Felfe, Heinz Vol. 4 0002
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N. DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL WELL IGENCEAGENCY SOURCESMETHODSEXEMPT ION 3B2E NAZI WAR CR IMES DI SCLOSURE AC1 flATE 2005 I;.. 4 CIANWTATIOS ACTION SECRET DISPATCH pram RR NORM C .f, BE; Chief, Bonn Element, Frankfurt; c !r, BOB; Chisf4AME__ , No INOcac,NO atOUIRED CDLV ONAL.C.10 C_Arf_) of BIlit19114.. German: . --- x X CAN nmo • Chief, Bonn Oparations. Base EC-4 fr. c". kJI g74-8, koolorouu SUMOrcr • Transmittal of 2fY Annual Counterespionage Report for 1963 a PEOWIMO RCEUI,E1 FY/ 1. Forwarded herewith for your information and retention are 2 ccO e s (If the English translation of the STV r.nnual roport entiticd Results of Counterempionage in 1963. 2. We defer to Headquarters for the indexing of names found in the report. Approved[ mou maul 47MCI Alfa NW rIlla Rttta ftla 1 .00.04PPOmon 1 tG10 thAf =LONE ro { tttohment (0/..w)s MA LANT KVAPO 1 a i noted :".74 JO Mi0111101ATJ SOURCE SYMBOL FILE RI VIACII 14 WWI 141D•if Distribution, C/EE w/att (5 aye) 2 - Bonn Element Frankfurt w/att ( 1 gY) 2 - C/BOB w/att (1 oy) 2 - C/MOB w/att (1 01) RECOa COPY 1 - COS/G/B w/o att 1 - COS/0/F w/o att SOURCE VW. Fitt, GROUP 1 CS CPI a Excluded from automatio downgrading and deolasaification - DISPATCH 111-4.10-07.-iNO-0.47.441R OAT EONA -20479 3 December 1964 auauw..”0., Tiig5-13m/S SECRET BIT Cl Report. 33Lib ATT. cid-77964)6A 1 ESNA- Y 7? esnm-asim - ;AASL/s# A rie-ileaL/Mod oF BPI/ AA/A/aim gEeier EA/Tin-ED - Aesee-rs OF crimi7Exe5P/o/v/96( >mg /96.3. CIEs C=1 CND .2) Arr 2 i-to EGAM- 01- 8177 eEkSoWNEL. LARII DATA arnmai CIO 3) 1:177:3 4-0 66N/4- .2.81i77 eicruaEs umiC NEC Immo Ii A, 334.7 4 I. 41/ t:ONFIDENTIAL FEDERAL AMOY YOR PEOVICTIOR OF TIE COISMOVION .• • soma Os comrnaus5no14at xi 194x Uftecm., , , RECORD COPY I • ORM $1 " FILE 3 es COPY DEC. /90/ j tv77 1. CONFIDENTIAL 411) 6111111111.11 1111.1111 CONFIDENTIA" z. A. ,Vhe Soviet Bloc Intelligens), ServAggss? AntlUfas. against the Federal ReP1b3.i4 LA 1963 1 I. Rxtent of Activities 1 II. Targets of Soviet Bloc intelligence Services 2 III. Recruitment Methods a) Recruitment Occasions 3 b) Recruitment Aids 4 IV.. Handling of Agents - Communications (Training) 4 H. Soviet Zone Intelligence Services . 5 I. Recruitment Methods of Soviet Zone Intelligence Services - Recruitment Attempts of Soviet Zone Intelligence Services by moans of Newspaper Ads 5 II. Handling of Soviet Zone Agents (WS Couriers and Instructors) 9 III. Qualified Individual Agents 11 IV. Information as to the Organisation of Soviet Zone Services 18 1. Integration of the Intelli gence Section of the Soviet Zone Border Troops into the MiS le 2. Organisation and Tasks of the MfS Main Depart- ment VIII 19 The WS "Passport and Tracing" Department (APF) 22 mosm 3. C. The Soviet Intelligence Services 25 I. Osneral 25 II. Recruiting Methods 25 III. Command and conmunioatien Channel. 30 IV. Intelligence Targets 50 Ejlen V. Legal Resident Agents 32 =mai D.The Polish Intelligence Services 37 S.The Czech Intelligence Services 42 Y.Ths Yugoslav Intelligence Services 43 0.211e Bungariali-Inielligence Services 44 H.Ths Roumanian and Bulgarian Intelligence Services 44 J.Survey on the Satellite Intelligence Services 45 K.Photos of Containers (see Appendix) L.Valid Sentences M,10. nY( •:i CONFIDENTIAL 3349 1:ONFIDENTIAL A. hi Soviet noo I4101;itenee8,100 Aotivity against the Federal Rep ublic of (n General Situation In 1963, the Federal Republic also eta one of the main targets of Soviet Bloc intelligence servioes lotiording to the Soviet Bloc intelligence terminology, the Federal Republic, as well as the Velted States, Brost Britain, PranOwend Japan, is a "Rain enemy". Consequently, the activity of Soviet Bloc intelligence service, did notslecken. Espionage activities were agein . dirsoted against almost all fields of public life. No essential changes were noticed with regard to targets. All services interest continued to be speolfloelly concentrated on the procurement of military and politioal information. As previously, the hostile servioes paid greatest attention to the careful selection and training of their agents and equipped them with highly qualified technical aids for maintaining the connection and for communication. The deo aaaaa of recognised recruitment oases which wee notiood after the erection of the Berlin Wall, did not continue further. The figures remained the same as lilt year. ixesa I. Extent pi Aotivity A total of 1,432 agent reoruiteents or recruitment attempts Cams mode by Soviet Bloo intelligence services, were discovered in 1963 in the Federal Republic (1962, 1,430). Theo. again CZ" included quite. number of oases in which troining,infiltra- tion andiquipment with intelligence aide already permitted the Caw, conclusion as to the agents or resident agents value and qualification. Agent couples appeared rather frequently. Of the 1,432 recognised oases 1,214 persons, that is SS, were approached by the Soviet Zone intelligence miracles. This wental number again emphasised