North Atlantic Press Gangs: and Naval-Civilian Relations in and , 1749-1815

by

Keith Mercer

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

at

Dalhousie University Halifax, Nova Scotia August 2008

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iv Table of Contents

Abstract ix

List of Abbreviations and Symbols Used x

Acknowledgements xi

Chapter 1: Introduction 1

Occupational Hazards 1

Impressment in Historical Context 5

The Press Gang and its Historians 10

Methodology and Sources 19

Structure of the Dissertation 21

Notes 31

Chapter 2: Yankee Roots: Planters, Press Gangs and the in Nova Scotia, 1749-1789 37

Introduction 37

Yankee Roots 43

Louisbourg and its Aftermath 49

Planters and Press Gangs 55

Sailors and Inhabitants 65

HMS Senegal in Liverpool 71

Colonial Resistance to Impressment 76

Privateers and Protections 85 Desertion and Pardons 89

The Peacetime Navy 94

Conclusion 96

Notes 98

Chapter 3: Taming the Press Gang: Impressment and Naval-Civilian Discord in Nova Scotia,

1790-1815 114

Introduction 114

The Ordeal of Richard Hughes 120

Forging Impressment Policy 126

The Press Gang Riot of 1805 140

HMS Whiting on the South Shore 150

Pandemonium in Pictou 159

Naval-Civilian Discord in Halifax 166

Plain Truth 179

Conclusion 189

Notes 191

Chapter 4: Nursery for Seamen?

The Origins of Naval Recruitment in Newfoundland, c.1749-1783 209

Introduction 209

Early Recruitment and the Sixth of Anne 214

Volunteers and the Poor 223

Enter the Press Gang 230

vi Pressing Concerns 241

Conclusion 244

Notes 247

Chapter 5: Customs and Coercion: Press Gangs, Guard Boats and the Civil Power in Newfoundland, 1793-1815 257

Introduction 257

Decline of Migratory Fishery 262

The Tragedy of 1794 269

The Parameters of Impressment 275

The St. John's Guard Boats 283

Resistance on the Water: HMS Camilla in 1806 289

Desertion and Punishment 298

The Civil Power 307

The 313

Conclusion 320

Notes 323

Chapter 6: Conclusion 337

Appendix 1: The Sixth of Anne 344

Appendix 2: Lieutenant-Governor Richard Hughes's Proclamation against Press Gangs 345

Appendix 3: Advertisement for Revenge 346

vii Appendix 4: Rendezvous Expenses for HMS Adamant, Halifax, 19-26 July 1790 347

Appendix 5: Press Warrant issued to Rupert George, Captain of HMS Hussar 350

Appendix 6: Press Warrants in Nova Scotia, 1793-1815 351

Appendix 7: Admiralty Instructions to John Whipple, 1795 352

Appendix 8: Excerpts from Isaac Lester's Diary at Poole,

Crisis, 1770 359

Appendix 9: Palliser's Act and Impressment 360

Appendix 10: Men Demanded from Counties and Ports in the Quota Acts of 1795 361

Appendix 11: Estimate of the Percentage of Naval Recruits Pressed in

Newfoundland, 1793-1815 362

Appendix 12: Naval Recruitment at Newfoundland, 1793-1815 363

Appendix 13: Joseph Cain's Protection from Impressment 364

Appendix 14: Port Orders of St. John's, c. 1807 365

Appendix 15: Account of Lionel Chancey: Clerk of the Peace, St. John's, 1809-10 367

Appendix 16: A Closer Look at the Boats of the 368 Bibliography 369

viii Abstract

Press gangs were detested throughout the North Atlantic world. For any seafarer, fisherman or maritime labourer, impressment was both a constant annoyance and an occupational hazard. It disrupted thousands of families and handicapped maritime trade. Although the British Navy had squadrons in Halifax and St. John's in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, this is the first study of press gangs in Atlantic Canada. It traces the origins of impressment in Nova Scotia and Newfoundland in the wider Atlantic world from 1749 to 1815. The New planters brought a shared history of resistance to impressment to Nova Scotia in the late and . Local authorities used these Yankee roots to battle press gangs during the American Revolution and to seize control of impressment during the . They won this battle so decisively that by the War of 1812 the Navy could no longer man its ships in Nova Scotia, and naval-civilian discord spilled out onto the streets of Halifax. Impressment in Newfoundland, by contrast, was shaped by events in the British Isles. The Newfoundland fishery was a nursery for seamen - a training ground for the Navy - but for most of the eighteenth century naval recruitment occurred in the English West Country and Ireland, not in Newfoundland. After statutory restrictions against impressment on the island were lifted in 1775, and impressment ravaged the labour market in the British Isles in the and , the Navy turned to Newfoundland as an alternative source of manpower. Thousands of men entered the fleet there during the Napoleonic Wars. Naval guard boats in St. John's harbour were the engine of impressment in Newfoundland, but naval officers also received recruits from a cooperative civil power. While impressment was a common feature of maritime life in the North Atlantic world, this thesis maintains that it had divergent origins and histories in Nova Scotia and Newfoundland.

IX List of Abbreviations and Symbols Used

ADM Admiralty Records CHA Canadian Historical Association CNS Centre for Newfoundland Studies CO Colonial Office Records DAL Dalhousie University D'Alberti D' Alberti Transcripts DCB Dictionary of Canadian Biography DRO Dorchester Record Office, Poole ENL Encyclopedia of Newfoundland and Labrador GN Government Record HMS His Majesty's Ship MHA Archive, St. John's MG Manuscript Group Record MUN Memorial University of Newfoundland and Labrador NMM , Naval Docs Naval Documents of the American Revolution NSARM Nova Scotia Archives and Records Management, Halifax ODNB Oxford Dictionary of National Biography PANL Provincial Archives of Newfoundland and Labrador, St. John's TNA The National Archives, London uss Ship UTP University of Press

X Acknowledgements

This has been a long voyage, with many squalls and calms along the way. I take pleasure in thanking the people and institutions that helped me reach my final destination. I would like to single out the Department of History at Dalhousie University. It not only supplied me with funding and office space, but also supported my scholarship and career development at every turn. The office staff - especially Tina Jones, Mary Wyman and Valerie Peck - provided this often bewildered graduate student with sound advice and good cheer. On the academic side, Dr. Shirley Tillotson guided me through the contours of modern Canadian history and wrote more reference letters for me than I care to count. Similarly, Dr. Krista Kesselring and Dr. David Sutherland supervised me in key reading fields. Other faculty made Dalhousie a welcoming place to learn the ropes of the historical profession.

Several organizations generously provided me with financial assistance, without which this project would not have been possible. They include the Office of the Dean of Arts and the Institute of Social and Economic Research at Memorial University, the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, the Department of History and Faculty of Graduate Studies at Dalhousie University, and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. I am very grateful for this support. I am also encouraged by the continuing support of the federal government in graduate studies in Canada, especially in the arts and social sciences.

Many of the ideas in my thesis were developed at conferences and public lectures. The feedback that I received at these places made this a better dissertation. They include the Dalhousie Graduate History Conference, the Canadian Historical Association, the Military History Symposium at the Royal Military College, the Graduate-Faculty Colloquium of the Department of History at Dalhousie, the Atlantic Canada Studies Conference, the University of Maine and University of International Graduate Student Conference, the Royal Nova Scotia Historical Society, the Canadian Association for Irish Studies, the Northeastern Conference on British Studies, and the Newfoundland Historical Society. I would also like to thank the organizations that provided travel grants for these conferences. In addition, several parts of this thesis were published in Newfoundland and Labrador Studies and the Journal of the Royal Nova Scotia Historical Society. I thank those journals and their editors for permission to reproduce that material here.

No graduate student reaches this point on their own. They have all received advice from professors, archivists and librarians, and shared their research with scholars and fellow students. I would like to single out those who swapped materials with me over the past few years, and who patiently answered my questions. They include Denver Brunsman, J.M. Bumsted, Brian Cuthbertson, Gordon Handcock, Jim Hiller, Martin Hubley, Isaac Land, Elizabeth Mancke, John Mannion, Jim Phillips, Nicholas Rogers, David Sutherland, Danny Vickers and George Young. I am also grateful to the staffs of the following institutions: Special Collections and Document Delivery in the Dalhousie

xi Killam Library, Nova Scotia Archives and Records Management, the Maritime History Archive and Centre for Newfoundland Studies at Memorial University, the Provincial Archives of Newfoundland and Labrador, Library Archives Canada, and The National Archives of the .

I would also like to thank my defence committee. Jack Crowley and John Reid provided me with valuable insights at different stages of the writing process, which made this a tighter dissertation. And more than the departmental representative, Claire Campbell has been a constant source of wisdom and humour over the past couple of years. I am especially grateful to Margaret Conrad of the University of New Brunswick for serving as my external examiner. She asked pertinent questions during the defence and suggested several ways to broaden the thesis for publication and future projects. Finally, and most importantly, I am indebted to Jerry Bannister as my supervisor for the past five years. I followed him to Dalhousie and was his first doctoral student. The supervisor-student relationship is the most important aspect of graduate studies, and I am glad that Jerry was there for all of my ups and downs. He guided my career orientation, pushed me academically, encouraged me to think broadly and conceptually about my research, and was always available to lend an ear and allow me to speak my mind - be it about work, bureaucracy or personal matters. For this I will always be grateful. One could not ask for a better supervisor.

A doctoral programme is something like an academic marathon - it is not necessarily the smartest students who reach the finish line, but rather those who gut it out at a steady pace. Even these people, however, rely heavily on friends and family to help them along the way. Bob Harding and Lilynn Wan have become far more to me than fellow doctoral students and officemates - they are friends for life. I honestly do not think that I would have finished the dissertation without them, and my time in Halifax would certainly have been less interesting. I will miss our infamous gatherings and leisurely chats around the garbage can - our intellectual hearth. They are also my teammates on the departmental softball team, which it has been my pleasure to captain for the past four years. Many thanks to the entire team. I would also like to thank other graduate students for their friendship and support, including Blake Brown, Emily Burton, Dave Eaton, Thane Ehler, Jeffers Lennox, Roger Marsters, Phil Rentsch, Katie Robins, Andrea Shannon and Amani Whitfield. Some have moved on to other things, but I wish all of them the best of luck in their future endeavours. I also thank Amy Lawton. You were only here for the final stages of this project, but your unwavering support means a great deal to me. We have only good things to look forward to. Finally, I would like to acknowledge my family. Perhaps my brother and sister - Derek and Wendy - wondered many times when my schooling was finally going to come to an end, but they were always there for me and steadfastly supported my career choice. I dedicate this dissertation to my parents. I know they are proud of me, but I doubt they realize how much I am proud of them as well. Put simply, I would not have gotten here without you. You wisely taught me the value of hard work and education, and it was these two things that made me into the person I am today. Thanks so much.

xii Chapter 1 Introduction

There are few aspects of eighteenth-century history which have aroused more passion and less accuracy than the press gang. N.A.M. Rodger, The Wooden World (1986)1

Occupational Hazards

Simeon Perkins was a pioneer. He rode the wave of planters to

Nova Scotia in the 1760s, where he established a northern branch for his family's business interests in Liverpool. He remained there for the next fifty years. An enterprising merchant, Perkins traded fish and lumber throughout the British Atlantic world, including coastal Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and , the American colonies, Newfoundland, Europe and the . Among other things, he operated a sawmill, invested in ship-building, and owned a small fleet of seagoing vessels. In wartime Perkins joined other Liverpool merchants in fitting out to capture enemy shipping. He tried to remain neutral during the American Revolutionary War, but

Perkins changed his mind when Yankee privateers attacked Liverpool and forced him and other residents to defend the town. Perkins was a pillar in the community. At one time or another, he served as a magistrate, judge, town clerk, county treasurer, commissioner of roads, deputy-register of the vice-admiralty court, lieutenant-colonel of the Queens

County militia, and member of the House of Assembly. He is commemorated by the

Nova Scotia government to this day: for example, his house is a historic site and the holiday 'Privateer Days' is framed around his private war at sea. This famed diarist lived a long and eventful life. He probably thought he had seen everything there was to see in

Liverpool.2

1 That all changed on a summer day in 1805. Captain James Gorham sailed into

Liverpool with a unique passenger, a Quebec farmer who was touring the Atlantic region with his learned pig. Magistrates allowed him to exhibit the animal between four and eight in the evening, for seven and a halfpence a head. Perkins was invited to take in the show, and the next day he escorted his wife, daughter, and some friends to visit the famous swine, and was astonished by its talents: "His performances are beyond my

Comprehension. I think the Owner has bestowed great Labour and pains on the pig. If it was a Horse or a dog it would not appear So Strange, but a hog I think the most unlikely

Animal to make a Scholar." Perkins did not specify what these talents were, but if they were similar to other learned pigs in this period, it could spell, count, and tell the audience what year it was. Overshadowed in this excitement was the Navy's intense recruitment drive in Nova Scotia, which created such anxiety in the maritime population that Perkins noted in his diary the day before that Captain William Allen refused to sail

"for fear of the Press."4 Seafarers encountered press gangs throughout the North Atlantic world. They were occupational hazards, not only in major seaports such as Halifax and

St. John's, but also a wide range of fishing havens and maritime communities. Liverpool may have been on the fringes of the British Empire, but it was well within reach of the

Royal Navy. As Perkins hinted in his diary, press gangs were far more common in

Liverpool than learned pigs. The aging magistrate could now rest assured that he had seen everything there was to see in Liverpool.5

The farmer and his pig moved on to St. John's, Newfoundland, in the fall, where it was exhibited for the "amusement of the Public" in a "quiet and orderly manner" before heading home to Quebec.6 These were extraordinary events in the eighteenth and

2 early nineteenth centuries, especially in the Atlantic region. Perkins's excitement about

the pig contrasts sharply with his low-key reference to impressment in his diary. Seeing a

learned pig was a once in a lifetime experience, but press gangs were a constant source of

anxiety on the south shore. Warships terrified Liverpool's population by anchoring in the

harbour and pressing its residents, as HMS Senegal did in 1776.7 Indeed, Perkins's diary

is littered with references to sailors who had been pressed into the Navy. Some of them,

such as David Collins in 1797, died in the service and left behind grieving parents,

spouses, and children to struggle with household economies. Liverpool's economy

depended on privateers from 1793 to 1805, but they too were harassed by the Navy.

James Freeman complained to the Nova Scotia government in 1800 about

on the high seas and in the West Indies. Privateers such as the Duke of and Charles

Mary Wentworth had had many of their "best sailors" conscripted recently. Others

refused to go to sea unless they were protected from the Navy, and generally

impressment wreaked havoc on Liverpool's economy.9 The Navy continued to take men

from privateers, such as the Liverpool Packet during the War of 1812.10 In the end, well

over 200 Liverpool natives were pressed into the British fleet during the eighteenth and

early nineteenth centuries, and approximately 100 of them died in the Navy or were

absent for extended periods of time.11 Impressment was an occupational hazard in Nova

Scotia and throughout the North Atlantic world. It had a far greater impact on places like

Liverpool than did the fleeting talents of a learned pig.

This dissertation explores press gangs and naval-civilian relations in Nova Scotia

and Newfoundland. It focuses on the period between the founding of Halifax in 1749 and

the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815. It starts with and the sailors of

3 Liverpool because their fear of impressment allows me to highlight a major hole in

Canadian historiography. Although the Navy had squadrons in Halifax and St. John's, historians have ignored press gangs. In a recent survey of the literature, Julian Gwyn

stated that the "early naval 's east coast is rich in resources, but if not

actually neglected, it is rarely studied." Even more troubling, naval-civilian relations

were absent from his survey and not a single essay has been published on press gangs in

Atlantic Canada. This is regrettable because impressment is one issue that bridges the gap

between military and social history. Canadian historians have perpetuated a false

dichotomy in this regard: military topics are usually partitioned into a separate field, and

leading practitioners of that field, such as Desmond Morton and Marc Milner, tend to

ignore social relations. Naval historians are also to blame: they continue to be fixated

on topics such as warfare and fleet tactics, admirals and privateering, and the defence of

maritime commerce. Gwyn has spent much of his career writing about the Royal Navy in

Nova Scotia, but his version of the Navy rarely comes ashore. It is at precisely that point

that this dissertation begins.14

This project uses impressment as a window onto naval-civilian relations in Nova

Scotia and Newfoundland. This issue strikes at the heart of Atlantic Canadian history.

The Newfoundland fishery was revered as a 'nursery of seamen' for the Navy, while

Nova Scotia was deliberately organized as an imperial outpost to be dominated by the

British military. This dissertation argues that Canadian historians need to write the Navy

back into their colonial stories, while naval historians need to realize that the Navy was

involved in more than imperial warfare. Textbooks continue to privilege soldiers and

army battles in Canadian history at the expense of navies and the sea, even during the

4 Seven Years War and War of 1812.15 This study calls for a broader, more integrative framework, which examines how civilians and colonial governments lived with and responded to British military agencies. It blends social and naval history together to reconstruct the dynamics of maritime life in the Atlantic region. It does not single out sporadic and violent confrontations, but starts with the premise that the Navy was stitched into the fabric of colonial life in Nova Scotia and Newfoundland in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. While impressment sparked confrontations between the Navy, colonial officials, merchants and sailors, it also revealed a significant amount of naval- civilian cooperation. Much as Simeon Perkins and Liverpool's sailors viewed impressment as an occupational hazard in 1805, this thesis suggests that it would be an occupational hazard for historians to keep ignoring press gangs in Nova Scotia and

Newfoundland. It attempts to retrieve impressment from the fringes of Atlantic Canadian history and place it firmly within the colonial story.

Impressment in Historical Context

Impressment was employed in England as far back as the Middle Ages. The

'Cinque Ports' of the used it to provide ships and men for national security in the twelfth century, and by the Elizabethan era it was the common method of manning state warships. However, until the turn of the eighteenth century the Royal Navy was a seasonal institution, and sailors were conscripted for summer cruises and then released in the fall. Impressment was a haphazard affair: warships sent press gangs into

London and major seaports to recruit men, without supervision from a government department. There were many irregularities and impressment was detested by all parties

5 involved, from the common sailor to the Lords of the Admiralty. It was particularly embarrassing for a country that prided itself on the rule of law and the liberty of freeborn

Englishmen. Several alternatives to impressment were proposed during the 1690s and early eighteenth century, such as a registry of seamen based on the French model, but they were rejected. The Impress Service, a department of the Admiralty, increasingly regulated press gangs on shore in the eighteenth century. Confined to London and its environs in the , the Impress Service expanded into almost every major town in the

United Kingdom during the French and Napoleonic Wars. Warships also sent press gangs ashore on their own accord and raided sailors from vessels on the high seas. In the end, the 'evil necessity,' as impressment became known, was pivotal to the establishment of

British naval supremacy in the eighteenth century. Although the need for impressment was eroded by the introduction of continuous service in 1853, which allowed sailors to have regular careers in the Navy, the British government did not formally abolish it. Had

Britain fought a large maritime war in the nineteenth century, it is possible that the press gang would have reappeared.16

Although less common, press gangs also helped man British armies until the

American Revolution. For example, Oliver Cromwell's 'New Model Army' was manned largely by impressment in the 1640s, and both sides in the English Civil War pressed horses and supplies. Impressment gave way to conscription in the twentieth century; the

British government 'drafted' men during the two world wars rather than compel them to serve by force. In 1914, Great Britain was the only major power in the war that relied exclusively on volunteers to man its army. However, despite 2.5 million volunteers having come forward by 1916, heavy casualties and the growing demand for manpower

6 led the government to institute conscription in that year. Legislation originally targeted

single men, but married men became fair game shortly thereafter. Conscription was the

subject of much political debate in the British Isles: pro-conscriptionists maintained that

without it there was little hope of defeating Germany, while anti-conscriptionists argued that it deprived industry of labour and undercut the war effort on the home front. By the

end of the war, nearly 2.3 million Britons had been conscripted into the armed forces, and without it, the Army would almost certainly have collapsed long before the armistice in

1918. When Britain again went to war against Germany in 1939, debate over conscription was muted and the draft was quickly introduced. British authorities attempted to balance

the country's economic and military needs regarding conscription, but even women were

drafted into the armed services from 1941. Conscription legislation remained in effect in

Britain until 1962.18 Although impressment, conscription, and other forms of forced

military service were common throughout world history, for instance in imperial Brazil in

the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, they played a particularly important role in

Canada and the United States.19

Forced military service in Canada has a long history. It both preceded and

succeeded British naval impressment in Newfoundland and Nova Scotia in the eighteenth

and early nineteenth centuries. As Desmond Morton has noted, the regime in New required all male residents to defend the colony, and while it was largely theoretical by the mid-nineteenth century, militia laws in British North American colonies continued this obligation.20 British provincials volunteered for both sides during the American Civil

War, while others, who had the misfortune to be in the United States at the time, were

forced into the Union and Confederate armies. Conscription also played a role in

7 Canadian politics. Anti-Confederates won the 1869 election in Newfoundland partly by fear mongering, with threats such as joining the new dominion would make

Newfoundlanders subject to Canadian taxes and conscription.22 Conscription affected

Canada in unexpected ways as well: for example, thousands of immigrants fled

conscription in Tsarist and Habsburg conflicts in the 1890s and early twentieth century to help people the Canadian West.23 Generally, however, conscription in Canada is

associated with the two world wars. In both 1917 and 1944 the federal government

invoked legislation to force Canadians to fight in Europe. While these decisions came late

in each war, and had minimal impact on military operations, they were politically

explosive and divided the country along ethnic and regional lines. Most Quebecers were vigorously opposed to conscription and voted against it in plebiscites and elections. This remained a galvanizing issue in Canadian politics and French-English relations in the postwar era. Many other groups in Canada opposed conscription. Western farmers were the most prominent, but dissent came from labour unions and pacifists to fishermen and

Acadians. While Canada adopted a peace-keeping role in the world after 1945, arid

conscription became a non-issue, that was not the case in the United States, where it remains a topic in current affairs.24

The United States has had a tense relationship with forced military service. As

Chapter 2 will show, impressment occurred in Boston in the 1690s and sparked popular protests and imperial-colonial discord throughout the eighteenth century. Although rarely

discussed, American warships occasionally conscripted sailors during the American

Revolution, as did the Continental Army. The latter lived off the land and routinely pressed food, horses, and supplies from Loyalists and non-combatants alike.25

8 Independence did not put a stop to America's disagreements with Great Britain over impressment. The Royal Navy pressed thousands of American sailors during the French and Napoleonic Wars, and this led to serious deterioration in Anglo-American relations.

High-profile cases such as the Havana incident in 1798 and the Chesapeake-Leopard affair in 1807 exacerbated the situation. Not only was impressment one of the main causes of the War of 1812, but it continued to be a stumbling block in diplomatic relations between the two countries well into the nineteenth century.26 Domestic conscription first occurred in America during the civil war, when both armies used it to bolster their ranks. There was resentment over exemptions from service, especially in

New York City in 1863, where rioting lasted for four days, until federal troops restored order. The US Army drafted more than twelve million men to fight in the two world wars in the twentieth century. The American government enacted conscription legislation in

1917 and 1940; only those draftees with family hardships or disabilities, and conscientious objectors, were exempted from service. America's military commitments during the Cold War ensured that conscription continued in force after 1945. Draft legislation was also invoked during the Vietnam War, but its educational deferments and social inequality combined with the unpopularity of the war to spark widespread demonstrations across the country in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The draft remains a relevant and controversial issue south of the border. News organizations such as CNN discuss the possibility of a draft in light of America's growing imperial and military operations around the world. As the forerunner of conscription, impressment is thus one topic that links the past with the present.27

9 The Press Gang and its Historians

For nearly a century, J.R. Hutchinson's The Press-Gang (1913) has stood alone as the only book-length study of impressment in Great Britain. Until the 1960s, students were forced to confront Hutchinson's out-dated interpretation of the Navy and his erroneous conclusions about its manning system. Hutchinson's analysis is static: he did not consider change over time, nor the geographic expansion of impressment into the

Atlantic world in the eighteenth century. Although Hutchinson did not discuss colonies such as Nova Scotia and Newfoundland, this thesis argues that impressment played a significant role in those maritime societies. Hutchinson stated that the Navy was corrupt, arbitrary, and cruel. Press gangs were armed to the teeth, manned by local toughs and brutal ex-Navy officers, and took pleasure in depriving Britons of their liberty. A gang member who spat in a pressed man's face was apparently "characteristic of the service," while the Navy welcomed riff-raff, freaks and criminals of all kinds, regardless of their health or seafaring skills. However, historians now agree that it was not technological superiority but advanced seamanship and gunnery that led to British naval supremacy in the eighteenth century - quite an accomplishment for "sewage" and "human refuse," as

Hutchinson described the lower deck. In a political statement, Hutchinson declared that

"A people who for a hundred years patiently endured conscription in its most cruel form will never again suffer it to be lightly inflicted upon them." Shortly after his book was published, the First ignited the powers of Europe and British authorities again implemented conscription.28

Reflecting the rise of social history in the 1960s, Michael Lewis, Daniel Baugh,

Christopher Lloyd, Peter Kemp and a new generation of historians began to investigate

10 the social history of the Navy. Baugh led the way on naval administration, which inspired countless students to investigate fresh topics. These included life at sea, living conditions and diet, wages and work regimen, manning and desertion, and crime and punishment. While his treatment of impressment was outdated, especially in its emphasis on the injustices of the manning system, Baugh noted that much of the folklore surrounding press gangs overemphasized its brutality: in his words, "the view we have is that of the victim, and not the captor." Lloyd framed his entire discussion of the lower deck in the long eighteenth century around the manning problem. He concedes that impressment was often cruel and arbitrary, but with no alternative it remained essential to

state security. Moreover, the brutality of press gangs was "exaggerated by politicians, pamphleteers and novelists alike." For his part, Dudley Pope attacks those historians who judge impressment by modern-day standards. He emphasizes that only a small proportion of the British population ever served in the Army or Navy, whereas conscription during the Second World War "swept up every able-bodied man unless he could prove his civilian job was 'essential war work'."30 In a more traditional vein, Brian Lavery compares press gangs to the game laws made infamous by E.P. Thompson's Whigs and

Hunters (1975): both illustrate the "draconian powers of the state." Lavery downplays the number of volunteers in the Navy and dismisses patriotism as a significant pull factor during the Napoleonic Wars.

This dissertation has benefited from all of these works, but naval revisionism reached its apex with the publication of N.A.M. Rodger's The Wooden World in 1986.

This influential study rejects the traditional picture of the Navy as a "floating concentration camp." The historiographical consensus that "naval discipline was harsh

11 and oppressive, officers frequently cruel and tyrannical, ratings drawn from the dregs of society, ill-treated and starved," was so distant from what historians understood of life in

Britain in the eighteenth century that it contributed to the neglect of naval history. Rodger argues that British society afloat resembled British society ashore: after all, he points out, the "wooden world was built of the same materials as the wider world." Regarding impressment, over time it became better organized and generally was a "humdrum affair calling for little if any violence." Rodger dismantled many of the myths that Hutchinson and other writers perpetuated about the Navy. And while he has since backtracked and cautioned readers that his version of the Navy is rooted in the mid-eighteenth century and may not be applicable to the Napoleonic era, this thesis contends that his revisionism went too far. Press gangs were not indiscriminate posses that beat men over the heads and trampled on constitutional rights, as Hutchinson suggested, but they did encounter stiff resistance. Rather than a mundane part of maritime life, impressment commonly sparked protests and violence in the British Isles and colonies such as Nova Scotia and

Newfoundland, not only during the Napoleonic Wars, but throughout the long eighteenth century. This thesis also challenges Rodger's assertion that colonies were peripheral to the Navy's goal of Atlantic hegemony.32

Unfortunately, maritime historians such as Ralph Davis, Daniel Vickers, and

Peter Earle have largely skipped over press gangs. This implies that impressment played a minor role in the lives of merchant sailors, which is not the picture painted in this dissertation.33 For example, Davis's classic monograph pays little attention to wartime, and when it does the focus is on shipping losses, wages, freight and insurance rates, tonnage levels, and the convoy system. Similarly, Vickers's focus on the small New ,

12 England port of Salem suggests that sailors were safe from the 'evil necessity' as long as they stayed in local waters. However, there have been a number of important studies on impressment in maritime history. In his article on the British market for seafarers in wartime, David Starkey investigates how the state maximized manpower from its various maritime sectors. It balanced the needs of commerce and war by using impressment to man warships and issuing protections to particular trades and classes of seafarers. Starkey argues that war itself was Britain's most productive nursery for seamen, because thousands of landsmen were turned into sailors by the end of each conflict.34 This type of analysis resonates in Newfoundland in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries: this thesis shows that as the migratory fishery declined in the 1790s, particularly in the

West Country, resident fishermen and green hands were increasingly targeted by press gangs in Newfoundland. There are also studies of impressment in local contexts:

Jonathan Press shows that the weak naval presence around Bristol was an insulator from wartime hazards, Tony Barrow describes the volatility of Greenland whaling crews, and

Norman McCord charts the expansion of the Impress Service into northeast England during the Napoleonic era.

British social historians are just beginning to study press gangs. In the 1950s,

John A. Woods chronicled how London reformers, many from the anti-slavery movement or disciples of John Wilkes, unsuccessfully challenged the constitutionality of impressment during the American Revolutionary War.36 More recently, Nicholas Rogers has examined resistance to impressment as a form of collective action. He follows this resistance into the courts, where seamen and merchants openly challenged over-zealous press masters. For Rogers, impressment not only contravened every citizen's birthright as

13 a freeborn Englishman, but it compromised his health and welfare as well. He points to the triangular nature of crowd protests, in this case involving the state, the shipping industry, and seamen. He criticizes E.P. Thompson and other historians who downplay the role of middlemen in the patrician-plebeian dichotomy. Rogers places resistance to impressment in the larger context of British popular protest in the eighteenth century. It was not a "humdrum affair," as N.A.M. Rodger has suggested. Rogers insists that sailors, crowds, merchants, municipal officials and other groups regularly protested against impressment in the British Isles.37 Resistance was not confined to the Georgian period.

For example, Cheryl Fury has shown that impressment circumscribed the economic and occupational freedom of Elizabethan seamen as well. Tudor mariners hated press gangs

•JO just as sailors did in Nelson's day.

There have been a number of advances in the legal, cultural, and imperial historiography of impressment. Peter King has examined the relationship between press gangs and prosecution rates in British courts. While legal scholars such as Douglas Hay have traditionally focused on military demobilization to chart the dramatic shifts in prosecution rates at the end of eighteenth-century conflicts, this does not account for crime levels in wartime. King argues that pre-trial enlistment was a common alternative to indictment and may have had a significant impact on recorded crimes.39 Similarly,

Philip Woodfine has demonstrated how sailors used the law of habeas corpus to protect themselves from impressment during the Napoleonic era.40 For his part, Daniel James

Ennis examines the portrayal of press gangs in contemporary British literature. Ennis traces the negative attitude towards impressment in the print industry and popular culture

- from novels and poetry to songs and the London stage.41 In a similar vein, Isaac Land

14 deals with the contradictions of impressment and liberty within the contexts of masculinity, culture, and empire in Georgian Britain.42 The historiography needs more creative studies of impressment and its opponents on the ground. For instance, a study comparable to Greg Dening's cultural analysis of theatre, authority, and etiquette on

British warships may help explain how press gangs were supposed to act in British and colonial contexts, and why they often encountered resistance.43

Impressment is a contentious issue in American history. While older works by

James F. Zimmerman and Dora Mae Clark dealt with imperial legislation and high politics, recent studies have focused on popular protest and the Navy's impact on the

American Revolution.44 Neil R. Stout argues that the Navy's manning needs in America were most acute in peacetime, between the Seven Years War and the Revolution, but concludes that impressment "did not become a great issue of the American Revolution."

Impressment protests were "minor affairs" compared to the Stamp Act riots and the

Boston Massacre.45 Since the late 1960s, however, the historiography on impressment in

America has been dominated by a Marxist critique of the Revolution. Jesse Lemisch fired off a series of trailblazing articles that re-interpreted the Revolution from the bottom up.

He argues that impressment riots spurred revolutionary sentiment in Boston and New

York and contributed to the American war. Seamen were at the forefront of this struggle.

Battles with press gangs connected the Stamp Acts riots and other grievances during the mid-eighteenth century with London's alienation of the American colonies in the 1760s and 1770s.46 Meanwhile, Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker contend that resistance to impressment was part of a larger working-class consciousness in the Atlantic world. This class consisted of seafarers, slaves, maritime labourers and portside populations, which

15 transcended national, racial, and ethnic boundaries. It used the sea to carry a revolutionary consciousness that linked ports and people throughout Europe, Africa,

North America, and the West Indies. The Knowles Riot in Boston in 1747 and the battles over impressment in America in the 1760s were integral to this culture of resistance.47

This builds upon Rediker's thesis that Anglo-American seafarers were the forerunners of an industrial proletariat. Resistance to impressment was part of a "spirit of rebellion" against commercial and imperial tyranny.

The Marxist paradigm has been contested on several fronts. For example, John

Lax and William Pencak take issue with Lemisch's assessment of the Knowles Riot in

1747. They do not agree that it was class-based, but emphasize its communal and cooperative characteristics. For Lemisch, town officials and seamen were necessarily in conflict, as were merchants and the poor. Lax and Pencak believe this is a false dichotomy, and feel that the Knowles Riot, "like previous Boston uprisings, demonstrated the will of the town as a whole, not of any particular element within it."49 Paul Gilje argued recently that colonial American seamen were not a proletariat, nor were they particularly patriotic. He distanced himself from both Lemisch and Rediker. There were many forms of "liberty" and "freedom," Gilje suggests, and those that mattered most to seafarers were usually "personal" and "individual." Sailors had a long history of involvement in popular disorders, but not every member of the waterfront participated in collective actions; and for those who did, their reasons were complicated and contradictory. Sailors joined impressment riots for patriotic reasons, for economic and libertarian reasons, and sometimes for the sheer joy of the fight. They were patriots as well as loyalists, and according to Gilje, many were both, as it suited their interests.

16 Gilje's portrait of American maritime culture does not fit neatly into the Marxist ideological box.50 Similarly, Nicholas Rogers discredits the notion of a many-headed in American- waters in the eighteenth century. Pirates and sailors did not do away with racial and class barriers.51 As Jeffrey Bolster has shown, Blacks were treated just as badly in merchant vessels as they were in British warships.52

Denver Brunsman recently completed a doctoral thesis on impressment in the

British-Atlantic world. This is the first study that links impressment in Britain to impressment in its American and West Indian colonies. He argues that press gangs were both an integrative and destructive force in the Atlantic world: "if press gangs helped to forge a common British Atlantic world, they also contributed to its ruin." Brunsman suggests that Britain paid a high price for its manning system. Impressment violated civil liberties, destabilized seaports, and mobilized entire colonies against the Navy. Press gangs also played a part in the broad changes that swept the Atlantic world during the

Age of Revolution. They inspired colonial resistance during the Revolution, drained wartime morale in the British Isles, and helped start the War of 1812. Brunsman concludes that impressment "left an extraordinary, if paradoxical, legacy by 1815." Press gangs allowed Britain to defeat and emerge as the dominant naval and imperial power of its time, but they also shattered the British-Atlantic empire that the Navy had helped build. Brunsman disagrees with Lemisch and other writers who "anticipate" the

American Revolution in early press gang riots. The intriguing question is not how press gangs advanced the revolutionary cause but why they failed to ignite the Revolution.

Brunsman believes that the answer rests with the Navy's precautions in the New World.

Impressment was infrequent, it usually conformed to colonial customs, and it did not take

17 place on land. The Navy was aware of the raucous potential of press gangs and took steps to minimize their impact on British colonies.

While Brunsman does a good job of contextualizing impressment in the British-

Atlantic world, he pays more attention to India than to Nova Scotia, and says very little about Newfoundland. This dissertation fills that gap in the literature. It also attempts to thrust the North Atlantic back into the historiography of the Atlantic world. The latter has become a dynamic field, especially since Bernard Bailyn established the international seminar on the history of the Atlantic world at Harvard University in 2001. While it has produced exciting work, there are several problems with Atlantic history in general and the Harvard school in particular: maritime history and the Atlantic Ocean are too often ignored, especially topics such as navies, shipping and seafaring; many 'Atlantic' studies are little more than refashioned British imperial and American colonial history, without an Atlantic orientation and wider or comparative frameworks; and while Stephen

Hornsby, Peter Pope and others have written about the North Atlantic recently, this region is neglected in the larger historiography.54 Although this dissertation is rooted firmly in Nova Scotia and Newfoundland, it shows that developments in the West Indies, the British Isles, and colonial America impacted naval-civilian relations in Atlantic

Canada. Moreover, it pays considerable attention to impressment in coastal waters and on the high seas, and argues that impressment was largely an aquatic exercise throughout the

North Atlantic world. This is the first major work on British naval impressment in Nova

Scotia and Newfoundland.

18 Methodology and Sources

This dissertation follows a narrative format that favours chronology over thematic analysis. Issues such as popular protest and naval desertion are discussed throughout the text rather than in separate chapters. E.H. Carr stated that "History is concerned with the relation between the unique and the general. As a historian, you can no more separate them, or give precedence to one over the other, than you can separate fact and interpretation."55 This project uses a selection of case studies and little biographies to illustrate larger trends in Nova Scotia and Newfoundland. It combines micro and macro history. It also supports Lauren Benton's argument that important case studies not only unravel local politics and customs, but were agents of change themselves - turning points in a particular colony or legal regime.56 This study contends that social history is inherently about people, and its case studies are intended to show that they too were actors in history.57 Lawrence Stone sparked a backlash when he wrote about a "revival of narrative" in the late 1970s. Marxists accused him of undermining social history and endorsing traditional political narratives. Stone did not urge anyone to "throw away his calculator," but he was critical of cliometrics and other forms of 'scientific' history.58

While this debate did not lead to a revival of narrative, there has been a flurry of creative history recently. Whether it is called 'narrative,' 'storytelling,' 'micro-history' or the

'history of events,' it has shaped the format of this dissertation. For instance, it incorporated the work of Peter Burke and James Goodman on the historiography of narrative.59 Greg Dening's study of theatre and authority aboard the infamous HMS

Bounty in the late 1780s, discussed above, is the classic example of narrative, micro-

19 history, and social analysis in naval history. It was helpful in thinking about methodological issues.

This dissertation is rooted in primary sources. Research commenced at The

National Archives in London. Correspondence between colonial governors and the

British government, and between naval commanders and the Admiralty, was used to give this project a chronological spine. This is one of the first studies to use musters and log books of British warships in the Atlantic world; sampling allowed me to re-create the mechanics of impressment on shore and in colonial waters, and to quantify recruitment for the French and Napoleonic Wars. Lieutenants' logs at the National Maritime Museum in Greenwich served the same function. For the British context, I consulted the diaries of

Benjamin and Isaac Lester, merchants in the Poole-Newfoundland trade in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The original diaries are located at the Dorchester Record

Office in Poole, while transcripts were provided by Gordon Handcock and Jerry

Bannister. Repositories in Newfoundland offered a range of sources. Most significant were the colonial secretary's letter book and the John Thomas Duckworth Collection at the Provincial Archives of Newfoundland and Labrador in St. John's. Similarly, the Nova

Scotia Archives and Records Management at Halifax supplied petitions to government officials, council minutes, merchant papers, court records, and a variety of colonial newspapers. Finally, this dissertation used a number of published sources, such as the

Diary of Simeon Perkins, the Journal of Aaron Thomas, and Naval Documents of the

American Revolution.60

20 Structure of the Dissertation

This dissertation examines how impressment operated in Nova Scotia and

Newfoundland, and how it evolved over time. It is the first systematic study of press gangs in the North Atlantic world. The origins of this story lie outside of the Atlantic region: for example, much of Nova Scotia's population arrived from New England in the

1760s and came to be known as the planters. They settled on the recently-seized Acadian farmlands, and founded Liverpool and other fishing villages on the south shore of mainland Nova Scotia. While D.C. Harvey, John Bartlet Brebner, George Rawlyk, and

Elizabeth Mancke have studied the planters' colonial heritage to understand their politics and neutrality during the American Revolution, this study argues that historians have missed an important connection between New England and Nova Scotia in their politics of extemporaneous resistance. It maintains that the planters brought a shared history of resistance to press gangs to Nova Scotia. Chapter 2 begins in Massachusetts in the 1690s and discusses that colony's battles with press gangs in the mid-eighteenth century, especially Governor William Shirley's attempts to forge local impressment regulations.

The latter included exempting a wide range of residents of Massachusetts from service in the Royal Navy. When the planters first moved to Nova Scotia in the late 1750s, one of the conditions they negotiated with the Nova Scotia government was protection from impressment. This chapter argues that impressment policy in Nova Scotia had distinctive

Yankee roots. The exemption granted to the planters kept impressment to a minimum until the 1770s, and it started the debate about what it meant to be a resident of Nova

Scotia in the eighteenth century.

21 When the outbreak of the Revolution in 1775 brought a significant amount of impressment to Nova Scotia for the first time, local authorities drew upon Shirley's impressment reforms from the 1740s and the New England experience generally to resist the Navy. Governor Francis Legge secured an exemption from impressment for residents of Nova Scotia, just as Shirley had done in Massachusetts two generations earlier. The

American war was a tumultuous period for naval-civilian relations in Nova Scotia.

Impressment disrupted maritime commerce, and press gangs clashed with Halifax crowds. Having protected residents from impressment, Nova Scotia authorities attempted to claim jurisdiction over press gangs on shore. Popular disturbances in Halifax led

Lieutenant-Governor Richard Hughes to issue several proclamations against impressment, and the Halifax grand jury criticized the Navy for sending press gangs into town without provincial authorization. While colonial authorities could have arrested the naval officers involved, they opted for reforms instead, to prevent more violence in the future. In the end, the Navy continued to press men on shore in Nova Scotia throughout the American war, without seeking colonial permission. Chapter 2 argues that Nova

Scotia had mixed success in its first battle with impressment: it used its American heritage to protect residents from the Navy, but lost the fight over press gangs on shore.

Finally, it suggests that historians have looked too hard to find revolutionary sentiment in

Nova Scotia. Impressment was one of the most volatile issues during the American war, but it did not produce a hint of disloyalty.

Chapter 3 maintains that Nova Scotia's battle with impressment during the

American war paid dividends in the 1790s. It begins with the Nootka Sound affair in

1790, when commodore Richard Hughes was ordered to put the North American

22 squadron on a wartime footing. The former governor asked the Nova Scotia government for permission to send a press gang into Halifax. However, the request was denied, and

Hughes inadvertently ceded jurisdiction over impressment to provincial authorities. This chapter argues that Lieutenant-Governor John Wentworth and his Executive Council forged an impressment policy in Nova Scotia between 1793 and 1805 that controlled press gangs on shore and restricted the Navy's access to maritime labour. It discusses that policy in detail: including press warrants and procedure, press gang composition and behaviour, as well as protections and government restrictions. This system operated relatively smoothly until 1805, when the manning problem became so intense that most warships in Nova Scotia were short-handed. Frustrated at the dearth of sailors, Vice-

Admiral Andrew Mitchell sent press gangs into Halifax without provincial authorization, which sparked a major riot. The Nova Scotia government seized upon this incident to tighten its grip on impressment. Desertion laws were used to bar naval parties from shore, fishermen became off-limits to the Navy, and not another press warrant was issued in

Halifax until the War of 1812. Nova Scotia's officials learned from their experiences during the American Revolution and succeeded in taming the press gang during the

Napoleonic Wars.

This chapter also uses case studies of press gang disturbances on the south shore in

1805 and Pictou in 1809 to show that impressment undermined the Navy's reputation in

Nova Scotia. Parties from the naval Whiting terrified the residents of Liverpool and Shelburne for more than a month in 1805, while the Pictou case became a cause celebre in the colony. When two young men were pressed at Pictou and sent to the West

Indies at the behest of rival timber merchants, the House of Assembly petitioned the

23 government for redress. This sparked a campaign against impressment in Halifax that lasted until the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815, and which was spearheaded by the

Society of Merchants and the local magistracy. Frustrated by restrictions on recruitment and the growing desertion problem, naval captains occasionally sent press gangs into

Halifax without colonial authority. This is when they came into conflict with civilian authorities such as William Sabatier, who were bent on flexing their authoritative muscle.

Popular clashes with press gangs became catalysts for political disputes between the government and the Navy. The most high-profile case occurred in 1813, when the magistrate Richard Tremain intervened on behalf of a man who was pressed in the streets and beaten by a naval party. By the War of 1812, commentators such as 'Plain Truth' criticized the Navy and the abuses of its press gangs, but they failed to appreciate that

Nova Scotia had won the battle over impressment so decisively that the Navy no longer had enough sailors to man its ships. Chapter 3 also undermines N.A.M. Rodger's assertion that impressment produced little violence, and it attempts to blend existing studies of the Navy, merchants, politics, and the law together to illustrate the important place of naval-civilian relations in Nova Scotia.

Chapter 4 moves this story to Newfoundland. Whereas Nova Scotia's cultural roots were in New England, Newfoundland was tied to the English West Country and southeast Ireland. Newfoundland was dominated by the British migratory fishery during the early-modern period. The Newfoundland trade was based in Dartmouth and Poole in the West Country, and later in Waterford and Cork in Ireland. This study supports Denver

Brunsman's argument that the Navy used a trans-Atlantic logic of impressment in the eighteenth century - not many men were entered in Newfoundland because they were

24 taken from convoys off the British Isles. By the Seven Years War they were also conscripted by the Impress Service, which stationed press gangs in Dartmouth, Poole, and other ports in the Newfoundland trade. By itself, however, this does not explain the dearth of impressment on the island before the American war. While historians have long examined legal barriers against impressment, and their role in sparking naval-civilian discord in America and the West Indies in the eighteenth century, this is the first study to consider those barriers in the North Atlantic. It argues that Parliament exempted

Newfoundland from impressment between 1708 and 1775. Along with the Navy's

Atlantic manning system and the availability of sailors in the British Isles, this accounts for the lack of recruitment on the island before the American Revolution. Chapter 4 is the first serious analysis of impressment in Newfoundland. While Gerald S. Graham, Olaf

Janzen, William Whitely and Jerry Bannister have studied the Newfoundland squadron, none of them explained how it manned its ships.

The American war was a turning point for naval recruitment in Newfoundland.

Statutory restrictions against impressment were repealed in 1775, and the Navy recruited there on a significant scale. Initially, press gangs were unnecessary because men volunteered to serve in the wooden world in large numbers. The cessation of the

American provisions trade sent the Newfoundland fishery into disarray, and hundreds of poor, hungry and unemployed fishing servants joined the Navy and Army in St. John's each year. Recruiting parties came from as far away as Quebec and New York to harness this new labour market. The Newfoundland squadron had little difficulty filling its crews and taking on supernumeraries, but by the time that the Admiralty realized the island's potential in manning the larger British fleet, the labour supply had begun to dry up.

25 Successive governors were ordered to recruit heavily in Newfoundland at a time when sailors were becoming harder to find. It is no surprise that impressment made inroads on the island at this time. By the end of the war, William Pitt the Younger complained in

Parliament that impressment was causing major problems at Newfoundland and that it needed to be regulated. Chapter 4 contends that Newfoundland was transformed from a minor source of manpower before 1775 into a training ground for the Navy during the

American war. Two changes in the Atlantic world shaped this transformation. First, the war segregated the Navy from its traditional labour market in the Thirteen Colonies, and it turned to Nova Scotia and Newfoundland to man its warships. Second, impressment and other wartime hazards devastated the Newfoundland trade in the West Country. Its labour supply was decimated by 1780 and the Navy looked to Newfoundland as a source of manpower.

The American war foreshadowed the death of the migratory fishery in the 1790s.

Chapter 5 takes issue with Gerald S. Graham and David Starkey, who have dismissed the nursery for seamen thesis and suggested that impressment was non-existent in

Newfoundland. Drawing upon Shannon Ryan's work, it shows that the Napoleonic era was a watershed in Newfoundland history. The migratory fishery declined, the resident industry and settled population exploded, and Newfoundland became a colony in all but name. Impressment played a significant role in this process. This chapter begins in the

West Country and Ireland, where impressment wreaked havoc on the Newfoundland fishing industry. Hundreds of fishermen and sailors were taken into the Navy in the

1790s and the migratory fleet was crippled. However, commentators such as George

Chalmers prematurely lamented the death of the nursery for seamen, not realizing that it

26 moved across the Atlantic to Newfoundland in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Approximately 4000 men entered the Navy at the island during the Napoleonic

Wars - an impressive figure considering the modest size of the Newfoundland squadron.

While naval recruitment first occurred in the closing years of the American war, this was overshadowed by the Navy's manning needs during the 1790s. Volunteers were available on the island, especially in St. John's at the end of the fishing season, but there were never enough of them, so press gangs stepped in to fill the void. Initially, some press gangs operated on shore in St. John's, but this came to a halt in 1794 when a naval officer was killed while escorting pressed men into town to collect their belongings. The Boston tragedy shocked the Navy into reforming its manning system for the duration of the

Napoleonic Wars. Press gangs were driven from shore and confined to St. John's harbour and the Newfoundland coast.

Guided by a series of port orders, the St. John's guard boats became the engine of naval recruitment in Newfoundland. The Navy relied on them almost exclusively after the press gang murder in 1794. When Captain William Pryce Cumby of HMS Hyperion attempted to land a press gang on shore in 1813, he was turned away by Thomas Coote and a St. John's magistracy that was determined to prevent violence. Although the Boston tragedy was the only impressment riot in Newfoundland's history, a series of violent altercations kept the Navy on edge in the early nineteenth century. Chapter 5 uses a case study of a guard boat disturbance in 1806 to show how these disputes could arise. It also suggests that the St. John's guard boats can be used to re-evaluate impressment procedure in the Atlantic world. It argues that press gangs came in many forms, and that impressment itself occurred overwhelming on the water, not on land. This was the case in

27 the New World, but also in British ports such as Poole and Cork. Finally, this chapter shows that the civil power sent petty criminals and vagrants to the Navy in

Newfoundland. Magistrates, constables, and clerks padded their salaries with cash bonuses for each recruit. This bolstered the British war effort, rid communities of undesirables, and eased the municipal burden of maintaining jails. Peter King contends that pre-trial enlistments occurred on a large scale in Georgian Britain and may have affected the pattern of recorded crimes. The Newfoundland squadron accepted dozens of these recruits per year by the War of 1812. While Jim Phillips and Jerry Bannister have touched on this issue in Nova Scotia and Newfoundland, this is the first sustained analysis of press gangs and the law in the Atlantic world. Newfoundland became a nursery for seamen in the early nineteenth century, but the Navy depended on guard boats and magistrates for manpower rather than the traditional press gang.

The conclusion in Chapter 6 compares the histories of impressment in Nova

Scotia and Newfoundland. It argues that this is primarily a story about colonial differences rather than similarities. First, despite being Britain's two main English- speaking colonies in the North Atlantic world that stayed loyal to the Crown, Nova Scotia and Newfoundland had different colonial origins. Nova Scotia was peopled largely by

New Englanders, and it was the Massachusetts experience in the 1740s that local authorities used to contest impressment. Newfoundland, by contrast, was essentially an extension of the migratory fishery from the West Country and Ireland, where large-scale impressment made the trade a nursery for seamen. When these labour markets were depleted in the 1770s and 1790s, the Navy relied increasingly upon Newfoundland as a source of manpower. Put simply, Nova Scotia was oriented south to New England while

28 Newfoundland looked east to the British Isles. The Atlantic roots of impressment were different in the two colonies.

Second, this study argues that the different political and government institutions in place in Nova Scotia and Newfoundland had a significant impact on naval-civilian relations in the two colonies. For instance, Nova Scotia used its colonial infrastructure to negotiate with the Navy and to resist press gangs - this included resident governors,

House of Assembly and Executive Council, and a newspaper press. Newfoundland had none of these things. There the naval commander was also the governor, and he made the decisions on impressment procedure. Newfoundland did not have a similar political apparatus to negotiate with the Navy, and this led to fundamental differences in impressment procedure and naval-civilian relations in the North Atlantic world. While impressment was resisted in both colonies, there was far more violence and protests in

Nova Scotia than in Newfoundland. Magistrates such as Richard Tremain were on the front lines in Halifax in battling the Navy, but their counterparts in St. John's usually cooperated with naval captains and sent dozens of petty criminals and other recruits to them each year in the early nineteenth century.

Finally, Newfoundland was recognized as a nursery for seamen while Nova

Scotia became a drain on the Navy's manpower. This is evidenced by the North

American squadron sending warships to Newfoundland to find sailors, because none were available in Nova Scotia. Part of the reason for this was the large mobile labour force that was needed for the Newfoundland fishery, but more of it had to do with Nova

Scotia's success in protecting residents and other groups from the Navy. By the War of

1812, so many groups were exempt from impressment that the Navy could not man its

29 ships in Nova Scotia. Although local customs protected Newfoundland fishermen from the Navy during the fishing season, they were never exempt from impressment as their counterparts were in Nova Scotia. In the end, residents of Nova Scotia enjoyed a degree of freedom from impressment that was unprecedented in the British Empire. While there were a number of similarities between Nova Scotia and Newfoundland - the American

Revolutionary War was a turning point in both places, for instance, and press gang disturbances in St. John's in 1794 and Halifax in 1805 spurred significant manning reforms - the political and social history of impressment was quite different in the two

North Atlantic colonies.

30 Notes

1 N.A.M. Rodger, The Wooden World: An Anatomy of the Georgian Navy (London, 1986), p. 164. 2 C. Bruce Fergusson, "Simeon Perkins," DCB; Elizabeth Mancke, "Simeon Perkins," in Gerald Hallowell (ed.), The Oxford Companion to Canadian History (Don Mills, ON, 2004), p. 481; Charles Bruce Fergusson, Early Liverpool and its Diarist (Halifax, 1961); Douglas Mitchell Brown, 'From Yankee to Nova Scotian: Simeon Perkins of Liverpool, Nova Scotia, 1762-1796' (Queens University, Unpublished M.A. Thesis, 1978). 3 Charles Bruce Fergusson (ed.), The Diary of Simeon Perkins, 1804-1812 (Toronto, 1978), vol. 5, 15-16 July 1805, p. 127. 4 Fergusson (ed.), Diary of Simeon Perkins, vol. 4, 15-16 July 1805, p. 127. 5 Fergusson (ed.), Diary of Simeon Perkins, vol. 4, 15-16 July 1805, p. 127. Learned pigs were a trans-Atlantic phenomenon. For instance, William Smith, soon to be the chief justice of Quebec, encountered one that dazzled London's most fashionable classes on Whitehall Street in 1785. As Smith noted, this Yorkshire swine engaged the audience in his show: "I went in this Morning to the Shew of the Learned Pigg. 25 Persons in the Room... There are Cards of Capital Letters and Cards of Figures. Questions are put, answer'd by his fetching out the Cards to the Middle of the Floor. What is the Year of our Lord, he brought out 1785. What the last Year, he brought out the Cards 1784. How many Gent & Ladies are in the Room he brought out No. 2 & then No. 5. A Watch was put to his Eye to tell the Hour & Minutes. He brought our No. 1 & then 2 & then 6 for the Minutes.. .One of Us was desired to give a Name. It was Pitt: he brought out M then R for Mr., then P then 1 then T & then T again.. .Your Pocket may be emptied in this great Town by the innumerable Exhibition of Spectacles of one Kind & Another in several Streets & Quarters of the City." According to Captain Edward Thompson, women lined up for hours to see this "classick pig." L.F.S. Upton (ed.), The Diary and Selected Papers of Chief Justice William Smith, 1784-1793, 2 vols. (Toronto, 1963-5), I, 10 March 1785, pp. 204-5; L.F.S. Upton, "William Smith", DCB. Similarly, in the eighteenth century the town of Alexandria, Virginia, proudly advertised the talents of "Toby the Learned Pig." He entertained audiences in Gadsby's Tavern. Thomas Hood immortalized the animal in his poem, "The Lament of Toby, The Learned Pig," which is told from Toby's perspective, as his career neared its end: "Of all my literary kin - A farewell must be taken, Good-bye to the poetic Hogg! - The philosophic Bacon!" The Works of Thomas Hood, 6 vols. (New York, 1861), II, pp. 316-18 (quote at p. 317). 6 , governor of Newfoundland, to Magistrates of St. John's, 1 October 1805, Centre for Newfoundland Studies [CNS], St. John's, The D'Alberti Transcripts, vol. 15, no page numbers. 7 Harold Innis (ed.), The Diary of Simeon Perkins, 1766-1780 (Toronto, 1948), vol. 1, 27 December 1775 - 15 March 1776, pp. 107-15; Charles Bruce Fergusson (ed.), The Life of Jonathan Scott (Halifax, 1960), pp. 56-8. This case is discussed in Chapter 2. 8 Fergusson (ed.), Diary of Simeon Perkins, vol. 4, 6 January 1797, p. 2. 9 Memorial of Joseph Freeman, [1800], The National Archives [TNA], London, United Kingdom, Admiralty Papers [ADM], Letters from Senior Officers in North America,

31 1800-4, pp. 160-9; Log of Charles Mary Wentworth Privateer, 1799-1800, Nova Scotia Archives and Records Management [NSARM[, Halifax, MG 20 / 215 /10. 10 'British Privateering during the War of 1812,' unpublished manuscript, no date, NSARM, MG 1, vol. 233, W.R. Copp Papers, pp. 53-72. Also see Faye Margaret Kert, Prize and Prejudice: Privateering and Naval Prize in Atlantic Canada in the War of 1812 (St. John's, 1997); C.H.J. Snider, Under the Red Jack (Toronto, 1927). 11 For one assessment, based largely on the Perkins diaries, see Dan Conlin, "Privateer Entrepot: Commercial Militarization in Liverpool, Nova Scotia, 1793-1805," Northern Mariner, 8.2 (April 1998), pp. 21-38, esp. Appendix 2. 12 Julian Gwyn, "Poseidon's Sphere: Early Naval History in Atlantic Canada," Acadiensis, 31.1 (Autumn 2001), pp. 152-63. 13 Desmond Morton, A Military History of Canada, 5th ed. (Toronto, 2007); Marc Milner, Canada's Navy: The First Century (Toronto, 1999). 14 For instance, see Julian Gwyn, "The Royal Navy in North America, 1712-1776," in Jeremy Black and Phillip Woodfine (eds.), The British Navy and the Use of Naval Power in the Eighteenth Century (Leicester, 1988), pp. 9-26; Gwyn, and Foremasts: The North American Squadron in Nova Scotia Waters, 1745-1815 (Vancouver, 2003). 15 For one example from a popular textbook, see J.M. Bumsted, A History of the Canadian Peoples, 2nd ed. (Don Mills, ON, 2003), esp. ch. 3. 16 I.C.B. Dear and Peter Kemp (eds.), Oxford Companion to Ships and the Sea, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 2005), pp. 110, 278-9; N.A.M. Rodger, The Safeguard of the Sea: A Naval History of Britain, Volume 1, 660-1649 (London, 1997), esp. pp. 138, 140-1, 160,314- 316, 324, 398-401; G.V. Scammell, "The Sinews of War: Manning and Provisioning English Fighting Ships, c. 1550-1650," Mariner's Mirror, 73.4 (November 1987), pp. 351-67; G. Hinchliffe, "Impressment of Seamen during the War of the Spanish Succession," Mariner's Mirror, 53.2 (May 1967), pp. 137-43; Eugene L. Rasor, Reform in the Royal Navy: A Social History of the Lower Deck, 1850-1880 (Hamden, Connecticut, 1976); Michael A. Lewis, The Navy in Transition, 1814-1864 (London, 1965); J.S. Bromley, "Away from Impressment: The Idea of a , 1696-1859," in A.C. Duke and C.A. Tamse (eds.), Britain and the Netherlands VI: War and Society, Papers Delivered to the Sixth Anglo-Dutch Historical Conference (The Hague, 1977), pp. 168-88; Bromley, "In the Shadow of Impressment: Friends of a Naval Militia, 1844-74," in M.R.D. Foot (ed.), War and Society: Historical Essays in Honour of J.R. Western, 1928-1971 (New York, 1973), pp. 183-97. 17 Dear and Kemp (eds.), Ships and the Sea, pp. 278-9; Charles Mark Fissel, English Warfare, 1511-1642 (New York, 2001); Arthur N. Gilbert, "Army Impressment during the War of the Spanish Succession," The Historian, 38.4 (1976), pp. 689-708; Gilbert, "Charles Jenkinson and the Last Army Press, 1779," Military Affairs, 42.1 (1978), pp. 7- 11; P.R. Edwards, "The Supply of Horses to the Parliamentarian and Royalist Armies in the English Civil War," Institute of Historical Research, 68.165 (February 1995), pp. 49- 66; Leon Radzinowicz, "Impressment into the Army and the Navy - A Rough and Ready Instrument of Preventive Police and Criminal Justice," in Marvin E. Wolfgang (ed.), Crime and Culture: Essays in Honor ofThorsten Sellin (New York, 1968), pp. 287-313.

32 David French, "Conscription," in John Cannon (ed.), The Oxford Companion to British History (Oxford, 1997), p. 238; John Kenyon (ed.), The Wordsworth Dictionary of British History (1981 repr. Ware, Hertfordshire, 1994), p. 88. 19 Hendrik Kraay, "Reconsidering Recruitment in Imperial Brazil," The Americas, 55.1 (July 1998), pp. 1-33; Kraay, '"The Shelter of the Uniform': The Brazilian Army and Runaway Slaves, 1800-1888," Journal of Social History, 29.3 (Spring 1996), pp. 637-57; Peter M. Beattie, "Conscription versus Penal Servitude: Army Reform's Influence on the Brazilian State's Management of Social Control, 1870-1930," Journal of Social History, 32.4 (Summer 1999), pp. 847-78. Desmond Morton, "Conscription," in Hallowell (ed.), Companion to Canadian History, p. 149. John Bartlet Brebner, North Atlantic Triangle: The Interplay of Canada, the United States and Great Britain (1945 repr. Toronto, 1966), p. 166; Greg Marquis, In Armageddon's Shadow: The Civil War and Canada's Maritime Provinces (Montreal, 1988), esp. ch. 5. 22 Desmond Morton, A Short History of Canada, 6th ed. (Toronto, 2006), pp. 94-5. 23 Robert Bothwell, The Penguin History of Canada (Toronto, 2006), p. 232; Morton, Military History of Canada, p. 124. 24 Morton, "Conscription," pp. 149-50; J.L. Granatstein and Richard Jones, "Conscription," in James H. Marsh (ed.), The Canadian Encyclopedia: Year 2000 Edition (Toronto, 1999), p. 545; Bothwell, Penguin History of Canada, chs. 11-12; Morton, Short History of Canada, pp. 175-90, 228-45; Morton, Military History of Canada, chs. 4-5; Ian Mackay, "The 1910s: The Stillborn Triumph of Progressive Reform," in E.R. Forbes and D.A. Muise (eds.), The Atlantic Region in Confederation (Toronto, 1993), pp. 192- 229, esp. 219-21. Wayne Carp, To Starve the Army at Pleasure: Continental Army Administration and American Political Culture, 1775-1783 (Chapel Hill, 1984), ch. 4; Elizabeth Cometti, "Impressment during the American Revolution," in Vera Largent (ed.), The Walter Clinton Jackson Essays in the Social Sciences (Chapel Hill, 1942), pp. 97-109. 26 The literature on this topic is vast, but see Scott Thomas Jackson, 'Impressment and Anglo-American Discord, 1787-1818' (University of Michigan, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 1976); James F. Zimmerman, Impressment of American Seamen (1925 repr. Port Washington, New York, 1966); Samuel Flagg Bemis, "The London Mission of Thomas Pinckney, 1192-1196," American Historical Review, 28.2 (January 1923), pp. 228-47; John F. Campbell, "The Havana Incident," American Neptune, 22 A (Fall 1962), pp. 264- 76; Robert E. Cray Jr., "Remembering the USS Chesapeake: The Politics of Maritime Death and Impressment," Journal of the Early Republic, 25 (Fall 2005), pp. 445-74; Brian DeToy, "The Impressment of American Seamen during the Napoleonic Wars," Consortium on Revolutionary Europe: Selected Papers (1998), pp. 492-501; Donald R. Hickey, "The Monroe-Pinkney Treaty of 1806: A Reappraisal," William and Mary Quarterly, 44.1 (January 1987), pp. 65-88; Martin Kaufman, "War Sentiment in Western Pennsylvania in 1812," Pennsylvania History, 31.4 (October 1964), pp. 436-48; Christopher McKee, "Foreign Seamen in the : A Census of 1808," William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Series, 42.3 (July 1985), pp. 383-93; Charles R. Ritcheson, "Van Buren's Mission to London, 1831-1832," International History Review,

33 8.2 (May 1986), pp. 191-213; Clement Cleveland Sawtell, "Impressment of American Seamen by the British," Essex Institute Historical Collections, 16 A (October 1940), pp. 314-44; George Selement, "Impressment and the American Merchant Marine, 1782- 1812: An American View," Mariner's Mirror, 59.4 (November 1973), pp. 409-18; J.C.A. Stagg, Mr. Madison's War: Politics, Diplomacy, and Warfare in the Early American Republic, 1783-1830 (Princeton, 1983); Anthony Steel, "Anthony Merry and the Anglo- American Dispute about Impressment, 1803-6," Cambridge HistoricalJournal, 9.3 (1949), pp. 331-51; Steel, "Diana versus Caravan and Topaz" Mariner's Mirror, 43.1 (1957), pp. 46-58; Steel, "Impressment in the Monroe-Pinkney Negotiation, 1806-1807," American Historical Review, 57.2 (January 1952), pp. 352-69; Steel, "More Light on the Chesapeake," Mariner's Mirror, 39 (1953), pp. 243-65; Spencer C. Tucker and Frank T. Reuter, Injured Honor: The Chesapeake-Leopard Affair, June 22, 1807 (Annapolis, 1996). Christopher Clark, "Conscription," in Paul S. Boyer (ed.), The Oxford Companion to United States History (Oxford, 2001), p. 154; George Q. Flynn, The Draft, 1940-1973 (Lawrence, Kansas, 1993). 28 J.R. Hutchinson, The Press-Gang: Afloat and Ashore (London, 1913). 29 Michael Lewis, A Social History of the Navy, 1793-1815 (London, 1960); Daniel A. Baugh, British Naval Administration in the Age ofWalpole (Princeton, 1965); Christopher Lloyd, The British Seaman, 1200-1860: A Social Survey (London, 1968); Peter Kemp, The British Sailor: A Social History of the Lower Deck (London, 1970). 30 Dudley Pope, Life in Nelson's Navy (Annapolis, 1981). 31 Brian Lavery, Nelson's Navy: The Ships, Men and Organisation, 1793-1815 (Annapolis, 1989). 32 Rodger, Wooden World; Rodger, "Shipboard Life in the Georgian Navy, 1750-1800: The Decline of the Old Order?," in Lewis R. Fischer (et al.), The : Twelve Essays on the Social History of Maritime Labour (Stavanger, Norway, 1992), pp. 29-39; Rodger, "Sea-Power and Empire, 1688-1793," in P.J. Marshall (ed.), The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume 2, The Eighteenth Century (Oxford, 1998), pp. 169-83. Ralph Davis, The Rise of the English Shipping Industry in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (London, 1962); Daniel Vickers, Young Men and the Sea: Yankee Seafarers in the Age of Sail (New Haven, 2005); Peter Earle, Sailors: English Merchant Seamen, 1650-1775 (London, 1998). 34 David J. Starkey, "War and the Market for Seafarers in Britain, 1736-1792," in Lewis R. Fischer and Helge W. Nordvik (eds.), Shipping and Trade, 1750-1950: Essays in International Maritime Economic History (Pontefract, 1990), pp. 25-42. 35 Jonathan Press, The Merchant Seamen of Bristol, 1747-1789 (Bristol, 1976); Tony Barrow, "The Noble Ann Affair, 1779: A Case Study of Impressment during the American Revolutionary War," in Barrow (ed.), Press Gangs and Privateers (Whitley Bay, Tyne and Wear, 1993), pp. 13-22; Norman McCord, "The Impress Service in North- East England during the Napoleonic War," in Barrow (ed.), Press Gangs and Privateers, pp. 23-39. John A. Woods, "The City of London and Impressment, 1776-1777," Proceedings of the Leeds Philosophical and Literary Society, 8 (1956) pp. 111-27.

34 37 Nicholas Rogers, Crowds, Culture, and Politics in Georgian Britain (Oxford, 1999); Rogers, "Liberty Road: Opposition to Impressment in Britain during the American War of Independence," in Colin Howell and Richard Twomey (eds.), Jack Tar in History: Essays in the History of Maritime Life and Labour (Fredericton, 1991), pp. 85-121. 38 Cheryl A. Fury, Tides in the Affairs of Men: The Social History of Elizabethan Seamen, 1580-1603 (Westport, Connecticut, 2002). 39 Peter King, "War as a Judicial Resource: Press Gangs and Prosecution Rates, 1740- 1830," in Norma Landau (ed.), Law, Crime, and English Society, 1666-1830 (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 97-116; Douglas Hay, "War, Dearth and Theft in the Eighteenth Century: The Record of the English Courts," Past and Present, 95 (1982), pp. 117-60. 40 Philip Woodfine, '"Proper Objects of the Press': Naval Impressment and Habeas Corpus in the French Revolutionary Wars," in Keith Dockray and Keith Laybourn (eds.), The Presentation and Reality of War: The British Experience, Essays in Honor of David Wright (Stroud, 1999), pp. 39-60. 41 Daniel James Ennis, Enter the Press-Gang: Naval Impressment in Eighteenth-Century British Literature (Newark, Delaware, 2002). 42 Isaac Edward Land, 'Domesticating the Maritime: Culture, Masculinity, and Empire in Britain, 1770-1820' (University of Michigan, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 1999). 43 Greg Dening, Mr. Bligh 's Bad Language: Passion, Power and Theatre on the Bounty (Cambridge, 1992). 44 Dora Mae Clark, "The Impressment of Seamen in the American Colonies," in Essays in Colonial History: Presented to Charles McLean Andrews by his Students (1931 repr. Freeport, New York, 1966), pp. 198-224. 45 Neil R. Stout, "Manning the Royal Navy in North America, 1763-1775," American Neptune, 23.3 (July 1963), pp. 174-85. 46 Jesse Lemisch, "Jack Tar in the Streets: Merchant Seamen in the Politics of Revolutionary America," William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Series, 25.3 (July 1968), pp. 371-407; Lemisch, Jack Tar vs. John Bull: The Role of New York's Seamen in Precipitating the Revolution (New York, 1997); Lemisch, "The American Revolution Seen from the Bottom Up," in Barton Bernstein (ed.), Towards a New Past: Dissenting Essays in American History (New York, 1968), pp. 3-45. 47 Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic (Boston, 2000). Marcus Rediker, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Merchant Seamen, Pirates, and the Anglo-American Maritime World, 1700-1750 (Cambridge, 1987). 49 John Lax and William Pencak, "The Knowles Riot and the Crisis of the 1740's in Massachusetts," Perspectives in American History, 10 (1976), pp. 163-214. Paul A. Gilje, Liberty on the Waterfront: American Maritime Culture in the Age of Revolution (Philadelphia, 2004). 51 Nicholas Rogers, "Archipelagic Encounters: War, Race, and Labor in American- Caribbean Waters," in Felicity A. Nussbaum (ed.), The Global Eighteenth Century (Baltimore, 2003), pp. 211-25. W. Jeffrey Bolster, Black Jacks: African American Seamen in the Age of Sail (Harvard, 1997).

35 Denver Alexander Brunsman, 'The Evil Necessity: British Naval Impressment in the Eighteenth-Century Atlantic World' (Princeton University, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 2004). 54 The literature on Atlantic history is always expanding, but see Bernard Bailyn, Atlantic History: Concepts and Contours (Harvard, 2005); Bailyn, "The Idea of Atlantic History," Itinerario, 20.3 (1996), pp. 19-44; Nicholas Canny, "Writing Atlantic History, or, Reconfiguring the History of Colonial British America," Journal of American History, 86 (1999), pp 1093-1114; David Armitage, "Three Concepts of Atlantic History," in David Armitage and Michael J. Braddick (eds.), The British Atlantic World, 1500-1800 (New York, 2002), pp. 11-27, and this volume generally; Alison Games, "Atlantic History: Definitions, Challenges, and Opportunities," American Historical Review, 111.3 (June 2006), pp. 741-57; Douglas R. Egerton, Alison Games, Jane G. Landers, Kris Lane and Donald R. Wright, The Atlantic World: A History, 1400-1888 (Wheeling, Illinois, 2007); Stephen J. Hornsby, British Atlantic, American Frontier: Spaces of Power in Early Modern British America (Hanover, 2005); Peter E. Pope, Fish into Wine: The Newfoundland Plantation in the Seventeenth Century (Chapel Hill, 2004). 55 E.R. Carr, What is History?, 2nd ed. (London, 1987), p. 65. 56 Lauren Benton, 'Imagining the King's Lost Army: Treason Law and Sovereignty Stories in the Early Modern Atlantic World' (Unpublished McKay History Lecture, DAL, 2007). For instance, Jack P. Greene, Pursuits of Happiness: The Social Development of Early Modern British Colonies and the Formation of American Culture (Chapel Hill, 1988), is a masterful study of social and cultural factors in American colonial development, but the fact that it does not mention one specific person takes away from the story. 58 Lawrence Stone, "The Revival of Narrative: Reflections on a New Old History," Past and Present, 85 (1979), pp. 3-24 (quote on p. 4). 59 Peter Burke, "History of Events and the Revival of Narrative," in Peter Burke (ed.), New Perspectives on Historical Writing (University Park, Pennsylvania, 1992), pp. 233- 48; James Goodman, "For the Love of Stories," Reviews in American History, 26 A (1998), pp. 255-1 A. Ironically, Giovanni Levi, "On Microhistory," in Burke (ed.), New Perspectives, pp. 93-113, is so complete with jargon and technical analysis that it is the type of work that Stone would have criticized. 60 Harold Innis, D.C. Harvey and Charles Bruce Fergusson (eds.), The Diary of Simeon Perkins, 1766-1812, 5 vols. (Toronto, 1948-78); Jean M. Murray (ed.), The Newfoundland Journal of Aaron Thomas: Able Seaman in HMS Boston (Don Mills, ON, 1968); William Bell Clark, William James Morgan and Michael J. Crawford (eds.), Naval Documents of the American Revolution, 11 vols. (Washington, 1964-2005).

36 Chapter 2

Yankee Roots: Planters, Press Gangs and the American Revolution in Nova Scotia, 1749-1789

Nova Scotia contains many disaffected Persons...their numbers daily increase by the emigrants from Boston and other places within the Massachusetts Bay.. .[who] under the pretence of their Trade being injured.. .will clamour against pressing. The people of New England formerly did the same. — Vice- Samuel Graves, 28 December 17751

Introduction

"Press! Press! Run, lads, run!" cried a group of fishermen running past them in the streets. "Press! Press! Press!" was the chorus from the windows, as David Strang observed, "in a swelling, screaming, chant that had in it a note of malediction as well as warning."2 The young man was in Halifax for the first time. Along with his older brothers, and several Liverpool sailors, Strang was there to purchase fishing hooks for a voyage to Labrador. They anchored in the Northwest Arm to avoid naval guard boats near the waterfront. A lantern coming their way revealed what sailors feared above all else in the North Atlantic world - the press gang. The Strangs hid in the dark alleyways, watching as the press gang passed by with its catch, German sailors taken from a

Lunenburg coaster with their "arms bound" and "heads bloody." Despite the danger, the

Strangs set off to purchase the hooks from a peddler named "Hart the Jew." However, one of them tripped on the sidewalk, making a loud noise, and they were surrounded by the press gang. After a short interrogation, the boatswain ordered his gangsmen to press the Strangs into the service, and a vicious battle ensued. The gangsmen beat the Strangs with "oak stretchers," and David could only watch in horror as his brothers were dragged

37 away, unconscious, their heads bouncing up and down on the Halifax street. Rescued by

Hart, David insisted that the press was against provincial law. Once the Army moved to

Boston, the peddler explained, Halifax was a corpse "lying unburied on the side of

Citadel Hill; and the press gangs are the worms in its rotten flesh."3

This is from Thomas H. RaddalPs His Majesty's Yankees (1942), a novel set in

Nova Scotia during the American Revolution. It was the summer of 1775: Lexington and

Concord signaled the beginning of serious fighting, and the Strangs of Liverpool, like many Nova Scotia families, were placed in an impossible situation. A large proportion of people in Nova Scotia were New England planters, and many still considered the

American colonies their home. "Of the Strang family," Barry Moody has observed,

"symbolically only the youngest son, David, the hero of the tale, is a native Nova

Scotian."4 Pressure from both sides forced David to determine what it meant to be a Nova

Scotian. Wedged between Yankee privateers and the British military, David realized that his interests did not coincide with those of either of the combatants. It was in the crucible of war that David and his neighbours fought for their families and communities, and in doing so they forged a distinctive Nova Scotian identity.

This chapter makes several contributions to the historiography of Nova Scotia. A few years after His Majesty's Yankees, Raddall published Halifax: Warden of the North

(1946), a work of non-fiction that became his most popular book. Raddall portrayed eighteenth-century Halifax as a military town dominated by imperial warfare. Led by social historians such as David Sutherland, however, the trend recently has been to move away from the Raddall narrative. It is argued here that this is a slippery slope: the capital was home to the and Royal Navy throughout the eighteenth and early

38 nineteenth centuries, Britain was at war for most of this period, and Halifax's military population outnumbered its civilian residents. Seen in this light, Halifax was a military town and Nova Scotia was a militarized colony. Therefore, Sutherland's revisionism belongs to the nineteenth century, when Halifax shed its garrison identity and Nova

Scotia matured into a British-American colony.6

This is not a plea to revive Raddall's narrative, but rather a reminder that life in eighteenth-century Nova Scotia was shaped by warfare, particularly in Halifax. As J.M.

Bumsted has noted, for rural Nova Scotians "Halifax was not only the source of political authority, but, with its taverns, brothels, and hard-living military men, it was Sodom and

Gomorrah as well."7 This is the impression in His Majesty's Yankees, where mariners balanced the intoxication of Halifax's nightlife with the danger of press gangs. The research Raddall conducted for his novel was recycled in his monograph; this can be seen in his discussion of press gangs, which is remarkably similar in the two books. Raddall captured the fear of impressment extremely well, especially in the seafaring population.

He also highlighted the Revolution as the key period for impressment in Nova Scotia, but virtually nothing has been written on this topic.8 For example, Julian Gwyn has written extensively on the North American squadron, but he has not focused on the Navy's wider role in Nova Scotia society.9 As such, this is the first detailed study of naval-civilian relations in Nova Scotia. Generally, this chapter supports Jim Phillips's exhaustive work on the criminal law in arguing that the military and warfare played a central role in the history of Georgian Halifax.10

This chapter also discusses the American Revolution in Nova Scotia, a dominant theme in the literature. From the days of John Bartlet Brebner and Wilfred B. Kerr, the

39 focus has been on why Nova Scotia did not join the Thirteen Colonies and rebel against the Crown. Popular themes have included the politics of colonial governors, geographic isolationism, the goals of Halifax's merchant community, religious awakening, the politics of neutrality, and state repression.11 According to Gordon Stewart and George

Rawlyk in one of the most compelling studies on the topic, despite their New England heritage the planters in Nova Scotia did not join the Revolution because they missed out on the 1760s, the key decade of imperial discord, colonial resistance, and political awakening in New England. For these authors, the 1760s paved the road to Independence and the planters were not in New England to experience it. This is known as the missing decade theory. In many respects, however, colonial American historiography has changed of late and the 1740s are now seen as the pivotal decade of resistance in New England.

This was certainly the case with impressment. This chapter contends that the planters, who did experience the tumultuous 1740s in New England, brought a shared history of resistance to impressment with them to Nova Scotia, where battles over press gangs commenced almost immediately. Nova Scotia authorities tried to enforce the same impressment regulations during the American Revolutionary War (1775-83) that

Massachusetts authorities forged during the 1740s. In this sense, there was no missing decade in Nova Scotia.13

For all their talk about the Revolution, Nova Scotia's historians have ignored one issue that brought the colony together in opposition to the British war effort. Governors, politicians, grand juries, and merchants all resisted press gangs during the war. Official resistance was emboldened by popular disturbances in Halifax; not only did press gang riots serve as a catalyst for official resistance, but according to M. Louise English

40 Anderson, they were the only legitimate form of crowd activity in Nova Scotia during the

Revolution.14 Impressment was a politically-charged issue. As Nicholas Rogers and Jesse

Lemisch have shown, resistance to impressment merged with other forms of protest and reform initiatives in Great Britain and the American colonies during the revolutionary era. This led to criticisms of the British government and to anti-war sentiment on both sides of the Atlantic.15 In Nova Scotia, by contrast, where press gangs were resisted by a wide variety of groups, there was not even a hint of pro-American sentiment stemming from the impressment debate. Resistance to the Navy did not merge with other protests in

Nova Scotia, nor did it lead to a larger sense of dissent or alienation toward the Crown.

This bolsters J.M. Bumsted's argument that historians have spent too much time on the

"conflict of loyalty" in Nova Scotia during the American war. It was an issue for a minority of Nova Scotians and affected only certain regions of the colony early in the war.16 Rather than explain why Nova Scotia did not join the Revolution, perhaps historians should focus on what actually happened on the ground in the colony. If impressment was one of the most volatile and politicized subjects in Nova Scotia during the war and did nothing for the American cause, then joining the Revolution may not even have been on the table.

This chapter examines how naval-civilian relations changed over time in Nova

Scotia. It argues that opposition to impressment in Nova Scotia had distinctive Yankee roots. The discussion begins in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, when

American and West Indian colonies negotiated impressment policy with the British government. While Governor William Shirley established impressment regulations in

Massachusetts during the early 1740s - including colonial control over press gangs on

41 shore, exemption for Massachusetts residents, and protections for coasting vessels - these positive steps were undercut by several cases of naval violence in the latter stages of the

War of the Austrian Succession (1744-8). Despite these setbacks, naval officers generally followed Shirley's impressment regulations in New England, even during the Seven

Years War (1756-63). New Englanders came to think of themselves as exempt from impressment, and when thousands of them migrated to Nova Scotia during the 1760s to plant on the vacated Acadian farmlands, they brought this sense of entitlement with them.

This chapter maintains that by negotiating a ten-year exemption from impressment with

Nova Scotia authorities, the planters made protection from the Navy a pre-condition of residency in the colony. This started the larger debate on what it meant to be an inhabitant of Nova Scotia.

The American war was a watershed for impressment in Nova Scotia. It was the first time that impressment occurred on a large scale there and the first time that it met with political resistance. Not surprisingly, the safeguards that Massachusetts pursued in the 1740s were transplanted to Nova Scotia. (They are described here in considerable detail, especially during the Revolution.) After complaints about impressment in 1775,

Governor Francis Legge contacted the admiral at Boston, who agreed to exempt Nova

Scotia residents from the press. The debate then shifted to jurisdiction over press gangs on land. Popular disturbances in Halifax led to a series of proclamations against impressment, and the grand jury criticized the Navy for sending press gangs into Halifax without provincial authority. In the end, captains continued to press seamen in Nova

Scotia until the end of the war, without seeking colonial permission. Much of this chapter concentrates on the American war, as it saw the first political battle over impressment in

42 Nova Scotia, and it was a time of acute naval-civilian discord. It argues that provincial authorities had mixed success in their first clash with the North American squadron: they drew on New England precedent to protect residents and coasting vessels from the Navy, but they lost the fight over press gangs on shore. This experience would pay dividends in the 1790s, when colonial officials butted heads with the Navy a second time over sending press gangs into Halifax.

Yankee Roots

There was less impressment in North America than anywhere else in the British

Atlantic world, but it was contested most vigorously along the American seaboard in the eighteenth century. Massachusetts led the fight because it suffered the most impressment.

Naval officers and colonial authorities first clashed in the 1690s, when warships pressed men along the coast. On a June evening in 1692, Captain Richard Short of HMS

Nonesuch led a press gang into Boston that abused residents, broke into buildings, and accosted members of the Massachusetts General Court. Similar incidents prompted

Governor William Phips to issue a proclamation against naval violence. Phips set the tone for future impressment debates in colonial America by ordering the arrest of anyone, military personnel and civilians alike, who pressed men without a warrant from the governor. Aggravated by desertion from the Nonesuch, Short ignored Phips's proclamation and impressment galvanized personal tensions between the two men. They were partners in a series of ventures that combined colonial business and private gain, with the naval captain usually receiving the short end of the bargain. Phips used Short to man semi-private vessels with naval seamen, and even issued the captain a press warrant

43 to make up these quotas. Short refused to lend Phips a large number of seamen for a voyage to Pemaquid in January 1793, and this sparked an altercation on the Boston docks. Phips beat Short with a cane and jailed him for several months. This incident was not specifically about impressment, but that was how it was remembered in Boston and how it has been portrayed by American historians. In the end, both men lost out: Phips was recalled by the English government the following year, for his ill-treatment of Short but also because of allegations regarding and his abuse of the Navigation

Acts, while Short damaged the Navy's reputation in the colonies, fell out of favour in the service, and did not receive another posting.17

There was significant confusion over the power and jurisdiction of colonial governors in the 1690s. This formed part of the background to the Phips-Short affair in

1693. The confusion over impressment was addressed in 1696, when the Board of Trade responded to complaints from and by recommending that authority to press sailors be removed from naval captains stationed throughout the New World. The

Privy Council then issued an order stating that "the sole power of impressing seamen in the Colonies be entrusted to the Governor, to whom Captains of King's ships shall make application when in want of men."18 Sent to the governors of Massachusetts, New York,

New Hampshire and Barbados in 1697 and at least half a dozen more officials in subsequent years, this order was intended to improve naval-civilian relations in the West

Indian and American colonies.19 This did not happen, as naval captains did not always respect the command structure.20 Several press gang disturbances occurred in Boston in

1697, and these wounds were reopened by more impressments during the War of the

Spanish Succession (1702-13). For instance, a high-profile case in Boston in 1702 led to

44 the arrest and detention of Captain Robert Jackson of HMS Swift. Nor was Massachusetts alone, for there was a chorus of complaints about impressment from the West Indies.

