MARYLAND HISTORICAL MAGAZINE VOL. XIV. DECEMBEE, 1919. No. 4. ROBERT SMITH AND THE NAVY GEORGE E. DAVIES ROBERT SMITH, born, Lancaster, Pa., 1757; died, Baltimore, Md., November 26, 1842; Secretary of tbe Navy, July 9, 1801, to April 1, 1809. Appointed Attorney-General Marcb 3, 1805, to August 7, 1805, but continued to act as Secretary of tbe Navy. Secretary of State from March 6, 1809, to Marcb, 25, 1811. Mucb bas been written of Jobn Barry, Paul Jones, and Edward Preble; tbese are our Naval heroes. Mucb less bas been written of the men who made it possible for these Captains to win their victories. Every naval victory is based upon preparation in men and ships; in money and supplies; in Navy Yards and guns. In this preparatory work in our early Navy, Robert Smith is prominent. He was tbe second Secretary of tbe Navy and it was under his direction that we waged one war and prepared for a second. In 1801, Thomas Jefferson was elected the third President of tbe United States, and a new party came into power. It has often been said that this party, the Republican, found its greatest strength among tbe land-owning gentry of Virginia. But there was also a commercial element in this new party 305 306 MARYLAND HISTOEICAL MAGAZINE. whicli demanded representation in the party councils. Balti- more and Philadelphia at this time ranked third and fourth in the size of their commerce, and each of them had returned Elepublicans to the Seventh Congress; so it was natural that Jefferson should offer the position of Secretary of the JSTavy to the acknowledged leader of the Maryland Democracy, Samuel Smith.' There were personal as well as political reasons for this offer. Samuel Smith was one of the largest ship owners on the Atlantic Coast. The " Peggy," the " Sally," and the " Unicom " 1 bore their owner's flag to Leghorn, London, and Cadiz, and brought back news and numerous casks of wine, both of which Samuel Smith shared with his friend, the new President. Judged by the standard of that time, Samuel Smith was well qualified to fill the post offered him, but he chose to decline the offer, stating that his duty " to his constituents and to his private affairs " made this necessary.2 Instead, he suggested the name of John Mason, or " if no merchant would accept—a gentleman from some other profession," evidently having in mind his brother Robert. A few days later he suggested the curious arrange^ ment that was finally adopted.3 Henry Dearborn, the Secretary of War, was appointed acting Secretary of the Navy, but did none of the work. Samuel Smith, without any appointment whatever, and without salary,' acted as Secretary of the Navy. Meanwhile, the place was offered to two Philadelphia gentle- men, and on their refusal, to Robert Smith.4 It was this delay in filling the place that enabled Henry Adams, the historian of this period, to say that Robert Smith was " an amiable and respectable person, but not of much weight, except through his connections by blood or marriage." 5 These are hardly fair words to apply to a man of forty-four, 1 Baltimore Customs " Kegistry," 1800-1809. 1 J. MSS., Mar. 17, 1801, s. 2, v. 76, No. 66. » J. MSS.. Mar. 20, 1801, s. 2, v. 76, No. 76. 4 J. MSS. Mar. 24, 1801, s. 1, v. 8, No. 79; also Mar. 26, Mass. State Hist. Soe., J. MSS., v. 1, s. 7, p. 97. "Adams: Gallatin: 277. EOBEET SMITH AND THE NAVY. 307 who had acquired the largest admiralty practice of his time,6 who had been offered the position of Judge of the Supreme Court of Maryland, and who had had ten years' experience in the Maryland Assembly. Perhaps Robert Smith's best qualifi- cation for his new office lay, as Jefferson phrased it, " not in his reading of Coke-Littleton—but in the fact, that from his infancy he must have been so familiarized with naval things, that he would be perfectly competent to select proper agents and to judge of their conduct." 7 Jefferson's expectations seem to have been fulfilled, for Goldsborough says of him, " he was particu- larly happy in discovering the merits of the most promising young officers, and in bringing forward our Deeaturs, Sommers, Lawrences, Trippes, and Perxys." 