the danger which the Soviet Zone intelligence services constitute for the Federal Republic. The other cases oan be broken down as follows: Soviet intelligence services 84 Polish intelligence services59 n Beech intelligence services 35 TutOslav intelligenoe services 15 "1101111 Shigisignintelligence services 10 RRumanian intelligence services 4 1111 ... Bulgarian intelligence servicee 2 unidentified hostile intelligence "WC services .. The Soviet Zone of Germany oontinued to raisin an important 111111111" , operational boss for these intelligents services activities against the Federal Republic. As in previoue Years, 000Pere" tion between the Soviet Zone and the Soviet Vision servioes L11.11 was the closest. Again a few oases became known where agent WOOL 1112011 3. ei CONFIDENTIAL •Y CONFIDENTIA" handling mil inillefar.Thi From the Soviet Zona to hits Soviet service, my via versa. FurthermOra, the Soviet Sloe States sissies in the redoral Republic onntinued to be used as bases of hostile ashtritY which enabled the individual intelligence wortrioeo to awry out sepionage under the gulls of diplomatia or mommeraial relations. A oomparisonghe activity of the individual services with the above mentioned starting points, does not give a uniform picture. The gravity center of the Soviet Zone intelligsnoe services is naturally with the handling agencies in East Berlin. The Soviet intelligence services oarry out their activities against the Federal Republic Rattly through their operational office. in the Soviet Zone. Besides the Soviet Embassy and the Soviet Trade Mission developed itatelligence' activities to quite considerably extent. The Yugoslays appear to primarily use their missions for intelligence activities against the Federal Republic. As regards intelligence activities, the other services probably equally operetta from their intelligence bases in East Berlin and their handling agencies in their own esuntries, while the missions of those countries in the Federal Republic, appear to be primarily concerned with tasks of a preparatory and supporting nature. ::10DMMI xx. Target of Soviet Bloc Int•llimenoe services Ms= In 1963 a total of 4,025 espionage camps were regarded. As compared with the number of the previous year (4.645), this means a deo f 15.9%.of Inthe sassvisa/ number of 41:1AW, recrui tments, this fact is of no decisive importance, neither withnagard to the hostile services activity nor to the counterintelligence results. During the period under review, BEAJI the most important espionage target. hardly changed. The following survey oaken this evident (in parenthesis the per- KielEtZVA centage of the 1962 results), ClAt Assignments of a preparatory Ectirg and supporting nature 1,704 42.5% (400%) Politiosl.Bopinnego 636 - 16.0 (16.5%) Economio Espionage 216 5.4% ( 8,6%) Military Espionage 1,311 32.2% (30.9%) Counterespionage 153 • 3.0% ( 2.2%) 4440 of Violence 5 0.1% ( 0.7%). Of the total of 4,025 recognised assignments, 1,992 idegO momploted (" 49%), hish0178 685 assignments m preparatory and supporting aselsomecta 320 " • political espionage 66 . A. economic espionage COX 637 * ••• Military espionage Sd .. counterespionage Laksall - 9 " sole at stmlance. - 2- CONFIDENTIAL •$ CONFIDENTIAL Also last year the greatest nunarical share of recorded espionage assignment was direeted against military targets in the Nedegal Republic. Besides the FRO Arasi Finices end all their installatiOne, the allied !Ovum stationed in 04knany, were again the subject of nylons. activities. The targets of the Soviet 2100services , political espionage primarily were the spheres of foreign and donestio politics. About 10% of all political assignments were directed against the democratic parties. Aloost all fields of economic life in the Federal Republic were covered by hostile cono ic espionage. The Soviet Bloc intelligence services special intsrest was Gerson industry. IX The greatest number of assignments were recorded in the field of electrical industry, followed by the chemical and armament industries and other branches of industry having almost an equal share. Assignments against institutes of scientific research were also continuously issued. The agents of eastern intelligence services in 1963 also reoeived assignments to furnish public opinion reports and the view. expressed b y West German residents with regard to oertain politieal events or current political questions. Through this type of espionage, the Soviet Bloc continued to pursue the aim of procuring in an intelligence manner, documents and materiel for infiltration, subversion, as well as for agitetion and propaganda against the Federal Republic. During the year under review, one case was recorded in which an agent group was engaged in sabotage preparations upon instructions of a Soviet Bloc intelligence service. The agents as a rule had the assignment to select concealment possibili- ties for weapons, explosivea and food, and to detect sensitive points for destruction in important plants, whereby the entire manufacture could be paralysed.