Jamaican authorities took action in 1703 by passing a provincial law that barred the Navy from pressing inhabitants of that colony. Parliament found this action to be "prejudicial to the public service," and the Jamaican assembly agreed to repeal the act, but only on the specific condition that the Board of Trade confirm that colonial governors had sole authority over impressment in the New World. Problems persisted, however, and the powerful West Indian sugar lobby instigated a determined campaign against impressment in the western hemisphere. Parliament responded by passing the Sixth of Anne (6 Anne, c. 37 [1708]), which prohibited impressment in the American and West Indian colonies, except for the recovery of naval deserters (see Appendix 2).21 This had an immediate impact on manning the Navy in the American colonies. When Hovenden Walker's ill- fated expedition to Quebec was undercut by desertion in Boston in 1711, the admiral lamented the "sad effects" of the Sixth of Anne.22

Two questions followed the Sixth of Anne: did it allow colonial governors to sanction impressment, for instance in wartime emergencies, and did it expire with the

Treaty of Utrecht in 1713? The first question was a matter of confusion until the 1740s, while the second had a lasting and divisive impact on naval-civilian relations in the

Americas throughout the eighteenth century. Until 1723, when it was officially removed from captains' instructions, the Navy ignored the Sixth of Anne; this was based on the attorney general's conclusion several years earlier that the statute had expired in 1713.

However, this did not affect the Board of Trade's instructions to colonial governors - who were told to observe the Sixth of Anne - and confusion reigned supreme. The

45 situation came to a head with the outbreak of the War of Jenkin's Ear in 1739: the Navy suffered from desertion in the colonies, captains resorted to impressment, merchants and seamen claimed protection under the Sixth of Anne, while British officials quoted the findings of the former attorney general. The dispute was then turned over to Dudley

Ryder and John Strange, the current attorney and solicitor generals, who reported that

"the Act is not now in force but expired at the end of the war."23 This was an explosive issue in the West Indies. The sugar lobby responded by re-organizing its campaign against impressment during the 1740s, which convinced Parliament to pass a new statute.

Known as the Sugar Act (19 Geo. II, c. 30 [1746]), it banned impressment in the West

Indies without the express permission of colonial governors. The specific exclusion from that statute of the mainland American colonies meant that impressment was still legal there, though vigorously contested.24

Since the outbreak of war in 1739, the Navy had sought colonial permission to press sailors in Massachusetts, despite the Crown law officers' reports that no such permission was needed. However, as desertion increased in the 1740s, Governor William

Shirley of Massachusetts was pressured by the Navy to pursue deserters and supply warships with replacements. He cooperated with the Navy but insisted upon safeguards for his colony. He issued government certificates to protect Massachusetts's trade and residents from impressment, and when it came time to press on shore, Shirley ensured that sheriffs and local officials headed the operation. To Shirley's chagrin, his efforts in regulating naval recruitment opened up an imperial-provincial cleavage in Massachusetts, where in the popular mind the colonial government was seen to be in collusion with

British military agencies. The manning debate hinged on three issues: colonial

46 jurisdiction over impressment on land, exemption to inhabitants of Massachusetts, and protection for coasting and fishing vessels. Popular protests erupted in Boston when these customs were broken, and the situation was aggravated by high levels of naval desertion in the American colonies. For instance, HMS Astrea lost fifty men to desertion in Boston in 1741, and Captain James Scott responded by pressing men from coasting and fishing vessels. A crowd surrounded Scott's lodgings and he was lucky to escape unharmed, though he continued to press sailors from coasters the following spring. One of the pressed men was an employee of Thomas Hutchinson, a young merchant and politician in

Boston. Hutchinson responded by spearheading a campaign against impresssment in

Massachusetts. Meanwhile, the Assembly and Council sent a joint petition to Shirley complaining about this "intolerable Violence." A short time later Shirley negotiated the release of Massachusetts residents, as well as the sailors taken from coasting and fishing vessels, and generally he was successful in restricting impressment to foreign seafarers in the mid-1740s.25

Shirley also played a leading role in the Louisbourg expedition of 1745, which required huge numbers of men. The Massachusetts Assembly agreed to raise 3000 land and sea forces for the siege; it also tolerated the impressment of 200 foreign sailors, and there was a series of intense recruitment drives in Boston leading up to the mission. The conquest of Cape Breton turned out to be bittersweet for Massachusetts. In addition to friction between British regulars and colonial forces, the conquest ensured that more warships visited Boston and coastal Massachusetts than ever before. The Admiralty created the North American squadron in 1745 and based it at Louisbourg; however, because the fortress town and the surrounding settlements could not provide it with

47 supplies, warships were sent to Boston instead. There the squadron received repairs, entered recruits, and hospitalized its sick and wounded.26 Tensions flared when the Cape

Breton warships pressed mariners at Boston and hundreds of provincial seamen fled to

Rhode Island and New York to avoid the Navy. Peter Warren,

American squadron, reflected that because of mass desertions and violence stemming from impressments at Boston, it would be safer for warships to refit at Louisbourg. He also noted the confusion surrounding the Sixth of Anne in Massachusetts, where colonial authorities argued that it was still in force.27 Impressment damaged Massachusetts's trade and commerce as well. Indeed, historians such as Joel A. Shufro have accepted at face value merchants' complaints that impressment led to the economic decline of Boston in the mid-eighteenth century, especially in its dearth of sailors, rising wages, and high prices for food and firewood.

Naval-civilian relations exploded in Boston in 1746 when a press gang operated illegally on shore. It killed two Louisbourg veterans, and a crowd assembled to carry out vigilante justice. The public complained about the "Behaviour of the Officers, who with their lawless Rabble like Ruffians entered the Houses of the Inhabitants in the Night, have committed Murders, particularly upon two brave Men who had been in constant

Service in the late Expedition against Cape-Breton."29 The Boston town meeting went on the offensive against impressment following this incident. It argued that Shirley's press warrants, which allowed the Navy to land press gangs supervised by provincial authorities on shore, were not only a breach of the Massachusetts Charter and the Sixth of

Anne, but also of Magna Carta. Shirley conceded that the Charter prevented him from sending Massachusetts residents out of the province, but he argued that he had upheld

48 this tenet, forbidding the Navy from pressing inhabitants and the crews of coasting vessels. Anger over the American colonies' exclusion from the Sugar Act in 1746 combined with fallout from the conquest of Louisbourg to produce a series of impressment reforms in Massachusetts. Press warrants were still issued, but they now had more checks and balances than Shirley's earlier initiatives. Protected groups included a range of inhabitants of Massachusetts: Louisbourg veterans, who were seen as local heroes; colonial fishermen; sailors in out-going merchantmen; coasting crews, which brought food and firewood into Boston; and sailors in government transports, particularly those servicing Cape Breton. Finally, after March 1746 Massachusetts authorities refused to issue warrants for landing press gangs on shore.

Louisbourg and its Aftermath

Sailors were first pressed in Nova Scotia during the 1740s, when the North

American squadron was established there. Vice-Admiral Isaac Townsend, commander of naval forces at Cape Breton, received complaints in 1746 that New England captains were secreting naval deserters out of the island. This was a problem because British military forces at Louisbourg depended on New England shipping for lumber and provisions. In retaliation, Townsend warned Shirley that unless this "base behaviour" was stopped, he would replace the deserters by pressing men from New England vessels. This could ruin their voyages. Their behaviour was even "more vile" because of Townsend's generosity "to the People of the several Colonies, by declaring, none of their Men should be impress'd into his Majesty's Service, which has been religiously observ'd on my side."31 He sent the governor a list of the deserters and their descriptions, hoping some of

49 them could be rounded up in Boston. Shirley expressed his concern at the behaviour of

New England masters trading at Louisbourg, and he told the admiral that he would do everything in his power to stop "a practice so scandalous and pernicious to His Majesty's

Service." He promised to issue a proclamation to discourage the practice, as well as to conduct an investigation in Boston and to push for convictions of the masters in question.

Captured deserters would be sent back to Cape Breton.

Impressment may have deterred some New Englanders from venturing to Cape

Breton, especially sailors, but there is little evidence that Townsend's correspondence with Shirley became public knowledge. A more serious threat to naval-civilian relations on the Atlantic periphery was Cape Breton's new governor, Charles Henry Knowles, and his disdain for all things New England. Knowles was a poor choice as governor.

Whereas his predecessor, Peter Warren, praised Louisbourg as a valuable asset to the

Navy, Knowles condemned it as the "most miserable ruinous place" he had ever seen.

The harbour was "very indifferent both as to anchoring and security against winds," and he dismissed Warren's proposal to make it a rendezvous for American and West Indian convoys. Nor did the climate agree with Knowles's constitution. Even more striking was the governor's abhorrence of New Englanders: he described them as "rum sellers," including William Pepperrell, the Massachusetts commander of the Louisbourg expedition.34 He was disgusted by the town upon his arrival: "The confused, dirty, beastly condition I found this place in is not to be expressed." People were living in half- destroyed huts, burying their dead under the floors, and piling "their filth in the other corners" rather than relieving themselves outdoors.35

50 Knowles's contempt for New Englanders was even more pronounced when it came to impressment. Warren had deep personal connections to the American colonies: he held several commands in America, had businesses there, his wife was from New

York, and several of his children were born in Boston. He was in tune with American politics and sensitive to colonial attitudes toward impressment. Knowles, by contrast, had none of these connections and no interest in colonial politics. Warren cautioned

Knowles against offending New Englanders, as they could refuse to supply the British garrison with provisions. This would have made the British stronghold on Cape Breton virtually untenable. He recommended that Knowles show "what lenity you can" regarding impressment. Warren had dealt skillfully with desertion and impressment during the siege in 1745, and he intervened after Knowles pressed two New Englanders at Louisbourg in 1746. When Townsend sailed from Cape Breton that October, Knowles assumed temporary command Of the North American squadron, and he made good on his predecessor's threat to New England captains - deserters would be replaced by impressment from colonial vessels, or from naval manning drives in Massachusetts. As a result, the Navy had a difficult time convincing New Englanders to travel to Louisbourg, where impressment loomed and they were at the mercy of officials like Knowles.

Impressment contributed to the stunting of the settlement of Louisbourg during the

British occupation.38

Knowles resigned his governorship in Cape Breton only to ignite an impressment riot in Boston in 1747. Thomas Hutchinson described the Knowles Riot, as it became known, as the most serious popular disturbance in the American colonies before the

Stamp Act riots in 1765. Knowles reacted to desertion from his ships in Massachusetts

51 Bay by pressing nearly fifty seamen. The result was a three-day-long demonstration. A crowd kidnapped several of Knowles's officers, threatened the governor's home with destruction, broke windows in the Assembly house, and burnt a barge on Boston

Common. Shirley's attempt to disperse the crowd failed, and he retreated to Castle Island to negotiate with Knowles, whose first inclination was to bombard the city. The crowd assembled before Knowles had a chance to inspect the recruits, and possibly to release the natives of Massachusetts. Rumours circulated that over 300 men had been pressed, many of them locals, and that all of this had occurred illegally on shore. Eventually, the negotiations succeeded, the local militia restored order, the naval officers were released, and the pressed Massachusetts residents were discharged from the Navy. Knowles sparked the riot in the first place by ignoring Massachusetts's colonial impressment regulations: he failed to distinguish between provincial and foreign sailors, incoming and outgoing vessels (including coasters), and men were taken on shore without colonial permission. As a sign of the tension between the Navy and Massachusetts, Hutchinson noted that Knowles was merely the latest naval officer to sail out of Boston "to the joy of the rest of the town."40 Denver Brunsman recently published a fascinating essay on

Knowles's role in igniting a series of impressment riots throughout the Atlantic world in the 1740s but, unfortunately, he glossed over the admiral's stint as governor of Cape

Breton, which is essential to the larger story.41

After the Knowles Riot, Massachusetts refused to cooperate with the Navy and impressment was confined to the sea. A young Samuel Adams defended the Boston crowd in 1747 in terms of Lockean principles in the Independent Advertiser, when government failed to protect the people from arbitrary impressment, a state of nature was

52 created, and the people were at liberty to defend themselves as they pleased. Shirley explained the troubling escalation of naval-civilian disputes to the British government, from the colony's perspective. He emphasized in particular the confusion surrounding the

Sixth of Anne. He argued that other colonies, such as Rhode Island and New York, should face the same impressment burden as Massachusetts. No action was taken, but the

Duke of Bedford wrote to the Admiralty in 1748 to explain that King George II had approved of a plan to obviate impressment in particular American colonies. This was to be communicated to the governors personally, but the war ended before anything materialized.43 Despite the return of peace in 1748, Massachusetts set out to restore privileges that had been undermined by the Sugar Act in 1746. For instance, the

Massachusetts Committee on Affairs relating to Great Britain requested its colonial assembly in 1749 to apply to the British government to protect all persons coming into

Boston from impressment into the Navy.44

Impressment was confined to incoming vessels in Massachusetts during the Seven

Years War. When a naval captain breached colonial regulations in 1756, by pressing men from coasting and fishing vessels, the General Court asked Hutchinson to protest formally to the British government. In his protest, Hutchinson concentrated on the economic impact of impressment, and asked specifically for coasting and fishing vessels to be officially exempt from the Navy. He also argued that impressment violated the

Massachusetts Charter. Although sympathetic, British officials refused to give

Massachusetts a privilege that other American colonies did not enjoy, and as a result local authorities withheld their support for impressment. In one move, the Massachusetts

Assembly sanctioned impressment for the provincial warship King-George, and then

53 cited its utility in defending the coast to try to convince the Navy to exempt fishing vessels from the press.45 In 1757, the community of Martha's Vineyard petitioned for an exemption from impressment because most of its male population was employed in whaling and fishing vessels. This was not granted, but the Navy generally accommodated colonial needs during the Seven Years War, and in 1757 the Assembly thanked Rear-

Admiral Francis Holburne for his cooperation in "disapproving of impressing our seamen at a time when the province is under so many burthens, and the effects of former impresses upon our Trade and Navigation are still remaining."46 Massachusetts's protests kept press gang disturbances to a minimum in the 1750s and convinced the Navy to abide by impressment regulations forged by Shirley and other colonial officials during the

1740s. Impressment continued in Massachusetts, but Governor Thomas Pownall alleviated grievances by dissuading the Navy from pressing Massachusetts residents.

Instead, it was New York that experienced most of the impressment disturbances during the Seven Years War.47

Although Neil Stout, Jesse Lemisch, William Pencak, Gary Nash, Douglas Leach and other colonial American historians have long highlighted impressment's controversial history in New England, none of them investigated its political legacy in the

North Atlantic world. In addition to the movement of people and goods, recent Atlantic historiography has also concentrated on maritime communications and the flow of news and ideology. Ian Steele, Bernard Bailyn, David Armitage, and Kenneth Banks are at the front ranks of this literary trend.49 Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker have contended that resistance to impressment was part of a larger working-class consciousness in the

Atlantic world. The Knowles Riot in 1747 and the battles over impressment in America

54 in the 1760s were integral to this culture of resistance. Meanwhile, Denver Brunsman focuses specifically on impressment in the British Atlantic world. He uses cases studies of press gangs in the American colonies, the West Indies, and the British Isles to argue that impressment was an 'evil necessity' that the Atlantic Ocean made common to all seafarers. However, Brunsman skimmed over the northern colonies of Nova Scotia and

Newfoundland, and failed to detect that the contours of resistance to impressment in

Massachusetts in the 1740s were transferred to Nova Scotia by the planters in the

1760s.51 And while the planters have been the subject of considerable scholarly analysis recently, led by Margaret Conrad and a series of planter studies conferences held at

Acadia University, historians have not picked up on the planters' formative role in

CO battling the Navy in their new homeland. The following section, and much of this chapter, concentrates on the connection between Massachusetts and Nova Scotia. While the economics of that relationship have been examined by prominent historians such as

John Bartlet Brebner and George Rawlyk, this is the first study of planters and press gangs in Nova Scotia.53

Planters and Press Gangs

In 1758 the Board of Trade ordered Governor Charles Lawrence to call Nova

Scotia's first elected assembly. This paved the way for New England's settlement of

Nova Scotia. The population of the northern American colonies exploded in the mid- eighteenth century and thousands of families moved into the interior: for example, between 1760 and 1775 some 200 new towns were established in New Hampshire,

Vermont, and Maine alone. The migration of New Englanders to Nova Scotia was thus an

55 extension of regional population dynamics. Many planters could avoid the pioneering experience that their cousins faced in the Appalachian frontier because the deportation of the left open some of the richest agricultural lands in the Atlantic region. On 12

October, only a few weeks after the fall of Louisbourg, Lawrence issued a proclamation inviting prospective settlers to Nova Scotia. It was published in the Boston Gazette and circulated widely throughout New England. The governor emphasized that the French had been driven from Cape Breton for good and he highlighted the value of the vacated

Acadian farmlands. Early in 1759 he issued a second proclamation, which outlined what settlers could expect in Nova Scotia: 100 acres of land to each head of household, with fifty additional acres for each family member and servant; two elected representatives from each township in the House of Assembly; a legal system similar to New England's; and freedom of religion for Puritans and other Protestant dissenters.54

This sparked much interest in New England, particularly in southern Connecticut.

Grantees in that colony sent a five-man delegation to survey the Bay of Fundy and to negotiate terms with the provincial government. Appearing before Lawrence and the

Executive Council, they asked a number of questions about land ownership and quit rents, which were answered to their satisfaction.55 However, the delegates also asked if they would be free from impressment into the Navy, for a period often years. The

Council answered in the affirmative, stating that it was their intention to promote the peopling of Nova Scotia, and that impressment "would be a means of retarding rather than forwarding" that objective.56 An early condition of residency in Nova Scotia was thus freedom from the Navy, at least for the planters. With the return of the Connecticut agents, news of their negotiations spread rapidly. This led to the formation of immigrant

56 societies in Massachusetts and Rhode Island. These groups sent their own delegations to

Halifax to clarify these policies, including the exemption from impressment. Press gangs sparked outrage in New England during the mid-eighteenth century and it is no surprise that the planters brought these cultural experiences to Nova Scotia. They believed that the Massachusetts Charter, along with laws and customs developed by

Shirley and other colonial officials, protected natives of Massachusetts from the Navy.

There is evidence that immunity from impressment was a motive for some New

Englanders who put down roots in Nova Scotia, especially in coastal communities that were remote from Halifax. They also wanted to avoid the growing restrictions and taxes of the imperial government.58 Between 1759 and 1767, nearly 8000 New Englanders settled on the south shore of Nova Scotia, in the , and on the north shore of the Bay of Fundy.59

Naval recruitment was rare in Nova Scotia during the Seven Years War. Halifax was still in its infancy, the population was small, movement in and out of the province was monitored by the provincial government, and the maritime labour force was minuscule.60 Most sailors were employed in government transports and off-limits to the

Navy. The London merchant John Henneker was contracted in the 1750s to supply the

Halifax Navy Yard with New England masts, and his crews were also protected. Vessels in government service carried exemptions for their men.61 Sailors serving in the armed vessels of the Nova Scotia government in the eighteenth century, or the sea militia, as

W.A.B. Douglas has described them, were also immune from impressment.62 Volunteers were almost unheard of in Nova Scotia in this period and captains turned to New England to bolster their complements. Impressment was also rare, particularly on shore, but one

57 exception occurred in Halifax in September 1757. Rear-Admiral Francis Holburae was desperate for men after American governors turned down his pleas for help. He reported to the Admiralty that he was "reduced to the necessity of making a Press at Halifax."63

Boats were manned and armed in the middle of the night, and returned before dawn with a number of pressed men. The results were disappointing. The manning problem was so intense that Holburne went against protocol and retained sailors from government transports, with orders to replace them with men released from the hospital. Holburne discharged sailors from coasting and provisioning vessels, and those with ties to Nova

Scotia were exempt from impressment. This special status may have preceded the arrival of the planters.64

The policy of the Nova Scotia government was to protect its inhabitants from the

Navy. For instance, in 1761 Lieutenant-Governor Jonathan Belcher issued a protection to the ten-man crew of the sloop Colvill, which was carrying papers to the British government - some from Lord Alexander Colvill, commander-in-chief of the North

American squadron. The sailors were exempt from impressment because they were

"Inhabitants and Settlers of this Province."65 Two years earlier, however, when the Lords of Trade asked the Admiralty for a protection certificate for Samuel Blackden to return to

Halifax from London, on the basis that he was an "Inhabitant of and Proprietor in Nova

Scotia," the request was denied.66 The Admiralty stated that its policy was not to grant individual protections, but it did offer to transport Blackden to Halifax in a warship, which "will be equal to a Protection."67

Following the Seven Years War, Nova Scotia authorities faced several cases like this one, and they were forced to examine who qualified as an inhabitant of the province.

58 A test case emerged in July 1763. The sailor John Monro petitioned Belcher, claiming to have been pressed into HMS Enterprise in violation of his constitutional rights. He asked

Belcher to get him discharged. Monro stated that "I am not Lawyer enough to be certain of the Limits of the Habeas Corpus, but I have been taught to look upon it as the

Hereditary Right of Britons that are not the refuse [of] the People."68 He had influential friends that would come to his defense and he expected to be heard. His conduct in the colony "had been attended with no Public Breach of the Laws, and.. .the little Business I performed in your Employment was executed with Fidelity."69 Monro did not specify what that business was and Belcher gave no indication that he knew the man. However, it was obvious that Monro was educated and Belcher handed the petition over to the

Council. A committee, including Judge Charles Morris, concluded that Monro had been discharged from a warship in Nova Scotia before this affair, and that "he is not, nor ever has been a settled Inhabitant in this Province." His application for discharge was improper. The committee also reported that habeas corpus did not apply to pressed sailors, but rather to prisoners in criminal cases with bail stipulated.71 Monro then petitioned the Admiralty for redress, on the basis that he had been pressed after the war was over. Colvill was told to investigate but it is unclear what he found out, or what happened to Monro.72 This case hints at what it meant to be a resident of Nova Scotia in this period. Monro was not a "settled Inhabitant," which suggests that to be a resident of

Nova Scotia one had to be living in the colony for some time, or own property there.73

Emboldened by powerful colonial assemblies, planters clung to the rights and customs they associated with documents such as the Massachusetts Charter, which included

n • 74 customary exemptions from impressment.

59 The Navy's manning problems in America were more acute after 1763 than during the Seven Years War. The peacetime Navy remained a powerful force in

American waters. For the first time it vigorously enforced the Navigation Acts, not only to combat smuggling but also to raise revenue for the British treasury.75 The Navy's effectiveness depended on its ability to keep the North American squadron properly manned. Desertion was a huge problem and customary impediments stood in the way of pressing sailors in peacetime. Taken together, they made the manning problem the

Navy's single greatest constraint before the American Revolution. Colonial merchants resented the Navy's role in policing trade, even entering into combinations to deprive warships of men, for instance in New York in 1767.7 At the same time, wages for merchant seafarers skyrocketed in the colonies, which led to wholesale desertions from the squadron.77 Captains began asking Colvill for permission to press sailors in early

1764. Worried about a reprimand, he informed the Admiralty of the deteriorating situation. Confessing that captains had already pressed sailors, Colvill made it clear that they had done so with prudence and discretion, and that he "never suffered any man to be impressed in the infant Colony of Nova Scotia."

Desertion was a serious problem in Nova Scotia. While sailors rarely ran away in

Halifax's early days, because they were intimidated by the surrounding wilderness and the hostility of the Mi'kmaq, desertion increased in the 1750s and 1760s and provincial authorities took measures to prevent it. In October 1755, for example, Vice-Admiral

Edward Boscawen complained to Governor Lawrence of the "many evil minded Persons" who secreted deserters from the fleet and helped them to escape. Lawrence and the

Council issued a proclamation to prevent further desertions, which included a reward of

60 five pounds to anyone who reported the harbouring of a deserter. Three years later the

House of Assembly made desertion one of its first orders of business. In the colonial statute 32 Geo. II, c. 12 (1758), persons convicted of harbouring or assisting deserters were subject to a fine of twenty pounds; and if they could not pay the fine, they would be imprisoned for six months, or for however long it took them to pay the fine. In addition, if a naval officer knew the hiding place of a deserter - in a dwelling house, for instance - he was to bring the matter before a magistrate. The magistrate would then issue a warrant to constables to search the building in the daytime, with only one naval officer in tow, either a lieutenant or . No seamen or marines were permitted on shore. At nighttime a magistrate would lead the search party personally. Initially, the statute was confined to the Seven Years War, but in 1759 the Assembly "found [it] to be very useful" and made it perpetual. Nova Scotia authorities flexed their authoritative muscle in claiming jurisdiction over searches for deserters on shore. These searches were often little more than covers for the Navy to land press gangs in town, or at least to combine the two operations. By limiting naval participation in these searches, Nova Scotia made a preemptive strike against impressment. The legislation's timing made sense: large numbers of warships stopped at Halifax between the conquests of Louisbourg and

Canada, Holburne sent press gangs into town the previous year, and Nova Scotia was trying to attract New England settlers, who had a long history of resistance to impressment.

Colvill blamed rum for high desertion rates in Halifax. He tried to rescind the licenses of the many grog shops around the Navy Yard, in which the provincial government cooperated. Parties of seamen that worked in the yard were reportedly

61 enticed by rum to run away and commit crimes.81 According to a settler from

Massachusetts in 1760, Halifax was overrun with public houses: "the business of one half of the town is to sell rum, and the other half to drink it."82 Colvill attempted to curb desertion with some of the harshest sentences ever meted out in the Navy. Writing to the

Admiralty, he reported that the "most severe punishments I ever knew have been inflicted, even six and seven hundred lashes a man have been given from ship to ship, so much were the courts martial convinced of the necessity of such severity."83 For instance,

Edward Lovely, a seaman onboard HMS Northumberland, Colvill's in 1761, was sentenced to receive 600 lashes for "absenting himself from duty," and suffered every single one of them. A handful of mariners were hanged for desertion at this time.84

In one case a naval seaman was murdered at Ketch Harbour while moving along the coast with a pack of deserters. Nova Scotia authorities offered a fifty pound reward for information leading to the conviction of the guilty parties, and Colvill offered a pardon to deserters who returned to the fleet, hoping that they would disclose information on the homicide, but there is no evidence that anyone was charged with this crime.85 Although statistics are unavailable, desertion was so frequent on the North American station, particularly the American seaboard, that some warships were bottled up in port, too weakly manned to venture to sea.86

To make matters worse for Colvill, a number of sailors were convicted of serious crimes in civilian courts. Halifax was a violent place in the 1760s and the military presence made it far worse, as soldiers and sailors were defendants in more than half of criminal trials.87 Courts of Session sent minor criminals to the Navy in Britain, but it is unclear how frequently this occurred in early Nova Scotia. There were at least two cases

62 in the Supreme Court. In fall 1754, the grand jury indicted Samuel Chip and his wife

Elizabeth for the robbery and assault of John Folliard. The couple would have been tried for highway robbery had Folliard showed up in court. While both were publicly whipped, with twenty lashes each on their bare backs, Elizabeth was released but her husband was detained. He was later "put on board a Man of War."88 As James Muir and Jim Phillips observed in a recent study, the legal basis for this punishment was unclear, "but it was likely an exercise of the royal prerogative of mercy. Unusually, since he had not been convicted, he was given a pardon and relief from possible further prosecution by

'agreeing' to serve in the navy."89 The legal basis of impressment as a form of criminal punishment may have been unclear in the statute books, but it was common enough in

Georgian Britain, especially in wartime. According to the legal historian Peter King, discretionary impressment was often used by magistrates to avoid criminal trials. This will be discussed at length in the following chapters.90 In places such as Halifax, which was home to a squadron of the Royal Navy, impressment held the added bonus of assisting the British military machine. Although it is unclear how frequently it occurred, the Navy received men from the Army from time to time, perhaps as an alternative to going to a military court martial. According to the soldier Elijah Estabrooks, who kept a diary of his travels during the Seven Years War, two Army deserters were put onboard a warship in Halifax harbour in November 1759. He does not suggest that this was an unusual way for the Army to deal with unruly soldiers.91

On 27 July 1754, HMS Vulture was searching for contraband in the Bay of Fundy when her boarding party was repelled by the Boston schooner Nancy and Sally. The schooner was illegally supplying the French with provisions at Fort Beausejour. It fired

63 into the Vulture's pinnace, manned by ten men, hitting John McDermott and Isaac Jolly in the head, and injuring several others. The Vulture had chased the schooner around the

Bay of Fundy for a day before it took refuge in Musquash Cove. Captain William Kenzie deemed the anchorage too shallow for the Vulture and sent the pinnace instead, which was met with musket and swivel gun fire. The New England sailors were warned that they could be hanged for firing on one of the King's vessels. In response, they warned the naval party "not to Come on board on the peril of [your] Lives." Once onboard, the boarding party was violently resisted, the smugglers fighting them with cutlasses and other weapons. Jolly was killed instantly, while McDermott died a few days later at

Annapolis Royal. Three of the schooner's sailors - Benjamin Street, Samuel Thornton, and John Pastree - were acquitted of murder in the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia later that year, in a politically-charged trial. They were convicted of the lesser sentence of manslaughter. John Hovey, master of the Nancy and Sally, and two other sailors, were found not guilty in separate trials. Chief Justice Jonathan Belcher was furious, telling the convicts that he thought them guilty of murder and that they should be executed. They were branded on the thumb and sentenced to nine months in prison. One of the defense's arguments was that the sailors resisted the Vulture's boarding party because they were afraid of being pressed into the Navy. Ironically, after serving the bulk of their prison sentences, they were punished again by being pressed into the Navy. Killing two naval seamen would have made them extremely unpopular in the service, which was likely

Belcher's intention.92

64 Sailors and Inhabitants

The residency question emerged again on 13 June 1775, when Governor Francis

Legge sought the Council's advice on "persons claiming the right of Inhabitants of this

Province in Order to Obtain Certificates for their safety as proprietors of fishing

Vessels."93 These petitions came in response to a British statute restraining New England trade. Initially, the Council deferred to Edward Coke, the famed jurist and champion of the common law in Tudor-Stuart England. They quoted a passage from the Institutes of the Laws of England:

Every person that dwelleth in any Shire, Riding, City, or Town corporate, though he hath but a personal Residence, yet is he said in Law to be an Inhabitant or a dweller there, as Servants &ca - But this Statute extendeth not to them, but to such as be Freeholders. And this is gather'd by the Words of the fourth branch of this Act [22 Henry VIII, c. 5 (1531)] that giveth the distress Vizt. - And to distrain every such Inhabitant &ca in his Lands, Goods & Chattels. And besides it were in a manner infinite & impossible, to tax by the next branch of this Act every Inhabitant being no Householder.94

The Council then issued certificates to four vessel owners: two had only become inhabitants several months before, while the other two, including Joseph Barss of

Liverpool, had been in the colony for several years.95 The following day the Council resolved that all future applicants had to make an official oath that they were inhabitants of Nova Scotia.96 At this point the Council requested Jonathan Belcher, now the chief justice, and Judge Charles Morris to give their opinion on what constituted an inhabitant of Nova Scotia.97

Not surprisingly, they crafted a more inclusive definition than Coke, who equated residency with freehold tenure and property ownership. In their opinion, "every Person" dwelling in a city, town or village was, "by his personal Residence," an inhabitant of

Nova Scotia. People who settled in Nova Scotia to prosecute trade, or to establish

65 businesses there, were "unquestionably and have always [been] adjudged Inhabitants," without a residency requirement. More specifically, New Englanders coming into the province were deemed inhabitants, provided that they were examined by the Council

no before being issued a certificate to that effect. Dozens of men took these oaths, particularly in Yarmouth and Liverpool, and they went before the Council to receive certificates. William Freeman and Gideon White, who became pillars in Nova Scotia society, were among those sworn in at Liverpool." On the one hand, the province tackled the residency question to protect fishing vessels and merchantmen from seizure by the

Navy, but, on the other hand, they must have known that a liberal definition would attract valuable settlers to Nova Scotia from the rebel colonies. The timing of this debate also coincided with the battle over impressment in Nova Scotia. This was no coincidence: colonial authorities knew that an inclusive definition of inhabitancy gave them legal and political justification for protecting its growing population from impressment. Licenses to inhabitants, particularly masters of vessels such as Thomas Clough of the schooner Polly, issued at Windsor in August 1775, were then used to shield crews from impressment into the Navy. In some cases, however, the system was blatantly abused. For instance, a number of these inhabitants were American patriots who obtained licenses to fish and trade off Nova Scotia without getting seized by the Navy.100

As early as December 1773, the Louisbourg merchant Lawrence Kavanagh complained to Governor Legge that a British warship had pressed men from his vessels at

Cape Breton.101 This was a sign of things to come. Impressment had not been a problem in Nova Scotia for some time, but during the American Revolution it occurred in the colony on a significant scale. There were a number of reasons for this: the planters' ten-

66 year exemption had expired; admirals and captains were likely ignorant of Colvill's policies during the Seven Years War, which protected inhabitants of Nova Scotia from impressment into the Navy; the colony's population had grown considerably, including the maritime population of the south shore; Halifax's merchants now owned a significant amount of domestic shipping, which required large numbers of seamen; hostile ports to the south made Halifax a northern base for dozens of warships; and these ships were short of men because of high desertion rates.102 While the Navy pressed colonial

Americans throughout the war, they were always security threats and captains looked elsewhere to replenish their complements. Nova Scotia was a logical choice, in terms of both geography and loyalty to Britain. Parliament also repealed the Sixth of Anne in

1775, and while that statute never became a political issue in Nova Scotia, its repeal cleared the way for the Admiralty to send press warrants to North America - for instance,

1 0^

250 arrived in one package in November 1776.

The evangelist Henry Alline wrote about impressment in Nova Scotia in his diary in 1775. Planning to visit New England that spring, Alline alluded to "young men being pressed to go to war."104 He resolved that staying in Nova Scotia, even though impressment was occurring there as well, was safer than traveling to New England by sea, and passing through the dozens of British warships patrolling Massachusetts Bay.

Similarly, David Bray, master of a Boston vessel returning home from Quebec, was stranded at Liverpool at this same. He was forced to leave the vessel there and find another passage home since the crew refused to go "because of the press at New

England."105 Only a couple of months later the Navy commenced an intense recruitment

67 drive in Nova Scotia. Bray's crew, and other sailors with no ties to Nova Scotia, became the main targets of the Navy.

On 4 August 1775, the Executive Council received a petition from John Prince,

Thomas Cochran and other Halifax merchants, complaining that sailors and fishermen were so afraid of impressment that trade had been disrupted. Fishing boats had been shot at to bring them to - opening holes in their sails and rigging - and one man was pressed while checking his nets. Another fisherman was pressed from his boat near Liverpool.

Unless remedies were found, the merchants argued, there would be disastrous consequences: the fishing industry would decline, the Halifax market would be deprived of food and supplies, and domestic shipping would be laid up due to a shortage of maritime labour. The Council informed the merchants that it regretted the

"inconvenience" and "ill consequences" of impressment, and it resolved to bring the issue before the admiral, "that he may give such Orders therein as may prevent such

Complaints for the future."106 Despite these protests impressment persisted in Nova

Scotia, particularly in Halifax harbour. For instance, a sailor named Daniel Streetland told the Massachusetts General Court in October 1775 that he had been conscripted from a schooner there earlier in the year. The Navy rowed a daily guard in Halifax harbour, as it did in other major ports, which provided captains with an excellent opportunity to press mariners from incoming vessels. This allowed the Navy to avoid sending press gangs on shore, which often sparked violence and assertions of colonial jurisdiction. As discussed in the next several chapters, guard boats were the vehicle through which most sailors were pressed in the North Atlantic world. This included Halifax and St. John's, the capitals of Nova Scotia and Newfoundland respectively.107

68 The impressment crisis came to a head in late October 1775 when the House of

Assembly formed a committee to petition the governor. Halifax was said to be in great distress from the pressing of seamen and fishermen the previous summer. When the

Council heard about this, it asked to form a joint committee, to present the address together - a rare moment of cooperation between the upper and lower houses. The

General Assembly called upon Legge to put a stop to impressment in Nova Scotia. The fishery was in dire straits, foreign and colonial trade was stagnant, and press gangs were scaring away Loyalist immigrants. The Assembly was thankful for favours given to

"Inhabitants of this Province" in the past, but there were few sailors left in Nova Scotia and impressment threatened to ruin maritime commerce. The complaint that warships also prevented coasters from bringing food and firewood into Halifax struck a sympathetic cord with Legge, who pleaded Nova Scotia's case to the Admiralty. He suggested that if an indulgence could be permitted in this case, it would boost Nova

Scotia's trade with the West Indies. The General Assembly instructed Legge to push for a blanket prohibition on impressment, and in the meantime to present the colony's case to the admiral at Boston, as well as to his captains in Nova Scotia.109

He received a favourable response from Vice-Admiral Samuel Graves at Boston in early December. "It is far from my intention," he declared, "to distress the Inhabitants of Nova Scotia," but it was his duty, and the duty of all of his captains, to keep the North

American squadron manned. "The Province of Nova Scotia," Graves hoped, "contains

Natives sufficient for its own Commerce, [and] these I am content to exempt from being impressed, but I insist upon every old Countryman being taken under the above restrictions."110 British seafarers were his priority, and they had to be pressed wherever

69 they could be found.111 Privately, Graves reflected that the exemption to "Natives of

Nova Scotia" was more than the squadron could bear, and was only intended to reassure the colony that its maritime commerce would be protected.112 He gave these orders to

Marriot Arbuthnot, the new commissioner of the Halifax Navy Yard, who had written to

Graves a few weeks before that Nova Scotia was in such a clamour over impressment that it might refuse to supply the military with provisions. Arbuthnot had sent Graves the

Assembly's address to Legge as well as a letter from Halifax's merchants asking for protection for domestic shipping. Graves reminded Arbuthnot that the Sixth of Anne was repealed and that "Captains of the Ships are to let no Opportunity slip of getting

Seamen."113 Even more, "I expect you will encourage pressing such men for the Fleet as are not Inhabitants of Nova Scotia."114 Graves even stated that Nova Scotians could be taken as well, "if there shall be a necessity for them."115

Graves dismissed the merchants' threats, since provisioning vessels were

"constantly protected" in North America. The Nova Scotia government also protected these vessels, such as the sloop Sillery in August 1775, which brought provisions from

Quebec to feed the Army in Nova Scotia. Reporting to the Admiralty, however, Graves was furious about the situation in Nova Scotia and railed against its "disaffected

Persons," particularly the New Englanders. Emigration from Massachusetts ensured that their numbers increased daily, and once in Nova Scotia they would use injuries to trade as a pretense to "clamour against Pressing."116 Graves stated that they had done the same in previous wars and he questioned their loyalty to the Crown. Nor was he pleased with

Arbuthnot, though he gave the naval commissioner the benefit of the doubt that he had

"not fully considered the Matter when he interested himself to the disadvantage of the

70 Fleet."117 Graves informed Legge that the squadron could only make up the deficiencies caused by desertion, sickness, and death by impressment. This was the case in Nova

Scotia and elsewhere in North America. While he was content to leave Nova Scotians alone, "for the present," other seafarers had to be taken into the service by force. Graves reiterated that warships needed to be manned properly to perform their duties in Nova

Scotia, including protecting the colony from Yankee depredations. Situating the manning debate in terms of maritime defense, Graves warned Legge that the exemption to Nova

Scotians was a privilege and not a right - in fact, it was "rather more than the present weak state of the Squadron will justify."118

HMS Senegal in Liverpool

In the middle of this debate, Graves dispatched HMS Senegal to Liverpool to recruit sailors. It arrived on 26 December and wintered there. Captain William

Duddingston was ordered to inspect vessels arriving from Europe, as they were rumoured to be carrying supplies and intelligence for American forces. He was also told to replenish the Senegal's complement at Liverpool, as well as to recruit generally for the service: if he received more than thirty seamen above his complement, Duddingston was to bring them back to the fleet at Boston. Volunteers were preferred, but if none were available, Duddingston was to press instead, "but you are not to press seamen that are

Inhabitants of Nova Scotia."119 Not surprisingly, no volunteers came forward and

Duddingston resorted to impressment. In late December the Senegal pressed two men traveling from Liverpool to Lunenburg, while a couple of days later Duddingston conscripted two men from another vessel.120 A month after this the warship pressed a

71 passenger from a Liverpool ship returning home from the West Indies, and to add insult to injury, the Senegal inadvertently spread smallpox in the community.121 The threat of impressment caused such a panic in Liverpool that on 15 March 1776, Duddingston asked the merchant Simeon Perkins to spread the word that inhabitants of Nova Scotia had nothing to fear. Nor would men be pressed from fishing and coasting vessels, as this was against the admiral's specific orders.122

Duddingston was not true to his word. About a week later a Yarmouth vessel on its way to Halifax put into nearby Herring Cove (now Brooklyn) to escape bad weather, only to find the Senegal lying at anchor. The Congregationalist minister Jonathan Scott was a passenger in the vessel and wrote about his stay in Liverpool in his journal.

Contrary winds kept the vessel in Herring Cove, where the following day a local resident came aboard and told the crew that the Senegal had pressed fifteen men since it had arrived in Liverpool, "and would undoubtedly press some of our people."123 "This filled us with concern," Scott remembered, "but it was too late for us to make our escape as we lay close by the Ship [the Senegal]."12 Soon thereafter, Duddingston seized the schooner and detained the crew. Upon hearing of this development while preaching in Liverpool,

Scott went onboard the Senegal and pleaded with its captain to release the men.

Duddingston agreed to release two crewmembers, "but he would not release Thomas

Perry by any means, because he was a young man and had no family."125 The young naval captain did not seem to care that this was in direct contravention of Graves's orders not to press "Inhabitants of Nova Scotia." Scott also spoke with Thomas Salter, another

Yarmouth man, onboard the Senegal and tried to comfort him. Salter was "full of tears,"

72 as Scott painfully remembered, having been pressed by Duddingston about six weeks earlier.126

Duddingston condemned the schooner as rebel property, since its only register was from New England. The schooner had a three-man crew and two passengers, including Scott. Duddingston sent the two older sailors on shore but pressed Thomas

Perry into the service. Even if Duddingston released the vessel, with such a small crew the impressment of one man may have been enough to ruin the voyage. Scott went onboard to console the young man, but who was now "overwhelmed with grief and tears." Scott gave Perry some advice and left him "in the greatest sorrow imaginable."128 Before finding a voyage to Halifax, Scott wrote Duddingston twice in an effort to get Perry discharged. While in the Nova Scotia capital, Scott wrote a declaration on behalf of Perry and left it with James Monk, Yarmouth's representative in the

Assembly and the solicitor general of Nova Scotia. It is unknown if Perry was released.

As this case demonstrates, impressment was a life-altering experience for many young men and Duddingston's duplicity terrified coastal Nova Scotia.129

Many of the men pressed into the Navy in Nova Scotia, especially residents of the colony, had familial or business connections to secure their release. For instance, early in

1782 the Liverpool schooner Ranger sailed for the West Indies. Encountering strong winds, the master, Elisha Hopkins, put into Port Roseway, where he had the misfortune to find HMS Atalanta. The warship pressed three of his mariners, including the mate,

Benjamin Freeman. Although one of the sailors gave the warship "the Slip," the other two, Freeman and James McLearn, were taken to Halifax. While some pressed men served in the Navy indefinitely, and often died there, Freeman and McLearn had

73 connections that ensured their discharge about a week later. News traveled fast on Nova

Scotia's south shore. After their impressments, Hopkins returned to Liverpool and told his story to Simeon Perkins, who wrote the Halifax merchant Thomas Cochran to get the sailors released. Cochran had recently been Liverpool's member in the Assembly and

Perkins told him to play hard ball with the Navy. He may have threatened a law suit.

Once discharged, Freeman and McLearn returned home over land, evidently a safer mode of travel in coastal Nova Scotia during the Revolution. McLearn had a wife and family to support, and in an act of desperation his mother traveled to Halifax to lobby for his release. For his part, Hopkins returned to Liverpool to get more sailors, before setting out

1 ^n for the Caribbean a second time. Sailors in Nova Scotia, as elsewhere in the North

Atlantic world, realized that impressment was an occupational hazard; while there was always a chance of running into captains like Duddingston, who did not play by the rules, if they had not chanced impressment then Nova Scotia's trade and economy would have come to standstill.

Duddingston did the Navy no favours in Liverpool with his heavy-handed searches for contraband. Vessels were seized and crews taken into custody, and on several occasions naval parties received warrants to search merchant houses on shore.

Duddingston was even made a magistrate of Queen's County for this purpose. In one case about thirty-five sailors and marines came on shore and many of them returned to the Senegal drunk. Duddingston also seized a number of vessels as prizes in Herring

Cove, said to have "Rebel Property" onboard, and sent them to the vice admiralty court in

Halifax for adjudication. The crews were taken out and there was a good chance that they were later pressed into the Navy. For example, the Liberty arrived in Liverpool on 1

74 February from the Mediterranean; Duddingston took the into custody and detained all hands except for the mate and a "Negro". There is no indication that these men were released. All told, the Senegal was in Liverpool for about three months and impressment

1 "\ 1 loomed as a threat the entire time.

Warships pressed men elsewhere in Nova Scotia, usually during coastal cruises.

For example, the armed naval vessel Canceaux sent a boat ashore to press at Canso in

1776, although without success.132 Similarly, after an abortive trip to Island of St. John in

1776, where he intended to settle, Thomas Curtis took passage on a merchantman home to England. Calling at Canso, its master was interrogated by a small British warship.

Curtis's vessel escaped under protests and gunfire from the warship, which, according to

Curtis, "had been recruiting in Nova Scotia and had got about 60 Very Rag[g]ed looking men." 3 It is unclear if this was a recruiting party from the Navy or some Army regiment, but warships routinely cruised along the south coast and in the Bay of Fundy looking for men. Outside of Halifax, this was the Navy's best chance to press sailors in

Nova Scotia. As discussed in Chapter 3, when settlement expanded in the early nineteenth century, seaports such as Pictou and Saint John also became fruitful places for naval recruitment.

Fishing villages such as Liverpool were the favourite hunting ground of the Navy in Nova Scotia. In May 1777, HMS Blonde chased the French warship Due de Choiseul into Liverpool harbour, where it intentionally ran aground. It was carrying uniforms, muskets and provisions for the Continental Army, and there were a number of suspicious passengers onboard who were facilitating the American war effort before France officially joined the conflict. It is possible, as some writers have suggested, that the

75 French warship planned to rendezvous with American privateers off Nova Scotia.

Captain John Milligen of the Blonde cooperated with Simeon Perkins in recovering items from the wreck. While on shore Milligen pressed two men into the Blonde. Perkins breakfasted with Milligen aboard the Blonde the following morning and convinced the captain to release one of these men. The other, John Doliver, was kept aboard the Blonde to go on a cruise, after which Milligen promised to release him.134 Similarly, only a few months after the Atalanta pressed some of Liverpool's sailors in 1782, including James

McLearn, Captain Brett was dispatched to the Bay of Fundy with direct orders to fill his complement and "raise Seamen and to bear them as Supernumeraries for the Fleet."135

Andrew Snape Hamond seemed to think that Brett would "meet with many men who will chuse to enter for His Majesty's Service," but failing this, he was to "lose no opportunity of impressing any Seamen."136

Colonial Resistance to Impressment

The manning problem began to intensify in Nova Scotia in 1776. On 16 April,

Vice-Admiral Molyneux Shuldham reported that warships were undermanned in Halifax, and that the slump in trade rendered press warrants from the Admiralty ineffectual.137

That was not completely true, however, for a couple of months later he directed the new lieutenant governor, Marriot Arbuthnot, to continue the practice of pressing every fifth man out of vessels coming into Halifax harbour.138 Arbuthnot reported in July that HMS

Mercury was ready for sea, but the crew was in an "enfeebled Condition," "very sickly & short of Complement."139 This was a frequent complaint during the war. Indeed, state and condition reports indicate that warships were routinely short significant numbers of men

76 in North America. In fact, they became so desperate for men that they began to press

American prisoners from New England cartels, Vessels given neutral status for transporting prisoners of war. The Admiralty authorized this practice early in the war.

Undermanned warships carried large numbers of American prisoners as supernumeraries.

Many rebels were skilled sailors, and because Britain did not acknowledge American sovereignty, they were also considered to be British subjects. Shuldham argued that "no confidence can be placed in them," and unless distributed throughout the service and constantly replaced with sailors from Britain, a dangerous situation could arise on the

North American station.141 He discouraged the practice and urged the Admiralty to bolster marine contingents on warships in North America. The Admiralty did send reinforcements, such as the 120 sailors who arrived aboard HMS Pembroke in November.

One reason for the hot presses that occurred throughout the British Isles in late 1776 and early 1777 was to send sailors to North America.142

American masters complained that British warships pressed sailors from cartels sailing into Halifax under flags of truce. For example, the schooner Sally entered Halifax with British prisoners in 1776, only to be made a prize and have her crew put onboard a man-of-war. Similarly, on 16 October, HMS Lizard pressed eighteen American prisoners from a cartel on its way out of Halifax.143 Captured Americans were detained in prison ships such as the Lord Stanley in Halifax harbour. There was always the danger that naval captains, frustrated by the manning situation in Nova Scotia, would draft recruits from these hulks.144 Not only were American sailors afraid to go to Halifax in cartel ships, where they could be pressed into the British Navy, but authorities in New England questioned Britain's intentions during prisoner exchanges. The Boston newspaper

77 Independent Chronicle was up in arms in February 1777 when a British cartel arrived in the harbour with only fourteen prisoners onboard, even though more than 200 were at

Halifax and the British still owed New England some fifty men. "These Circumstances," cried the newspaper, "create Suspicions that there is some secret Design in sending this

Flag."145 It charged that the crew of the British cartel should not "be allowed to come on

Shore, and walk at large."146 About this time a person arrived in Boston from Halifax, who reported that he and thirteen New England prisoners on board the "British Pirate" ship HMS Renown, were actually forced to man its boats and attack an American warship.147 According to this person, the "Pirates put those Sons of America in the Front of the Battle to Cover themselves, whereby some of our Sons were Slain by their

Friends!"148 The ContinentalJournal, another Boston newspaper, published a rallying cry: "Remember this O Americans, and let your Justice whet her Sword to Revenge the innocent Blood of your murdered Children."149

The revolutionary cause in Boston received a steady flow of spies and intelligence from Halifax.150 One man returning to Boston in June 1777 reported to the Independent

Chronicle that a British squadron had recently sailed for the New England coast, though the ships "are very poorly manned, and one-third of them by American sailors, whom they compel to enter their service."151 Shortly after this, ten American sailors escaped from the Lord Stanley and made their way to Cape Ann. They were reportedly among seventy-five American prisoners who had been drafted to man HMS Rainbow, HMS

Milford, and the naval brig Cabot}52 British officials at Halifax refused to include "old countrymen," or sailors who had been born in the British Isles, in cartel exchanges, regardless of whether they lived in the Thirteen Colonies. Some of the escapees reported

78 that the British "compel them at the point of bayonet, to go on board their pirate ships, as seamen."153 To make matters worse, Vice-Admiral Richard Lord Howe, commander-in- chief of naval forces in North America, ordered his captains to burn American prizes at sea and to press their crews. Their cargoes were not deemed valuable enough to warrant sending prize crews into vice admiralty courts, therein temporarily depriving warships of manpower.154 Later in the war impressment from cartels dropped considerably, if not halted altogether. American complaints on this subject ceased, despite the fact that the

British took far more prisoners than did their enemy. Sometimes it was the British who complained about American tactics in prisoner exchanges. In November 1777, for example, while arranging an exchange with Massachusetts authorities, commodore

George Collier stated that an American privateer had previously sailed into Windsor

"under the Name of a Cartel," but was there for the "most villainous Purposes."155 If this happened again, he threatened, they would be treated as spies and "suffer accordingly."156

Nor were the British alone in raiding cartels for seafarers; the Americans did the same thing, entering and even pressing British prisoners from cartels and merchantmen on the high seas.157 For the most part, however, cartels operated smoothly between Halifax and

Boston later in the war, and with prisoners on both sides confined up to six months, they

1 SS were relieved to be set free.

Arbuthnot was appointed the acting governor of Nova Scotia after Legge departed the colony in May 1776. He became the first of three successive naval officers to serve as lieutenant governor during the American war.159 From the Navy's perspective, this must have offered hope that impressment would meet with less resistance, but trouble was on the horizon. While the Admiralty conceded that too much impressment was counter-

79 productive, the squadron continued to press sailors in Nova Scotia, without seeking colonial permission. This prompted Lieutenant-Governor Richard Hughes to issue a proclamation in December 1778 (see Appendix 2). The terms of the debate had now shifted: the issue was no longer the impressment of inhabitants of Nova Scotia, who had officially been protected since 1775, but rather jurisdiction over press gangs on shore.

Admiralty warrants permitted impressment in Nova Scotia's harbours and on the high seas, but sending press gangs into town sparked outrage and provincial resistance, just as it had in Massachusetts during the 1740s. Hughes, a former naval officer, condemned the

Navy's disregard for Colonial authority, especially since press gangs on shore were

"frequently attended with Quarrels and Bloodshed and the loss of Life."160 Unlike the

Assembly in 1775, Hughes did not lobby for unrealistic goals, such as a prohibition on impressment or immunity for domestic shipping. He established regulations instead, to protect Halifax from social unrest in the future. Press gangs were forbidden to operate in town without colonial permission, and searches for deserters were illegal unless sanctioned by the magistracy, according to the provincial statute discussed above.

Hughes wanted impressment confined to Halifax harbour and he threatened criminal prosecution for non-compliance.161 However, the following summer a nasty brawl erupted on the Halifax waterfront between a press gang and local residents. Hughes took the same stance as the year before and re-printed his proclamation against unregulated impressment.162

All was relatively quiet until January 1781, when the grand jury issued a presentment against the Navy. It came in response to a riot sparked by press gangs marching through Halifax "in Contempt of all civil Authority," tying people's "Hands

80 behind their Backs, [and] carr[ying] them through the Streets like Malefactors." Naval officers were reinforced with marines and soldiers in this case, which became common practice during recruitment drives in Nova Scotia in the early nineteenth century.

According to Simeon Perkins, who heard about the incident in Liverpool, the Navy

instigated a hot press to man HMS Richmond; but unlike most presses on land, which

occurred at night, under the cover of darkness, "Marines and Saylors Drove all before them in the Streets in the day time."164 The recruits were from Halifax and Lunenburg,

and many were kept as prisoners in a guard house before being sent onboard the

Richmond. While the pressing of inhabitants of Nova Scotia was at the centre of this case,

and likely accounts for the grand jury's intervention, the central naval-civilian dispute was now jurisdiction over impressment on land.165

The grand jury argued that it was illegal for press gangs to operate in Halifax without permission. It declared its disapprobation for the violence that had occurred and

lamented the Navy's lack of respect for provincial authority. Although the Halifax

Sessions could have censured the officers involved, it decided to formulate guidelines

instead, to prevent more violations of the criminal law. Nor did the grand jury contest the

legality of impressment in Nova Scotia; it even declared that it was "truly sensible of the

Necessity of procuring Seamen and others for His Majesty's Service," and offered to

"point out the People that are proper for such Purposes."166 The grand jury pushed for naval-civilian collaboration in this regard. The "proper Objects" were said to be readily available in Halifax, and, by pressing them, the "useful" artisan and his family, and the populace at large, would be protected from the twin evils of military service and social unrest. The grand jury pointed out that Halifax had long been supplied with provisions

81 and fuel from Lunenburg, Liverpool and Chester, among other south shore communities, which brought the supplies to market by sea. Impressment threatened to keep these vessels away and deprive the civilian and military populations of material comfort. What the grand jury really wanted, however, was for the Navy to respect the customary chain of command in Nova Scotia. Hughes issued another proclamation to this effect. He reiterated that unregulated impressment was an "Outrageous breach of Law," and explained once and for all that authority to land press gangs on shore belonged

1 f\1 exclusively to the Nova Scotia government.

Impressment remained a problem in Nova Scotia throughout the American

Revolution. In June 1782, for example, the Wesleyan minister William Black was preaching in Halifax when he was interrupted by a number of "impious" men in the crowd, who in addition to throwing gunpowder crackers into the fire to create explosions, shouted out to Black that "You'll not preach long - the press gang is coming."168 Black's country friends tried to dissuade him from visiting Halifax, as "the press-law was then in operation, [and] he would be impressed into his Majesty's service."169 This is not as far­ fetched as it sounds: Henry Alline was threatened in Windsor in the same way a year earlier, and during the Napoleonic Wars the rector of St. Paul's Church in Halifax, the

Church of England minister Robert Stanser, was reportedly pressed into the wooden world, much to the embarrassment of Vice-Admiral Herbert Sawyer.170 While Black's experiences suggest that impressment remained a problem in Nova Scotia later in the war, it seems to have been regulated for the first time during Andrew Snape Hamond's tenure as lieutenant governor in 1781 and 1782. This was facilitated by Hamond's position as resident naval commissioner, and in the admiral's absence, his role as

82 commander-in-chief of the Navy in Nova Scotia. Captain Russell was having a difficult time filling the complement of HMS Hussar in the spring of 1781. He was active in recovering naval deserters and Hamond allowed him to press several "old Countrymen" from a prize recently brought into Halifax. No supernumeraries were available, however, and the Army could not spare soldiers to serve as marines, so Russell asked Hamond to

171 discuss the "obvious expedient" of impressment on shore.

Hamond had no objection to sending press gangs into Halifax, but Russell had to conform to strict regulations. It had to occur in "an early hour of the evening," and the press gang had to be "accompanied by Peace Officers" of the colony, who would supervise its activities.172 Most importantly, Russell had to ensure that "none of the

Inhabitants, People belonging to market Boats, or Fishermen are allowed to be 1 7^ impressed." These stipulations are nearly identical to the reforms that Hughes established in his several proclamations on impressment, and those were based on

Massachusetts's customary safeguards from the 1740s. Russell likely sent a press gang into town.174 Hamond took additional steps to supply his warships with men. Shortly after granting Russell permission to press seamen in Halifax, he ordered the naval sloop

Albany to anchor off Mauger's Beach "for the purpose of impressing seamen out of the merchant Ships inward bound, and to search all those that go out for Deserters from the

Navy."175 Impressment from incoming vessels in Halifax harbour was the Navy's best chance to recruit sailors in Nova Scotia. The Navy also used crew sharing to circumvent impressment and provide a temporary expedient to the manning problem.176 Naval- civilian discord returned to Halifax after John Parr replaced Hamond as governor, much to the chagrin of the local population. On 27 November 1782, Parr issued a proclamation

83 against press gangs in Nova Scotia. This was copied nearly verbatim from Hughes's earlier publications, with complaints of "Violent and unlawful Acts [that] have been

Committed on the Inhabitants of this Province."177 Evidently, not all naval captains adhered to the arrangement that Russell and Hamond carved out earlier that year.

According to J.M. Bumsted, too much has been made of the conflict of loyalty in the Atlantic region during the American war. "It was a conflict that affected only a minority of the population.. ..[and although] a good deal of pro-American sentiment was voiced in parts of Nova Scotia in 1775, there was little evidence of armed defiance of authority."178 Some Yankees living in Nova Scotia returned to New England, while others, such as Simeon Perkins in Liverpool, preferred to steer a neutral course and defend their communities against allegations of disloyalty from Halifax. Historians have focused on several topics in trying to detect imperial-colonial cleavages in Nova Scotia:

Governor Legge's ill-advised proposals to reform provincial finances and call out the militia; Yarmouth's plea in 1775 to live in a neutral state, because many of its residents grew up in the American colonies and still had family there; the so-called Cumberland rebellion in 1776; the rebellious sympathies of a small group of Halifax merchants; and the assistance given by some residents of Nova Scotia to Yankee privateers and prisoners of war.179 These whispers of discontent petered out by the late 1770s and did not create a revolutionary movement in Nova Scotia. Nor did press gangs spark backlashes against the Crown, which is telling because they created more violence, anxiety, and political turmoil in both Halifax and coastal Nova Scotia than any of these things. Crowds battled press gangs in the streets, families were torn apart when their sons and fathers were forced into the service, and virtually every segment of the political and judicial machine

84 butted heads with the Navy over impressment in Nova Scotia during the war. If press gangs could not stir the revolutionary pot in Nova Scotia, then perhaps there was nothing in the pot to stir.

Privateers and Protections

The Navy made several concessions to Nova Scotia's maritime population in the eighteenth century, including privateer crews. Advertisements ran in the Nova-Scotia

Gazette in January 1779 for the Revenge privateer: "All Gentlemen and able bodied

Landsmen, who wish to acquire Riches and Honor, are invited to repair on board the

Revenge Private ship of War, now laying in Halifax Harbour (see Appendix 3)."

Captained by James Gandy, she mounted thirty guns and was to sail south to cruise against French shipping. Volunteers could apply aboard the Revenge or at the rendezvous in Mr. Fraud's tavern in Halifax. Advances were offered, as well as shares in prize money, but the most important lure was protection from impressment, which extended beyond Nova Scotia to cruises on the high seas, in the Caribbean, and off South

America. The privateer schooner Liverpool, captained by George Young, advertised for men at the same time, and promised "protection from the Press."182 In early February

1782 the Halifax privateer Lord Cornwallis put into its home port, having suffered significant damage arid being in need of repairs. The privateer was stranded at the harbour's mouth, in danger of being driven to sea by the ice, because the "Ships

Company are leaving her for fear of being impressed."183 The captain and owners wrote to the lieutenant governor for a protection for its officers and fifteen sailors, which

Hamond granted for a period of three months. Protection certificates listed the names of

85 the privateer's crew, in case it was inspected by a British warship either in Nova Scotia waters or on the high seas.184

' Hamond also issued protections to armed traders, vessels that combined the duties of a merchantman and privateer. For instance, shortly after Hamond issued a protection to the Lord Cornwallis, he was petitioned by the merchant John Prince, who at a great expense had fitted out the "Letter of marque Brig called the Halifax Packet" bound to the

West Indies with a perishable cargo. 5 It is possible that the Halifax Packet was to carry a load of goods to market and then make a cruise as a privateer on the Spanish Main. In any case, Prince asked for a protection and Hamond granted one.186 Privateers were active in Nova Scotia throughout war and their crews were generally protected from the

Navy. They were particularly active in Liverpool, where rendezvous and other recruitment methods were based on naval manning drives in Britain and Halifax.

Recruitment for Liverpool's privateers took place in a range of communities on the south shore, including Barrington and Lunenburg, as well as Halifax.187 A rendezvous was opened for the Dreadnought in Liverpool in February 1783, and managed to get one voyage in before the war ended.188 With their heavily-manned crews, often of skilled mariners, the Navy viewed privateers as competitors for manpower rather than allies in a fight against a common enemy. This is the subject of considerable scholarly debate in

Nova Scotia regarding the early nineteenth century.189 For instance, Dan Conlin has argued that Liverpool's privateers played a key role in defending that town and sustaining its economy during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic era, especially from 1793 to 1805, but he also indicates that it was not warships in Halifax that local privateers had

86 to worry about, but rather impressment into the naval squadrons based in Jamaica,

Barbados, and the Leeward Islands.190

A number of groups were protected from impressment in Nova Scotia. This was facilitated by naval governance in the colony: for example, Hamond was not only the lieutenant governor and resident naval commissioner, but in the absence of the admiral, he was also the commander-in-chief of naval forces in Nova Scotia. He combined the duties of port admiral and colonial administrator, and this came in handy when dealing with impressment and protections.191 In April 1782, he issued a number of protections to merchant crews, often in vessels sailing to the West Indies, as long as they were not carrying deserters from the Navy or Army out of the province. In one case Hamond criticized Captain Russell of the Hussar for ignoring the protection he had issued to two vessels belonging to a Halifax merchant named Cochran. The vessels were delayed because Russell pressed four of their sailors, after Cochran "paid their Advance

Wages." Hamond instructed Russell to discharge them immediately. The Halifax market was supplied with provisions and firewood from a range of south shore communities. Protections for coasting vessels and their crews were a priority for Nova

Scotia authorities throughout the American Revolution, just as they had been for

Massachusetts officials several decades before. As such, Hamond issued protections to

James and Peter Martin in February 1782, who were "Inhabitants of the Town of

Lunenburg" and employed in the "coasting Trade."193 This guaranteed that they would not be pressed into the Navy in Nova Scotia waters.

The Navy also took steps to promote the fishing industry in Nova Scotia. Hamond issued a protection certificate to Thomas Tiller in April 1782, formerly a tobacco smith

87 by trade, and "Native of the Province of Nova Scotia," who "has my Permission to follow his Occupation as a Fisherman." Protection certificates - or 'papers', as sailors called them - meant nothing if the man was not carrying them when confronted with impressment, either on shore or at sea. As such, protections described a sailor's physical characteristics: for example, Tiller was thirty-three years-old, stood five-feet-six inches high, was "marked with the small Pox," and was still "wearing his own hair." Nor did the

Navy confine protections to fishermen who were actually born in Nova Scotia. At the same time that Tiller was granted a protection, Hamond issued two more protections to fishermen, one who was born in New England and the other who was born in the West

Country.194 The Navy's manning problems persisted in Nova Scotia until the end of the war, and frustrated captains occasionally broke protocol by pressing sailors from government transports. Hamond ordered a number of captains to discharge men that had been pressed from these vessels in Halifax harbour, in the service of both the and Ordnance Department.195 Seafarers had options in wartime and protections were not always the first thing they were looking for. Wages skyrocketed in the merchant marine and prize money lured men into privateers. The Navy cooperated with Halifax's merchants in 1782 to employ a regular packet with Boston, and the merchants subsidized the crew's wages. When the merchants withdrew their subscription, the sailors bolted for other employment and higher wages, even though aboard the packet they were exempt from impressment into the Navy.196

88 Desertion and Pardons

Most desertions from the Navy occurred in Halifax while sailors were on shore duty or liberty, or from a ship's boat in the harbour. Others deserted from the naval yard and naval hospital, likely because they were surrounded by rum houses.197 For instance, around midnight on 2 November 1776, four sailors attempted to desert from HMS Albany by stealing its yawl and racing for the Dartmouth shore. They were captured and later punished in front of the fleet, with at least thirty lashes from the cat-o'-nine-tails. Regular trips to the Dartmouth shore for wood and water provided many opportunities for seamen to desert.198 Similarly, about a month later three seamen deserted from the naval brig

Diligent in the Bay of Fundy while scouting American forces along the Maine border. To add insult to injury, they joined the American cause.199 Others fled into the Maine interior during prisoner exchanges with American authorities.200 Some men went to great lengths to get out of the service, perhaps none more than a deserter from the Rainbow in 1777, who swam two miles on the open sea before reaching Machias.201 While most desertions were punished summarily, with about a dozen lashes, it was such a problem in Halifax that a number of seamen were convicted in courts martial, or naval tribunals. Recruitment difficulties in Nova Scotia hardened naval captains' resolve on desertion. According to the Articles of War, the Navy's legal code, desertion was a capital crime. Although sailors were occasionally hanged for desertion in the eighteenth century, including in

Nova Scotia, preliminary research indicates that this was rare and that corporal punishment remained the norm.202

Communities knew that it was in their best interests to cooperate with the Navy in retrieving deserters. The Nova Scotia government ordered magistrates to assist military

89 search parties in this regard, or face the penalties stipulated in provincial desertion legislation - twenty pounds if convicted, based on the testimony of three justices of the peace.203 Simeon Perkins and other law officers routinely interrogated strangers in

Liverpool, particularly when they were suspected of being deserters from the Army or

Navy. They pursued some leads to great lengths - chasing men into the forest and neighbouring communities, such as Port Joli, Port Mouton and Little Harbour, among other places on the south shore. Men and women were fined for concealing and assisting deserters, usually five pounds per person, including husbands and wives.204 More importantly, justices of the peace returned deserters to the Navy to avoid punishment for civilians, in the form of impressment. For instance, despite the Senegal's impressment of sailors in Liverpool in 1776, and Duddingston's disregard for provincial laws, one sailing master returned two boys to the warship after they had strayed away at the height of the recruitment drive. Good deeds like this could persuade naval officers to reduce impressment in a particular area.205

Less than a year later, naval officers from the Milford asked Perkins to keep an eye out for deserters, and over the next several months Liverpool's authorities did just that, capturing one deserter and sending him to Halifax. Naval officers used the threat of impressment when they suspected residents of harbouring deserters. For example, in

December 1781 the parents of a Lunenburg man asked Perkins to plead with Captain

Percy Brett of the Atalanta, who had arrived in Liverpool, to get their son released from that warship. Brett pressed the young man as punishment because he believed that the inhabitants of Lunenburg had concealed deserters from the Atalanta.207 In one case an

Army deserter received 400 lashes and ran again because he was to receive another 400

90 lashes, and then be put onboard a man-of-war. It is unclear what he feared more - the lash or the Navy.208 During the Revolution and the 1780s, the North American squadron also reimbursed soldiers, law officers, militiamen, and civilians who returned deserters to the Halifax Navy Yard. Generally, they received forty shillings per deserter and ten to twenty shillings per straggler. Rewards were also available for civilians who found volunteers for the Navy, although it is unclear how frequently this occurred in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.209

Desertion was a source of friction between the Navy and Army in Nova Scotia during the Revolution. Lieutenant-Governor Hamond tried to avoid inter-service animosity, but Brigadier General Campbell, head of the Army in Nova Scotia, was not always cooperative. On 2 February 1782, Hamond informed Campbell that several warships in Halifax were short of their complements. He had information that a "great

Number of Seamen [are] at present concealed in the environs of the Town," and requested Campbell to give orders to his officers stationed in Nova Scotia's various outposts to take up deserters and stragglers, who were often traveling in the interior to avoid detection.210 He offered forty shillings per deserter and twenty shillings per straggler. Disputes erupted when naval officers claimed soldiers as deserters from the

Navy, or when soldiers gave themselves up as deserters from the Navy. It was also possible for men to have deserted from both services. After several cases like this, in which he did not receive cooperation from Campbell, Hamond wrote to Rear-Admiral

Robert Digby at Boston to take the matter up with Sir Guy Carleton, head of the British

Army in North America. Unless an officer from the deserter's warship was on the spot, or two former shipmates signed affidavits before a magistrate, Campbell would not

91 cooperate with the Navy. This was the case even if the deserter gave himself up, or if the desertion happened years before in England or the West Indies, not involving a warship presently stationed in Nova Scotia. Campbell instructed his officers to use military force to retake soldiers that had been seized by the Navy.211 While naval deserters sometimes joined the Army in Nova Scotia, likely to avoid detection and a whipping, Army officers also recruited sailors into their regiments. Hamond complained to Campbell in 1782 that deserters from government transports had taken refuge in the Army; these vessels were headed for Spanish River in Cape Breton to load coals, but could not depart until the sailors were returned. Even more, Major Bayard of the Orange Rangers not only refused to give them up, but "persists that he has a right to enlist any seaman that does not belong to any of His Majesty's Ships."212

Occasionally, the civil power in Halifax and other towns in Nova Scotia sent vagrants and petty criminals to the Navy. In this way, impressment served as an alternative to corporal punishment, transportation, and prison sentences. There is very little evidence of this in the official papers for Nova Scotia, especially in court records.

Most impressments were negotiated informally between magistrates, offenders, and victims before going to trial, usually to avoid the expense of the legal system altogether.

This was the case in Britain, where semi-compulsory enlistments were a form of social control in wartime.213 Captains were reluctant to enter hardened criminals, especially murderers, but they were sometimes sent to the Navy by Nova Scotia courts. For instance, Roger Cain, a soldier in the King's Rangers, was convicted of rape in the

Supreme Court in 1781 and condemned to death. Lieutenant-Governor Hughes granted

Cain a pardon on condition that he entered a warship and stayed there for the remainder

92 of the war. It is unclear, however, if the Navy accepted Cain into the service. Captains made final decisions on recruits and it was no guarantee that they would accept criminals simply because domestic courts sent them.214 In the absence of workhouses, the armed forces were also seen as a safe place for troubled youths. For example, thirteen-year-old

Simeon Woodworth was convicted of larceny in a Halifax court in 1772 and sentenced to be burned in the hand, but that punishment was later remitted on the condition that he was indentured into the North American squadron.215

Most royal pardons in Nova Scotia were unconditional. Moreover, the overwhelming number of conditional pardons only stipulated that the offender leave the colony for good. Military personnel convicted in local courts were more active pardon petitioners than civilians, and free pardons for these people simply meant that they continued to serve in the Navy or Army. There was a positive correlation between pardon rates and criminals' connections to the military, which is not surprising when it is considered that Halifax was a garrison town and home to the North American squadron of the Royal Navy. In at least half a dozen cases, according to the research of Jim

Phillips, civilians accused of capital crimes in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries obtained pardons on condition that they joined the armed forces. Unlike Cain, they avoided going to trial. Generally speaking, courts were more lenient to sailors and soldiers who committed crimes in Nova Scotia than they were to civilians. Phillips has argued persuasively that this stemmed from the influence of a non-resident British elite.

The next chapter shows that law officers from a number of jurisdictions in Nova Scotia pardoned criminals and sent them to the armed forces during the Napoleonic Wars,

91 (\ though not on the same scale as in Newfoundland.

93 The Peacetime Navy

After the Treaty of Versailles was signed in 1783, officially ending the American war, the North American squadron withdrew from its stronghold in New York. Convoys of transports brought the Army back to Britain. Considerable naval resources were also required to carry thousands of Loyalists and freed slaves (and the slaves owned by

Loyalists) to Nova Scotia. Once these tasks were completed, the Navy's responsibilities in North America were greatly reduced. The American Navy no longer posed a threat to

Nova Scotia's security or maritime trade, as the bulk of its warships were decommissioned in the 1780s. Therefore, the Admiralty reduced the squadron to peacetime levels: this usually consisted of a fourth or fifth-rated flagship, two frigates and three sloops, and a number of and smaller vessels. The duties that faced its peacetime commodores - Charles Douglas, Herbert Sawyer, and Richard Hughes - included the enforcement of navigation and customs laws; protecting the fisheries, West

Indian trade and Cape Breton coal deposits; facilitating Loyalist settlements in the Bay of

Fundy and Shelburne; and policing American fishing and trading vessels in Nova Scotia waters. Generally speaking, the Navy's job in peacetime was to show the flag in the

Atlantic region. Sawyer began the practice of wintering the bulk of the squadron in

Halifax rather than , and some of the smaller warships wintered in Annaoplis

Royal, Passamaquoddy, Shelburne, and the Saint John River in the 1780s. Summer cruises took warships throughout the Atlantic region, from Cape Breton and Canso to

Gaspe Bay and the Gulf of St. Lawrence.217

Not only were there fewer warships in Nova Scotia to make these cruises, but their crews were also reduced. The Royal Navy as a whole demobilized rapidly after the

94 Revolution: from about 107,000 men in 1783 to fewer than 14,000 in 1786.218

Nevertheless, the manning problem persisted into the 1780s; indeed, it was nearly as acute in peacetime as it had been during the American war. As R.A. Evans concluded, this period "was one of continuous shortage of man-power." Death, sickness, and desertion constantly eroded the squadron's complements, but unlike during the

Revolution, the Navy could not resort to impressment in the peace of the 1780s. For instance, on 1 July 1783, Captain Archibald Allderdice of the naval brig Brandywine advertised for volunteers in a Halifax newspaper. He needed only six men. It is safe to say that a year earlier Allderdice would have pressed those men from incoming vessels in

Halifax harbour or on the coast of Nova Scotia.220

The manning problem was tempered by the rotation of warships between Nova

Scotia and Britain; frigates returned home within a couple of years, and fully manned warships replaced them in Nova Scotia. However, sloops and other small warships were on station for longer periods of time, and their crews dwindled accordingly. Generally, warships arriving on station in Nova Scotia were well-manned; however, their complements could be depleted quickly, and there were at least a few cases of cruisers

791 that were too undermanned to take to sea. For example, HMS Weazel limped into

Halifax in 1786 twenty-one men short of its seventy-man complement, and according to

Sawyer, no prospect of attracting volunteers.222 Nor did the use of galleys, tenders, and other small warships help the cause, since they had to be manned with sailors from the larger men-of-war. Sawyer grounded three in 1785 to avoid crew sharing.223 Volunteers were available in Britain in far greater numbers, and crews were bolstered there by turn-

95 over from other warships. Put simply, recruitment for the North American squadron in peacetime occurred primarily in the British Isles, not in Nova Scotia.

Conclusion

Nova Scotia's authorities drew on the colony's Yankee heritage to contest and regulate impressment in the eighteenth century. Press gangs sparked imperial-colonial discord in New England during the 1740s, long before the Stamp Act demonstrations and

Boston Massacre. Governor William Shirley of Massachusetts tried to stay on good terms with the North American squadron, provided that its captains respected colonial impressment policies and customs. He established four principal safeguards:

Massachusetts had sole jurisdiction over press gangs on shore, not the Navy, and these recruitment drives would be regulated by provincial or municipal law officers; residents of the colony were exempt from naval service; coasting and fishing vessels were not to be molested; and impressment should be confined to foreign sailors from incoming vessels.

Violence in 1745 and 1747 put an end to Massachusetts's cooperation with the Navy, but naval captains generally followed these regulations during the late 1740s and the Seven

Years War. When thousands of New England planters arrived in Nova Scotia in the

1760s they brought this awareness of privileges against impressment with them. They immediately negotiated an exemption from impressment as a pre-condition of residency in Nova Scotia, and the Navy honoured this policy during the Seven Years War. The

American Revolution brought with it impressment on an unprecedented scale, and residency became a major political issue.

96 Halifax's merchants complained in 1775 that impressment hurt maritime trade and the fishing industry, and the General Assembly persuaded Governor Francis Legge to bring these concerns to the Admiralty. Vice-Admiral Samuel Graves granted Nova

Scotians an exemption from impressment, but the Navy continued to press seamen in

Nova Scotia, without colonial permission. As a result, Lieutenant-Governor Richard

Hughes criticized the Navy for disrespecting provincial jurisdiction, and concluded that authority to press on shore belonged exclusively to the Nova Scotia government. More press gangs disturbances in Halifax prompted the grand jury to issue a presentment against the Navy, but rather than prosecute the officers involved, Nova Scotia authorities made impressment reforms instead, to prevent violence for the duration of the war.

Despite these efforts, the Navy continued to press sailors in Nova Scotia until the end of the war in 1783. As discussed in Chapter 3, Nova Scotia may not have won this first battle over impressment, but its combination of political and popular resistance would pay dividends during the 1790s. Finally, this chapter argued that historians have spent too much time chasing the ghost of John Bartlet Brebner and his Neutral Yankees of Nova

Scotia. They seem to be fixated on the question of why Nova Scotia did not become the fourteenth colony to join the Revolution, and have actively searched for examples of pro-

American sympathy. This study supports J.M. Bumsted's argument that there was no revolutionary movement in Nova Scotia. Put simply, impressment was the most politicized issue in Nova Scotia during the war, but it did not spur anti-British sentiment, let alone mobilize patriots on the ground.