8 When the Republicans took office, they found that they were not as free to carry out their naval plans as they had fancied. Our Navy, at the close of the war with France, consisted of thirteen frigates and seventeen smaller vessels. By the law of 1800, Congress authorized the sale of all but six of the frigates, and Benjamin Stoddert, the Federalist Secretary of the Navy, had by April 1st fulfilled this provision of the law, receiving for the twenty-five ships sold some $275,000. Thus the policy, which naval writers have often attributed to Jefferson, was in reality the policy of the Federal party. This reduction of the Navy, considered at the time a great mistake, was in reality a wise move; for the vessels sold were mainly converted merchant- men which were not strong enough to bear the long 24-pound cannon and carronades which were just then coming into use.9 One important question that confronted the new Government was: the disposal of the small remnant of a Navy that was left. Under the law, only three frigates might be retained in active service. To what point, then, should they be sent ? Gallatin's answer to this question was typical of the man. He believed • Bait. Dist. Ct. Reds. 1799-1800. ' J. MSS. s. 1, v. 8, No. 140a, July 9, 1801. »Naval Chron. 212. •J. MSS.JS. 3, v. 1, No. 120. 308 MAETLAND HISTOEICAL MAGAZINE. that the most pressing need of the Government was the payment of its debts. A government, he argued, should be run like a private business and should have no debts. A Navy was a use- less luxury. " Spain," he said, " had a Navy, but no commerce; while Holland, without a Navy, had large commercial interest.10 On the other hand, Robert Smith declared again and again that our best policy lay in maintaining a large naval force. " Such a nation as Spain would not have dared to have committed such aggressions against our rights had she not been under the impres- sion that we were utterly unprepared for war." 11 At another time he writes: " Peace will only come with fear, and that can only be excited by a respectable squadron. I am inclined to believe that nothing but a formidable squadron will prevent all the Barbary powers from making war against us. A feeble force will subject us to the suspicion of purchasing a peace." 12 Jefferson maintained an attitude of neutrality on this subject. Though he had pledged that the Navy should not be further reduced, he liked to humor G-allatin's economical foibles. On the other hand, he allowed Smith to carry on his plans prac- tically without a check. The result of this division in the Cabinet was unfortunate: Smiths' recommendations for supplies were usually cut down by half; and, when he persisted in carrying out his plans, we see the unhappy Secretary of the Treasury, bitterly complaining that he had no means of raising the money. The Government actually waged a foreign war at a distance of 3,000 miles from home on an appropriation that was meant to cover only the maintenance of three frigates upon our own coast. The figures for a single year will illustrate how badly this financial game of cross purposes worked: in 1803, Congress appropriated $114,000.00 for oak timber for new frigates; $174,000.00 was spent; for gunboats, there was a deficit of $46,000.00. There was a total deficit of $306,000.00 in an expenditure of $1,215,000.00, or about one-fourth of the "Adams: Gallatin: 157. " J. MSS., s. 3, v. 2, No. 54. Sept. 9, 1805. a J. MSS., s. 3, v. 1, No. 38. Sept. 4, 1802. EOBEET SMITH AND THE NAVY. 309 total. These figures may be taken to show either bad manage- ment on the part of the Treasury or of the Navy, according to the sympathies of the writer, but in either case, they show bad team work in the Government.13 To return to our question—the disposal of our fleet—it was finally decided to send the squadron to the Mediterranean, At that time we sent about 100 ships a year to Italy and to Smyrna.14 To protect them we paid the Barbary powers about $100,000.00 a year. To Algeria we paid an annuity of $21,000.00. Biennially, we paid $17,000.00 and, besides all this, there were lesser fees of $5,000.00. As General Smith explained in a letter to Commodore Truxton: " The object of the expedi- tion was instruction to our young officers—and because it was conceived that a squadron cruising in sight of the Barbary powers would have a tendency to prevent them seizing on our commerce whenever passion or a desire of plunder might incite them thereto." 15 On May 20th, the final instructions were sent to Commodore Dale, who commanded this, the first squadron ever -sent out to a foreign station: " It is the positive command of the President"—the words are significant of the spirit of independence which was to animate our new Navy—" that on no pretence whatever are you to permit the armed vessels under your command to he detained or searched, nor any of the officers or men belonging to her to be taken from her, by the ships of any foreign power." 18 In addition, Dale was to cruise along the Barbary Coast, returning in December if no one of the powers had up to that time declared war upon us.17 It is not the purpose of this paper to follow out the course of the war that followed with Algiers and Tripoli.