronic formats. la forme de microfiche/fïh, de reproduction sur papier ou sur fomat électronique. The author retains ownership of the L'auteur conserve la propriété du copyright in this thesis. Neither the droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. thesis nor substantial extracts from it Ni la thése ni des extraits substantiels may be printed or otherwise de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés reproduced without the author's ou autrement reproduits sans son permission. autorkation. Table of Contents Abstract ............................................... iii Introduction........................................... I Notes: Introduction .................................... 13 Chapter One: The Versailles Precedent and Initial Arnerican Perceptions of Civil-Military Government...... 18 Notes: Chapter One ..................................... 40 Chapter Two: The Formulation of an Amencan Civil-Military Direcive and the Ascendendcy of Demilitarimion through Deindustrialization........ 54 Notes: Chapter Two ..................................... 88 Chapter Three: The Erosion of the Concept of Deindustrialization in Postwar Germany ................. 105 Notes: Chapter Three ................................... 149 Chapter Four: A Limited Role for the Former Enemy ...... 168 Conclusion............................................. 2 11 Notes: Conclusion...................................... 216 Bibliography ..........................i .............. 2 17 Abstract This thesis examines the rehabilitation of western Gennany from a totalitarian enemy to a democratic partner involved in a military alliance. Previous accounts of German remilitarization focus almost exclusively on the growing Cold War tensions after 1945 and argue that the Korean War acted as the prirnary catalyst infïuencing the birth of the Bundeswehr. These historians hypothesize that the four occupying powers largely demilitarized their respective zones of occupation. This thesis evaluates this orthodox argument using the perspectives offered by post-revisionist economic historians. These historias demonstrate that Gennany's industrial infrastmciure suffered far less destruction through bombing and reparations than understood in the ùnmediate postwar penod and that Gemindustria1 capacity remained higher in 1946 than before the Second World War. General Lucius D. CIay and the American State Department accepted the need for an early modification of the occupational poiicy developed in Joint Chiefs of Staff 1067 and at the Potsdam Conference owing largely to the high costs of the enterprise. The Americans placed Germany on the path towards the economic "miracle" of the 1950s. This thesis argues that diese changes in deindustriaiization also irnpacted the more traditional diplornatic and military functions of the funire West Gemiany. West Germany maintained a rnilitary potential despite the policy of demilitarization. American difficulties with the Soviets during this period later intensified efforts at rehabilitating Germany, Introduction: Industry and the Military The Wehrmacht capitulateci to the Allies on 8 May 1945. German military defeat ended Adolf Hitler's grasp at world power and the war left the Ttiird Reich and much of Europe a heap of rubble. American General Lucius D. Clay's fmt impression of Gennany immediately der the conflict recorded that the "destruction was unbelievably massive and distnbuted throughout Germany as a whole. We were already forced with the problem of getting food to many of the cities and getting transportation going" .' The victorious Allies also hoped to impose an arnbitious postwar prograrn on a vanquished Germany in order to destroy the future capacity of Germany to again plunge the world into war. The extent of wartime desuuction and the totality of the Allied military occupation implied chat Germany could not skirt disarmament afier the Second World War as it had afier the first. Clay stated plainly that there "was no German govemment. We were it. Absolute and sovereignn.' A Gennan army no longer exited. The possibility of a reborn German army arose after a relatively brief five years of occupation. Chancellor Konrad Adenauer of the newly formed West German government issued a mernorandun on 29 August 1950 advoating the remilitarization of West Germany in order to fort@ the limited American and British occupationai forces against a potential military offensive by the Soviet ni on.^ German General a. D. Heusinger later stated on 21 October 1953 that Germany represented the frontline in a potential European war with the Soviet Union. German remilitarimion could help guarantee the safety of the democratic world.' The West German Bundeswehr took up arms in defence of the West five years later. Gerald Livingston argues that the Bundeswehr eventually developed into the "best fighting force in Europe" and that "it provides the single Iargest contribution to the North Atlantic Alliance's contingents in the most critical ana, the so-called central frontn.' Actual German remilitarization occurred a decade after the Allies entered Gemyintent on permanent and total disaniament. What had happened to Allied resolve? This thesis addresses an Unbalance in explaining the extraordinary shifi in American perceptions of the Gerrnan state and military from that of enemy to necessary ally . Any new smdy requires justification in view of the deluge of literanire explaining the reorganization of a West Gennan military and generally al1 aspects of the rebirth of the German state from the perspective of American and British occupational policy. Historians tend to neglect the slow diachronie transformation in Arnerican civil-military conceptions and the working definitions of German disarmament throughout the immediate postwar. This thesis focuses attention on the spectacular evolution of American civil-rnilitary policy into accepting an early positive role for Gennan industry. Historians of the Bundeswehr point to the fullscale outbreak of the Cold War in the early 1950s and active Arnerican rniIitary participation in the Korean war to explain the sudden switch in favour of Gennan assistance in a defensive alliance with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization WATO] against the Soviet Uniom6 John W. Young for exarnple points out that "German rearmament had been pressed on NATO States by the Arnericans in September 1950, at the height of the Korean War crisis, and was seen by US military planners as a vital rnove to counter the Red Amy's strength in Europe.' Historians therefore view the rearrnament of Germany in the 1950s from the orthodox or revisionist perspective of the growing American- Soviet conflict.' The Cold War tensions initiated the dernand for West and East German remilitarization. Current post-revisionist conceptions bring a measure of detachment into historical understanding of the postwar that moves away from the "polemics of Soviet-American rivalryn.9 Post-revisionist Historians attempt the examination of countries other than the United States and Soviet Union and offer a series of conclusion which generate interest in reappraising the decision to unleash Geman military potential." Post-revisionist historians such as Anne Deighton point out that "economic leverage and military might in both conventional and nuclear forces did not yet dominate international relations, for this was a period when the arts of diplomacy and negotiation held sway, while the lessons of war were digested and the shape of the peace decided"." General American belief in a potential war widi the Soviet Union did not solidi@ until after 1947 since American strategic thinking still perceived of the Soviet threat as "much more psychological and economic than military in naturen.'* Anne Deighton, in agreement wifh Reiner Pomrnerin and Saki Dockrill, argues that the 3 postwar victors still viewed Gemiany as "the object of great power diplomacy" and that "international tension between East and West was heightened by a mutual fear of a resurgence of German power" ." The solution to the "Germa. problem" in the imrnediate postwar. as pointed out by Woffgang Krieger, remained the elimination of the Ruhr chernical and steel industries in order to destroy a German military potential." The elimination or total control of German military ability through industriai control represented a fked characteristic of American postwar conceptions and therefore historical analysis. This understandable explanation undoubtedly derives from a misplaced belief in the monolithic nature of American postwar policy and a singular almost simplistic definition of official American views concedg demilitarization

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