97 Notes

1 Vice-Admiral Samuel Graves to Philip Stephens, Admiralty Secretary, 28 December 1775, in William Bell Clark (ed.), Naval Documents of the American Revolution [Naval Docs] (Washington, 1968), vol. 3, p. 274. 2 Thomas H. Raddall, His Majesty's Yankees (1942 repr. Halifax, 1996), ch. 8. 3 Raddall, His Majesty's Yankees, chs. 8-9. Raddall describes the German sailors as Dutch. In reality, the Germans were the largest group of "Foreign Protestants" who settled in Nova Scotia in the early 1750s, especially at Lunenburg. 4 Barry Moody, "The Novelist as Historian: The Nova Scotia Identity in the Novels of Thomas H. Raddall," in Alan R. Young (ed.), Time and Place: The Life and Works of Thomas H Raddall (Fredericton, 1991), esp. pp. 144-6. For more historical fiction that deals with the armed forces, see Thomas H. Raddall, At the Tide's Turn and Other Stories (Toronto, 1959). 5 For background, see Thomas H. Raddall, In My Time: A Memoir (Toronto, 1977), pp. 193-209. 6 Judith Fingard, Janet Guildford and David Sutherland, Halifax: The First 250 Years (Halifax, 1999); David A. Sutherland, 'Warden of the North Revisited: A Re­ examination of Thomas RaddalPs Assessment of Nineteenth-Century Halifax," Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada, 19 (1981), pp. 81-91. Also see C. Bruce Fergusson, "Eighteenth-Century Halifax," Canadian Historical Association Annual Report, 32 (1949), p. 34. 7 J.M. Bumsted, Henry Alline, 1748-1784 (Toronto, 1971), p. 23. 8 Thomas H. Raddall, Halifax: Warden of the North (1946 repr. Halifax, 1993), pp. 87-9, 113,126-7,137,150. 9 Julian Gwyn, "Poseidon's Sphere: Early Naval History in Atlantic Canada," Acadiensis, 31.1 (Autumn 2001), pp. 152-63; Gwyn, Frigates and Foremasts: The North American Squadron in Nova Scotia Waters, 1745-1815 (Vancouver, 2003). His work on the Halifax Navy Yard is an important exception, but it mostly concerns administration. See Gwyn, Ashore and Afloat: The British Navy and the Halifax Naval Yard before 1820 (Ottawa, 2004). 10 Jim Phillips, '"Securing Obedience to Necessary Laws': The Criminal Law in Eighteenth-Century Nova Scotia," Nova Scotia Historical Review, 12.2 (1992), pp. 87- 124; Phillips, "The Operation of the Royal Pardon in Nova Scotia, 1749-1815," University of Toronto Law Journal, 42.3 (1992), pp. 401-49; also consult Phillips, "Women, Crime, and Criminal Justice in Early Halifax, 1750-1800," in Jim Phillips, Tina Loo, and Susan Lewthwaite (eds.), Essays in the History of Canadian Law, Volume 5: Crime and Criminal Justice (Toronto, 1994), pp. 174-206; and Allyson N. May and Phillips, "Homicide in Nova Scotia, 1749-1815," Canadian Historical Review, 82.4 (December 2001), pp. 625-61. 11 For instance, see Barry Moody, "Acadia and Old Nova Scotia," in M. Brook Taylor (ed.), Canadian History: A Reader's Guide Volume 1: Beginnings to Confederation (Toronto, 1994), pp. 108-9; Viola F. Barnes, "Francis Legge, Governor of Loyalist Nova Scotia, 1773-1776," New England Quarterly, 4 (1931), pp. 420-47; John Bartlet Brebner, The Neutral Yankees of Nova Scotia: A Marginal Colony During the Revolutionary Years

98 (New York, 1937); Wilfred Brenton Kerr, The Maritime Provinces of British North America and the American Revolution (1941 repr. New York, 1970); Kerr, "The Merchants of Nova Scotia and the American Revolution," Canadian Historical Review, 13 (1932), pp. 20-36; Kerr, "Nova Scotia in 1775-6," Dalhousie Review, 12 (1932-3), pp. 97-107; George A. Rawlyk, Revolution Rejected, 1775-1776 (Scarborough, ON, 1968); Ernest A. Clarke and Jim Phillips, "Rebellion and Repression in Nova Scotia in the Era of the American Revolution," in F. Murray Greenwood and Barry Wright (eds.), Canadian State Trials, Volume 1: Law, Politics, and Security Measures, 1608-1837 (Toronto, 1996), pp. 172-220; Barry Cahill, "The Treason of the Merchants: Dissent and Repression in Halifax in the Era of the American Revolution," Acadiensis, 26.1 (Autumn 1996), pp. 52-70; Donald Desserud, "Nova Scotia and the American Revolution: A Study of Neutrality and Moderation in the Eighteenth Century," in Margaret Conrad (ed.), Making Adjustments: Change and Continuity in Planter Nova Scotia, 1759-1800 (Fredericton, 1991), pp. 89-112; Lewis R. Fischer, "Revolution without Independence: The Canadian Colonies, 1749-1775," in Ronald Hoffman et al. (eds.), The Economy of Early America: The Revolutionary Period, 1763-1790 (Charlottesville, Virginia, 1988), pp. 88-125. 12 For general surveys, see Sylvia Frey, "Causes of the American Revolution," in Daniel Vickers (ed.), A Companion to Colonial America (Maiden, Mass., 2003), pp. 508-29; Doron Ben-Atar, "The American Revolution," in Robin Winks (ed.), The Oxford History of the British Empire, Volume 5: Historiography (Oxford, 1999), pp. 94-113. Gordon Stewart and George Rawlyk, A People Highly Favored of God: The Nova Scotia Yankees and the American Revolution (Toronto, 1972). 14 M. Louise English Anderson, 'Crowd Activity in Nova Scotia during the American Revolution' (Queens University, Unpublished M.A. Thesis, 1985). 15 Nicholas Rogers, "Liberty Road: Opposition to Impressment in Britain during the American War of Independence," in Colin Howell and Richard J. Twomey (eds.), Jack Tar in History: Essays in the History of Maritime Life and Labour (Fredericton, 1991), pp. 55-75, which is expanded upon in Rogers, Crowds, Culture, and Politics in Georgian Britain (Oxford, 1998), ch. 3; Jesse Lemisch, "Jack Tar in the Streets: Merchant Seamen in the Politics of Revolutionary America," William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Series, 25.3 (July 1968), pp. 371-407; Lemisch, Jack Tar vs. John Bull: The Role of New York's Seamen in Precipitating the Revolution (New York, 1997); Lemisch, "The American Revolution seen from the Bottom Up," in Barton Bernstein (ed.), Towards a New Past: Dissenting Essays in American History (New York, 1968), pp. 3-45. 16 J.M. Bumsted, "1763-1783: Resettlement and Rebellion," in Phillip A. Buckner and John G. Reid (eds.), The Atlantic Region to Confederation: A History (Toronto, 1994), esp. p. 169 Emerson W. Baker and John G. Reid, The New England Knight: Sir William Phips, 1651-1695 (Toronto, 1998), esp. chs. 10-11; Denver Alexander Brunsman, 'The Evil Necessity: British Naval Impressment in the Eighteenth-Century Atlantic World' (Princeton University, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 2004), pp. 89-95; William R. Miles, 'The Royal Navy and Northeastern North America, 1689-1713' (Saint Mary's University, Unpublished M.A. Thesis, 2000), esp. pp. 124-35; Douglas Edward Leach, Roots of

99 Conflict: British Armed Forces and Colonial Americans, 1677-1763 (Chapel Hill, 1986), pp. 139-40; Barbara Ritter Dailey, "Sir William Phips," ODNB. Brunsman, 'Evil Necessity,' pp. 96-9. 19 'Power of Impressing Seamen,' in Leonard Woods Labaree (ed.), Royal Instructions to British Colonial Governors, 1670-1776, 2 vols. (New York, repr. 1967), I, pp. 442-3. 20 There were exceptions. For example, P.S. Haffenden has noted that the restricting of impressment to colonial governors in 1696 facilitated the manning of HMS Falkland and HMS Orford shortly thereafter. He states that "Probably over half the complement of the latter were New Englanders." Haffenden, New England in the English Nation, 1689-1713 (Oxford, 1974), pp. 98-9. 21 Brunsman, 'Evil Necessity,' pp. 96-9; Dora Mae Clark, "Impressment of Seamen in the American Colonies," in Essays in Colonial History: Presented to Charles McLean Andrews by his Students (1931 repr. Freeport, New York, 1966), pp. 204-7; 6 Anne, c. 37,(1708). 22 Walker to Henry St. John, 12 September 1711, in Gerald S. Graham (ed.), The Walker Expedition to Quebec, 1711 (Toronto, 1953), pp. 356-7. This volume is littered with references to desertion and recruiting problems. Also see General John Hill's Journal, 27 July 1711, in Graham (ed.), Walker Expedition, p. 348. On Walker, see Graham, "Sir Hovenden Walker," DCB; J.K. Laughton, rev. J.D. Davies, "Sir Hovenden Walker," ODNB. 23 Clark, "Impressment of Seamen," pp. 207-15 24 Clark, "Impressment of Seamen," pp. 207-15; Richard Pares, "The Manning of the Navy in the West Indies, 1702-63," Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 4l Series, 20 (1937), pp. 31-60; 19 Geo. II, c. 30 (1746). Generally on the West Indies, see Pares, War and Trade in the West Indies, 1739-1763 (London, 1963). 25 P.S. Haffenden, "Community and Conflict: New England and the Royal Navy, 1689- 1775," in The American Revolution and the Sea: Proceedings of the 14l International Conference of the International Commission for Maritime History (National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, 1974), pp. 88-90; Brunsman, 'Evil Necessity,' pp. 237-41; Jack Tager, Boston Riots: Three Centuries of Social Violence (Boston, 2001), pp. 61-3. 26 Brunsman, 'Evil Necessity,' pp. 241-3; Haffenden, "Community and Conflict," p. 90. 97 • Warren to Thomas Corbett, 2 June 1746, in Julian Gwyn (ed.), The Royal Navy and North America: The Warren Papers, 1736-1752 (London, 1973), pp. 259-62; Warren to Townsend, 8 August 1746, in Gwyn (ed.), Warren Papers, pp. 304-5; Warren to Corbett, 5, 15 October 1746, in Gwyn (ed.), Warren Papers, p. 354; Warren to Corbett, 2 June 1746, in Gwyn (ed.), Warren Papers, pp. 259-62; Warren to George Clinton, 24 June 1746, in Gwyn (ed.), Warren Papers, pp. 279-80. 98 Brunsman, 'Evil Necessity,' pp. 243-5; Haffenden, "Community and Conflict," pp. 89- 90; Joel A. Shufro, 'The Impressment of Seamen and the Economic Decline of Boston, 1740 to 1760' (University of Chicago, Unpublished M.A. Thesis, 1968). For contemporary complaints about the economic impact of impressment on Boston and Massachusetts trade, see Josiah Willard to Warren, 2 November 1745, in Gwyn (ed.), Warren Papers, pp. 185-6; John Osborne to William Pepperrell and Warren, in Gwyn (ed.), Warren Papers, pp. 211-12.

100 29 Quoted from Douglas Edward Leach, "Brothers in Arms? Anglo-American Friction at Louisbourg, 1745-1746," Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society, 89 (1977), pp. 36-54 at 53. Emphasis on Cape Breton is in the article. 30 Brunsman, 'Evil Necessity,' pp. 193-214,245-6; Haffenden, "Community and Conflict," pp. 89-90. 31 Townsend to Shirley, 17 August 1746, The National Archives [TNA], London, United Kingdom, ADM [Admiralty Papers] 1 / 480, Dispatches from Senior Officers in North America, 1745-63, pp. 256-7. 32 Shirley to Townsend, 12 September 1746, ADM 1 / 480, pp. 291-5. 33 Donald F. Chard, 'The Impact of He Royale on New England, 1713-1763' (University of Ottawa, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 1976), pp. 126-7. 34 Gwyn, Frigates and Foremasts, pp. 19-22. 35 Quoted in Chard, 'Impact of He Royale,' p. 129. Julian Gwyn, The Enterprising Admiral: The Personal Fortune of Admiral Sir Peter Warren (Montreal, 1974); Gwyn, An Admiral for America: Sir Peter Warren, Vice Admiral of the Red, 1703-1752 (Gainesville, Florida, 2004); Gwyn, "Sir Peter Warren," DCB; Gwyn, "Sir Peter Warren," ODNB; J.K. Laughton, rev. Michael Partridge, "Sir Charles Henry Knowles," ODNB. 37 Warren to Knowles, 2 June 1746, in Gwyn (ed.), Warren Papers, pp. 254-9 at 257. 38 Warren to Squadron, 29 April 1745, in Gwyn (ed.), Warren Papers, pp. 85-6; Warren to Knowles, 30 July 1746, in Gwyn (ed.), Warren Papers, p. 301; Gwyn, Frigates and Foremasts, p. 19; Chard, 'Impact of He Royale,' pp. 127-31; Leach, "Brothers in Arms," p. 53. Knowles complained to the British government of New England masters secreting away naval deserters from Louisbourg to Boston. Knowles to Duke of Newcastle, 9 July 1746, in Gwyn (ed.), Warren Papers, pp. 290-3. 39 Haffenden, "Community and Conflict," p. 90. 40 John Lax and William Pencak, "The Knowles Riot and the Crisis of the 1740's in Massachusetts," Perspectives in American History, 10 (1976), pp. 163-214; Brunsman, 'Evil Necessity,' pp. 246-57; Tager, Boston Riots, ch. 3; Haffenden, "Community and Conflict," pp. 90-1; Gwyn, Frigates and Foremasts, pp. 21-2. 41 Denver Brunsman, "The Knowles Atlantic Impressment Riots of the 1740s," Early American Studies, 5.2 (Fall 2007), pp. 324-66. 42 William Pencak, "Thomas Hutchinson's Fight against Naval Impressment," New England Historical and Genealogical Register, 132 (1978), p. 29; also see Brunsman, 'Evil Necessity,' p. 259. 43 Clark, "Impressment of Seamen," pp. 217-19. 44 Haffenden, "Community and Conflict," p. 91. 45 Brunsman, 'Evil Necessity,' pp. 260-1; Pencak, "Hutchinson's Fight," pp. 30-3. 46 Haffenden, "Community and Conflict," p. 91. 47 Brunsman, 'Evil Necessity,' pp. 261-3; Haffenden, "Community and Conflict," p. 91; Pencak, "Hutchinson's Fight," pp. 30-3; Jesse Lemisch, Jack Tar vs. John Bull: The Role of New York's Seamen in Precipitating the Revolution (New York, 1997), ch. 2. AQ Neil R. Stout, The Royal Navy in America, 1760-1775: A Study of Enforcement of British Colonial Policy in the Era of the American Revolution (Annapolis, , 1973); Stout, "Manning the Royal Navy in North America, 1763-1775," American

101 Neptune, 23.3 (July 1963), pp. 174-85; Stout, "The Royal Navy in American Waters, 1760-1775' (University of Wisconsin-Madison, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 1962); Lemisch, "Jack Tar in the Streets"; Lemisch, Jack Tar vs. John Bull; Lemisch, "American Revolution from the Bottom Up"; Lax and Pencak, "Knowles Riot"; William Pencak, War, Politics and Revolution in Provincial Massachusetts (Boston, 1981); Gary B. Nash, The Urban Crucible: Social Change, Political Consciousness, and the Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, Mass., 1979); Leach, Roots of Conflict, esp. ch. 7. A host of unpublished works also focus on impressment in New England. See Joseph Aloysius Devine, 'The British North American Colonies in the War of 1739-1748' (University of Virginia, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 1968); John Kern, 'The Politics of Violence: Colonial American Rebellions, Protests, and Riots, 1676-1747' (University of Wisconsin-Madison, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 1976). Ian K. Steele, The English Atlantic, 1675-1740: An Exploration of Communication and Community (Oxford, 1986); Bernard Bailyn, Atlantic History: Concepts and Contours (Harvard, 2005); David Hancock, Citizens of the World: London Merchants and the Integration of the British Atlantic Community, 1735-1785 (Cambridge, 1995); David Armitage, "Three Concepts of Atlantic History," in David Armitage and Michael J. Braddick (eds.), The British Atlantic World, 1500-1800 (New York, 2002), pp. 11-27; Kenneth J. Banks, Chasing Empire Across the Sea: Communications and the State in the French Atlantic, 1713-1763 (Montreal, 2003). 50 Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic (Boston, 2000). Also see, "The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves and the Atlantic Working Class in the Eighteenth Century," in Howell and Twomey (eds.), Jack Tar in History, pp. 11-36. 51 Brunsman, 'Evil Necessity.' Margaret Conrad (ed.), They Planted Well: New England Planters in Maritime Canada (Fredericton, 1988); Conrad (ed.), Making Adjustments (op cit); Conrad (ed.), Intimate Relations: Family and Community in Planter Nova Scotia, 1759-1800 (Fredericton, 1995); Conrad and Barry Moody (eds.), Planter Links: Community and Culture in Colonial Nova Scotia (Fredericton, 2001). 53 John Bartlet Brenber, New England's Outpost: Acadia Before the Conquest of Canada (New York, 1927); George A. Rawlyk, Nova Scotia's Massachusetts: A Study of Massachusetts-Nova Scotia Relations, 1630 to 1784 (Montreal, 1973). 54 R.S. Longley, "The Coming of the New England Planters to the Annapolis Valley," Collections of the Nova Scotia Historical Society (1961), pp. 81-101, reprinted in Conrad (ed.), They Planted Well, pp. 14-19 (citations are to reprint); D.C. Harvey, "The Struggle for the New England Form of Township Government in Nova Scotia," Canadian Historical Association Report and Papers (1933), p. 15; Charles Bruce Fergusson, "Pre- Revolutionary Settlements in Nova Scotia," Collections of the Nova Scotia Historical Society, 37 (1970), pp. 14-19; Dominick Graham, "Charles Lawrence," DCB; Margaret R. Conrad and James K. Hiller, Atlantic Canada: A Concise History (Don Mills, ON, 2006), pp. 78-80, Brebner, Neutral Yankees, pp. 4-5, ch. 2. 55 Longley, "Coming of Planters," pp. 19-22; Fergusson, "Pre-Revolutionary Settlements," pp. 15-16.

102 56 Executive Council Minutes, 19 April 1759, Nova Scotia Archives and Records Management [NSARM], Halifax, RG 1, vol. 188, pp. 53-8. Longley, "Coming of Planters," p. 22; Fergusson, "Pre-Revolutionary Settlements," pp. 15-16. CO Edwin Crowell, A History ofBarrington Township and Vicinity (Yarmouth, Nova Scotia, 1923), pp. 97, 229; Brebner, Neutral Yankees, p. 24. 59 Conrad and Hiller, Atlantic Canada, p. 80. 60 Executive Council Minutes, 14 September 1750, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 186, p. 78. 61 Contracts between Navy Board and John Henneker, 1755 and 1757, NSARM, MG 13, Halifax Navy Yard, vol. 2, p. 469 62 W.A.B. Douglas, "The Sea Militia of Nova Scotia, 1749-1755: A Comment on Naval Policy," Canadian Historical Review, 47.1 (March 1966), pp. 22-37; J.C. Arnell, "The Armed Vessels of the Nova Scotia Government in the Late Eighteenth Century," Mariner's Mirror, 55.2 (May 1969), pp. 195-208. 63 Holburne to John Cleveland, 17 September 1757, ADM 1 / 481, p. 420. 64 Holburne to Cleveland, 17 September 1757, ADM 1 / 481, p. 420. Also see W.A.B. Douglas, 'Nova Scotia and the Royal Navy, 1713-1766' (Queen's University, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 1973), pp. 254-6, 293-4. Rear-Admiral Philip Durell had some success in raising volunteers in the American colonies in 1759. As commodore of the squadron that was to attack Quebec with General , he noticed that his ships were short-handed and wrote to governors in the American colonies. Durell promised a bounty of forty shillings to every able seaman that volunteered to serve in the Navy for a year or more, and they would be discharged at the end of that service. They did not have to serve in Europe or the West Indies and Durell promised to discharge them somewhere in North America. About 100 seamen had arrived in Halifax from Boston by May and about 240 from the American colonies by June. See Douglas, 'Nova Scotia and Royal Navy,' p. 340; W.A.B. Douglas, "Philip Durell," DCB. 65 Commission and Order Book, 16 April 1761, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 165, p. 129. 66 Cleveland to John Pownall, 9 February 1759, TNA, ADM 2 / 524, Secretary's Letters to Public Officers and Flag Officers, 1758-9, p. 420. 67 Cleveland to Pownall, 14 February 1759, TNA, ADM 2 / 524, p. 449. 68 Executive Council Minutes, 8 August 1763, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 188, pp. 398-400. 69 Executive Council Minutes, 8 August 1763, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 188, pp. 398-400. 70 Executive Council Minutes, 8 August 1763, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 188, pp. 398-400. 71 Executive Council Minutes, 8 August 1763, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 188, pp. 398-400. 72 Stephens to Colvill, 23 September 1763, TNA, ADM 2/536, p. 303. 73 Executive Council Minutes, 8 August 1763, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 188, pp. 398-400. 74 Denver Brunsman, 'Herding Seamen: British Naval Impressment in the Eighteenth- Century Atlantic World' (Unpublished Paper given to the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia, June 2007). Stout, Royal Navy in America. 76 Stout, "Manning the Navy," pp. 175-6. 77 Stout, "Manning the Navy," pp. 175-6. 78 Colvill to Stephens, 19 May 1764, TNA, ADM 1 / 482, pp. 356-8.

103 /y Executive Council Minutes, 8 October 1755, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 187, pp. 380-4. Captain James Campbell recommended to the Admiralty in 1756 that warships in Nova Scotia should winter in South Carolina, where there were good careening facilities and they would avoid the northern winter. He also suggested that this would discourage desertion, although it is unclear why this would be. Gwyn, Ashore and Afloat, p. 5. 80 32 Geo. II, c. 12 (1758): "An Act to prevent the Sale of Slop Clothing, and for punishing the Concealers or Harbourers of Seamen or Marines deserting from the Royal Navy," in Richard John Uniacke (ed.), The Statutes at Large, passed in the several General Assemblies held in His Majesty's Province of Nova Scotia (Halifax, 1805), pp. 13-15,56-57. 81 Commission and Order Book, 12 November 1760, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 165, pp. 94-5; Gwyn, Ashore and Afloat, pp. 8-16. 82 Letter of unnamed settler to Reverend Dr. Stiles of Boston, 1760, quoted from Thomas C. Halliburton. An Historical and Statistical Account of Nova Scotia, 2 vols. (1829 repr. Belleville, ON, 1973), I, pp. 12-13. 83 Stout, "Manning the Navy," pp. 175-6. 84 Colvill to Admiralty, 10 October 1762, in C.H. Little (ed.), The Recapture of St. John's, Newfoundland: Dispatches of Rear-Admiral, Lord Colville, 1761-1762 (Halifax, 1959), pp. 30-2; also see Gwyn, Ashore and Afloat, p. 241; Colvill to Stephens, 30 November 1765, TNA, ADM 1 / 482, p. [?]; Colvill to Stephens, 12 November 1765, TNA, ADM 1 / 482, p. [?]. The British Army in North America also faced significant desertion problems in the 1760s, and used severe corporal punishments to deter soldiers from fleeing the service. According to General Thomas Gage in 1768: "Desertion has been so frequent amongst the several Regiments, and the Lenity which has been shewn them, having had so little Effect towards a Reformation in that Point, that I am sorry to acquaint your Lordship [Hillsborough], of the Necessity I lye under, of making Some Examples, in hopes to put a stop to such Practices, in the Regiments under my Command." Gage to Hillsborough, 18 August 1768, in Clarence Edwin Carter (ed.), The Correspondence of General Thomas Gage with the Secretaries of State, 1763-1775, 2 vols. (1931 repr. New York, 1969), II, pp. 186-8. 85 Commission and Order Book, 1 September 1761, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 165, pp. 178-9. 86 Stout, "Manning the Navy," p. 177. 87 Stout, "Manning'the Navy," pp. 175-6; Phillips, "Securing Obedience," p. 114; Phillips, "Royal Pardon." 88 James Muir and Jim Phillips, "Michaelmas Term 1754: The Supreme Court's First Session," in Philip Girard, Jim Phillips and Barry Cahill (eds.), The Supreme Court of Nova Scotia, 1754-2004: From Imperial Bastion to Provincial Oracle (Toronto, 2004), p. 268. 89 Muir and Phillips, "Michaelmas Term 1754," p. 268. 90 Peter King, "War as a Judicial Resource: Press Gangs and Prosecution Rates, 1740- 1830," in Norma Landau (ed.), Law, Crime, and English Society, 1666-1830 (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 97-116. 91 Diary of Elijah Estabrooks, 1758-60, NSARM, p. 24. 92 For a detailed study of this case, see Muir and Phillips, "Michaelmas Term 1754," pp. 270-7; also see Crown Prosecution Records, 1749-1779, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 342, nos.

104 43-5, 50; Phillips, "Securing Obedience," pp. 87-92; Halifax Gazette, 30 November 1754; Thomas B. Akins, History of Halifax City (Halifax, 1895), pp. 43-4; Thomas B. Vincent, "Jonathan Belcher: Charge to the Grand Jury, Michaelmas Term, 1754," Acadiensis, 7.1 (Autumn 1977), pp. 103-4. There were doubts about jurisdiction, particularly where the boarding took place, and if the case should not have been tried in an Admiralty court. Neither of the victims were midshipmen, as described in some sources. The boarding party consisted of Joseph Marriott, the Vulture's master, George Phillips, a midshipman, and eight seamen. 93 Executive Council Minutes, 13 June 1775, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 189, pp. 306-7. 94 The passage was taken from Coke's discussion of a Tudor statute dealing with jurisdictional responsibility for the repair of bridges. See Edward Coke, The Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England: Containing the Exposition of Many Ancient and other Statutes (London, 1''97), p. 703. 95 Executive Council Minutes, 13 June 1775, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 189, pp. 306-7. 96 Executive Council Minutes, 14 June 1775, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 189, p. 309. 97 Executive Council Minutes, 16 June 1775, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 189, pp. 309-10. 98 Executive Council Minutes, 20 June 1775, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 189, pp. 311-12. 99 Executive Council Minutes, 20-26 June 1775, 3-17 July 1775, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 189, pp. 311-27. 100 Vice-Admiral Samuel Graves commented On residency that autumn. While it was Parliament's intention to allow emigrants from New England to enjoy the privileges of other inhabitants in Nova Scotia, he personally felt that provincial authorities should make them be resident for a year or two, and to give proof of their loyalty, before being allowed to prosecute seaborne commerce. He also wished that "Registers were not so indiscriminately granted, but it is difficult to say how or where the line could be drawn." Graves to Edward Le Cras, Captain of HMS Somerset, 30 September 1775, in William Bell Clark (ed.), Naval Docs (Washington, 1966), vol. 2, pp. 252-3. See Commission and Order Book, 18 August 1775, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 170, pp. 179-80; Petition of Thomas Davis and Ephraim Spooner to Massachusetts General Court, 18 November 1776, in William James Morgan (ed.), Naval Docs (Washington, 1976), vol. 7, p. 196; Memorial of Agreen Crabtree, 4 August 1776, in Morgan (ed.), Naval Docs (Washington, 1972), vol. 6, p. 48. 101 Executive Council Minutes, 8 December 1773, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 189, p. 209. 102 Fischer, "Revolution without Independence," pp. 88-125. 103 Stephens to Graves, 24 June 1775, TNA, ADM 2 / 549, pp. 449-53; Stephens to Graves, 24 June 1775, TNA, ADM 2 / 549, pp. 453-5; Stephens to Graves, 29 September 1775, TNA, ADM 2 / 550, p. 179; Stephens to Vice-Admiral Richard Howe, 4 May 1776, TNA, ADM 2 / 551, p. 545; George Jackson to Howe, 22 November 1776, TNA, ADM 2 / 553, pp. 223-4. 104 Henry Alline, The Life and Journal of The Rev. Mr. Henry Alline (Boston, 1806), p. 42. 105 Harold Innis (ed.), The Diary of Simeon Perkins, 1766-1780 (Toronto, 1948), 2 June 1775, p. 93. 106 Executive Council Minutes, 4 August 1775, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 189, pp. 334-5. Legge commented to General Thomas Gage that recruitment parties for the British Army

105 were useless in Halifax, "as the Town is too much drained already of men, and those which are Recruited are those who have Wives and a Number of small Children and very indifferent men..." Legge to Gage, 31 August 1775, NSARM, Dartmouth Papers, vol. 1, ffi- 345-?- Marriot Arbuthnot to Andrew Snape Hammond, 11 November 1775, in Clark (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 2, p. 978; Innis (ed.), Diary of Simeon Perkins, vol. 1, 25-27 August 1775, p. 99; Jeremiah Powell to Massachusetts General Court, 24 October 1775, in Clark (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 2, pp. 588-9. 108 Journal of the House of Assembly of Nova Scotia, 23, 30 October 1775, NSARM, vol. 2, pp. 3-9. 109 General Assembly to Legge, [30] October 1775, TNA, Colonial Office Papers [CO] 217 / 52, pp. 16-17; Journal of Assembly, 30 October 1775, vol. 2, pp. 8-9; Legge to Lord Dartmouth, 4 November 1775, TNA, CO 217 / 52, pp. 7-9. 110 Graves to Arbuthnot, 8 December 1775, TNA, ADM 1 / 485, pp. 508-9. 111 Graves to Arbuthnot, 8 December 1775, TNA, ADM 1 / 485, pp. 508-9. 112 Narrative of Vice-Admiral Samuel Graves, 12 December 1775, in Clark (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 3, pp. 64-5. 113 Graves to Arbuthnot, 8 December 1775, TNA, ADM 1 / 485, pp. 508-9. 114 Graves to Arbuthnot, 8 December 1775, TNA, ADM 1 / 485, pp. 508-9. 115 Graves to Arbuthnot, 8 December 1775, TNA, ADM 1 / 485, pp. 508-9. 116 Graves to Arbuthnot, 8 December 1775, TNA, ADM 1 / 485, pp. 508-9. 117 Graves to Arbuthnot, 8 December 1775, TNA, ADM 1 / 485, pp. 508-9; Graves to Stephens, 28 December 1775, TNA, ADM 1 / 485, pp. 504-7; Commission and Order Book, 19 August 1775, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 170, p. 181. 118 Graves to Legge, 13 December 1775, TNA, ADM 1 / 485, p. 510. 119 Graves to Duddingston, 18 December 1775, in Clark (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 3, p. 152; Graves to Stephens, 28 December 1775, TNA, ADM 1 / 485, pp. 504-7; Captain's Log of HMS Senegal, in Clark (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 3, pp. 261-2; Innis (ed.), Diary of Simeon Perkins, vol. 1, 27 December 1775, p. 107. Indeed, Duddingston likely conscripted five sailors from an American schooner en route to the fishing village, abandoning the prize at sea. Narrative of Graves, 27 January 1776, in Clark (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 3, p. 1006; Captain's Log of HMS Senegal, in Clark (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 3, p. 180. Innis (ed.), Diary of Simeon Perkins, vol. 1, 29-30 December 1775, 1 January 1776, pp. 107-8. 191 Innis (ed.), Diary of Simeon Perkins, vol. 1,3, 13 February 1776, pp. 110-11. 122 Innis (ed.), Diary of Simeon Perkins, vol. 1,15 March 1776, p. 115. 123 Charles Bruce Fergusson (ed.), The Life of Jonathan Scott (Halifax, 1960), pp. 56-7. 124 Fergusson (ed.), Life of Jonathan Scott, pp. 56-7. 19^ Fergusson (ed.), Life of Jonathan Scott, pp. 56-7. 126 Fergusson (ed.), Life of Jonathan Scott, pp. 56-7. 127 Fergusson (ed.), Life of Jonathan Scott, pp. 57-8. 1 9S Fergusson (ed.), Life of Jonathan Scott, pp. 57-8. 1 9Q Fergusson (ed.), Life of Jonathan Scott, pp. 57-8, 61. 130 D.C. Harvey and C. Bruce Fergusson (eds.), The Diary of Simeon Perkins, 1780-1789 (Toronto, 1958), vol. 2, 14-25 January 1782, pp. 110-12.

106 131 Innis (ed.), Diary of Simeon Perkins, vol. 1,1-2, 27 February 1776, pp. 110-13; Richard Bulkeley to Duddingston, 3 February 1776, in Clark (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 3, p. 1107; Captain's Log of HMS Senegal, in Clark (ed.), Naval Docs (Washington, 1969), vol. 4, pp. 2, 468, 1249, Executive Council Minutes, 21 November 1775, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 189, p. 372. 132 Master's Log of HMS Canceaux, in Morgan (ed.), Naval Documents (Washington, 1970), vol. 5, p. 835. 133 Thomas Curtis, 'A Narrative of the Voyage of Thos Curtis to the Island of St. John's in the Gulf of St. Lawrence in North America, in the year 1775,' in D.C. Harvey (ed.), Journeys to the Island of St. John or Prince Edward Island, 1775-1832 (Toronto, 1955), pp. 57-8. 1 4 Innis (ed.), Diary of Simeon Perkins, vol. 1, 25-26 May 1777, p. 200; Thomas H. Raddall, "The Adventures of H.M.S. Blonde in Nova Scotia, 1778-1782," Collections of the Nova Scotia Historical Society, 35 (1966), pp. 29-52. 135 Hamond to Brett, 16 May 1782, NSARM, The Hamond Naval Papers, vol. 7, p. 88; Hamond to Brett, 16 May 1782, NSARM, Hamond Papers, vol. 9, p. 120. 136 Hamond to Brett, 16 May 1782, NSARM, The Hamond Naval Papers, vol. 7, p. 88; Hamond to Brett, 16 May 1782, NSARM, Hamond Papers, vol. 9, p. 120. Elizabeth Mancke suggests that the Navy may have tolerated American privateering in Nova Scotia so that it could recapture and press British sailors into the service. The Navy was always desperate for sailors, but this was unlikely. Elizabeth Mancke, 'Two Patterns of New England Transformation: Machias, Maine and Liverpool, Nova Scotia, 1760-1820' (Johns Hopkins University, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 1989), p. 164. 137 Shuldham to Stephens, 16 April 1776, TNA, ADM 1 / 484, pp. 504-5. 138 Shuldham to Arbuthnot, 5 June 1776, in Clark (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 5, p. 376. This and some other relevant documents on Shuldham can be found in Robert Wilden Nesser (ed.), The Despatches ofMolyneux Shuldham: Vice-Admiral of the Blue and Commander-in-Chief of His Britannic Majesty's Ships in North America, January-July, 1776 (New York, 1913). 139 Arbuthnot to Stephens, 7 July 1776, in Clark (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 5, p. 959. 140 'An Account of the State and Condition of His Majesty's Ships and Vessels under the Command of the Vice Admiral the Viscount Howe off New-York,' June-July 1777, in Morgan (ed.), Naval Docs (Washington, 1986), vol. 9, pp. 262-3. 141 Shuldham to Stephens, 25 April 1776, TNA, ADM 1 / 484, p. 534; Stephens to Howe, 23 June 1776, in Morgan (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 6, p. 438. 142 Arbuthnot to Lord George Germain, 26 November 1776, in Morgan (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 7, pp. 289-90; Dr. Edward Bancroft to Silas Deane, 8 November 1776, in Morgan (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 7, pp. 732-3. The Admiralty sent sixty recruits to the Nova Scotia squadron in the summer of 1776. Admiralty to Lieutenant James Gordon, Commander of HMS Boulogne, 1 August 1776, in Morgan (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 6, p. 521. Also see London Chronicle, 4 January 1776, in Clark (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 3, p. 477. "Hot press" was an intense recruitment drive intended to take as many seamen as possible in a short period of time, usually with no warning. In this way it functioned like an embargo on shipping. Sometimes called a "general press" or "press from all protections," a "hot press" often freed every seafaring man up to the Navy, even those with protections. "Hot

107 presses" mostly occurred in the British Isles, where impressment was common on land, rather than in the colonies, where it was rare on land. Chapters 4 and 5 discuss "hot presses" in the British-Newfoundland fishery. New-England Chronicle, 12 September 1776, in Morgan (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 6, p. 787; Captain's Log of HMS Lizard, in Morgan (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 6, p. 1286. 144 Captain's Log of HMS Rainbow, in Morgan (ed.), Naval Docs (Washington, 1980), vol. 8, p. 202; Captain John Glover to Jeremiah Powell, President of the Massachusetts Council, 30 May 1777, in Morgan (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 8, p. 1043. 145 Independent Chronicle, 27 February 1777, in Morgan (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 7, pp. 1305-6. 146 Independent Chronicle, 27 February 1777, in Morgan (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 7, pp. 1305-6. 147 ContinentalJournal, 30 January 1777, in Morgan (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 7, p. 1063. 148 Independent Chronicle, 27 February 1777, in Morgan (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 7, pp. 1305-6. 149 ContinentalJournal, 30 January 1777, in Morgan (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 7, p. 1063. 150 Edmund Duval Poole (ed.), Annals of Yarmouth and Barrington (Nova Scotia) in the Revolutionary War (Yarmouth, NS, 1899). 151 Independent Chronicle, 19 June 1777, in Morgan (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 9, pp. 141-2. The same man reported that two American cartels were detained in Halifax, "by order of the poor, simple, harmless George Collier, deputized commander of the british [sic] pirate fleet there." Emphasis in the original. 152 Independent Chronicle, 26 June 1777, in Morgan (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 9, p. 173. 153 Independent Chronicle, 10 July 1777, in Morgan (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 9, pp. 254-5. 154 'Howe's Instructions for Disposal of Prizes of Little Value' to , Captain of HMS his, 8 June 1777, in Morgan (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 9, p. 74. 155 Collier to Massachusetts Commissary of Prisoners, 9 November 1777, in Michael J. Crawford (ed.), Naval Docs (Washington, 1996), vol. 10, pp. 439-40. 156 Collier to Massachusetts Commissary of Prisoners, 9 November 1777, in Crawford (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 10, pp. 439-40. 157 Journal of Continental Congress, 2 November 1776, in Morgan (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 7, p. 20; Order of Massachusetts Council, 21 November 1776, enclosed in William Sever to James Bowdoin, President of the Massachusetts Council, 19 November 1776, in Morgan (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 7, no. 4, p. 208; Observations of the Late Master of the British Ship Spiers, 27 November 1776, in Morgan (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 7, pp. 299- 300; Order of Massachusetts General Court Relative to British Naval Prisoners at Newburyport, 30 November 1776, in Morgan (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 7, pp. 330-1; Robert Morris to , 23 December 1776, in Morgan (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 7, pp. 574-5; William Whipple to John Bradford, 20 July 1777, in Morgan (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 9, pp. 299-300; Continental Navy Board of the Eastern Department to Massachusetts Council, 18 November 1777, in Crawford (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 10, p. 529. 158 For the relief of a British prisoner, see Diary of Benjamin Marston, [18 March] 1777, in Morgan (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 8, p. 140. For American sources on cartels, see Massachusetts Council to Captain Josiah Godfrey, 7 October 1777, in Crawford (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 10, p. 54; Edward Brooks to James Bowdoin, 8 November 1777, in

108 Crawford (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 10, p. 433; The Boston-Gazette, and Country Journal, 24 November 1777, in Crawford (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 10, p. 589; Massachusetts Council to Governor Nicholas Cooke, 28 November 1777, in Crawford (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 10, p. 620; Proceedings of the Rhode Island General Assembly, 1 December 1777, in Crawford (ed.), Naval Documents, vol. 10, pp. 643-4; Petition of Daniel McNeill to Massachusetts Council, 22 December 1777, in Crawford (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 10, pp. 778-9; 'Votes and Resolutions of the [Continental] Navy Board of the Eastern Department,' 31 December 1777, in Crawford (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 10, pp. 837-8. For British sources, see Andrew Snape Hamond to Graves, 28 October 1781, NSARM, Hamond Papers, vol. 7, p. 39; Hamond to Admiralty, 25 September 1781, NSARM, Hamond Papers, vol. 7, p. 44; Commission and Instructions for the Ann Cartel to Boston, 27 October 1781, NSARM, Hamond Papers, vol. 8, pp. 7-8; Hamond to Lord George Germain, Secretary of State, 25 November 1781, NSARM, Hamond Papers, vol. 8, pp. 13-14; the Hamond Papers generally, NSARM, vols. 7-9, much of which deals with cartels and prisoners of war. 159 Donald F. Chard, "Marriot Arbuthnot," DCB. 160 Commission and Order Book, 12 December 1778, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 170, p. 275. 161 Commission and Order Book, 12 December 1778, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 170, p. 275. Occasionally, naval officers were also Halifax magistrates, which must have complicated the situation. Executive Council Minutes, 13 August 1776, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 189, p. 413. Nova-Scotia Gazette and Weekly Chronicle, 20 July 1779. 1 /r-y Nova-Scotia Gazette and Weekly Chronicle, 23 January 1781. 164 Harvey and Fergusson (eds.), Diary of Simeon Perkins, vol. 2, 10 January 1781, p. 63. Nova-Scotia Gazette and Weekly Chronicle, 23 January 1781. 166 Nova-Scotia Gazette and Weekly Chronicle, 23 January 1781. Nova-Scotia Gazette and Weekly Chronicle, 23 January 1781. The proclamation was published with the presentment. It can also be found in Royal Proclamations, 22 January 1781, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 436, no. 83. Also see Mather Byles DesBrisay, History of the County of Lunenburg (Bridgewater, NS, 1967), 3r ed., pp. 61-2. This case is discussed briefly in Peter L. McCreath and John G. Leefe, A History of Early Nova Scotia (Tantallon, NS, 1982), p. 303. Matthew Richey, A Memoir of the Late Rev. William Black, Wesleyan Minister, Halifax, NS.... (Halifax, 1839), pp. 70-1. 169 Richey, Memoir of William Black, pp. 70-1, 81-2. 1 70 Alline, Life and Journal, pp. 119, 123; H.F. Pullen, The Shannon and the Chesapeake (Toronto, 1970), p. 2. 171 Hamond to Russell, 19 April 1782, NSARM, Hamond Papers, vol. 7, p. 75; Hamond to Russell, 20 April 1782, NSARM, Hamond Papers, vol. 7, pp. 75-7; Hamond to Russell, 23 April 1782, NSARM, Hamond Papers, vol. 7, pp. 78-9. 172 Hamond to Russell, 23 April 1782, NSARM, Hamond Papers, vol. 7, pp. 78-9. 173 Hamond to Russell, 23 April 1782, NSARM, Hamond Papers, vol. 7, pp. 78-9. 174 Hamond to Russell, 23 April 1782, NSARM, Hamond Papers, vol. 7, pp. 78-9. 175 Hamond to Lieutenant Vardon of HMS Albany, 13 June 1782, NSARM, Hamond Papers, vol. 9, p. 131. The sloop's commander was in the hospital at this time.

109 Crew sharing was similar to the practice of turning men over in Britain, except fewer numbers were involved and the seafarers in question were not transferred to other warships permanently. It most often occurred when one warship was in port for repairs and the other was ordered to sea for a short cruise. There are numerous examples for Nova Scotia, but see Hamond to Captain Phips of HMS Allegiance, 17 September 1781, NSARM, Hamond Papers, vol. 9, p. 26; Hamond to Captain Russell of HMS Hussar, 22 December 1781, NSARM, Hamond Papers, vol. 9, p. 51; Hamond to Captain Brett of HMS Atalanta, 28 March 1782, NSARM, Hamond Papers, vol. 9, pp. 86-7; Hamond to Captain Parker of HMS Pallas, 5 December 1782, NSARM, Hamond Papers, vol. 9, pp. 180-1. 177 Royal Proclamations, 27 November 1782, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 436, no. 86; J.B. Cahill, "Sir Andrew Snape Hamond," DCB. 178 Bumsted, "Resettlement and Rebellion," p. 169. 1 70 Bumsted, "Resettlement and Rebellion," pp. 168-80; Bumsted, "Francis Legge," DCB; Conrad and Hiller, Atlantic Canada, pp. 83-5; W.S. MacNutt, The Atlantic Provinces: The Emergence of Colonial Society, 1712-1857 (Toronto, 1965), ch. 4; Elizabeth Mancke, The Fault Lines of Empire: Political Differentiation in Massachusetts and Nova Scotia, ca. 1760-1830 (New York, 2005), ch. 5; Ernest A. Clarke, The Siege of Fort Cumberland, 1776: An Episode in the American Revolution (Montreal, 1995). Poole (ed.), Annals of Yarmouth and Barrington, is a valuable source on the latter. 180 Nova-Scotia Gazette and Weekly Chronicle, 12 January 1779. 1 O 1 Nova-Scotia Gazette and Weekly Chronicle, 12 January 1779. Nova-Scotia Gazette and Weekly Chronicle, 12 January 1779. Also see Innis (ed.), Diary of Simeon Perkins, vol. 1, 22-4 February 1779, pp. 228-9. 183 Order to Captains and Commanders, 2 February 1782, NSARM, Hamond Papers, vol. 9, pp. 64-5. 184 Order to Captains and Commanders, 2 February 1782, NSARM, Hamond Papers, vol. 9, pp. 64-5. 185 Order to Captains and Commanders, 5 February 1782, NSARM, Hamond Papers, vol. 9, pp. 65-6. 186 Order to Captains and Commanders, 5 February 1782, NSARM, Hamond Papers, vol. 9, pp. 65-6. 187 For example, see Innis (ed.), Diary of Simeon Perkins, vol. 1, 13-16 December 1779, p. 267; Harvey and Fergusson (eds.), Diary of Simeon Perkins, vol. 2, 16 May-8 June 1780, 24-5 July 1780, 29 October 1782, pp. 14-20, 30-1, 166. Perkins sometimes referred to Lunenburg as Malagash, its name before German settlers arrived there in 1753. 188 Harvey and Fergusson (eds.), Diary of Simeon Perkins, vol. 2, 18 February 1783, 18 March 1783, pp. 177,180. 189 Dan Conlin, "A Historiography of Private Sea War in Nova Scotia," Journal of the Royal Nova Scotia Historical Society, 1 (1998), pp. 79-92; Conlin, 'A Private War in the Caribbean: Nova Scotia Privateering, 1793-1805' (Saint Mary's University, Unpublished M.A. Thesis, 1996), esp. ch. 1; David A. Sutherland, "1810-1820: War and Peace," in Buckner and Reid (eds.), Atlantic Region to Confederation, pp. 237-8. 190 George Mullane, "The Privateers of Nova Scotia, 1756-1783," Collections of the Nova Scotia Historical Society, 20 (1921), esp. pp. 17, 23-42; George E. Nicholls, "Notes on

110 Nova Scotian Privateers," Collections of the Nova Scotia Historical Society, 13 (1908), pp. 116-24; James Henry Ross, 'Privateering in Nova Scotia during the American Revolutionary War, 1775-1783' (Mount Allison University, Unpublished B.A. Thesis, 1957). For one example of a naval-privateer conflict, involving the Lord Cornwallis, see Mullane, "Privateers of Nova Scotia," pp. 35-9; Dan Colin, "Privateer Entrepot: Commercial Militarization in Liverpool, Nova Scotia, 1793-1805," Northern Mariner, 8.2 (April 1998), pp. 21-38; Conlin, "A Private War in the Caribbean: Nova Scotia Privateering, 1793-1805," Northern Mariner, 6.4 (October 1996), pp. 29-46. Gwyn, Frigates and Foremasts, p. 70. 192 Hamond to Russell, 11 April 1782, NSARM, Hamond Papers, vol. 7, p. 71. For similar cases, involving ships going to the West Indies, see Order to Captains and Commanders, 10 April 1782, NSARM, Hamond Papers, vol. 9, pp. 89-90; Protection of Hibernia, 10 April 1782, NSARM, Hamond Papers, vol. 9, p. 90; Protection of Fanny, 16 April 1782, NSARM, Hamond Papers, vol. 9, p. 97. These protections list the names of all crewmembers. 193 Order to Captains and Commanders, 5 February 1782, NSARM, Hamond Papers, vol. 9, p. 66. 194 Protection of Thomas Tiller, 17 April 1782, NSARM, Hamond Papers, vol. 9, p. 101; Protection of James Gardner, 23 April 1782, NSARM, Hamond Papers, vol. 9, p. 103; Protection of Thomas Warren, 23 April 1782, NSARM, Hamond Papers, vol. 9, p. 103. 195 Hamond to Captain Graves of HMS Belisarius, 19 November 1781, NSARM, Hamond Papers, vol. 9, p. 42; Hamond to Captain Scott of HMS La Magicienne, 13 December 1781, NSARM, Hamond Papers, vol. 9, p. 46; Hamond to Graves, 13 December 1781, NSARM, Hamond Papers, vol. 9, p. 46; Hamond to Captain Russell of HMS Hussar, 24 April 1782, NSARM, Hamond Papers, vol. 9, p. 104. 196 Hamond to Rear-Admiral Robert Digby, Commander-in-Chief of the North American Squadron, 29 September 1782, NSARM, Hamond Papers, vol. 7, pp. 134-5. Also see Hamond to John Dilworth, Commander of HM Vessel Halifax Packet, 13 April 1782, NSARM, Hamond Papers, vol. 9, pp. 123-4; Gwyn, Ashore and Afloat, pp. 8-13. 197 Hamond to Sick and Hurt Board, 6 August 1781, NSARM, Hamond Papers, vol. 7, p. 7; Arbuthnot to Stephens, 18 November 1775, in Clark (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 2, pp. 1063-4. 198 Captain's Log of HMS Albany, in Morgan (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 7, p. 14. 199 Master's Log of HMS Diligent, in Morgan (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 7, pp. 429-30. George Collier, A Detail of Some Particular Services Performed in America, during the years 1776, 1777, 1778, and 1779... (New York, 1835), pp. 38-47. 201 John Preble to Jedediah Preble, 17 August 1777, in Morgan (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 9, p. 760; also see the Petition of Henry Strickland and Samuel Johnson to the Massachusetts Council, 29 September 1777, in Morgan (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 9, p. 978; Frederic Kidder, Military Operations in Eastern Maine and Nova Scotia during the Revolution, Chiefly Compiled from the Journals and Letters of ColonelJohn Allan, with Notes and Memoir of Col. John Allan (Albany, New York, 1867), p. 129. 909 List of Courts Martial, December 1776-February 1777, enclosed in Howe to Stephens, 6 February 1777, in Morgan (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 7, pp. 1119-24. The standard works on naval discipline are N.A.M. Rodger, The Wooden World: An Anatomy

111 of the Georgian Navy (London, 1986); John D. Byrn Jr., Crime and Punishment in the Royal Navy: Discipline on the Leeward Islands Station, 1784-1812 (Aldershot, 1989); Markus Eder, Crime and Punishment in the Royal Navy of the Seven Years' War, 1755- 1763 (Aldershot, 1989). Unfortunately, there has not been much work on the American Revolutionary War, but see A.G. Jamieson, "Tyranny of the Lash? Punishment in the Royal Navy during the American War, 1776-1783," Northern Mariner, 9.1 (January 1999), pp. 53-66. Also see N.A.M. Rodger, "Shipboard Life in the Georgian Navy, 1750- 1800: The Decline of the Old Order?," in Lewis R. Fischer (ed. et al.), The North Sea: Twelve Essays on the Social History of Maritime Labour (Stavanger, Norway, 1992), pp. 29-39. 203 Commission and Order Book, 8 August 1780, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 170, p. 305; Uniacke (ed.), Statutes at Large, pp. 13-15, 56-7. For a case of a naval captain falsely accusing a citizen of concealing a deserter, see Hamond to Captain Russell of HMS Hussar, 17 April 1782, NSARM, Hamond Papers, vol. 7, p. 74. 204 Innis, Diary of Simeon Perkins, vol. 1, 9-19 February 1779, pp. 226-8. 205 Innis, Diary of Simeon Perkins, vol. 1, 4 January 1776, p. 108. 206 Innis, Diary of Simeon Perkins, vol. 1, 5 December 1776, 16 April 1777, 25-6 April 1777, 4 May 1777, pp. 139, 148-50. Harvey and Fergusson (eds.), Diary of Simeon Perkins, vol. 2, 6-13 December 1781, ^-102-4. Harvey and Fergusson (eds.), Diary of Simeon Perkins, vol. 2, 18, 26 October 1782, pp. 164-5. i

112 211 Hamond to Digby, 1 July 17.82, NSARM, Hamond Papers, vol. 7, pp. 95-6. (Campbell's Order, 10 April 1782, enclosed therein). For examples of contention over deserters, see Hamond to Russell, 9 April 1782, NSARM, Hamond Papers, vol. 7, pp. 69- 70; Hamond to Russell, 12 April 1782, NSARM, Hamond Papers, vol. 7, pp. 71-2; H. Trembell to Russell, 13 April 1782, NSARM, Hamond Papers, vol. 7, p. 72; Hamond to Russell, 16 April 1782, NSARM, Hamond Papers, vol. 7, p. 73; Hamond to Russell, 20 April 1782, NSARM, Hamond Papers, vol. 7, pp. 75-7; Hamond to Russell, 23 April 1782, NSARM, Hamond Papers, vol. 7, pp. 78-9; Hamond to Russell, 11 April 1782, NSARM, Hamond Papers, vol. 9, p. 91; Hamond to Captain Douglas of HMS Chatham, 13 April 1782, NSARM, Hamond Papers, vol. 9, p. 93. 212 Hamond to Campbell, 12 September 1782, NSARM, Hamond Papers, vol. 7, pp. 126- 7. Evidently, this dispute was not as bad at that between Sir George Collier and General Eyre Massey in 1776, who nearly fought a duel on Citadel Hill. They were there with their pistols and seconds, until Collier, at least in his account of the incident, managed to talk Massey down. The governor then forced the two men, the heads of the Navy and Army in Nova Scotia respectively, to shake hands. See 'The War in America by Admiral Sir George Collier,' 1776, private journal, National Maritime Museum, London, United Kingdom, JOD / 9, no page numbers; Julian Gwyn, "Sir George Collier," DCB; H.M. Chichester, rev. Roger T. Stearn, "Eyre Massey," ODNB. 213 King, "Judicial Resource," pp. 97-116; Philip Woodfine, '"Proper Objects of the Press': Naval Impressment and Habeas Corpus in the French Revolutionary Wars," in Keith Dockray and Keith Laybourn (eds.), The Presentation and Reality of War: The British Experience, Essays in Honor of David Wright (Stroud, 1999), pp. 39-60. 214 Commission and Order Book, 28 July 1781, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 170, pp. 316-17; Phillips, "Operation of the Royal Pardon," p. 417; Pardon of Roger Cain, 12 November 1776, NSARM, Oversize Collection, no. 421. 215 Pardon of Simeon Woodworm, 22 October 1772, NSARM, Oversize Collection, no. 437. 216 Phillips, "Operation of Royal Pardon," pp. 401-9. 217 R.A. Evans, 'The Army and Navy at Halifax in Peace-Time, 1783-1793' (Dalhousie University, Unpublished M.A. Thesis, 1970), chs. 1-2; Paul Webb, "British Squadrons in North American Waters, 1783-1793," Northern Mariner, 5.2 (April 1995), pp. 19-34; Gwyn, Frigates and Foremasts, pp. 81-9. 218 N.A.M. Rodger, The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, Volume 2, 1649-1815 (London, 2004), pp. 636-9; Christopher Lloyd, The British Seaman, 1200- 1860: A Social Survey (London, 1968), pp. 286-90. 219 Evans, 'Army and Navy,' p. 102. 990 Nova-Scotia Gazette and Weekly Chronicle, 1 July 1783. 221 Evans, 'Army and Navy,' chs. 1-2, pp. 102-4. 222 Sawyer to Stephens, 12 July 1786, TNA, ADM 1 / 491, p. 414. 223 Sawyer to Stephens, 26 June 1785, TNA, ADM 1 / 491, pp. 279-81; Sawyer to Stephens, 23 July 1785, TNA, ADM 1 / 491, pp. 288-9.

113 Chapter 3 Taming the Press Gang: Impressment and Naval-Civilian Discord in Nova Scotia, 1790-1815

I have left an Order generally to all the Squadron, that no Man is to be impressed upon the wharves or on shore; or that any Native Fisherman, Foreigner, or Apprentice, belonging to this Province, shall be detained by any Officers under my command.

— Vice-Admiral John Borlase Warren, 28 November 18091

Introduction

John George Marshall enjoyed a long and eccentric life. The son of a Loyalist, he was born in Country Harbour, Nova Scotia, before moving to Guysborough County in

1794. Marshall entered the law office of Lewis Morris Wilkins in Halifax in 1803 and was admitted to the bar of Nova Scotia in 1810. He practiced law in Pictou before returning to Halifax, where he married and established a successful business. Marshall succeeded his father as the representative for in the House of Assembly, and held that seat for many years, until he was appointed chief justice of the Inferior Court of

Common Pleas. When that court was abolished in 1841, Marshall retired from public affairs and became a prolific writer on moral issues. He also wrote The Justice of the

Peace (1837), the standard textbook for magistrates in nineteenth-century Nova Scotia, which went through several editions. Described by a friend as a "Puritan of the Puritans,"

Marshall spearheaded the temperance movement in Nova Scotia and lectured widely in the United Kingdom. He supported 's campaign against Confederation, prompting the latter to remark at a public rally in 1867, with Marshall at his side: "When

I think of a man of his age and intellect.. .aiding his countrymen in this struggle, I feel he

114 has done that for us which hardly any one else could have done so well [and this] will make me feel grateful towards him to the day of my death...".

In 1879, at the age of ninety-three, Marshall wrote a short memoir of his public life in Nova Scotia. One of his reminiscences concerns the Royal Navy. The year was

1805. Press gangs scoured Halifax's streets and held the town in a state of fear and anxiety: "that great encroachment on personal liberty.. .was resorted to, in this port, among the merchant and other shipping, and also in the town, and was carried out by numerous press gangs from the naval force."3 Marshall recalled that the Navy "planned and managed the adventure very adroitly, and with numerous squads swept the streets of the town in every quarter, seizing on every person whom they imagined was liable or in any way fit for their service."4 The Army garrisons in Halifax aided the press gangs. The victims on one October evening represented a cross-section of Halifax society. Boarded together in a military barracks on Barrington Street, the captives remained there until naval authorities inspected them the following morning. According to Marshall, these

"self-appointed naval judges" conscripted the recruits they wanted, and the others "were set at liberty."5

Marshall found one story from this "impressment season" amusing. He was clerking in the law office of Lewis Wilkins, counsel to a young fisherman swept up by the press gangs. Wilkins obtained a writ of habeas corpus and brought the lad before

Chief Justice for a hearing, with a naval party as an escort.

Blowers concluded that the youngster was not liable to impressment and immediately set him free. As the naval party walked away in defeat, however, its officer grunted that he wanted to press the fisherman again, regardless of the law. Wilkins overheard this and

115 whispered to the youngster to run for his office, which he did, as Marshall recalled, "with all speed."6 The naval party chased the young man through the streets, while the elder

Wilkins struggled to bring up the rear. At this time Marshall was busy entertaining James

Stewart, the colony's solicitor general. The pair was fixated on a large globe in Wilkins's office, tracing the voyages of a Nova Scotia privateer. Meanwhile, the voyage in the streets continued. The fisherman headed the race and entered the office first, knocking the globe over in the process, "but happily not ourselves."7 At this point the youngster thought he was safe, but the naval officer burst through the door in hot pursuit. The chase might have taken another twist had Wilkins not appeared on the scene, and before

Marshall's eyes, "with his two strong arms seizing him round the waist.. .literally hurled

[the naval officer] into the street."8 But he refused to give up the fight. Marshall thought him a "nimble and spirited youngster," for as soon as he got back on his feet, he ordered the press gang to guard the exits. The solicitor general then joined the fray, giving a stern warning to leave the fisherman alone, or else. The naval officer had to think about it for a few minutes, but finally he relented and "the fisherman was speedily and joyfully on his way home."9

Marshall's story is the most compelling first-hand account we have of press gangs in the North Atlantic world. It is a narrative of the largest and most violent impressment riot in Nova Scotia's history, and a turning point for naval-civilian relations in that colony. Provincial authorities had largely cooperated with the North American squadron in its recruitment drives since 1793, but the press gang riot of 1805 galvanized public opinion against impressment to such an extent that naval-civilian relations deteriorated sharply in Halifax, particularly during the War of 1812. This chapter argues

116 that the provincial government forged a policy that controlled press gangs on shore and restricted the Navy's access to maritime labour. After fierce battles with the Navy during the American Revolution, colonial authorities set out to tame the press gang during the

Napoleonic era. Plebeian clashes with naval officers in Halifax were catalysts for official resistance to the Navy, just as they had been during the American war. This chapter traces that resistance over time.

The story begins with the Nootka Sound crisis of 1790, when commodore Richard

Hughes inadvertently handed control over impressment to the Nova Scotia government.

Colonial officials used this mistake to seize control of impressment during the 1790s.

Nova Scotia's impressment policy worked well until the Peace of Amiens in 1802, after which the manning problem became so intense that most warships on the North

American station were short-handed. Vice-Admiral Andrew Mitchell responded to this situation in 1805 by sending press gangs into Halifax without provincial authority, which sparked the riot alluded to by Marshall at the beginning of this chapter. Naval violence was not confined to Halifax. For example, case studies of impressment disturbances in

Shelburne in 1805 and Pictou in 1809 will be used to demonstrate that the Navy's manning troubles in Nova Scotia undermined its reputation and larger presence in the colony. The Pictou case became a cause celebre. The House of Assembly and newspapers got involved, sparking a campaign against impressment by merchants and magistrates that ceased only with the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815. While colonial authorities lost the first battle over impressment during the 1770s and 1780s, they succeeded the second time around in protecting residents of Nova Scotia from the Navy during the Napoleonic Wars.

117 This chapter offers a qualified endorsement of N.A.M. Rodger's recent challenge to naval historians to move beyond great battles and company histories of the Navy. He called on them to "put naval affairs back into the history of Britain."10 Twenty years earlier he dismantled the historiographical chimera that life in Georgian warships was akin to "a floating concentration camp."11 While Rodger re-invigorated the social history of the Navy, his call to arms has largely fallen on deaf ears - historians have not even begun to understand the Navy's role in maritime communities. Nor is Rodger off the hook. Take impressment, for instance, the most contentious of all naval-civilian relations:

Rodger revolutionized the way we think about this 'evil necessity,' but his analysis is confined to the naval side of the story. There was far more to impressment than the mechanics of press gangs and the efficiency of the Impress Service. Impressment was not a "humdrum affair calling for little if any violence," as Rodger suggested in a classical broadside of over-revisionism.12 This chapter uses case studies of disturbances in Halifax and other Nova Scotia communities to show that impressment was a volatile issue during the Napoleonic Wars. Far from a humdrum affair, it commonly led to violence and political disputes.

To properly understand impressment one has to unravel the Navy's role in maritime communities: its relationship with town officers, magistrates and merchants; its role in politics and the legal system; its social interaction with the community; and the customs and accommodations that allowed the Navy to operate safely in the community after having ripped sons, brothers, and fathers away from families. Impressment, by its very nature, was a naval-civilian affair. If Rodger is serious about putting "naval affairs back into the history of Britain," then he ought to consider the Navy's presence in British

118 1 3 and British-Atlantic communities, where those affairs played out on the ground.

Canadian historians have not done a better job. Julian Gwyn and W.A.B. Douglas have ignored naval-civilian relations in the eighteenth century just as Desmond Morton and

Marc Milner have done for the twentieth century.14 Virtually nothing has been written about press gangs in the North Atlantic world, especially for Nova Scotia and

Newfoundland. Gwyn suggested in a recent survey of the literature that more work needs to be done on the social history of the Navy in the Atlantic colonies.15 This chapter attempts to fill that historiographical void. It uses impressment to explore the interplay between the Navy, provincial government, merchant community, Halifax magistracy, and residents of Nova Scotia.

The problem is not a lack of studies on these topics, but rather that they have never been analyzed together. For example, Gwyn, Douglas, Paul Webb, Marc Drolet and others have written a great deal about the North American squadron.16 Colonial politics has received attention as well: J. Murray Beck outlined the contours of governance and political development, while Brian Cuthbertson has focused on elections and key figures such as John Wentworth and Richard Uniacke.17 Similarly, David

Sutherland has concentrated on the Halifax merchant community and its pursuit of development in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, including its role in municipal affairs.18 Finally, the legal has undergone something of a renaissance in recent years: this includes Jim Phillips's work on the criminal law, Philip

Girard on the Supreme Court and historiography, James Muir on civil law in early

Halifax, and Blake Brown on jury reform in the mid-nineteenth century.19 This chapter builds upon these valuable studies. It discusses magistrates' battles with the Navy over

119 impressment and the legal system's use of pardons to send criminals to the British fleet.

Generally, it attempts to bring these historiographies together through a common denominator, impressment. From Thomas H. Raddall in the mid-twentieth century to

Harry Bruce in the present day, press gangs have usually been relegated to popular histories of Nova Scotia.20 That is no longer good enough. Press gangs ran far deeper into the social and political history of Nova Scotia than previously understood, and they need to be incorporated into that larger narrative.

The Ordeal of Richard Hughes

The Nootka Sound crisis of 1790 was a turning point for impressment in Nova

Scotia. Away in Charlottetown that May, Rear-Admiral Richard Hughes received an

Admiralty dispatch warning that hostilities with Spain (and possibly France) were imminent. Spanish authorities had seized a British trading post on Vancouver Island and claimed western North America as Spanish territory. Britain was slow to respond, but when it did the Navy was mobilized rapidly.21 As commander-in-chief of the North

American squadron, Hughes felt that warships should be ready for sea at a moment's notice. He decided to raise complements to wartime levels when he arrived back in

Halifax.22 Warships commonly sailed with skeleton crews in interwar periods, and according to those levels the squadron's six principal men-of-war were adequately manned. The problem came when Hughes ordered them to a wartime footing: HMS

Penelope went from 200 to 220 men, HMS Thisbe and HMS Dido from 180 to 200, HMS

Adamant from 320 to 350, and HMS Rattler from 100 to 125. Strategically, this was a wise move: it was Hughes's responsibility to defend Nova Scotia, and there was no way

120 of knowing that the Nootka affair would not escalate into Atlantic warfare. On the other hand, Hughes faced a 120-man deficiency virtually over-night, with no obvious means of filling that void.23

Hughes received a letter from Rupert George and three other naval captains stating that the squadron was undermanned, and "our most Strenuous endeavours to procure Volunteers to supply the deficiency [are not] likely to prove successful."24 This was a thinly-veiled request to press sailors. The captains argued that it was common to raise complements to wartime levels in situations such as the Nootka affair; however, news of war could reach Halifax at any time, and they worried that seamen would conceal themselves from the Navy and migrate to other parts of the province.25 Hughes concluded that impressment was his only option. He asked Lieutenant-Governor John

Parr for permission to press seventy men, and Parr brought the issue before the Executive

Council for a hearing. Hughes informed Parr that the "Critical Situation of Public

Affairs" demanded that the squadron be fully manned and ready for sea at a moment's notice, but apart from its importance to "King and Country," Hughes failed to explain what the critical situation actually was.26 This was a pivotal mistake. He also told the lieutenant governor to observe "great Secrecy," not to leak information to merchants, and that time was of the essence.27

The Council rejected Hughes's request. It argued that there did not appear to be that "Necessity or Occasion which could justify the measure."28 It is unclear how much the Nova Scotia government knew about Britain's relations with Spain at this time, but its decision was predictable. Hughes was not forthcoming about the Nootka crisis, and impressment was a controversial measure at the best of times, rarely invoked in

121 peacetime. Even more, Hughes gave provincial authorities the ammunition to shoot down his own application. He cited the British statute 19 Geo. II, c. 30 (1746): "An Act for the better Encouragement of the Trade of his Majesty's Sugar Colonies in America."

The Sugar Act had nothing to do with Nova Scotia; as mentioned in Chapter 2, it banned impressment in the West Indies without the permission of colonial authorities. In his application, however, Hughes informed Parr and the Council that it gave them executive authority over impressment in Nova Scotia. He even provided them with a copy of the act. As it turned out, Hughes's pioneering work as a colonial official was turned against him by the new administration. His insistence that the Navy seek colonial permission before pressing sailors came back to haunt him. This had been his position as lieutenant governor during the American war, when he argued that "impressing Men for the Kings

Service, without permission of the Civil Authorities, is contrary to, and an Outrageous breach of the Law."31

When it came to the Nootka affair in 1790, Hughes stayed true to his position as lieutenant governor of Nova Scotia rather than thinking as the admiral of the North

American squadron. Explaining his actions to the Admiralty, he stated that "Seamen cannot be Impressed in any part of the Kings Dominions in America without the permission of the Governor, and Council of the Province."32 Hughes was wrong again, and he should have known better. Colonial Americans believed that the Sixth of Anne prohibited impressment in the New World in the eighteenth century, but that statute was never in force in Nova Scotia and Parliament repealed it in 1775. As a naval officer,

Hughes should have known this. Moreover, had the Sixth of Anne been in force in Nova

Scotia, requiring the Navy to secure colonial permission before pressing sailors on shore,

122 he would have used that statute in his campaign against press gangs during the American war. Hughes did nothing of the sort.33

Hughes was upset with the Council's decision, which was "so Contrary to my expectation, and to the usual custom on the like Occasions."34 He informed the Admiralty that the Navy faced serious impediments from authorities in Nova Scotia; he was incredulous at their lack of cooperation, especially since the colony depended on his squadron for material support and protection.35 For example, earlier that year Parr had asked for the Navy's help in suppressing illegal trade. In defiance of commercial treaties and legislation, American vessels visited Liverpool "in a most open and daring manner."36 Hughes sent two warships to Liverpool, which seized a number of American vessels and curtailed the contraband trade. When they returned to Halifax, the captains reported that smugglers could be stopped only by stationing small vessels on the south shore to pursue them into shallow waters. The admiral forwarded this recommendation to the Admiralty. Hughes was frustrated that Parr lobbied for favours like this, but when it came to pressing sailors in an emergency, the Navy was dismissed out of hand.

Hughes blamed the manpower deficiency on merchant ship owners, who encouraged sailors to desert from the Navy and then employed them in their own vessels.

Without replacements from Britain, and few local volunteers, the squadron's manpower eroded over time.38 Prevented from sending press gangs on shore, Hughes also decided against conscripting sailors from incoming vessels; he may even have believed, again incorrectly, that Parr and the Council had jurisdiction over impressment in Nova Scotia waters. Hughes hoped to avoid spreading rumours of war in the seafaring community.

Sailors were commonly taken from incoming vessels, but it was unlikely that Hughes

123 would have received more than a handful of men before merchants complained to the

Nova Scotia government and seafarers brought trade to a standstill by avoiding Halifax harbour. Having boxed himself into a corner, Hughes issued bounties and directed his captains to open rendezvous to attract volunteers. Rendezvous were the Navy's recruitment headquarters on shore in maritime ports.

Bounties varied according to seafaring experience: able seamen received five pounds in the 1790s, while ordinary seamen received two pounds and one shilling and landsmen one pound and one shilling (meaning a guinea) respectively.40 Hughes informed Henry Duncan, the resident naval commissioner, of his intentions and explained that rendezvous were commonly used in Britain during manning emergencies. The admiral directed his captains to be frugal and Duncan to pay their expenses, which would be reimbursed by the Navy Board. To his surprise, Duncan did not feel authorized to do this: his instructions said nothing about rendezvous, the Halifax Navy Yard had not funded them before, and until he received word from London he suggested that Hughes charge the disbursements to his personal contingency account. This is what he did, and citing British precedents, he sought approval retroactively, but in another slap in the face, the Admiralty criticized Hughes for opening the rendezvous without its permission.

Unable to press in Nova Scotia, Hughes wondered aloud how he could have complied with the British government's order to increase the squadron's manpower without impressment or rendezvous. The Nootka crisis demanded action and he did this with the

"utmost frugality and Oeconomy."41

Six rendezvous were opened in Halifax in late July, one for each of the six warships on station. Rendezvous were located in taverns or inns, with the Navy's pendant

124 flying outside. Each was headed by a lieutenant and manned with petty officers and midshipmen. Captains made daily reports to Hughes on their progress. Expenses included rent for lodgings, hiring boats, purchasing stationary and printing advertisements, and subsistence money for naval personnel and volunteers. Volunteers received nine pence per day for subsistence and a shilling as entrance money, which was popularly referred to as the 'King's Shilling'; these incentives were in addition to bounties, which recruits received when they entered a particular warship. A considerable sum was spent on drink to entice volunteers. Lieutenant Thomas Twysden's accounts for the Adamant's rendezvous suggest that there was not a clear distinction between entrance money and drinking money. He often referred to them as the same thing (see Appendix 4). Folklore tells us that press gangs tricked sailors into drinking tankards of ale with shillings at their bottoms; no matter how it happened, sailors in possession of the King's Shilling could not give it back, and they were put onboard a man-of-war. There is no evidence of this apocryphal practice in Nova Scotia, but naval recruitment certainly involved a liberal flow of alcohol.42

Bounties failed to attract enough volunteers.43 Only the Adamant's rendezvous was kept open for a significant period of time, and then only until mid-August, just three weeks; this was probably because it was short more than fifty men. Recruiting numbers are not always reliable, but rendezvous accounts suggest that the Adamant recruited twenty-four men, the Thisbe eleven, the Brisk four, and the Dido four. Despite its rendezvous being open for a week and a half, the Rattler did not attract a single volunteer. In the end, the recruitment drive added fewer than fifty men to the entire squadron; indeed, Hughes reported on 16 August that it was still more than 100 men short

125 of its wartime establishment - nevertheless, each warship was said to be "ready for sea."44 The recruitment drive cost about thirty-four pounds, less than half of Hughes's contingency account, which was a small price to pay for bolstering the squadron's capabilities during a military emergency.45 Fortunately for Hughes, the Nootka scare ended peacefully and the squadron was reduced to peacetime levels by the end of the year.46 He could not have known it at the time, but Hughes's actions had a profound effect on the Navy during the French and Napoleonic Wars. He had handed control over impressment to Nova Scotia authorities.

Forging Impressment Policy

As the Navy's search for sailors intensified during the French Revolutionary War

(1793-1802), the Nova Scotia government solidified its impressment policy. The Hughes case set the tone, especially for impressment on shore. When Rupert George, captain of

HMS Hussar and commodore of the North American squadron, needed to increase the

Navy's manpower in April 1793, he followed the road paved by his predecessor. George was one of the naval captains who petitioned Hughes for permission to press sailors in

Halifax during the Nootka affair in 1790. He respected colonial authority over impressment in Nova Scotia, even though the legal foundation of this authority was highly questionable. Nevertheless, when it came time to press George knew what to do - he petitioned Lieutenant-Governor John Wentworth to send press gangs into Halifax.

Wentworth took the matter before the Executive Council, which in turn crafted the first press warrant in Nova Scotia's history.47

126 This became the chain-of-command for sending press gangs on shore in Nova

Scotia: written requests were made to the lieutenant governor, who brought them before the Council, which relayed its decision to the Navy. George wisely couched his proposal in terms of colonial defense. He told Wentworth that a French warship was reportedly on the coast and that he wanted to put to sea without a loss of time. The Hussar was short thirty men, George had unsuccessfully advertised for volunteers, and there was little prospect of taking men from incoming vessels because masters had adopted the practice of landing them on the coast before entering port, to evade naval guard boats in Halifax harbour. George felt that impressment would not hurt domestic trade. After all, sailors had recently taken matters into their own hands: if they did not receive the wages they demanded in Nova Scotia, they moved to the United States to get them, whereby their

"Country is likely to be forever deprived of their Assistance."48 Was it not better that they served in the Navy, rather than being lost to the British mercantile marine altogether?

Asked by Wentworth what authority he had to press sailors in Nova Scotia, George cited the Admiralty's order to increase the squadron's complement by 200 men, and stated that impressment was consistent with how warships were manned in Britain under similar

49 circumstances.

After due deliberation, the president of the Council and the attorney general drafted George's warrant (see Appendix 5). Not surprisingly, they drew inspiration from the Sugar Act of 1745, which Hughes told them about in 1790. The statute was in force in the West Indies, but it was irrelevant everywhere else. Although it did not apply to Nova

Scotia, and colonial officials must have known this, it was a clever move on their part to incorporate the legislation, because it banned impressment on shore without the express

127 permission of colonial authorities. Nova Scotia officials co-opted the Sugar Act to forge their own impressment policy. By framing the warrant in this way, which George did not contest, Wentworth and the provincial government seized control of press gangs in Nova

Scotia without a fight. This case set the terms of the manning debate during the French and Napoleonic Wars, and it became the precedent for all future press warrants in Nova

Scotia.50

George was permitted to press thirty men in one week. Only mariners and seamen were liable to the press, which meant than landsmen such as farmers and artisans were off-limits. Each recruit was to receive one shilling as press money, in addition to naval bounties and bonuses offered by the provincial government and merchants. The Council warned naval officers against accepting gratuities, either for conscripting someone, discharging them, or leaving them alone. Only commissioned officers could lead press gangs on shore, and their names and ranks had to be signed on the back of the warrant.

George was required to sign the warrant as well. Finally, the commodore was told that he would receive cooperation from the civil power - sheriffs, magistrates, constables, government officials, as well as the residents of Halifax.51 In separate instructions,

Wentworth told George that farmers who brought produce to Halifax in market boats were protected from impressment into the Navy. This had sparked much debate during the American war. The lieutenant governor concluded by stating that the warrant was expressed in the terms of "the Act of Parliament [Sugar Act] and usage in England."52

Future warrants followed these same parameters and colonial authorities cited this document as historical precedent.

128 The issue of manning was at its most intense at the outbreak of the war. Early in

1793, before the official declarations of war, George was warned of French hostilities and ordered to increase his complements: "you are hereby required and directed to procure, with all possible dispatch, as many more men as may be necessary for that purpose, and to bear such increased Complement until you receive further Order."53 George did not receive the instructions until late April, when he immediately contacted Wentworth about landing a press gang on shore.54 Impressment alone could not solve the Navy's manning problems in Nova Scotia. For example, the naval schooners Diligent and Chatham performed valuable duties along the coast, but they had to be manned by sailors from other warships. This aggravated the manning problem to such an extent that they were laid up for good that summer.55 Crew sharing was a common expedient to manning deficiencies in Nova Scotia: for example, when men-of-war underwent repairs in the

Halifax Navy Yard their crews often went on cruises in other warships. This was a short- term solution to a much larger problem; crew sharing was similar to turning men over from ship to ship in Britain, but in this case they were only on loan. Despite George's warrant, the Hussar was still in desperate need of men later that summer. For instance, before decommissioning the Diligent and Chatham, George used them as tenders for the

Hussar, ordering their commanders to "Raise as many Seamen or healthy Seafaring Men for His Majesty's Ship under my Command" as they could. They were to feed them until the commodore returned to Halifax.5

Wentworth and the Council made impressment requests their first order of business. As executive decisions, most were made on the same day they were submitted, often in an emergency meeting of the Council. Impressment requests had several

129 common denominators. For example, time was of the essence: captains prefaced requests by telling the lieutenant governor that they had been ordered to sea immediately. In this way they shifted responsibility to provincial authorities, for if warships were too undermanned to defend the coast, the government could get blamed for the loss of merchantmen to enemy warships and privateers. Captains also stated that impressment was a last resort, only to be used during emergencies.57 Most requests included complaints about desertion. Captains not only wanted permission to press sailors on shore, they also wanted permission to take up stragglers "lurking about Halifax."58

Occasionally, deficiencies were blamed on accidents or deaths, while at other times requests were made because of specific manpower opportunities. For instance, Henry

Mowat, captain of HMS Assistance, received intelligence in December 1796 that hundreds of Newfoundland fishermen had arrived in Nova Scotia recently on their way to the United States. He hoped to take them into the service and was granted a warrant for sixty men. This was an easy decision for the Council - the impressment of footloose

Newfoundlanders, unlike residents of Nova Scotia, would not have created alarm in the local seafaring community.59

The Council signed thirteen press warrants between 1793 and 1805 (see Appendix

6). Of those thirteen, six were issued to specific warships, while seven were general warrants for the entire squadron. They were issued to captains and admirals respectively.

The restrictions on George's warrant were not permanent, but future captains were similarly constrained in the number of sailors they could take and the time they had to take them. Each warrant had an expiry date: while Captain Robert Murray's for HMS

Asia in 1797 was limited to "sunrise to sunset," the warrant issued to Vice-Admiral

130 George Vandeput later that year was good for two months. With that said, twelve press warrants lasted for a fortnight or less, and nine for a week or less. In other words, press gangs were not permitted to roam Halifax's streets for extended periods of time. On 1

May 1793, only a few days after issuing George's warrant, the Council issued another one to Captain William Affleck of HMS Alligator. He was given only twenty-four hours to find sailors, as it "has been the practice and waye of this Province to Authorize impressing" just before a ship was to sail.61 Since this is only the second press warrant on record in Nova Scotia, this case suggests two things: there may have been earlier requests

- though no reference is made to them in future warrants or correspondence - and those requests were likely dealt with informally, before a formal impressment policy was established in Nova Scotia during the 1790s.62

Eight of the thirteen warrants had quotas for the maximum number of seafarers that could be pressed: they ranged from twenty to seventy men, with six warrants from thirty to sixty men. No quotas were given in five warrants, suggesting that press gangs were free to recruit as many men as they pleased within a certain time frame. For example, Captain Affleck of the Alligator was permitted to press an unspecified number of seafarers in May 1793, but only during the course of one day. Affleck's warrant came only a few days after George's warrant, which makes its restricted time period understandable.63 Only two impressment requests were denied in this period, and both came hot on the heels of previous recruitment campaigns. Apart from precedents and restrictions, other issues the government had to consider included the social temperature of the community, disruption to maritime trade, as well as the actual availability of sailors in the Halifax area. When Captain Charles Henry Knowles of HMS Daedalus applied for

131 a warrant in June 1794, his request was denied. Wentworth explained to Knowles that the

Council would have backed his application had George not recently pressed a large number of men for both the Hussar and HMS Blanche in Halifax. In its opinion, the exercise would be neither "salutary" nor "expedient."64 There were not enough sailors left to justify another warrant, and impressment had already disrupted shipping and tested the patience of the Halifax populace.65

Nova Scotia's impressment policy was unique. In the West Indies, where the

Navy had squadrons in Jamaica, Barbados and the Leeward Islands, impressment was contested until the Sugar Act outlawed it in 1746. Press gangs were permitted on shore after this, but only with the approval of colonial assemblies. This was rare following the

1740s.66 As Chapter 2 showed, impressment was also controversial in the mainland

American colonies. Governor William Shirley of Massachusetts created impressment regulations in the 1740s, complete with warrants for gangs on shore, but they fell apart after naval-civilian violence in 1746. Press gangs were no longer permitted on shore.

Nova Scotia differed from both regions in its tolerance of impressment. Once the British colonies in the West Indies gained control over press gangs, they refused to cooperate with the Navy; Massachusetts, on the other hand, barred press gangs from shore when it could no longer control them. Unlike Nova Scotia, West Indian and northern American colonies, especially Massachusetts, Rhode Island and New York, rarely assisted the

Navy's recruitment drives, certainly not on land. In Newfoundland, where there were few press gangs until the French Revolutionary War, a violent altercation in St. John's in

1794 led to major reforms in manning policy. Newfoundland did not possess Nova

Scotia's colonial infrastructure, but this incident created such fear on the island that

132 impressment was restricted to incoming vessels during the Napoleonic Wars. Therefore, comparing impressment in various British-Atlantic colonies shows that Nova Scotia stands out in at least two respects: it was the only place where press gangs regularly operated on shore in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and it was the only place where the colonial government cooperated with the Navy's recruitment drives. Of course, the Nova Scotia government only cooperated in this regard for as long as it maintained control over impressment. As discussed below, when naval-civilian relations deteriorated after 1805, particularly because of unregulated presses in Halifax, press gangs were no longer welcome on shore. Finally, and comparatively speaking, it is noteworthy that visibility of press gangs in Halifax does not mean that Nova Scotia experienced more impressment than other British colonies. As Chapter 5 explains,

Newfoundland was the nursery for seamen in the North Atlantic world.

Press gangs usually consisted often or eleven sailors, called 'gangsmen,' and one commissioned officer, ordinarily the first or second lieutenant of the warship named in the press warrant. A petty officer or midshipman commonly tagged along, but it was rare for press gangs to exceed twelve men. Contrary to folklore and traditional naval historiography, they rarely included local toughs and rattan-swinging boatswains, particularly in colonial settings, but rather trustworthy seamen from particular warships, men who had been in the service long enough that they could be trusted not to desert. Put simply, press gangs were groups of regular sailors. Some press gang stereotypes are accurate, regarding their weaponry, for instance. Gangsmen rarely used muskets, for the simple reason that they were too dangerous and the Navy wanted to avoid bloodshed. •

Press gangs did carry cutlasses from time to time, and when marines headed ashore they

133 marched with bayonets. There are many references to press gangs armed with cudgels and sticks, including in Nova Scotia. These weapons may have been unsophisticated, but they enabled coercion and brute force, and were much less likely to kill or to maim than pistols and swords.67

Armed with a press warrant, captains manned and armed boats to row ashore to conscript sailors. They were sent in the evening, under the cover of darkness, and targeted the main haunts of the seafaring community, primarily the waterfront and popular taverns, but also crimping houses and dens of ill repute. Press gangs often worked single-handedly, but captains regularly sent two or three at a time. For instance, at nine o'clock on the evening of 28 April 1793, Rupert George, having obtained the first press warrant in Nova Scotia's history, ordered three from the Hussar into Halifax. New recruits were imprisoned aboard the warship for the night, until George inspected them the following morning. Authorized to press a maximum of thirty men, between fifty arid sixty were actually sent aboard. In this case, and many others like it, the majority of the recruits were released. The Hussar impressed more than fifty men, but only nineteen made it into the ship's books. George did not specify why so many recruits were released, but as will be discussed below, numerous groups were protected from the Navy in Nova

Scotia by law and custom.

Occasionally, captains attacked the manpower problem with stealth, manning every one of their boats with press gangs - for example, the flagship of Rear-Admiral

George Murray, HMS Resolution, unleashed all of its boats into Halifax on 24 September

1794. This must have terrified the town. The third-rate Resolution, with a crew of about

600 men, was one of the largest warships on the North American station; its formidable

134 supply of boats carried more than 100 men to serve in the press gangs. The HMS

Cambrian did the same thing on 1 May 1803, but its boats could not carry as many press gangs.70 There were also cases in which captains sent abnormally large press gangs ashore. The captain of HMS Boston, for instance, sent a "Boat Manned and Armed with

Two Lieutenants on Shore on the Impress Service" on 29 November 1799.71 That two lieutenants were involved suggests that this was a powerful gang, perhaps in the order of twenty men; this would have given it the force necessary to safely transport the twenty- five men it conscripted that evening in Halifax back to the Boston.72 Colonial authority was far less entrenched in towns and villages in coastal Nova Scotia and the Bay of

Fundy than it was in Halifax. Captains occasionally sent press gangs on shore in these places without provincial backing, as HMS Columbine did in Saint Andrews, New

Brunswick, in July 1809. Wherever impressment occurred, however, the Navy was vigilant in sending parties ashore to collect recruits' wages and personal belongings. The

Columbine did this on several occasions in New Brunswick, usually the morning after it pressed the men.73

A protection system guided the Navy wherever it sailed. British statutes protected masters and chief mates from the press, in merchantmen of fifty tons burden; apprentices during their first three years at sea and landsmen during their first two years; foreigners, which in Nova Scotia usually meant Americans; seafarers in specialized industries such as the Greenland whale fishery and Newcastle coal trade; and generally, mariners on either side of the ages of eighteen and fifty-five. The Navy also faced internal restrictions from the Admiralty, which granted protections to privateer crews, transport vessels, dockyard workers, and a range of ships and sailors in government service. Of course,

135 none of these protections mattered unless a seaman was carrying his 'papers' when confronted by a press gang.74 As long as the squadron received press warrants from the

Admiralty, however, it did not require permission to conscript mariners in Nova Scotia waters and on the high seas.75 These warrants expired after a few months and the

Admiralty constantly received requests for more. Vice-Admiral Andrew Mitchell sent press gangs into Halifax in 1805, but this failed to produce enough recruits, and later that year he wrote to the Admiralty several times for warrants that allowed him to press men at sea. In this way the squadron pressed large numbers of men in Nova Scotia waters and off the American seaboard. This also reduced the need to send press gangs on shore.

Admiralty warrants circumvented provincial jurisdiction and mitigated the threat of popular disturbances in Halifax.

Admiralty warrants listed protected groups as well as the laws that protected them. These warrants were issued to two sets of captains: those on regular cruises, which allowed them to press men when boarding vessels; and those on the Impress Service, whose sole purpose was to find sailors for the Navy. Tenders were commonly employed for the latter in the British Isles, but they were also used in Nova Scotia from time to time. They had free range to recruit throughout the Atlantic region. Commanded by lieutenants, tenders recruited men for larger warships on the North American station, which sometimes accompanied them. They were particularly valuable in chasing merchantmen into shallow waters. For example, HMS Thetis was aided in its recruitment drive in August 1797 by two tenders working in concert on Nova Scotia's south shore: the naval brig Vixen and the naval commissioner's yacht, commanded by a lieutenant from the Thetis. They entered volunteers, pressed men, and turned them over to the Thetis

136 back in Halifax. The yacht's impressment activities sparked outrage in Liverpool, where authorities plotted to arrest its commander.77 The naval Prince Edward performed the same function for HMS Prevoyante in 1795 on Newfoundland's south coast, as did the naval schooner Bream for HMS Halifax in 1807, off Canso, Pictou, and Prince

Edward Island. These small warships played a key role in manning the North American

no squadron.

The warrant given to John Whipple of the gun boat Attack in 1795 illustrates the procedure for pressing men at sea (see Appendix 7). When boarding vessels, captains called the crew on deck and asked if any sailors wished to volunteer. These men were entitled to a bounty as well as an advance of two months' wages; if they refused to volunteer they were not entitled to these incentives, but could still be pressed. Moreover, when sailors entered the Navy - both voluntarily and coerced - it was the captain's responsibility to ensure that their sea chests, bedding, and personal items came with them.

The Navy did a good job of collecting men's wages up to the time of their impressment.

It was not the Navy's intention to disrupt trade; therefore, commanders such as Whipple were ordered not to delay voyages any longer than was absolutely necessary. Tenders carried extra supplies of provisions, slops and hammocks for the new recruits; hot meals were a priority; and if a surgeon's mate was onboard he offered the recruits medical attention. Finally, captains were warned against padding their returns with men not 70 physically fit for the service.

Halifax harbour was the most productive recruitment source in Nova Scotia.

Warships took turns launching guard boats that boarded incoming and outgoing vessels - to keep an eye out for deserters and suspicious passengers, but also to seize contraband

137 and interrogate crews for intelligence. In response to deserters leaving Halifax by water, the provincial government gave notice in June 1795 that all outgoing vessels would be examined by a boat from George's Island, Point Pleasant or Point Sandwich, and that no vessel was to leave at night.80 Guard boats were ideally situated to press sailors from incoming vessels; in this way they functioned as floating press gangs, or press boats. This is how the vast majority of sailors were pressed in Halifax and other colonial ports in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. For example, on 27 July 1799 the naval sloop

Pheasant armed its cutter and sent it on the "Impress Service." A lieutenant was in charge and several smaller boats assisted in the procedure. They boarded the brig Eliza, from which the Pheasant received six men. The following day another press boat from the

Pheasant entered nine sailors from the merchantmen Speculation and Victory?1 Guard boat duties passed from one warship to another in a daily cycle. It was common for captains to answer the signal to "take the Guard."82

When rules and customs were broken, however, it often led to chaos in the maritime labour market. For instance, when the brig Sophy arrived in Halifax from the

Bay of Fundy in 1805 its entire crew was pressed, and the "whole country was thrown into consternation."83 The Sophy was a mast ship contracted to bring timber and plank to the naval yard in Halifax, and according to officials there, when rumours circulated that the Navy was ignoring protections for seafarers in government service, "it was vain to attempt by any encouragement to induce men to come near the harbour of Halifax."84

Sailors were aware of the danger that guard boats posed in Halifax harbour and sometimes went to great lengths to avoid them. For instance, the brig Sisters was stranded outside of Halifax in 1797, when its crew abandoned ship and headed ashore in a boat.

138 Not a single person was left onboard and the cargo was badly damaged. Masters commonly landed their crews on empty stretches of coastline to avoid impressment in

Halifax harbour; crews often forced their masters to do this. Unless sailors had extraordinary contracts with their employers, they likely forfeited their wages in these cases. Considering the demand for maritime labour in Nova Scotia, this was a risk many seamen were willing to take.

As discussed in the previous chapter, Nova Scotia authorities also sent criminals to the Navy. This increased from the late eighteenth century to the Napoleonic Wars. In some cases convicts petitioned for pardons on condition that they join the fleet. For instance, George Sugat was convicted of stealing a horse in Windsor in 1808 and granted a pardon, in part because he gave testimony on other crimes. This was endorsed by the provincial government and Sugat was sent to HMS Bellona at Halifax.86 The Navy did not accept serious criminals, and their petitions were denied by colonial authorities.

Walter Lee was convicted of murder in Sydney in 1812 and his pleas to join the Navy were rejected by the provincial government. He was executed a short time later.87 The initiative in these cases often came from the courts and government rather than the felons, but it was exceptional for the lieutenant governor in 1811 to direct the sheriff of Halifax to "propose" to Thomas Murray that he be pardoned, "upon consenting to serve for ever" in the Navy. Convicted of burglary in Halifax, Murray accepted the offer and joined

HMS Emulous?* Criminals were sent to the fleet from a number of Nova Scotia counties, but most had been convicted of petty crimes in Halifax courts. Jim Phillips found at least half a dozen criminals who were pardoned on condition that they join the armed forces in

Nova Scotia.89 My research has uncovered thirty sent to the Navy, mostly during the

139 Napoleonic Wars. Further research will turn up more cases, but it is clear that impressment was not a common alternative to criminal punishment in Nova Scotia. This makes the colony unique, at least compared to Britain and Newfoundland, where petty criminals and vagrants were sent to the Navy in significant numbers. Nova Scotia also differs in terms of procedure. As Peter King has shown for Britain and Chapter 5 demonstrates for Newfoundland, royal pardons were rare in those places because impressment was used to circumvent the legal system. Pre-trial enlistments were frequently the product of informal arrangements.90 Most recruits were arrested or indicted, not convicted. This was not the case in Nova Scotia, where naval conscripts were both convicted and pardoned.

The Press Gang Riot of 1805

As the French Revolutionary War gave way to the Napoleonic Wars (1803-15),

Nova Scotia's impressment policy matured and became more entrenched. Wentworth and the Council cited their own rulings, especially the George case from 1793. This system worked well for more than a decade, with no known press gang disturbances between

1793 and 1804. However, as desertion increased in Halifax in the early nineteenth century, the Navy intensified its search for sailors. Warships were undermanned, volunteers were rare, and there were few unprotected sailors for the Navy to press. In fact, the manning situation in Nova Scotia was so dire that captains could not man their ships, and there was little the Navy could do about it. On the eve of Nelson's victory over the combined French and Spanish fleet in the in October 1805, the

British government was worried about Napoleon's invasion plans, and the Admiralty

140 concentrated on the European theatre of war. No reinforcements of seamen or fully- manned warships were sent to the North American squadron. The latter responded by pressing sailors elsewhere in the Atlantic world, such as the West Indies, the American seaboard, Newfoundland, on the high seas, and at Quebec. However, the squadron was based in Halifax and that was where the manning problem was most acute. It was only a matter of time until captains' frustrations boiled over and tested more than a decade of naval-civilian tranquility. This came in the form of the most deadly press gang riot in

Nova Scotia's history.

At the beginning of May 1805, Vice-Admiral Andrew Mitchell complained to

Wentworth that desertion was crippling the Halifax squadron. Warships were poorly manned and merchants enticed naval seamen to run away. He requested a press warrant and permission to send parties on shore to search for deserters. Wentworth took the matter before the Council, which resolved that a Nova Scotia statute already regulated desertion, and that searches on shore had to be sanctioned by the solicitor or attorney generals, and supervised by the Halifax magistracy. However, the Council did issue a press warrant, which was good for a fortnight and allowed Mitchell to enter an unlimited number of seafarers. This was one of the more liberal warrants ever issued in Nova

Scotia. Wentworth informed the admiral that he had intentionally left it open so that he could delegate authority to as many officers as he pleased.91

Mitchell stated that a fortnight was not long enough. He demanded multiple warrants, for six months a piece. Wentworth took the matter seriously and convened a special meeting of the Council, which was delayed for about a week to allow all members to attend.92 It rejected Mitchell's demands. The Council informed him that there was no

141 precedent for such a long and wide-ranging warrant in Nova Scotia, and in its opinion, it would only "produce the most alarming and injurious Consequences to the Country, without contributing in any material degree to the obtaining the Object sought by it."93

Further, if impressment was confined to seamen, Mitchell would not find enough to fill half the complement of a sloop-of-war, meaning about 110 to 125 men. This dearth of sailors stemmed from losses in the West Indies trade; hit hard by enemy captures, of both privateers and merchantmen, Nova Scotia mariners languished in French colonial prisons, while their families were dependent on poor rates and private charity. The Council suggested another reason for the manpower shortage: deep-sea mariners left the province as quickly as they arrived. The threat of impressment drove them to the United States, where they received protection under the American flag and higher wages than they could obtain in Nova Scotia.94

Speaking from past experience, the Council dismissed the notion that sending press gangs on shore had ever been an effective means of manning the British fleet in

Nova Scotia. It also downplayed the fishery's role as a nursery for seamen, or training ground for the Navy, as sustained warfare had sent it into decline. As discussed in

Chapters 4 and 5, the same debate surrounded the British-Newfoundland fishery during the Napoleonic Wars. Wentworth reminded Mitchell that he possessed Admiralty warrants to press sailors on the high seas and from vessels in Nova Scotia waters, while the domestic statute on desertion allowed the Navy to pursue stragglers on shore. The

Council concluded by arguing that press gangs sparked social unrest in the community, particularly for the labouring poor and other residents of Nova Scotia who were not liable to impressment. Press gangs should only be landed during emergencies, and only when

142 there was a reasonable expectation of finding a significant number of sailors. The Council was confident that once Mitchell educated himself on the manning situation in Nova

Scotia, he would find its arguments "well Grounded."95

The Council's tone was patronizing. Only Mitchell, as commander-in-chief of the

North American squadron, could have known the full extent of the manning problem in

Nova Scotia, including the shortage of local sailors as well as the weakly-manned state of

British warships. For the time being, he left the issue alone and concentrated on the

Navy's recruitment drive. Evidence suggests that the press gangs unleashed under the

Council's warrant were relatively successful: for example, warships such as HMS

Cleopatra and HMS Cambrian entered significant numbers of men in Halifax that May.96

Moreover, in the middle of the recruitment drive, Halifax's merchants offered bounties to volunteers.97 Simeon Perkins recorded in his diary that Thomas Parker, master of the brig

Lylly, arrived in Liverpool from Halifax on 16 May, where "a press for Seamen remains."98 One of Parker's men was detained, but as far as Perkins could tell, the Navy released the other Liverpool seamen. The release of protected mariners and other seafaring men, after they had been pressed, seriously undercut the Navy's recruitment efforts in Nova Scotia.99 There were other problems as well. Back in February, Mitchell commissioned the recently-captured French warship Ville de Milan, but the manning situation was such that it lay idle for several months. This only added to his frustration.

The Admiralty's solution was to send two warships to Newfoundland to enter as many volunteers as possible, and to press the rest. Newfoundland was known as a more productive source of sailors than Nova Scotia, and these sailors had a greater impact on warships there because they were smaller and fewer in number. Indeed, it speaks volumes

143 about the Navy's manning problems in Nova Scotia in 1805 that it pillaged the labour market of a neighbouring, and much smaller, naval station. Mitchell obviously did not think the May recruitment drive was productive enough.1 °

The following October he allowed press gangs from the Cleopatra to storm the streets of Halifax. Apart from Marshall's story at the beginning of this chapter, first-hand accounts of the riot have not survived, but marines reportedly abused civilians in the streets with bayonets. The warrant expired, and with no further authorization of impressment from Wentworth, the Council or civilian authorities, a major riot ensued in which one man was killed and seven others injured. Wentworth lashed out at the admiral for the illegal pressing, while the Council chastised him for disturbing the peace. The solicitor general, James Stewart, was called upon to prosecute the guilty parties, especially the officers and seamen who formed the press gangs.101 This was a touchy issue, however, for Mitchell had recently married the daughter of Richard Uniacke, the attorney general and a staunch political enemy of Wentworth; privately, Uniacke criticized Wentworth, but publicly he kept quiet and took a leave of absence in England.

In the end, no naval officers were criminally charged, but according to Thomas B. Akins,

Mitchell paid heavy fines in civil court because a press gang broke open the store of

Forsyth and Company on the pretense of looking for deserters.102 There were only a handful of major press gang disturbances in Nova Scotia - perhaps six stretching from the American Revolution to the War of 1812 - but Mitchell's behaviour fits the pattern: he disregarded colonial laws, turned his back on Nova Scotia's chain-of-command, and sparked popular protest by sending press gangs into town without provincial authority.

144 As Brian Cuthbertson has noted, however, "[f]or most of Halifax the impressment affair was an aberration in an otherwise congenial relationship with the army and navy."103 The Navy enjoyed a great deal of social interaction with the community. Rear-

Admiral George Murray may have been unpopular with Halifax's merchants in the 1790s because of impressment, but this did not stop them from electing him president of the

North British Society.104 Mitchell was also far from alone in marrying into Halifax society, in both its polite and plebeian elements - with so many sons in the Navy and

Army, according to Cuthbertson, Nova Scotians "felt intimately tied to Britain in her furious struggle with Napoleon."105 Shortly after the riot in 1805, when news reached,

Halifax of Nelson's victory in the Battle of Trafalgar on 23 October, the town was illuminated with fireworks and celebrations. Nova Scotians embraced British military and imperial achievements even though the war effort brought discord and violence to their doorsteps.106 On several occasions, Wentworth went to great lengths to cultivate good relations with the Navy. For example, when Murray complained that impressment alone could not man his warships in 1795, Wentworth arranged for the Nova Scotia Regiment to provide him with soldiers as temporary replacements. He did this several times.

Reflecting on the Navy in 1803, he even conceded that impressment had never damaged

Nova Scotia's trade or fisheries - in his words, "no material influence could be produced by it."107

Wentworth's public persona was a different matter. The Nova Scotia government seized upon the press gang riot of 1805 to tighten its grip on impressment, especially on shore. Colonial authorities were not always successful in watching out for domestic interests, but they did make important strides, for instance in protecting timber vessels

145 and privateers. Merchants were also effective in petitioning for the release of pressed seafarers. And while fishermen were technically fair game in 1805, the government moved quickly in the riot's aftermath to protect them for the duration of the Napoleonic

Wars. When combined with the Admiralty's protection system, this eliminated a large

1 OS segment of the maritime workforce from the Navy. Nova Scotia authorities also cited the danger of naval officers searching for deserters as a pretext to bar press gangs from town altogether. When the Assembly first sat in 1758, desertion legislation was one of its first orders of business. Officers were forbidden to enter town without a justice of the peace. If they knew the location of a straggler, they were supposed to apply for a writ of habeas corpus and a magistrate would then survey the premises and report back to the chief justice. In the eighteenth century this policy was not followed to the letter of the law, but from 1805 the Nova Scotia government used the legislation to strengthen its control over the Navy. As demonstrated in John George Marshall's reflections at the beginning of this chapter, pressed men now employed lawyers to secure their release from the wooden world. Captains were served with writs of habeas corpus to present the pressed seafarers in court, where a judge examined the legality of their detention. Chief

Justice Sampson Salter Blowers set the young man free in Marshall's story because he was a fisherman from the south shore of Nova Scotia, and therefore not liable to 109 impressment.

The most telling reform is that not another press warrant was issued in Nova

Scotia until the War of 1812. Press gangs were barred from shore for much of the

Napoleonic Wars. Men with some claim to resident status in Nova Scotia were also discharged from the Navy. This was the argument John Liddell and Company made in

146 1809 for one of its employees. They petitioned Lieutenant-Governor George Prevost on behalf of Thomas Murphy, master of the shallop William & Jean, who had been pressed by HMS Mullet on a trading voyage to Pictou. In addition to being a ship master, which was usually more than enough to get released from the Navy, Murphy was a freeholder and a married man. His employers argued that he needed to return home to his family because they were "entirely supported by his honest Industry."110 There is no record that

Murphy was released, but this likely occurred once Prevost brought the case before the admiral.111 Another protection was membership in the militia. Simeon Perkins regularly supplied sailors and.privateersmen with militia certificates, which guaranteed them protection from impressment. It was no secret that men joined the militia for no other reason than to protect themselves from the Navy. A month after Murphy was pressed,

Edward Mortimer, colonel of the Pictou militia, complained that two of his men had been pressed in that town by sailors from HMS Colibre. The admiral assured Prevost that the two men would be discharged when the warship returned to Halifax.113

An increasing number of Nova Scotians were discharged from the Navy during the Napoleonic Wars. The press gang riot of 1805 was a catalyst for further restrictions and reforms. Among those exempt were freeholders, fishermen, privateersmen, sailors in mast ships, fanners, members of militia units and apprentices, not to mention the multitude of groups protected by the Admiralty and Navy Board - including foreigners

(mainly Americans), masters and mates of merchant vessels, and sailors in government service. Hundreds more were released because they were physically unfit for naval life, often "ruptured" with ulcers or hernias; John Felcas, on the other hand, a supernumerary pressed by HMS Asia in 1799, was discharged because he was "Insane." Others were

147 released because they were personal or domestic servants, or, in the case of William

Mills, who was entered at Saint John in 1813, because he was a sea fencible. Beginning with the New England planters in the late 1750s, colonial authorities used residency to protect Nova Scotians from impressment. The Navy conceded the exemption during the

American Revolution, and Nova Scotia authorities enforced it during the French and

Napoleonic Wars. The most important reason for discharging sailors from the Navy was because they were residents of Nova Scotia. In fact, so many men were released from the

Navy that warships were short-handed and admirals worried about the squadron's ability to perform its duties.114

On 20 September 1794, a press gang from HMS Resolution took hold of a man named James Deans, who was released when the sheriff proved that he was an

"Inhabitant of Halifax."115 This was one of the first cases in which residency was invoked to free a Nova Scotian from the Navy during the Napoleonic Wars; unfortunately, it is unclear what evidence was produced to secure Deans's release. Hundreds of similar cases followed. For example, HMS Asia undertook a massive recruiting drive in the autumn of

1799, pressing some 108 men in just over two weeks, but eighty-seven of them were sent home because they were residents of Halifax.116 The manning situation deteriorated over time as most recruits, especially in Halifax, were released for one reason or another. For instance, around the time that Deans was discharged from the Resolution in 1794, that warship released at least fourteen other pressed men: six as apprentices, four as masters or owners of vessels, two as residents of Halifax, and two because they were unfit for the service. The Resolution pressed nineteen men in Halifax on 20 December, but every one of them was discharged as "Citizens of the United States of America."117 Similarly, press

148 gangs from HMS Leander conscripted thirty-three men on the streets of Halifax in

December 1803 only to have Admiral Mitchell discharge twenty-two of them immediately, while six others were relieved of naval duty because they were apprentices.118 And finally, on 19 October 1811, recruiting parties from HMS Spartan pressed fifteen men in Halifax, but all of them were put on shore the next day because they were "Protected."119 William Sabatier, chairman of the Society of Merchants, claimed that Nova Scotia provided the Navy with "a supply of hardy seamen." This was not the case during the Napoleonic Wars, when Nova Scotia became a drain on the

Navy's manpower rather than the other way around. A key reason for this was the provincial government's success in protecting residents of Nova Scotia from impressment.

Desertion was another problem for the Navy. Warships in Nova Scotia lost more men to desertion than they recruited. In some cases the ratios are staggering: for example,

HMS Centaur was in Halifax in 1805, and had twenty-three men run away compared to only three recruits.121 HMS Aeolus picked up one rating in 1808 but lost five to desertion, while the naval sloop Atalante, stationed in Halifax in 1810 and 1811, recruited two men but lost twenty to desertion.122 Men-of-war were plagued by desertion throughout the

Atlantic region, from Halifax and Yarmouth to Saint John and Charlottetown. Most absconded while performing regular duties on shore, from the hospital or naval yard, or during shore leave. Others swam from the ship at night or took a boat and raced for the coast. Desertion exacerbated the manning problem in Nova Scotia and it worsened over time, particularly during the War of 1812. Anxious that the Navy would try to make up these deficiencies with impressment, merchants offered bounties for volunteers and in

149 1808 organized a public subscription for recovering deserters, which ran to several hundred pounds and was published in the Royal Gazette,,123 From 1812 to 1815 the

Legislative Assembly voted an annual sum of £750 to attract sailors to the Navy. They were entitled to five guineas apiece, if they volunteered. These preemptive strikes against impressment failed to solve the manning problem in Nova Scotia.124

HMS Whiting on the South Shore

Impressment restrictions and high desertion rates exacerbated an already delicate situation in Nova Scotia. Warships were short-handed and captains resorted to illegal measures. The Mitchell case was the most publicized example of this, but an equally galvanizing press gang incident occurred in Shelburne a few months earlier. The naval schooner Whiting was stationed in Halifax in 1805 and pressed a couple of dozen seamen, many of whom were turned over to the flagship Cleopatra. With a complement of only eighteen men, Mitchell used the Whiting to recruit generally for the North

American squadron.125 It was in this capacity that it visited the south shore. Liverpool was one of its first ports of call and it created quite a panic there. Simeon Perkins followed its movements closely, beginning with its arrival on 27 June: "One of the Kings

Cutters arrives from Halifax. She did not Shew Colours till She got within half a mile then hoisted a Blue Ensign & Red pennant. The officers came on Shore but did not call on men. Mr. Power Saw them at the Battery & waited on them to his House."126 When the Whiting sent a boat ashore two days later, the townspeople were so "apprehensive of a press" that, according to Perkins, it caused "some rumpus."127 Three Black men took shelter in Perkins's home, claiming to have been "chased by the men of wars people."128

150 The schooner's officers were insulted in the street, and one injured by a cutlass, all because the community feared that "the Men of war's men were about to Impress."129 Its commander, Lieutenant Orkney, complained about the mistreatment of his seamen and told Perkins that he had no intention of pressing men in Liverpool. A much relieved

Perkins took Orkney at his word and was "very Sorry" for the misunderstanding.130

Orkney was not true to his word. On the evening of 1 July, he sent a boat into

Liverpool that pressed Lovelace Moc. The impressment stemmed from a domestic dispute in which Moc's wife, perhaps in a rage at her husband, asked a party from the

Whiting to take him onboard the warship; however, when they did so, according to

Perkins, "She made a great ado about it, and went hallowing thro the Street."131 Over the next couple of days Orkney pressed two more men: a Black carpenter named Anthony

Smith from his home and John Keaser, who "took away his wives bed and Some other things out of the House and left her very destitute."132 Black sailors occasionally worked aboard merchant vessels and privateers in Nova Scotia, but my research indicates that few of them were pressed into the Navy. Perkins and other Liverpool officials applied to

Orkney to get Smith released. Orkney informed them that Smith's impressment was a mistake and that he would be released in the near future; however, when the Whiting set sail the following day Smith remained onboard, as did both Moc and Keaser. Indeed,

Perkins was still trying to get Smith released from the Navy more than a year later, apparently without success.133 The Whiting also pressed a sailor from an American schooner on the way out of Liverpool, before it headed westward to Port Mouton, where she anchored for a couple of days.134

151 Another Liverpool mariner, the teenager Prince Snow, was pressed into the

Whiting a week or two later. He had been on a fishing trip to Canso with Freeman

Gardner, skipper of the Commerce, and then on a voyage to Boston when the schooner put into Cape Negro and was boarded by the Whiting. Orkney pressed Snow as well as a young man from Port Riviere, a small cove to the east of Liverpool. Snow was turned

over to the Cleopatra in Halifax, but Perkins and other Liverpool officials used their

influence, and the Snow family's desperate situation, to secure his release in late

September. He seems to have been the only Liverpool man who was pressed by the

Whiting and subsequently released. The others remained in the Navy. Like Captain

William Duddingston in HMS Senegal thirty years earlier, Orkney lied to Perkins and the people of Liverpool, and impressment threatened its labouring population for the entire time the warship roamed the south shore. Even this, however, paled in comparison to the

Whiting's activities in Shelburne.

Word of its recruitment campaign in Liverpool preceded the Whiting's arrival in

Shelburne. Indeed, fear of impressment was so widespread in the town that Orkney posted a notice at the customs house, stating that he was not there to press fishermen or

farmers - this was against Admiral Mitchell's orders - and that they should continue to

"follow their several occupations" in peace.136 Again, Orkney was not true to his word:

only a few days later he sparked widespread panic by allowing sailors to tear through the

countryside. Dozens of people were awoken in the middle of the night, forced to open their doors or a naval party would knock them down with axes. Other inhabitants, both young and old, were threatened with cutlasses and pistols. Several of them suffered

serious injuries. As a result, dozens of families in the Shelburne area, including Sandy

152 Point, abandoned their homes and took refuge in the woods. A special court of sessions was convened on 22 July to hear complaints about the Whiting's officers, as well as John

Hames, the Shelburne customs collector and magistrate who played a key role in terrorizing the constituents that he was supposed to protect. The court consisted of four justices of the peace and it sat until 1 August.137

Among the witnesses was sixty-seven-year-old Joseph Mangham, a twenty-five year veteran of the British Army. He had been a weaver and farmer in Shelburne for twenty years. Mangham testified that his family, consisting of his elderly wife and two orphan children, was accosted by a party from the Whiting in his potato garden on the afternoon of 18 July. The garden was located near the Mangham home, and the family was working there when Mangham's wife noticed one of the Whiting's officers, likely the master's mate named Hollis, approaching the house. Finding the door locked, Hollis threatened to break it down with an axe before she agreed to open it. They searched every inch of the dwelling but refused to give an explanation for doing so; however, three sailors had deserted from the Whiting a few days earlier, and it is likely that the naval party was looking for them, or at least for evidence that they had been in the area.

Meanwhile, Mangham noticed magistrate Hames standing in the road a little way off and asked him to intervene on his behalf and stop the ransacking; to his surprise, not only did

Hames refuse this request but he treated the old man with disdain. Fearing more violence,

Mangham lodged his family in the forest until the court proceedings began several days later.138

More than a dozen families feared the Navy's intrusions to such an extent that they lived in the woods for extended periods of time, some with infants and disabled

153 adults to care for. Indeed, many of the Whiting's victims were elderly couples with young

children. Few had it as bad as Andrew Goodick, who somehow lived in the woods with

his wife and eight children for more than a week; these families likely worked together to

survive. A handful of male victims had served in the British armed forces for

considerable periods of time - twenty years in the Royal Artillery in the case of the

seventy-nine-year-old farmer Jasper Grassman. One father had a son serving in the Royal

Navy, while another had three sons enlisted in the Shelburne militia. Most of the male

victims were freeholders and members of farming, fishing, and artisan families with roots

in the community. When young or middle aged men were accosted by the naval party,

some of them were forced onboard the Whiting. For example, the fisherman Conrad

Buchanan testified that the naval party "presented a Pistol at his Breast and Swore they

would shoot him unless he went with them."139 Buchanan escaped and fled with his

family into the forest. Faced with the same predicament - one naval seaman swearing

that he "would tie him Neck and heel if he did not go with him on board" the Whiting -

the farmer Daniel Cormick also got clear and took to the woods.140 Understandably, he was desperate to do so: he cared for a daughter and a deranged wife, and impressment

threatened his family's very existence.141

As the naval party moved from house to house, the actions of its leaders, magistrate John Hames and master's mate Hollis, moved beyond the criminal to border on the sadistic. For example, near midnight one evening Hames barged through Henry

Echlin's door with a sword in one hand and a pistol in the other, tore him away from his wife, threatened to blow his brains out, and confined him on the trumped-up charge of harbouring deserters. Hames demanded twenty pounds from Echlin, a farmer and part-

154 time school teacher, "saying that was the Law for People who Harboured Deserters."

Echlin denied the charge, and having no money, Hames told him that he would take the place of one deserter and that another press gang was coming to "sweep them all" into the

Navy, especially his son, when he returned to Shelburne from a fishing voyage.143 On the

road Hames called Echlins a "Damned Rascall" and promised to flog him with a horse­

whip if he was saucy.144 To his wife's horror, the naval party marched Echlin to

Shelburne and put him onboard the Whiting. She was left with six young children to care

for and not a "morsel of Bread," nor the money or credit to obtain the "Actual necessarys

of life."145 When she appeared before the court on 1 August, Anna Echlin had been living

in the forest for more than two weeks and her husband was still onboard the Whiting.

Unfortunately, there is no record of Echlin in the Whiting's muster book and it is unclear

what became of him. He may have been regarded as a supernumerary and released, or he

may have been turned over to another warship. Hames repeated these outrages elsewhere,

and what is worse, they seem to have been endorsed by Lieutenant Orkney, who watched

the Echlin incident and did not intervene.146

The naval party's mission in the Shelburne countryside was to investigate

desertion. It used that excuse to force several men onboard the Whiting, likely for

interrogation or because they had resisted. For instance, the fisherman Daniel Moore was taken and released on the same day, after which he and his wife abandoned their home to

live in the forest. Similarly, the sixty-year-old farmer Nathaniel Turner watched helplessly as the naval party roughed up his family, likely with the intention of pressing his two sons into the Navy. Hollis wounded both of them with a cutlass before the family

fled to the woods. Their father was taken onboard the Whiting for three days before he

155 was released, after which he also took refuge in the wilderness. Neither Moore nor Turner was entered into the Whiting's books, which suggests that they were not intended to serve

in the Navy. Turner was exempt because of his age and would never have been cleared as

fit for naval service.147

Other Shelburne residents, such as the carpenter John Fell, were not as fortunate.

Fell was in bed with his wife when he heard knocking at the door. Initially they refused to

open it, but relented when the naval party threatened to beat it down. In came two sailors who told Fell to come with them; when he refused, Hames entered the house armed with

a pistol and, according to Fell's wife, threatened to "blow her husbands brains out."148

Unlike the others, Fell was pressed into the Whiting and entered into its books, but he managed to desert at Cape Forchu less than a fortnight later. He likely returned home

overland.149 The Whiting's records are vague with respect to its movements at this time, but it is clear that Orkney entered more than a dozen men in southwestern Nova Scotia in

late July and early August 1805. Several were pressed at Shelburne. For instance, the

Shelburne Sessions recommended the eight-man crew of the fishing vessel Four Johns

"for Protection to His Majesty's Officers of the Navy," because they were all freeholders

(or sons of freeholders) and members of the Shelburne militia.150 Orkney left Shelburne

and sailed away to the southwest, where the Whiting harassed Barrington and Yarmouth,

among other towns. Those communities likely heard of the Whiting's exploits at

Liverpool and Shelburne before it arrived and took appropriate precautions.

Unfortunately, no records have survived that describe the Whiting's recruitment efforts in those places.151

156 Once the witnesses recorded their depositions, the Shelburne Sessions petitioned

Chief Justice Sampson Salter Blowers. Gideon White and the other magistrates demanded justice for the violent and unlawful conduct of Hames and the Whiting's officers. They told Blowers that the depositions "will Convey but a faint Idea of the distress of the Inhabitants of this Town and Coast." The magistrates stated further that the damage caused by impressment extended beyond Shelburne to much of coastal Nova

Scotia. "We Cannot for a moment suppose," they declared, that Admiral Mitchell gave orders to press fishermen, farmers, and freeholders.153 Indeed, Orkney had posted a notice that this was against the admiral's orders, which was signed by Hames in his capacity as customs collector, but Orkney broke that promise several days later when "both Farmers and Fishermen were not only pressed but two [were] Cruelly wounded."154 The

"Unnamed Citizens of Shelburne" requested Blowers to lay the case before Lieutenant-

Governor Wentworth and the Council to prevent such "Outrageous and destructive

Conduct" in the future.155 They also offered a stern warning: if this behaviour was allowed to continue then the young fishermen of the south shore, the most valuable part of their communities, would immigrate to the United States. Their fathers would likely follow, "unless justice is done them."156

The Shelburne magistrates argued that Hames was the sole cause of the distress.

He was in town during the Sessions, knew why it was sitting (he even lurked about the court house), but refused to testify. His fellow magistrates condemned Hames's conduct as tending to "destroy that peace, Harmony, Good order and Governing which every

Civil Magistrate under the British Government is sworn to Support."157 Gideon White argued that Hames should be held responsible for his behaviour, especially his

157 mistreatment of Joseph Mangham. White also highlighted Hames's influence with

Orkney and the fact that he blatantly disobeyed the order against impressment at the customs house, which he drafted personally. Apparently, Hames accused Mangham of resisting the naval party and of raising a mob. White dismissed the mob suggestion entirely, and declared that it was natural for British subjects to resist violent and unlawful intrusions into their homes and personal lives - what would you expect from a sixty- seven-year-old man who had been "wounded Abused impressed and drove from" his home? The magistrates also educated Blowers on Shelburne County's legal deficiencies.

If anyone in the town could issue writs of habeas corpus, neither Echlins nor Fell would

1 CO have been conscripted into the Whiting.

In the end, not only did Hames avoid the Shelburne Sessions, but there is no indication that Orkney and the Whiting's seamen acknowledged its existence, let alone suffer a reprimand. There is also no evidence that Blowers took legal action or that the case was presented to Wentworth and the Council. It must have been a slap in the face for many Shelburne residents that Hames did not receive discipline of any kind either - a year later Wentworth granted him three months' leave of absence to travel to England on personal business, and even expressed satisfaction with Hames's conduct in his "Offices of the Revenue and Magistracy."159 Gideon White and other Shelburne officials did not record why the Nova Scotia government refused to discipline Hames or take a greater interest in this case. Had-the incident occurred in Halifax rather than a remote coastal village, Hames's outrages would have been laid bare for all to see - naval authorities, colonial officials, the merchant community, and the newspaper press. It is possible that the Whiting's impressments were overshadowed by the press gang riot in Halifax several

158 months later. What is clear, however, is that impressment disturbances in Halifax and on

the south coast in 1805 diminished the Navy's reputation in Nova Scotia. They also

discredit N.A.M. Rodger's assertion that impressment rarely led to violence or protests

on shore. This was not the case in Nova Scotia, where impressment disputes arose when junior officers disregarded orders from their superiors, as was the case with Orkney in

Shelburne, and when the naval elite violated provincial and municipal regulations on

their own accord, as was the case with Mitchell in Halifax. These incidents show that the

violent and tyrannical image of impressment in popular folklore and traditional

historiography is sometimes rooted in historical fact. Sailors and maritime communities

resisted impressment throughout the North Atlantic world. Chapters 4 and 5 will show

that press gangs were contested in the British Isles and Newfoundland just as they were

in Nova Scotia.160

Pandemonium in Pictou

One of the most significant impressment cases in Nova Scotia's history occurred

in Pictou in October 1809. About a year earlier Edward McCray and Matthew Allan

arrived in the Pictou area, perhaps from nearby Caribou, to work as farmers, labourers,

and timber manufacturers with partner Robert McCully. From the start they were harassed by rival timber interests, some of whom, such as John McDonald, were newcomers to Pictou and described as yeomen, while others were established merchants,

such as John Cameron. In the summer of 1809 the partners were cutting timber on the waterfront property of William Cochran, a Halifax merchant, with the latter's permission.

On 15 August, the merchant Hector McLean and at least four other men forcibly seized

159 fifty tons of their timber and put it aboard a vessel in the harbour. The aggressors

threatened to beat the young men if they resisted, or attempted to repossess the timber,

declaring that they "intended to have it by force not regarding the Law."161 However, the

young partners filed a complaint in the Supreme Court at Pictou. McCray stated that he

did not believe the defendants to be freeholders in Nova Scotia, they were likely to flee

the province, and unless they were held on bail the young men's timber could be lost

forever. The case was decided in May 1810. The defendants were found guilty of trespass

and ordered to pay McCray, Allan, and McCully nearly sixty pounds in damages, as well

as to pay the court costs. However, the latter defaulted on payment and likely fled the

province - the chief justice ordered the sheriff of Pictou to arrest them the following two

summers, without success.1

Not long after this dispute the partners were targeted by other timber speculators

in Pictou. In early September 1809, shortly before court proceedings began against

Hector McLean and company, a group of yeomen led by John McLeod forcibly seized a

much larger haul of their timber - pine and spruce worth hundreds of pounds, along with

axes and other tools. McCray, Allan, and McCully were in the process of hauling the

timber to Pictou harbour for sale when McLeod's group, consisting of at least nine men,

assaulted them with "force and arms."163 According to McCray and his partners,

McLeod's group threatened to "beat, maim and wound them" in order to steal the

timber.164 Armed with clubs, axes and guns, they chased the young men away from their

timber, pursuing McCray and Allan for about a mile into the interior. McLeod's group warned them to stay away, that it was now their timber, and "they would keep it and

defend it."165 Apparently, the labourers of McCray and his partners were so frightened by

160 the experience that they refused further employment. In an affidavit sworn at Halifax on

16 September, McCray stated that McLeod and the other accused had previously threatened to seize their timber. He cautioned that they were not freeholders and posed a serious flight risk. The partners were hoping to collect as much as £500 in damages. Four days later the Supreme Court issued a warrant for the arrest of McLeod's group and slated the case for trial in May 1810. The defendants were released on bail during the ensuing winter.166

Before either trial occurred, however, McCray and Allan were captured by enemies in Pictou and sent off to sea. The leaders of this scheme hoped that McCray and

Allan would not make it back to Nova Scotia in time for their trials, if at all, and that they would retain the stolen timber. The culprits in this scheme, merchant John Cameron and yeoman John McDonald, were most likely partners or friends of the McLean or McLeod groups. Cameron was a prominent merchant in Pictou and the stolen timber was probably intended for him. On 12 October 1809, Cameron and McDonald confronted Allan in

Pictou and battered him with swords, staves and knives; he was then bound and incarcerated, perhaps aboard a vessel in Pictou harbour. McCray was captured around the same time, but the circumstances remain unclear; for whatever reason McCully, the third partner, remained at large. He may have fled the district to avoid his partners' fate.167 The timber trade made Pictou into one of the busiest ports in the North Atlantic region in the early nineteenth century. Labour camps, immigration, disbanded soldiers, the growing number of grog shops, and the arrival of dozens of British and Atlantic merchantmen each year gave the town a transitory and pioneering character. Away from colonial officialdom in Halifax and largely insulated from the law, natives and newcomers used

161 fear, intimidation, and violence to turn a profit in the backwoods of Pictou County and

rural Nova Scotia. For these characters, impressment was a natural extension of the rough

house tactics they used everyday.

Coincidentally, Rear-Admiral Alexander Cochrane, commander-in-chief of the

Leeward Islands station of the Royal Navy, visited the area that October to survey his

property on Pictou Island.169 Cameron and McDonald used this opportunity to dispose of

their enemies. Falsely presenting themselves as "the Magistrates of Pictou," they

described McCray and Allan as "Persons of infamous Character and disturbers of the

Peace."170 They convinced the admiral to press them into the naval cutter Ram,

commanded by Lieutenant Sheppard, which was then in Pictou harbour. The two men

were incarcerated under close guard for ten days before they were hurried off to Halifax,

with a request from their enemies that they be kept in irons and not set at liberty in the provincial capital. To this end, Sheppard confined them in the hold and transferred them

to a schooner near the harbour's mouth, a safe distance from the town. Before the real

magistrates of Pictou figured out what had happened, and secured a writ of habeas corpus

to secure their release in Halifax, McCray and Allan were turned over to HMS Thetis and

sent to the West Indies.171

At this point Pictou's civil power got involved. Its five principal magistrates, together with nearly forty residents, petitioned the House of Assembly on 30 October

seeking redress. It declared that McCray and Allan were not seamen or "employed in

Navigation" - they were rated landsmen aboard the Thetis - but rather men of property,

business and credit in Pictou, and at the time of their impressments they had been working in lawful occupations on shore, one in a blacksmith's shop and the other

162 building a house. Since their arrival in Pictou a year earlier, McCray and Allan had

lived "inoffensively as peaceable subjects of the Government."173 Their enemies, on the

other hand, were mainly recent arrivals to the province who had entered into a

combination to seize their timber; it was also the case, the Pictou magistrates told the

House, that men of capital in Pictou, such as the unnamed John Cameron, were pulling

the combination's strings behind the scenes and had "repeatedly heretofore threatened to

have the said two men put on board of Men-of-war."174 The petitioners were concerned

that McCray and Allan were beyond the reach of the common law of Nova Scotia, and

that as British subjects their liberties had been violated. While the magistrates knew

nothing of the address to Cochrane, they respected the admiral and believed that he must

have been deceived in this case. The House was asked to conduct an enquiry and to call

upon Lieutenant-Governor George Prevost to release the men from the Navy; Prevost

was held in high regard, the petition read, for his "uniform disposition to guard His

Majesty's Subjects in this highly favored Colony from oppression."175 They demanded

punishment for "all of the Members of this illegal Conspiracy," and requested the House

to prevent such outrages in the future.176

The petition was laid before the House on 30 November, which immediately

dissolved into a committee to interview witnesses. A week later the committee tabled its

report. It concluded that the pressing of McCray and Allan, who were both freeholders

and enrolled in the local militia, was instigated by enemies on the false pretence that they

were thieves and robbers. They had for some time been involved in a dispute with "many

of the Inhabitants" of Pictou regarding timber rights. McCray and Allan were "in nowise

subjects to impressment," and this incident had caused great panic among young Nova

163 Scotians, who reportedly fled from their homes to avoid impressment into the Navy.177

The House resolved that the "taking, detention and transportation" of the young men from the province was "highly illegal, unconstitutional and oppressive [and a] great injury to this Province."178 It promptly delegated a sub-committee to address the lieutenant governor; Prevost then issued a statement that he would contact Cochrane immediately, who he had no doubt would rectify the injustice, from his well known disposition to promote the commercial interests of the province. This was indeed the case, but by the time Cochrane ordered Captain Miller of the Thetis to release McCray and Allan it was too late - they had deserted the warship several weeks before, swimming ashore in English Harbour, Antigua. Cochrane informed Prevost that they were likely making their way back to Nova Scotia.

Local historians such as George Patterson suggest that once impressed, McCray and Allan vanished from Pictou forever.180 This was not the case, as they appeared in local courts over the next few years. How they made it back to Nova Scotia is a mystery, but they were home by the following summer. McCully was never pressed into the Navy.

When the trespass case against Hector McLean's group went to trial in the Supreme

Court at Pictou in May 1810, McCray, Allan and McCully won a small settlement. The guilty parties fled Pictou and restitution was never made.181 To add insult to injury, shortly after the trial Alexander Mcintosh, a member of the McLean group, and his partners brought McCray and Allan before the Supreme Court to recover a small debt.182

The case against John McLeod's group was also slated for trial at Pictou in May 1810; the defendants were charged with trespass and McCray, Allan, and McCully sought to recover £500 in damages. The former pled not guilty and turned the tables on the young

164 timber manufacturers: according to their deposition, McLeod's group owned the timber in question and it was McCray, Allan, and McCully who attempted to forcibly seize it with axes and other weapons. Afraid of being maimed, the defendants "gently", "quietly and without violence" took the axes from them. This case stretched out until May 1812, when the Supreme Court awarded the plaintiffs a paltry twenty-eight pounds in damages

- a far cry from the £500 they were seeking. Even this sum does not seem to have been paid by 1814, when McCray, Allan, and McCully had all left the district.183

Allan may have moved to Halifax, for in September 1810 he brought a charge of trespass in the Supreme Court there against John Cameron and John McDonald.

However, the defendants successfully petitioned to change the venue to Pictou, where the crime had allegedly taken place.184 Allan filed a deposition against Cameron and

McDonald in the Supreme Court at Pictou the following May. He told a harrowing tale of theft, assault, false imprisonment, and impressment at the hands of the defendants, and sought to recover damages totaling £1000. Allan claimed that he was not a seaman or

"liable to be impressed," but was nevertheless sent to "parts beyond the Seas."185

Cameron swore in court that several of his witnesses were out of the province, he believed on the way from Britain to Pictou, and that he could not "safely proceed to the

Trial" until they arrived.186 The case was continued each May until it disappeared from the Supreme Court's records in 1813.187 It is unclear why Allan decided to prosecute alone rather than teaming up with his old partners; indeed, McCray (perhaps with

McCully) brought at least one case against Cameron at the same time, although it too was delayed and faded away.188 In the end, Cameron and McDonald never answered for pressing McCray and Allan and sending them to the West Indies, while the latter never

165 received payment for their stolen timber. All three partners disappeared from the courts in

1813. By the time of Pictou's first census in 1817, they were a distant memory.

Naval-Civilian Discord in Halifax

This case created quite a stir in Halifax. It was followed in the newspapers and had a significant impact on manning policy. For the first time since 1775 the House of

Assembly got involved in an impressment case, and in doing so it championed the constitutional rights of Nova Scotians. This case also spurred the Society of Merchants to confront the Navy on its use of press gangs in Halifax. The merchants complained publicly in the middle of the Assembly's investigation that impressment was hurting merchant ship owners. The Society's chairman, William Sabatier, relayed these grievances to Prevost, who moved on them quickly and received a positive response from

Vice-Admiral John Borlase Warren. Warren was sympathetic to the Society's concerns - earlier in his career he wrote a tract criticizing the excesses of press gangs in Britain.

Writing aboard his flagship, HMS Swiftsure, Warren issued a proclamation for the release of protected sailors. If any seaman was taken from the merchant service, "who either by

Law or the regulations of Government are not liable to impress," this was contrary to his orders and they were to be discharged from the Navy immediately.190 More importantly,

Warren issued a general order to the North American squadron, "that no Man is to be impressed upon the Wharves or on shore; or that any Native, Fisherman, Foreigner, or

Apprentice belonging to this Province, shall be detained by any Officers under my command."191 Warren already had a track record of releasing Nova Scotians from the

Navy. This correspondence was printed in the Weekly Chronicle and circulated widely

166 throughout the colony. Along with the Pictou case, the Society's campaign in 1809 was

• 109 interpreted as a significant victory against impressment in Nova Scotia.

Impressment in the outports may have strained Nova Scotia's relationship with the Navy, but it was press gangs in Halifax, operating illegally on shore, that instigated popular disturbances. Naval-civilian tensions increased over time, especially during the

War of 1812. Faced with low recruitment figures, high desertion rates and weakly- manned crews, captains became increasingly frustrated. Put simply, they did not have enough sailors to man their ships, and did not possess the means or authority to recruit them in Nova Scotia. This mixture of manpower problems had been brewing for some time. Colonial authorities seized control of impressment on shore during the 1790s, while the press gang riot of 1805 nearly ended Nova Scotia's cooperation with the Navy altogether. Press warrants were not forthcoming and Warren outlawed impressment on shore in 1809. Even worse was the number of groups protected from the Navy, not only on shore but also in Nova Scotia waters and on the high seas. These included residents of

Nova Scotia - such as fishermen, farmers, freeholders, militiamen, privateer crews, masters and mates of vessels, and apprentices - as well as foreigners and sailors in government service. Essentially, the only men who could be entered into the Navy were volunteers, who were few and far between in Nova Scotia, and British and colonial sailors working aboard deep-sea vessels. This was the problem facing the North

American squadron during the War of 1812. Under these circumstances, it is not a surprise that captains occasionally broke protocol, either sending press gangs on shore or conscripting protected men.

167 The first hint of trouble came in July 1812, when Richard Tremain and two other

Halifax magistrates complained to Lieutenant-Governor John Sherbrooke about a press

gang from HMS Spartan. Unfortunately, we do not know the exact nature of the

complaint, but Sherbrooke assured the merchants that he would bring the matter to the

attention of Vice-Admiral Herbert Sawyer, the commander-in-chief of the Halifax

squadron, "to have regulations established as will prevent a recurrence of the evil

complained of." Sawyer had received a general press warrant from the Nova Scotia

government a couple of weeks earlier. It was issued on 1 July and lasted for forty-eight hours. It is possible that one of the Spartan's lieutenants led a press gang into Halifax

after the warrant had expired, and that this is what the merchants were complaining

about.194 The Spartan pressed two men in Halifax a couple of days before the merchants'

complaint, including a Halifax native - this may have sparked the complaint as well. The

Spartan was one of the few warships that recruited successfully in the Atlantic region

during the War of 1812, entering dozens of men in Halifax and Saint John.195 It is unknown how Sawyer responded to the incident or if he reprimanded the naval officers

involved. What is clear, however, is that the magistracy took an increasingly aggressive

stand against impressment in Halifax.

In late May 1813, William Sabatier, as chairman of the Society of Merchants, complained to Sherbrooke about a recent impressment on shore - "a practice not only contrary to His Majesty's Instructions and the Orders issued by Admiral Sir John B.

Warren [in 1809]," but if allowed to persist would seriously injure "this Town and

Province and "His Majesty's Service."196 Sabatier implied that the practice had been dormant for some time, probably since the press gang riot of 1805. The Society also

168 contended that allowing the impressment of "British seamen" ran counter to

Sherbrooke's privileges as lieutenant governor - "Your Excellency being the legitimate guardian of the safety of His Majesty's Loyal and peaceable subjects."197 It was -

Sherbrooke's responsibility to balance the needs of the public and the Navy; this was especially the case with impressment, a practice so open to abuse. The Society did not stop there: it stated for the record that impressment from outgoing vessels was illegal, and if not stopped, "all Trade must cease"; foreign seamen were off-limits, since they replaced British sailors in the mercantile marine; every naval officer who took hold of a landsman was "liable to a Civil Action"; and if fishermen could be pressed into the Navy then the fisheries of Nova Scotia would have to be abandoned, and the "principal dependence of the Colony and its revenue, would be ruined."198 The Society demanded government action, even though there was already a near-prohibition on impressment in

Nova Scotia.199 This was a powerful attack on the Navy and Sherbrooke. As David

Sutherland has noted, John Wentworth was replaced as lieutenant governor in 1808 by a string of Army officers, starting with Sherbrooke. The British government valued their military background during the Napoleonic Wars, especially with conflict on the horizon with the United States, but they took little interest in the Nova Scotian economy generally and merchants' interests in particular. This growing divide sharpened the Society's attacks on impressment.200

To back up. its case the Society sent the lieutenant governor a copy of Admiral

Warren's proclamation from 1809.201 It also included an affidavit from the Halifax merchant John William Morris, belonging to the company house of the same name, who had several men pressed from his brigantine Annabella just before it was scheduled to

169 sail to the West Indies. The master and mate were on shore when a boat from HMS

Armide reportedly pressed all four of its sailors, leaving only a small boy in charge of the vessel. Captain Thomas Troubridge of the Armide released two of the men, but despite

Morris's protests, he retained the others. Morris pleaded with Troubridge that it had taken a long time to recruit even this small of a crew, the voyage had been delayed in the meantime, and that he paid fourteen pounds in advance to the two pressed seamen. Not only did he stand to lose this money, but he faced the difficult task of finding replacements in a barren maritime labour market. Morris informed Troubridge that the commander-in-chief had given an order to "prevent impressments of this kind," to which the captain apparently retorted, "that he did not bear a damn for the Commander in

Chiefs Order" and that Morris should consider "himself well off that he did not keep the whole of the men so taken." Morris stated that Troubridge pressed men from another out-going vessel on the same night. It speaks volumes about the tumultuous nature of the manning situation in Nova Scotia that the two sailors at the centre of the controversy had no ties to the province, but rather were Scandinavian and British.203

Less than a month later the Society forced Sherbrooke's hand by submitting a memorial signed by fifty merchants. It complained about the Navy generally and about impressment in particular. Specifically, the merchants wanted John Borlase Warren to settle the dispute, likely because as admiral in 1809 he issued merchant-friendly orders against impressment in Nova Scotia. Sherbrooke promised to send the memorial to the

Chesapeake, where Warren was stationed as commander-in-chief of the recently- consolidated North American, Jamaican and Leeward Islands squadrons of the Royal

Navy, but there is no evidence that Warren became involved in this case. To

170 Sherbrooke's surprise, the Society had also sent the memorial to Whitehall, without

warning him. Learning of this, he hastily dispatched a cover letter, rather than have

British ministers read the complaints for the first time.204 He sent it to Henry Bathurst, the

third Earl Bathurst, a powerful cabinet minister and secretary of state for war and the

colonies. Bathurst consulted the Admiralty and reported back to Sherbrooke later in 1813.

Sherbrooke handed the report over to the Society, and though it has not survived, the

subsequent deterioration of naval-civilian relations in Halifax suggests that the Society

was disappointed with its contents. On another level, this case illustrates the Society's

growing tenacity on maritime issues; as the war progressed it became the most vocal

critic of impressment in Nova Scotia. Sabatier's leadership was instrumental: he not only battled press gangs as chairman of the Society but also as a magistrate and sheriff of

Halifax County.205

Not even HMS Shannon's celebrated victory over USS Chesapeake could halt

naval-civilian discord in Halifax. Captain Philip Broke of the Shannon lured the

Chesapeake into a fight off Boston harbour on 1 June 1813, in which the former battered

the enemy with broadsides and boarded in the smoke. The Americans surrendered in

eleven minutes. Broke was injured and command fell to the Shannon's second lieutenant and Halifax native, Provo Wallis. On the afternoon of Sunday, 6 June, Wallis guided the two warships into Halifax harbour, which created quite a stir in the community. Once the ships were in sight, someone raced into St. Paul's Church and interrupted the sermon.

Soon the congregation joined the rest of Halifax in lining the waterfront and cheering the

Shannon into the harbour. Writing to his brother Gideon in Shelburne, Nathaniel White described the scene:

171 Nearly 2 hours before she hove in sight, the wharves were lined with Inhabitants, from a Telegraphic report from below... I was on board of the Chesapeake coming up the harbour, and such a horrid sight I never witnessed. Nothing but dead and dying strewed in every part of the ship. Among the wounded was a poor fellow that was in the class with me in College.206

The carnage was unfathomable: even the Shannon suffered more casualties in eleven minutes than Nelson's flagship, HMS Victory, did after six hours during the Battle of

Trafalgar in 1805. White was not alone in visiting the warships, as many Nova

Scotians greeted them in pleasure boats in Halifax harbour. Newspapers covered the story exhaustively while local writers serenaded Broke and the Shannon in poems and ballads.208

This great victory should have improved naval-civilian relations in Nova Scotia, and in a paradoxical sense it did. Nova Scotians celebrated the British war effort both globally and at home, and the Navy played a key role in the development of a British-

Nova Scotian identity during the Napoleonic Wars. Newspapers such as the Acadian

Recorder recited naval successes, compared the British, French and American fleets, and praised the skill and toughness of Britain's jack tars - the last defense of the British

Empire.209 At the same time, Nova Scotians had little interest in coming face-to-face with naval personnel on the streets, which were seen as imperial intruders and socially divisive influences. This was certainly the case with the Navy's recruitment efforts in Halifax.

The latter's residents saw no problem, on the one hand, in celebrating the Shannon's victory over the Chesapeake, and then, on the other hand, in refusing to provide the warship with sailors, even though it was widely known that Broke was taking the

Shannon south in the hopes of fighting an American warship. The Shannon entered only one recruit in Halifax in the previous few months; rather than press in Nova Scotia, it

172 boarded a vessel on the way to Boston and conscripted twenty Irish-Newfoundland fishing servants. This symbolizes the gulf in recruitment productivity between the region's two British naval stations: as Chapter 5 demonstrates, inhabitants and seafarers in Newfoundland were not insulated from impressment to nearly the same extent as they were in Nova Scotia.210 The restrictions on the press in Nova Scotia and the poor state of its maritime labour market during the War of 1812 likely discouraged Broke from even trying to recruit locally. While the Shannon's victory sent Halifax into naval euphoria, the underlying tensions that had existed since 1805 were still there, and they only needed a spark to reignite.

This came in the form of impressment less than two months later. Richard

Tremain, a merchant and justice of the peace, complained to Sherbrooke in late July 1813 about the violent and illegal activities of a press gang. Awoken by cries in the street,

Tremain hurried down the stairs to find people throwing stones at a naval party. Asked what was afoot, the group explained that "it was people pressing."211 Tremain persuaded them not to interfere until he investigated. The magistrate ran down the street to find

"three men dragging a man along and with large Clubs beating him unmercifully, and apparently without provocation."212 Tremain believed he was seriously injured. He asked the naval party what it intended to do with the man, but did not receive a civil response; instead, one member of the press gang charged at Tremain, "flourishing his Club and swearing [that] he would break my head" - it was only with "difficulty [that] I could escape his blows."213 He then made for the king's wharf to find soldiers and reinforcements, who returned with Tremain to the scene of the crime. Meanwhile, two military sentinels had interfered in the dispute, and a crowd had dispersed the naval party

173 and rescued the pressed man. Tremain took three naval seamen into custody and • instructed the Halifax militia to keep them under guard. Magistrates increasingly called on the various Army and militia units in Halifax to police the town at night. They could

stand up to press gangs physically, but inter-service violence was discouraged by officers

from all sides.214

Later than night Tremain was called upon again, with complaints that apprentices and other men were being pressed illegally. He reported to Sherbrooke that Halifax was in a state of constant alarm until it was confirmed that the press gangs had returned to their ships in the harbour. Tremain went down to the waterfront to investigate and found that the seamen he arrested had been released into the custody of the Halifax Navy Yard.

A frustrated Tremain complained that:

Your Excellency will at once see the difficulty a Magistrate has to perform his duty if sailors arm'd with Clubs are allowed to range the Streets of Halifax, take hold of whom they please, call them deserters, and at once take upon them to beat those or others that interfere without Controul.

After a complaint from Captain John Talbot of HMS Victorious, whose seamen did the pressing, Tremain cited the "repeated outrages Committed by Sailors allow'd to come on

Shore without proper Officers, or authority," which "has been too often represented to your Excellency, to allow you to be ignorant of the unpleasant difficulty Magistrates labour under in quelling riots." Tremain added that the crowd dispersed peacefully when he arrived, without hurting Talbot's sailors. He took his duties as a magistrate seriously, he performed them to the best of his ability, and had Talbot been the offender in this case, "he might have met the same fate."217 In his capacity as magistrate, Tremain returned deserters to the Navy that same night, and suffered personally when sailors were pressed out of his own vessel.

174 The Navy's troubles may have faded away had Talbot not petitioned Sherbrooke to punish Tremain. Accusing a magistrate of heading a mob was a serious allegation. For his part, Talbot claimed that the sailors were on shore to apprehend John McDugle, a deserter from the Victorious, rather than to press sailors. Seamen aboard the Victorious had information that McDugle was concealed in a Halifax home and Talbot gave orders to retrieve him. According to Talbot's sailors, McDugle was in the custody of sentinels at the king's wood yard until Tremain and a mob rescued him. The naval party called for help "in the King's name," but were abused and hit with stones. This contradicted

Tremain's statement, but even if the seamen were not pressing on shore, it was illegal for them to search for deserters unless supervised by a magistrate.219 John MacColla, the acting mayor of Halifax, received statements from all parties and concluded that the seamen had made false statements. The two sentries denied that McDugle was in their custody. And contrary to Talbot's testimony, MacColla had evidence that press gangs were in Halifax that night.220 Sherbrooke settled the dispute by arranging for the seamen and witnesses to meet at the Halifax Sessions for examination, to be supervised by

Richard Uniacke, the attorney general.

Sherbrooke informed Rear-Admiral Edward Griffith, the commander-in-chief of the North American squadron, that the Sessions found in favour of Tremain, who was deemed to be in "the correct and temperate performance of his duty."222 The naval seamen, on the other hand, pressed men without provincial authority and disturbed the peace of the town. It seems that Sherbrooke had finally been won over to Halifax's fight against impressment. He reminded Griffith that the Navy was required to make formal application to the lieutenant governor for a warrant before pressing sailors on shore in

175 Nova Scotia. If granted, the warrant had to be executed by a commissioned officer, "with a most delicate regard to the civil rights of the Inhabitants."223 The press gang also had to be supervised by a magistrate, which was a new restriction. According to the lieutenant governor, this process balanced the Navy's manning needs with the tranquility of the town and the civic rights of its inhabitants. Sherbrooke emphasized that Halifax's merchants offered rewards for the recovery of deserters, as well as bounties for volunteers; the Assembly also voted an annual fund for bounties, which guaranteed five guineas to each able seaman who volunteered for the Navy. Citing numerous complaints, the lieutenant governor again pointed to Warren's proclamation against impressment in

1809. He even suggested that impressment should be forbidden outright in Halifax during the war with the United States: then seamen would flock to Nova Scotia to take advantage of high wages, others would engage in privateers, and naval officers could lure them into the service with drink and tales of prize money. Sherbrooke concluded by reminding Griffith about the laws and procedures for the recovery of deserters in Nova

Scotia. Perhaps condescendingly, he also sent the admiral a gift of Uniacke's recently- published volume of provincial statutes.

Before Talbot persisted in his attack on Tremain, the Sessions met to discuss public disturbances in Halifax. The Sessions consisted of magistrates who sat regularly to discuss town business. This was a special meeting to discuss the "Riots" and "disorderly conduct" that for "some time past [has] been witnessed on the part of the Inhabitants."225

The press gang altercation spurred the magistrates into action, but neither this case nor the Navy generally was mentioned in the court's deliberations. It is clear, for instance, that there had been a number of recent popular protests in Halifax that did not involve the

176 Navy, although the Sessions did not specify what they were about. Thomas B. Akins noted that sections of Halifax were dominated by grog shops, poverty, and hard-drinking military men in this period. There were a number of altercations involving soldiers and the poor, including murders and rapes, and this may have been what concerned the

Sessions. This picture of Halifax is supported by Jim Phillips's work on crime. The magistrates resolved to form a nightly patrol to consist of one magistrate, one constable, and at least six militiamen. They were to police the downtown each night by foot and to receive cooperation from the Army's guard houses. This is where the impressment case may have ended had Talbot not called for an investigation.228

The Navy continued to diminish its reputation in 1813 by publicizing naval- civilian tensions in Halifax courts. Before the Talbot case was resolved there was another dispute between a naval officer and a magistrate. Lieutenant White of HMS Statira asked his captain to complain to the lieutenant governor about the conduct of Rufus Fairbanks.

White had led a party on shore to look for deserters, but Fairbanks called out the militia to stop him. Search parties were required to be under a magistrate's supervision, but

Fairbanks gave no indication that this was an illegal search. He was the magistrate on duty that night, and he headed the nightly patrol recently established by the Sessions. It seems that he dispersed the search party to restore order in the downtown area, but White claimed that Fairbanks insulted him, and he sought redress. Sherbrooke again called upon

Uniacke to investigate. Unfortunately for White, witnesses portrayed Fairbanks's conduct in a favourable light and the naval lieutenant did not receive the satisfaction he desired.

While Uniacke submitted a report in this case, with reflections on desertion and the law in Nova Scotia, it has not survived. Instead, we are left with Sherbrooke lecturing Griffith

177 on the Navy's misdeeds in Halifax. He claimed that the service and town would be better off if naval officers respected laws on impressment and desertion. One result of this incident was that the Sessions let the militia take charge of the nightly patrol, though a magistrate would still make the rounds. Fairbanks was one of the justices who made this decision.230

Naval-civilian tensions increased the following year as the Navy continued its march into the courts. In one case Hyde Parker, captain of HMS Tenedos, was found guilty in absentia for trespass. Ordered to pay a fine of £100, there is no indication that he acknowledged the trial.231 William Bennett sought to recover damages from Parker for confining him aboard the Tenedos. A small trader in Halifax, Bennett was alongside the warship to collect debts from its seamen. Once onboard Bennett was guarded by a marine for several days and then carried to sea for six weeks, for no apparent reason. The

Acadian Recorder trumpeted that £100 was "a very low estimation of British liberty!"

For his part, Parker was said to have served with distinction during the War of 1812, all of it on the North American station. Less than a month later Vice-Admiral Griffith entered the Sessions as the victim of an assault. James Field, a cooper's apprentice, was convicted of striking the admiral on a Halifax street. Griffith seized the youngster and held him until the authorities arrived. Field was sentenced to a month in jail and fined ten pounds with court costs, although Griffith intervened to have the fine remitted. Naval- civilian relations deteriorated sharply in Nova Scotia over time. This was particularly the case in Halifax from 1805, where impressment undermined the Navy's larger presence in

i • 234 the community.

178 Plain Truth

On 3 December 1814, a writer styling himself "Plain Truth" published a stinging criticism of the Royal Navy in the Acadian Recorder. Nova Scotians once enjoyed a cordial relationship with the North American squadron, he said, but naval-civilian relations had recently taken a turn for the worse because of the barbaric and illegal behaviour of press gangs. "Plain Truth" claimed to be a supporter of the king's service, but he could no longer keep silent when Halifax was exposed to the "cruel tyranny" of these unregulated posses.235 Merchants complained that guard boats illegally conscripted

sailors from outbound vessels, while townspeople were terrorized by officers who pressed men in the streets and broke open buildings to search for deserters. "Plain Truth" lambasted the violence of the Navy and criticized Nova Scotia's authorities for inadequate protection. He called on the newspaper's readers to "resist oppression":

Where were the magistrates and courts to arrest and prosecute the press gangs? Why did they allow naval officers to ransack homes and businesses? What about his liberty and constitutional birthright as an Englishman and a Nova Scotian? As a concerned citizen, who had long borne these injustices with patience and forbearance, "Plain Truth" decided to take a stand, hoping to strike a sympathetic cord with provincial and imperial authorities.236

This set off a debate in the Acadian Recorder. "A Sojourner" blasted "Plain

Truth" for republican sympathies and inciting the same kind of behaviour that led New

England to revolt in the American Revolution. Probably a Briton, "A Sojourner" stated that if "Plain Truth" lived in the United Kingdom, he would have seen magistrates balance their duties to country and community; they may have not wanted to assist the

179 Impress Service, but this was their responsibility. Halifax was lacking in subordination.

"A Sojourner" noted the protection the Navy provided to Nova Scotia and yet Halifax was probably the least friendly port it visited - '"Ingratitude is the growth of every clime,'" he piped, "and here it is an evergreen." For his part, "Plain Truth" took issue with "A Sojourner's" assault on his colony's New England heritage and defended its national, political, and moral character. As for the Navy's transgressions, they were on record and the only subordination he knew was to the laws of England; if naval officers followed these, there would be no problem with impressment in Halifax. "Plain Truth" had visited both British and European cities, and nowhere did he find the breaking of windows to be a "gentlemanly recreation" or the knocking of a man down a "mere venial indiscretion."238

It is possible that "A Sojourner" was William James, the author of a five-volume history of the Royal Navy during the Napoleonic Wars. Having escaped from

Philadelphia as a prisoner of war, James arrived in Halifax in late 1813 and found employment with Anthony Henry Holland, editor of the Acadian Recorder and a native of Nova Scotia. James approached Halifax's other three newspapers but, according to him, they were under the control of editors from Boston, who were "rank republicans at heart." Over the next couple of years, James used the Acadian Recorder to celebrate the superiority of the British Navy and to discredit reports of American victories in Halifax's rival newspapers. However, it is unclear what pen name he used, since Holland reported on naval affairs as well. Generally, James tried to convince Nova Scotians to shun

Halifax's "American junto" of editors, shed their republican character, and become loyal

British subjects. He published a pamphlet in Halifax denigrating a string of recent

180 American naval successes, which created a stir in Nova Scotia and throughout the

Atlantic world.239

In reality Halifax's three other newspapers - the Royal Gazette, Halifax Journal,

and Weekly Chronicle - were under the control of John Howe and his family, not Boston

or New England interests. Together with his son Joseph and brother-in-law William

Minns, the Howe family had a virtual monopoly of the Halifax press until the Acadian

Recorder was launched in 1813. Conservative in outlook, they shied away from political

controversy. Born in Boston, John Howe was a Loyalist and moved to Halifax during the

American war. His family was not the "American junto" or nest of "rank republicans"

that James described. On the contrary, Howe was a respected inhabitant of Halifax, who held a number of official posts and served as an emissary between the Nova Scotian and

American governments in 1807 and 1808. Lieutenant-Governor Prevost trusted him fully

on this important diplomatic mission. According to J. Murray Beck, historians have

traditionally divided Halifax society into two sections - the violent and military culture of the waterfront, on the one hand, and the fashionable and polite culture of the governing

and mercantile elite, on the other hand. Beck maintains that Howe belonged to a third

community, which consisted of New England puritans and their families, who scorned the "wild life at Government House and the depraved orgies of the dives in Barrack

Street."240 If William James's remarks about Boston influence and republican sympathies

in Halifax are to be believed, this could help explain the town's tense relationship with the Navy, and why that relationship deteriorated sharply when Britain went to war with the United States in 1812.241

181 The situation was more complex than James knew. A number of writers have highlighted the persistence of connections between Nova Scotia and New England in the early nineteenth century - in terms of trade, migration, education, religion, marriage and other areas. Unlike James, who grouped Americans together in a single group of radicals and republicans, Ronald H. McDonald has argued that Nova Scotians viewed the United

States as a heterogeneous society. They distinguished between New England and the

South, and blamed Thomas Jefferson, and the southern Republicans for starting the War of 1812. New England was also vehemently opposed to the war, which culminated in the Hartford Convention in late 1814, the meeting of twenty-six Federalists to channel opposition to American foreign policy. Since Nova Scotians received much of their news about the conflict and American politics from the Federalist press, McDonald suggests that "their response to the War of 1812 was in many ways similar to that of their

New England neighbours."242 In the end, we need to know more about Nova Scotia-New

England relations before making firm conclusions about their impact on resistance to press gangs in Halifax.

"Plain Truth's" letter to the Acadian Recorder was the last public outcry against impressment in Nova Scotia. He argued that the peace of Halifax and the "lives of its loyal inhabitants" were endangered by the Navy.243 Just weeks before he claimed to have witnessed a mate from the brig Alexander pressed in the middle of the night. The

Scotsman was sent to sea despite producing a mate's certificate, which should have protected him from the Navy. "Plain Truth" stated that the man was not allowed to collect his clothes from shore and that his employers were not informed of the situation. Around the same time, the crew of the brig Hebe of was detained by a party from

182 HMS Spencer. "Plain Truth" claimed that its master was abused and insulted, and had it not been for the timely interference of the magistrates, as well as a military guard and a number of residents, they would have been sent to sea contrary to Warren's standing order on impressment. The Spencer's log book states that its boats were sent ashore to look for deserters, and as "Plain Truth" argued, these searches were used as cloaks by the

Navy to press sailors. The Spencer entered few men in Halifax at this time and none of them had roots in Nova Scotia. On the other hand, it lost a dozen to desertion, which led its captain to send the search parties into town. In this case and many others, the unbalanced relationship between recruitment and desertion was the catalyst for naval- civilian tension in Halifax.244

"Plain Truth's" editorial came in response to a meeting of the Halifax Sessions, which was convened by Sabatier in his capacity as chairman of the Society of Merchants.

Among the justices in attendance were Richard Tremain, Rufus Fairbanks and John

Liddell, all of whom had butted heads with the Navy recently over impressment. The

Society presented depositions on a recent press gang disturbance in Halifax, likely the

Hebe incident. The Sessions resolved that the outrages committed against the residents of

Halifax must be stopped or they would be "attended with consequences of a most serious nature."245 It also resolved that Sabatier should wait on the lieutenant governor to voice the Society's complaints in person, and that he should also take the matter to the admiral.246 Sherbrooke apprised Griffith of the recent tumult, enclosing a dozen depositions, and reminded him of their conversation from the previous summer.

Sherbrooke was confident that if conducted legally the Impress Service would not disturb the public peace. However, as "Plain Truth" noted in his editorial, based on testimony

183 from this public meeting, there was little hope of cooperation from the Navy. Griffith did not take this lecture sitting down. He defended the Spencer's officers and chastised the inhabitants for concealing deserters. To "Plain Truth's" astonishment, he also censured the magistrates, "that sworn select body of respectable men, who form our police, and are the immediate guardians of our dearest and most sacred rights." Fortunately for both sides, the American war was drawing to a close and so too was the need for impressment in Nova Scotia.248

Alluding to an impressment case involving HMS Niemen, "Plain Truth" insisted that if naval officers were mistreated then they should bring the issue before the domestic courts. He stated,

Our laws are the laws of England, and no officer or sailor can be denied their favoring protection; and happy do I feel in asserting, that from my intimate knowledge of the magistrates of this country, no rank or influence could screen an offender from condign punishment.249

Further, if the crimes were serious then they could be dealt by the Supreme Court, the equal of any bench in the empire.250 He certainly had esteem for the civil power, but one has to wonder if "Plain Truth" was writing with an honest pen. The Navy rarely received fair hearings in civilian courts in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. This was so from London and Poole to Boston and St. John's, especially when press gangs were involved. Magistrates were supposed to assist the Navy in finding men and rounding up deserters, but they were half-hearted in these endeavours. As "Plain Truth" put it, they were Halifax's first line of defence, evidenced by their battles against impressment between 1805 and 1814. The Navy could expect even more bias from the Supreme Court and other benches, where cases were decided by civilian juries that found impressment repugnant.251

184 "Plain Truth" focused on the decline of naval-civilian relations in Halifax but did not explain how this came to be. As mentioned in the Hebe case, which led to the debate in the Sessions and to his editorial, the Spencer's recruitment in Nova Scotia was quadrupled by its loss to desertion. Nova Scotia, therefore, and Halifax in particular, was a drain on the Navy's manpower. As discussed earlier in this chapter, in the context of the press gang riot of 1805, warships in Nova Scotia generally lost more men to desertion than they recruited. Even those warships that recruited well in Nova Scotia had significant numbers of men that ran away. Desertion increased after 1805, which coincided with increasingly heavy restrictions on impressment. The manning problem was more acute than this, since most recruits were discharged for one reason or another.

Residency was one of the main reasons, but by 1805 the Navy's protection system had merged with a multitude of colonial exemptions to create a dangerous situation in Nova

Scotia: desertion increased over time and warships were short-handed; bounties attracted few volunteers; so many groups became off-limits that only British seafarers could be pressed; and impressment was overwhelmingly restricted to Halifax harbour and the

Nova Scotia coast. By the War of 1812, warships based in Nova Scotia looked for manning alternatives and began to press heavily off the American coast and in Quebec and the West Indies.

Merchants and magistrates often complained about impressment in Nova Scotia, but the Navy also had reason to complain. It could not press on shore without provincial backing, and press gangs were restricted by warrants and were under the watchful eye of the Halifax magistracy. The Navy could not conscript apprentices and foreigners, fishermen and privateersmen, residents of Nova Scotia and many other groups. In July

185 1812, the Council gave Herbert Sawyer a press warrant for forty-eight hours, and then in

February 1814, it gave Edward Griffith a warrant for twenty-four hours. These were the only warrants issued in Nova Scotia after 1805.252 One has to wonder how the Navy manned its ships at all with so many barriers placed in front of them. The reality is that they did not - warships were drastically undermanned in Nova Scotia. Some historians have even blamed British losses to the American Navy in the War of 1812 on inadequate

253 crew sizes.

On the eve of the American war, the manning problem was so desperate that

Admiral John Borlase Warren appealed to British seamen in the United States to return to the Royal Navy. He targeted those who had been "seduced" into American warships, as well as deserters from the Navy who were later "forced to serve against their Native

Country."254 Warren used patriotic language to encourage them to return to "British

Colours.. .before it may be too late." Timothy Jenks and Kathleen Wilson have investigated the links between naval iconography, patriotism and the war effort in Britain, but these connections have not been explored in Nova Scotia and other Atlantic colonies. Warren went on, I trust, that every British Seaman will unite in supporting the Noblest Cause that ever called for the Efforts of Men, The Preservation of the Liberties, Independence, Religion and Laws of all the remaining Nations of the World, against true Tyranny and Despotism of France, and to defend the honour of the British Flag upon the Sea, at a Moment when Providence has blessed her Arms with Success, in sustaining the Efforts of injured Spain and .257

Warren promised a royal pardon and bounties. Early in 1813, Captain Hugh Pigot of

HMS Orpheus took the similarly unprecedented step of advertising in a local newspaper that sailors returning to England from the United States, or moving on to another British

186 colony, were exempt from impressment in Nova Scotia. The Navy resorted to issuing proclamations throughout that offered free pardons to deserters who re­ entered the service. Rear-Admiral Herbert Sawyer summed up the situation succinctly in

1812: he wanted to float the hulk HMS Centurion to protect the dockyard, but declared that to man her with volunteers or pressed men was "impossible from their scarcity."259

The plain truth is that Nova Scotia won the impressment battle so decisively between

1790 and 1815 that there were no longer enough sailors in the colony for the Navy to man its ships.

Even Nova Scotia's newspapers began to recognize the seriousness of the manning problem. On 3 June 1814, the Acadian Recorder pleaded with the Admiralty and British government to address the problem. Now that the American war was drawing to a close, and the "[British] Government is laying up some of our ships of war...and will soon have plenty of good men to spare, we hope they will consider the short-handed state of nearly all the vessels on this station; especially the smaller classes of them."260 After all, "What are guns without men to work them, but mere harmless lumps of wood and iron?"261 Editor Anthony Holland argued that if 1500 to 2000 seamen were sent from

Britain it would do away with the manning problem, and "man our ships as they should be."ZOi To add insult to injury, he highlighted the squadron's manpower deficiencies by comparing them to the upstart American Navy and its plethora of seamen. American captains took scores of mariners to sea above their regular complements, while British captains scratched and clawed to keep their crews at peacetime levels. Unfortunately, the

Acadian Recorder did not address the root of the problem, mainly the provincial restrictions on impressment in Nova Scotia.

187 As Nicholas Rogers and others have demonstrated, Britons on both sides of the

Atlantic found impressment abhorrent.264 "Plain Truth" was no different, but he was confident that "if legally called upon" no Nova Scotian "would refuse his willing aid to promote the interests of the great bulwark of his liberty, and national rights."265 In other words, no Nova Scotian would refuse to serve in the Navy in a time of need. Similarly,

Sherbrooke suggested to Griffith,

The Inhabitants of this Province are I believe as ready as any Subjects of the British Empire to pass by any irregularities which may be committed by the navy in carrying on the important service of that department. Their feelings rise to enthusiasm when the glorious achievements of the British Navy are the Subjects of conversation. They are as sensible [to] how much their safety depends upon the success of the British Navy and there [sic] sentiments operate so powerfully upon their minds as to induce them to pass over many grievances.267

These passages are disingenuous. Nova Scotians did not voluntarily join the Navy in

significant numbers, certainly not from a sense of national duty. Nor did they overlook the Navy's transgressions to facilitate the British war effort. Sherbrooke commented privately in August 1813 that the Navy in Nova Scotia was desperate for men, but did not offer to help the squadron find any; on the contrary, he suggested opening a rendezvous in Halifax to enter volunteers for the naval campaign on the Great Lakes, and was "very happy to use every exertion in my power to forward its success."268 However, as noted in their reactions to the Shannon-Chesapeake affair, Nova Scotians did respond enthusiastically to naval successes, and the colony thanked the squadron regularly for its protection. This may seem like a paradox, but it is nothing of the sort: Nova Scotians celebrated the Navy in abstract terms, in popular culture, as the last defense against

Napoleon or Cousin Jonathan. When it came to facilitating this defense, they turned their back on the Navy and their sense of national duty; and when they came face-to-face with

188 naval personnel in the streets, Nova Scotians increasingly saw them as outsiders and resented the Navy's presence in the community. "Plain Truth" failed to mention that

Nova Scotians enjoyed a degree of freedom from impressment that was unprecedented in the British Empire.

Conclusion

Nova Scotia may have lost the battle over impressment during the American

Revolution, but it tamed the press gang during the Napoleonic Wars and protected its inhabitants from the Navy. Ordered to put warships on a wartime footing in 1790,

Richard Hughes, the former lieutenant governor and current commodore of the North

American squadron, asked the Nova Scotia government for permission to send a press gang into Halifax. The request was denied and Hughes ceded jurisdiction over impressment to provincial authorities. Over the next decade, Lieutenant-Governor John

Wentworth and the Executive Council forged an impressment policy in Nova Scotia that controlled press gangs on shore and restricted the Navy's access to maritime labour. This chapter discussed that policy in detail: including warrants and protocol, press gang composition and behaviour, as well as protections and government restrictions. This arrangement operated relatively smoothly until 1805, when a manning crisis led Vice-

Admiral Andrew Mitchell to send press gangs into Halifax without colonial authorization. A major riot ensued and Nova Scotia authorities used the incident to tighten their grip on impressment. Desertion legislation barred naval parties from shore, fishermen became off-limits to the Navy, and not another press warrant was issued by the

Nova Scotia government until the War of 1812.

189 Naval-civilian relations also deteriorated along the coast. Municipal officials were alarmed by a disturbance in Shelburne in 1805, in which parties from the naval schooner

Whiting terrified the south shore for more than a month. A more high-profile affair took place in Pictou in 1809, when two young men were pressed into the Navy and sent to the

West Indies at the instigation of rival timber merchants. Although the Navy moved quickly to release them, the incident sparked a campaign led by the Society of Merchants and Halifax magistracy against impressment that lasted until 1815. Frustrated by restrictions, naval captains increasingly sent press gangs into Halifax in violation of provincial regulations. This is when they butted heads with civilian authorities who were bent on flexing their authoritative muscle. Policy disputes coincided with popular disturbances. The most volatile case occurred in 1813, when Richard Tremain intervened on behalf of a man who was pressed in the streets and beaten with wooden clubs. This chapter used case studies of disturbances in several Nova Scotia communities to show that impressment was a major source of friction in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. It was hardly a humdrum affair, as N.A.M. Rodger described impresssment.

Local commentators failed to appreciate the seriousness of the manning problem in Nova

Scotia. "Plain Truth" did not realize that Nova Scotia won the battle over impressment so decisively that there were no longer enough sailors for the Navy to man its ships.

190 Notes

1 Weekly Chronicle, 15 December 1809. 2 C.E. Thomas, "John George Marshall," DCB; Morning Herald, 7 April 1880; Morning Chronicle, 7 April 1880; Acadian Recorder, 7 April 1880. 3 John George Marshall, A Brief History of Public Proceedings and Events, Legal - Parliamentary - and Miscellaneous, in the Province of Nova Scotia, during the Earliest Years of the Present Century (Halifax, [1879]), pp. 22-4. 4 Marshall, Brief History, pp. 22-4. 5 Marshall, Brief History, pp. 22-4. 6 Marshall, Brief History, pp. 22-4. 7 Marshall, Brief History, pp. 22-4. 8 Marshall, Brief History, pp. 22-4. 9 Marshall, Brief History, pp. 22-4; Phyllis R. Blakeley, "Lewis Morris Wilkins," DCB. Marshall recalled that Wilkins was "my kind [of lawyer] and always [a] firm and valuable friend." Wilkins was a prominent lawyer in Halifax, Lunenburg, and Pictou between 1804 and 1814. At various times, he was also a politician, militia officer, and Supreme Court judge. Also see Phyllis R. Blakeley, "Sampson Salter Blowers" and "Sir ," both in DCB; Rev. G.W. Hill, Memoir of Sir Brenton Halliburton: Late Chief Justice of the Province of Nova Scotia (Halifax, 1864), p. 66. Halliburton studied the law with Stewart at this time. N.A.M. Rodger, The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, Volume 2, 1648-1815 (London, 2004), p. lxiii. 11 N.A.M. Rodger, The Wooden World: An Anatomy of the Georgian Navy (London, 1986), p. 11. 12 Rodger, Wooden World, p. 182. Rodger, Command of the Ocean, p. lxiii. 14 Julian Gwyn, "The Royal Navy in North America, 1712-1776," in Jeremy Black and Phillip Woodfine (eds.), The British Navy and the Use of Naval Power in the Eighteenth Century (New , 1989), pp. 9-26; Gwyn, Frigates and Foremasts: The North American Squadron in Nova Scotia Waters, 1745-1815 (Vancouver, 2003); W.A.B. Douglas, 'Nova Scotia and the Royal Navy, 1713-1766' (Queen's University, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 1973); Desmond Morton, A Military History of Canada, 5th ed. (Toronto, 2007); Marc Milner, Canada's Navy: The First Century (Toronto, 1999). 15 Julian Gwyn, "Poseidon's Sphere: Early Naval History in Atlantic Canada," Acadiensis, 31.1 (Autumn 2001), pp. 152-63. 16 See no. 14 on Gwyn and Douglas; Paul Webb, "British Squadrons in North American Waters, 1783-1793," Northern Mariner, 5.2 (April 1995), pp. 19-34; Marc Drolet, 'The North American Squadron of the Royal Navy, 1807-1815' (McGill University, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 2002); and generally Gwyn, "Poseidon's Sphere." 1 -7 J. Murray Beck, The Government of Nova Scotia (Toronto, 1957); Beck, The Politics of Nova Scotia: I, 1710-1896 (Tantallon, NS, 1985); Beck, "Ups and Downs of Halifax Influence in Nova Scotia Government, 1749-1981," Transactions of the Royal Historical Society of Canada, 4th series, 19 (1981), pp. 69-80; Brian C. Cuthbertson, The Loyalist Governor: Biography of Sir John Wentworth (Halifax, 1983); Cuthbertson, The Old

191 Attorney General: A Biography of Richard John Uniacke (Halifax, 1980); Cuthbertson, Johnny Bluenose at the Polls: Epic Nova Scotian Election Battles, 1758-1848 (Halifax, 1994). 18 David A. Sutherland, "Halifax Merchants and the Pursuit of Development, 1783- 1850," Canadian Historical Review, 59.1 (March 1978), pp. 1-17; Sutherland, 'The Merchants of Halifax, 1815-1850: A Commercial Class in Pursuit of Metropolitan Status' (University of Toronto, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 1975). Also see G.F. Butler, "The Early Organization and Influence of Halifax Merchants," Collections of the Nova Scotia Historical Society, 25 (1942), pp. 1 -16. Jim Phillips and Philip Girard (eds.), Essays in the History of Canadian Law: Volume Three-Nova Scotia (Toronto, 1990); Phillips, '"Securing Obedience to Necessary Laws': The Criminal Law in Eighteenth Century Nova Scotia," Nova Scotia Historical Review, 12.2 (1992), pp. 87-124; Phillips, "The Operation of the Royal Pardon in Nova Scotia, 1749-1815," University of Toronto Law Journal, 42.3 (1992), pp. 401-49; Phillips, "Halifax Juries in the Eighteenth Century," in Greg Smith, Allyson May and Simon Devereaux (eds.), Criminal Justice in the Old World and the New: Essays in Honour of John M. Beattie (Toronto, 1998), pp. 135-82; Phillips, "The Criminal Trial in Nova Scotia, 1749-1815," in G. Blaine Baker and Jim Phillips (eds.), Essays in the History of Canadian Law: Volume Eight - In Honour ofR.C.B. Risk (Toronto, 1999), pp. 469-511; Phillips, "Homicide in Nova Scotia, 1749-1815," Canadian Historical Review, 82.4 (2001), pp. 625-61; Phillips, "The Criminality of Women in Eighteenth-Century Halifax," Acadiensis, 31.2 (2002), pp. 71-97 (among Phillips's other articles); Philip Girard, Jim Phillips, and J.B. Cahill (eds.), The Supreme Court of Nova Scotia, 1754- 2004: From Imperial Bastion to Provincial Oracle (Toronto, 2004); Girard, "The Making of a Colonial Lawyer: Beamish Murdoch of Halifax, 1822-1842," in Carol Wilton (ed.), Inside the Law' Canadian Law Firms in Historical Perspective (Toronto, 1996), pp. [?]; Girard, "The Supreme Court of Nova Scotia, Responsible Government, and the Quest for Legitimacy, 1850-1920," Dalhousie Law Journal, 17 (1994), pp. 429-57; Girard, "Themes and Variations in Canadian Legal Culture: Beamish Murdoch and his Epitome of the Laws of Nova Scotia," Law and History Review, 11 (1994), pp. 101-44; James Muir, 'Civil Law in Colonial Halifax: Merchants and Craftsmen, Creditors and Debtors' (York University, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 2004); R. Blake Brown, 'The Jury, Politics, and the State in British North America: Reforms to Jury Systems in Nova Scotia and Upper Canada, 1825-1867' (Dalhousie University, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 2005); Brown, "Three Cheers for Lord Denman: Reformers, the Irish, and Jury Reforms in Nova Scotia, 1833-1845," Journal of the Canadian Historical Association, 16(2005), pp. 139- 67; Brown, "Storms, Roads, and Harvest Time: Criticisms of Jury Service in Pre- Confederation Nova Scotia," Acadiensis, 36.1 (2006), pp. 93-111; Brown, '"That Privilege.. ..of Having Grand Jurymen from our Towns': Grand Juries, Municipal Reform, and Responsible Government in Nova Scotia, 1833-1879," Journal of the Royal Nova Scotia Historical Society, 10 (2007), pp. 47-71. 20 Thomas H. Raddall, Halifax: Warden of the North (1946 repr. Halifax, 1993); Harry Bruce, An Illustrated History of Nova Scotia (Halifax, 1997). 21 Jeremy Black, The British Seaborne Empire (New Haven, 2004), pp. 144-5; Rodger, Command of the Ocean, pp. 364-5.

192 22 Hughes to Phillip Stephens, Admiralty Secretary, 12 July 1790, The National Archives [TNA], London, United Kingdom, ADM [Admiralty Papers] 1 / 492, Letters from Senior Officers in North America, 1789-95, pp. 76-7; Webb, "British Squadrons," p. 29. 23 State and Condition Report, May 1790, TNA, ADM 1 / 492, p. 69; State and Condition Report, 25 July 1790, TNA, ADM 1/492, p. 97. The complements of HMS Dido and HMS Brisk, two of the smaller warships on station, stayed at reduced levels. Smaller naval craft are excluded from this discussion. 24 George et al. to Hughes, 3 July 1790, TNA, ADM 1 / 492, p. 90. 25 George et al. to Hughes, 3 July 1790, TNA, ADM 1 / 492, p. 90. 26 Hughes to Parr, 6 July 1790, TNA, ADM 1 / 492, p. 82. 27 Hughes to Parr, 6 July 1790, TNA, ADM 1 / 492, p. 82; Executive Council Minute, 6 July 1790, TNA, ADM 1 / 492, p. 78; Evans, 'Army and Navy,' p. 104. This case is not in the Executive Council Minutes at NSARM. 28 Executive Council Minute, 6 July 1790, TNA, ADM 1 / 492, p. 78. 29 Hughes to Parr, 6 July 1790, TNA, ADM 1 / 492, p. 82; Executive Council Minute, 6 July 1790, TNA, ADM 1 / 492, p. 78; Evans, 'Army and Navy,' p. 104. 30 Hughes to Parr, 6 July 1790, TNA, ADM 1 / 492, p. 82; 19 Geo. II, c. 30 (1746). 31 Nova-Scotia Gazette and Weekly Chronicle, 23 January 1781. 32 Hughes to Stephens, 12 July 1790, TNA, ADM 1 / 492, pp. 76-7 33 Hughes to Stephens, 12 July 1790, TNA, ADM 1 / 492, pp. 76-7; 6 Anne, c. 37 (1708); 15 Geo. Ill, c. 31 (1775); Richard Pares, "The Manning of the Navy in the West Indies, 1702-63," Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 4th Series, 20 (1937), pp. 31-60; Dora Mae Clark, "Impressment of Seamen in the American Colonies," in Essays in Colonial History: Presented to Charles McLean Andrews by his Students (1931 repr. Freeport, New York, 1966), pp. 198-224. 34 Hughes to Stephens, 12 July 1790, TNA, ADM 1 / 492, pp. 76-7. 35 Hughes to Stephens, 12 July 1790, TNA, ADM 1 / 492, pp. 76-7. 36 Hughes to Stephens, 12 July 1790, TNA, ADM 1 / 492, pp. 76-7. 37 Hughes to Stephens, 28 January 1790, TNA, ADM 1 / 492, pp. 55-6. Yankee smugglers apparently threatened the life of the deputy naval officer in Liverpool, which compelled him to leave the province. 38 Hughes to Stephens, 12 July 1790, TNA, ADM 1 / 492, pp. 76-7. Dozens of ratings were also discharged as invalids. 39 Hughes to Stephens, 25 July 1790, TNA, ADM 1 / 492, pp. 88-9. 40 Hughes to Stephens, 25 July 1790, TNA, ADM 1 / 492, pp. 88-9; Brian Lavery, Nelson's Navy: The Ships, Men and Organisation, 1793-1815 (London, 1989), p. 124. 41 Hughes to Stephens, 25 July 1790, TNA, ADM 1 / 492, pp. 88-9; Duncan to Hughes, 21 July 1790, TNA, ADM 1 / 492, pp. 90-1; Hughes to Stephens, 16 August 1790, TNA, ADM 1 / 492, p. 102; Hughes to Stephens, 13 October 1790, TNA, ADM 1 / 492, p. 140; Phyllis R. Blakeley, "Sir Richard Hughes," DCB; Webb, "British Squadrons," p. 30; Evans, 'Army and Navy,' pp. 103-4; Gwyn, Frigates and Foremasts, p. 130. Luckily for Hughes, the Navy Board allowed the rendezvous expenses. 42 Rendezvous Accounts for HMS Penelope, July-August 1790, TNA, ADM 1 / 492, pp. 103, 116; Rendezvous Accounts for HMS Brisk, July 1790, TNA, ADM 1 / 492, p. 104; Rendezvous Accounts for HMS Adamant, July-August 1790, TNA, ADM 1 / 492, pp.

193 109-12; Rendezvous Accounts for HMS Thisbe, July-August 1790, TNA, ADM 1 / 492, p. 113; Rendezvous Accounts for HMS Dido, July 1790, TNA, ADM 1 / 492, p. 114; Rendezvous Accounts for HMS Rattler, July 1790, TNA, ADM 1 / 492, p. 115; Hughes to George, 18 July 1790, NSARM, MG 1, vol. 2160, George Family Papers, no. 29. 43 Quoted in Webb, "British Squadrons," p. 30. 44 Rendezvous Accounts for HMS Penelope, July-August 1790, TNA, ADM 1 / 492, pp. 103,116; Rendezvous Accounts for HMS Brisk, July 1790, TNA, ADM 1 / 492, p. 104; Rendezvous Accounts for HMS Adamant, July-August 1790, TNA, ADM 1 / 492, pp. 109-12; Rendezvous Accounts for HMS Thisbe, July-August 1790, TNA, ADM 1 / 492, p. 113; Rendezvous Accounts for HMS Dido, July 1790, TNA, ADM 1 / 492, p. 114; Rendezvous Accounts for HMS Rattler, July 1790, TNA, ADM 1 / 492, p. 115; State and Condition, 16 August 1790, TNA, ADM 1 / 492, p. 122; Webb, "British Squadrons," p. 30; Gwyn, Frigates and Foremasts, p. 52. Webb's numbers do not match the rendezvous returns, but the squadron may have released some of its recruits. Only by consulting their musters can we know for sure. 45 Hughes's Contingency Account, 1789-90, TNA, ADM 1 / 492, p. 105. Webb errs in stating that rendezvous expenses were £84.7.5. This was the total for Hughes's entire contingency account; he only claimed £34.15.5 for the rendezvous. Webb, "British Squadrons," p. 30. 46 Hughes to Stephens, 9 April 1791, TNA, ADM 1 / 492, p. 169. 47 Executive Council Minutes, 27 April 1793, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 190, pp. 262-6. For the original warrant, see Wentworth to George, 27 April 1793, NSARM, MG 1, vol. 2160, George Family Papers, no. 74. 48 Executive Council Minutes, 27 April 1793,.NSARM, RG 1, vol. 190, pp. 262-6; Wentworth to George, 27 April 1793, two different letters, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 50, Wentworth Letter Books, no page numbers. 49 Executive Council Minutes, 27 April 1793, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 190, pp. 262-6; Wentworth to George, 27 April 1793, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 50, Wentworth Letter Books. 50 Executive Council Minutes, 27 April 1793, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 190, pp. 262-6. Elizabeth Mancke suggests that Nova Scotia authorities waited for the metropolitan government in London to grant exemptions for the colony on impressment during the Napoleonic Wars, rather than seizing the initiative themselves, as maintained here. Elizabeth Mancke, 'Two Patterns of New England Transformation: Machias, Maine and Liverpool, Nova Scotia, 1760-1820' (Johns Hopkins University, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 1989), p. 201. 51 Executive Council Minutes, 27 April 1793, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 190, pp. 262-6. 52 Wentworth to George, 27 April 1793, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 50, Wentworth Letter Books. 53 Admiralty to George, 8 February 1793, NSARM, MG 1, vol. 2160, George Family Papers, no. 62; George to Stephens, 25 April 1793, NSARM, MG 1, vol. 2162, George Family Papers, no. 1. 54 Admiralty to George, 8 February 1793, NSARM, MG 1, vol. 2160, George Family Papers, no. 62; George to Stephens, 25 April 1793, NSARM, MG 1, vol. 2162, George Family Papers, no. 1.

194 55 George to Captain Fisher of HMS Winchelsea, 21 February 1793, NSARM, MG 1, vol. 2162, George Family Papers, no. 1; George to Lieutenant Sawyer, Commander of HMS Chatham, 25 February 1793, NSARM, MG 1, vol. 2162, George Family Papers, no. 1; George to Sawyer, 31 March 1793, NSARM, MG 1, vol. 2162, George Family Papers, no. 1; George to Lieutenant Hughes of HMS Diligent, 30 March 1793, NSARM, MG 1, vol. 2162, George Family Papers, no. 1; George to Sawyer, 31 May 1793, NSARM, MG 1, vol. 2162, George Family Papers, no. 1; George to Brigadier General Ogilvie, 9 April 1793, NSARM, MG 1, vol. 2162, George Family Papers, no. 1; Captain William Affleck of HMS Alligator to Lieutenant Robert Hughes of HMS Diligent, 5 May 1793, NSARM, MG 1, vol. 2160, George Family Papers, no. 83; George to Henry Duncan, 17 August 1793, NSARM, MG 1, vol. 2162, George Family Papers, no. 1; George to Stephens, 27 August 1793, NSARM, MG 1, vol. 2162, George Family Papers, no. 1; George to Affleck, 26 June 1793, NSARM, MG 1, vol. 2162, George Family Papers, no. 1. 56 George to Sawyer, 10 June 1793, NSARM, MG 1, vol. 2162, George Family Papers, no. 1; George to Lieutenant Thomas Jenis, Commander of HMS Diligent, 1 July 1793, NSARM, MG 1, vol. 2162, George Family Papers, no. 1. 57 Executive Council Minutes, 16 November 1795, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 190, p. 317. 58 Executive Council Minutes, 2 January 1795, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 190, p. 306. 59 Executive Council Minutes, 23 June 1800, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 191, p. 41; Executive Council Minutes, 16 December 1796, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 190, p. 331. 60 Executive Council Minutes, 31 January 1797, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 190, pp. 333-4; Executive Council Minutes, 17 October 1797, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 190, pp. 343-5. 61 Executive Council Minutes, 1 May 1793, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 190, pp. 266-7. 62 Executive Council Minutes, 1 May 1793, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 190, pp. 266-7; Wentworth to Affleck, 1 May 1793, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 50, Wentworth Letter Books. While most of these warrants are noted in early histories of Nova Scotia, the information and dates contained in them are not always reliable. Thomas C. Halliburton, An Historical and Statistical Account of Nova Scotia, 2 vols. (1829 repr. Belleville, ON, 1973), vol. 1; Beamish Murdoch, A History of Nova-Scotia; or Acadie, 3 vols. (Halifax, 1865), vols. 2-3. See Appendix 3.3 for further details. 63 Executive Council Minutes, 1 May 1793, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 190, pp. 266-7; Wentworth to Affleck, 1 May 1793, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 50, Wentworth Letter Books. 64 Executive Council Minutes, 6 June 1794, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 190, pp. 290-1. 65 Executive Council Minutes, 6 June 1794, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 190, pp. 290-1; Wentworth to Knowles, 6 June 1794, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 51, Wentworth Letter Books, 126-7. 19 Geo. II, c. 30 (1746); Pares, "Manning the Navy in the West Indies"; Duncan Crewe, Yellow Jack and the Worm: British Naval Administration in the West Indies, 1739-1748 (Liverpool, 1993), chs. 2-3; Denver Alexander Brunsman, 'The Evil Necessity: British Naval Impressment in the Eighteenth-Century Atlantic World' (Princeton University, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 2004), ch. 2. 67 Keith Mercer, "The Murder of Lieutenant Lawry: A Case Study of British Naval Impressment in Newfoundland, 1794," Newfoundland and Labrador Studies, 21.2 (Fall 2006), pp. 260-1; Rodger, Wooden World, p. 168; Brunsman, 'Evil Necessity,' pp. 23, 383-5.

195 68 Executive Council Minutes, 27 April 1793, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 190, pp. 262-6; Captain's Log of HMS Hussar, TNA, ADM 51 / 452; Muster of HMS Hussar, TNA, ADM 36 /12,002. Simeon Perkins heard that George "pressed about 60 people on Saturday Night." Charles Bruce Fergusson (ed.), The Diary of Simeon Perkins, 1790- 1796 (Toronto, 1961), vol..3, 2 May 1793, p. 225. 69 Captain's Log of HMS Resolution, TNA, ADM 51 / 1107. 70 Captain's Log of HMS Cambrian, TNA, ADM 51 /1512. 71 Captain's Log of HMS Boston, TNA, ADM 51 /1292. 72 Captain's Log of HMS Boston, TNA, ADM 51 /1292. For other examples of press gangs on shore in Halifax, see Captain's Log of HMS Prevoyante, TNA, ADM 51/1137, 17 November 1795; Captain's Log of HMS Asia, TNA, ADM 51 /1304, 29 November - 11 December 1799. 73 Captain's Log of HMS Columbine, TNA, ADM 51 / 2227, 13 July 1809. Dudley Pope, Life in Nelson's Navy (Annapolis, Maryland, 1981), pp. 101-2. 74 Mercer, "Lieutenant Lawry," p. 269; Peter Kemp (ed.), The Oxford Companion to Ships and the Sea (Oxford, 1976), pp. 415-16, 672; Rodger, Wooden World, p. 177; Christopher Lloyd, The British Seaman, 1200-1860: A Social Survey (London, 1968), pp. 158-60; Pope, Life in Nelson's Navy, ch. 8; Stephen F. Gradish, The Manning of the British Navy during the Seven Years War (London, 1980), ch. 3; Daniel A. Baugh, British Naval Administration in the Age ofWalpole (New Jersey, 1965), ch. 4. 75 Executive Council Minutes, 18 May 1805, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 191, pp. 153-6. 76 Mitchell to John Barrow, 19 July 1805, TNA, ADM 1 / 496, p. 8.1; Mitchell to William Marsden, 14 December 1805, TNA, ADM 1 / 496, p. 241. 77 Muster of HMS Thetis, TNA, ADM 36/13,182; Fergusson (ed.), Diary of Simeon Perkins, 1797-1803 (Toronto, 1967), vol. 4, 26-30 August 1797, pp. 47-8. 78 Muster of HMS Prince Edward, TNA, ADM 36 /13,680; Captain's Log of HMS Prince Edward, TNA, ADM 51 / 4678; Captain's Log of HMS Prevoyante, TNA, ADM, 51 /1137; Master's Log of HMS Prevoyante, TNA, ADM 52 / 3106; Muster of HMS Halifax, TNA, ADM 37 /1634; Captain's Log of HMS Halifax, TNA, ADM 51 /1692; Muster of HMS Bream, TNA, ADM 37 / 377. The latter says nothing about its role in supplying the Halifax with men; its various log books, which may have done this, do not seem to have survived. 79 Admiralty Instructions to Whipple, 31 August 1795, NSARM, MG 1, vol. 952, White Family Papers, no. 585. 80 Notice on Deserters, 5 June 1795, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 171, Commission and Order Book, p. 147. 81 Captain's Log of HMS Pheasant, TNA, ADM 51 /1320; Muster of HMS Pheasant, TNA, ADM 36 /15,034. For other examples of impressment from vessels in Halifax harbour, see Captain's Log of HMS Boston, TNA, ADM 51 / 1292, 11 October, 14 November 1799; Muster of HMS Swiftsure, TNA, ADM 37 / 2238; Muster of HMS Africa, TNA, ADM 37 / 3301. %i See the entry for 2 June 1814 in the Captain's Log of HMS Spencer, TNA, ADM 51 / 2820. Also see Captain's Log of HMS Hussar, TNA, ADM 51 / 452, 4 March 1793; Fergusson (ed.), Diary of Simeon Perkins, 1804-1812 (Toronto, 1978), vol. 5, 21 July 1811, p. 322

196 83 Julian Gwyn, Ashore and Afloat: The British Navy and the Halifax Naval Yard before 1820 (Ottawa, 2004), pp. 198-9. 84 Gwyn, Ashore and Afloat, pp. 198-9. 85 Forsyth & Co. to Robert Livie & Co., 18 November 1797, NSARM, MG 3, vol. 150, Letter Book of William Forsyth and Company, 1796-8, pp. 418-19. 86 Petition of Sugat, 13 April 1808, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 225, Manuscript Documents, no. 16; Justice of the Peace of Windsor to Lieutenant-Governor George Prevost, 10 May 1808, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 225, Manuscript Documents, no. 17; Executive Council Minutes, 14 May 1808, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 191, p. 240; Muster of HMS Bellona, TNA, ADM 37/315. 87 Deposition of Thomas Cutler, 29 June 1812, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 226, Manuscript Documents, no. 15; Rex v. Walter Lee, 25 June 1812, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 226, Manuscript Documents, no. 16; Petition of Lee to Lieutenant-Governor Sherbrooke, 29 [June 1812], NSARM, RG 1, vol. 226, Manuscript Documents, no. 17; Execution Warrant for Lee, 22 July 1812, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 173, Commission and Order Book, pp. 162-3 (also in H.H. Cogswell to Charles Muller, 27 July 1812, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 140, Provincial Secretary's Letter Book, p. 409). 88 S.H. George to Sheriff, 7 May 1811, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 140, Provincial Secretary's Letter Book, pp. 312-13; Muster of HMS Emulous, TNA, ADM 37 / 3051. 89 Phillips, "Royal Pardon," pp. 401-9. 90 Peter King, "War as a Judicial Resource: Press Gangs and Prosecution Rates, 1740- 1830," in Norma Landau (ed.), Law, Crime, and English Society, 1666-1830 (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 97-116. 91 Wentworth to Mitchell, 6 May 1805, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 54, Wentworth Letter Books, pp. 12-13; Executive Council Minutes, 6 May 1805, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 191, p. 152; Wentworth to Mitchell, 8 May 1805, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 51, Wentworth Letter Books, pp. 13-14. 92 Executive Council Minutes, 16 May 1805, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 191, pp. 152-3. 93 Executive Council Minutes, 18 May 1805, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 191, pp. 153-6. 94 Executive Council Minutes, 18 May 1805, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 191, pp. 153-6. On the complements of warships, see Steel's Navy List (London, 1793-1815). 95 Executive Council Minutes, 18 May 1805, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 191, pp. 153-6. 96 Muster of HMS Cleopatra, TNA, ADM 36 /16,912; Muster of HMS Cambrian, TNA, ADM 36 /16,687-8. The Cleopatra's muster book shows that it received plenty of recently-pressed men from HMS Leander and HMS Whiting, among other warships. They had been turned-over quickly and did not make it into their ship's books. 97 Nova-Scotia Royal Gazette, 30 May 1805. 98 Fergusson (ed.), Diary of Simeon Perkins, vol. 5, 16 May 1805, p. 113. 99 Fergusson (ed.), Diary of Simeon Perkins, vol. 5, 16 May 1805, p. 113. 100 Fergusson (ed.), Diary of Simeon Perkins, vol. 5, 16 May 1805, p. 113; Mitchell to John Barrow, 19 July 1805, TNA, ADM 1 / 496, p. 81. 101 Executive Council Minutes, 23 November 1805, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 191, pp. 161-2; Muster of HMS Cleopatra, TNA, ADM 36 /16,912.

197 Cuthbertson, Loyalist Governor, pp. 132-4; Wentworth to Lord Casterleagh, 2 November 1805, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 54, Wentworth Letter Books, pp. 62-3; Thomas B. Akins, History of Halifax City (Halifax, 1895), pp. 137-8. 103 Cuthbertson, Loyalist Governor, p. 133. James S. Macdonald, Annals of the North British Society of Halifax, Nova Scotia, with Portraits and Biographical Notes, 1768-1903 (Halifax, 1905), 3rd ed., pp. 67-76. 105 Cuthbertson, Loyalist Governor, p. 133. 106 Akins, Halifax City, p. 138. 107 Wentworth to Lord Hobart, 24 December 1803, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 53, Wentworth Letter Books, pp. 463-74. Susan Whiteside errs in suggesting that Wentworth and civilian interests were perpetually at odds with the military and naval establishment in Nova Scotia. Susan Whiteside, 'Colonial Adolescence: A Study of the Maritime Colonies of British North America, 1790-1814' (University of British Columbia, Unpublished M.A. Thesis, 1965), pp. 65-8. 108 Wentworth to Lord Castlereagh, 3 February 1806, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 54, Wentworth Letter Books, pp. 80-2; Gerald S. Graham, "Fisheries and Sea Power," in G.A. Rawlyk (ed.), Historical Essays on the Atlantic Provinces (Toronto, 1967), p. 14. 109 Marshall, Brief History, pp. 22-4; Richard John Uniacke (ed.), The Statutes at Large, passed in the several General Assemblies held in His Majesty's Province of Nova Scotia (Halifax, 1805), pp. 13-15, 56-7. 110 Liddell & Company to Prevost, 26 June 1809, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 225, Manuscript Documents, no. 55. 111 Liddell & Company to Prevost, 26 June 1809, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 225, Manuscript Documents, no. 55. Fergusson (ed.), Diary of Simeon Perkins, vol. 5, 11 January - 18 May 1805, pp. 86- 114. Also see W.S. MacNutt, The Atlantic Provinces: The Emergence of Colonial Society, 1712-1857(Toronto, 1965), pp. 151-2. 113 S.H. George to Mortimer, 17 July 1809, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 140, Provincial Secretary's Letter Book, pp. 80-1. 114 For examples of apprentices being discharged from the Navy in Nova Scotia, see Muster of HMS Thetis, TNA, ADM 36 /13,182; Muster of HMS Assistance, TNA, ADM 36 /12,205; Muster of HMS Driver, TNA, ADM, 36 /14,123; Musters of HMS Leander, TNA, ADM 36 / 16,378-9; Muster of HMS Halifax, TNA, ADM 37 / 1634. On masters and mates, see Muster of HMS Thetis, TNA, ADM 36 /13,182; Muster of HMS Resolution, TNA, ADM 36 /11,679-80. On militia men and sea fencibles, see Muster of HMS Assistance, TNA, ADM 36/12,205; Muster of HMS Bream, TNA, ADM 37 / 3717. On men physically unfit for the service, see Muster of HMS Assistance, TNA, ADM 36 /12,205; Musters of HMS Leander, TNA, ADM 16,378-9; Muster of HMS Cleopatra, TNA, ADM 36 / 16,912; Muster of HMS Halifax, TNA, ADM 37 / 1634; Muster of HMS Asia, TNA, ADM 36 / 13,620. On Americans and foreigners, see Muster of HMS Cleopatra, TNA, ADM 36 /16,912; Muster of HMS Aeolus, TNA, ADM 37 / 1890. 115 Muster of HMS Resolution, TNA, ADM 36 / 11,679. 116 Muster of HMS Asia, TNA, ADM 36 /13,620. 117 Muster of HMS Resolution, TNA, ADM 36/11,679.

198 118 Muster of HMS Leander,TNA, ADM 36 /16,379. 119 Muster of HMS Spartan, TNA, ADM 37 / 3666. In another case around this time, press gangs swept up ninety-eight men during one night in Halifax, but had to release eighty-two of them the following day for various reasons. Joseph A. Goldenberg, "The Royal Navy's of New England Waters, 1812-1815," International History Review, 6.3 (August 1994), p. 432. Goldenberg does not specify when this event took place, what warships were involved, or if the Nova Scotia government issued a formal press warrant to the Navy. 1 90 Cited in C.B. Fergusson, "William Sabatier - Public Spirited Citizen or Meddling Busybody," Nova Scotia Historical Quarterly, 5.3 (1975), p. 315. 121 Muster of HMS Centaur, TNA, ADM 36 /16,308-10. 122 Muster of HMS Aeolus, TNA, ADM 37 /1890; Muster of HMS Atalante, TNA, ADM 37/2987. 123 Nova-Scotia Royal Gazette, 30 May 1805, 1 July 1807, 12 July 1808; Halifax Journal, 16 November 1812. 124 Resolution on Bounties, 5-6 August 1812, NSARM, RG 5, Series A, Records of Legislative Assembly of Nova Scotia, 1763-1815, vol. 18, nos. 132, 136; Nova-Scotia Royal Gazette, 26 August 1812. 125 Muster of HMS Whiting, TNA, ADM 36/16,951. 126 Fergusson (ed.), Diary of Simeon Perkins, vol. 5,27 June 1805, p. 122. 127 Fergusson (ed.), Diary of Simeon Perkins, vol. 5, 29 June 1805, p. 123. 128 Fergusson (ed.), Diary of Simeon Perkins, vol. 5, 29 June 1805, p. 123. 129 Fergusson (ed.), Diary of Simeon Perkins, vol. 5, 29 June 1805, p. 123. 130 Fergusson (ed.), Diary of Simeon Perkins, vol. 5, 29 June 1805, p. 123. 131 Fergusson (ed.), Diary of Simeon Perkins, vol. 5, 2 July 1805, p. 124. 132 Fergusson (ed.), Diary of Simeon Perkins, vol. 5,3-4 July 1805, p. 124. 133 Fergusson (ed.), Diary of Simeon Perkins, vol. 5, 3-4 July 1805, p. 124; Perkins to Crofton Uniacke, 17 May 1806, in Fergusson (ed.), Diary of Simeon Perkins, vol. 5, p. 476. 134 Fergusson (ed.), Diary of Simeon Perkins, vol. 5, 5-10 July 1805, pp. 124-6. 135 Fergusson (ed.), Diary of Simeon Perkins, vol. 5, 6 August, 28 September 1805, pp. 132, 146; Perkins and Snow Parker to Richard John Uniacke, 6 August 1805, in Fergusson (ed.), Diary of Simon Perkins, vol. 5, pp. 473-4; Muster of HMS Whiting, TNA, ADM 36/16,951. 136 Orkney's Notice, 10 July 1805, NSARM, MG 1, vol. 954, White Family Papers, no. 818. All surviving papers in this case were retained by the Shelburne magistrate Gideon White, who sat on the Special Sessions. They survive in the White Family Papers: NSARM, MG 1, vol. 954, nos. 818-825. The other Shelburne magistrates on the bench were Stephen Skinner, Jacob V. Buskirk, and James Dore. 138 Evidence from Special Sessions, 22 July 1805, NSARM, MG 1, vol. 954, White Family Papers, no. 819. 139 Evidence from Special Sessions, 22 July 1805, NSARM, MG 1, vol. 954, White Family Papers, no. 819; Papers on the Conduct of the Whiting's Officers, [1 August] 1805, NSARM, MG 1, vol. 954, White Family Papers, no. 822.

199 140 Evidence from Special Sessions, 22 July 1805, NSARM, MG 1, vol. 954, White Family Papers, no. 819; Papers on the Conduct of the Whiting's Officers, [1 August] 1805, NSARM, MG 1, vol. 954, White Family Papers, no. 822. 141 Evidence from Special Sessions, 22 July 1805, NSARM, MG 1, vol. 954, White Family Papers, no. 819; Papers on the Conduct of the Whiting's Officers, [1 August] 1805, NSARM, MG 1, vol. 954, White Family Papers, no. 822. 142 Deposition of Charles Bower, 29 July 1805, NSARM, MG 1, vol. 954, White Family Papers, no. 820. 143 Deposition of Charles Bower, 29 July 1805, NSARM, MG 1, vol. 954, White Family Papers, no. 820; Deposition of Anna Echlin, [1 August] 1805, NSARM, MG 1, vol. 954, White Family Papers, no. 823. 144 Deposition of Charles Bower, 29 July 1805, NSARM, MG 1, vol. 954, White Family Papers, no. 820; Deposition of Anna Echlin, [1 August] 1805, NSARM, MG 1, vol. 954, White Family Papers, no. 823. 145 Deposition of Anna Echlin, [1 August] 1805, NSARM, MG 1, vol. 954, White Family Papers, no. 823. 146 Deposition of Charles Bower, 29 July 1805, NSARM, MG 1, vol. 954, White Family Papers, no. 820; Deposition of Anna Echlin, [1 August] 1805, NSARM, MG 1, vol. 954, White Family Papers, no. 823. 147 Evidence from Special Sessions, 22 July 1805, NSARM, MG 1, vol. 954, White Family Papers, no. 819. 148 Deposition of Charity Fell, 1 August 1805, NSARM, MG 1, vol. 954, White Family Papers, no. 821. 149 Deposition of Charity Fell, 1 August 1805, NSARM, MG 1, vol. 954, White Family Papers, no. 821; Muster of HMS Whiting, TNA, ADM 36 /16,591. 150 Papers on the Conduct of the Whiting's Officers, [1 August] 1805, NSARM, MG 1, vol. 954, White Family Papers, no. 822; Muster of HMS Whiting, TNA, ADM 36 / 16,591. 151 Papers on the Conduct of the Whiting's Officers, [1 August] 1805, NSARM, MG 1, vol. 954, White Family Papers, no. 822; Muster of HMS Whiting, TNA, ADM 36 / 16,591. Unfortunately, none of the Whiting's log books have survived for this period; however, the places at which its sailors deserted in late July and early August 1805 suggest that the Whiting was cruising off southwestern Nova Scotia, especially the Barrington, Cape Sable, and Yarmouth areas. Draft of Letter from Unnamed Citizens of Shelburne to Chief Justice Blowers, [1 August] 1805, NSARM, MG 1, vol. 954, White Family Papers, no. 824. 153 Draft of Letter from Unnamed Citizens of Shelburne to Chief Justice Blowers, [1 August] 1805, NSARM, MG 1, vol. 954, White Family Papers, no. 824. 154 Draft of Letter from Unnamed Citizens of Shelburne to Chief Justice Blowers, [1 August] 1805, NSARM, MG 1, vol. 954, White Family Papers, no. 824. 155 Draft of Letter from Unnamed Citizens of Shelburne to Chief Justice Blowers, [1 August] 1805, NSARM, MG 1, vol. 954, White Family Papers, no. 824. 156 Draft of Letter from Unnamed Citizens of Shelburne to Chief Justice Blowers, [1 August] 1805, NSARM, MG 1, vol. 954, White Family Papers, no. 824; Draft of Letter to

200 Chief Justice Blowers, [1 August 1805], NSARM, MG 1, vol. 954, White Family Papers, no. 826. The drafts are slightly different. 157 Draft of Letter from Unnamed Citizens of Shelburne to Chief Justice Blowers, [1 August] 1805, NSARM, MG 1, vol. 954, White Family Papers, no. 824; Draft of [Gideon White's] Observations on J.H.'s [John Hames's] Letter, [1 August] 1805, NSARM, MG 1, vol. 954, White Family Papers, no. 825. 158 Draft of Letter from Unnamed Citizens of Shelburne to Chief Justice Blowers, [1 August] 1805, NSARM, MG 1, vol. 954, White Family Papers, no. 824; Draft of [Gideon White's] Observations on J.H.'s [John Hames's] Letter, [1 August] 1805, NSARM, MG 1, vol. 954, White Family Papers, no. 825; Wentworth to Hames, 18 August 1806, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 54, Wentworth Letter Books, p. 113. 159 Draft of Letter from Unnamed Citizens of Shelburne to Chief Justice Blowers, [1 August] 1805, NSARM, MG 1, vol. 954, White Family Papers, no. 824; Draft of [Gideon White's] Observations on J.H.'s [John Hames's] Letter, [1 August] 1805, NSARM, MG 1, vol. 954, White Family Papers, no. 825. Wentworth to Hames, 18 August 1806, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 54, Wentworth Letter Books, p. 113. 160 This case is discussed briefly in Patricia L. Rogers, '"Unprincipled Men who are One Day British Subjects and the next Citizens of the United States": The Nova Scotian Merchant Community and Colonial Identity Formation, c. 1780-1820' (Michigan State University, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 2001), pp. 49-52. Marion Robertson, King's Bounty: A History of Early Shelburne, Nova Scotia (Halifax, 1983), ch. 5, deals with the Army and Navy, but ignores press gangs. 161 Magistrates and Residents of Pictou protest against the activities of a Press Gang, 30 October 1809, NSARM, RG 5 / A, Records of the Legislative Assembly of Nova Scotia, vol. 16, no. 38; Edward McCray et al. vs. Hector McLean et al., 1809, NSARM, Ace. No. 1986-550/105, Supreme Court in Pictou County, Case Files, 1806-11, File 117; McCray et al. vs. McLean et al, 1811, NSARM, Ace. No. 1986-550/106, Case Files, 1811-13, File 35; Supreme Court in Pictou County, Judgment Book, 1807-15, NSARM, Ace. No. 1986-180/001, p. 40; Supreme Court in Pictou County, Docket Book, 1806-11, May 1810, NSARM, Series 1365, no page numbers. 162 Magistrates and Residents of Pictou protest against the activities of a Press Gang, 30 October 1809, NSARM, RG 5 / A, Records of Legislative Assembly, vol. 16, no. 38; Edward McCray et al. vs. Hector McLean et al, 1809, NSARM, Ace. No. 1986-550/105, Supreme Court in Pictou County, Case Files, 1806-11, File 117; McCray et al. vs. McLean etal., 1811, NSARM, Ace. No. 1986-550/106, Case Files, 1811-13, File 35; Supreme Court in Pictou County, Judgment Book, 1807-15, NSARM, Ace. No. 1986- 180/001, p. 40; Supreme Court in Pictou County, Docket Book, 1806-11, May 1810, NSARM, Series 1365, no page numbers. Complete list of defendants: Hector McLean, Alexander Mcintosh, Hugh Cameron, James Logan, and William Graham. It seems that Hector McLean died during the court proceedings. The sheriff seized cattle that he thought belonged to the guilty parties, but this turned out to be a mistake. Despite several orders from the chief justice to sell the defendants' property to pay their debts, none could be found. Therefore, it appears that no payments were made in this case. 163 Edward McCray et al. vs. John McLeod et al., 1810, NSARM, Ace. No. 1986- 550/105, Supreme Court in Pictou County, Case Files, File 118.

201 164 Edward McCray et al. vs. John McLeod et al., 1810, NSARM, Ace. No. 1986- 550/105, Supreme Court in Pictou County, Case Files, File 118. 165 Edward McCray et al. vs. John McLeod et al., 1810, NSARM, Ace. No. 1986- 550/105, Supreme Court in Pictou County, Case Files, File 118. 166 Edward McCray et al. vs. John McLeod et al., 1810, NSARM, Ace. No. 1986- 550/105, Supreme Court in Pictou County, Case Files, File 118. Complete list of defendants: John McLeod, Hugh Cameron, Findlay McLeod, Robert Logan, Angus Morrison, Roderick McKenzie, Donald Morrison, James Logan and William Graham. 167 Matthew Allan vs. John Cameron and John McDonald, 1811, NSARM, Ace. No. 1986-550/105, Supreme Court in Pictou County, Case Files, File 137. Margaret Conrad and James K. Hiller, Atlantic Canada: A Region in the Making (Don Mills, ON, 2001), p. 97; George Patterson, A History of the County of Pictou, Nova Scotia (Montreal, 1877); Roland H. Sherwood, "The Founding of Pictou," Nova Scotia Historical Quarterly, 1.4 (December 1971), pp. 325-34; Illustrated Historical Atlas of Pictou County, Nova Scotia (Philadelphia, 1879); Judith Hoegg Ryan, The Birthplace of New : An Illustrated History of Pictou County, Canada's Cradle of Industry (Halifax, 1995). On the timber trade generally, see Graeme Wynn, Timber Colony: A Historical Geography of Early Nineteenth Century New Brunswick (Toronto, 1981). 169 Cochrane was granted 2900 acres on Pictou Island on 20 October. Five days later he was promoted to vice admiral of the blue; this likely stemmed from the success of his joint military expedition against the French West Indies earlier that year. Executive Council Minutes, 20 October 1809, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 192, p. 11; Stephen Howarth, "Sir Alexander Forrester Inglis Cochrane," ODNB. 170 Magistrates protest Press Gang, 30 October 1809, NSARM, RG 5 / A, Records of Legislative Assembly, vol. 16, no. 38; Allan vs. Cameron and McDonald, 1811, NSARM, Supreme Court in Pictou County, Case Files, File 138; Journal of the House of Assembly of Nova Scotia, 8-9 December 1809, NSARM, vol. 7, pp. 421-4. 171 Magistrates protest Press Gang, 30 October 1809, NSARM, RG 5 / A, Records of Legislative Assembly, vol. 16, no. 38; Allan vs. Cameron and McDonald, 1811, NSARM, Supreme Court in Pictou County, Case Files, File 138; Journal of the House of Assembly of Nova Scotia, 8-9 December 1809, NSARM, vol. 7, pp. 421-424. McCray and Allan entered the Thetis's books on 12 October at Halifax. Musters of HMS Thetis, TNA, ADM 37/1835-6. 172 Magistrates protest Press Gang, 30 October 1809, NSARM, RG 5 / A, Records of Legislative Assembly, vol. 16, no. 38 (this document can also be found in NSARM, MG 100 / 42, Miscellaneous Manuscript Files). 173 Magistrates protest Press Gang, 30 October 1809, NSARM, RG 5 / A, Records of Legislative Assembly, vol. 16, no. 38. 174 Magistrates protest Press Gang, 30 October 1809, NSARM, RG 5 / A, Records of Legislative Assembly, vol. 16, no. 38. 175 Magistrates protest Press Gang, 30 October 1809, NSARM, RG 5 / A, Records of Legislative Assembly, vol. 16, no. 38. 176 Magistrates protest Press Gang, 30 October 1809, NSARM, RG 5 / A, Records of Legislative Assembly, vol. 16, no. 38; Musters of HMS Thetis, TNA, ADM 37 /1835-6.

202 111 Journal of Assembly, 30 November- 13 December 1809, NSARM, vol. 7, pp. 407-30; Cochrane to Prevost, 24 February 1810, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 304, Selections from the Files of the House of Assembly, no. 27; The Novator, 25 December 1809. 178 Journal of Assembly, 30 November - 13 December 1809, NSARM, vol. 7, pp. 407-30; Cochrane to Prevost, 24 February 1810, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 304, Selections from House of Assembly, no. 27; The Novator, 25 December 1809. 179 Journal of Assembly, 30 November - 13 December 1809, NSARM, vol. 7, pp. 407-30; Cochrane to Prevost, 24 February 1810, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 304, Selections from the Files of the House of Assembly, no. 27; The Novator, 25 December 1809. McCray and Allan both jumped ship on 19 November, likely together; John Connor, a recent recruit at Halifax, also deserted on the same day. Musters of HMS Thetis, TNA, ADM 37 /1835-6. 180 George MacLaren, The Pictou Book: Stories of our Past (New Glasgow, NS, 1954), pp. 124-7; also see Patterson, History of the County of Pictou (Montreal, 1877), pp. 259- 61. 181 McCray et al. vs. McLean et al., 1809, NSARM, Ace. No. 1986-550/105, Supreme Court in Pictou County, Case Files, 1806-1811, File 117; McCray et al. vs. McLean et al., 1811, NSARM, Ace. No. 1986-550/106, Case Files, 1811-1813, File 35; Supreme Court in Pictou County, Judgment Book, 1807-1815, NSARM, Ace. No. 1986-180/001, p. 40; Supreme Court in Pictou County, Docket Book, 1806-11, May 1810, NSARM, Series 1365. 182 Mcintosh et al. vs. McCray and Allan, 1810, NSARM, Ace. No. 1986-550/105, Supreme Court in Pictou County, Case Files, 1806-1811, File 123; Supreme Court in Pictou County, Docket Book, May 1811, NSARM, Series 1365. The young men refused to pay the small debt and this case faded away. It is difficult to trace individuals over time: for example, in February 1811 an Alexander Mcintosh was acting as a sheriff in Pictou, while that summer another Alexander Mcintosh was charged with murder and subsequently found guilty and transported to Halifax. We do not know whether either of these two men was the Alexander Mcintosh involved in the McCray and Allan cases. Proceedings of the Pictou Sessions, February and June 1811, February 1812, NSARM, RG 34 / 318 / P4, no page numbers. As the Scottish capital of Nova Scotia, Pictou was home to many people with the surnames Mcintosh, Cameron and McLeod; moreover, as the leading timber port in the province, Pictou saw a large number of immigrants, transients and sailors in the early nineteenth century, many of whom quickly moved on to other places. These factors make genealogy in Pictou difficult. 183 Edward McCray et al. vs. John McLeod et al, 1810, NSARM, Ace. No. 1986- 550/105, Supreme Court in Pictou County, Case Files, File 118; Supreme Court in Pictou County, Judgment Book, 1807-1815, NSARM, Ace. No. 1986-180/001, p. 100; Supreme Court in Pictou County, Docket Book, May 1810, NSARM, Series 1365. 184 Allan vs. Cameron and McDonald, 1810, NSARM, Halifax County Supreme Court Records, RG 39 / Series C, Box 96. 185 Allan vs. Cameron and McDonald, 1811, NSARM, Ace. No. 1986-550/105, Supreme Court in Pictou County, Case Files, File 138; Supreme Court in Pictou County, Docket Book, May 1811, May 1812, May 1813, NSARM, Series 1365.

203 186 Allan vs. Cameron and McDonald, 1811, NSARM, Ace. No. 1986-550/105, Supreme Court in Pictou County, Case Files, File 138; Supreme Court in Pictou County, Docket Book, May 1811, May 1812, May 1813, NSARM, Series 1365. 187 Allan vs. Cameron and McDonald, 1811, NSARM, Ace. No. 1986-550/105, Supreme Court in Pictou County, Case Files, File 138; Supreme Court in Pictou County, Docket Book, May 1811, May 1812, May 1813, NSARM, Series 1365. Allan claimed to have been imprisoned for about a year after his impressment, but this does not fit with the evidence. 188 Supreme Court in Pictou County, Docket Book, May 1810, May 1811, May 1812, May 1813, NSARM, Series 1365. 189 Census of District of Pictou, 1817, NSARM (typescript by Allan C. Dunlop in 1979). 190 Weekly Chronicle, 15 December 1809; S.H. George to Sabatier, 23 November and 2 December 1809, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 140, Provincial Secretary's Letter Book, pp. 117- 20; Malcolm Lester, "Sir John Borlase Warren," ODNB. 191 Weekly Chronicle, 15 December 1809. 192 Weekly Chronicle, 15 December 1809; S.H. George to Sabatier, 23 November and 2 December 1809, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 140, Provincial Secretary's Letter Book, pp. 117- 20. For an example of Warren securing the release of Nova Scotians who had been pressed into the Navy before the Society's campaign in November 1809, according to a previous standing order, see Warren to [Prevost?], 15 July 1809, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 225, Manuscript Documents, no. 44. S.D. Clark, Movements of Political Protest in Canada, 1640-1840 (Toronto, 1959), p. 147, comments on the connections between the Pictou case in 1809 and opposition to impressment in Halifax. 193 H.H. Cogswell, Deputy Provincial Secretary, to John Lawson, George Grassie and Richard Tremain, 15 July 1812, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 140, Provincial Secretary's Letter Book, p. 408. 194 Executive Council Minutes, 1 July 1812, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 192, pp. 239-40. 195 Muster of HMS Spartan, TNA, ADM 37 / 3667. Nicholas McKay of Scotland and Michael Brown of Halifax were initially listed as pressed supernumeraries from 13 July to 1 August, but were then changed to volunteers in the ship's regular books. This indicates that they subsequently volunteered, or were allowed to volunteer, to receive the naval bounty. 196 Sabatier to Sherbrooke, 25 May 1813, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 226, Manuscript Documents, no. 74. 197 Sabatier to Sherbrooke, 25 May 1813, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 226, Manuscript Documents, no. 74. 198 Sabatier to Sherbrooke, 25 May 1813, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 226, Manuscript Documents, no. 74. 199 Sabatier to Sherbrooke, 25 May 1813, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 226, Manuscript Documents, no. 74. 200 Sutherland,'Merchants of Halifax,'p. 32. 201 Sabatier to Sherbrooke, 25 May 1813, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 226, Manuscript Documents, no. 74. 202 Morris's Affidavit, 26 May 1813, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 226, Manuscript Documents, no. 83.

204 203 Morris's Affidavit, 26 May 1813, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 226, Manuscript Documents, no. 83. Troubridge had strong family connections in the Royal Navy - he was the son of the famous rear admiral of the same name and son-in-law to Rear-Admiral Alexander Cochrane in the West Indies - and thus was likely not too concerned about minor squabbles. J.K. Laughton, rev. Andrew Lambert, "Sir Edward Thomas Troubridge," ODNB. 204 Sabatier to Sherbrooke, 25 May 1813, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 226, Manuscript Documents, no. 74; Sherbrooke to Earl Bathurst, 4 July 1813, TNA, CO [Colonial Office Papers] 217/91, Nova Scotia Correspondence, pp. 141 -2 (also in NSARM, RG 1, Lieutenant Governors' Dispatches to Secretary of State, vol. 59, doc. 127); Malcolm Lester, "Sir John Borlase Warren," ODNB. 205 Bathurst to Sherbrooke, 28 September 1813, TNA, CO 218 / 29, pp. 29-30; H.H. Cogswell to Sabatier, 10 January 1814, NSARM, RG 1, Provincial Secretary's Letter Book, vol. 141, p. 1; Neville Thompson, "Henry Bathurst," ODNB; David A. Sutherland, "William Sabatier," DCS; Fergusson, "William Sabatier," pp. 303-30; Butler, "Early Organization." 206 Nathaniel White to Gideon White, 12 June 1813, NSARM, MG 1, vol. 955, White Family Papers, no. 983. Gwyn, Frigates and Foremasts, p. 140. 208 H.F. Pullen, The Shannon and the Chesapeake (Toronto, 1970), esp. chs. 6-8; Peter Padfield, Broke and the Shannon (London, 1968); Acadian Recorder, 11, 25 September 1813; Carl Christie, "Sir Provo William Parry Wallis," DCB; J.K. Laughton, rev. Andrew Lambert, "Sir Philip Bowes Vere Broke," ODNB; Captain's Log of HMS Shannon, TNA, ADM 51 / 2861; Ship's Log of HMS Shannon, TNA, ADM 53 /1208; Muster of HMS Shannon, TNA, ADM 37 / 4402; Akins, Halifax City, pp. 155-6. 209 For example, see the letters by "True Blue" and "Old True Blue" in the Acadian Recorder, 1, 8 January 1814. 210 Muster of HMS Shannon, TNA, ADM 37 / 4402; Captain's Log of HMS Shannon, TNA, ADM 51/2861; A.C. Wardle, "The Newfoundland Trade," in C. Northcote Parkinson (ed.), The Trade Winds: A Study of British Overseas Trade during the French Wars, 1793-1815 (London, 1948), p. 246. 211 Tremain to Sherbrooke, 30 July 1813, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 226, Manuscript Documents, no. 90. 212 Tremain to Sherbrooke, 30 July 1813, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 226, Manuscript Documents, no. 90. 213 Tremain to Sherbrooke, 30 July 1813, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 226, Manuscript Documents, no. 90. 214 Tremain to Sherbrooke, 30 July 1813, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 226, Manuscript Documents, no. 90; David A. Sutherland, "Richard Tremain," DCB. 215 Tremain to Sherbrooke, 30 July 1813, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 226, Manuscript Documents, no. 90. 216 Tremain to Sherbrooke, 30 July 1813, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 226, Manuscript Documents, no. 90. 217 Tremain to Sherbrooke, 30 July 1813, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 226, Manuscript Documents, no. 90.

205 218 Tremain to Sherbrooke, 30 July 1813, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 226, Manuscript Documents, no. 90. 219 Talbot to Sherbrooke, 30 July 1813, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 226, Manuscript Documents, no. 91; Talbot's Summary of the Sailors' Statements, no date, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 226, Manuscript Documents, no. 93. 220 MacColla to Major General Saumarez, 31 July 1813, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 226, Manuscript Documents, no. 95. 221 Talbot to Sherbrooke, 31 July 1813, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 226, Manuscript Documents, no. 92; Sherbrooke to Talbot, 31 July 1813, NSARM, RG 1, vol. Ill, Lieutenant Governor's Letter Book, p. 29; Sherbrooke to Talbot, 30 July 1813, NSARM, RG 1, vol. Ill, Lieutenant Governor's Letter Book, p. 30. 222 Sherbrooke to Griffith, 7 August 1813, NSARM, RG 1, vol. Ill, Lieutenant Governor's Letter Book, pp. 31-4. 223 Sherbrooke to Griffith, 7 August 1813, NSARM, RG 1, vol. Ill, Lieutenant Governor's Letter Book, pp. 31-4. 224 Sherbrooke to Griffith, 7 August 1813, NSARM, RG 1, vol. Ill, Lieutenant Governor's Letter Book, pp. 31-4; Sherbrooke to Talbot, 7 August 1813, NSARM, RG 1, vol. Ill, Lieutenant Governor's Letter Book, p. 37. 225 Halifax Sessions, 29, 31 July 1813, NSARM, RG 34/312 / P5, Halifax County, Records of the Court of Sessions, April 1810 -November 1814, no page numbers. 226 Akins, Halifax City, esp. pp. 158-62. 227 See no. 19 on Phillips's many articles, particularly "Securing Obedience," "Royal Pardon," and "Homicide in Nova Scotia." 228 Halifax Sessions, 29, 31 July 1813, NSARM, RG 34 / 312 / P5. 229 Sherbrooke to Talbot, 4 August 1813, NSARM, RG 1, vol. Ill, Lieutenant Governor's Letter Book, p. 35; Cogswell to Attorney General, 4 August 1813, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 140, Provincial Secretary's Letter Book, p. 512; Cogswell to White, 5 August 1813, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 140, Provincial Secretary's Letter Book, p. 511; Sherbrooke to Griffith, 16 August 1813, NSARM, RG 1, vol. Ill, Lieutenant Governor's Letter Book, pp. 40-5. 230 Halifax Sessions, 17 August 1813, NSARM, RG 34 / 312 / P5. 231 Acadian Recorder, 17 May 1814. 232 Acadian Recorder, 17 May 1814. 233 Andrew Lambert, "Hyde Parker," ODNB. 234 Acadian Recorder, 14 May 1814; Halifax Sessions, NSARM, RG 34 / 312 / P5; Minutes of Halifax Sessions, NSARM, RG 35 / 312 / P6, September 1813 - April 1818, no page numbers; Grand Jury Book, 1811-28, 8 June 1814, NSARM, RG 34-312-P8, p. 138. Acadian Recorder, 3 December 1814. 236 Acadian Recorder, 3 December 1814.1 could not determine "Plaint Truth's" identity. 237 Acadian Recorder, 17 December 1814. 238 Acadian Recorder, 24 December 1814. This debate went on for several weeks. "A friend of a Sojourner" backed his charge, while "A True Nova-Scotian" attacked both him and "A Sojourner". The tone of the editorials became personal and shifted away from the Navy. Acadian Recorder, 31 December 1814, 7 January 1815.

206 239 William James to First Lord of the Admiralty, 4 January 1819, printed in Holden Furber, "How William James Came to be a Naval Historian," American Historical Review, 38.1 (October 1932), p. 78; J.K. Laughton rev. Andrew Lambert, "William James," ODNB; Gertrude Tratt, "Anthony Henry Holland," DCB. 240 J. Murray Beck, "John Howe," DCB. Also see Tratt, "Anthony Henry Holland," DCB. 241 Furber, "William James," pp. 78-9. 242 Ronald H. McDonald, 'Nova Scotia Views the United States, 1784-1854' (Queens University, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 1974), pp. 83, 84-7, and generally chs. 1-2. McDonald states that the strong connections between Nova Scotia and New England worried Anthony Henry Holland, editor of the Acadian Recorder. He later championed an independent Nova Scotia development and "was what one might call a 'Nova Scotia patriot.'" Also see Judith Elizabeth Tulloch, 'Conservative Opinion in Nova Scotia during an Age of Revolution, 1789-1815' (Dalhousie University, Unpublished M.A. Thesis, 1971), esp. pp. 116-30; J.C.A. Stagg,Mr. Madison's War: Politics, Diplomacy, and Warfare in the Early American Republic, 1783-1830 (Princeton, 1983); Roger H. Brown, "Hartford Convention," in Paul S. Boyer (ed.), The Oxford Companion to United States History (Oxford, 2001), p. 329. 243 Acadian Recorder, 3 December 1814. 244 Acadian Recorder, 3 December 1814; Captain's Log of HMS Spencer, TNA, ADM 51 / 2820; Muster of HMS Spencer, TNA, ADM 37 / 5153. 245 Halifax Sessions, 4 November 1814, NSARM, RG 34 / 312 / P5. 246 Halifax Sessions, 4 November 1814, NSARM, RG 34 / 312 / P5. 247 Acadian Recorder, 3 December 1814. 248 Sherbrooke to Griffith, 5 November 1814, NSARM, RG 1, vol. Ill, Lieutenant Governor's Letter Book, pp. 115-16; Cogswell to John G. Pyke, 5 November 1814, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 141, Provincial Secretary's Letter Book, p. 29; Acadian Recorder, 3 December 1814. 249 Acadian Recorder, 3 December 1814. 250 Acadian Recorder, 3 December 1814. 251 For instance, see Nicholas Rogers, "Impressment and the Law in Eighteenth-Century Britain," in Norma Landau (ed.), Law, Crime and English Society, 1660-1830 (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 71-94. 252 Executive Council Minutes, 1 July 1812, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 192, pp. 239-40; Executive Council Minutes, 28 February 1814, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 192, pp. 383-4. 253 Barry J. Lohnes, "British Naval Problems at Halifax during the War of 1812," Mariner's Mirror, 59.3 (August 1973), pp. 317-33. For a further discussion of the Navy's different manning concerns in Nova Scotia at this time, see Lohnes, 'The War of 1812 at Sea: The British Navy, New England, and the Maritime Provinces of Canada' (University of Maine at Orono, Unpublished M.A. Thesis, 1971). 254 Nova-Scotia Royal Gazette, 14 October 1812; Halifax Journal, 16 November 1812. 255 Nova-Scotia Royal Gazette, 14 October 1812; Halifax Journal, 16 November 1812. Timothy Jenks, Naval Engagements: Patriotism, Cultural Politics, and the Royal Navy, 1793-1815 (Oxford, 2006); Kathleen Wilson, "Empire, Trade and Popular Politics in Mid-Hanoverian Britain: The Case of Admiral Vernon," Past and Present, 121

207 (November 1988), pp. 74-109; Wilson, "How Nelson became a Hero," The Historian, 87 (October 2005), pp. 6-17. 257 Nova-Scotia Royal Gazette, 14 October 1812; Halifax Journal, 16 November 1812. Acadian Recorder, 16 January 1813. 259 Lohnes, "Naval Problems," pp. 320, 324. 260 Acadian Recorder, 4 June 1814. 261 Acadian Recorder, 4 June 1814. 262 Acadian Recorder, 4 June 1814. 263 Acadian Recorder, 4 June 1814. 264 Nicholas Rogers, "Liberty Road: Opposition to Impressment in Britain during the American War of Independence," in Colin Howell and Richard J. Twomey (eds.), Jack Tar in History: Essays in the History of Maritime Life and Labour (Fredericton, 1991), pp. 55-75, which is expanded upon in Rogers, Crowds, Culture, and Politics in Georgian Britain (Oxford, 1998), ch. 3. 65 Acadian Recorder, 24 December 1814. Acadian Recorder, 24 December 1814. 267 Sherbrooke to Griffith, 16 August 1813, NSARM, RG 1, Lieutenant Governor's Letter Book, vol. Ill, pp. 40-5. 268 Sherbrooke to George Prevost, 10 August 1813, in William Wood (ed.), Select British Documents of the Canadian War of 1812, 3 vols. (Toronto, 1923), II, pp. 474-5.

208 Chapter 4

Nursery for Seamen? The Origins of Naval Recruitment in Newfoundland, c. 1749-1783

I directed Lieutenant Lumsdayne to open a Rendezvous at St. John's as soon as the Fishing season was Over.... And if there had been ships to have taken them on board, and Provisions sufficient to maintain them home I could have raised a Thousand [men] with little or no difficulty. — Governor Richard Edwards, 7 December 17791

Introduction

George Chalmers was a prominent writer on politics, commerce and the law in

Georgian Britain. Born in Scotland in 1742, he studied law at University before moving to America to help his uncle with legal issues in Baltimore. Chalmers practiced law there for several years, but as a vocal loyalist he became out of favour in

Maryland society during the tumultuous period before the American Revolution. He was so afraid of retaliation that he carried pistols wherever he traveled. Chalmers returned to

England in 1775 and devoted his energies to studying the history of Britain's colonies in

North America. In one of his first publications, Chalmers attacked Edmund Burke and his pro-American views on the Revolution. Intellectually progressive and influenced by the writings of Adam Smith, Chalmers was among a small group of prominent "neo- mercantilists" who combined economic liberalism with economic nationalism after the

Revolution. Chalmers spent much of the 1780s on literary projects designed to annoy

American audiences and trumpet British trade and imperialism. Published in 1782, his

Estimate of the Comparative Strength of Great Britain during the Present and Four

Preceding Reigns went through seven editions and was translated into many languages.

209 King George III personally ordered a volume from a London bookstore. Chalmers was rewarded for his endeavours in 1786 with an appointment as the chief clerk of the Privy

Council's Committee on Trade and Foreign Plantations, a position that he held until his death in 1825. Chalmers published books on a variety of topics, including several collections on lawyers and jurisprudence, biographies of Thomas Paine and Mary Queen of Scots, and a survey of Scottish history and antiquities.

In his Opinions on Interesting Subjects (1784), Chalmers argued that colonial fisheries were a threat to the empire. Responding to the fallout from the Revolution, he stated that colonies were competitors in shipbuilding, maritime trade, and sea power.

Laws that protected colonial seafarers from impressment only exacerbated this problem.

"Sailors, who reside at a distance of three thousand miles," declared Chalmers, "were they [even] subject to the press, are unuseful to Britain, because their services cannot be commanded, when they are wanted most."3 Sailors in Nova Scotia, Canada, and

Newfoundland were thus not entitled to any protection or favours from the Navy. Gerald

S. Graham summarized Chalmers's rationale: "If the fishing industry were to be transferred from Poole and Dartmouth to Bonavista and St. John's, so far as its usefulness to the Royal Navy was concerned it might as well be in Quebec."4 Unless seafarers returned to Britain each year, where they could be snapped up by press gangs, they did not contribute to the British war effort. Writing to Charles Jenkinson, Lord Hawkesbury, at the beginning of the French Revolutionary War in 1793, Chalmers reported that "It is indeed true that the Fishery is not so useful as a nursery for seamen as it was. It has become more of a colony and less of a Fishery than formerly owing to the natural result of Population rather than law."5 Fewer sailors were employed in sack ships and bankers

210 and the growth of Newfoundland's resident fishery and population had undermined the

British migratory trade. For Chalmers, the Newfoundland fishery no longer deserved its reputation as a training ground for the Navy.6

While Chalmers was an expert on British fisheries, he overlooked several important changes in the Newfoundland trade and Atlantic impressment policy during the

American Revolutionary War. This chapter examines the origins of naval recruitment in

Newfoundland in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and argues that Chalmers was wrong about the death of the nursery for seamen during the revolutionary era and the

Napoleonic Wars. As Denver Brunsman has noted, the Navy used an Atlantic manning system in the early-modern period. Relatively few men entered the Navy in

Newfoundland because they were pressed with ease on return voyages, from convoys off the English and Irish coasts. By the late eighteenth century they were also taken by the

Impress Service, which stationed press gangs in Dartmouth, Poole, and other ports in the

Newfoundland trade. In this sense Chalmers was correct: the Newfoundland fishery served as a training ground for the Navy because its sailors and fishermen were pressed wholesale in the British Isles, not at Newfoundland. However, this does not fully explain the lack of impressment on the island before the Revolution. Dora Mae Clark, Richard

Pares, Jesse Lemisch and other historians have discussed statutory bans on impressment in America and the West Indies in the eighteenth century and their role in sparking resistance to the Navy, but no one has examined this legislation's application to

Newfoundland.8 This chapter demonstrates that Parliament exempted Newfoundland from the press between 1708 and 1775. There were some impressments, but they were rare before the Revolution. When combined with the Navy's Atlantic manning strategy

211 and the abundance of manpower in the West Country, this accounts for impressment's late arrival in Newfoundland.

The American war was a turning point for impressment in the British-

Newfoundland fishery. The nursery for seamen was not dead, as Chalmers lamented in

1793, but had shifted to Newfoundland. This began in the late 1770s and was completed during the Napoleonic Wars. Far from being useless to the British war effort, sailors and young able-bodied men were available in the thousands on the island during the

American Revolution. Warships completed their crews in Newfoundland and the

Admiralty ordered governors to recruit generally for the British fleet. This contradicts

N.A.M. Rodger's assertion that overseas colonies were peripheral to Atlantic hegemony in the eighteenth century. It also undermines Brian Lavery's dismissal of the

Newfoundland and North American squadrons of the Royal Navy as "backwaters" that were "nearly always weak and unimportant."9 Neither writer noticed Newfoundland's growing importance in manning the Navy in this period, nor that the nursery for seamen had moved its base across the Atlantic from Poole to St. John's. Traditionally, the Navy recruited seafarers from the Newfoundland trade in the West Country, but press gangs had decimated that labour market to such an extent by 1780 that the Navy looked to

Newfoundland as an alternative source of manpower. The publican John Mahany's defiance of press gangs in St. John's in 1780 signalled their arrival on the island, while

William Pitt the Younger's complaints to Parliament in 1783 reveal that impressment was wreaking havoc in Newfoundland by the end of the war.

Unbeknownst to Chalmers, Newfoundland was a major source of manpower for the British war effort during the American war. The statutory restrictions on impressment

212 were lifted in 1775, but initially press gangs were unnecessary because volunteers were ubiquitous on the island. The cessation of the American provisions trade in 1775 created hardship in Newfoundland, and hundreds of poor and hungry fishing servants volunteered for the Navy and Army in St. John's. By the time this labour pool began to dry up in the late 1770s, the Admiralty had discovered Newfoundland's potential as a training ground for the Navy and ordered governors such as Richard Edwards to recruit heavily there.

With fewer volunteers available, press gangs stepped in to fill the void. Generally, the

American war prevented the Navy from recruiting in the mainland colonies for the first time in the eighteenth century, and it looked to Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and elsewhere to help replace this traditional labour market. In addition, the migratory fishery was undercut by impressment and other wartime hazards in the West Country, and by

1780 it was no longer a productive nursery for seamen. Impressment had also caused problems during the Seven Years War and Falklands dispute in 1770, but the American war was different - it foreshadowed the demise of the migratory fishery in the 1790s and its replacement by Newfoundland as a nursery for seamen. Chalmers was unaware of these subtle but important changes in the North Atlantic world. He did not realize that the

Navy looked increasingly to Newfoundland to fill its crews rather than to Dartmouth and

Poole. This chapter traces the origins of naval recruitment in Newfoundland, from its slow beginnings in the seventeenth century to its key role in manning the British fleet during the American war.

213 Early Recruitment and the Sixth of Anne

As discussed in Chapter 2, in 1708 the House of Commons passed a statute that became known throughout the Atlantic world as the 'Sixth of Anne' - "An Act for the encouragement of the trade to America."10 It was not directed at Newfoundland in particular, but the Sixth of Anne prohibited impressment (except for naval deserters) in the American colonies and "along its coasts and seas."11 While the British government contended that this was a temporary measure, expiring with the Treaty of Utrecht in

1713, popular opinion in the West Indian and mainland American colonies held that it was perpetual, and that impressment there was illegal. This issue remained a significant colonial grievance until the outbreak of the American Revolution, since the Navy ignored the statute and continued to press sailors in colonies such as Massachusetts and New

York throughout the eighteenth century; this sometimes sparked urban unrest and popular backlashes against imperial authority. While the Navy ignored the Sixth of Anne and continued to press seamen in the American colonies, it had respected this prohibition in

Newfoundland. This is supported by several commentators later in the eighteenth century, as well as the dearth of impressment in Newfoundland before 1775. Christopher

English's assertion that this ban was "always ignored" in Newfoundland is not supported by the evidence.13 The Sixth of Anne was repealed by Talliser's Act' in 1775, a statute that was designed specifically for Newfoundland and which formally sanctioned the use of press gangs there.

Technically, because Newfoundland was a 'settled' rather than a 'conquered' colony, it adopted English common law, which recognized the legality of impressment in the seventeenth century. This means that impressment was legal on the island before the

214 Sixth of Anne. In practice, however, while press gangs disrupted the fishing industry in the West Country, there is little evidence that the Navy recruited many sailors in

Newfoundland.15 One reason for this was that Newfoundland was not a formal naval station, although from 1660 the Admiralty did send warships there on convoy duty each year. While at the island naval captains patrolled the coast and kept an eye on the French fishery. They also became the government's eyes and ears in Newfoundland, especially during the settlement debate in the 1670s. Convoy commanders were given a range of duties, from tabling censuses to examining the complaints against planters. In addition to regulating the fishery and performing bureaucratic functions, the Navy assumed a governing authority in Newfoundland. It informally became a court of appeal, which was codified in 'King William's Act' in 1699. The Navy's increased responsibility in post-

Restoration Newfoundland was the foundation for the rise of the naval government in the eighteenth century.16

There are several reasons why naval recruitment occurred in Newfoundland in the seventeenth century. Maritime warfare was common and the island was not immune from impressment. Warships also had access to thousands of skilled fishermen and seafarers each year, at a time when fishermen still sailed their own vessels across the Atlantic.

Since these men were unemployed after the fishing season, and because their masters often persuaded them to stay in Newfoundland to conserve provisions on return voyages, they were ideal recruits for naval convoys that sailed in the fall. It was also inevitable that desertion and death trimmed down naval crews, which captains would want to replenish. At the same time, warships did not require full complements for routine duties in Newfoundland, and pressing in the summer would unnecessarily have cost the

215 Admiralty in pay and provisions. Recruitment was thus a seasonal exercise, confined to the fall to satisfy the imperatives of both the Navy and merchant community. As J.D.

Davies explains, Newfoundland was like other colonies in the seventeenth century:

"vessels guarding the Newfoundland fishery often entered some men at St. John's, while ships assigned to New England, Virginia, or the West Indies recruited some proportion of their crews among local seamen."17

An early example of naval recruitment occurred in 1669, when the Admiralty ordered Captain Hubbard of HMS Falcon to sail to Newfoundland with a short-handed crew. He was the convoy commander that year. To conserve provisions, Hubbard was instructed to enlist a crew of 100 men in England, "But when you shall depart from

Newfoundland towards ye Streights [the Mediterranean], you are to increse your number of Men unto ye Complement of 140."18 Hubbard was to recruit forty men for the Falcon in Newfoundland, once the fishing season was over. It is unclear if they were expected to volunteer or if Hubbard was to press them into the service.19

While it is unknown how often convoys bolstered their crews in seventeenth- century Newfoundland, it was far less common for naval expeditions to call at the island specifically to recruit men. There was such a case during the English Civil War. Miles

Causton, master of the merchantman George of London, was captured by Royalist forces in 1644 and carried into Dartmouth as a prize. There he learned that Royalist warships were preparing to sail to the American colonies and Newfoundland, and in the latter "to take all fishermen that are for the Parliament, with which ships and men they intend to make a complete fleet to set on against the Parliament and to master the Narrow Seas."

He heard that warships were fitting out at Bristol for the same purpose. This was likely an

216 isolated incident, sparked by intense competition for men between the Royalist and

Parliamentary navies. It was more common to hear complaints that fishermen remained in Newfoundland to duck press gangs in the West Country. This occurred during the second Anglo-Dutch war in 1665.21

There are only hints of impressment before the Sixth of Anne was passed in 1708.

For example, when Vice-Admiral John Graydon's squadron arrived in Newfoundland on its ill-fated expedition against the French colony of Placentia in 1703, the commodore was criticized by Thomas Handasyde, the commander of English troops in St. John's, for the "wholesale impressment of men."22 Handasyde forwarded the protests of eighteen merchants and ship captains to the Board of Trade, and appealed to Graydon to release the landsmen among them. Similarly, fishing interests in London complained to the

Board in 1705 that planters and their servants should be free from the press in

Newfoundland, which implies that impressment was taking place on the island.24 Early the following year Archibald Cummings, in a report to Parliament, described among other disorders "that men of war should not be allowed to press men who come into the big harbours for safety."25 While impressment occurred in Newfoundland during the War of the Spanish Succession, it is unclear on what scale. Shortly after these complaints the

Sixth of Anne outlawed impressment on the island. There is scant evidence of naval recruitment of any kind from that point to the Seven Years War, and even then it was sporadic. Newfoundland recruits were involved in the Louisbourg expedition in 1758, and in August of that year a British naval schooner patrolling the northeast coast stumbled upon a group of fishermen that had reportedly fled into woods to escape

217 impressment. It is also possible that they feared punishment for encroaching on the

French Shore.26

One exception to this trend was the French naval raid of 1762, which spurred much naval recruitment. Lord Alexander Colvill, commodore of the North American squadron in Halifax, sailed north to recapture St. John's that fall. On his way he encountered two merchantmen that the French had dispatched to England as cartels.

Colvill did not hesitate in pressing twenty-three single Irishmen into his flagship, HMS

Northumberland. He seems to have left married men alone, although it is unclear if they produced marriage certificates or other documentation. The recruits informed Colvill that if he went into Bay Bulls, "numbers of their Countrymen would resort to me, and enter aboard the Squadron." After two days, however, none had appeared, which Colvill rashly attributed to Irish disloyalty. On the other hand, he did receive a schooner of fifty recruits from Conception Bay, who were willing to serve "during the present

Exigency."28 He distributed them throughout the squadron. Thomas Graves, the governor of Newfoundland, had ordered magistrate Charles Garland in Harbour Grace to encourage Newfoundlanders to join the Navy: those who came voluntarily would be discharged at the end of the crisis (if that was their wish), and they were entitled to the bounty and "every other advantage attending Seamen who serve in His Majesty's

90

Navy." While the Navy pressed men at the island in 1762, Colvill ordered his captains not to touch "any of the Inhabitants of Newfoundland, who have Families or Property."

From his base in Trinity, the Poole merchant Benjamin Lester heard that men "were enlisting on board" the Navy at Placentia every day. His own apprentice joined the Navy in St. John's, men were doing the same at Carbonear, and several vessels "came in from

218 Fogo with Men from the Norward bound to the Assistance of the fleet."31 Most of them likely quit the Navy after the French threat was over.32

It was a different story for the Newfoundland trade on the other side of the

Atlantic, where the Navy and its press gangs ravaged the West Country during the Seven

Years War. Barnstable merchants complained in 1755 that their trade was in ruins because of French encroachments, forestalling and engrossing, and inadequate convoys.33

In 1758 the Admiralty was bombarded with petitions from Bristol, Bideford, Dartmouth,

Poole, Exeter, Topsham and Teignmouth, which highlighted the decline of the fishery and the damage caused by impressment.34 Traders from Dartmouth and Poole were flabbergasted by the press at home and in the fishery, and requested protections from the

Admiralty.35 Bristol's merchants did not envy the fisherman's predicament: he was pressed into the Navy, and if taken by the French, died in a foreign prison. They complained that they faced financial ruin by advancing fishermen portions of their salaries at the beginning of the voyage, only to see them pressed into the Navy. On short notice, merchants then had to find replacements at a time when maritime labour was scarce.36 Bideford's mayor echoed these same grievances and stated that impressment had discouraged its remaining traders from participating in the fishery altogether.

According to Ralph Lounsbury, West Country representatives complained in the late

1750s that "impressment and capture had made labour for the fishery so scarce and so expensive that shipowners and byboatkeepers were faced with great financial burdens if

TO the war continued."

The fishery's fortunes were tied to the Navy. Early in the Seven Years War, weak convoys and enemy privateers created serious losses, and all West Country ports had

219 trouble finding labourers. Wages more than doubled and insurance rates soared. The tide turned with Britain's naval victories of 1759: the fishery rebounded in the early 1760s, the French were driven from Newfoundland, and the labour shortage gave way to a labour glut in the mid-1760s. However, Bideford and Barnstable did not recover. Their

Newfoundland interests were in decline before the war, but impressment accelerated this to such an extent that by 1758 the north Devon fishery had collapsed. Bideford and

Barnstable were the only ports still clinging to the old-style fishing ship; with their large crews, these vessels were easy pickings for the Navy. Bideford and Barnstable also concentrated their interests in southern Newfoundland, and in the early years of the war planters and merchants encroached on their waterfront property. Neither port had diversified its Newfoundland trade - for instance, sponsoring settlement and a resident fishery, as was the case with Dartmouth and Poole - which meant that they had nothing to fall back on when the migratory fishery declined. Bideford sent twenty-five vessels to

Newfoundland in peacetime, but by 1758 its spokesmen lamented that the "trade is decayed and sunk to its lowest ebb"; while Barnstable, which had sent twenty ships to

Newfoundland in 1740, sent none in 1758. Impressment played a significant role in driving Bideford and Barnstable from the Newfoundland trade during the 1750s. It hurt the Newfoundland fishery to a greater extent at this time than any conflict since the

Dutch and Spanish wars of the 1650s.39

The Navy's manpower needs continued to hamper the West Country in the late eighteenth century. The Falkland Islands crisis in 1770 foreshadowed what was to come during the American war. Since the in 1763 the Admiralty had been exercising a global strategy of naval deterrence. Warships showed the flag in contentious

220 regions, and the Admiralty used large-scale mobilizations to force enemies to back down and avoid full-blown warfare.40 Unable to persuade Spain to pay its ransom debt from the capture of during the Seven Years War, Britain forced its hand by establishing a trading post in-the Falkland Islands in the south Atlantic. When Spain ousted these traders, the British government mobilized its navy.41 Unfortunately for the Newfoundland trade, this move coincided with the end of the fishing season in 1770 and the return of convoys to the West Country. Hundreds of Newfoundland fishermen were pressed in

Poole harbour (see Appendix 8). Dartmouth, Teignmouth, and other West Country ports were also hit hard by impressment. On 22 September 1770, the Poole merchant Isaac

Lester noted in his diary that 3000 seamen had apparently been pressed in London in one day. Poole's mayor was asked to sign press warrants, and while he stalled the Navy for a day or two, Lester and the maritime community knew what to expect.42 West

Countrymen were vulnerable to impressment on the return voyage from Newfoundland.

To protect crews, skippers landed them on empty stretches of coastline before sailing into major ports. Benjamin Lester anchored in Studland Bay on his way home from Trinity in

December 1770, where a pilot warned him about a "Smart pressing for Seamen."43 The crew made it ashore, but they were caught by press gangs a short time later.44 The

Admiralty ordered a press from all protections in Poole on 22 December, in which men were taken from "Every Vessell in the Harbour."45 Impressment terrified the West

Country at this time, and the Newfoundland trade breathed easier when the Falklands dispute was resolved in 1771.

Recruitment was incremental in Newfoundland after 1763 and usually involved volunteers rather than pressed men. first arrived in Newfoundland during the

221 French raid of 1762 as master's mate of the Northumberland, but he returned the following year to survey the island's coastline. In this capacity, he commanded the naval schooner Grenville for several years. Initially, the schooner had a crew of only ten men, but it was increased to twenty in 1765. Some of them were recruited locally. For instance, the Irishmen Peter Cook and William Walsh, who were both rated able seamen, volunteered for the Grenville at St. John's in 1764. Similarly, the seventeen-year-old

Ruben Herbert of Somerset volunteered at St. Lawrence the following year, while two more Devonshire sailors entered at St. John's in 1766.46 It is safe to assume that larger warships on the also entered seafarers in the mid-eighteenth century, in both peace and war.47

Although it was less common, and technically illegal in peacetime, impressment did occur in Newfoundland from time to time. For example, Phillip Leigh, owner of the merchantman Joyce, complained to the Admiralty in 1764 that two of his men were onboard HMS Zephyr - one having volunteered and the other "taken by force."48

Governor was asked to investigate, as Leigh did not want to "lose his

Voyage and become a considerable sufferer."49 Even at this early date Newfoundland was valued for its rich maritime labour market. A year earlier, Lord Colvill of the North

American squadron was turned down when he requested that warships be able to enter supernumeraries in peacetime. If his captains could not keep their warships fully manned in Nova Scotia, the Admiralty would direct the Newfoundland squadron to "furnish as many Men, as they can spare, when they leave that Island toward completing the

Complements of the former."50 This idea was put into practice during the 1770s, the same period in which Newfoundland began to fulfil its role as a nursery for seamen. Spurred on

•222 by the repeal of the Sixth of Anne in 1775 and the Navy's depletion of the labour market in the West Country, naval recruitment first occurred on a significant scale in

Newfoundland during the American war.

Volunteers and the Poor

Newfoundland was a major source of manpower for the British armed forces during the American Revolution. Press gangs canvassed the West Country and took hundreds of fishermen into the Navy. On the other side of the Atlantic, economic hardship not only ensured that there were hundreds of ratings for the taking, but that they actually volunteered. That spring the Continental Congress responded to British restrictions on Massachusetts commerce by banning Yankee-Newfoundland trade. By this time Newfoundland in general and its resident population in particular, was dependent on American provisions. New England took a lead role in the rebellion and its trade to Newfoundland fell off sharply: from 170 ships in 1774 to only three in 1776. The situation was dire. Not only did planters depend on American provisions, but so too did much of the migratory fishing fleet, which comprised hundreds of ships and thousands of men. In Keith Matthews's words, merchants unloaded their ships in Newfoundland in the spring of 1775 and sent them "scurrying around the North Atlantic in a frantic search for bread and flour."51 Desperate reports started trickling in from the outports that fall; families had consumed all of their bread and flour and were dependant on salt provisions.

Undernourishment and disease became rampant, and by the time that ships arrived from

Europe the following spring with food, some settlers had starved to death.

223 Missionaries told harrowing tales of "Famine, Nakedness & Sickness" throughout the late 1770s.53 James Balfour reported burying dozens of people in Conception Bay, some having starved to death. As a result, there was a decline in the population of many coastal settlements. Some of the unemployed and hungry escaped to England or America, but far more drifted into St. John's - to find employment, charity, food, or a passage off the island. This migration occurred every fall, after the fishing season.54 It was in these dire straits that fishing servants saw the benefits of joining the armed forces: bounties and steady wages, regular (even hot) meals, and warm clothing and shelter. Others intended to desert as soon as they got off the island. It was also in this context that the Navy and

Army realized the manning potential of Newfoundland's floating and mobile population, which overwhelming consisted of single, able-bodied men. Ironically, it was the squadron based in New England and the regiments based in Nova Scotia and Canada, rather than their equivalents in Newfoundland, which first drew upon this resource. Unlike in New

England or Nova Scotia, where the Navy resorted to impressment from the start of the

American Revolution, there was no need for this in Newfoundland because men volunteered in significant numbers.

The North American squadron was desperate for sailors in September 1775.

American commerce was at a standstill and there was little chance of attracting volunteers or pressing many seamen. Vice-Admiral Samuel Graves, commanding the fleet at Boston, wrote to Governor Robert Duff of Newfoundland.55 In addition to sickness and desertion, which were common, "we have been unfortunate in having a great many good men taken prisoners by the Rebels, and some killed and wounded, which has so reduced our Numbers that I am sometimes under the necessity of manning

224 the Sloops and smaller Vessels from the large Ships." Despite constant efforts to press seafarers in Massachusetts Bay, most of his warships were undermanned. The rebellion was spreading like wild fire and his men-of-war would soon be the targets of insults, not to mention enticements to its seamen to desert. "I flatter myself," Graves went on, "that as your situation enables you to get young healthy fellows, you will be so good to send me as many as can be spared."57 Graves informed Duff that he might even have to despatch a warship from Newfoundland to ferry the recruits to Boston, as he could not spare one himself.5 Graves was not sure that there were many deep-sea mariners in

Newfoundland, but he was confident that "young healthy Fishermen" were available "at the breaking up of the Season."59

Duff ordered his captains to round up as many seamen and able-bodied landsmen as they could find to send to Boston. As Duff explained to the Admiralty, however, this was not likely to "turn out very successful," since both Guy Carleton and Thomas Gage, generals of the Army at Quebec and Boston respectively, had anticipated Graves's move.

They sent recruiting parties to Newfoundland offering bounties, which made the poor

"People to be rather backward" in preferring the Army over the Navy.60 Duff responded by opening a rendezvous in St. John's, which quickly entered eighty-four "Stout

Volunteers."61 They were sent to Boston in HMS Savage. Graves reported that "these are a very good set of Men," and had Duff been authorized to offer bounties, "many more would have entered." The Admiralty now realized Newfoundland's potential as a nursery for seamen. It sent orders to Duff that August to "Enter as many Seamen in

Newfoundland for His Majesty's Ships fitting out for the Sea, as the Ships and Sloops of my Squadron could conveniently receive on board before they left that Country for

225 England." Due to the lag in Atlantic communications, Duff did not receive the order until he was off the British coast.64

The Admiralty ordered the new governor, Vice-Admiral John Montagu, to raise seamen at the end of the following season, but did not give him the authority to offer the same bounties that were available in Britain. There able and ordinary seamen received three and two pounds respectively for entering the Navy. Without this inducement,

Montagu had to report in November 1776 that his endeavours to raise seamen were "not attended with the success I expected."65 Instead of entering the Newfoundland squadron, men gravitated to American recruiting parties on the island, probably from the Army, because they offered bounties.66 Upon his arrival back in England, Montagu informed the

Admiralty that not many men would volunteer for the Navy in Newfoundland without receiving a bounty. The following March he broached the issue again, stating that with a bounty he could probably enter 300 to 400 men at the end of the upcoming fishing season.67 The Admiralty was finally convinced. Montagu was ordered to "cause the several Captains under my Command to enter as many Supernumerary Seamen after the

Fishing Season is over as they can get." These were to be borne for wages and victuals, and to be handed over to the commanding officer at their first British port-of-call. That year he gave the same bounty in Newfoundland that volunteers pocketed in Britain.

Montagu was also directed to submit a list of the recruits to the Navy Board, differentiating able from ordinary seamen.69

The Admiralty's new vision for recruitment in Newfoundland far exceeded

Montagu's expectations. Writing aboard HMS Europe, before crossing the Atlantic,

Montagu explained that he had complied with the previous year's orders and that his

226 captains entered many seamen. He also noted, however, that the clerk of the cheque at

Spithead refused to honour the bounties he awarded on the island, without notification from the Navy Board. He pleaded with the Admiralty to direct the Navy Board to pay the bounties immediately.70 To Montagu's surprise, the number of men recruited in 1777 also fell short of the Navy's expectations. In response, the governor stated that all of the warships in the Newfoundland squadron, even those that wintered at the island, had arrived at the fishery short-handed but returned to Britain with full complements of men.

Some brought supernumeraries for the larger fleet. To Montagu this was a successful recruiting season. Perhaps with a hint of satisfaction, he informed the Admiralty that it could expect even fewer recruits the following year, because his bounties had still not

71 been paid by the Navy Board.

The Admiralty had not learned from its mistakes by the time Richard Edwards was appointed governor in 1779. In a letter to the Earl of Sandwich, the First Lord of the

Admiralty, before departing for the fishery, Edwards reminded him of a private conversation the two once had regarding the manning situation in Newfoundland. This took place at Sandwich's residence, before Edwards had any expectation of the

Newfoundland command. He told Sandwich that from his previous experience on the station he was certain "a Number of men might be rose for his Majesty's service with no

Injury to the fishery at the end of the year."72 Edwards also repeated Montagu's assertion that if he could offer a bounty on the spot that would be honoured in Britain, a large number of supernumeraries could be raised for the Navy. Since many fishing servants remained on the island during the winter, Edwards was confident that a small bounty at the outset was more valuable in "gelling them" to the Navy than a larger bounty when

227 they returned to Britain. Edwards had served as governor of Newfoundland in the late

1750s, which made him an authority on its labour market in wartime. This time the

Admiralty responded unequivocally, and only a few days later directed Edwards to issue bounties to volunteers in Newfoundland.74

Edwards produced solid returns, even among resident fishermen, but more planning could have resulted in even higher numbers. The governor ordered Lieutenant

Lumsdayne to open a rendezvous at St. John's as soon as the fishing season was over.

Lumsdayne entered 102 volunteers in less than two weeks, and Edwards boasted to the

Admiralty that had there been enough ships and provisions for the return voyage, "I could have raised a Thousand with little or no difficulty."75 Since these things could not be obtained, he was "obliged to refuse a number of Stout able fellows"; his warships were already on half allowance to feed supernumeraries on the return voyage to Britain, and

Edwards left several seamen in the naval hospital in St. John's because he had no room for them.76 On his own initiative, Edwards revised the Navy's winter orders in

Newfoundland to take advantage of the bustling labour market. He ordered Captain

Michael Stanhope of the naval sloop Trepassey, who was to winter at St. John's that year, to fill his complement and then raise as many supernumeraries as possible. The latter were to be given wages and victuals until they were turned-over to other warships in

Britain. Only a few small naval vessels wintered at Newfoundland each year, but

Edwards repeated these orders over the next couple of seasons. This manning initiative was successful and it continued to be used throughout the late eighteenth and early

77 nineteenth centuries.

228 The Navy faced a number of miscellaneous manning considerations in

Newfoundland as well. For instance, at the beginning of the war the naval schooners

Labrador and Canada, and the naval cutters Placentia and Quebec, were used as tenders for larger warships. They had to be manned by those consorts. Valuable in peacetime, these small vessels were useless during the war due to the large number of American privateers on the coast. They were laid up because it was too dangerous to allow them go to sea alone.78 Sickness was also a problem in Newfoundland from time to time. In 1780 a disease ravaged both the Newfoundland squadron and the town of St. John's, which, according to Edwards, killed many of its residents. Manning problems also surfaced when naval vessels were built or captured at Newfoundland, since they had to be manned by warships on station or by a local recruitment drive. For instance, in 1780 Edwards signed contracts for two cutters to be built in Newfoundland; one was to be named the St.

John's and constructed by William Lilley of Harbour Grace. He appointed Ralph

Milbank, the first lieutenant of the Portland, to be her commander and to open a rendezvous at Harbour Grace to raise its crew of eighty men. The St. John's was not completed until the end of the war, when Vice-Admiral John Campbell, the new governor of Newfoundland, sold it out of the service.

British policy towards Newfoundland focused on the Navy's manning problems.

For example, Palliser's Act was designed to bolster the trans-Atlantic fishery by forcing servants to return home each year. There was another motive: the British government knew that the migratory fishing fleet, which travelled under naval convoy at specific times of the year, was an easy target for the Impress Service and warships off the English and Irish coasts. In part, therefore, Palliser's Act was intended to man the Navy during

229 the Revolution. In its instructions to the naval governor each year, the Admiralty stated that it was "very prejudicial to this Kingdom that the Fishing Ships not bring home from

Newfoundland the Complement of Men they carry out, many of them being enticed away to New England & others left in the Country."82 As a result, Montagu was given the impossible order in 1776 of ensuring that all masters of vessels brought home the entire number of men that they carried to the fishery. There were only two exceptions: those who died, and those who "enter'd into His Majesty's Service."83 The government knew that hundreds of able-bodied men were available in Newfoundland each fall, and it wanted them pressed into the service in the British Isles or funnelled into the armed forces on the island. They did not want potential recruits to slip away to New England and be lost to the British war effort.84

Enter the Press Gang

On the eve of the American war, Lieutenant Robert Tomlinson published an

Essay on Manning the Royal Navy?5 Tomlinson had witnessed the brutality of impressment in the merchant service, but it was his role in manning the Navy during the

Falklands crisis in 1770 that turned him into a reformer. Overseas trades such as the

Newfoundland fishery were devastated, especially in the West Country. Tomlinson commanded the naval cutter Kite between Harwich and Sheerness and much of his time was spent pressing sailors. The personal hardships he witnessed on the Impress Service had a lasting effect on him, and led to his campaign to abolish the evil necessity.86 Instead of impressment, Tomlinson called for a registry of seamen similar to the inscription maritime in France; he also advocated fixed terms in the Navy and improved conditions

230 for its sailors. Most of his ideas were unoriginal; indeed, a string of pamphlets on impressment had been printed in England since the 1690s. Tomlinson's scheme, which was introduced into Parliament in 1777, was voted down without much opposition.87

Nevertheless, the pamphlet was original in that it highlighted the value of Britain's nurseries for seamen: the northeast-coast coal trade, the deep-sea fleets of London and

Liverpool, and the inshore fisheries. There was also the Newfoundland fishery, which if nurtured correctly, Tomlinson insisted, could train 14,000 good sailors every three years.

"And every one must acknowledge," he added, "who knows anything of the people brought up in that fishery, that they are as hardy as any set of men which use the sea, and commonly of very robust bodies."88

Tomlinson's projections were exaggerated, but his vision of a nursery for seamen began to take shape in Newfoundland. Poverty and warfare created a steady supply of able-bodied men on the island, but there was no reason to press them because they volunteered instead. Not only did the Newfoundland squadron fill its lower decks with men, and recruit generally for the service, but the island was flooded with other recruiting parties as well. Some were from the North American squadron, but more were sent by

Army regiments based in New York, Quebec, Nova Scotia and even St. John's Island

(Prince Edward Island). There are numerous examples, especially from the first three or four years of the war.89 However, over time visiting recruiting parties were accused of social and fiscal irregularities, which included forcing Newfoundland fishermen into the service against their will. By 1780, Governor Edwards barred Nova Scotia and Quebec recruiting parties from the island.90 He had another motivation: the island's labour supply

231 was being siphoned off to the mainland, at the expense of the Newfoundland squadron and the local military.91

After several British defeats in America, in 1777 Captain Robert Pringle of the

Royal Engineers in St. John's proposed the establishment of a volunteer regiment. The

Army in Newfoundland was in a weak state. He informed the British government that if no soldiers could be sent from England, it would be no problem to recruit 500 locally; in fact, more than three times that number had been stranded in Newfoundland that fall due to a lack of shipping. "They will be greatly distressed for provisions in the spring,"

Pringle trumpeted, "and will be glad to enter the service on any terms."92 The

Newfoundland Volunteers, as the corps became known, entered hundreds of men on promises of bounties and provisions for their families. As with recruitment into the

Newfoundland squadron, poverty, unemployment, and hunger drove them into government service. According to Edward Langman, a missionary for the Society of the

Propagation of the Gospel at St. John's in 1780, "many Men, Every day, for want of

Masters & Employ in the fishery, [are] Enlisting themselves to Serve His Majestie for three years."93 In the end several hundred men enlisted, with enrolment peaking during the famine winter of 1779-80. The corps disbanded abruptly in 1780, but Edwards, anxious over American naval designs on the fishery, replaced it with the Newfoundland

Regiment. The regiment entered more than 300 men and stood guard in St. John's until

1783. Although never tested by an enemy, these corps provided much-needed employment and temporary relief to hundreds of poverty-stricken families during the

American war.94

232 While there would be some confusion over the legality of impressment in

Newfoundland in the 1790s, this was not the case during the American war. Passed in

1775, Palliser's Act was fresh in the minds of those working in the Navy and fishing

industry. Designed specifically for the fishery, it repealed the Sixth of Anne and legalized

impressment in Newfoundland (see Appendix 9).95 Naval authorities on the island

quickly recognized its implications, and Duff was directed in June 1775 to put the statute

into effect. However, unlike the squadrons based in Boston and Halifax, there is no

evidence that the Admiralty sent him any press warrants.96 Despite its legality,

impressment was rare in Newfoundland for much of the American war, particularly

during its first few years. This did not stem from confusion over manning policy or a poor labour market, but rather because men were volunteering in significant numbers.

There was no reason for press gangs to force them into the service when they joined on

their own accord. As the Revolution wore on, recruits became more difficult to find and

impressment reared its head. It first occurred in Newfoundland on a consistent basis

during the closing years of the American war.

There were several reasons for the emergence of impressment. The first must be

seen in a trans-Atlantic context. Impressment damaged the West Country during the

Seven Years War and channelled hundreds of Newfoundland fishermen into the Navy

during the Falklands dispute of 1770. As the Navy's manpower needs expanded in the

late eighteenth century, it recruited heavily in the West Country and depleted its pool of

seafarers. Press gangs made it difficult for men to cross the Atlantic during the American

war, and when the West Country's supply of mariners was exhausted in the late 1770s the

Admiralty looked to Newfoundland for manpower. Initially, governors concentrated on

233 manning the small Newfoundland squadron, which did not require many seafarers. This changed over time. The Admiralty ordered successive governors to enter hundreds of supernumeraries each year, to be distributed amongst the British fleet back home. This strained the local labour market, especially as social conditions improved on the island, the fishing industry stabilized, and fewer men volunteered out of economic necessity. The

Navy also faced stiff competition from military recruiting parties, first from the mainland and then from Pringle's volunteers and the Newfoundland Regiment. Put simply, the

Admiralty demanded more recruits at a time when they were becoming harder to find on the island. It is no coincidence that this is when impressment first occurred on a regular basis in Newfoundland.

The House of Lords reported in 1778 that, while the Newfoundland fishery had improved of late and was a valuable training ground for the Navy, fishermen's wages had increased from eight to fourteen pounds a voyage and seamen's wages had doubled per month.97 The-merchants' situation was actually much worse than these British politicians realized. The American war put the West Country's resolve to the test respecting impressment. Dartmouth's traders complained in 1778 that its fishery was "in a most alarming and distressed state" because of press gangs.98 Acknowledging that

Newfoundland crews were needed to help man the Navy, they also stated that unless the

Admiralty offered them some protections the fishery would eventually collapse. Even outgoing vessels were consistently raided for sailors.99 The situation was so bad in 1778 that when HMS Proteus arrived in Plymouth to pick up the Newfoundland convoy there were only four vessels waiting to go to Newfoundland, three of which had no crews "for want of Protections."100 One naval captain in the West Country reported that seafarers

234 were entering the militia in droves to avoid impressment into the wooden world. In

March 1778 there was a press from all protections in Poole. According to the merchant

Isaac Lester, who witnessed the scene personally, the press gangs took "all the men they could lay their hands on," seamen and landsmen alike.102 Two more intense recruiting drives hit Poole in 1779, although fortunately for the Newfoundland trade most of the fleet had already sailed.103

The labour crunch came to a head in 1780, when Poole's mayor refused to support press warrants until fishermen under contract were granted exemptions. The

Admiralty denied the request, stating that it could not grant Poole a favour that other

West Country towns did not enjoy.104 Poole tried again later that year. Governor Edwards knew how scarce men were in England and Ireland, and since Poole's traders recruited heavily in the latter to save their voyages, "we should be glad to be indulged that any men we could get there for the Newfoundland Fishery may be exempt from being imprest until the Voyage is Ended."105 The merchants had no problem with their employees being pressed at the end of the season, and were content to renew this game of cat and mouse the following spring. The request must have worked, for Poole's mayor and merchants thanked Edwards the following spring for providing convoys and exemptions from impressment.106 The impression from the diaries of Benjamin and Isaac Lester is that impressment fell off sharply in the West Country after 1779. This may have been because the Navy's mobilization in the American war had finally reached a secure footing, but it is more likely that press gangs had exhausted the maritime labour pool in Devon and

Dorset.107 It was at this point that impressment first occurred on a regular basis in

Newfoundland. Impressment disruptions in the West Country during the mid-eighteenth

235 century and American war transformed the fishery's role as a training ground for the

Navy. In the Napoleonic era, the nursery for seamen crossed the Atlantic from the West

Country to Newfoundland.

More generally, recruitment for the armed forces intensified in Newfoundland during the American war because Britain could no longer count on the mainland colonies for its local recruitment needs. This was the first time it faced this predicament in the eighteenth century. Previous wars were fought against France, and Britain usually received manning and logistical support from colonies such as Massachusetts. The Navy also expanded in size from the Seven Years War to the Revolution - in both ships and men - which exacerbated the manning problem.108 With much of the fighting in America rather than in Europe, the Navy stationed an unprecedented number of warships in the western Atlantic. Unable to enter recruits locally, and suffering from high desertion rates along the American seaboard, British warships were undermanned and looked northward for men.109 Nova Scotia and Newfoundland were thus called upon to help fill the recruitment void left by the American colonies. Military recruiting parties were sent to

Newfoundland for the same reason. As Christopher Magra has shown, New Englanders who in previous wars may have joined the British Army or Royal Navy, or fought alongside red coats in colonial militia units, were now the enemy. Fishermen were thus turned into soldiers and fighting sailors on both sides of this Anglo-, in Atlantic towns from St. John's to Marblehead.110

Impressment was also common from merchant vessels on the Grand Banks and

Newfoundland coast in this period. For example, in 1776 Captain Richard Braithwaite of

HMS Centurion boarded a vessel on the Grand Banks and pressed eleven of its crew. The

236 schooner was full of British seamen who had been captured by American privateers and subsequently released; they were returning to Britain from captivity in New England. The

Centurion, which belonged to the North American squadron, was about eighty men short of its complement. This indicates that Newfoundland's manning potential was becoming known throughout the North Atlantic world.111 Obviously, warships on the

Newfoundland station also pressed sailors in local waters. For example, HMS Sibyl boarded a schooner off Cape Spear in late July 1779, on the way from New York to St.

John's with a cargo of sugar, and pressed three of its sailors. Captain William Pasley commented in his journal that they were skilled sailors and "an article we are always in

11 9 want of- being in truth never satisfied." Pasley did not speak so glowingly about

Newfoundland's climate and the nature of local society. Before departing for Portugal, he stated that "never do I wish, never do I desire to see again this horrid place - The Lord deliver me from Newfoundland."113

The number of unemployed men in Newfoundland reached a crisis point in

October 1777. Alarmed by the growing number of fishing servants who were wintering on the island rather than returning to Britain, Montagu issued vagrancy orders to magistrates. Similar orders had been issued during labour gluts in St. John's in the 1760s.

Any person who was not a "lawful Inhabitant," or a servant with a "Written Agreement," was forbidden from remaining on the island during the forthcoming winter.114 They had no way of subsisting and were "greatly injurious to the Inhabitants who reside here."115

Montagu proclaimed that anyone without a contract by 12 May, whether "secreting himself or simply "Idling about," was to be taken up and "sent on board the Kings

Ship."116 He also targeted "dieters," those men who worked for food and lodgings rather

237 than for real wages. Masters entertaining dieters were to be fined five pounds, as were those who hired men for two summers and a winter. Montagu, of course, wore two hats in Newfoundland: one as governor, under which he was concerned with poverty and unemployment, and the other as naval commander, under which he was looking out for the manpower needs of the squadron. Vagrancy policies helped in both capacities.

Montagu and other governors encouraged the unemployed in coastal settlements such as

Fogo to flock to St. John's at the end of the fishing season, where they could join the

Navy. They might volunteer, as most did, or they could be pressed into the wooden world. One way or another, governors knew that if these men traveled to St. John's there was a good chance that they would find themselves in the Navy.117

At the beginning of the fishing season in 1778, Dartmouth merchants complained to the Board of Trade that impressment was wreaking havoc on the fishery, including at

Newfoundland. Two years later representatives from Poole petitioned Edwards about having fishermen "exempt from being imprest until the Voyage is Ended." l They highlighted the scarcity of seafarers in both the West Country and Newfoundland. By this time Edwards was inspecting the crews of privateers and armed traders operating out of

Newfoundland, with the intention of snagging a few good men. He issued an order in

1779 that all seamen found above a privateer's complement, as stated in its commission, would be pressed into the Navy. He had already done this to the Hero out of Chester.120

Impressment also seems to have been making inroads into the outports by the end of the war. For instance, when a warship appeared in one village in 1783, a number of fishermen reportedly fled into the woods to escape the press. Impressment was becoming common on the island.

238 Although the Newfoundland squadron was the last resort for many fishermen, once in the service they found their captains and the governors of Newfoundland to be useful patrons. The Navy did a good job of collecting recruits' wages, sea chests, and belongings when they joined the service. For instance, when Thomas Murray volunteered for HMS Portland in 1779, after fishing the summer at Bay Bulls, Governor Edwards personally secured his wages from his former employer.122 Similarly, planters in Harbour

Grace sent Patrick Welton to St. John's in 1783 with three boatloads offish, where he was pressed into HMS Salisbury, likely by a guard boat. Welton petitioned Governor

William Campbell for restitution. He claimed that his employers not only owed him that season's wages from the fishery, but also his watch and personal savings, which he had left in their care, perhaps anticipating that he might be pressed in St. John's harbour.123

Impressment was so common by 1783 that William Pitt the Younger thought

Newfoundland was "unfairly treated" compared to other British fisheries. He argued in

Parliament that if the impressment clauses in Palliser's Act were not repealed, then the conscription of fishermen should be forbidden outright during the season, or allowed only upon license by the governor.124

On 12 September 1780, Edwards ordered magistrates in St. John's to search the house of the publican John Mahany. He was rumoured to keep firearms and weapons in readiness to "oppose any of His Majesty's Officers in searching for straggling seamen."125 About a week later Mahany appeared in the governor's court, accused of breaching the peace and being in possession of weapons with the intention of using them against military officers. Alexander Campbell, a corporal in the Army, testified that he visited Mahany's establishment the previous evening. Asked by him if "he was not afraid

239 of the Press," Mahany answered that he "was not afraid of any Bugar that would dare to take him for he had three loaded muskets and a hanger [small sword]."126 Mahany told

Campbell that "he would blow any bugers brains out that would dare to lay hold of him," and informed William Murdock, another corporal, that "he would screen any poor fellow that was going to be prest."127 These witnesses accused the publican of other violent and levelling behaviour. When magistrate Nicholas Gill searched Mahany's house he recovered two muskets and two fowling pieces, as well as a sword, cutlass and bayonet, none of which the accused could account for. Mahany was fined twenty pounds and jailed until he could find security for his good behaviour.128 He was also fined five pounds for abusing a constable; he was ordered to pay up or be expelled from the island. This case suggests that impressment was on people's minds in 1780 and becoming more common, and that press gangs may have operated on shore in St. John's during the American war.

Impressment hampered the Newfoundland trade in the West Country even after the Treaty of Paris in 1783. A crisis in Dutch politics in 1787 nearly led to war between

Britain and France, and the Navy used press gangs to mobilize the Navy.130 News of large-scale presses in London, , and the Isle of Wight drove fishermen into the

Dorset interior. The Navy stationed cutters off Poole and sent press gangs into town.

Captain Biggs of the Impress Service told Benjamin Lester that unless he could find lodgings for his press gang, he would press every man in Poole harbour. Despite lookouts and other precautions, a number of Newfoundland crews were taken into the Navy. An even larger mobilization accompanied the Nootka Sound affair in 1790.132 There was a press from all protections in Poole in July and the Lester brothers had a difficult time

240 getting their seafarers to come in from the country.133 Press gangs disrupted

Newfoundland voyages in the spring and conscripted fishermen when they returned home in the fall. As Chapter 5 will explain, the outbreak of war in 1793 sent the Newfoundland trade into disarray. As the migratory fishery declined, impressment became more common in St. John's and the nursery for seamen crossed the Atlantic from the West

Country to Newfoundland.134

Pressing Concerns

It was also during the American war that the Navy began to use impressment as a form of punishment in Newfoundland. As Jerry Bannister has shown, naval officers formed the backbone of the island's legal system, and they assigned and meted out punishments in the eighteenth century.135 For instance, three seamen were convicted in the Court of Oyer and Terminer in St. John's in 1775 of bringing the schooner George-

Yard in from the Grand Banks against their master's wishes. As punishment, they forfeited their wages and were pressed into HMS Romney. Similarly, in 1779 two boat keepers in St. John's, John Davis and Jeffrey Judd, were pressed into the Portland for the misdemeanour offence of knowingly purchasing provisions from a vessel that had been wrecked in western Newfoundland. Since the Court of Oyer and Terminer had finished sitting for the year, Edwards used impressment as an extra-legal punishment, but he had no problem discharging the men a short time later, which seems to have occurred when they arrived back in Portsmouth.137 Finally, in a surrogate court held at Placentia in 1781, five fishermen were convicted of breaking Thomas Welsh's wharf, and one of them, presumably the ringleader, was pressed into HMS Duchess of Cumberland as

241 punishment.138 As discussed in Chapter 5, the St. John's magistracy regularly pressed men on behalf of the Navy during the Napoleonic Wars, although most cases never made it into the courts.

Impressment was also used to punish masters of vessels, planters, and other residents who harboured deserters. Edwards outlined this policy in 1780. Based on reports that merchants, masters, and boat keepers were entertaining deserters in the outports, he served notice that they would be prosecuted "with the utmost severity of the

Law."139 If they knew the men to be deserters and did not turn them over to the nearest magistrate, all of their seamen and fishermen would be pressed "without exception."140

Two years later Campbell re-issued this proclamation and distributed it throughout the island.141 In addition, he gave constables and residents an incentive to cooperate with the

Navy: a reward of two pounds for every deserter.142 This policy became entrenched during the Napoleonic era. Like other naval stations, desertion was a serious problem in

Newfoundland. At the outset of the war, Duff warned tavern keepers and St. John's residents against providing naval seamen with spirituous liquors. The seamen ran into debt and used their slops and possessions as payment. Duff charged that this was an

"encouragement to vice" and led to "many evil consequences."143 This included desertion, especially to crimps looking to coerce seafaring men away from the wooden world to turn a profit in the local labour market, and Duff ordered the civil power in St.

John's to round up these special offenders. As punishment, they would give the slops back to the seamen without reimbursement, lose their tavern licenses, and would be subject to further penalties at the magistracy's discretion. This may have included impressment into the Newfoundland squadron.144

242 Newspapers did not exist in St. John's in the eighteenth century, which means that public notices were posted in taverns, coffee houses, and on the doors of government buildings. It is unclear how Montagu circulated his advertisement on stragglers in 1777.

Apparently, seamen sent to the naval hospital frequently straggled into town, where they got drunk and committed "great irregularities," to the "disturbance of the peaceable

Inhabitants, and to the prejudice of their own healths."145 Others attempted to desert from the Navy altogether. As such, if any naval seaman was found drunk in a public house, the owner was to be fined five pounds and have his license revoked. Montague also upheld

Duffs proclamation on naval slops.146 Occasionally, there were inter-agency disputes concerning deserters and recruits in Newfoundland. William Able, a seaman from HMS

Arethusa, was convicted of desertion in a court martial held at St. John's in 1782. His sentence seems to have been mitigated by the fact that he enlisted in the Newfoundland

Regiment after running away, while he was drunk.147 It was rarer for men to desert in the

British Isles and abscond to Newfoundland, but this is exactly what four men belonging to HMS Ocean did in 1774. They ran from the Ocean and signed onto a fishing ship at

Saltcombe, Devon, bound to Bay Bulls. The captain of the Ocean felt that they could be apprehended in Newfoundland with little difficulty, and Governor Molyneux Shuldham was asked to bring them back to the British Isles. He was given their physical descriptions: for example, William Atkinson was twenty-four-years-old, stood five-foot- four, was of a light complexion, wore his own hair, and was "pitted with the

Smallpox."148 When newspapers such as the Royal Gazette appeared in St. John's in the early nineteenth century, detailed advertisements such as this one were used to combat the growing desertion problem.

243 Conclusion

After slow beginnings, due partly to restrictions on impressment between 1708 and 1775, the Navy recruited in Newfoundland for the first time on a significant scale during the American war. Poverty and unemployment drove hundreds of fishing servants to join the Newfoundland squadron in the late 1770s, but by the end of the conflict impressment had also made inroads on the island. This chapter has argued that

Newfoundland transformed from a minor source of manpower before 1775 into a training ground for the Navy during the American war. A key reason for this was disruption in the

West Country. Press gangs helped drive Bideford and Barnstable from the fishery during the Seven Years War, and they conscripted hundreds of fishermen and sailors during the

Falklands dispute of 1770. The American Revolutionary War foreshadowed larger changes at work in the fishery. Press gangs depleted the West Country labour pool in the late 1770s, the same period in which naval recruitment first occurred in Newfoundland on a regular basis. While George Chalmers accurately noted the decline of the migratory fishery in 1793, as discussed in the next chapter, he did not realize that the nursery for seamen had crossed the Atlantic to Newfoundland. This process began during the

American war and was completed in the Napoleonic era.

This is not the first study of the Navy in Newfoundland. Gerald S. Graham produced a number of works on the defence of Newfoundland and the fishery's place in

British imperial strategy.149 Olaf Janzen has also concentrated on the Navy's protection of the island, especially during the American war.150 William Whitely focused on naval governors such as Hugh Palliser and John Thomas Duckworth within the context of the fishery and British policy, and James Cook's role in surveying Newfoundland during the

244 1760s.151 Jerry Bannister was the first historian to study naval-civilian relations in

Newfoundland in his book on governance and the law in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.152 William Miles recently analyzed the organization of convoys during the War of the Spanish Succession.153 These studies explain a great deal about the

Navy in Newfoundland, but none of them investigated how it manned its ships. This is the first examination of naval recruitment in Newfoundland.

This chapter and the next undermine several generations of Newfoundland historiography, which dismissed the idea that the fishery was a training ground for the

Navy. Writing in the nineteenth century, Charles Pedley disregarded it completely, while

Moses Harvey and Joseph Hatton called it a "delusion."154 J.D. Rogers put it like this:

"For two centuries and a half Newfoundland was regarded as a prime source of naval strength; but it was nearly a century after this theory was abandoned that Newfoundland began to contribute sailors to the Royal Navy."155 While Rogers stated that

Newfoundland did.not contribute sailors to the fleet until , Gordon Rothney explained that because the theory "was proclaimed so often, nearly everyone seemed to believe it, even though it was not true."156 Patrick Crowhurst adds that the contemporary view of the fishery as a nursery for seamen "is no longer accepted." Keith Matthews concluded that seafarers were immune from the Navy in Newfoundland by both "law and custom."158 Olaf Janzen agreed, noting that fishermen "knew that in Newfoundland they were exempt from impressment."159 While scholars such as Glanville Davies have occasionally noted that the fishery was disrupted by impressment in the West Country, their voices have been drowned out by the historiographical orthodoxy.160 Gerald S.

Graham and David J. Starkey synthesized this orthodoxy: the cod fishery was never a

245 training ground for the Navy, but rather the mythical creation of merchants and interest groups looking for government favours in wartime. Impressment was non-existent on the island, and illegal there anyway. Far from a nursery for seamen, Newfoundland was a safe haven from the Navy.161 In his classic work, Empire of the North Atlantic, Graham states emphatically that "the Newfoundland fishery never fulfilled its function as the great 'nursery for seamen.'"162 This study argues that Graham and his historiographical tradition got it wrong: not only did the trans-Atlantic fishery serve as a nursery for seamen, as discussed in this chapter, but impressment was both legal and common in

Newfoundland from the American Revolution. Chapter 5 carries this story into the

French and Napoleonic Wars, when approximately four thousand men entered the Navy in Newfoundland.

246 Notes

1 Edwards to Philip Stephens, Admiralty Secretary, 7 December 1779, The National Archives [TNA], London, United Kingdom, Admiralty Papers [ADM] 1/471, Correspondence from Senior Officers in Newfoundland, 1776-83, pp. 361-4. 2 Alexander Du Toit, "George Chalmers," ODNB; John E. Crowley, "Neo-Mercantilism and The Wealth of Nations: British Commercial Policy after the American Revolution," The Historical Journal, 33.2 (June 1990), pp. 339-60, esp. no. 10, pp. 343-50, 359. Crowley argues that Chalmers, John Baker Holroyd (the earl of Sheffield), and Charles Jenkinson (later Lord Hawkesbury and the earl of Liverpool) shared a fate of political displacement after the Revolution. They rationalized the loss of the American colonies by becoming "neo-mercantilists." Influenced by Adam Smith and his Wealth of Nations, they saw themselves as nationalists and intellectually progressive. 3 George Chalmers, Opinions on Interesting Subjects or Public Law and Commercial Policy; Arising from American Independence (London, 1784), p. 92. 4 Gerald S. Graham, "Fisheries and Sea Power," in G.A. Rawlyk (ed.) Historical Essays on the Atlantic Provinces (Toronto, 1967), p. 10. 5 Cited in Gerald S. Graham, Sea Power and British North America, 1783-1820: A Study in British Colonial Policy (Harvard, 1941), p. 105. Hawkesbury was a senior British cabinet minister and fellow "neo-mercantilist." See John Cannon, "Charles Jenkinson," ODNB; Crowley, "Neo-Mercantilism and The Wealth of Nations.'" 6 W.L. Morton, 'Newfoundland in Colonial Policy,T 775-1793' (Oxford University, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 1935), pp. 222-3. 7 Denver Alexander Brunsman, 'The Evil Necessity: British Naval Impressment in the Eighteenth-Century Atlantic World' (Princeton University, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 2004). 8 Dora Mae Clark, "Impressment of Seamen in the American Colonies," in Essays in Colonial History: Presented to Charles McLean Andrews by His Students (New Haven, 1931), pp. 198-224; Richard Pares, "The Manning of the Navy in the West Indies, 1702- 63," Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 4th Series, 20 (1937), pp. 31-60; Jesse Lemisch, Jack Tar vs. John Bull: The Role of New York's Seamen in Precipitating the Revolution (New York, 1997). 9 N.A.M. Rodger, "Sea-Power and Empire, 1688-1793," in P.J. Marshall (ed.), The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume 2, The Eighteenth Century (Oxford, 1998), pp. 169-83; Brian Lavery, Nelson's Navy: The Ships, Men and Organisation, 1793-1815 (Annapolis, 1989), pp. 245, 250. 10 6 Anne, c. 37, s. 9(1708). 11 6 Anne, c. 37, s. 9(1708). 12 Clark, "Impressment in American Colonies"; Jesse Lemisch, "Jack Tar in the Streets: Merchant Seamen in the Politics of Revolutionary America," William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Series, 25.3 (July 1968), pp. 371-407; Douglas Edward Leach, Roots of Conflict: British Armed Forces and Colonial Americans, 1677-1763 (Chapel Hill, 1986), ch. 7; Brunsman, 'Evil Necessity,' chs. 3-5.

247 13 15 Geo. Ill, c. 31, s. 19 (1775); Christopher English, "Introduction," in English (ed.), Two Islands: Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island: Essays in the History of Canadian Law, Volume 9 (Toronto, 2005), pp. 6-7. 14 Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 2nd ed. (Toronto, 1985), pp. 21-2. Also see J.E. Cote, "The Reception of English Law," Alberta Law Review, 15.1 (1977), pp. 29- 92; Elizabeth Gaspar Brown, "British Statutes in the Emergent Nations of North America: 1660-1949," American Journal of Legal History, 7 (1963), pp. 95-136. 15 Keith D. Mercer, 'War, Impressment, and the English-Newfoundland Cod Trade: An Examination of the "Nursery for Seamen Argument" for the Maritime Wars of the mid- nth century, 1625-1674' (Memorial University of Newfoundland, Unpublished Honours Thesis, 2001). 16 10 & 11 Wm. Ill, c. 25 (1698-9); Keith Matthews (ed.), Collection and Commentary on the Constitutional Laws of Seventeenth-Century Newfoundland (St. John's, 1975); Keith Matthews, "Historical Fence Building: A Critique of the Historiography of Newfoundland," Newfoundland Quarterly, 74.1 (1978), pp. 21-30, repr. Newfoundland Studies, 17.2 (2001), pp. 143-65; Peter E. Pope, Fish into Wine: The Newfoundland Plantation in the Seventeenth Century (Chapel Hill, 2004); Jerry Bannister, The Rule of the Admirals: Law, Custom, and Naval Government in Newfoundland, 1699-1832 (Toronto, 2003), ch. 2. J.D. Davies, Gentlemen and Tarpaulins: The Officers and Men of the Restoration Navy (Oxford, 1991), p. 76. 18 Admiralty Commissioners to Hubbard, 1 April 1669, TNA, ADM 2/1, Selected Orders and Letters from the Duke of York, King Charles II, and the Admiralty Board, no page numbers (this document was consulted in the Finding Index for Newfoundland Documents [FIND], Maritime History Archive [MHA], St. John's, Newfoundland, MHA 16-C-1-053). 19 Admiralty to Hubbard, 1 April 1669, TNA, ADM 2 /1. 20 Examination of Miles Causton, January 1/11, 1643-4, in J.R. Powell and E.K. Timings (eds.) Documents Relating to the Civil War, 1642-1648 (London, Navy Records Society, 1963), p. 121; Charles Burnet Judah Jr., The North American Fisheries and British Policy to 1713 (Urbana, Illinois, 1933), p. 91. 21 Peter E. Pope, 'The South Avalon Planters, 1630 to 1700: Residence, Labour, Demand and Exchange in Seventeenth-Century Newfoundland' (Memorial University of Newfoundland, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 1992), pp. 208-9. 22 Michael Godfrey, "Thomas Handasyde," DCB. 23 Godfrey, "Handasyde," DCB. 24 George Strange et al. of Bideford to Lords of Trade, 10 July 1705, TNA, Colonial Office Papers [CO] 194 / 3, Newfoundland Correspondence, 1703-6, p. 274; Agnes M. Field, 'The Development of Government in Newfoundland, 1638-1713' (University of London, Unpublished M.A. Thesis, 1924), pp. 269-79. 25 Quoted from Field, 'Development of Government,' p. 274; also see Cummings to Parliament, 31 January 1706, TNA, CO 194 / 3, p. 424. 26 G.O. Rothney, 'The History of Newfoundland and Labrador, 1754-1783' (University of London, Unpublished M.A. Thesis, 1934), pp. 35, 37-8.

248 C.H. Little (ed.), The Recapture of St. John's, Newfoundland: Dispatches of Rear- Admiral, Lord Colville, 1761-1762 (Halifax, Maritime Museum of Canada, 1959), p. 22. 28 Captain's Log of HMS Northumberland, TNA, ADM 51 / 3925, a copy of which is in the David Webber Collection, Provincial Archives of Newfoundland and Labrador [PANL], St. John's, MG 279. 9Q Garland's order to encourage Newfoundlanders to enter the Navy, 30 August 1762, TNA, ADM 80 / 121, Book of Orders and Proclamations by Governors of Newfoundland, 1740-1805, p. 23. 30 Captain's Log of HMS Northumberland, TNA, ADM 51 / 3925. 31 Lester-Garland Papers, Dorchester Record Office [DRO], Dorset, United Kingdom, D / LEG, Diaries of Benjamin and Isaac Lester, 1761-1802. See Benjamin Lester's Diary, 8 August - 21 September 1762. Jerry Bannister and Gordon Handcock generously provided me with transcripts of these diaries. 32 On the raid generally, see Olaf Janzen, "The French Raid Upon the Newfoundland Fishery in 1762 - A Study of the Nature and Limits of Eighteenth-Century Sea Power," in William B. Cogar (ed.), Naval History: The Seventh Symposium of the U.S. Naval Academy (Wilmington, Delaware, 1988), pp. 35-54. 33 Barnstable merchants to Lords of Trade, 20 December 1755, TNA, CO 194 /14, p. 23. 34 Glanville James Davies, 'England and Newfoundland: Policy and Trade, 1660-1783' (University of Southampton, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 1980), p. 382. 35 Dartmouth merchants to Lords of Trade, 16 November 1758, TNA, CO 194 /14, pp. 18-19; Poole merchants to Lords of Trade, 26 December 1758, TNA, CO 194 /14, p. 20; Merchants of Exeter, Topsham, and Teignmouth to Lords of Trade, [1758], TNA, CO 194/14, p. 22. 36 Henry Case, mayor of Bristol, to Lords of Trade, 22 February 1759, TNA, CO 194 / 14, pp.14-15. 37 Mayor of Bideford to Lords of Trade, 24 November 1758, TNA, CO 194 /14, p. 16. 38 Ralph G. Lounsbury, The British Fishery at Newfoundland, 1634-1763 (New Haven, 1934), pp. 315-17. 39 Keith Matthews, 'A History of the West of England - Newfoundland Fishery' (Oxford University, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 1968), pp. 388-90; Mercer, 'Impressment and English-Newfoundland Cod Trade,'chs. 4-7. 40 Nicholas Tracy, Navies, Deterrence, and American Independence: Britain and Seapower in the 1760s and 1770s (Vancouver, 1988). Tracy, Deterrence and American Independence, ch. 4; N.A.M. Rodger, The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, Volume 2, 1649-1815 (London, 2004), pp. 327- 30. 42 Isaac Lester's Diary, DRO, 22 September-2 October 1770. 43 Benjamin Lester's Diary, DRO, 29 December 1770. 44 Benjamin Lester's Diary, DRO, 29 December 1770; Isaac Lester's Diary, DRO, 29 December 1770. 45 Isaac Lester's Diary, DRO, 22 December 1770. 46 David Bonner Smith, "Cook and the Grenville" Mariner's Mirror, 23.2 (April 1937), p. 233. This research note is followed by a table of the Grenville's crew from 1764 to 1767, which is derived from its original musters.

249 47 On Cook generally, see William H. Whitely, James Cook in Newfoundland, 1762-1767 (St. John's, 1975); Glyndwr Williams, "James Cook," DCB; Andrew C.F. David, "James Cook," ODNB; J.C. Beaglehole, The Life of Captain James Cook (Stanford, California, 1974). 48 Stephens to Palliser, 6 September 1764, TNA, ADM 2 / 537, Secretary's Letters to Public and Flag Officers, 1764, p. 385. 49 Stephens to Palliser, 6 September 1764, TNA, ADM 2 / 537, p. 385. 50 Stephens to Colvill, 24 May 1763, TNA, ADM 2 / 536, pp. 210-11. 51 Keith Matthews, Lectures on the History of Newfoundland, 1500-1830 (St. John's, 1988), p. 117. Matthews, Lectures, ch. 19; C. Grant Head, Eighteenth Century Newfoundland: A Geographer's Perspective (Toronto, 1976), ch. 8. New England's connection to Newfoundland ran much deeper than the provisions trade. Its merchants also dominated the carrying trade with the West Indies; they transported low-grade codfish to slave plantations, and in return supplied Newfoundland with rum, sugar, and molasses. Most ships in the fishery, even those owned by West Country merchants, were built in the American colonies. Finally, New England was a popular destination for Newfoundland migrants. The Revolution severed these connections. Social conditions improved in Newfoundland after a couple of years, but starvation was always a possibility in coves and villages that were isolated by ice for much of the year. British forces retreated from Boston to New York in 1776, which opened up a loyal hinterland to supply Newfoundland with some provisions. Meanwhile, Canadian surpluses made their way to the island and the West Country continued to supply the fishery with bread. Merchants in Bermuda and Newfoundland stepped in to fill the void in the West Indies trade. Head, Eighteenth Century Newfoundland, p. 198. 54 Head, Eighteenth Century Newfoundland, p. 198. 55 Narrative of Vice Admiral Samuel Graves, 4 September 1775, in William Bell Clark (ed.), Naval Documents of the American Revolution [Naval Docs] (Washington, 1966), vol. 2, p. 7. 56 Graves to Duff, 4 September 1775, in Clark (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 2, pp. 8-11. 57 Graves to Duff, 4 September 1775, in Clark (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 2, pp. 8-11. 58 Graves to Duff, 4 September 1775, in Clark (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 2, pp. 8-11. 59 Graves to Captain Edward Le Cras of HMS Somerset, 4 September 1775, in Clark (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 2, p. 11; Graves to Stephens, 6 September 1775, in Clark (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 2, pp. 29-31. 60 Duff to Stephens, 14 November 1775, TNA, ADM 1 / 470, p. 229. 61 Duff to Stephens, 14 November 1775, TNA, ADM 1 / 470, p. 229. 62 Duff to Stephens, 14 November 1775, TNA, ADM 1 / 470, p. 229; Narrative of Graves, 4 December 1775, in Clark (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 2, pp. 1264-5. Also see Narrative of Graves, 26 November 1775, in Clark (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 2, p. 1143; Graves to Commodore Marriot Arbuthnot at Halifax, 12 December 1775, in Clark (ed.), Naval Docs (Washington, 1968), vol. 3, p. 63. 63 Duff to Stephens, 24 November 1775, TNA, ADM 1 / 470, p. 252.

250 64 On Atlantic communications, especially the Newfoundland trade, see Ian K. Steele, The English Atlantic, 1675-1740: An Exploration of Communication and Community (Oxford, 1986), ch. 5. 65 Montagu to Stephens, 12 November 1776, TNA, ADM 1 / 471, pp. 48-53. 66 Montagu to Stephens, 12 November 1776, TNA, ADM 1/471, pp. 48-53. 67 Montagu to Stephens, 14 March 1777, TNA, ADM 1 / 471, p. 92. Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to Montagu, 20 March 1777, in William James Morgan (ed.), Naval Docs (Washington, 1980), vol. 8, p. 698; Montagu to Stephens, 24 March 1777, TNA, ADM 1/471, p. 98. 69 Admiralty to Montagu, 20 March 1777, in Morgan (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 8, p. 698; Montagu to Stephens, 24 March 1777, TNA, ADM 1 / 471, p. 98. 70 Montagu to Stephens, 13 April 1778, TNA, ADM 1/471, p. 177. The clerk of the cheque was an officer in royal dockyards who went onboard warships to muster their complements. They checked for false musters. Dean King, A Sea of Words: A Lexicon and Companion to the Complete Seafaring Tales of Patrick O 'Brian, 3r ed. (New York, 2000), p. 145. 71 Montagu to Stephens, 5 May 1778, TNA, ADM 1 / 471, pp. 193-5. 72 Edwards to Sandwich, 3 June 1779, TNA, ADM 1/471, pp. 338-9; Edwards to Stephens, 7 June 1779, TNA, ADM 1 / 471, p. 341. 73 Edwards to Sandwich, 3 June 1779, TNA, ADM 1 / 471, pp. 338-9; Edwards to Stephens, 7 June 1779, TNA, ADM 1 / 471, p. 341. 74 Edwards to Sandwich, 3 June 1779, TNA, ADM 1/471, pp. 338-9; Edwards to Stephens, 7 June 1779, TNA, ADM 1 / 471, p. 341; Frederic F. Thompson, "Richard Edwards," DCB. 75 Edwards to Stephens, 7 December 1779, TNA, ADM 1/471, pp. 361-4; Rothney, 'History of Newfoundland,' p. 253. See Chapter 3 for rendezvous in Nova Scotia. Also consult I.C.B. Dear and Peter Kemp (eds.), Oxford Companion to Ships and the Sea, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 2005), p. 463. 76 Edwards to Stephens, 7 December 1779, TNA, ADM 1 / 471, pp. 361-4. 77 Edwards to Stanhope, 4 November 1779, TNA, ADM 1 / 471, pp. 367-9; Captain Frederick of HMS Spy to Lord Sandwich, 27 November 1777, in G.R. Barnes and J.H. Owen (eds.), The Private Papers of John, Earl of Sandwich: First Lord of the Admiralty, 1771-1782 (London, Navy Records Society, 1932), vol. 1, pp. 194-7; Edwards to Captain Sampson Edwards, 27 October 1780, TNA, ADM 1 / 471, pp. 451-4; Edwards to Senior Officer in St. John's, 26 October 1781, TNA, ADM 1/471, pp. 536-7. 78 Duff to George Jackson, Admiralty Secretary, [early 1776], TNA, ADM 1 / 470, p. 272; Edwards to Montagu, 24 July 1779, TNA, ADM 1 / 471, pp. 345-6; Edwards to Stephens, 6 September 1779, TNA, ADM 1 / 471, pp. 349-51. 79 Edwards to Stephens, 15 November 1780, TNA, ADM 1 / 471, pp. 447-50. 80 Edwards to Stephens, 15 November 1780, TNA, ADM 1 / 471, pp. 447-50; Edwards to Stephens, 28 September 1781, TNA, ADM 1 / 471, pp. 524-5; Campbell to Stephens, 23 September 1782, TNA, ADM 1 / 472, pp. 31-2; Campbell to Stephens, 11 August 1783, TNA, ADM 1 / 472, p. 88. 81 Also see Jerry Bannister, "Palliser's Act," in Gerald Hallowell (ed.), The Oxford Companion to Canadian History (Don Mills, ON, 2004), p. 472.

251 Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to Montagu, 23 March 1776, in Clark (ed.), Naval Docs (Washington, 1969), vol. 4, pp. 989-94; Campbell to Captain Nicholls of HMS Thorn, 26 October 1783, TNA, ADM 1 / 472, pp. 97-101. 83 Admiralty to Montagu, 23 March 1776, in Clark (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 4, pp. 989-94; Campbell to Nicholls, 26 October 1783, TNA, ADM 1 / 472, pp. 97-101. 84 Admiralty to Montagu, 23 March 1776, in Clark (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 4, pp. 989-94; Campbell to Nicholls, 26 October 1783, TNA, ADM 1 / 472, pp. 97-101. 5 Robert Tomlinson, 'A Plan for Manning the Royal Navy without Recourse to Impressment' (London, 1774), in J.G. Bullocke (ed.), The Tomlinson Papers: Selected from the Correspondence and Pamphlets of Captain Robert Tomlinson, R.N., & Vice- Admiral Nicholas Tomlinson (London, Navy Records Society, 1935), pp. 103-202. 86 Bullocke (ed.), Tomlinson Papers, pp. viii-ix. 87 Bullocke (ed.), Tomlinson Papers, pp. 106-7. On impressment literature, see J.S. Bromley (ed.), The Manning of the Royal Navy: Selected Public Pamphlets, 1693-1873 (London, Navy Records Society, 1974). 88 Tomlinson, 'Plan for Manning Navy,' in Bullocke (ed.), Tomlinson Papers, pp. 156-7, 162-3. For examples of military recruiting parties in Newfoundland, see Thomas Gage, Army General at Boston, to Governor Francis Legge of Nova Scotia, 29 July 1775, in Clark (ed.), Naval Docs (Washington, 1964), vol. 1, pp. 1002-3; Gage to Lord Dartmouth, 20 September 1775, in Clark (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 2, pp. 160-1; Vice-Admiral Samuel Graves to Sir Guy Carleton, 13 October 1775, in Clark (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 2, p. 438; Commodore Marriot Arbuthnot at Halifax to Graves, 15 January 1776, in Clark (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 3, p. 792; Legge to Lord George Germain, 10 April 1776, in Clark (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 4, pp. 744-5; Gage to Lord Dartmouth, 20 August 1775, in Clarence Edwin Carter (ed.), The Correspondence of General Thomas Gage with the Secretaries of State, 1763-1775, 2 vols. (1931 repr. New York, 1969), I, pp. 414-16; Arbuthnot to Sandwich, 26 December 1775, 1 February 1776, in Barnes and Owen (eds.), Sandwich Papers, vol. 1, pp. 113-17; Wilfred Brenton Kerr, The Maritime Provinces of British North America and the American Revolution (New York, 1941), pp. 118-19; Patrick O'Flaherty, Old Newfoundland: A History to 1843 (St. John's, 1999), p. 99; Rothney, 'History of Newfoundland,' p. 239; Davies, 'England and Newfoundland,' p. 204. 90 Act and Resolves of the Massachusetts General Court, 28 March 1777, in Morgan (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 8, p. 217; Edwards to Lieutenant-Governor Richard Hughes of Nova Scotia, 12 June 1780, Centre for Newfoundland Studies [CNS], St. John's, D'Alberti Transcripts, vol. 1, no page numbers; Edwards to General Haldimand, governor of Quebec, 20 July 1780, CNS, D'Alberti Transcripts, vol. 1; Edwards to Hughes, 18 September 1780, CNS, D'Alberti Transcripts, vol. 1; Edwards to Lieutenant Colonel Byat, 28 September 1780, CNS, D'Alberti Transcripts, vol. 1 91 Edwards to Haldimand, 17 September 1780, CNS, D'Alberti Transcripts, vol. 1. 09 Quoted from G. W.L. Nicholson, The Fighting Newfoundlander: A History of the Royal Newfoundland Regiment (St. John's, 1964), pp. 14-15. 93 Quoted from Head, Eighteenth Century Newfoundland, pp. 198-9. 94 Nicholson, Fighting Newfoundlander, pp. 15-23; Stuart R.J. Sutherland, "Robert Pringle," DCB; O'Flaherty, Old Newfoundland, p. 101. For surveys, see James E.

252 Candow, "The British Army in Newfoundland, 1697-1824," Newfoundland Quarterly, 69A (Spring 1984), pp. 21-8; Olaf Uwe Janzen, "Military Garrisons," in Joseph R. Smallwood and Cyril F. Poole (eds.), Encyclopedia of Newfoundland and Labrador [ENL], 5 vols. (St. John's, 1981-94), III, pp. 540-9. On American naval designs, see Olaf Uwe Janzen, "The American Threat to the Newfoundland Fisheries, 1776-1777," American Neptune, 48.3 (Summer 1988), pp. 154-64. On the Newfoundland squadron generally during the American war, see Janzen, "The Royal Navy and the Defence of Newfoundland during the American Revolution," 14.1 (Autumn 1984), pp. 28-48. 95 Other historians have noted that Palliser's Act repealed the Sixth of Anne and legalized impressment in Newfoundland, but they did not follow up on this topic. Gordon O. Rothney, 'British Policy in the North American Cod-Fisheries, with Special Reference to Foreign Competition, 1775-1819' (University of London, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 1939), p. 48; W.L. Morton, "A Note on Palliser's Act," Canadian Historical Review, 34.1 (1953), p. 38. 96 'Abstract of the Most Material Proceedings in this [British Admiralty] Department Relative to North America,' 1 June 1775, in Clark (ed.), Naval Docs, vol. 1, p. 481; Stephens to Vice-Admiral Samuel Graves, 24 June 1775, TNA, ADM 2 / 549, pp. 449- 53; Stephens to Graves, 24 June 1775, TNA, ADM 2 / 549, pp. 453-5; Stephens to Graves, 29 September 1775, TNA, ADM 2 / 550, p. 179. Also see Chapter 3 on Nova Scotia. 97 'Proceedings in the Lords Respecting the Commercial Losses Occasioned by the American War,' 6 February 1778, in Michael J. Crawford (ed.), Naval Docs (Washington, 2005), vol. 11, pp. 967-71. 98 Dartmouth's merchants to Board of Trade, 24 March 1778, TNA, CO 194 /19, p. 18. 99 Dartmouth's merchants to Board of Trade, 24 March 1778, TNA, CO 194 /19, p. 18. 100 Governor Montagu to Philip Stephens, 24 April 1778, TNA, ADM 1 / 471, p. 190. 101 Captain Scott to Admiralty, 13 March 1780, TNA, ADM 1 / 2485, Captains Letters, Surname "S", no page numbers, cited in Davies, 'England and Newfoundland,' p. 383. 102 Isaac Lester's Diary, DRO, 18 March 1778. 103 Isaac Lester's Diary, DRO, 20 April 1779; Matthews Collection, MHA, "Press Gangs," File 5.01.185. Also known as "hot" or "general presses," these raids were only used during urgent mobilizations. They temporarily froze protections and freed up the entire seafaring population to press gangs. These procedures counted on surprise and stealth to take large numbers of men in short periods of time. See Lavery, Nelson's Navy, p. 122; Peter Kemp (ed.), Oxford Companion to Ships and the Sea (Oxford, 1976), p. 400. 104 Scott to Admiralty, 4 January 1780, TNA, ADM 1 / 2485, cited in Davies, 'England and Newfoundland,' p. 383. 105 Mayor and merchants of Poole to Edwards, 29 December 1780, TNA, ADM 1/471, p. 470. 106 Mayor and merchants of Poole to Edwards, 29 December 1780, TNA, ADM 1/471, p. 470; Matthews Collection, MHA, "Press Gangs," File 5.01.185. 07 Daniel A. Baugh, "Why did Britain lose command of the sea during the war for America?," in Jeremy Black and Philip Woodfine (eds.), British Navy and Use of Naval Power in the Eighteenth Century (New Jersey, 1989), pp. 149-69.

253 108 Rodger, Command of the Ocean, pp. 606-9, 636-9; Christopher Lloyd, The British Seaman, 1200-1860: A Social Survey (London, 1968), pp. 286-9. 109 Neil R. Stout, "Manning the Royal Navy in North America, 1763-1775," American Neptune, 23.3 (July 1963), pp. 174-85. 110 Christopher Paul Magra, 'The New England Cod Fishing Industry and Maritime Dimensions of the American Revolution' (University of Pittsburgh, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 2006), ch. 5, and his '"Soldiers...Bred to the Sea': Maritime Marblehead, Massachusetts, and the Origins and Progress of the American Revolution," New England Quarterly, 11A (2004), pp. 531-62. 111 'Extract of a Letter from Whitehaven, June 14,' in Morgan (ed.), Naval Docs (Washington, 1976), vol. 6, pp. 418-19. 112 'Journal of Admiral Sir William Pasley, Kept on board HMS Sibyl cruising on the Newfoundland and Lisbon stations, 1779-80,' 24-25 July 1779, National Maritime Museum [NMM], Greenwich, England, JOD / 8, no page numbers. 113 Journal of William Pasley, 23 May 1779, NMM, JOD / 8. 114 Circular Order on Vagrancy, 6 October 1777, TNA, ADM 80 /121, pp. 81-2. 115 Circular Order on Vagrancy, 6 October 1777, TNA, ADM 80 /121, pp. 81-2. 116 Circular Order on Vagrancy, 6 October 1777, TNA, ADM 80 /121, pp. 81-2. 117 Circular Order on Vagrancy, 6 October 1777, TNA, ADM 80 /121, pp. 81-2; Kerr, Maritime Provinces, pp. 120-1; G.M. Story, W.J. Kirwin, and J.D.A. Widdowson (eds.), Dictionary of Newfoundland English, 2nd ed. with supplement (Toronto, 1990), p. 140. 118 Merchants and Others of Dartmouth to Board of Trade, 24 March 1778, TNA, CO 194 /19, p. 18. 119 Mayor and Merchants of Poole to Edwards, 29 December 1780, TNA, ADM 1/471, p. 470. 120 Order on Privateers, 3 September 1779, TNA, ADM 80 /121, pp. 85-6. 121 Kerr, Maritime Provinces, p. 122. 122 Order to John Dingle, Magistrate at Bay Bulls, 22 October 1779, TNA, ADM 80 / 121, p. 94. Campbell to Charles Garland, Magistrate at Harbour Grace, 29 September 1783, CNS, D'Alberti Transcripts, vol. 2 (includes Welton's petition). 124 Morton, 'Newfoundland in Colonial Policy,' pp. 127, 132; 'W. Pitt, MP, From an Act of Parliament... From Ministers,' 12 February 1783, TNA, CO 5 / 43, p. 449 (consulted in MHA, FIND, 17-A-3-015). 125 Edwards to Magistrate Nicholas Gill of St. John's, 12 September 1780, CNS, D'Alberti Transcripts, vol. 1. 126 Record of Governor's Court at St. John's, 19 September 1780, CNS, D'Alberti Transcripts, vol. 1. 127 Governor's Court, 19 September 1780, CNS, D'Alberti Transcripts, vol. 1. 128 Governor's Court, 19 September 1780, CNS, D'Alberti Transcripts, vol. 1. 129 Governor's Court, 6 October 1780, CNS, D'Alberti Transcripts, vol. 1. 130 Rodger, Command of the Ocean, p. 364. Also see Jeremy Black, The British Seaborne Empire (New Haven, 2004), p. 143; Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (1976 repr. New York, 1990), p. 122.

254 131 Benjamin Lester's Diary, DRO, 11 March - 30 May 1786, 24 September - 27 October 1787. Rodger, Command of the Ocean, pp. 364-5; Black, British Seaborne Empire, pp. 144- 5; Kennedy, British Naval Mastery, p. 122. 133 Benjamin Lester's Diary, DRO, 5 May- 16 August 1790, 3 December 1791. 134 Benjamin Lester's Diary, DRO, 5 May - 16 August 1790, 3 December 1791. 1 ^S Bannister, Rule of the Admirals, esp. chs. 6-7. Commissioners of Oyer and Terminer to Governor Duff, 7 [October] 1775, PANL, GN 2 /1 / A, Colonial Secretary's Letter Book, vol. 6, p. 40; Duff to Commissioners of Oyer and Terminer, 7 October 1775, PANL, GN 2 /1 / A, vol. 6, p. 41. 137 Edwards to Stephens, [December 1779], TNA, ADM 1 / 471, p. 391; Edwards to Stephens, [December 1779], TNA, ADM 1 / 471, p. 393. 138 Placentia District Court Records, 15, 19 September 1781, PANL, GN 5 / 4 / C /1, Minute Book, Box 198, pp. 148-9.1 thank Jerry Bannister for this reference. This is the case in Rule of the Admirals, Table 7.2, p. 233. Proclamation on Deserters, 31 July 1780, CNS, D'Alberti Transcripts, vol. 1. 140 Proclamation on Deserters, 31 July 1780, CNS, D'Alberti Transcripts, vol. 1. 1 Proclamation on Deserters, 31 July 1780, CNS, D'Alberti Transcripts, vol. 1. 142 Proclamation on Deserters, 2 August 1782, TNA, ADM 80 /121, pp. 100-1. Also see Placentia District Court Records, 2 August 1782, PANL, GN 5 / 4 / C /1, Minute Book, Box 198, p. 158; Campbell to Magistrates of Newfoundland, 2 August 1782, CNS, D'Alberti Transcripts, vol. 2. 143 Order to St. John's Magistrates on Tavern Keepers and Naval Slop Clothing, 17 July 1775, TNA, ADM 80 /121, p. 74. 144 Order to St. John's Magistrates, 17 July 1775, TNA, ADM 80 /121, p. 74. On crimps, see Dear and Kemp (eds.), Ships and the Sea, p. 142. 145 Advertisement on Stragglers, 20 May 1777, TNA, ADM 80 /121, p. 80. 146 Advertisement on Stragglers, 20 May 1777, TNA, ADM 80 /121, p. 80. 147 Governor Campbell to Unknown Army Officer, 28 October 1782, CNS, D'Alberti Transcripts, vol. 2. 148 Stephens to Shuldham, 22 April 1774, TNA, ADM 2/548, p. 423. 149 Gerald S. Graham, "Britain's Defence of Newfoundland," Canadian Historical Review, 23.3 (September 1942), pp. 260-79; Graham, "Newfoundland in British Strategy from Cabot to Napoleon," in R.A. MacKay (ed.), Newfoundland: Economic, Diplomatic, and Strategic Studies (Toronto, 1946), pp. 245-64. 150 Olaf Uwe Janzen, 'Newfoundland and British Maritime Strategy during the American Revolution' (Queen's University, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 1984); Janzen, "Royal Navy and the Defence of Newfoundland," pp. 28-48; Janzen, "American Threat," pp. 154-64; Janzen, "Showing the Flag: Hugh Palliser in Western Newfoundland, 1764," Northern Mariner, 3.3 (July 1993), pp. 3-14. 151 William H. Whitely, James Cook in Newfoundland, 1762-1767 (St. John's, 1975); Whitely, "James Cook, Hugh Palliser, and the Newfoundland Fisheries," Newfoundland Quarterly, 69.3 (October 1972), pp. 17-22; Whitely, "Hugh Palliser," DCB; Whitely, Duckworth's Newfoundland: The Island in the Early Nineteenth Century (St. John's, 1985).

255 Bannister, Rule of the Admirals; Bannister, "The Naval State in Newfoundland, 1749- 1791," Journal ofthe Canadian Historical Association, New Series, 11 (2000), pp. 17- 50. 153 William R. Miles, 'The Royal Navy and Northeastern North America, 1689-1713' (Saint Mary's University, Unpublished M.A. Thesis, 2000). Charles Pedley, The History of Newfoundland: From the Earliest Times to the Year 1860 (London, 1863), p. 26; Moses Harvey and Joseph Hatton, Newfoundland, the Oldest Colony: Its History, its Present Condition, and its Prospects in the Future (Boston, 1883), p. 42. 155 J.D. Rogers, Newfoundland (Oxford, 1911), pp. 195-6. 156 Gordon O. Rothney, Newfoundland: A History (Ottawa, 1973), p. 14. 157 Patrick Crowhurst, The Defence of British Trade, 1689-1815 (Folkstone, Kent, 1977), p. 112. 58 Matthews, Lectures, p. 33. 159 Olaf Uwe Janzen, "Napoleonic Wars," ENL, IV, pp. 5-6. 160 Davies, 'England and Newfoundland,' pp. 379-84. Although Davies is the exception, he still devotes only a few pages to the nursery for seamen at the end of his thesis. 161 Graham, "Fisheries and Sea Power," pp. 7-16; Graham, The Politics of Naval Supremacy: Studies in British Maritime Ascendancy (London, 1965), pp. 113-14; David J. Starkey, "The West Country-Newfoundland Fishery and the Manning of the Royal Navy," in Robert Higham (ed.), Security and Defence in South- West England Before 1800 (Exeter, 1987), pp. 93-101. Gerald S. Graham, Empire of the North Atlantic: The Maritime Struggle for North America,.2nd ed. (Toronto, 1958), p. 56.

256 Chapter 5

Customs and Coercion: Press Gangs, Guard Boats and the Civil Power in Newfoundland, 1793-1815

The Newfoundland Fisherys employ a great number of Vessels and is a good nursery for Seamen of the British Navy. -Journal of Aaron Thomas, HMS Boston, 17941

Introduction

On 26 August 1811, a sixteen-year-old apprentice named John Grigg was on shore leave in St. John's, stretching his legs after a voyage from his home town of

London. He was indentured to Francis Baron, master of the brig Adonis, for a period of four years. Grigg had not been to sea before, and time aboard a sack ship was intended to provide him with valuable experience on the rough waters of the North Atlantic. A nursery for seamen, the Newfoundland trade was an excellent way for young sailors to learn the ropes of maritime life. However, when Grigg stepped ashore in St. John's he was not carrying his papers - either a protection certificate or shipping paper - and was quickly pressed into HMS Antelope, the flagship of the Newfoundland squadron. His master petitioned John Thomas Duckworth, the governor of Newfoundland, to discharge him into his custody. Baron pleaded that he was a young apprentice who had accidentally left his papers aboard another vessel. Had he been carrying documentation, Grigg may still have been forced into the wooden world, but he would have been discharged just as quickly. Legally, he was exempt from impressment, and this likely convinced Duckworth to release him a few days later.2

The significance of this case is not that Grigg was pressed, but that he was pressed on shore. In fact, he is the only person known to have been pressed on shore in

257 Newfoundland after a naval officer was murdered in St. John's in 1794. That event was a turning point in the history of impressment in Newfoundland. Fearing more violence, naval and civilian authorities restricted impressment to guard boats that boarded incoming vessels, particularly in St. John's harbour. Press gangs were barred from shore for the duration of the Napoleonic Wars. Newfoundland changed dramatically in this period: the decline of the migratory fishery combined with a rise in permanent population to transform it from a fishing station - a great ship moored near the Grand Banks - into a resident colony, while St. John's, a modest port and naval station - or mere Portsmouth - emerged as the political and commercial capital of the island. Newfoundland became a colony in all but name.3 As discussed in Chapter 4, the Navy used an Atlantic manning strategy in the eighteenth century: few men were taken in Newfoundland because they were pressed from convoys off the English and Irish coasts. This changed in the late eighteenth century. Statutory restrictions against impressment were lifted in 1775, and the

Navy recruited there on a significant scale during the 1770s. Impressment devastated the fishing industry in the West Country, and as its maritime labour market dried up the Navy looked increasingly to Newfoundland for manpower. The nursery for seamen did not die, but rather shifted across the Atlantic to Newfoundland. As the migratory fishery declined in the 1790s, the Navy turned to Newfoundland and its guard boats as an alternative source of manpower.

Volunteers were available in Newfoundland during the 1790s, particularly in St.

John's at the end of the fishing season, but there were never enough and press gangs stepped in to fill the void. Press gangs were active in St. John's before the Boston tragedy in 1794, in which a lieutenant who had headed a press gang was beaten to death the next

258 day. This incident shocked the Navy into reforming its manning system. Press gangs now plied their trade on the water rather than on land. Regulated by a series of port orders, the

St. John's guard boats became the dominant mode of naval recruitment in Newfoundland during the Napoleonic era. William Pryce Cumby, captain of HMS Hyperion, found this out the hard way during a heated dispute with the St. John's magistracy in 1813 over impressment on shore. The Boston tragedy likely convinced the magistracy to reject

Cumby's demands and it was the catalyst for larger manning reforms during the

Napoleonic Wars. Like impressment generally, which increased in Newfoundland over time, resistance to the Navy did not fade away either; it followed impressment into St.

John's harbour, where a number of violent cases kept the Navy on edge in the nineteenth century. John Grigg was likely not the only sailor who was pressed on shore in this period, but it was very rare. While the Boston tragedy transformed the nature of impressment in Newfoundland, it diminished neither its scale nor its importance in manning the Navy.

This chapter traces the evolution of impressment on the island during the

Napoleonic era. It moves beyond the folklore surrounding press gangs to explain how they operated on the ground, or more accurately, on the water. It also represents the first detailed study of the civil power and impressment in Newfoundland, and elsewhere in the

Atlantic world.4 Until now examination of this subject has been confined to the British

Isles. Several decades ago Leon Radzinowicz, the prominent legal scholar of early- modern Britain, characterized impressment as a form of social control in the eighteenth century; petty criminals and undesirables were channelled into the armed forces to cleanse towns of disruptive elements, which had the bonus of bolstering the British war

259 effort. This insight was ignored at the time, and so too was Radzinowicz's interest in impressment and the law.5 Prominent legal historians such as J.M. Beattie have skipped over impressment, while Douglas Hay and others have focused on dearth, theft, and demobilization in wartime.6 For their part, naval historians have downplayed the impressment of criminals into the fleet, but this is beginning to change. For instance,

Markus Eder and Clive Emsley have shown that it was common during the Seven Years

War and Napoleonic era.7 Meanwhile, Nicholas Rogers and Phillip Woodfine have focused on the social history of impressment, including Britons' use of the law to resist the Navy.8 Peter King has taken this to a new level: by concentrating on pre-trial enlistments as well as pardons of convicted felons, he argues that impressment had a significant impact on prosecution rates in eighteenth-century Britain. Impressment impacted patterns of crime in time of war.9

This historiographical trend has not taken root in Newfoundland and other

British-Atlantic colonies. For example, Jerry Bannister touched on impressment as a form of criminal punishment in his study of naval governance in eighteenth-century

Newfoundland, but other historians, focusing on statute law and civil government, have tended to ignore the issue.10 Unlike in Nova Scotia, where pardons enticed criminals into the armed forces on a relatively small scale, this chapter shows that pre-trial enlistments were common in Newfoundland during the Napoleonic Wars, particularly in St. John's.

From slow beginnings, the impressment of criminals and undesirables became an official policy on the island in 1805. By the War of 1812, the civil power sent dozens of men to the fleet each year and became a significant source of naval recruitment. Magistrates, sheriffs, constables, and clerks of the peace received bonuses for each recruit the Navy

260 accepted and used this extra-legal arrangement to bolster their salaries. Far from being protected in Newfoundland, residents and sailors could not count on civilian authorities to screen them from impressment. Unlike in Nova Scotia, the civil power participated in manning the Navy in Newfoundland.

This chapter also revises our understanding of press gangs and impressment procedure in the Atlantic world. Trends in Newfoundland hold true for other British colonies. Folklore depicts press gangs in colourful terms, as bands of club-swinging sailors that terrorized city streets and trampled on constitutional rights. The irony that

Britain depended on sailors to preserve its liberty against Napoleonic France, though they were deprived of it themselves, was lost on no one at the time. As the face of the 'evil necessity', press gangs have been seen as the engines of impressment. There is much truth to this in the British Isles: the Impress Service was stationed in dozens of towns by the 1790s, including Poole, Waterford, and other ports in the Newfoundland trade, and press gangs were active in these areas. Warships also dispatched press gangs into ports before they sailed. The Navy took many seafarers in this way, but far more were conscripted out of vessels and boats on the water - in harbours, along the coast, and on the high seas. This was the case in the British Isles, as noted for Poole in the previous chapter, but it was the norm in North America.

Press gangs were rarely sent ashore in British colonies. It was simply too dangerous, unless they were regulated by colonial officials, as they were in Halifax during the Napoleonic Wars. Even in Halifax, however, which was exceptional in its tolerance of impressment on shore, press gangs were far from common. In this sense, the case of St. John's, Newfoundland, is a useful corrective to the conventional wisdom on

261 press gangs and impressment procedure in the Atlantic world. In Newfoundland impressment was confined to the water, to guard boats that boarded incoming vessels.

Guard boats were the dominant mode of naval recruitment in Newfoundland during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The same was true of Halifax, Boston, and

British ports and ports-of-call throughout the Atlantic world. Put simply, impressment usually occurred on the water, not on land. But the parties who manned these boats were still press gangs; they performed the same functions as formal gangs on land, and were often called press boats or floating press gangs. In this regard, historians need to rethink the nature of press gangs specifically and impressment more generally. While gangs on shore often shared common features, for instance in terms of manpower and armament, naval parties varied considerably in size and composition based on a range of factors.

They did not always look the same, nor were they intended to; many were designed to evade detection by civilians and local authorities. Moreover, since most operated in boats rather than on land, they hardly resemble the picture that has been handed down by the traditional historiography. Press gangs wore many hats in Newfoundland, just as they did in the wider Atlantic world.11

Decline of Migratory Fishery

As Shannon Ryan has demonstrated, the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic

Wars represented a watershed in Newfoundland history. The migratory fishery collapsed and was replaced by a resident industry. The seasonal migrations that had dominated the

Newfoundland trade for two centuries turned into emigration, and the sedentary population of the island exploded. West Country and Irish merchants retreated from

262 direct participation in the fishery in favour of supplying planters with goods and provisions - and operating the passenger trade. Put simply, Newfoundland transformed from a fishery into a colony. While the migratory fishery recovered from the American war to experience record catches in the 1780s, prolonged warfare during the 1790s and early nineteenth century disrupted its organization in the West Country and Ireland to such an extent that it never recovered. Press gangs accelerated this trend, while embargoes, enemy captures, high insurance rates and other wartime hazards undercut the fishing industry. There was a small recovery in the migratory fishery from Poole and

Teignmouth after 1815, but it did not last long and the West Country withdrew from the

Newfoundland trade.12

The Navy's manpower needs in the 1790s outstripped the merchant marine's ability to supply it with sailors. The Impress Service extended into Ireland, Scotland,

Wales and the English interior in the late eighteenth century, and by 1795 it consisted of thirty-two regulating captains, eighty-five press gangs, and nearly 1000 men. There were seven press gangs in London alone, with a warship permanently anchored at the Tower of

London to collect recruits. The Impress Service was also rooted in the home ports of the

Newfoundland trade. Press gangs were stationed in Poole, Exeter, Dartmouth and other

West Country ports, while there were numerous gangs around Waterford and Cork in southeast Ireland, as well as Dublin, Belfast, and Londonderry.13 These were centres of trade and migration to Newfoundland. Naval convoys took advantage of the Irish and

West Country labour markets before crossing the Atlantic. For example, HMS Concorde received a dozen men from a Cork rendezvous in 1800 before proceeding to the Grand

Banks with Irish and West Country vessels.14 Similarly, HMS Camilla stopped at Jersey

263 in the in 1803, where she entered twenty-seven men, while HMS

Mercury even hauled to off the Lizard in 1798 and pressed three Cornish fishermen straight out of their boats.15 The Newfoundland fleet was also an easy target for press gangs and naval cutters on its voyage home to the British Isles each fall. Press gangs disrupted the shipping of the Poole firm of Saunders and Sweetman in the 1790s. In 1794 its crews and passengers attempted to avoid the Impress Service by forcing masters to land them at small coves to the west of Waterford.16 Oftentimes it was naval escorts who pressed men. HMS Brilliant entered twenty-five from its Newfoundland convoy before making a British landfall in 1799.17

Press gangs and warships ravaged the Newfoundland trade in the 1790s. The threat of impressment drove seafarers inland, beyond the reach of the Impress Service.

Benjamin Lester reported in December 1792 that a Captain Woodland's crew was so

"afraid of the Impress" at Poole that it would not report for duty.18 Fear of impressment was a constant source of labour shortages and sailing delays, and it made it extremely difficult for merchants to man their vessels. For example, the Lester brig Hope arrived in

Poole in May 1793 and was being loaded for a convoy when "all our hands" were taken by the Impress Service.19 The master set off to recruit more but met with little success, and the Hope could not sail until another crew was in place. Similarly, in 1796 the

Maria sailed for Youghal and had a man pressed before making it out of Poole harbour, while the following year three men were pressed from two vessels at Poole readying for the Newfoundland convoy.21 In 1799 the Lester brothers received a letter from a Captain

Gaylor in the Newfoundland fishery; he was seeking details on an upcoming convoy and reported that his crew had already been pressed.22 The Navy stationed cutters off Poole

264 harbour to press men from incoming vessels. When a Captain Salter arrived in Poole in the Cabot in 1793 his crew was pressed in the offing, while in 1794 the Impress Service boarded the Apollo from Burin and pressed thirty fishermen.23 There are numerous examples of West Country crews being pressed into the Navy in the 1790s.24 The Navy's manning drive was so intense in 1798 that 'sailors' were pressed from oyster boats in southern Dorset.25 Margaret Chang has observed that impressment and other government intrusions, such as growing restrictions on the number and quality of sailors that could be taken on merchant vessels, sent the British migratory fishery into a steep decline. Labour problems forced merchants to abandon direct participation in the fishery in favour of the supply trade. Newman and Company, which had been active in the Newfoundland fishery since the sixteenth century, was one of the few firms that adapted and prospered during the Napoleonic Wars.

Press gangs were detested in the North Atlantic world, but Poole had an unusually violent reputation for resisting the Navy. As J.R. Hutchinson explains, because the Poole sailor was "[bjred in the roughest of all schools, the Newfoundland cod fishery, he was an exceptionally tough nut to crack."27 A popular verse held that,

If Poole were a fish Pool And the men of Poole fish There'd be a pack for the Devil And fish for his dish.28

There were many cases of violence involving Poole-Newfoundland vessels, but the bloodiest altercation took place in November 1794, when the Maria arrived from Trinity and was boarded by a press gang, which it resisted. Three of the Maria's sailors were killed. According to Benjamin Lester, as the press gang negotiated the Maria into port a

"Mob assembled in Such Numbers that had not the attention of the Magistrates and the

265 Soldiers been well expected, we should have a Riot and the Mob would have Killed

Phillips and Glover, the two Lieutenants that gave orders to fire."29 The press gang was lucky in this case, as there were no murder charges and the naval officers escaped from

Poole unharmed. The Maria incident rankled Poole for some time. The town considered it a miscarriage of justice and never forgave the Navy.30 Nicholas Rogers observes that towns like Poole had tightly-integrated seafaring communities, which became virtual havens "where only the most intrepid gangsman would enter."31 Poole put up a stout resistance, but the Lester diaries show clearly that impressment devastated the

Newfoundland trade in the 1790s. According to Lester, when peace preliminaries were signed in 1801 and the Impress Service discharged its gangs, there were "great Rejoicings about Town, all the men except the Quakers, Illuminated, Guns firing and etc. and

Soldiers Exercising on the Quay,"32

Not even impressment quenched the Navy's thirst for men in the 1790s. One solution came in the form of the Quota Acts passed by Parliament in 1795. The first demanded counties to provide a certain number of able-bodied men for the British fleet, to be raised by magistrates in the parishes. Each district was expected to recruit among the poor and agrarian work force, and to raise bounties for volunteers. Devon had always been well-represented in the service, and it was called upon again in 1795 (see Appendix

10). The second act applied to the ports of England. Able seamen were the equal of two landsmen, and to ensure that quotas were reached an embargo was placed on British shipping. These acts caused resentment in the service, especially for skilled seamen who volunteered at the beginning of the war. They now saw thousands of landsmen and petty criminals receive bonuses as high as seventy pounds, which was more than ten times their

266 original bounties. Known as Billy Pitt's Men, after the prime minister who sponsored the legislation, Quota men were blamed for discipline problems and declining skill levels in

Nelson's Navy.33

The great port cities and nurseries for seamen were called upon heavily in the

Quota Acts. As the capital of the British-Atlantic world, and the home of vast fleets from the and the West Indies, London headed the list by a large margin.

Hull, Bristol, Yarmouth and other ports were also targeted. The slave trade was represented by Liverpool, while Newcastle supplied men from the coal industry. The quotas issued to Dartmouth and Poole were also significant, especially considering the size of those towns. And while it may be true, as N.A.M. Rodger has suggested, that

Devon's contribution to the Navy tailed off as its shipping and overseas trades declined during the Napoleonic Wars, these figures do not capture the large number of West

Countrymen pressed from the Newfoundland fleet in the opening years of the French

Revolutionary War.34 As discussed below, several thousand men were also taken in

Newfoundland, many of them from Devon. Impressment was an occupational hazard on both sides of the Atlantic. In March 1795, the Committee of Trade at Dartmouth reported to James Wallace, the governor of Newfoundland, that it was not in their power to provide the number of men required by the Quota Acts. The merchants claimed that upwards of 900 from Dartmouth had already been taken into the Navy. Though "our

Wishes and Exertions are to the object," the number specified in the Quota Acts was

"utterly impossible" to meet and Dartmouth hoped that "his Majesty in Council will be pleased to grant us relief."35

267 Teignmouth's fishery was confined to bankers by the 1790s, making it unique among West Country ports in the Newfoundland trade. In December 1805 some twenty merchant houses in Teignmouth petitioned Erasmus Gower, governor of Newfoundland, about their problems with impressment; they confessed that he was their best hope for concessions from the Admiralty and British government, as Teignmouth apparently did not have an MP to represent their interests. Teignmouth was not a parliamentary borough, but it is unclear why its traders could not be heard by other MPs, such as John Pollexfen

Bastard, the long-time representative of Devon.36 They told Gower that since the Impress

Service had stationed a press gang in Teignmouth, it was difficult to get sailors and fishermen to come in from the country. They were scared of impressment. The merchants also complained that they could not ship men, or advance money to their families, unless they received special exemptions from impressment for one mate, three fishermen, and one splitter per vessel. If these protections were granted the merchants could make up the rest of their crews with green men, but if not "the Fishery must perish; and that great nursery for seamen perish with it."37

Gower urged the Admiralty to grant the protections and encourage that "valuable

TO nursery of seamen." He explained that bankers required skilled fishermen, "who require several years experience to qualify them for the employment, and are as important to this fishery as the Harpooner Line Managers and Boat Steerers are to the Greenland and

Southern Whale Fisheries."39 However, these skilled men, many of whom were farming near Teignmouth, would not commit to a vessel unless protected from impressment on the return voyage. In the meantime landsmen would gain experience at sea, and because they were not protected, could on "their return to England in the fall of the year, be taken

268 into His Majesty's Service." Gower backed his arguments with numbers: in 1804 the banker fishery consisted of about twenty vessels, whereas in the 1790s it supported 100 sail, which "I understand is occasioned chiefly by the difficulty of obtaining Fishermen on account of the impress."41 The Admiralty granted most of Teignmouth's requests: protections for one mate, two fishermen and one splitter per vessel, as long as a "minute description of the man's person" was written on each certificate.42 They were good until the end of the year. Teignmouth's merchants complained about impressment again in

1810. Fishermen were so afraid of the Impress Service that they would not show their faces until the fleet was ready to sail.43 Impressment not only accelerated the decline of

Teignmouth's trade, but the migratory fishery generally during the Napoleonic Wars. The

Navy now looked to Newfoundland as its nursery for seamen.

The Boston Tragedy of 1794

With the fishing season winding down on 18 October 1794, Governor James

Wallace ordered the Newfoundland squadron to prepare for convoy duty to Europe the following week. HMS Boston was short fourteen men, and rather than take to sea with a diminished crew, Captain J.N. Morris asked for permission to advertise for volunteers in

St. John's. Warships did not require full crews for coastal duties in Newfoundland, but this was not an ordinary voyage - Britain had recently declared war on Revolutionary

France, and the Boston was headed for hostile waters in southern Europe. It was imperative that it be prepared for battle when it took to the high seas. Wallace was surprised by Morris's request, since he was permitted to obtain "seamen in any way in

[his] power," which meant impressment. 4 Encouraged to seek a second opinion from

269 Captain Herbert Sawyer of HMS Amphion, with whom Morris had cruised the Grand

Banks the past few months, he learned that men had been pressed in St. John's in the last few weeks. Morris decided to post the handbills anyway, but no volunteers came forward by 24 October and the Boston was scheduled to sail the following day. Persuaded by

Wallace arid Sawyer that landing a press gang would provide "no apprehension of giving an Alarm, that might frustrate an intended general Press," he ordered the Boston's first and second lieutenants, Robert Kerr and Richard Lawry, to row ashore that evening to conscript any seamen or fishermen "they might find Idling about."45

Later that night the press gang crept back to the Boston with the men it had conscripted in town. Morris deemed the mission a success, as it was "performed without

Interruption or Riot." 6 The fact that both Kerr and Lawry accompanied the press gang may indicate that it was abnormally large, perhaps in the order of twenty men, or twice the size of a regular gang; but as discussed below, impressment occurred in many forms, and there was no such thing as 'the' press gang. We cannot be certain of the catch on this evening, but evidence suggests that was in the range often to twenty men, with a number having been employed in the fishery the previous summer. It is possible that some of them were seized in a tavern, the most common and fruitful recruiting ground for press gangs in Britain. The pressed men were detained aboard the Boston for the night. Morris inspected them the following morning and set free those "whose Masters appeared to claim them"; the eight men remaining volunteered for the Navy and were scheduled to have their names signed into the Boston's muster book. They were also awarded "the bounty."47 This was a reward for volunteers, but it was also common to give pressed men a gratuity for good behaviour, to minimize their resentment at being forced into the

270 wooden world. At least five of the eight recruits were rated landsmen aboard the Boston, which suggests that Morris entered more green hands than able seamen, who were always preferred by the Navy.48

That afternoon Kerr, the commanding officer, sent Lawry into town with two of the new recruits. The ratings needed to pick up clothing and sea chests, as well as to collect wages for their work in the fishery. Armed only with a dirk, Lawry landed the cutter at the upper end of St. John's harbour. Consisting of four seamen, in addition to

Lawry, the naval party accompanied the ratings to the store of merchant John Noble.

Since neither Noble nor his business agent was in the office, Lawry escorted the men to their lodgings. The group then came face to face with an angry crowd. Armed with sticks and clubs, it reportedly behaved in a "Riotous and tumultuous manner."49 It liberated the pressed men and battered Lawry in "so unmercifull a manner that he died the next morning of the wounds he had received in this fray."50 One segment of the crowd stalked the naval party from behind, while another segment met it head on, cutting off all possible exits. Having attacked Lawry with "savage ferocity," it turned its attention to the other members of the Boston's boat crew.51 This was a premeditated attack and, according to Aaron Thomas, an able seaman from the Boston who kept a diary of his experiences in Newfoundland, two mariners were "beat in a terrible manner, and their lives for some time despaired of. One other got off with a few strokes, and his Messmate got off, perhaps with his life, by running for, and gaining the boat."52 The latter was the only member of the naval party to escape. He alerted the squadron's guard, which carried the injured men back to the Boston, while Governor Wallace sent marines to "Quell a

Riot" in St. John's.53 No contemporary estimate of the size of this crowd has survived,

271 but the terms "riot" and "mob" indicate a large number of participants, as does the ease with which it overpowered five naval seamen in two coordinated attacks.54

Word of the attack spread quickly in St. John's. According to Thomas, it created a

"great noise" in both the naval and mercantile establishments.55 Lawry passed away a few hours after the attack. Wallace was aboard the flagship, HMS Monarch, preparing for convoy duty when he heard the news. Enraged, he informed Chief Justice D'Ewes Coke that he was coming ashore the following morning to investigate and that he expected his

"attendance with the Constables and the whole force of the Civil Power."56 In the meantime, Wallace targeted the murderers. That evening naval parties marched into town, but they met with little success. The streets were eerily quiet, and the crowd that only a short time before had battered Lawry with "savage ferocity" was nowhere to be found. The next morning Wallace and Coke coordinated naval and civilian search parties to canvass the town. With magistrates and constables at their side, marines detained about

100 men, who were imprisoned for the night aboard the men-of-war; the Boston's muster book identifies thirty-three of them, listed as supernumeraries who were "Prest to find out the murderers of Lt. Lawry."57 Some were sent directly to the St. John's jail. The next morning Wallace questioned the detainees aboard the Monarch. Growing increasingly frustrated, he lashed out at the suspects, demanding to know who "gave the deadly blows" and threatening to "hang them instantly at the Yard Arm if they did not disclose

CO and inform who the Murderers were." Afraid that "his own Neck was in danger," one man turned king's evidence and identified three of the ringleaders.59

A grand jury was empanelled and magistrates arrested two of the three suspects,

Garrett Farrell and Richard Power. The third suspect, William Burrows, evaded the

272 authorities. Wallace also received Morris's narrative of events, compiled from the eyewitness statements of Lawry's party. Farrell and Power were charged with murder and were quickly tried and convicted in the Supreme Court. Coke condemned them to death and Wallace ordered the sheriff of St. John's to execute them a couple of days later, which he did near Fort Townshend. Hangings were public events, and this case, coming shortly after the murder of a naval officer, was intended to reinforce the authority of the naval regime. Marines acted as a guard in the procession. Following the executions,

Farrell and Power were cut down from the gallows and delivered to the surgeons for dissection and anatomization. Lawry's funeral was also a spectacle. The coffin was rowed ashore in an elaborate ceremony, involving boats from every warship on the

Newfoundland station. All of its officers attended, as did the gentlemen of the town, and members of the St. John's Volunteer Rangers and the Army. After the trial, executions and funeral, few people in St. John's would have downplayed the seriousness of the crime or doubted the government's resolve to prevent sedition. When Wallace described

Lawry's murder to the Admiralty, he concluded with a hint of strategic optimism: although the episode was violent and tragic, it "may probably in its consequences have a good effect."60 The theatre of state authority that he had orchestrated might subdue the town and prevent impressment disturbances in the future.61

Aaron Thomas felt there were irregularities in the trial and Wallace was lucky that it took place in Newfoundland. The verdict might have been overturned in a British court, because the jury illegally struck Wallace's conduct from the court's evidence, especially his threat to hang suspects from the Monarch's yardarm. Wallace disagreed with this assessment. Writing to both the Admiralty and War Office, back in Portsmouth, he did

273 not even hint at irregular conduct. On the contrary, he stated that the accused had received a "fair and Candid Trial," a civilian jury of their peers found them guilty on clear evidence, and they suffered the appropriate punishment for capital offenders.63 Even more, Wallace informed the Admiralty that Lawry's murder was a particularly heinous crime, since it was both premeditated and unnecessary. Lawry escorted the fishermen ashore to collect their wages, and the naval party did not provoke any onlookers. Indeed, if the crowd's objective was to rescue the pressed men, then "they gained their Object before they began the assault."64 While Lawry's party was not a press gang, it was likely seen as one by many residents, since he led the recruitment drive the night before and was marching through town with two of the pressed men. This was the most dangerous time for naval officers on the Impress Service. Townsmen knew that the Navy collected recruits' belongings before warships sailed from the island, and that this was likely to occur the day after their initial impressments. The crowd that attacked Lawry was probably aware of this and pounced on the naval party when it was most vulnerable. A similar case occurred in 1798: two days after HMS Mercury pressed four men from the

Elizabeth in St. John's harbour, the recruits were "rescued by the Inhabitants when sent for their Cloaths."65

In the middle of the trial the grand jury sent an urgent letter to the chief justice, concerned that Wallace was putting the squadron to sea. It was imperative that he remain in Newfoundland until the trial was over. In "consequence of the Riot," the grand jury pleaded, "great disquiet and alarm have been experienced by the Inhabitants, so as to prevent the regular Business of the Place [from] being carried on."66 Moreover, Farrell and Power were likely to be convicted of murder, and they could not "suffer for the

274 atrocious deed" until Wallace returned the following summer, since governors were required to be present for executions in Newfoundland.67 The grand jury concluded that the "disagreeable ferment" in the town would not subside until the trial and executions were concluded, so "we therefore beg leave to request you would make known to his

Excellency, how much in our opinion his stay here a few days longer may be instrumental to the reestablishment of good order."68 Wallace agreed to say, and turned his attention to the third suspect, Burrows. He offered a reward of fifty pounds for information that led to his arrest. This did not work, so Wallace tried again, this time promising a pardon. Eyewitnesses not involved in the homicide would be forgiven if they identified the guilty parties. The offer was good for three months, but again no one stepped forward. In the end, Burrows was never brought to justice and there is no evidence that anyone else was charged with the murder of Lieutenant Lawry.69 Lauren

Benton has used similar "stories" to examine law and culture in the early-modern

Atlantic world. These case studies not only unravel local politics and customs, but

Benton has shown that they were also agents of change - turning points in a particular colony or legal regime. The murder of Lieutenant Lawry was such an agent of change.

Much of this chapter shows how it transformed the nature of impressment in

Newfoundland during the Napoleonic Wars.70

The Parameters of Impressment

Before Lawry's murder, Morris behaved as if he was uncertain whether he could press in Newfoundland, even though he had commanded warships there on two separate occasions, including HMS Pluto in 1793. He entered dozens of men in St. John's in 1793

275 and 1794 - many of whom were pressed - and the Newfoundland squadron as a whole recruited more than 500 in those same years, including 200 pressed men (see Appendix

12). This makes it highly unlikely that Morris was ignorant of press gangs, let alone that the Boston had not already conscripted sailors in the weeks leading up to the homicide.

Despite this confusion, Morris's behaviour suggests that impressment was not firmly rooted in Newfoundland before the 1790s. This stemmed from its statutory prohibition.

While impressment occurred in the final years of the American Revolutionary War, a decade of peace may have created a disconnect in manning policy. Nevertheless, impressment became a fixture in Newfoundland in the early 1790s. It is also possible that

Lawry's murder involved an early instance of press ganging on shore, and that this was the reason for the attack. This was not mentioned during the criminal investigation, and as Sawyer told Morris at the time, other press gangs had preceded him into the capital in the previous few weeks.71

In September 1794, a month before Lawry's murder, Aaron Thomas noted in his diary that Queen Anne, "in the Sixth Year of her Reign, passed an Act of high favor and indulgence to the New World, for it said that it should not be Lawfull for her Naval

Officers to press the Seamen from Private Ships in America or Newfoundland... neither should they press persons who were on shores at these places."72 He also stated that this statute had been repealed by Palliser's Act in 1775. From his travels around the Avalon

Peninsula, Thomas was in a unique position to learn both the naval and civilian perspectives on impressment. Earlier that summer, he trekked back to St. John's after a social visit to Portugal Cove. Thomas and his companion, a fisherman named Murphy, were overtaken by some locals carrying a catch of salmon. It was getting dark, and as

276 new guides were on hand, Murphy returned to Portugal Cove. But when the group learned that Thomas belonged to the Boston, it became a "serious concern to one of them, for my society impress'd upon his weak intellect the certainty of being impress'd into the

King's Service [and he] absolutely avail'd himself of running into the woods with the

Salmon on his back, supposing I had sent Murphy forwards for the purpose of bringing a

Gang of the Boston's people to force them on board the Frigate."73 Even in hamlets like

Portugal Cove, residents were aware that press gangs were legal and active in

Newfoundland. While the Navy ignored the Sixth of Anne and continued to press seamen in the mainland American colonies in the eighteenth century, Thomas's testimony,

Palliser's Act and the dearth of impressment before 1775, suggest that it respected this prohibition in Newfoundland.74

It is difficult to quantify the number of men pressed in Newfoundland. Muster books rarely distinguished between voluntary and coerced recruitment - most specify where a man was entered but not how he was entered. This was not always the case, however, and the survival of some forty musters that do separate these categories provides an estimate of impressment during the Napoleonic Wars. Appendix 11 illustrates the twenty musters with the largest number of recruits, and therefore the smallest margin for error. A conservative estimate is that forty percent of recruits in

Newfoundland were pressed. A more realistic estimate, taking into consideration the ambiguity of the term 'volunteer,' as well as the silences of coercion, is that approximately fifty percent were forced into the service. Sailors commonly resisted press gangs only to cry 'volunteer' when there was no chance to escape. Many did this to receive a bounty. The Admiralty turned a blind eye to the practice, hoping to avoid

277 protests and to obtain more skilled mariners. While some warships entered abnormally high percentages of volunteers, perhaps because of captains' reputations and geographic followings, there were also those that pressed abnormally high percentages of recruits.

For instance, HMS Concorde pressed twelve of its thirteen recruits in 1801, and HMS

Prometheus conscripted all twenty in 1814, for percentages of ninety-two and 100 respectively. Historians still know little about the manning of the Navy during these wars. Christopher Lloyd, Daniel Baugh and other naval historians have suggested that the impressment figure hovered around fifty percent for most of this period, increasing to seventy-five percent during the War of 1812.76

It is impossible to compare Newfoundland quantitatively to the mainland British colonies, since comparable data do not yet exist. Press gangs instigated more popular protests in Massachusetts, New York and Nova Scotia than they did in Newfoundland, but this speaks to domestic politics and imperial tensions rather than impressment frequency. Thousands of fishing servants and sailors traveled to Newfoundland each summer, and it was the density of this migration that made the fishery a training ground for the Navy. Anonymity was also valuable, for most of the men pressed in

Newfoundland were transients, who lacked the family networks and friends that would have come to their rescue in Britain and Nova Scotia. Most press gang riots occurred when local residents had been conscripted. As discussed below, when a resident population began to take hold in St. John's during the War of 1812, recruits and deserters received more assistance from people on shore, many of whom were relatives and friends. The seasonal nature of Newfoundland's labour force thus mitigated the threat of naval-civilian discord. A sample of 172 warships from 1793 to 1815, representing about

278 seventy-five percent of the Navy's presence, provides a clear picture of recruitment in

Newfoundland. As conflict with Revolutionary France gave way to the Napoleonic Wars,

Britain expanded the size of the Navy, and this increased the demand for men to fill the lower decks. As discussed in Chapter 4, starting with the American Revolution the

Admiralty looked increasingly across the Atlantic in its search for sailors. Volunteers were available in Newfoundland in considerable numbers, particularly in St. John's at the end of the fishing season, but there were never enough and press gangs stepped in to fill the void. Manning was most intense at the outset of the conflict in the 1790s, tailing off steadily until only a few dozen men were taken during the Peace of Amiens. Recruitment took off again when the Napoleonic wars commenced in 1803, and there was a steady intake of men through the War of 1812. Sailors were now pressed into an expanding

Newfoundland squadron, even though many warships stopped at the island only for a few weeks on convoy duty. Taking a conservative estimate that forty percent of seafarers were forcibly entered into the Navy, some 1500 men were pressed in Newfoundland

(Appendix 12).

Impressment was regulated in Newfoundland in a number of ways. The Navy was guided by a protection system wherever it sailed. During the Napoleonic Wars, an assortment of statutes protected masters and mates from the press, in merchant vessels of fifty tons burden. Apprentices were exempt in their first three years at sea and landsmen during their first two years. Generally, seamen under eighteen and over fifty-five were off-limits, as were foreigners, and seafarers in specialized industries such as the

Greenland whale fishery. On the other hand, while the Newfoundland trade often received favourable treatment, it was never protected from impressment for significant

279 periods of time - it was simply regarded as too valuable a source of manpower. The Navy also faced restrictions from the Admiralty and Navy Board, which protected privateers, transports, cartels, dockyard workers, and a range of ships and sailors in government service.77 None of these protections mattered unless a seaman was carrying his papers when confronted by a press gang. For instance, when Joseph Cain, a Dorset apprentice, was shipped to Newfoundland in 1805, not only was he armed with an apprenticeship indenture but also a protection certificate (see Appendix 13).78 Seafarers and fishing servants normally received their paperwork in British ports, but after the establishment of the Royal Gazette in St. John's in 1807, some certificates and indentures could be

70 obtained locally.

The Navy followed local laws and regulations as well. The most important were the St. John's port orders. There were also regulations that allowed impressment to be used to punish harbourers of deserters and to channel vagrants and minor criminals into the Navy. All of these are discussed below. The Navy respected customs too, especially the seasonal rhythms of the fishing economy. Deep-sea mariners were fair game all year long, and dozens were pressed from incoming vessels, particularly in St. John's harbour.

Fishermen, on the other hand, as well as drying crews and sack shipmen, were protected from the Navy until the fall, to safeguard labour demands and mercantile commitments during the season. In 1800 the Admiralty received a memorial from St. John's merchants complaining that captains were pressing men during the fishing season, and that business was suffering. The Admiralty forwarded it to Governor Charles Morice Pole, who on ordered the officers of the Newfoundland squadron to leave fishermen alone. Similarly, in September 1798 the Mercury pressed a man named James Kenny but was forced to

280 discharge him a few weeks later because "his ship [was] employed as a Banker."81 HMS

Rattler entered three supernumeraries in St. John's in July 1805, but they were released when "Claimed by the Fishery."82 The Navy respected the seasonal nature of impressment in Newfoundland.

Fishing contracts expired in the fall, which provided an ideal opportunity for the

Navy to round up mariners without annoying merchants and employers. Boatloads of men from all over the island flocked to St. John's in the fall, looking for winter employment or passages to the British Isles. Doubling the population for a few weeks, they were easy pickings for the press gangs - and for the Army. In 1805, Governor

Erasmus Gower allowed Major General Thomas Skinner to recruit on 10 October, even though the fishing season was not over. But he also followed his predecessor, James

Gambier, in protecting trading vessels from the press, and prohibiting the conscription of mariners and fishermen without the consent of their employers. The merchant Benjamin

Lester informed Gower that contracts were settled on 20 October in Trinity and

Bonavista Bays, and that recruitment for the armed forces began only five days later.

Therefore, the Navy had a small window in which to press fishermen in Newfoundland, perhaps only a few weeks between the termination of shipping papers in October and the embarkation of convoys in November. The seasonal nature of the fishery ensured that the bulk of recruitment occurred in the fall. As Jerry Bannister has shown with respect to naval governance and the law, custom played a prominent role in Newfoundland society in the long eighteenth century.

Skerrett was unhappy with Gower's restrictions, which favoured employers and the Navy over the garrison. At the same time, Army recruitment parties were common on

281 the island during the Napoleonic Wars, and they reached into outlying districts to make soldiers out of fishermen. Parties from other maritime colonies also ventured to

Newfoundland, just as they had during the American war, but their interests took a back seat to local imperatives. For instance, on several occasions parties from the Nova Scotia

Regiment released new recruits in Newfoundland because they were "claimed by the

Navy."85 The squadron faced stiff competition for manpower, particularly as the migratory fishery declined in the 1790s. More competition came from the St. John's

Volunteer Rangers, which was formed by Gower and Skerrett in 1806 to supplement the small garrison. This voluntary corps consisted of several hundred men. It survived haphazardly through the War of 1812, and according to its constitution, members "could not be pressed into Service in the Royal Navy." Scores of men probably signed up to shield themselves from impressment. Sean Cadigan has noted that it is a "telling comment on the harsh conditions of employment in the Newfoundland fishery" that men actually volunteered for the Navy and Army, rather than being forced into the service by press gangs. Like the American conflict, poverty helped the war effort in unexpected ways in the early nineteenth century.88

The final check on impressment was naval procedure. Captains inspected new recruits and released those who had been advanced credit in the cod and seal fisheries, and, as discussed in the Lawry case, those with existing contracts. In the end, the primary difference between impressment in Newfoundland and Nova Scotia was government procedure and chain of command. Newfoundland did not possess a civilian governor, executive council, or house of assembly; in Nova Scotia, by contrast, which had all of these institutions after 1758, the admiral submitted a formal request to the governor

282 before sending press gangs on shore. As noted in Chapter 3, the governor consulted with the council and some requests were denied. A similar chain of command did not exist in

Newfoundland, where the admiral was also the governor. He personally called the shots on impressment procedure. Seen in this light, it is no surprise that Wallace was so confident about the legality of press gangs in 1794. While Newfoundland did not possess the colonial infrastructure to stand up to the Navy and regulate press gangs on shore, this did not matter: ironically, because of the Boston tragedy, it experienced far less impressment on shore than Nova Scotia. That does not mean that there was less impressment; on the contrary, Newfoundland was widely regarded as a training ground for the British fleet, while Nova Scotia increasingly became a drain on the Navy's manpower. Warships on the North American station were actually sent to Newfoundland to recruit men. Although captains in Newfoundland did not receive warrants to press men on land, they were armed with Admiralty warrants that sanctioned impressment on the high seas and in Newfoundland waters. This became the dominant source of sailors for the Newfoundland squadron.89

The St. John's Guard Boats

The overwhelming majority of men pressed in Newfoundland were taken by guard boats in St. John's harbour. After Lawry was murdered in 1794 there is little evidence that press gangs set foot on shore again. Fearing more violence, impressment was confined to guard boats that boarded incoming merchantmen. As the Napoleonic

Wars progressed, especially during the manning crisis of the War of 1812, recruits were entered in large numbers by the St. John's guard boats. These floating press gangs, or

283 press boats, were guided by a series of port orders. While the only extant copy (see

Appendix 14) dates from the administration of John Holloway, governor of

Newfoundland from 1807 to 1809, they originated as customary guidelines during the

American war, long before they became formal naval procedure. Like other customs in

Newfoundland, the port orders were passed down from one governor to the next during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.90

According to the port orders, the flagship signalled to warships arriving in St.

John's to send over a lieutenant. He was given a copy of the orders, to which he signed his name and the name of his vessel. The Navy rowed a daily guard in St. John's harbour.

Warships took turns launching a guard boat, which patrolled the harbour day and night.

Boats were dispatched first by the junior commander and extended to the senior captains on station. For example, on 30 October 1794, HMS Bonetta "Answered the Signal to take the guard," and was relieved the next day by a guard boat from HMS Amphion.91 There was an "Officer of the Guard" for each shift, who reported aboard the flagship early the next morning. Guard boats boarded all arrivals and departures, except for Newfoundland- based fishing craft. They inspected vessels' articles and were constantly looking for deserters and suspicious passengers. Passengers not stipulated in the articles required a pass from the governor before clearing St. John's, unless they were a "Merchant Trader, or other Person carrying on business on the Island."92 Without a pass they were interrogated by the commander-in-chief. Vessels attempting to depart without hoisting the distinguishing signal given by the customs house could be fired upon by the forts, and would not be allowed to pass.93

284 The "Officer of the Guard," sometimes a lieutenant but more often a midshipman, lost no time in reporting intelligence to the governor at his summer residence in Fort

Townshend, "by Night or Day."94 According to Edward Chappell, a lieutenant serving in

HMS Rosamond in 1813, governors of Newfoundland took this aspect of the port orders seriously:

The naval Guard Officer was directed to obtain the most minute information from every vessel arriving at St. John's; and to communicate the result of his inquiries, in person, to the Governor. In cases of reports concerning British convoys being on their way towards Newfoundland, or that the enemy's privateers had been observed hovering near the coasts, it was positively ordered, that the Guard Officer should immediately make the same known to the Admiral, without regard to any hour or time in which such intelligence might be obtained. In the execution of his duty, the author once had occasion to wait on Sir Richard Keats with intelligence of this description. The Admiral had retired to bed; but in five minutes he entered the audience-chamber, wrapped in a flannel dressing-gown. With the most patient scrutiny, he made himself acquainted with every minute particular; and in less than half an hour afterwards, a frigate sailed out of the harbour, in pursuit of the supposed American corsair.95

Guard boats had miscellaneous duties as well. Among other things, they prevented merchantmen from riding at the king's buoys, to keep the narrow entrance of St. John's harbour clear for other shipping. On several occasions they rescued the crews and cargoes of vessels that had foundered in those Narrows. In addition to policing the harbour, the

Navy also had a social presence in the community, which included its roles as a fire department and surrogate court system.96

Guard boats also carried one or two extra sailors. These men replaced deserters and other detainees, and generally assisted vessels that needed assistance. They also served in lieu of seafarers that had been pressed from incoming merchantmen. Guard boats were floating press gangs. Manpower quotas were fixed in the port orders: no more than one man in five could be pressed from a single vessel, and each merchantman was

285 subject to impressment just once per voyage. Captains were supposed to record the names and vessels of new recruits, and present them to the admiral each morning in the "Report of the Guard." Pressed men were interrogated aboard the flagship before they could be entered into a warship's books and officially join the Navy. The squadron occasionally used hulks and prison ships in St. John's, such as HMS Triton, as holding pens for these recruits.97 Over time guard boats and floating press gangs became the same thing. HMS

Fox regularly sent its cutter on the "Impress Service" in 1793; in doing so it killed two birds with one stone, as the cutter pressed sailors while performing regular duties.98

Sailors must have been nervous when approaching St. John's: how could a jack tar know, even at the moment of boarding, if a guard boat was on regular duty or if it came to press him into the Navy?

The St. John's guard boats were the engine of impressment in Newfoundland. For instance, when Newman and Company and thirty-nine other merchants and ship owners asked Wallace to put a stop to a hot press in St. John's in 1795, a year after Lawry's murder, it was not concerned with stragglers on the streets but rather with conscription from incoming vessels. Impressment was ravaging trade: fishing vessels were too afraid of the press to join convoys in St. John's, coasting schooners stayed away, and the fishing economy, the merchants complained, would be severely depressed unless the governor reined in the press gangs. The "numerous Boats which come from the different harbours at this Season to sell their Fish and Oil" refused to make the trip, and the merchants feared that bankers and fishing boats would lose their final voyage of the season.99

However, the merchants did not contest the legality of impressment in Newfoundland, or the utility of guard boats; they understood that the island was a maritime dependency in

286 wartime, and knew only too well that the Navy safeguarded their business interests.

Wallace responded curtly, claiming ignorance of the impressments and requesting more details. The merchants left the issue alone.100

Vessels and boats travelled to St. John's from other parts of Newfoundland, and as soon as they came through the Narrows they were boarded by guard boats. The rumour of impressment was enough for Bonavista vessels to stay away in 1805. John Bland, a magistrate at Bonavista, informed Gower that October of the apprehension "among the common people of this Bay."101 They heard rumours that boats entering St. John's with more than four crewmembers would have the excess number pressed into the Navy. For most boats this was not a problem, Bland explained, but several of the larger craft were fitted with topsails and heavy anchors, which required more than four sailors to operate safely, especially "at this advanced season."102 Since there was no other way to transport the fish to St. John's, trade would be disrupted. Gower responded quickly, assuring Bland that there was no such impressment policy, and that boats from Bonavista Bay would be left alone.103 Similar complaints were voiced by the St. John's firm of Parker and Knight in the same year. The seaman William Matthews was pressed out of its schooner in the harbour, with the cargo fully loaded and the vessel ready for sea. The other crewmembers were so alarmed that they refused to rejoin the vessel. To entice the men onboard, Gower told the merchants that none of them "shall be pressed out of her."104 He also promised to investigate Matthews's case personally. Despite Gower's overtures, a significant amount of impressment occurred in St. John's at this time, courtesy of the guard boats.

Guard boats pressed hundreds of men during the Napoleonic Wars, and the squadron's dependence on them increased over time. They pressed from vessels based in

287 Newfoundland, as well as coasters from neighbouring colonies and larger Atlantic merchantmen. For example, when the English sack ship Devonshire entered St. John's harbour in 1810, it was boarded by a press boat from the naval schooner Mackerel, which took one of its sailors.105 In the same year Governor John Thomas Duckworth received a petition from Michael Swim, a Nova Scotia farmer who had traveled to St. John's to get is son released from the Navy. The young man had been working aboard the Concord, a schooner on a summer voyage to Newfoundland, when he was pressed by HMS Jamaica in St. John's harbour.106 Seafarers in Nova Scotia often refused to go on voyages to

Newfoundland during the Napoleonic Wars because they were afraid of impressment.

Since most of these vessels would have traveled to St. John's, it is likely that their crews knew about the guard boats. In a general survey of Newfoundland's trade and fishery in 1806, Gower stated that schooners arriving from the Maritimes brought much-needed provisions and lumber to the island, and were their crews subject to impressment they would never make the voyage. As a result, "such colonials are never impressed."108

Gower was mistaken: sailors from other colonies were not protected in Newfoundland, especially during the War of 1812. A tragedy involving guard boats occurred on 4 August

1814. The Scottish brig Swiftsure arrived in St. John's from Port Glasgow when a party from HMS Sabine climbed over her gunwales. Thirteen of the crew jumped into the ocean to avoid impressment, including Adam Ross, the vessel's second mate, who drowned. This case captures the guard boats in action, changing into press gangs to conscript bewildered sailors.109

Muster books rarely specify recruits' former vessels, but the ones that do provide a clear picture of the volume of men pressed by the St. John's guard boats. For example,

288 HMS Mercury entered forty-nine men in St. John's in 1798, at least forty-three of whom were taken by guard boats. Most of them were pressed.110 The Navy relied heavily on guard boats as the Napoleonic Wars progressed. The small warship HMS Alert entered twenty men in St. John's in 1809, at least fifteen of whom were taken from merchant vessels: three from the Camden of St. John's, five from the Hope of Greenock, one from the Lively of Waterford, and another from the Joyce of Ross. Guard boat victims came from all over the Atlantic world, but especially British seaports. These examples also illustrate the types of vessels that were boarded: the Camden was a schooner, the Hope a ship, the Lively a brigantine, and the Joyce a brig.111 By the War of 1812, the

Newfoundland squadron was manned almost exclusively by guard boats. When HMS

Prometheus entered eighteen men in St. John's in 1814, at least fourteen of them were taken from merchant vessels; meanwhile, of the fourteen sailors entered by HMS Galatea in the same year, eleven were snapped up by the guard boats. These were very high percentages. Impressment in Newfoundland, as well as impressment in the West Country,

Nova Scotia, the Caribbean and colonial Massachusetts, occurred overwhelming on the water, not on land. These press gangs stalked their prey with boats and oars, and do not resemble the picture that has been handed down by the traditional historiography. The St.

John's guard boats can be used to reassess the nature of press gangs and impressment procedure in the Atlantic world.112

Resistance on the Water: HMS Camilla in 1806

On 29 November 1806, a boat's crew from HMS Camilla boarded the merchantman Euphemia outside of St. John's harbour. Manned with at least seven

289 sailors, including two midshipmen, this was a guard boat sent by Captain John Bowen to

press from incoming vessels. But something went drastically wrong. James Boucher,

master of the Euphemia, prevented a midshipman from taking one of his sailors and

rallied his crew to resistance. The young officer was knocked on the head, while his naval

colleagues were chased into their boat. The latter raced back to the Camilla to inform

Bowen of what had transpired, who immediately sent more boats to intercept the

Euphemia and press its entire crew. He also brought charges in the Supreme Court, which

resulted in fines for two ship captains. While press gang disturbances were rare in St.

John's, guard boats were commonplace: they were the Navy's dominant mode of

recruitment during the Napoleonic Wars.113

HMS Camilla was classed as a sixth-rate, a frigate with twenty guns and

approximately 160 men. These small frigates were the workhorses of the Navy, as well as

the warships most commonly found in Newfoundland. In July 1806, the Camilla became

the first post ship of John Bowen, the youngest member of a prominent naval family from

Devon.114 That August the Camilla set sail from England with a fleet of merchantmen

bound to Newfoundland, and then turned around and escorted another convoy to

Portugal. Bowen steered the Camilla back to England, where he found yet another West

Country fleet headed for Newfoundland. He arrived in St. John's on 20 October. The

Camilla stayed in the fishing capital for two months before convoying more

merchantmen to Portugal, in company with the naval sloop Heron and naval brig

Childers. Bowen finally returned to Portsmouth in February 1807 after a hectic year on

the Newfoundland station.n5

290 Before departing St. John's, Bowen handed in the Camilla's weekly accounts and made a final report to Governor Gower. He had completed the Camilla's complement of men and even turned over a valuable sailor to the naval schooner Adonis. On 24

November, Bowen had commenced a recruitment drive, attracting fourteen volunteers over the next couple of weeks. These men were originally listed as supernumeraries, but they all made it into the ship's books before leaving St. John's. The Camilla also received a seaman named Patrick Molly, courtesy of the St. John's magistracy. At the same time, the Camilla took turns rowing a guard boat in the harbour, which pressed many men.

However, as stipulated in the port orders, recruits were inspected aboard the flagship before entry into the Navy, and in this way Bowen discharged the majority of the pressed men. The Navy was primarily interested in skilled sailors, and it closely inspected those brought in by the press gangs. For instance, six of the Camilla's pressed men were released because they were apprentices, four because they were "ruptured," one because he was "unserviceable," and another because he was the master of a vessel.116 Others were discharged for unspecified reasons, and there were a couple of deserters from the

117 local garrison.

Bowen also reported a violent altercation involving the Camilla, before Gower heard about it from other sources. On the evening of 29 November, he had dispatched a guard boat through the Narrows to press men from the Euphemia. The naval party boarded it two miles south of St. John's, north of Cape Spear. The Euphemia belonged to

Alexander Boucher, a prominent Greenock merchant with a fishing establishment in St.

John's. He was part of the wave of Scottish merchants infiltrating the Newfoundland trade at this time. James Boucher, Alexander's brother, was master of the Euphemia.

291 When midshipman Thomas Wilson climbed aboard his vessel, Boucher realized that he was there to press men, and he refused to cooperate. Wilson demanded to see the ship's articles but Boucher claimed that there were none, as the Euphemia was a new vessel.

The midshipman then asked him to assemble the crew for inspection. After telling Wilson that "if you want them, [go] look for them [yourself]," he called the crew to attention.118

The Euphemia's first mate provided the naval party with a lantern to search below decks.119

The situation deteriorated when Wilson fixed upon a man named Tool, whom he ordered into the Camilla's boat. Tool identified himself as a carpenter, but it seems that he was really the second mate. Wilson offered to replace him with a sailor from the naval party to work the Euphemia into St. John's, but Boucher refused. Wilson remonstrated with him on the "impropriety of his conduct," and told Boucher that he was going to take the man regardless.120 He ordered the naval party to lower him into the boat. As for

Boucher, he was emboldened by the timely arrival of six men who had been sent to assist the Euphemia into St. John's harbour, including William Thomas, a clerk with Alexander

Boucher and Company, as well as John Elmes, master of the brig Anna Maria. Wilson later testified that Boucher pleaded with Tool not to go, that he was a "damned fool" if he

191 did, and promised Wilson that he "would shoot him if he met [him] onshore." The midshipman repeated his orders, but the naval party was prevented from lowering Tool into the boat.122

Boucher then proclaimed that there was a mutiny onboard the Euphemia. Elmes and his sailors came to Boucher's defence, and for the first time Tool, the man in the middle, refused to cooperate with the Navy. Boucher called for his pistols, while his crew

292 armed itself with handspikes and pump-breakers. The master called out that if men allowed themselves to be pressed, then "it will be your own faults," and promised that he would quit the ship before it could be taken from him, which he did, moving into a small

1 9^ boat alongside the Euphemia. He soon returned, however, and told Wilson that he

"would loose his life sooner than this man should be taken."124 According to Nathaniel

Rodd, the Camilla's other midshipman, Boucher attempted to strike a deal with Wilson: leave Tool alone and the Camilla was free to press another seafarer in his place, perhaps even the first mate, who was armed with a handspike, "or any others of the crew, after the ship came into harbor, and that he would prevent their going onshore" for that purpose.125

Wilson balked at Boucher's proposal and told him to step aside. A scuffle ensued and the naval party was outnumbered. At this point, Boucher encouraged his crew to resistance, several violent blows were struck, and Wilson was beaten "senseless upon the Deck."126

He eventually made it back to the boat, regaining consciousness aboard the Camilla with a handkerchief wrapped around his head. He was laid up in the sick bay for about ten days.127

In the meantime, Boucher drove Rodd clear off the quarterdeck and shoved several of the Camilla's sailors. This included Henry Toms, the boat-keeper who climbed aboard when the trouble started. According to William Hall, another one of the Camilla's sailors, Boucher slapped him to the floor and told his crew that "I would call you damned cowardly rascals if you let this man [Tool] go out of the ship."128 He even suggested that he would physically rough-up his own sailors if they cooperated with the Navy. The press gang eventually retreated to the cutter and raced back to the Camilla to inform Captain

Bowen of what had happened; the Euphemia still had to warp into St. John's harbour,

293 which meant that Bowen had plenty of time to consider his options before Boucher could land his crew. He decided to press all of the Euphemia 's sailors as punishment for their behaviour.129

The following day, 30 November, Bowen laid the affair before Thomas Coote, a clerk in the Supreme Court. The case went to trial about a week later and witnesses were called for both sides. Seven of the Camilla's boat crew testified against Boucher, all with the same story: Boucher verbally and physically assaulted the naval party and encouraged his crew to resistance. Boucher stated that he took no active role in the resistance. He did call for his pistols, but only because a piece of wood had been thrown at him. He also admitted that he had prevented Wilson from pressing Tool, whom he identified as his second mate. Boucher testified that he was fatigued at the time, that his first mate was drunk, and Tool was essential to the Euphemia's safety. Boucher's only witness, William

Thomas, a clerk with Alexander Boucher and Company, backed up his testimony. He did not see Boucher "strike any person"; however, he did witness Boucher take a handspike away from his first mate, which presumably would have been used against the press gang.130 In the end, Boucher was acquitted of battery but convicted of assault. He was also found guilty of resisting a guard boat, which was legally on the Impress Service. He was fined twenty pounds and ordered to pay £100 for good behaviour.131 A separate trial was held for John Elmes, master of the Anna Maria. Convicted of similar crimes, he too was fined the small sum of twenty pounds.

This was a high-profile case, but unlike Lawry's murder in 1794 it did not have a long-term impact on impressment in St. John's. Fortunately for the Navy, it also does not appear to have soured its relationship with the community. At the same time, it was not in

294 the Navy's interest to publicize these types of events in civilian courts, especially in colonial settings. Impressment was a volatile affair and the St. John's guard boats were involved in several disputes. This came with the territory, but even in cases where naval personnel were assaulted, it did not make sense to drag the Navy's reputation through the mud for small fines. In 1807, Captain James Agassiz of HMS Rattler was dragged into court for ordering a guard boat to seize a schooner belonging to James MacBraire and

Company. The merchant sued Agassiz for damages - for the illegal detention of his vessel, with force of arms, and the deterioration of its perishable cargo. William George, master's mate of the Rattler and head of its boarding party, was accused of assault for striking a man with his sword. In the days after this incident Agassiz tried desperately to make peace with MacBraire. The naval party got off with small fines and sureties for good behaviour, but as the chief justice explained, the goal was to avoid similar disputes in the future. Publicized in court, they could undermine naval-civilian relations in St.

John's and exacerbate the manning problem.

The Camilla case sheds new light on the St. John's guard boats. Impressment on the water could lead to violence, and likely did so more than the historical record indicates. There were several reasons for this: merchant crews were within sight of freedom and families on shore, the tense situation played out in the confined area of a seagoing vessel, naval parties were armed and merchant crews had access to weapons, and floating press gangs were small and weak compared to those that operated on shore.

Impressment was also a factor in Agassiz's case in 1807, but this time cooler heads prevailed. In addition to seizing the vessel, the naval officer in charge ordered MacBraire to call his crew aft. One man was selected for impressment, who "appeared unwilling to

295 go," but MacBraire said "he must go into the boat," and that he would speak with the captain to get him discharged.134 If not for MacBraire's leadership, impressment could have turned this into a violent affair. MacBraire was not only a merchant, but also a captain in the Army, and he played a leading role in the founding of the Benevolent Irish

Society and the Society of Merchants. Although an Anglican and Loyalist, he was popular in the Irish-Catholic community of St. John's. He was not the type of figure that naval captains wanted to butt heads with overseas.

This case provides other details on guard boats, for instance that they were indistinguishable from press gangs. Bowen sent boats to "take the guard" and go "on the impress service" at the same time. While the Camilla used guard boats to recruit heavily in St. John's in 1806, as other warships did in this period, Bowen was forced to relinquish most of these sailors for one reason or another. Many were physically unfit for the service.137 This case also gives a rough idea of the size and composition of guard boat crews: the Camilla's had seven men, including two midshipmen. One sailor stayed in the boat while a midshipman was in charge of the boarding party. By comparison, the

Rattler's guard boat in 1807 had a lieutenant and master's mate; however, the presence of senior officers in this case, rather than midshipmen, may have been due to Agassiz's order to seize the vessel, which was not a common procedure. In both cases, one naval officer stayed on deck while the other searched the hold and inspected the vessel's articles; once back on deck, the master of the vessel was ordered to assemble his crew, from which one sailor (sometimes two) was usually pressed into the Navy. Before being lowered into the guard boat, the pressed man was escorted below decks to collect his sea chest and other belongings. Finally, the Camilla case demonstrates that guard boats not

296 only patrolled St. John's harbour, but occasionally ventured outside of it to board vessels along the coast.

Since guard boats were the dominant mode of recruitment in Newfoundland during the Napoleonic Wars, most impressment disputes occurred on the water, aboard merchant vessels. As the following case demonstrates, seafarers in Newfoundland did not take impressment lying down. In the summer of 1812, Peter Gibson, a sailor in the

Magnet merchantman, was pressed by a guard boat from HMS Jason in St. John's harbour. Gibson informed Captain J.W. King that he wished to volunteer; he also stated that he was a shipwright, and asked for permission to retrieve his tools. King sent a midshipman with him, but the pair was only aboard the Magnet for a few minutes when the naval officer discovered the ruse: Gibson intended to desert and concocted the shipwright story to get off of the warship. The midshipman seized Gibson, but the latter knocked the young officer down and escaped. The Magnet's mate and several crewmembers then beat the midshipman, as did a Mr. McAllister, the owner of the adjacent wharf. McAllister held the midshipman down, allowing Gibson to run away, and then called over labourers from his wharf, who "assisted in most cruelly beating the

no

Midshipman." Had another naval party not heard the "Cry of Murder," King felt that the midshipman would have succumbed to the "fury of Mr. McAllister & his gang."139

The authorities caught up with Gibson in St. John's, but there is no record of this case going to court, and based on earlier incidents, the Navy probably wanted to avoid negative publicity. Increasingly familiar with guard boats, this case suggests that seafarers learned how to use impressment procedure against them in Newfoundland -

Gibson knew when the Navy was vulnerable. This was similar to how crowds rescued

297 pressed men from naval parties on shore when collecting their belongings, such as in the

Boston tragedy in 1794.140

Desertion and Punishment

Lewis Amadeus Anspach is remembered today as the author of A History of the

Island of Newfoundland, published in 1819. This was the first general history of the colony. Arriving in St. John's in 1799, the Church of England minister worked tirelessly to establish schools in Conception Bay. He was also a diligent magistrate, applying reforms to the island's legal system that his predecessors had neglected.141 It was in this capacity that Anspach published v4 Summary of the Laws of Commerce and Navigation,

Adapted to the present State, Government, and Trade of the Island of Newfoundland in

1809. He wrote it "for the assistance of himself and others of his Brother-Magistrates in this Island, who might stand in need of it."142 Neglected by historians, this book is a valuable guide on marine insurance, Greenwich Hospital duties, truck and debt, punishment, and the courts. As Jerry Bannister has demonstrated, much of

Newfoundland's legal system originated on the ground, arising from the customs of the country; the St. John's port orders are a good example of this. Anspach published a more systematic book on the commercial laws of Newfoundland in 1810, and he became a trusted advisor of Governor John Thomas Duckworth.143

Without guidance from the Admiralty, most regulations on naval recruitment in

Newfoundland developed customarily. For instance, Anspach noted in his Summary of the Laws of Commerce how impressment was used as a form of punishment for harbouring deserters:

298 Masters of vessels entertaining or hiring any deserters from the royal navy, are liable to a penalty of £50. Masters of fishing vessels guilty of the like offence, forfeit £20. And any person harbouring, entertaining, or piloting deserters from the navy or army, forfeit £10 for every such deserter, and an equal number of their best men, whether servants or others, will be impressed into his Majesty's navy.144

This was not adopted from English maritime law, but the proclamations of governors of

Newfoundland. Hugh Palliser issued the first in 1764. He noted the "great Interruptions" that frequently occurred when seamen deserted from the Navy and merchant service.145

He strictly forbade naval captains from entering men that were under contract to inhabitants and boatkeepers. Similarly, if the latter entered or entertained a deserter from the Navy, "an equal number of the best men in their Service will be taken from them."146

They would be pressed into the Newfoundland squadron. Publicans and residents who helped men desert from the wooden world would "be punished with the utmost severity of the law."147 Governors Richard Edwards and John Campbell issued similar proclamations in 1780 and 1782, which were sent to magistrates in the outlying districts of Newfoundland. Constables and other peace officers were encouraged to return deserters to the Navy for small rewards.148

Desertion became a larger problem in the 1790s. On 16 July 1795, Governor

James Wallace issued proclamations on desertion to the magistrates of St. John's and

Torbay. Not only did he want them to return deserters to the Navy, but they were to be on the lookout for any seafaring man who did not have a passport. Magistrates would receive two pounds for bringing them to the Navy. The naval government also made a concerted effort to capture deserters travelling overland, likely to the South Avalon or

Conception Bay, to find a passage off the island.149 Two years later Governor William

Waldegrave proclaimed that inhabitants and boatkeepers would be fined ten pounds for

299 each deserter they harboured, in addition to having an equal number of their best men pressed into the Navy. He also offered a reward of one pound for information that led to the recruitment of a "straggling unprotected Able bodied Seaman" into the Navy.150

Further, no employer could hire a seaman or fisherman in Newfoundland who could not produce a certificate of discharge from his previous employer or a passport from the government, unless at the end of this service he entered the Navy. Waldegrave also pressured tavern keepers and constables. They were ordered to detain all travelers "who cannot give a satisfactory account of themselves."151

Waldegrave's proclamation undercut desertion, but he clearly felt that it did not go far enough. He contacted Chief Justice D'Ewes Coke and Secretary of War William

Windham about a revised proclamation that would have increased fines and penalties to combat desertion, created a register of seafarers, and targeted criminals and vagrants in the outports. Coke liked the proclamation, but stated that it could not be enforced in

Newfoundland without a new act of Parliament. He advised the governor to delay publishing it until he heard back from London. It was never published. Waldegrave was frustrated by mass desertions from the Army and Navy in the late 1790s; the former threatened to weaken the entire corps, while the latter was such an evil that "the squadron must shortly be reduced to the necessity of impressing from the merchant vessels, to the great discouragement of the Trade of this Island."152 The manning problem continued to plague Waldegrave, and, disgruntled by desertions from the Navy in October 1799, shortly before convoys were to sail, he declared that if any deserter from the Navy or

Army was found aboard any vessel in Newfoundland, "I will impress the whole of their

Crew or Crews for the use of His Majesty's Service."153 Ignorance was no excuse: before

300 masters hired seamen from the outports, they were to take them before the authorities for an inspection.154 Similar proclamations were issued by Governors Charles Morice Pole and James Gambier in 1800 and 1803. Impressment was now a standard punishment for harbouring deserters in Newfoundland.155

Although there are not many extant cases of the Navy using impressment to punish employers for harbouring deserters, one occurred on the northeast coast in August

1811. Cunninghame, Bell, and Company petitioned Duckworth about one of its planters at St. Julien's, who had five men pressed by HMS Narcissus. This represented his entire shore crew, at the height of the drying season, which forced the planter to quit the fishery.

The merchants felt that an enormous loss could be avoided if Duckworth released the men and sent them back to the French shore; Duckworth forwarded the complaint to

Captain F.W. Aylmer of the Narcissus. Aylmer informed Duckworth that he did not have the full particulars, but would summon the two officers principally involved to report directly to the governor. Alymer seems to have been stalling, for several days later

Patrick Hine, a representative of the aggrieved planter, complained to Duckworth that he was given a list of the Narcissus's sailors but the men in question were not on it. He hoped to inspect the crew that afternoon at the courthouse, but the only men to arrive were deserters from the Narcissus who had jumped ship at St. Julien's. Hine informed

Duckworth that two of the detained men, Patrick Currin and Edward Neville, were spotted onboard the Narcissus that day. Neither was on his list.

At this point Duckworth intervened. He was informed by Alymer that the five men had been charged with harbouring and encouraging naval deserters, including several from the Narcissus. Duckworth struck a compromise: two men would stay in the

301 Navy while three would be discharged. With the charge of enticing desertion it is surprising that Duckworth took mercy on the planter, but he likely did so because Alymer had effectively ruined his fishing season. In the end, however, Duckworth went back on his word and the five men were not released from the Navy. One deserted at St. John's, but it is probable that Duckworth interrogated the naval officers involved and learned that the merchant firm had lied to him. Nine men had run from the Narcissus that summer and they were aided by residents at both Croque and St. Julien's; and instead of one planter losing five men, the recruits in question - who were members of drying crews - had been pressed from three different employers in the two villages, with neither employer losing more than two men. Once he discovered the truth, Duckworth upheld the punishment for harbouring deserters.156

Duckworth was also irritated by desertion the previous summer, when seamen from HMS Antelope absconded on the Labrador coast. He issued a proclamation at Pitt's

Harbour on 23 August 1810, claiming that it was "impossible for them to be kept alive in such situations, without having recourse to the Fishermen for food, or for them ultimately to escape without their assistance, [in] which case it must always be known that they are deserters."157 Despite his "good will towards the Fishery," Duckworth stated angrily that unless the deserters were returned he would press an equal number of men from the same harbour into the Navy.158 Indeed, a short time after the Narcissus case the following summer, Duckworth cemented this policy. Spurred on by mass desertions in St. John's, which resulted in naval courts martial and harsh corporal punishments, Duckworth proclaimed that he could not allow the squadron to be unmanned. It was unlikely that deserters could conceal themselves in St. John's without assistance from masters and

302 residents. To discourage this he extended the punishment advertised at Pitt's Harbour to

the Newfoundland trade generally: "the desertion of every Seaman from the Squadron in

this Harbour will cause the impressing of one under any circumstances from the Trade.. .1

shall consider the man so impressed as a substitute, and taken by necessity and he will

therefore be restored on the deserter being apprehended and brought back."159

As stipulated in Anspach's Summary of the Laws of Commerce, fines were used to

tackle the desertion problem. One case occurred at Bonavista in 1811. Gerard Ford, a justice of the peace, brought Richard Dyke before a special court of sessions to answer

charges that he had shipped John Stone, knowing him to be a deserter from HMS Comet.

Dyke was fined twenty pounds and another ten pounds for employing a servant who

could not produce a certificate of discharge from his previous master. Ford returned

Stone to the Navy; he also informed Duckworth, in light of the desertions in St. John's,

that if descriptions of these men were sent to outlying districts then more of them would

be discovered.160 Magistrates played an integral role in returning deserters to the armed

forces during the Napoleonic Wars. There were financial incentives for doing so:

government rewards, straggling vouchers, as well as subsistence and passage money,

supplemented their modest salaries. The merchant community and grand jury

occasionally offered compensation, while in 1813 the captains of HMS Hyperion and

HMS Manly, William Pryce Cumby and Edward Collins, advertised in the Royal Gazette

that they would pay ten guineas for each deserter, in addition to other rewards.161 As time

went on, magistrates sent unemployed fishing servants, suspicious travellers, and petty

criminals to the armed forces in St. John's. They were financially compensated for

bolstering the war effort.

303 While the Dyke case was typical of masters being fined for harbouring deserters,

Duckworth worried about the punishment's legality. In 1812, he asked Crown law officers about the applicability of a desertion statute from 1797 to Newfoundland: "An

Act for preventing the Desertion of Seamen from British Merchant Ships trading to His

Majesty's Colonies and Plantations in the West Indies."162 The previous season a master was convicted by a surrogate court of enticing men to desert the Navy and employing them in his fishing operation. The court fined him £100, based on this statute. Duckworth heard that the fine was likely to be disputed in England, based on the argument that the statute was not applicable to Newfoundland; therefore, he sought clarification before crossing the Atlantic that spring. Duckworth quoted from a popular shipping manual to maintain that the statute, interpreted broadly, could extend beyond the West Indies to other British colonies; if this was not the case, however, he wanted to know what an appropriate fine would be, as encouraging desertion was a serious offence and must be prevented during the War of 1812. Chief Justice Robert Tremblett and the magistrates of

Newfoundland were divided on the subject.163

The Admiralty solicitor reported that the statute was confined to the West Indies.

It did not apply to Newfoundland. He also noted that had the crime occurred in England it would have been tried at common law, and the punishment - fine, imprisonment, or both

- was at the discretion of the court in which the offender was convicted. Since

Newfoundland had its own courts with criminal jurisdiction, Charles Bicknell suggested that the master should be tried for enticing men to desert the Navy in one of those tribunals, and be punished "in the same manner as he might have been in any Court in this Kingdom."164 Part of the confusion on this issue stemmed from Anspach's Summary

304 of the Laws of Commerce, which incorporated the desertion statute even though it did not

apply to Newfoundland. The statute's £100 penalty also contradicted the punishments for

harbouring deserters that had developed in Newfoundland over time, from the customs of

the country.165 By the end of 1812, therefore, Duckworth had been told to forget about

imperial statutes and revert to the common law and customary punishments to combat

desertion in Newfoundland.

That fall Duckworth sought legal advice on another statute. He wanted

clarification on the Mutiny Act, passed in 1810, and its fine of twenty pounds for

harbouring deserters; the offender had four days to pay the fine, after which he could be jailed for up to six months without bail.166 Earlier in the year, a St. John's resident was

convicted of harbouring a deserter from the Royal Nova Scotia Regiment. Under similar

circumstances, previous governors permitted offenders to join the Army or Navy.

According to Duckworth, this was a practical solution: it punished the offender, bolstered

the war effort, and spared civilian authorities the expense of the prisoner's subsistence.

However, the Army balked at the compromise, because it ran counter to the "spirit" of

the Mutiny Act. Duckworth informed British authorities that neither the St. John's

magistracy nor the naval government had the budget to defray these expenses. Moreover,

since cases like this one occurred frequently, and were likely to continue to do so,

perhaps it would be best to have the punishment commuted and allow future offenders, at

the discretion of the magistrates, to enter the armed forces. It is unclear how the law

officers responded, but judging by the commutation of sentences both before and after

this case, it is probable that the Mutiny Act was ignored and customary punishments

remained the norm in Newfoundland.

305 Impressment was also used to punish the crews of American fishing vessels on the Labrador coast. According to several treaties, these schooners were permitted to fish in the Strait of Belle Isle and off Labrador, but not to build installations or to dry their catches on shore. Newfoundland's governors sent warships to the northern fisheries, but

Labrador was under Quebec's jurisdiction until 1809, and surrogates from Newfoundland could not judge legal disputes there. American crews were accused of interfering in

British sealing and salmon enterprises, monopolizing bait, setting forests ablaze, cutting wood and drying fish on shore, dumping offal irresponsibly, and trading illegally with the

Inuit in Labrador and the French in Newfoundland. The most serious complaint was that they encouraged British fishermen to desert to the United States. The increased number of American vessels at the fishery in 1804 created a public outcry among Labrador merchants, and Governor Erasmus Gower sent the armed cutter Queen Charlotte there to make a report on the British and American fisheries. The following year he sent HMS

Curlew, with instructions to board American vessels, seize and arrest those fishing illegally, and to press British subjects on those vessels.169 This became standard procedure during the Napoleonic Wars. The naval schooner Adonis did not seize any

American vessels in 1807, but it did press several mariners.170 Governor Duckworth saw

Labrador as a nursery for seamen and upheld this impressment policy.171 While

Americans and British sailors aboard Yankee vessels were fair game, Duckworth assured

Newfoundland and Labrador merchants that their fishermen would not be conscripted.

Conception Bay carried on a migratory fishery on the French Shore and Labrador coast in this period. As such, Duckworth notified its fishing masters in 1812 to complete shipping papers for their servants and sailors in the northern fisheries - specifying name, height,

306 complexion and position - so that they would not be taken up as naval deserters, or pressed into the Newfoundland squadron.172

The Civil Power

Impressment was also a criminal punishment, a popular alternative to fines, floggings, and imprisonment. A case in Trinity in 1800 demonstrates how it was used in the fishery. Joseph Whittle, master of the Jane and Sarah of Liverpool, complained to magistrate John Clinch about the erratic behaviour of his cook, John Smith. The latter was brought before a surrogate judge to answer his master's allegations: intoxication, neglect of duty, insubordination, and threats of violence toward the master and his mates.

Smith deserted for several days upon arrival in Trinity, refused to cook for the crew, and armed himself with a stick, "bidding defiance to whomsoever should stop him."173 He threatened to take out his vengeance on Whittle and the mates, "that he would kill one, suck the blood of the other and pull the Guts out of the third."174 He went onboard the vessel waving a cudgel, before being overpowered by the crew. While Smith described most of Whittle's testimony as erroneous, he produced no witnesses and the other crewmembers backed up their master. The court convicted Smith, but it also offered him a compromise: to be released back into Whittle's custody, assuming that the master agreed and that Smith apologized to him. If this was unsatisfactory, he could be sent to

St. John's and put "on board a man of War."175 Smith accepted and begged Whittle's pardon in open court rather than enter the Navy.176

While Stone had some control over his future, the option of joining the Navy rather than crawling back to his master, in most cases there was no choice. For example,

307 having learned of a "most violent outrage" at Greenspond in June 1805, involving the fishing crews of Benjamin Lester and Company, Governor Gower dispatched the St.

John's magistrate John Bland to investigate.177 Then in September, when the season was coming to a close and it would cause minimal loss to their masters, Gower sent a warship to the area to press the unruly men. Gower expected the cooperation of their employer,

John Garland of Trinity, in rounding them up. He explained to Garland that the men had to be conscripted into the Navy as punishment for their behaviour, but he also did not wish to spread alarm about impressment. He ordered Lieutenant McKillop, who was there to do the pressing, to explain to the community the governor's motives in this case,

"which I hope will have the effect of preserving good order among them in future."178

These offenders were not given the choice of joining the Navy, as Stone was in Trinity five years earlier, but rather pressed into service to send a message to other fishermen on the northeast coast.

It is unclear how frequently impressment was used as a criminal punishment in

Newfoundland, or what the circumstances usually were. For example, in September 1811 the naval cutter Adonis pressed Patrick Canoll at Greenspond. While the Adonis's muster book states that he was handed over by the civil power - magistrates, constables, sheriffs, and other law officers - its log book states that Canoll was sent to the Adonis by a surrogate court.180 Despite this confusion, evidence suggests that most men sent to the

Navy in Newfoundland never set foot in court, and that was precisely the point.

Impressment channelled petty criminals, vagrants, debtors, and undesirables into the fleet, while avoiding the expense and official trappings of the legal system. Theoretically, all involved had something to gain: the community rid itself of troublemakers and

308 avoided the costs of jailing convicts; the Navy received a steady flow of recruits, often fishermen and sailors; law officers pocketed small bonuses; and the recruits, although sent to a place that some viewed as draconian, avoided lengthy prison sentences, whippings, and other major punishments. Of course, the vast majority of recruits did not choose to enter the British fleet in this way. As for the Navy, it did not accept serious criminals such as rapists or murderers, nor men who were mentally and physically unfit for the service.

Muster books of warships are the best indicator of the civil power's role in supplying the Newfoundland squadron with men. For example, HMS Concorde received three from "St. John's Prison" on 9 December 1801.181 More often, musters state that recruits had been provided by the "civil power," often with a "CP" inserted next to their names. This was the case for two sailors who entered HMS Isis in St. John's on 26

August 1804.182 While musters provide a general picture of change over time, references to the civil power were unofficial and only appeared sporadically; they often depended on the inclinations of particular clerks, or how meticulous naval captains expected their recruitment records to be. There were many discrepancies, and it is probable that most recruits sent to the Navy by the civil power were not described as such in the records. For example, Patrick Molloy was entered into the Camilla's muster on 11 December 1806 as a regular supernumerary, among many others conscripted that fall, but the Camilla's log book shows that he was actually handed over by the civil power.183 In the end, it is impossible to quantify the number of men that the civil power sent to the Newfoundland squadron.

309 Authorities in St. John's sent a growing number of men to the Navy, particularly during the War of 1812. At the same time, there are few references to this naval-civilian collaboration before 1803, probably because of the abundance of maritime labourers during the 1790s. Several factors changed this in the early nineteenth century: the labour supply declined; Atlantic warfare and recruitment devastated the migratory fishery, particularly in the British Isles; the Navy expanded in size during the Napoleonic Wars; and more warships were sent to Newfoundland each year. Having received a modest number of recruits from the civil power in the eighteenth century, Gower made this an official policy in 1805. He informed the St. John's magistracy "that every opportunity should be embraced for raising men in this Island for His Majesty's service during the

War."184 Whenever they sent a man to jail for desertion, rioting, "or any petty offence whatever," who was fit for military service and not employed in the fishery or onboard a merchantman, they were not to release him if warships were in the harbour.185 The magistrate was to apply to the commanding officer "without loss of time," and if the

Navy was interested, he should be "delivered up accordingly."186 When no warships were in the harbour, or if the Navy did not want the recruit, he could be sent to the Army "if he should be disposed to enter" that service.187

Gower then elaborated on this new recruitment policy. In separate orders to the

St. John's magistracy, he stated:

And you are hereby authorised, whenever you may judge it expedient, to remit any sentence of the Magistrates or the Court of Sessions for small fines, imprisonment or corporal punishment, on condition that the offender shall enter into His Majesty's service, provided he shall be fit for it, taking care that he be accordingly given up to persons duly authorised to receive him, and observing upon all occasions to give the preference to the Navy, agreeably to the object of the Fishery. But in the exercise of the above

310 authority you are to take care that the sentence of the Law be not relaxed in favour of great offenders.188

The governor essentially gave the civil power a free hand in turning petty criminals over to the Newfoundland squadron. As mentioned, impressment was not only used to funnel convicted felons into the Navy, but also to avoid the court system altogether. While

Gower insisted that the Navy receive preferential treatment over the Army in 1805, he tempered this stance the following year. Due to the urgency of completing the Nova

Scotia Regiment for the defence of the island, Gower stated that in future all prisoners with commuted sentences for small offences, and who "have not been accustomed to a seafaring life," had the choice of entering the Navy or the Army.189 Gower appreciated the needs of the Army, but Newfoundland was a maritime dependency in wartime and he insisted on a naval monopoly over sailors, fishermen, and seafaring men who cut deals with the civil power.190

Gower's initiatives resulted in a sharp increase in the number of recruits provided by the civil power in St. John's. This peaked during the War of 1812, when the Navy received at least thirty men per year. HMS Mercury received three ratings from the civil power in November 1807, while HMS Galatea entered nineteen from the peace officers in 1815.191 The Navy was circumspect in accepting recruits, especially criminals; many of them were released. For instance, the Galatea discharged one in 1815 because he was

"unfit for the service," while Governor Waldegrave criticized a Ferryland magistrate in

1797 for sending a recruit who was not a seaman, and "whose Hearing is so far gone as to render him a very improper object to be employed either in the Navy or Army."192 He went on: "Were every unserviceable able man who might be picked up in the district of

Ferryland permitted to enlist either as a sailor or soldier, the King would, in paying the

311 bounty granted to Volunteers and for apprehending unprotected stragglers, expend a much greater sum than the services of such men could ever possibly compensate."193 This case also shows that civilian recruitment was not confined to St. John's. The Adonis received a sailor from the civil power on the Exploits River in 1810, while HMS Derwent entered two men from law officers at Burin in 1815. Many other communities sent recruits to the Navy.194

Of course, the civil power had more than the public good at heart when sending criminals to the Navy. Magistrates, sheriffs, constables, and clerks of the peace were compensated financially. This is illustrated by the accounts of Lionel Chancey, a clerk of the peace in St. John's in 1809 and 1810 (see Appendix 15). Chancey sent at least ten men to the Newfoundland squadron in this period, and another to the Army. At least half of the naval recruits were described as "first class," or skilled mariners who would be rated able seamen in the wooden world.195 Legally, all of them had been charged with crimes or interrogated by the magistracy. Three were charged with larceny, and three others with a breach of the public peace. Joseph Millar, one of the latter, was the only man who was prosecuted and punished; put another way, he was the only one who went through the formal legal process. Chancey pocketed a tidy sum for each recruit the Navy accepted. He received twelve shillings per man, and in the case of Millar, a guinea.

Financial compensation ensured the cooperation of the civil power, while at the same time giving a small boost to the British fleet. In addition to sending undesirables to the armed forces, and rounding up deserters, the civil power gained in power generally during the Napoleonic Wars.196

312 The War of 1812

Frustrated by desertion, in April 1813 William Pryce Cumby, captain of HMS

Hyperion, proclaimed the "the notorious fact, that the Crime of Desertion from His

Majesty's Ships is practiced to a greater extent in this Island than in any part of the World

1 Q,n

besides." Cumby explained to Governor Richard Keats that he had followed the port

orders but failed to replenish the Hyperion's complement by pressing from incoming

vessels. Thirteen seamen had run since March and the warship was thirty short of its

complement. Cumby railed against merchants who brought thousands of men to the

fishery each year but did not transport them back to the British Isles, where they could be

pressed into the Navy. Once on the island they considered themselves immune from

impressment, due to the "confessed impotency of the Civil Power."198 This was also an

incentive to crimps and other "disaffected persons" to encourage desertion from the

Newfoundland squadron.199 Although merchants offered ten guineas for the return of

each of the Hyperion's deserters, in addition to other rewards, only one had been found.

According to Cumby, the "magnitude of the Offence of harbouring and concealing

deserters.. .appears to be very imperfectly understood in this Country."200 He attributed

this to the "torpid supineness of the Police."201

A week earlier he wrote Thomas Coote, officially the chief magistrate in St.

John's and the supreme surrogate of Newfoundland, about the desertion problem and

stressed the importance of having warships fully manned during the War of 1812. Failing

to press afloat, Cumby demanded the civil power assist him in pressing on land.202 Coote

politely informed the captain that although he wanted to assist the Navy, particularly in

rounding up deserters, he could "by no means sanction the landing of parties from the

313 King's Ships for the purpose of Impressment on shore, well knowing, that such a measure would inevitably lead to the most serious and dangerous consequences."203 While Cumby was disappointed with the response - having "deeply to lament the acknowledged incompetency of the Civil Power in this Island" - he assured Coote that press gangs would not venture into town without the backing of the justices of the peace.204 Cumby did accept Coote's offer on deserters, however, and proposed a nocturnal search, based on reports that they slept in town by day and hid in the woods at night. Whether territoriality led Coote to deny the press warrants, or perhaps the fear of social discord, it mattered not to Cumby for the result was the same: Newfoundlanders considered themselves immune from impressment, a "universal practice in every other part of His

Majesty's Dominions."

Cumby may not have pushed too far because he made the request in April, well outside the seasonal impressment parameters in Newfoundland. It is more likely that this case symbolizes a larger trend at work in St. John's. If press gangs were confined to the water, something Coote confirms, how could he know that if sent ashore they would

"inevitably lead to the most serious and dangerous consequences"?206 He had not witnessed a press gang riot in Newfoundland, for the simple reason that there were none after 1794. While Coote may not have been in St. John's during the Boston tragedy, he was a law officer there for much of the Napoleonic Wars, appearing as a surrogate in the

Supreme Court. By 1810 he was the chief magistrate in St. John's and the supreme surrogate of Newfoundland, which placed Coote at the apex of the legal system, ahead of naval captains as well as justices of the peace. Next to the chief justice he was the most powerful law officer on the island. One of Keats's final acts as governor was to sing his

314 praises to the British government, describing the "ability, Integrity, and Moderation that has procured him my Approbation, and the Confidence and respect of the Inhabitants at large." Coote enjoyed Keats's trust and it was his job to gauge the social temperature of St. John's, drawing on past experience to protect its residents. It took considerable fortitude to stand up to Cumby - a senior naval officer and hero of the Trafalgar campaign in 1805 - which makes it unlikely that he would have done so without historical precedent and genuine concern.208

Coote was in fact no stranger to naval-civilian discord. He had a front row seat for the Camilla case in 1806, in which a guard boat was repelled by the crew of a merchant vessel near St. John's. He was the clerk of arraigns in the Supreme Court at the time, and he instigated the prosecutions against two ship captains for resisting the Camilla's press gang. He had faced similar clashes on land. For instance, in 1810 a Lieutenant Bailey of

HMS Franchise was attacked by a group of "malicious and ill-disposed Persons" in St.

John's.209 About three weeks later Walter Walsh and two other men were returning to their lodgings in St. John's when they were accosted by a naval party. The latter consisted of five or six armed men, likely from the Franchise. One of them, who appeared to be an officer, took hold of Walsh and called out "Franchise a ."210 Walsh pleaded with the officer to let them go, but the officer took him by the collar and made several swipes at him with a sword. Walsh's waistcoat was shredded, he received a dangerous wound on his chest, and when he got loose he was stabbed in the back. Walsh and his friends were chased through the streets until they received help from pedestrians.

It is unclear if this naval party sought retribution for its battered lieutenant, or if it was a press gang operating illegally on shore. What is clear is that Walsh was seriously injured,

315 and when he was finally in a position to give a deposition, Coote was there at his bedside.

By this time, the Franchise had sailed and it is unlikely that Walsh ever received justice.211

In the end, Cumby's objections fell on deaf ears: Keats did not overturn Coote's decision, he accepted the magistrate's authority, and press gangs did not set foot in town.

There were not many popular disturbances in St. John's in this period, but Coote knew firsthand that press gangs could inflame the population. Although neither Cumby, Coote, nor Keats mentioned the Boston tragedy specifically in 1813, that does not mean that they were not thinking about it. It was less than a generation old, and it is difficult to imagine such a violent and high-profile case disappearing that quickly from the region's collective memory. Lawry's murder probably informed Coote's decision to bar press gangs from shore in 1813, and it was the catalyst for the restriction of impressment to St. John's harbour during the Napoleonic Wars. This case also illustrates the growing authority of the civil power in St. John's. Although governors made executive decisions on impressment, magistrates now enjoyed the discretion to refuse press warrants. This was quite a change from 1794, when Governor Wallace had dispatched press gangs into St.

John's without a second thought.

The Hyperion's manning problems in 1813 underscore the Navy's dependence on guard boats. Having no choice but to back down from sending press gangs into town, guard boats were virtually the only recruitment option Cumby had left at his disposal.

Judging by the dozens of men he entered in St. John's, they were not a bad option after all. Indeed, when the civil power did provide him with a few recruits, he no longer needed them and turned them over to the Comet.212 Despite Cumby's rhetoric, this case

316 demonstrates that naval and civilian authorities worked together efficiently in

Newfoundland. Cumby's outrage over desertion also mellowed with time. The Hyperion did lose a significant number of men, but Cumby's diatribe really targeted the merchants and residents who harboured deserters rather than the deserters themselves. Shortly after his exchange with Coote, Cumby published a notice in the local newspaper that deserters would be forgiven and escape punishment if they returned to the Navy. On the other hand, he posted a reward for information leading to the conviction of residents who helped those same deserters.213 Back in Portsmouth, Cumby even petitioned the Navy on behalf of two deserters who returned to the Hyperion in Newfoundland. Their service was

"highly meritorious and commendable," and Cumby asked to have the "R" removed from beside their names in the muster book, so that they could be paid. According to

Lieutenant Chappell of the Rosamond, who met Cumby in Newfoundland in 1813, "there is not a better officer in the navy, nor one who is more universally beloved by his inferiors."215

Desertion had always been a problem in Newfoundland, but it became more acute during the War of 1812. Although warships continued to enter a significant number of recruits, these totals were often negated by desertion. For instance, HMS Crescent entered thirteen men in Newfoundland in 1814, but lost seventeen to desertion.216 While this was an exceptional case, it is clear that some warships, including the Hyperion in

1813, commenced recruitment drives to compensate for men that had run away. Warships such as HMS Bellerophon developed specific orders in St. John's harbour to combat the desertion problem: no boat was to leave the ship without a sufficient number of officers to guard its seamen, and lieutenants were ordered to keep a careful watch over the crew,

317 so that "Men who may be inclined to leave the ship, cannot escape." Desertion combined with a shrinking maritime labour pool in Newfoundland to increase the pressure on the St. John's guard boats, the dominant source of naval recruitment. The problem, however, was not simply that seamen were running away, but that they were receiving help from the public. Cumby noted this in 1813, but he simply repeated what governors had been complaining about for years. As Newfoundland transformed from a fishing installation into a colony, and St. John's from a harbour into a commercial centre, an increasing number of recruits had relatives and friends on shore to look out for their interests. Sometimes they petitioned governors for redress, but in cases where recruits

(and other ratings) escaped from the Navy there were now support networks to screen them from the authorities.

In November 1812, the Royal Gazette advertised a reward for three deserters from the Antelope who "are well known in Newfoundland, having been employed in the

Fishery."218 Similarly, Michael Bryan; who deserted from HMS Muros in 1812, was

"brought up" in the fishery "and is well known about Saint John's and the ports to the

Northward"; Edward Lahey, who ran from the Comet in 1813, was "well known" in St.

John's, "his relations living here, and is supposed to have been harboured about the Town since he deserted"; and Timothy Hearn, who deserted from the Hyperion in the same year, "has a Brother residing in Saint John's."219 Other advertisements name the employers that recruits had worked for the previous summer. Population growth in St.

John's gave deserters more places to hide and made it easier for them to blend in to the community. The relationship between desertion and recruitment can be gauged from a case in 1810. Vice-Admiral John Borlase Warren of the North American squadron sent

318 the gun brig Plumper to Newfoundland to recruit men, but it was quickly dispatched back to Halifax. In the absence of Duckworth, Captain John Allen of the Franchise explained to Warren that the Newfoundland squadron was poorly manned, and that "all the men employed in this trade, with very few exceptions, are protected from the press."220 Due to high merchant wages, Allen concluded that the Plumper would have a more difficult time preventing desertions in Newfoundland than raising men. As for the Franchise, it had been St. John's for a fortnight and "notwithstanding every exertion, I have not been able to [enter] one Seaman."221

The Navy continued to press sailors in Newfoundland until 1815. Unlike in the early 1790s, when press gangs occasionally set foot on shore, the St. John's guard boats were the dominant mode of recruitment. In February 1814, the Admiralty awarded

Newman and Company the privilege of flying a white ensign over its establishments in

Newfoundland. This recognized the services of twenty Irish fishing servants, who were conscripted at sea by Captain Philip Broke of HMS Shannon, while en route to

Newfoundland. The youngsters fought so bravely in the Shannon's battle with USS

Chesapeake in 1813 that Newman's was protected from the press for the duration of the war.222 Impressment continued throughout 1815: HMS Hazard, for example, pressed men in St. John's on 16 December, long after the cessation of hostilities. The British government, which always had an antiquated vision of Newfoundland, continued to refer to the migratory fishery as a nursery for seamen throughout the Napoleonic Wars. While the migratory trade entered a steep decline in the 1790s, this chapter has demonstrated that Newfoundland became a training ground for the Navy in the early nineteenth century.

319 Conclusion

The Boston tragedy ebbed and flowed in the popular imagination throughout the nineteenth century, not only in print but also through storytelling and folklore. During excavations that preceded the construction of the Roman Catholic Basilica in St. John's in the late 1830s, diggers uncovered two corpses. They were believed to have been the remains of Farrell and Power, the two Irishmen executed for Lawry's murder.224 Several generations later, on 18 June 1880, when excavations commenced for the Anglican

Cathedral, a third skeleton was unearthed. Buttons retrieved with the bones indicated that the remains belonged to a military officer. A debate ensued as residents speculated on the identity of the corpse. Some spectators championed John Philpot, an ensign in the Royal

Newfoundland Veterans Company. He was a casualty of the last fatal duel in the island's history, fought in St. John's in 1826. Others suggested that the remains were older, dating from the Napoleonic era. They pointed to Lawry. While the identity of these corpses is an intriguing footnote to the narrative, what really matters was the response of the local residents, who were so familiar with the Boston tragedy that its characters were on the tips of their tongues when the guessing game commenced. Lawry survives in folklore to this day. According to one legend, his ghost continues to haunt pedestrians on the St.

John's waterfront.226

Henry Francis Shortis, the historiographer of the Newfoundland Museum in the early twentieth century, added to Lawry lore by documenting a fictional version of the murder for his "Fugitive History" of Newfoundland.227 In this tale "Dick Lawney" is an

Irish ruffian from county Waterford, who grew up fighting with his neighbours, "Lank" and "Stock" Neil. When the two parties caught up with each other later in life, in the

320 muddy alleyways of St. John's, the lieutenant was killed in a scuffle arising from an insult he levied against "Stock's" sister back in the old country. The fugitives fled to

Massachusetts and were never heard from again. According to Shortis, the mystery was solved during the 1880s, when a St. John's resident ventured to the Boston Public Library and befriended one of its patrons. The gentleman invited the curious tourist to his home for dinner, and then chronicled Lawry's demise as they smoked cigars in his private study. The storyteller was the grandson of "Lank" Neil, the renegade with a standing

99R bounty on his head in Newfoundland. Shortis's version is consistent with the evolution of legends: unlike myths, which often focus on the supernatural, legends develop from narratives based in historical fact, later spawning fictional mutations and alternate storylines when passed down orally from one generation to the next. According to cultural historians and anthropologists, legends are considered folk history, while myths and other magical folktales are considered oral literature. Lawry's murder resonated most strongly within the Irish-Catholic community, because of the ethnicity and faith of the murderers, but especially the sectarian tensions that gripped Newfoundland in the nineteenth century.229

The Boston tragedy was a watershed in the history of impressment in

Newfoundland. It signalled its arrival on a large scale in the 1790s and it reformed naval recruitment for the duration of the Napoleonic Wars. Press gangs on shore were replaced by guard boats in St. John's harbour. The aquatic nature of impressment in

Newfoundland casts doubt on the traditional historiography: there was no such thing as

'the' press gang, and impressment usually occurred on the water rather than on land - this was true in St. John's and Halifax as well as in Poole and Waterford. Gerald S. Graham

321 argued that as Newfoundland transformed into a settled colony in the Napoleonic era it lost its vitality as a nursery for seamen. In his words, the "training of a few green men on thirty or forty fishing ships and bankers could mean little to the British Admiralty."230

Graham accepted the opinion of a Major Thorne on the poor quality of Newfoundland recruits. As Thorne reported to undersecretary of war John Sullivan in 1803, "I think I could safely answer that there are but few that an officer of the Navy would deem a seaman." Those in bankers were described as "lubbards" while "Irish Labourers on

Shore are not even used to the management of boats."232 Graham conceded that statistics are unreliable, but concluded that the Admiralty likely "never obtained more than 200 seamen annually from the Newfoundland fishing fleet."233 Graham and others make two key mistakes: they conflate impressment in the trans-Atlantic fishery with impressment at

Newfoundland, and they fail to investigate what actually happened on the ground. As discussed in Chapter 4, the trans-Atlantic fishery was a training ground for the Navy in the eighteenth century, when hundreds of men were pressed each year in the West

Country and Ireland. When the migratory trade declined in the 1790s, Newfoundland became a nursery for seamen, not the backwater that Thorne described to the British government. Graham should have investigated impressment's impact on the

Newfoundland trade, on both sides of the Atlantic, rather than imperial policies and mercantilist rhetoric.

322 Notes

1 Jean M. Murray (ed.), The Newfoundland Journal of Aaron Thomas: Able Seaman in H.M.S. Boston (Don Mills, ON, 1968), p. 182. Baron to Duckworth, 28 August 1811, Provincial Archives of Newfoundland and Labrador [PANL], St. John's, MG 204, John Thomas Duckworth Collection, pp. 1794-6; Muster of HMS Antelope, The National Archives [TNA], London, ADM [Admiralty Papers] 37 / 3509. 3 Shannon Ryan, "Fishery to Colony: A Newfoundland Watershed, 1793-1815," Acadiensis, 12.2 (Spring 1983), pp. 34-52. A "mere Portsmouth" refers to the evolution of St. John's from a rendezvous for convoys into a commercial port. Keith Matthews, A "Who was Who " of Families engaged in the Fishery and Settlement of Newfoundland, 1660-1840 (St. John's, 1971), p. 25. 4 Denver Brunsman recently completed a study of impressment in the British-Atlantic world. Broad in scope, it investigates manning procedure and press gangs in Britain, the mainland American colonies, the West Indies, and even places such as India. Brunsman glossed over Nova Scotia and did not investigate Newfoundland. While Brunsman discusses naval-civilian relations in considerable detail, especially resistance to press gangs, he does not discuss impressment as a form of criminal punishment. My thesis, by comparison, examines impressment in the North Atlantic world but focuses squarely on Nova Scotia and Newfoundland. It is rooted firmly within the colonial histories of those two places, where impressment was used as an alternative to imprisonment, floggings, and transportation. It is likely that colonial and municipal authorities also used impressment as a form of punishment in America and the West Indies, but historians have not studied this topic. Denver Alexander Brunsman, 'The Evil Necessity: British Naval Impressment in the Eighteenth-Century Atlantic World' (Princeton University, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 2004). 5 Leon Radzinowicz, "Impressment into the Army and the Navy - A Rough and Ready Instrument of Preventive Police and Criminal Justice," in Marvin E. Wolfgang (ed.), Crime and Culture: Essays in Honor ofThorsten Sellin (New York, 1968), pp. 287-313. It was incorporated into Leon Radzinowicz, A History of English Criminal Law and its Administration from 1750: Volume. 4, Grappling for Control, 5 vols. (London, 1968), ch, 3. 6 J.M. Beattie, Crime and the Courts in England, 1660-1800 (Princeton, 1986); Beattie, Policing and Punishment in London, 1660-1750: Urban Crime and the Limits of Terror (Oxford, 2001); Douglas Hay, "War, Dearth and Theft in the Eighteenth Century: The Record of the English Courts," Past and Present, 95 (May 1982), pp. 117-60, esp. 137- 46; Douglas Hay and Nicholas Rogers, Eighteenth-Century English Society: Shuttles and Swords (Oxford, 1997), ch. 10, esp. pp. 155-61. 7 Markus Eder, Crime and Punishment in the Royal Navy of the Seven Years' War, 1755- 1763 (Aldershot, Hampshire, 2004), pp. 38-40; Clive Emsley, "The Recruiting of Petty Offenders during the French Wars 1793-1815," Mariner's Mirror, 66.3 (August 1980), pp. 199-207. Nicholas Rogers, "Vagrancy, Impressment and the Regulation of Labour in Eighteenth- Century Britain," Slavery and Abolition, 15.2 (1994), pp. 102-13; Rogers, Crowds,

323 Culture, and Politics in Georgian Britain (Oxford, 1998), ch. 3; Rogers, "Impressment and the Law in Eighteenth-Century Britain," in Norma Landau (ed.), Law, Crime and English Society, 1660-1830 (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 71-94; Philip Woodfine, '"Proper Objects of the Press': Naval Impressment and Habeas Corpus in the French Revolutionary Wars," in Keith Dockray and Keith Laybourn (eds.), The Representation and Reality of War: The British Experience; Essays in Honour of David Wright (Gloucestershire, 1999), pp. 39-60. 9 Peter King, "War as a Judicial Resource: Press Gangs and Prosecution Rates, 1740- 1830," in Landau (ed.), Law, Crime and English Society, pp. 97-116; King, Crime, Justice and Discretion in England, 1740-1820 (Oxford, 2000). 10 Jerry Bannister, The Rule of the Admirals: Law, Custom, and Naval Government in Newfoundland, 1699-1832 (Toronto, 2003), pp. 231-2; Christopher English, "The Official Mind and Popular Protest in a Revolutionary Era: The Case of Newfoundland, 1789-1819," in F. Murray Greenwood and Barry Wright (eds.), Law, Politics, and Security Measures, 1608-1837: Volume 1, Canadian State Trials (Toronto, 1996), pp. 296-322; Melvin Baker, 'The Government of St. John's, Newfoundland, 1800-1921' (University of Western Ontario, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 1980). 11 J.R. Hutchinson, The Press-Gang: Afloat and Ashore (London, 1913); Daniel James Ennis, Enter the Press-Gang: Naval Impressment in Eighteenth-Century British Literature (Newark, New Jersey, 2002). Ryan, "Fishery to Colony," pp. 34-52; Keith Matthews, Lectures on the History of Newfoundland, 1500-1830 (St. John's, 1988), ch. 23; Gordon Handcock, "The Poole Mercantile Community and the Growth of Trinity, 1700-1939," Newfoundland Quarterly, 80.3 (Winter 1985), pp. 19-20; John Mannion, 'The Irish Migrations to Newfoundland' (Unpublished Paper to the Newfoundland Historical Society, 1973; typescript at the Centre for Newfoundland Studies [CNS], St. John's); H.J. Trump, "Newfoundland Trade from the Port of Teignmouth in the 19th Century," Transport History, 9 (Winter 1978), pp. 260-8; Peter Perry, "The Newfoundland Trade - The Decline and Demise of the Port of Poole, 1815-1894," American Neptune, 28.4 (Fall 1969), pp. 275-83. 13 Steel's Navy Lists (London, 1795); Brian Lavery, Nelson's Navy: The Ships, Men and Organisation, 1793-1815 (London, 1989), pp. 120-1; Brunsman, 'Evil Necessity,' pp. 383-5. 14 Muster of HMS Concorde, TNA, ADM 36/13,910. 15 Muster of HMS Camilla, TNA, ADM 16,956; Muster of HMS Mercury, TNA, ADM 36/13,233. 16 John Mannion, "Pierce Sweetman," DCB. 17 Muster of HMS Brilliant, TNA, ADM 36 /14,614. 18 Lester-Garland Papers, Dorchester Record Office [DRO], Dorset, United Kingdom, D / LEG, Diaries of Benjamin and Isaac Lester, 1761-1802. See Benjamin Lester's Diary, DRO, 26 December 1792. 19 Benjamin Lester's Diary, DRO, 9-11 May 1793. 20 Benjamin Lester's Diary, DRO, 9-11 May 1793. 21 Benjamin Lester's Diary, DRO, 5 February 1796, 11 December 1797. 22 Benjamin Lester's Diary, DRO, 16 April 1799. 23 Benjamin Lester's Diary, DRO, 10 December 1793.

324 24 Benjamin Lester's Diary, DRO, 8, 16 December 1793. 25 Benjamin Lester's Diary, DRO, 28 May 1798. 26 Margaret Ann Chang, 'Newfoundland in Transition: The Newfoundland Trade and Robert Newman and Company, 1780-1805' (Memorial University, Unpublished M.A. Thesis, 1975), esp. pp. 77-8; also see Keith Matthews, "Robert Newman," DCB. 27 Hutchinson, Press-Gang, p. 194. Hutchinson, Press-Gang, p. 194. 29 Benjamin Lester's Diary, DRO, 30 November 1794, 9 December 1794. 30 Benjamin Lester's Diary, DRO, 30 November 1794, 9 December 1794; F.W. Mathews, 'Poole and Newfoundland: Printed in the Poole and Parkstone Standard' (Unpublished Manuscript at CNS, 1936), pp. 93-4; Hutchinson, Press-Gang, p. 193. 31 Rogers, Crowds, p. 100. 32 Benjamin Lester's Diary, DRO, 3 October 1801. 33 Lavery, Nelson's Navy, p. 128; Peter Kemp (ed.), Oxford Companion to Ships and the Sea (Oxford, 1976), pp. 498-9, 683. There were penalties in the Quota Acts for non­ compliance. 34 N.A.M. Rodger, "Devon Men and the Navy, 1689-1815," in Michael Duffy (et al), The Maritime History of Devon: Volume 1, From Early Times to the Late Eighteenth Century (London, 1992), pp. 209-15. 35 Dartmouth's Committee of Trade to Wallace, 14 March 1795, TNA, ADM 1 / 473, Letters from Senior Officers in Newfoundland, 1793-7, p. 149. R.G. Thorne (ed.), The History of Parliament: The House of Commons, 1790-1820, 5 vols. (London, 1986), II, pp. 95-129, III, pp. 153-5, IV, pp. 711-12; Alastair W. Massie, "John Pollexfen Bastard," ODNB. 37 Teignmouth's merchants to Gower, 19 December 1804, TNA, ADM 1 / 475, pp. 314- 15. 38 Gower to Robert Marsden, Admiralty Secretary, 23 December 1804, TNA, ADM 1 / 475, pp. 312-13. 39 Gower to Marsden, 23 December 1804, TNA, ADM 1 / 475, pp. 312-13. 40 Gower to Marsden, 23 December 1804, TNA, ADM 1 / 475, pp. 312-13. 41 Gower to Marsden, 23 December 1804, TNA, ADM 1 / 475, pp. 312-13; Shannon Ryan, 'Newfoundland Consolidated Census Returns, 1698-1833' (Typescript at CNS, 1969). 42 Marsden to Gower, 2 January 1805, TNA, ADM 2 / 930, Letters to Senior Officers in Newfoundland, 1795-1815, pp. 181-2. 43 Teignmouth's merchants to Holloway, 8 March 1810, TNA, ADM 1 / 477, p. 6. 44 Morris to Wallace, 28 October 1794, PANL, GN 2 /1 / A, Colonial Secretary's Letter Book, vol. 12, pp. 294-5. This section is based on Keith Mercer, "The Murder of Lieutenant Lawry: A Case Study of British Naval Impressment in Newfoundland, 1794," Newfoundland and Labrador Studies, 21.2 (Fall 2006), pp. 255-89. 45 Morris to Wallace, 28 October 1794, PANL, GN 2 /1 / A, vol. 12, pp. 294-5. 46 Morris to Wallace, 28 October 1794, PANL, GN 2 /1 / A, vol. 12, pp. 294-5. 47 Morris to Wallace, 28 October 1794, PANL, GN 2 /1 / A, vol. 12, pp. 294-5.

325 48 Morris to Wallace, 28 October 1794, PANL, GN 2 /1 / A, vol. 12, pp. 294-5; Wallace to Stephens, 27 November 1794, TNA, ADM 1/473, pp. 132-3; Muster of HMS Boston, TNA, ADM 36 /11,913; Pay Book of HMS Boston, TNA, ADM 35 / 257. 49 Morris to Wallace, 28 October 1794, PANL, GN 2 /1 / A, vol. 12, pp. 294-5. 50 Murray (ed.), Journal of Aaron Thomas, ^- 178. 51 Morris to Wallace, 28 October 1794, PANL, GN 2 /1 / A, vol. 12, pp. 294-5. 5 Murray (ed.), Journal of Aaron Thomas, p. 178. 53 Captain's Log of HMS Boston, TNA, ADM 51/1146. 54 Morris to Wallace, 28 October 1794, PANL, GN 2 /1 / A, vol. 12, pp. 294-5; Wallace offers Pardon, 30 October 1794, PANL, GN 2 /1 / A, vol. 12, p. 302; Wallace to Stephens, 27 November 1794, TNA, ADM 1 / 473, pp. 132-3; Murray (ed.), Journal of Aaron Thomas, p. 178; Captain's Log of HMS Boston, TNA, ADM 51/1146; Master's Log of HMS Boston, TNA, ADM 52 / 2793; Master's Log of HMS Monarch, TNA, ADM 52 / 3247; Lieutenant's Log of HMS Boston, National Maritime Museum [NMM], Greenwich, England, ADM / L / B /140. 55 Murray (ed.), Journal of Aaron Thomas, pp. 178-80. 56 Coke to Wallace, 30 October 1794, PANL, GN 2 /1 / A, vol. 12, p. 298. 57 Muster of HMS Boston, TNA, ADM 36 /11,913. 58 Murray (ed.), Journal of Aaron Thomas, pp. 178-80. 59 Murray (ed.), Journal of Aaron Thomas, pp. 178-80; Wallace to Stephens, 27 November 1794, TNA, ADM 1/473, pp. 132-3; Morris to Wallace, 28 October 1794, PANL, GN 2 /1 / A, vol. 12, pp. 294-5; Coke to Wallace, 30 October 1794, PANL, GN 2 /1 / A, vol. 12, p. 298; Muster of HMS Boston, TNA, ADM 36 /11,913. 60 Wallace to Stephens, 27 November 1794, TNA, ADM 1 / 473, pp. 132-3. 61 Murray (ed.), Journal of Aaron Thomas, pp. 178-9; Captain's Log of HMS Boston, TNA, ADM 51/1146; Master's Log of HMS Boston, TNA, ADM 52 / 2793; Master's Log of HMS Lutine, TNA, ADM 52 / 3159; Master's Log of HMS Bonetta, TNA, ADM 52 / 2870; Master's Log of HMS Monarch, TNA, ADM 52 / 3247; Muster of HMS Boston, TNA, ADM 36 /11,913; Lieutenant's Log of HMS Boston, NMM, ADM / L / B /140; Morris to Wallace, 28 October 1794, PANL, GN 27 1 / A, vol. 12, p. 298; Jonathan Hill to Coke, 25 October 1794, PANL, GN 2 /1 / A, vol. 12, p. 294; Wallace to Sheriff of St. John's, 30 October 1794, PANL, GN 2 /1 / A, vol. 12, pp. 299-300; Wallace to Stephens, 27 November 1794, TNA, ADM 1 / 473, pp. 132-3; Bannister, Rule of the Admirals, pp. 212-15. 62 Murray (ed.), Journal of Aaron Thomas, pp. 178-9. For more on Thomas, see Sarah Glassford, "Seaman, Sightseer, Storyteller, and Sage: Aaron Thomas's 1794 History of Newfoundland," Newfoundland and Labrador Studies, 21.1 (Spring 2006), pp. 149-75. 63 Wallace to Stephens, 27 November 1794, TNA, ADM 1/473, pp. 132-3. 64 Wallace to Stephens, 27 November 1794, TNA, ADM 1/473, pp. 132-3. 65 Wallace to Stephens, 27 November 1794, TNA, ADM 1/473, pp. 132-3; Wallace to Henry Dundas, Secretary of War, 30 November 1794, TNA, WO [War Office papers] 1 / 15, Newfoundland Correspondence, 1792-4, pp. 145-8; Muster of HMS Mercury, TNA, ADM 36/13,233. 66 Grand Jury to Coke, 29 October 1794, PANL, GN 2 /1 / A, vol. 12, pp. 296-7; Coke to Wallace, 29 October 1794, PANL, GN 2 /1 / A, vol. 12, p. 296.

326 bl Grand Jury to Coke, 29 October 1794, PANL, GN 2 /1 / A, vol, 12, pp. 296-7. 68 Grand Jury to Coke, 29 October 1794, PANL, GN 2 /1 / A, vol. 12, pp. 296-7; Coke to Wallace, 29 October 1794, PANL, GN 2 /1 / A, vol. 12, p. 296. 69 Wallace offers Reward, 29 October 1794, PANL, GN 2 /1 / A, vol. 12, p. 301; Wallace offers Pardon, 30 October 1794, PANL, GN 2 /1 / A, vol. 12, p. 302. Lauren Benton, 'Imagining the King's Lost Army: Treason Law and Sovereignty Stories in the Early Modern Atlantic World' (Unpublished McKay History Lecture at Dalhousie University, November 2007); Benton, Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World History, 1400-1900 (Cambridge, 2002). 71 Musters of HMS Boston, TNA, ADM 36 /11,913-14; Pay Book of HMS Boston, TNA, ADM 35 / 257; Musters of HMS Pluto, ADM 36 /13,503-4; Morris to Wallace, 28 October 1794, PANL, GN 2 /1 / A, vol. 12, pp. 294-5. 72 Murray (ed.), Journal of Aaron Thomas, p. 169. 73 Murray (ed.), Journal of Aaron Thomas, pp. 71-4. 74 Murray (ed.), Journal of Aaron Thomas, pp. 71-4. 75 Muster of HMS Concorde, TNA, ADM 36/13,912; Muster of HMS Prometheus, TNA, ADM 37/4751. 76 Christopher Lloyd, The British Seaman, 1200-1860: A Social Survey (London, 1968), p. 196; Peter Kemp, The British Sailor: A Social History of the Lower Deck (London, 1970), p. 165; Daniel A. Baugh, "The Eighteenth Century Navy as a National Institution, 1690-1815," in J.R. Hill (ed.), The Oxford Illustrated History of the Royal Navy (Oxford, 1995), pp. 138-9; Michael Lewis, A Social History of the Navy, 1793-1815 (London, 1960), pp. 135-9; N.A.M. Rodger, The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, Volume 2, 1648-1815 (London, 2004), p. 443. 771.C.B. Dear and Peter Kemp (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Ships and the Sea, 2n ed. (Oxford, 2005), pp. 278-9, 445-6; N.A.M. Rodger, The Wooden World: An Anatomy of the Georgian Navy (London, 1986), p. 177; Lloyd, British Seaman, pp. 158-60; Dudley Pope, Life in Nelson's Navy (Annapolis, Maryland, 1981), ch. 8; Stephen F. Gradish, The Manning of the British Navy during the Seven Years War (London, 1980), ch. 3; Daniel A. Baugh, British Naval Administration in the Age ofWalpole (Princeton, New Jersey, 1965), ch. 4. 78 Cain's apprenticeship agreement, 9 April 1805, and Cain's exemption from impressment, 13 April 1805, PANL, MG 241, Joseph Cain Collection. 79 Royal Gazette and Newfoundland Advertiser, 16 June 1814. 80 Evan Nepean, Admiralty Secretary, to Pole, 20 [June] 1800, TNA, ADM 2 / 930, p. 124; Pole to Nepean, 22 June 1800, TNA, ADM 1 / 474, p. 381. 81 Muster of HMS Mercury, TNA, ADM 36 /13,233. 82 Muster of HMS Rattler, TNA, ADM 36 /17,175. 83 Gower to Viscount Castlereagh, 25 October 1805, TNA, Colonial Office Papers [CO] 194, Newfoundland Correspondence, vol. 44, pp. 180-1; John Clinch to Joseph Tunsell, 10 October 1805, TNA, CO 194, vol. 44, p. 182; Lester & Co. to Gower, 10 October 1805, TNA, CO 194, vol. 44, pp. 184-5; Gower to Magistrates of Newfoundland, 15 October 1805, TNA, CO 194, vol. 44, pp. 186-7; Gower to Skerrett, 14 October 1805, TNA, CO 194, vol. 44, p. 188; Skerrett to Gower, 15 October 1805, TNA, CO 194, vol. 44, pp. 190-1; Gower to Skerrett, 15 October 1805, TNA, CO 194, vol. 44, pp. 192-3;

327 Skerrett to Gower, 17 October 1805, TNA, CO 194, vol. 44, pp. 194-5; Gower to Skerrett, 17 October 1805, TNA, CO 194, vol. 44, pp. 196-7. 84 Bannister, Rule of the Admirals, esp. chs. 2-5; Bannister, "The Naval State in Newfoundland, 1749-1791," Journal of the Canadian Historical Association, New Series, 11 (2000), pp. 17-50. 85 For the monthly returns of the Royal Nova Scotia Regiment, which was often recruiting in Newfoundland during the 1790s, see TNA, WO 1/17-18, Nova Scotia Correspondence, 1794-5, 1796-1800. For an example of one of their recruits being claimed by the Navy in December 1795, see TNA, WO 1 /17, p. 143 86 David A. Webber, The Saint John's Volunteer Rangers, 1805-1814 (St. John's, 1962),

Sean T. Cadigan, Hope and Deception in Conception Bay: Merchant-Settler Relations in Newfoundland, 1785-1855 (Toronto, 1995), p. 87. 88 Although there has been some interesting work on the Army in Newfoundland, little is known about its social life and virtually nothing about recruitment. Until we know more it is impossible to gauge the Army's impact on naval recruitment on the island. See James E. Candow, "The British Army in Newfoundland, 1697-1824," Newfoundland Quarterly, 69 .4 (Spring 1984), pp. 21-8; Olaf Uwe Janzen, "Military Garrisons," in Joseph R. Smallwood and Cyril F. Poole (eds.), Encyclopedia of Newfoundland and Labrador [ENL], 5 vols. (St. John's, 1981-94), III, pp. 540-9. 9 Governor Richard Keats to J.W. Croker, Admiralty Secretary, 9 April 1813, TNA, ADM 1 / 478, p. 84. 90 'Schedule of Orders, Letters, and Papers delivered to John Thomas Duckworth by Holloway, his predecessor as governor of Newfoundland,' 11 April 1810, PANL, MG 204, Duckworth Collection, p. 148. 91 Master's Log of HMS Bonetta, TNA, ADM 52 / 2870; Master's Log of HMS Amphion, TNA, ADM 52 / 2732. 92 Port Orders, undated, PANL, MG 204, Duckworth Collection, pp. 247-50. 93 Port Orders, undated, PANL, MG 204, Duckworth Collection, pp. 247-50. For examples of passes, see Pass to James B. Buchanan, 13 September 1810, PANL, MG 204, Duckworth Collection, Reel 7, Furlong Collection, p. 125; Pass to American Seamen, 28 September 1810, PANL, MG 204, Duckworth Collection, Reel 7, Furlong Collection, p. 138; Pass to A.W. Curdy and John Minto, 9 October 1810, PANL, MG 204, Duckworth Collection, Reel 7, Furlong Collection p. 169; Royal Gazette and Newfoundland Advertiser, 13 September 1810. 94 Port Orders, undated, PANL, MG 204, Duckworth Collection, pp. 247-50. 95 Edward Chappell, Voyage of His Majesty's Ship Rosamond to Newfoundland and the Southern Coast of Labrador; of which countries no account has been published by any British traveller since the reign of Queen Elizabeth (London, 1818), pp. 209-10. Patrick O'Flaherty makes a mistake in dismissing Chappell's book out of hand simply because he told tall tales and painted an unfavourable picture of early Newfoundland society. Many British observers in this period, especially Army and Navy officers, made similar observations. Patrick O'Flaherty, The Rock Observed: Studies in the Literature of Newfoundland (Toronto, 1979), pp. 59-60. For another observer of Newfoundland in this period who is ignored by historians, and who comments on Newfoundland society and

328 naval-civilian relations, see Robert Steele, A Tour through part of the Atlantic; or, Recollections from Madeira, the Azores (or Western Isles), and Newfoundland....Visited in the Summer of 1809, in H.M.S. Vestal (London, 1810), esp. pp. 90-102, 144-7. Steele was a lieutenant in the . R.G. Moyles does not dismiss Chappell's observations in his book, "Complaints is many and various, but the oddDivil likes it": Nineteenth Century Views of Newfoundland (Toronto, 1977), pp. 2-4. 96 Port Orders, undated, PANL, MG 204, Duckworth Collection, pp. 247-50. On how guard boats fit into the Navy's larger presence in St. John's, see Bannister, Rule of the Admirals, pp. 180-5. For examples of guard reports, see Duckworth Collection, PANL, MG 204, Reel 6, Furlong Collection, pp. 5466-81. For an example of a guard boat helping a merchant crew in St. John's harbour, see Royal Gazette and Newfoundland Advertiser, 3 May 1810. 97 Port Orders, undated, PANL, MG 204, Duckworth Collection, pp. 247-50; Keats to Croker, 24 December 1813, TNA, ADM 1 / 478, pp. 260-1; John Barrow, Admiralty Secretary, to Duckworth, 10 June 1812, TNA, ADM 2 / 930, pp. 57-8; 'List of Disposable Supernumeraries onboard the Prison Ship HMS Triton,'' 7 September 1812, PANL, MG 204, Duckworth Collection, p. 5109; Musters of HMS Triton, TNA, ADM 37/3684,5458,5816. 98 Captain's Log of HMS Fox, TNA, ADM 51 / 371. 99 Newman and Company et al. to Wallace, 13 October 1795, PANL, GN 2 / 1 / A, vol. 12, pp. 356-7. 100 Newman and Company et al. to Wallace, 13 October 1795, PANL, GN 2 /1 / A, vol. 12, pp. 356-7; Jonathan Hill, Civil Secretary, to H.W. Brown, 13 October 1795, PANL, GN2/l/A,vol. 12, pp. 357-8. 101 Bland to Gower, 17 October 1805, CNS, The D'Alberti Transcripts, vol. 15, no page numbers. 102 Bland to Gower, 17 October 1805, CNS, D'Alberti Transcripts, vol. 15. 103 Gower to Bland, 23 October 1805, CNS, D'Alberti Transcripts, vol. 15. 104 Gower to Messrs Parker & Knight, 12 October 1805, D'Alberti Transcripts, vol. 15. 105 Duniam to Duckworth, [1810], PANL, MG 204, Duckworth Collection, pp. 1079-80. 106 Swim to Duckworth, 15 September 1810, PANL, MG 204, Duckworth Collection, pp. 1317-20. 107 For instance, see Charles Bruce Fergusson (ed.), The Diary of Simeon Perkins, 1797- 1803 (Toronto, 1967), vol. 4, 28 June 1803, p. 469; Fergusson (ed.), The Diary of Simeon Perkins, 1804-1812 (Toronto, 1978), vol. 5, p. 158. 108 This report is discussed in C.R. Fay, Life and Labour in Newfoundland (Toronto, 1956), p. 134. 109 Royal Gazette and Newfoundland Advertiser, 11 August 1814. 110 Muster of HMS Mercury, TNA, ADM 36 /13,233. 111 Muster of HMS Alert, TNA, ADM 37/1519. 112 Muster of HMS Prometheus, TNA, ADM 37 / 4751; Muster of HMS Galatea, TNA, ADM 37 / 5302. 113 Bowen to Governor Erasmus Gower, 19 December 1806, TNA, ADM 1 / 476, pp. 145-6.

329 Born in Ilfracombe in north Devon, Bowen was the son of James Bowen (1751-1835), a master in the Navy and later a commissioner of the Navy Board and a rear admiral. Two of Bowen's uncles were captains in the Navy, as was his elder brother, James. While he never rose above the rank of post-captain, Bowen is well-known for his role in the settlement of Tasmania (formerly Van Diemen's Land). In 1803, he was a lieutenant in HMS Glatton, which transported convicts to New South , a colony in southeast Australia. Bowen offered his services to the governor of , who in turn directed him to establish Tasmania's first European settlement at Ridson Cove on the southeast coast, and to name it Hobart. Although Bowen sailed for England in 1805 to continue his naval career, he is still remembered as the founder of Tasmania. Bowen became a commander in 1804 and was promoted to captain of the Camilla two years later. David Lyon, The Sailing Navy List: All the Ships of the Royal Navy - Built, Purchased and Captured - 1688-1860 (London, 1993), pp. 90-1; Lavery, Nelson's Navy, p. 41; E. Flinn, "John Bowen (1780-1827)," Australian Dictionary of Biography (online ed.); Phillip Tardif, John Bowen's Hobart: The Beginning of European Settlement in Tasmania (Hobart, Tasmania, 2003); J.K. Laughton rev. Andrew Lambert, "James Bowen," ODNB; David Syrett and R.L. DiNardo (eds.), The Commissioned Sea Officers of the Royal Navy, 1660-1815 (Aldershot, 1994), pp. 44-5. 115 Captain's Log of HMS Camilla, TNA, ADM 51 /1667; Bowen to Gower, 19 December 1806, ADM 1 / 476, pp. 145-6; Bowen to Gower, 20 January 1807, TNA, ADM 1 / 476, p. 148; Thomas Innes, captain of HMS Childers, to Gower, 16 January 1806, TNA, ADM 1 / 476, p. 140; Gower to Marsden, 21 November 1806, TNA, ADM 1 / 476, p. 120; Lyon, Sailing Navy List, pp. 98, 276. 116 Muster of HMS Camilla, TNA, ADM 36 /16,959. The West Country merchants Robert Newman and Peter Ougier testified to the House of Commons in 1793 that Newfoundland fishermen made poor recruits for the Navy, because of ulcers and other physical ailments stemming from their line of work. Sheila Lambert (ed.), House of Commons Sessional Papers of the Eighteenth Century: Volume 90, Newfoundland, 1792- 93 (Wilmington, Delaware, 1975), pp. 342-3. 117 Bowen to Gower, 19 December 1806, TNA, ADM 1 / 476, pp. 145-6; Muster of HMS Camilla, TNA, ADM 36 /16,959; Captain's Log of HMS Camilla, TNA, ADM 51 / 1667. 118 Supreme Court Minute Book, 1806-11, 3 December 1806, PANL, GN 5 / 2 / A /1, Box 25, pp. 68-73. 119 Bowen to Gower, 19 December 1806, TNA, ADM 1 / 476, pp. 145-6; E.R. Seary, Family Names of the Island of Newfoundland, 2nd ed. (St. John's, 1978), p. 42; Matthews, Who was Who, p. 41; Crown vs. James Boucher, Supreme Court Minute Book, 3 December 1806, PANL, GN 5 / 2 / A /1, Box 25, pp. 68-73. 120 Supreme Court Minute Book, 3 December 1806, PANL, GN 5 / 2 / A /1, Box 25, pp. 68-73. 121 Supreme Court Minute Book, 3 December 1806, PANL, GN 5 / 2 / A /1, Box 25, pp. 68-73. 122 Bowen to Gower, 19 December 1806, TNA, ADM 1 / 476, pp. 145-6; Supreme Court Minute Book, 3 December 1806, PANL, GN 5 / 2 / A /1, pp. 68-73.

330 123 Supreme Court Minute Book, 3 December 1806, PANL, GN 5 / 2 / A /1, Box 25, pp. 68-73. 124 Supreme Court Minute Book, 3 December 1806, PANL, GN 5 / 2 / A /1, Box 25, pp. 68-73. 125 Supreme Court Minute Book, 3 December 1806, PANL, GN 5 / 2 / A /1, Box 25, pp. 68-73. 126 Supreme Court Minute Book, 3 December 1806, PANL, GN 5 / 2 / A / 1, Box 25, pp. 68-73. 127 Bowen to Gower, 19 December 1806, TNA, ADM 1 / 476, pp. 145-6; Supreme Court Minute Book, 3 December 1806, PANL, GN 5 / 2 / A /1, pp. 68-73. 128 Supreme Court Minute Book, 3 December 1806, PANL, GN 5 / 2 / A /1, Box 25, pp. 68-73. 129 Bowen to Gower, 19 December 1806, TNA, ADM 1 / 476, pp. 145-6; Supreme Court Minute Book, 3 December 1806, PANL, GN 5 / 2 / A /1, pp. 68-73. 130 Supreme Court Minute Book, 3, 15 December 1806, PANL, GN 5 / 2 / A /1, pp. 68- 74. 131 Supreme Court Minute Book, 3, 15 December 1806, PANL, GN 5 / 2 / A /1, pp. 68- 74. 132 Crown vs. Elmes, 3 December 1806, Supreme Court Minute Book, PANL, GN 5 / 2 / A /1, pp. 75-7. The Camilla's witnesses accused Elmes of disrupting the press gang and striking and kicking some of its sailors; he was also said to have encouraged his crew to take part in the resistance, and that he prevented the naval party from lowering Tool into the boat several times. Elmes's witnesses testified that they did not see their master use any violence. 133 Capel Heans vs. Agassiz, 13 and 17 March 1807, Supreme Court Minute Book, PANL, GN 5 / 2 / A /1, pp. 116, 122-3; Crown vs. Agassiz, 16 March 1807, Supreme Court Minute Book, PANL, GN 5 / 2 / A /1, pp. 118-21; Crown vs. George, 17 March 1807, Supreme Court Minute Book, PANL, GN 5 / 2 / A /1, pp. 124-5. 134 Crown vs. Agassiz, 16 March 1807, Supreme Court Minute Book, PANL, GN 5 / 2 / A/1, pp. 118-20. 135 Keith Matthews, "James MacBraire," DCB; John Mannion, "James MacBraire," in James H. Marsh (ed.), The Canadian Encyclopedia: Year 2000 Edition (Toronto, 1999), p. 1379. 136 Captain's Log of HMS Camilla, TNA, ADM 51 /1667; Master's Log of HMS Camilla, TNA, ADM 52 / 3816; Ship's Log of HMS Camilla, TNA, ADM 53 / 399; Lieutenant's Log of HMS Camilla, NMM, ADM / L / C / 27. 137 Muster of HMS Camilla, TNA, ADM 36 /16,959. 138 King to Duckworth, 13 August 1811, PANL, MG 204, Duckworth Collection, pp. 4858-9. 139 King to Duckworth, 13 August 1811, PANL, MG 204, Duckworth Collection, pp. 4858-9. 140 King to Duckworth, 13 August 1811, PANL, MG 204, Duckworth Collection, pp. 4858-9. 141 Frederick Jones and G.M.S. Story, "Lewis Amadeus Anspach," DCB.

331 Lewis Amadeus Anspach, A Summary of the Laws of Commerce and Navigation, Adapted to the present State, Government, and Trade of the Island of Newfoundland (London, 1809), p. x. 143 Bannister, Rule of the Admirals; Jones and Story, "Anspach," DCB; Notes from a Report to Governor Duckworth by Rev. Louis [sic] Amadeus Anspach (St. John's, 1971). Anspach, Summary of the Laws of Commerce, pp. 135-6. 1 5 Palliser's Proclamation against Harbouring Deserters, 23 June 1764, TNA, ADM 80 / 121, Book of Orders and Proclamations by Governors of Newfoundland, 1749-1805, p. 30. 146 Palliser's Proclamation against Harbouring Deserters, 23 June 1764, TNA, ADM 80 / 121, p. 30. 147 Palliser's Proclamation against Harbouring Deserters, 23 June 1764, TNA, ADM 80 / 121, p. 30. 148 Edwards's Proclamation on Deserters, 31 July 1780, CNS, D'Alberti Transcripts, vol. 1; Campbell's Proclamation on Deserters, 2 August 1782, TNA, ADM 80 /121, pp. 100- 1. Also see Placentia District Court Records, 2 August 1782, PANL, GN 5 / 4 / C /1, Minute Book, Box 198, p. 158; Campbell to Magistrates of Newfoundland, 2 August 1782, CNS, D'Alberti Transcripts, vol. 2. 149 Proclamation on Deserters to William Dodd, William Fogherty and the Constables of Torbay, 16 July 1795, TNA, ADM 80 /121, p. 133; Proclamation on Deserters to the Chief Justice and Magistrates of St. John's, 16 July 1795, TNA, ADM 80 /121, p. 134. 150 Proclamation on Deserters, 28 July 1797, TNA, ADM 80 /121, pp. 136-8. 151 Proclamation on Deserters, 28 July 1797, TNA, ADM 80 / 121, pp. 136-8. Waldegrave followed other governors in threatening tavern keepers not to entertain naval seamen, soldiers and deserters from either service, or they would have their license revoked. For the license Wallace issued to Elizabeth Sutton in Trepassey in 1794, see Willeen G. Keough, 'The Slender Thread: Irish Women on the Southern Avalon, 1750- 1860' (Memorial University, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 2001), p. 291. 152 Waldegrave to Coke, 27 August 1797, CNS, D'Alberti Transcripts, vol. 6; Coke to Waldegrave, 5 September 1797, CNS, D'Alberti Transcripts, vol. 6; Waldegrave to Windham, 25 October 1797, CNS, D'Alberti Transcripts, vol. 7. 153 Notice on Desertion, 16 October 1799, TNA, ADM 80 /121, p. 142. 154 Notice on Desertion, 16 October 1799, TNA, ADM 80 /121, p. 142. 155 Proclamation on Deserters, 25 August 1800, TNA, ADM 80 /121, pp. 144-5; Order against Assisting and Harbouring Deserters, [1803], TNA, ADM 80 /121, pp. 156-7 156 Cunninghame, Bell and Company to Duckworth, 5 September 1811, PANL, MG 204, Duckworth Collection, pp. 1845-7; Aylmer to Duckworth, 5 September 1811, PANL, MG 204, Duckworth Collection, pp. 1849-50; Hine to Duckworth, 7 September 1811, PANL, MG 204, Duckworth Collection, pp. 1861-3; Note on the Recovery of Deserters at Croque, [August 1811], PANL, MG 204, Duckworth Collection, p. 4499; List of Drying Crew at St. Julien's and Croque, [1811], PANL, MG 204, Duckworth Collection, pp. 4613-16; Duckworth to Aylmer, 6 September 1811, PANL, MG 204, Duckworth Collection, Reel 8, Yale Letter Books, vol. 2, no page numbers; Duckworth's Journal, 5 September 1811, PANL, MG 204, Duckworth Collection, pp. 5648-50; Muster of HMS Narcissus, TNA, ADM 37 / 3623. Charles Carty, one of the pressed shoremen, deserted

332 from the Narcissus at St. John's on 14 September; Patrick Murphy, another one, was turned over to HMS Comet on 20 October 1811, on Duckworth's personal order. This case is discussed briefly in William H. Whitely, Duckworth's Newfoundland: The Island in the Early Nineteenth Century (St. John's, 1985), p. 12. 157 Proclamation on Deserters, 23 August 1810, PANL, MG 204, Duckworth Collection, p. 1291. 58 Proclamation on Deserters, 23 August 1810, PANL, MG 204, Duckworth Collection, p. 1291. Proclamation on Deserters, 14 August 1811, PANL, MG 204, Duckworth Collection, Yale Letter Books, vol. 2, no. 398. 160 Ford to Duckworth, 5 September 1811, PANL, MG 204, Duckworth Collection, pp. 1841-2; Examination of Richard Dyke, 2 September 1811, PANL, MG 204, Duckworth Collection, p. 1845. 1 l Royal Gazette and Newfoundland Advertiser, 1, 30 April 1813. 162 37 Geo. Ill, c. 73(1797). 163 Duckworth to Croker, 27 January 1812, TNA, ADM 1 / 477, pp. 306-7; Duckworth to Earl of Liverpool, 20 May 1812, PANL, MG 204, Duckworth Collection, Furlong Entry Books, vol. 2, pp. 222-3. 164 Bicknell to Croker, 1 February 1812, TNA, ADM 1 / 477, p. 308; Barrow to Duckworth, 3 February 1812, TNA, ADM 2 / 930, p. 50. Anspach, Summary of the Laws of Commerce, pp. 112, 135-6. 166 50 Geo. Ill, c. 7(1810). 167 Duckworth to Bathurst, 1 November 1812, PANL, MG 204, Duckworth Collection, Furlong Entry Books, vol. 3, pp. 389-90. 168 Duckworth to Bathurst, 1 November 1812, PANL, MG 204, Duckworth Collection, Furlong Entry Books, vol. 3, pp. 389-90. 169 William H. Whitely, "Newfoundland, Quebec and the Labrador Merchants, 1783- 1809," Newfoundland Quarterly, 15 A (November 1977), pp. 17-26; Instructions to Captain Northey on the Labrador Station, 1805, TNA, ADM 1 / 475, pp. 343-4; Merchants in Conception Bay to Gower, 20 October 1806, TNA, ADM 1 / 476, pp. 107- 8. Also see W.G. Gosling, Labrador: Its Discovery, Exploration, and Development (London, 1910), ch. 15; William H. Whitely, "Newfoundland, Quebec, and the Administration of the Coast of Labrador, 1774-1783," Acadiensis, 6.1 (Autumn 1976), $.92-112. Whitely, "Newfoundland, Quebec and Labrador Merchants," p. 25. 171 Additional Instructions to Captains and Commanders on the American fisheries at Labrador and Newfoundland, no date, PANL, MG 204, Duckworth Collection, pp. 521-5; Duckworth's Observations on Instructions as Admiral and Governor of Newfoundland,' no date, PANL, MG 204, Duckworth Collection, p. 97. 172 Order to Fishing Masters of Conception Bay, 11 May 1812, PANL, MG 204, Duckworth Collection, p. 2638. 173 Surrogate Court at Trinity, 9 May 1800, PANL, MG 205, Charles Morice Pole Collection, no page numbers. 174 Surrogate Court, 9 May 1800, PANL, MG 205, Pole Collection. 175 Surrogate Court, 9 May 1800, PANL, MG 205, Pole Collection.

333 176 Surrogate Court, 9 May 1800, PANL, MG 205, Pole Collection. 177 Gower to Garland, 12 September 1805, CNS, D'Alberti Transcripts, vol. 15. 178 Gower to Garland, 12 September 1805, CNS, D'Alberti Transcripts, vol. 15. 179 Gower to Garland, 12 September 1805, CNS, D'Alberti Transcripts, vol. 15. 180 Muster of HMS Adonis, TNA, ADM 37 /1020; Master's Log of HMS Adonis, TNA, ADM 52/4403. 181 181 Muster of HMS Concorde, TNA, ADM 36/13,912. 182 Muster of HMS Isis, TNA, ADM 36 /15,912. 183 Muster of HMS Camilla, TNA, ADM 36 /16,959; Captain's Log of HMS Camilla, TNA, ADM 51/1667. 184 Gower to Magistrates of St. John's, 18 September 1805, CNS, D'Alberti Transcripts, vol. 15. 185 Gower to Magistrates of St. John's, 18 September 1805, CNS, D'Alberti Transcripts, vol. 15. 186 Gower to Magistrates of St. John's, 18 September 1805, CNS, D'Alberti Transcripts, vol. 15. 187 Gower to Magistrates of St. John's, 18 September 1805, CNS, D'Alberti Transcripts, vol. 15. 188 Gower to Magistrates of St. John's, 18 September 1805, CNS, D'Alberti Transcripts, vol. 15. 189 Gower to Magistrates of St. John's, 17 October 1806, CNS, D'Alberti Transcripts, vol. 16. 190 Gower to Magistrates of St. John's, 17 October 1806, CNS, D'Alberti Transcripts, vol. 16. The Nova Scotia Regiment was stationed in Newfoundland. At times the War Office swapped the regiments of neighbouring colonies, particularly when soldiers were becoming too familiar with the local population. 191 Muster of HMS Mercury, TNA, ADM 37 /1105; Musters of HMS Antelope, TNA, ADM 37 / 2485, 3509-10; Muster of HMS Galatea, TNA, ADM 37 / 5303. 192 Muster of HMS Galatea, TNA, ADM 37 / 5303; James P. Ranee to Carter, 25 August 1797, CNS, D'Alberti Transcripts, vol. 6. 193 Ranee to Carter, 25 August 1797, CNS, D'Alberti Transcripts, vol. 6. 194 Muster of HMS Adonis, TNA, ADM 37 /1020; Muster of HMS Derwent, TNA, ADM 37 / 4644. Keough, 'Slender Thread,' pp. 436,470, notes a couple of cases in which minor sentences were mitigated by entry into the Army. 195 Account of Lionel Chancey, 14 October 1810, PANL, MG 204, Duckworth Collection, pp. 3926-9. 196 Account of Chancey, 14 October 1810, PANL, MG 204, Duckworth Collection, pp. 3926-9. 197 Cumby to Governor Richard Keats, 20 April 1813, PANL, GN 2 /1 / A, vol. 24, pp. 217-20. 198 Cumby to Keats, 20 April 1813, PANL, GN 2 /1 / A, vol. 24, pp. 217-20. 199 Cumby to Keats, 20 April 1813, PANL, GN 2 /1 / A, vol. 24, pp. 217-20. 200 Cumby to Keats, 20 April 1813, PANL, GN 2 /1 / A, vol. 24, pp. 217-20. 201 Cumby to Keats, 20 April 1813, PANL, GN 2 /1 / A, vol. 24, pp. 217-20. 202 Cumby to Coote, 14 April 1813, PANL, GN 2 /1 / A, vol. 24, pp. 220-1.

334 203 Coote to Cumby, 14 April 1813, PANL, GN 2 /1 / A, vol. 24, pp. 221-2. 204 Cumby to Coote, 15 April 1813, PANL, GN 2 /1 / A, vol. 24, pp. 223-4. 205 Cumby to Coote, 15 April 1813, PANL, GN 2 /1 / A, vol. 24, pp. 223-4. 206 Coote to Cumby, 14 April 1813, PANL, GN 2 /1 / A, vol. 24, pp. 221-2. 207 Keats to Lord Bathurst, 17 May 1816, TNA, ADM 80 / 151, Letter book of R.G. Keats, 1815-16, pp. 380-1. 208 Janet E. Miller Pitt, "Thomas Coote," ENL, vol. 1, p. 527; Keats to Bathurst, 17 May 1816, TNA, ADM 80 /151, pp. 380-1; Governor Charles Hamilton to Bathurst, 28 July 1818, TNA, CO 194, vol. 61, p. 72. 209 Royal Gazette and Newfoundland Advertiser, 29 November 1810. 210 Examination of Walter Walsh, 7 December 1810, PANL, MG 204, Duckworth Collection, pp. 1608-9. 211 Coote to Duckworth, 22 December 1810, PANL, MG 204, Duckworth Collection, pp. 1604-6; Examination of Walsh, 7 December 1810, PANL, MG 204, Duckworth Collection, pp. 1608-9. 212 Muster of HMS Hyperion, TNA, ADM 37 / 4312. Royal Gazette and Newfoundland Advertiser, 30 April 1813. 214 Cumby to Navy Board, 30 December 1813, TNA, ADM 1 /1666, Captains' Letters, Surname "C", 1814, no page numbers. TIC Chappell, Voyage of Rosamond, p. 150. 216 Musters of HMS Crescent, TNA, ADM 37 / 4254, 5259. 217 Captain Edward Hawker to Lieutenants of HMS Bellerophon, 1 June 1813, NMM, HAW / 8, Captain Edward Hawker's Order Book, 1813-14, no page numbers. •> 1 Q Royal Gazette and Newfoundland Advertiser, 27 August 1812. 219 Royal Gazette and Newfoundland Advertiser, 26 November 1812, 3 June 1813, 2 September 1813. 220 Allen to Warren, 6 September 1810, PANL, MG 204, Duckworth Collection, pp. 4671-3. 221 Warren to Duckworth, 25 August 1810, PANL, MG 204, Duckworth Collection, p. 4673; Allen to Warren, 6 September 1810, PANL, MG 204, Duckworth Collection, pp. 4671-3; Frissel to Duckworth, 11 September 1810, PANL, MG 204, Duckworth Collection, p. 4674. 222 A.C. Wardle, "The Newfoundland Trade," in C. Northcote Parkinson (ed.), The Trade Winds: A Study of British Overseas Trade during the French Wars, 1793-1815 (London, 1948), p. 246; Percy Russell, Dartmouth: A History of the Port and Town (London, 1950), p. 127; Fay, Life and Labour, p. 20. 223 Muster of HMS Hazard, TNA, ADM 37 / 5570. 224 Paul O'Neill, The Oldest City: The Story of St. John's, Newfoundland (1975-6 repr. Portugal Cove-St. Phillips, NL, 2003), pp. 519-20, 555. On the Roman Catholic Basilica, see Catherine F. Horan, "Basilica of St. John the Baptist," ENL, vol. 1, pp. 141-2. Several abandoned graveyards were scattered on the outskirts of the city, and it is possible that the men were laid to rest in a burial ground once reserved for plague victims 225 O'Neill, Oldest City, p. 534. On the Anglican Cathedral, see Janet E. Miller Pitt, "Cathedral of St. John the Baptist (Anglican)," ENL, vol. 1, pp. 385-7. On the duel, see Hugh A. Halliday, Murder among Gentlemen: A History of Duelling in Canada (Toronto,

335 1999), pp. 103-10. The pistols used in this affair are on display at the Newfoundland Museum. Wayne C. Stockwood, "The Last Duel," ENL, vol. 1, pp. 650-1. 226 O'Neill, Oldest City, pp. 668-70, 729-30. O'Neill notes that Lawry and the press gang "are said to have rowed to Steer's Cove" with the two recruits. While this is not in the documentary record, the naval party did land at the upper end of St. John's harbour, in which Steer's Cove was located. In any case, the name Steer's Cove dates from the mid- nineteenth century, which means that it was not in use in 1794. The street corner was named after John Steer, who arrived from Torquay, Devon, as a child in 1824. He opened a dry goods business that later became a wholesale supply house and insurance firm. Steer's Cove is still a street name in St. John's. 997 Robert H. Cuff (ed.), Dictionary of Newfoundland and Labrador Biography (St. John's, 1990), p. 312. 228 'In the Days of the Press Gang,' PANL, MG 282, Henry Francis Shortis Fonds, vol. 3, no. 161. His fugitive history was never published. David Adams Leeming (ed.), Storytelling Encyclopedia: Historical, Cultural, and Multiethnic approaches to Oral Traditions around the World (Phoenix, 1997), pp. 179, 276-7, 320-1; also see Maria Leach (ed.), Funk and Wagnall's Standard Dictionary of Folklore, Mythology, and Legend (New York, 1972), pp. 408-9, 612, 778. To this day most writers who chronicle the Lawry murder are Irish-Newfoundlanders. For example, see O'Neill, Oldest City, pp. 729-30; Mike McCarthy, "The Press Gang Murder," Newfoundland TV Topics, 13 November 1979, p. 9, and his The Irish in Newfoundland, 1600-1900: Their Trials, Tribulations and Triumphs (St. John's, 1999), pp. 82-4; Patrick O'Flaherty, Old Newfoundland: A History to 1843 (St. John's, 1999), p. 111; Jack Fitzgerald, Beyond the Grave: From Crime to Eternity (St. John's, 2002), pp. 94-5. For more on the Irish connections in this case, see Mercer, "Lieutenant Lawry," pp. 273-4; also see John Mannion, '"Notoriously disaffected to the Government...': British Allegations of Irish Disloyalty in Eighteenth-Century Newfoundland," Newfoundland Studies, 16.1 (Spring 2000), pp. 1-29; Mannion, "Transatlantic Disaffection: Wexford and Newfoundland, 1798-1800," Journal of the Wexford Historical Society, 17 (1998-9), pp. 30-60. For other works that discuss the Lawry case, see Charles Pedley, The History of Newfoundland: From the Earliest Times to the Year 1860 (London, 1863), pp. 166-8; Frederick W. Rowe, A History of Newfoundland and Labrador (Toronto, 1980), p. 221; Wayne C. Stockwood, "Conscription and Impressment," ENL, I, pp. 508-9; English, "Official Mind," p. 309; Bannister, Rule of the Admirals, pp. 213-14, 219-21; Cyril J. Byrne (ed.), Gentlemen-Bishops and Faction Fighters: The Letters of Bishops O 'Donel, Lambert, Scallan and Other Irish Missionaries (St. John's, 1984), p. 35. But see Mercer, "Lieutenant Lawry," no. 29. D.W. Prowse does not discuss this case in the text of his book. Prowse, A History of Newfoundland: From the English, Colonial and Foreign Records (London, 1895), p. 654. 230 Gerald S. Graham, Sea Power and British North America, 1783-1820: A Study in British Colonial Policy (Harvard, 1941), p. 248. 31 Cited in Graham, Sea Power and British North America, pp. 266-7. 232 Cited in Graham, Sea Power and British North America, pp. 266-1. 233 Graham, Sea Power and British North America, pp. 248, 266-7; Nigel Chancellor, "John Sullivan," ODNB.

336 Chapter 6 Conclusion

Folklore is an intriguing way to compare press gangs in Nova Scotia and

Newfoundland. For example, the Boston tragedy in 1794 survived in popular culture in the nineteenth century, but it is the only reference to impressment in Newfoundland's cultural memory. The absence of impressment from popular and academic histories has led some historians to conclude that press gangs were non-existent on the island, and that the nursery for seamen was a fraud. Newfoundland is exceptional in this regard - other towns and colonies that were home to the Royal Navy, and its press gangs, have found a prominent place for naval-civilian relations in their historiographies. Newfoundland's historical villains include West Country merchants and fishing admirals, but not press gangs. This is surprising because Memorial University is the centre of folklore studies in

Canada, and as this thesis has shown, press gangs were common in Newfoundland during the Napoleonic Wars.1 In Nova Scotia, by contrast, press gangs are alive and well in folklore and cultural memory. This includes the 'The Press Gang' restaurant in Halifax and the discussion of impressment in popular history. Thomas H. Raddall, F.F. Tupper, and Ronald Sherwood have mixed together fact, fiction, and folklore about press gangs in their books on Halifax, Liverpool, and Pictou.2 This folklore disparity suggests that impressment was more important in Nova Scotia than in Newfoundland, but this was not the case. This dissertation has argued that press gangs had a significant impact on both of these North Atlantic colonies.

337 This chapter summarizes the thesis's main themes and briefly compares press gangs in Nova Scotia and Newfoundland. It is primarily a story about differences rather than similarities. Although the two colonies are rarely grouped together, apart from

Acadia and the English Shore in the seventeenth century, there are compelling reasons for doing so.3 For instance, they were Britain's two main English-speaking colonies in the

North Atlantic world, and both stayed loyal to the Crown during the American

Revolution. Geographically, they are situated close together, and as for economics, both depended on fishing and maritime commerce. Each colony also had a capital or metropolis - Halifax and St. John's were the centres of government, politics, trade, and population in Nova Scotia and Newfoundland. In addition, Halifax and St. John's were both home to squadrons of the Royal Navy and to regiments of the British Army. This gave them a similar military character during the many wars of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Recruitment and other military-civilian relations impacted their populations on a daily basis. However, Nova Scotia and Newfoundland had very different cultural roots and government institutions, and these things shaped impressment and naval-civilian relations in unique ways.

Nova Scotia was peopled largely by New England planters in the late 1750s and

1760s. They filled up the Acadian farmlands and established fishing communities on the south shore. They also brought a history of resistance to impressment with them to Nova

Scotia. Boston fended off press gangs in the 1690s, naval-civilian relations intensified on the American seaboard in the mid-eighteenth century, and Massachusetts created impressment regulations during the 1740s. The latter included protecting residents of

Massachusetts from the Navy, and regulating press gangs on shore. One of the conditions

338 that the planters negotiated for with the Nova Scotia government was protection from impressment. This started the debate about what it meant to be a resident of Nova Scotia in the eighteenth century. When the exemption expired after ten years, Nova Scotia authorities drew upon the New England model from the 1740s to contest impressment. It was a different story in Newfoundland. The island was an extension of the migratory fishery, which sent thousands of fishermen and hundreds of ships to the island each year.

There were planters in Newfoundland as well, but they came from the West Country and

Ireland. Impressment occurred on a large scale in the British Isles in the eighteenth century and the Newfoundland trade was valued as a training ground for the Navy. Since warships pressed men with ease from convoys off the English and Irish coasts, there was no need to take them in Newfoundland. However, when the British labour market was depleted in the 1770s and 1790s, which devastated the migratory trade, the Navy looked to Newfoundland as an alternative source of manpower. Therefore, the origins of impressment were rooted in different places in the Atlantic world. Nova Scotia was tied to New England, while Newfoundland's development was shaped by events in the British

Isles.

There were also major differences in impressment procedure and naval-civilian relations in Nova Scotia and Newfoundland. This stemmed from the political and government institutions in place in the two colonies. From the 1750s, Nova Scotia possessed a colonial governor, assembly, council and newspaper press, which negotiated with the Navy and resisted press gangs. For example, Nova Scotia authorities forged policies between 1793 and 1805 that regulated press gangs on shore and protected residents from the Navy. Newfoundland did not have this colonial infrastructure - there

339 was no resident governor, assembly, or newspaper for much of this period. Moreover, the governor was also the admiral in Newfoundland, and he made executive decisions on impressment. And while press gangs were resisted in both colonies, there were far more protests in Nova Scotia than in Newfoundland. Popular and official resistance worked in tandem from the 1770s to the War of 1812. The civil power also had contrasting relationships with the Navy in the two colonies. Magistrates such as Richard Tremain battled press gangs in Halifax's streets during the War of 1812 and rarely cooperated with the Navy. In Newfoundland, Thomas Coote also privileged social tranquility over impressment on shore, but he still cooperated with the Navy. Magistrates rounded up deserters on the island, and they sent dozens of petty criminals to the Navy each year in the early nineteenth century. While pre-trial enlistments were a significant source of naval recruitment in Newfoundland, only a small number of criminals were sent to the

Navy in Nova Scotia.

Impressment productivity was the biggest difference between the two naval stations. The Newfoundland fishery was valued as a nursery for seamen, while Nova

Scotia increasingly became a drain on the Navy's manpower. The North American squadron sent warships to Newfoundland on several occasions to find sailors, because none were available in Nova Scotia. The Newfoundland fishery required a large seasonal labour force, and this was the major source of naval recruitment on the island. Nova

Scotia, by contrast, did not have a mobile labour supply that the Navy could target on a regular basis. While this difference affected productivity, the main reason that Nova

Scotia lagged behind Newfoundland as a source of sailors for the British fleet was its success in protecting residents and other groups from impressment. Mass desertions in

340 Halifax only exacerbated the problem. So many groups were protected by the War of

1812 that the Navy could no longer man its ships in Nova Scotia. 'Plain Truth' and other commentators criticized the Navy and its impressment transgressions, but they did not realize that Nova Scotia had won the fight over impressment so decisively that it actually undermined the British war effort. Customs and other safeguards existed in

Newfoundland as well - for instance, in protecting servants and sack shipmen during the fishing season - but residents of Newfoundland were never exempted from impressment like their neighbours were in Nova Scotia. While the Newfoundland squadron entered approximately 4000 men during the Napoleonic Wars, the North American squadron lost more to desertion than it recruited locally.

It is also important to note three key similarities between impressment in Nova

Scotia and Newfoundland. First, the American Revolution was a turning point in both colonies - the time when impressment first occurred on a significant scale. There were local and Atlantic reasons for this. In Nova Scotia, the planters' exemption from impressment had expired and the maritime population of the south shore had increased significantly in recent years. In Newfoundland, statutory restrictions against impressment were lifted in 1775, and when the West Country labour pool dried up in the 1770s, the

Navy turned to Newfoundland to man its warships. More generally, the American war cut the Navy off from its traditional labour market in the American colonies, and warships looked north for alternative sources of manpower. Second, press gang riots in St. John's in 1794 and Halifax in 1805 led to important manning reforms. The Boston tragedy shook the naval establishment in Newfoundland to such an extent that impressment was confined to the St. John's guard boats for the duration of the Napoleonic Wars. Similarly,

341 the press gang riot in Halifax in 1805 ended more than a decade of naval-civilian tranquility. Nova Scotia authorities used it to tighten their grip on impressment: fishermen became off-limits, desertion legislation barred naval parties from shore, and not another press warrant was issued until the War of 1,812. Finally, most sailors were pressed on the water - by guard boats in Halifax and St. John's harbours, and from merchant vessels along the coast. Impressment was overwhelmingly an aquatic exercise throughout the Atlantic world.

This is the first study of impressment in Nova Scotia and Newfoundland. It maintains that press gangs played a far more important role in Atlantic Canada than historians have traditionally assumed. Canadian scholars have perpetuated a false dichotomy in this regard - military topics are often seen as curiosities and confined to the margins of regional narratives. Naval historians, meanwhile, have been content to stay on the margins and ignore social relations. That is no longer good enough. This dissertation argues that Nova Scotia and Newfoundland were militarized colonies in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. They were shaped by imperial warfare and by the presence of the Royal Navy and the British Army. This project used impressment as a window onto naval-civilian relations in the North Atlantic world. While press gangs have been studied in a British-Atlantic context recently, Nova Scotia and Newfoundland received little attention.4 They are also neglected in Atlantic history generally. This dissertation fills that gap in the literature. It thrusts the North Atlantic back into the larger historiography of the Atlantic world, and argues that press gangs were occupational hazards in Nova Scotia and Newfoundland.

342 Notes 1 Press gangs are neglected in most cultural surveys of the island, such as Fred Rowe, "Myths of Newfoundland," Newfoundland Quarterly, 74A (Winter 1979), pp. 3-16; Philip D. Hiscock, "Folklore," in Joseph R. Smallwood and Cyril F. Poole (eds.), Encyclopedia of Newfoundland and Labrador, 5 vols. (St. John's, 1981-94), II, pp. 243- 71; G.M. Story, W.J. Kirwin and J.D.A. Widdowson (eds.), Dictionary of Newfoundland English, 2nd ed. (Toronto, 2002). 2 Thomas H. Raddall, Halifax: Warden of the North (1946 repr. Halifax, 1993); Raddall, His Majesty's Yankees (1942 repr. Halifax, 1996); F.F. Tupper, Historic Liverpool ([Nova Scotia], 1944); Ronald H. Sherwood, Pictou Pioneers: The Story of the First Hundred Years in the History of Pictou Town (Windsor, NS, 1973).

3 Peter Pope, "Comparisons: Atlantic Canada," in Daniel Vickers (ed.), A Companion to Colonial America (Maiden, Massachusetts, 2003), pp. 489-507. 4 Denver Alexander Brunsman, 'The Evil Necessity: British Naval Impressment in the Eighteenth-Century Atlantic World' (Princeton University, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 2004).

343 Appendix 1 The Sixth of Anne

And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, That no mariner or other person who shall serve on board, or be retained to serve on board any privateer, or trading ship or vessel, that shall be imployed in any part of America, nor any mariner, or other person, being on shoar in any part thereof, shall be liable to be impressed or taken away, or shall be impressed or taken away by any officer or officers of or belonging to any of her Majesty's ships of war, impowered by the lord high admiral, or any other person whatsoever, unless such mariner shall have before deserted from such ship of war belonging to her Majesty at any time after the fourteenth day of February, one thousand seven hundred and seven, upon pain that any officer or officers so impressing or taking away, or causing to be impressed or taken away, any mariner or other person contrary to the tenor and true meaning of this act, shall forfeit to the master, or owner or owners of any such ship or vessel, twenty pounds for every man he or they shall so impress or take, to be recovered with full costs of suit, in any court within any part of her Majesty's dominions.

Source: 'An act for the encouragement of the trade to America,' 6 Anne, c. 31, s. 9 (1708)

344 Appendix 2 Lieutenant-Governor Richard Hughes's Proclamation against Press Gangs

A Proclamation

Whereas impressing Men on the Land for the Sea Service without the Countenance & permission of Civil Authority and the Search after Deserters from that Service without the Power of the Magistrate are both proceedings irregular, unjustifiable and unlawfull, and are frequently attended with Quarrels and Bloodshed, and the loss of life. In order therefore to prevent such Evils, and for the Public Security[,] I have thought fit to Publish this Proclamation hereby restricting all Persons whatever, from such irregular and illegal Practices, as they would avoid the pains & penalties following the prosecutions at Law to which Offenders in such Cases become liable.

Source: Commission and Order Book, 12 December 1778, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 170, p. 275.

345 Appendix 3 Advertisement for Revenge Privateer

Revenge Privateer

Commanded by Captain James Gandy, Who has been on several Cruizes, and met with great Success.

All Gentlemen [Volunteers; Seamen] and able bodied Landsmen, who wish to acquire Riches and Honor, are invited to repair on board the Revenge Privateer ship of War, not laying in Halifax Harbour; mounting Thirty Carriage Guns, with Cohorns, wivels, &c. bound on a Cruize to the Southward for four Months against the French, and all His Majesty's Enemies, and then to return to this Harbour.

All Volunteers will be received on board the said ship - or by Captain James Gandy, at the Rendezvous at Mr. Froud's Tavern near the Market House, where they will meet with all [our] Encouragement, and the best Treatment; Proper Advance will be given.

God save the King

N.B. As it is expected that many of the Loyal Inhabitants of this Province, will try their Fortunes by entering on board so good a ship at such a favorable Time, a Protection will be given to prevent their being impressed on board Men of War - As no Time is to be lost, the [ship] will go to sea in Fourteen Days, great Part of the Crew being engaged.

If any men belonging to His Majesty's Navy, or Army, should attempt under any Disguise or Pretence whatsoever to offer themselves they may depend on being secured, and prosecuted.

Source: Nova-Scotia Gazette and Weekly Chronicle, 12 January 1779

346 Appendix 4 Rendezvous Expenses for HMS Adamant, Halifax, 19-26 July 1790

An Account of Lieutenant Thomas Twysden's Disbursements in Procuring Men for His Majesty's Ship Adamant at the Rendezvous between the 19 day of July and the 26th day of July 1790

Times of Entry, Names, Disposal and Amount of Subsistence &c of the New Raised Men

When Where or from Persons Names Distinguishing Sent oni Ship Board or Subsistence Nine Pence pr day Entered What ship or place the Able and Ordinary Seamen otherwise Disposed & how, each And the Landmen & if Dischd. By whose Order or for What reason

When How Disposed of No. of Days Sum

July 19th Halifax John Leonard, LM, Volunteer 20th Sent aboard the Ship One Nine pence Sackville Two Ordinary Seamen 20th . One Eighteen pence Not Approved of, Volunteers July 20th Halifax Joseph Fisher, Carpenter, Do. 21st Sent aboard the Ship One Nine pence Do. James Johnson, Able, Do. 22 Do. Two Eighteen pence July 21 July 22 Halifax Samuel Williams, Ord., Do. 22 Do. One Nine pence July 23 July 24 Halifax Joseph Jeffries, Able, Do. 24th Do. One Nine pence Do. Francis Hogg, Do., Do. — Do. One Nine pence Do. Samuel Johnson, Do., Do. — Do. One Nine pence Appendix 4 (Continued)

Incident Expenses

When procured Nature thereof Sum (£ s D)

19 July Subsistence Money to myself & those employed with me 11.3 For printing and fixing up Invitation Bills 11.0 Stationary 2.6 Subsistence for three Volunteers 2.3 Drinking Money /or Entrance Money 3.0

Expense for July 19th £1.10.0

20 July Subsistence Money to myself & those Employed with me 11.3 Do for Volunteers 2.3 Drinking Money 2.0 oo Expense for July 20* £0.15.6 ^

21 July Subsistence Money to myself and those employed with me 11.3 Drinking for the People at different Times 6.6

Expense for July 21st £0.17.9

22 July This day reduced the Gang to Two Men per Order of the Admiral, And Stopped paying the Subsistence Money; being Victualled on board the Ship.

Subsistence and Drinking Money for one Volunteer 1.9 Advanced the People for Drinking 2.6

Expense for 22nd July £0.4.6 Appendix 4 (Continued)

23 July Advanced the People for Drinking 23rd July 2.6 Subsistence & drinking for 3 Volunteers 5.3

24 July Advanced the People... 2.6 1.0 Boat Hire £0.11.3 Expense 23rd and 24th July 2.0 25 July Advanced the people the 25th July

Expense for July 19th 1.10.0 20 15.6 21 17.9 22 4.6 23 2.6 24 11.3

25 2.0 ON

4.3.6 Paid for the Hire of Rooms at the Rendezvous 1.11.6

Total { Sterling 5.15.0 Currency 6.7.9

Received the 3rd August 1790 of the Right Honourable the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty by the Hands of Sir Richard Hughes Baronet Commander in Chief &c. the Sum of Eight Pounds 16s / 7d, being the full Amount of Expenses Attending the Rendezvous for raising Seamen.

Witness Charles Howard Thomas Twysden

Source: ADM 1 / 492, TNA, p. 110. Appendix 5 Press Warrant issued to Rupert George, Captain ofHMS Hussar

By His Excellency John Wentworth.. .Lieutenant Governor and Commander in Chief, in and over His Majesty's Province of Nova Scotia, Vice Admiral of the same and so forth.

Whereas there is now subsisting a War between Great Britain & France and whereas it has been represented to me by Rupert George Esq. Captain and Commander of His Majesty's Ship of War, the Hussar, that Intelligence has been received of a Frigate of the Enemy being upon the Coast and that preparing to proceed to Sea in His Majesty's said Ship under his Command, without loss of time, he wishes permission to Endeavour to compleat his Complement of Men by a press on Shore. In pursuance of an Order in Council dated this 27 day of April 1793, made upon the said Representation under and by Virtue of an Act passed in the 19th year of the reign of his late majesty King George the 2d Entitled "An Act for the better Encouragement of the Trade of his Majesty's Sugar Colonies in America," I do hereby impower and direct you the said Rupert George Esq. to impress or cause to be impressed as many Mariners or seamen not Exceeding thirty, as shall be necessary to complete the number of Men allowed to his Majesty's said Ship, giving into each Man so impressed one Shilling for press money, and in the Execution hereof, you are to take care that neither yourself, nor any Officer Authorized by you, do demand or receive any money, Gratuity, reward or other consideration whatsoever, for your sparing, Exchanging or Discharging, any person or persons impressed or to be impressed, as you will answer at your peril, You are not to Extend any person with the Execution of this Warrant but a Commissioned Officer, and to insert his Name & Office in the Deputation on the other side hereof, And to set your Hand and Seal thereto. This Warrant to continue in force til the fourth day of may next And in the due Execution of the same & every part thereof, all Sheriffs, Justices of the Peace, Constables and all other [of] His Majesty's Officers & Subjects whom it may Concern are thereby required to be aiding and assisting unto you and those employed by you. As they tender His Majesty's service & will answer the Contrary at their peril.

27 April 1793 Wentworth

I Do hereby Depute,

Belonging to His Majesty's Ship the Hussar under my Command to impress a Number of Mariners or Seamen not Exceeding thirty according to the tenure of this warrant.

In Testimony whereof I have hereto put my Hand & Seal the day of .

Source: Executive Council Minutes, 27 April 1793, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 190, pp. 262-6.

350 Appendix 6 Press Warrants in Nova Scotia, 1793-1815

Date Applicant Warships Time Limit Quota Limit

27 April 1793 Captain Rupert George HMS Hussar 4 May 1793 30 Men 1 May 1793 William Affleck HMS Alligator 24 Hours Unspecified 28 May 1794 Commodore Rupert George HMS Hussar, HMS Blanche 48 Hours 50 Total 6 June 1794 Captain Sir Charles Henry Knowles HMS Daedalus Rejected Rejected 23 September 1794 Rear-Admiral George Murray General Warrant 7 Days Unspecified 2 January 1795 Captain Rodney Home HMS Africa Rejected Rejected 16 November 1795 Rear-Admiral George Murray General Warrant 48 Hours 70 Men* 16 December 1796 Captain Henry Mo watt** General Warrant 4 Days 60 Men 31 January 1797 Captain Robert Murray HMS Asia Sunrise to Sunset 60 Men 17 October 1797 Vice-Admiral George Vandeput General Warrant 2 Months Unspecified*** 27 November 1799 Admiral George Vandeput General Warrant 2 Weeks Unspecified*** 23 June 1800 (Monday) Captain Robert Murray**** General Warrant Saturday, 28 June, Noon 30 Men 30 April 1803 Captain William Bradley HMS Cambrian 10 Days 50 Men 1 May 1804 Captain Thomas Garth HMS Camel 2 Days 20 Men 6 May 1805 Vice-Admiral Sir Andrew Mitchell General Warrant 14 Days Unspecified 1 July 1812 Vice-Admiral Herbert Sawyer General Warrant 48 Hours Unspecified 28 February 1814 Admiral Edward Griffith General Warrant Unknown***** Unknown*****

Sources: Executive Council Minutes, 1793-1815, NSARM, RG 1, vols. 190-2; Commission and Order Book, 1793-6, NSARM, RG 1, vol. 171.

Note: Margaret Ells counted fourteen warrants between 1793 and 1815. She missed one warrant. Margaret Ells, 'The Development of Nova Scotia, 1782-1812' (University of London, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 1937), pp. 307-9. Peter Heriot Watson tabulated these warrants, but his data was taken from secondary sources and much of it is incorrect. Peter Heriot Watson, 'The Impact of the Navy on the History of Nova Scotia, 1749-1819' (Acadia University, Unpublished M.A. Thesis, 1957), pp. 160-1.

The warrant in the Executive Council Minutes does not give a quota, but 70 men is specified in the Commission and Order Book. Captain of HMS Assistance. Rear-Admiral George Murray suffered a stroke in October 1796 and Mowatt, as senior captain in Nova Scotia, assumed temporary command. Vice-Admiral George Vandeput arrived six months later. This warrant states that inhabitants of Nova Scotia are exempt from impressment. It also applies to vessels throughout the province, not simply Halifax. Vandeput died at sea in March 1799 and command devolved to Murray as senior captain. His successor, Vice-Admiral Sir William Parker, arrived in August 1800. The Executive Council Minutes state that the warrant follows Griffith's letter, but the next page is blank. Therefore, Griffith's time and quota restrictions are unknown. Appendix 7 Admiralty Instructions to John Whipple, 1795

By the Commissioners for Executing the Office of Lord High Admiral of Great Britain and Ireland, &c.

Instructions to Lieutenant John Whipple Commanding His Majesty's Gun Boat the Attack appointed to procure Men for the Service of His Majesty's Fleet

Whereas it is thought fit that you shall be employed to procure men for the service of His Majesty's Fleet; and you will herewith receive a Press Warrant empowering you to impress Seamen, Seafaring men, and other persons therein described; You are hereby strictly required and directed, in the execution thereof, to observe the following Instructions, viz.

I

You are to receive all Volunteers of able bodies, in good health, and capable of doing His Majesty service at sea, who may offer; the Seamen not to be under 20 or above 50 and the Landmen not under 20 or above 35 years of age.

II

You are to impress such Seamen, Seafaring men, and other persons described in the Press Warrant sent herewith, as will not enter voluntarily, and are not regularly protected, or hereinafter excepted, provided they are able and fit for His Majesty's service. But you are to observe that Landmen and person of the undermentioned descriptions are not to be impressed, viz.

The Masters of Merchant Ships or vessels; and the First Mates, Boatswains and Carpenters of such as are of fifty tons or upwards.

Men belonging to ships and vessels in the immediate and constant employment and pay of the Public Offices names in the margin; but you are not to consider Merchant ships or vessels, taken upon freight by the Commissioners of His Majesty's Navy or Victualling, or by the Master- General or Principal Officers of the Ordnance, for the provisions or stores of any kind, as coming under the above descriptions; or to pay regard to any Protection, (except from ourselves) with which such Merchant ships or vessels may be respectively furnished.

[Navy, Victualling, Ordnance, Customs, Excise, Post-Office]

352 And you are further to observe, that the persons hereafter described are also not to be impressed, they being exempted by the Acts of Parliament against them respectively mentioned, and entitled to Protections from us, provided they come under the descriptions and limitations contained in the said Acts.

6 Anne, cap. 31 Watermen belonging to the Insurance-Offices within the Cities of London and Westminster.

13 Geo. II, cap. 17 Men of the age of fifty-five years or upwards.

Youths not having attained the full age of eighteen years.

Apprentices to the Sea service; provided they shall not have used the Sea before the Dates of their respective indentures, or served more than three years, to be computed from those dates.

Landmen betaking themselves to the Sea service (of what age soever they shall be) until they shall have served full two years, to be computed from the time of their first going to Sea.

13 Geo. II, cap. 17 Foreigners.

2 Geo. Ill, cap. 15 Masters and some of the Apprentices, Mariners and Landmen belonging to, and actually engaged in the service of, any Fishing vessel employed in the Fishery on any of the Sea coasts, or in any of the navigable rivers of Great- Britain.

11 Geo. Ill, cap. 38 Harpooners, Line-managers, Boat-steerers, and Seamen or common Mariners, belonging to ships or vessels employed on the Whale Fishery in the Greenland Seas or Davis's Straits, or having given security to proceed on the said Fishery the next season.

But, as this Office, in granting Protections for persons of the above-mentioned descriptions, is liable to great impositions by the production of false testimonials, which it may be difficult, if not impossible in many cases to detect; you are to be very particular in the examinations of all such persons whenever they shall fall in your way; and, if you find, or have good reason to believe, that they have either fraudulently, or by surprise, obtained such Protections, made any improper use of them afterwards, or that they are not the real persons for which they were granted, you are immediately to cause the parties to be impressed, and, the Protections to be taken from them, and sent to our Secretary.

353 Ill

You are not to impress any men belonging to any ship or vessel whose names are inserted in a Protection signed by us, although they should not be exactly described therein; provided they are actually in the ship or vessel for which they are protected, or working in a boat near unto and in the service of the same; But, if there be more Seamen, Seafaring men, (or other persons described in the Press Warrant) in any ship or vessel, than the Protection is granted for, you are to impress those who are supernumerary; and you are to observe that, if the Protection granted for any ship or vessel is carried on shore, it shall not be of any use to protect any of the persons (for whom it might have been granted) whilst they are there; but subject them, as well as those who may be in such-ship or vessel, during it's absence, to be impressed; and you are to take care to impress them accordingly.

IV

When you go on board any Merchant ship or vessel, in order to get seamen from her, you first to call the crew upon deck, and to let them know, that, if any of them will declare themselves willing to serve His Majesty, and go along with you, they shall not only receive such Bounties as His Majesty may have thought proper to promise by His Royal Proclamation, but also two months wages in advance before the ship or vessel they may be appointed to serve in proceeds to sea; but that, otherwise, if they refuse to go voluntarily, they will be excluded from those advantages.

V

When you have taken as many Seamen out of a Merchant Ship or vessel homeward bound, as shall be proper, you are to see that they bring their chests and bedding with them; and to take care to put on board her an equal or sufficient number of good Seamen in their room, under the care of a discreet Officer, to whom you are to give directions to assist in navigating her safely to the place of her unlading, or any nearer port the Master shall desire, and not to quit her sooner upon any pretence whatsoever. And as you are strictly forbidden yourself, so are you as strictly to charge the said Officer and Seamen, not to demand any money, or other gratification whatsoever, upon that account, as you and they will answer it at your perils; And you are also strictly charged when you go on board Merchant ships or vessels to get men from them, not to do any thing that may either expose them to danger, or delay them longer from proceeding to their intended ports, than may be absolutely necessary for His Majesty's service.

VI

You are to give tickets of leave to the men whom you put on board Merchant ships or vessels, for such time as you shall judge reasonable for their return; and, if you send them into the rivers Thames or Medway, or to any of the Out-Ports where there is a Clerk of the Cheque or Naval Officer, you are to draw out a list of their names, and sign a certificate at the foot thereof, in the following form:

354 I do herby certify, that the persons above-named belonging to His Majesty's were this day put on board the Merchant ship, in lieu ofprest men; and are to return to in order to repair on board the and I desire that you will pay them conduct-money to that place. Given under my hand on board the the day of—

To the Clerk of the Cheque, or Naval Officer, at

which list and certificate you are to seal up, and send it by the chief of the men, whose names are contained therein, to the said Clerk of the Cheque or Naval Officer, who, upon receipt thereof, is directed to pay to each man the usual conduct-money, taking their receipts for a voucher, and to indorse on the backs of their tickets of leave, the time when, and the sums paid to enable them to return as above directed.

VII

If you send men in the Merchant ships or vessels to any Out-Port where there is not a Clerk of the Cheque of Naval Officer; and you judge it best for them to travel from thence'by land to rejoin you, or to proceed to some other place, in order to their repairing on board the ship or vessel to which they belong, or to their being otherwise disposed of for His Majesty's service, as circumstances may require, you are to send a like list and certificate, sealed up, the Collector of the Customs of such Out-port, who will thereupon pay them conduct-money accordingly, and take their receipts for the same upon the back of your certificate; but if you would have the men remain at the port you send them to till you call or send for them, you are then to draw out your certificate in the following manner, viz.

/ do hereby certify, that the persons above-named, belonging to His Majesty's — — were this day put on board the Merchant ship, bound to in lieu of Seamen prest, from her, and are directed to remain at that place till I call or send for them; I therefore desire you will supply them with nine-pence a day each for their subsistence, for so [a] long time as they remain there. Given under my hand on board the the day of .

To the Collector of His Majesty's Customs at Upon which they will be subsisted by the Collector, and their receipts taken by him as aforesaid, for what money he supplies them with; and you are to take care to call or send for the said men as soon as possible.

VIII

If any Seamen, fit for His Majesty's service, shall be brought to you by order of the Civil Magistrates, or by any of the Officers of the Vice-Admirals of the Maritime counties, or who, having secreted themselves, shall be taken by you, or those employed under you, in consequence of information, you are to receive the Seamen so brought to you, and to give the persons who bring them certificates of their having done so; and you are, also, to give

355 certificates to the persons who may have given such information, in order to enable them to obtain the rewards to which they may be respectively entitled.

IX

When you are employed in a TENDER on the service of procuring men, you are to observe the following directions, viz.

1. You are to take care to have always a sufficient quantity of provisions on board; and also a proper number of slops, beds, bedding and hammacoes, for the use of the new-raised men; and to apply in time to the proper office when any of the said provisions or stores are wanting.

2. You are to see that the guns, small arms, and Ordnance stores are always kept in good order; and if there is an Armourer or Armourer's Mate put on board for that purpose, to take care that he doth his duty. And whereas the principal Officers of the Ordnance formerly represented, that Masters of tenders had been very negligent in their care of the small arms, though they were allowed oil to clean them, and a chest to keep them in; you are therefore to cause those on board the tender, to which you are appointed, to be oiled frequently, and kept in a chest when not in use; and to let the Master of her know, that the Navy Board are directed to stop his pay until he produces a certificate from the Ordnance Office that he has returned his arms and stores in as good order as the reasonable use thereof will admit.

3. You are to see that the Master of the tender does furnish what deals shall be necessary to make platforms for the men to lie on, according to his contract with the Navy Board, that they be not forced to lie on the casks or ballast, to the prejudice of their health; and if he is negligent, or refuses to do it, to give that Board immediate information.

4. You are to take care that the Surgeon's Mate, who may be put on board the tender, with necessary medicaments, for the relief of such persons sent out with you, or procured afterwards, as may happen to be sick, go dive constant attendance on aboard her for that purpose; and you are strictly charged not to send any Sick men to quarters on shore, where there are no agents of Surgeons appointed to take care of them, unless their distempers are of such a nature as absolutely to require it; and, in that case, you must put them into quarters fit for people in their condition, at the rate of twelve-pence a man per day; and, under the care of some skilful Apothecary or Surgeon for cure, at the rate of six- shillings and eight-pence per man; and, in case of death, you are to cause them to be as decently buried as ten shillings a man will admit, and to draw upon the Commissioners for taking care of Sick and Wounded Seamen for the money; sending to them, at the same time, a list of the mens names whom you have sent sick on shore, with an account of the time when they were put ashore, and when they returned on board again, or died, and receipts for the persons to whom any

356 monies shall have been paid on their account, attested by the Master of the tender and the Surgeon's Mate; and, at the foot of the said list and account. You are, with the said Master and Surgeon's Mate, to make affidavit to the truth of every article contained therein.

You are diligently, when any other orders you may be under will admit, to employ yourself in procuring Volunteers, and in impressing both on shore and from Merchant ships, vessels, and boats, such Seamen, Seafaring men, and others described in your Press Warrant, as will not enter voluntarily, and are not protected or exempted as aforesaid; governing yourself, in the execution of that service, by such articles of the preceding Instructions as may relate thereto.

You are at liberty to go to any of the ports adjacent to that where you may be stationed, if there shall be a greater likelihood of procuring men there; but, if you find there are but few Seamen to be got in Port, you are strictly charged not to idle your time away, but to tog out and cruise upon the neighbouring coast, in order to meet with Merchant ships and vessels, and to procure Seamen from them, when you find they are not protected; returning frequently to the port whereat you may be stationed, to enquire if any orders are lodge there for you, and to send hither the journal and account herein-after mentioned; and

Whenever you take men from Merchant ships or vessels, and put others on board in lieu, you are to observe the directions contained in the Vth, Vith, and Vllth articles of the preceding Instructions.

You are to take care that every man on board be as well accommodated with lodging as the vessel will admit of, and that they have all His Majesty's full allowance of provisions daily; and, if the copper be so small that one boiling will not suffice, to order as many more D oiling as will be sufficient.

You are, once a week, to send to our Secretary, so as to arrive at this Office on a Monday, a journal of your proceedings, together with an account, under your own hand, of the men procured in that week, and of the total number on board, agreeable to the annexed form; and you are to be very particular in representing, if any men have escaped from the tender, or otherwise, and how the same happened; noting in the said account which are able and ordinary Seamen, and which Landmen, and distinguishing how many have been procured since the last account; how many in the whole; how many have been sent away, to what place, when, and by what conveyance; and how many discharged, when, and by whose order.

You are not to discharge any man, on any pretence whatsoever, without our orders.

When you have got on board such a number of men, either of your own procuring, or sent or delivered to you by other Officers, as the vessel will

357 conveniently receive, you are to repair, without loss of time, with them, to such port as you may be under orders to carry them to; and, having disposed of them there, agreeable to those orders, you are to return to your former station, to procure others, and to repair with them as above directed, until you receive further order; observing, whenever you dispose of any new-raised men, to deliver with them complete lists of their names, times of entry, &c. and to transmit duplicates to the Navy Board, to enable that Board to correct any mistake which may be in the bounty lists.

10. If you belong to any of His Majesty's ships or vessels, and are employed in a tender to procure men for such ship or vessel, you are to be very careful, (so far as the same may depend upon you) that the men so procured be not otherwise disposed of, unless you receive particular directions for that purpose.

11. You are lastly to observe, that proper notice will be taken of your diligence or remissness in this service; of the number of men you procure; and whether you receive on board the tender persons who are unfit, or take care to entertain such only as are fit, for His Majesty's service.

X

And whereas the Commanders of His Majesty's ships and vessels have sometimes taken new-raised men to complete their own complements, not only from Officers employed on shore to procure men for His Majesty's fleet, but from tenders and other vessels falling in their way, which is a discouragement to Volunteers, who may have entered for particular ships, and a procedure we highly disapprove of; in case, therefore, you shall receive application or direction from any such Commander for delivering to him new-raise men, you are to produce this article of your Instructions, that he may see our disapprobation of such proceeding; and, if he afterwards persists in taking the men, you are immediately to acquaint our Secretary therewith, that we may take such measures thereupon as the nature of the case may require.

Given under our hands the 31 of August 1795

By the Command of their Lordships, Wm. Marsden

Source: White Family Papers, 31 August 1795, NSARM, MG, vol. 952, no. 585.

358 Appendix 8 Excerpts from Isaac Lester's Diary at Poole, Falkland Islands Crisis, 1770

26 October 1770 Brig came in returning from Bonavista, had 30 of her men pressed at the start

29 October 1770 Mr. John Slade's Little Brigg Jano arrived today from The Land, but her men are Pressed

30 October 1770 Mr. Miller's Brigg of Ringwood arrived this afternoon from Fogo, in 19 days, all her men Pressed

6 November 1770 This morning Peter Jolliff Junior Brigg Arrived from Fogo in 24 days, 40 people were Pressed out of

him off the Start

11 November 1770 Sam Clark's brigg arrived from the Land this day, all his men pressed

17 November 1770 This afternoon Peter Jolliff s Brig Dartmouth arrived at Topsam...all its people Except 3 or 4 are Pressed OS in

18 November 1770 Mr. John Slade arrived today, his men Pressed in the Bay ^

5 December 1770 Saved all the Men at Ireland, but the people belonging to the [Amy] was pressed.. .coming from Ireland

22 December 1770 This Morning they Press from all Protections in Every Vessell in the Harbour, Such a consternation was Never Seen here before Source: Lester-Garland Papers, Dorchester Record Office, Dorset, D / LEG, Diaries of Benjamin and Isaac Lester, 1761-1802 Appendix 9 Palliser's Act and Impressment

And whereas by an act of parliament, passed in the sixth year of the reign of her late Majesty Queen Anne, intituled, An act for the encouragement of the trade to America [Sixth of Anne], it is amongst other things enacted, That no mariner or other person who shall serve on board, or be retained to serve on board any privateer, or trading ship or vessel, that shall be employed in any part of America, nor any mariner or other person being on shore in any part thereof, shall be liable to be impressed or taken away by any officer or officers of or belonging to any of her Majesty's ships of war, impowered by the lord high admiral, or any other person whatsoever, unless such mariner shall have before deserted from such ship of war: and whereas the said privilege or exemption so given by the said act to mariners serving on board ships or vessels employed in any of the seas or ports of the continent of America, or residing on shore there, is prejudicial to the fisheries carried on by his Majesty's subjects of Great Britain and Ireland, and others his Majesty's dominions in Europe, and has proved an encouragement to mariners belonging thereto to desert in time of war, or at the appearance of a war, to the British plantations on the said continent of America; be it therefore enacted by the authority aforesaid, That the said clause, so far as it relates to the exempting of mariners or other persons serving, or retained to serve, in any ship or vessel in the seas or ports of the continent of America, or other persons on shore there, from being impressed, be and the same is hereby repealed.

Source: 'An act for the encouragement of the Fisheries carried on from Great Britain, Ireland, and the British Dominions in Europe,' 15 Geo. Ill, c. 31, s. 19 (1775).

360 Appendix 10 Men Demanded from Counties and Ports in the Quota Acts of 1795

Yorkshire 1081 London 5074 Lancashire 589 Liverpool 1711 Middlesex 451 Newcastle 1240 Kent 450 Hull 731 Devon 393 Whitehaven 700 Somerset 351 Clyde 683 Lincolnshire 342' Bristol 666 323 Sunderland 659 Suffolk 263 Whitby 573 Norfolk 260 Yarmouth 506 Cheshire 246 Dartmouth 394 Staffordshire 245 Poole 279

Sources: N.A.M. Rodger, "Devon Men and the Navy, 1689-1815," in Michael Duffy (et al.), The Maritime History of Devon: Volume 1, From Early Times to the Late Eighteenth Century (London, 1992), p. 213; Brian Lavery, Nelson's Navy: This Ships, Men and Organisation (London, 1989), p. 126.

361 Appendix 11 Estimate of the Percentage of Naval Recruits Pressed in Newfoundland, 1793-1815

Year Warship Total Pressed Percentage Recruits Men Pressed

1796 Venus 40 25 63 1798 Brilliant 27 10 37 1799 Castor 24 14 58 1803 Isis 78 36 46 1803 Lapwing 38 18 47 1805 Isis 54 27 50 1805 Rattler 35 17 49 1806 Camilla 43 20 47 1806 Isis 56 30 54 1807 Mercury 54 18 33 1809 Jamaica 36 17 47 1809 Comet 48 25 52 1810 Comet 43 27 63 1811 Antelope 30 11 37 1811 Recruit 26 12 46 1812 Comet 26 11 42 1813 Bellerophon 38 15 39 1813 Crescent 33 21 64 1814 Pioneer 20 10 50 1815 Salisbury 19 9 47

Source: Muster Books, TNA, ADM 36-37

362 Appendix 12 Naval Recruitment at Newfoundland, 1793-1815

Year Ship Recruits Sample Recorded Estimated

1793 .6 205 256 1794 7 266 333 1795 7 214 268 1796 5 133 166 1797 6 91 114 1798 5 110 138 1799 6 63 79 1800 6 52 65 1801 6 48 60 1802 7 25 31 1803 6 252 315 1804 5 126 158 1805 6 108 135 1806 10 158 198 1807 9 197 246 1808 8 75 94 1809 7 169 211 1810 8 162 203 1811 9 158 198 1812 8 113 141 1813 11 213 266 1814 14 171 214 1815 10 109 136

Total 172 3218 4025

Source: Muster Books, TNA, ADM 36-37

Note: "Recorded" figures indicate actual recruitment. This sample contains seventy-five percent of the naval presence in Newfoundland. "Estimated" figures extrapolate these numbers to 100 percent. This provides an estimate of total recruitment, had the sample included the entire naval presence.

363 Appendix 13 Joseph Cain's Protection from Impressment

By the Commissioners for Executing the Office of Lord High Admiral of the United and Ireland, &c.

WHEREAS by an Act of Parliament passed in [the] 13th year of the reign of His late Majesty King George the Second, it is enacted, that the persons under the age and circumstances therein mentioned, shall be freed and exempted from being impressed into His Majesty's Service, upon due proof made before us of their respective ages and circumstances as the case shall happen: And whereas we have received testimony that the Bearer Joseph Cain has bound himself Apprentice to Richard Wright Street & Co of Pool[e] to serve at sea, by indenture dated the 9 April 1805 and that he never used the sea before that time; and he being therefore entitled to a Protection in pursuance of the said Act of Parliament, to free and exempt him being impressed for the space of Three Years from the aforementioned date of his indenture]. We do he[reby] require and direct all Commanders of His Majesty's ships, Press-masters, and others whom it doth or may concern, not to impress him into Him Majesty's Service, during the said space of Three Years, provided a description of his person be inserted in the margin hereof. But in case it shall appear, that the person for whom this protection is granted, or in whose behalf it shall be produced, is not under the aforementioned circumstances, then the Officer, to whom it shall be produced, is hereby strictly charged and required to impress such person, and immediately to send the Protection to us. Given under our Hands, and the Seal of the Office of Admiralty, the 13l Day of April One thousand eight hundred and Five.

To all Commanders and Officers of His Majesty's Ships, Press-Masters, and all others whom it doth or may concern.

Source: Joseph Cain Collection, 13 April 1805, PANL, MG 241.

364 Appendix 14 Port Orders of St John's, c. 1807

On the arrival of any of His Majesty's Ships or Vessels in this Harbour, the Flag Ship is to make a Signal for a Lieutenant from each to copy Orders, who is accordingly to take a Copy of the following Orders, signing his name, with the name of the Ship to which he belongs at the foot hereof.

His Majesty's Ships & Vessels in this Harbour are to row Guard daily in rotation beginning with their Junior Commander, and a Report thereof is to be sent on board the Flag Ship every morning at half past Seven o'Clock.

The Officer of the Guard is to board every Vessel that may arrive or depart (Fishing Craft excepted) and to search them diligently to see that there are no Deserters concealed in them nor any Persons besides the Crews specified in the Vessels Articles, to be allowed to proceed in them without a Pass signed by me, or in my Absence by a Magistrate: and in case of finding any Deserter or Person departing without such Pass (unless it should be a Merchant Trader, or other Person carrying on business on the Island) on board any Vessel going out, the Officer is to order her to be anchored in safety and bring the detained Person on board the Flag Ship from whence the Circumstance is to be immediately communicated to me.

The Guard Boat is always to carry one or two spare Men, who if occasion should require, may be trusted to replace such as may be taken out of any Vessel before she is anchored in safely, or otherwise to assist any Vessel that may require it.

Not more than one Man in every five of the Crew of any Vessel is to be impressed out of her, and the Officer who takes any Man is to certify the same in the Vessels Log Book, and sign his Name thereto, with the name of the Ship to which he belongs, and no more Men shall afterwards be impressed out of such Vessel during the Voyage in which she shall then be engaged.

Every man who shall be impressed or enter for any one of His Majesty's Ships is to be sent on board the Flag Ship before he shall be entered on any Ships Books.

In case the Officer of the Guard shall receive any Intelligence of particular Interest or Importance which it may be necessary to communicated to me immediately, he is, without loss of time, (whether by Night or Day) to repair to Fort Townshend for that purpose.

The Officer of the Guard is to prevent Vessels from riding at the King's Buoys in the Narrows after being warped up to them.

The Report of Guard is to specify the names of Men pressed out of the respective Vessels.

365 His Majesty's Ships are to moor so as to ride with a Clear Hawse to the Westerly Wind, and in the event of sudden Changes, which are frequent in the Fall of the Year, the Hawser (if foul) is to be immediately Cleared.

The Sheet Cable is always to remain bent, and the Anchor clear for letting go.

The Masters are to make themselves acquainted as early as possible, with the Navy Men [?] and dangers of the Narrows so that Pilots may not be required particularly in the event of being forced from the Anchorage.

Whereas a Convoy shall be getting under weigh to proceed out of the Harbour, His Majesty's Ships lying there are to send as many Boats as they can possibly spare to assist in weighing their Anchors, and the Flag Ship when present, or the Senior Officers Ship is to make Signal No. 2 / 2 for that purpose.

Source: Duckworth Collection, PANL, MG 204, pp. 247-50.

366 Appendix 15 Account of Lionel Chancey: Clerk of the Peace, St John's, 1809-10

Michaelmas Quarter 1809

31 October Fees for George Thomson - sent to the Navy 1st Class £0.12.0

1 November Fees for Francis Henry Boninnia - sent to the Navy 1st Class 0.12.0

Do. Fees for William Devine - enlisted in Nova Scotia Regiment 0.12.0

22 November Fees for Richard Haydon (Larceny) - sent to the Navy 0.12.0

Epiphany Quarter 1810

13 February Fees in the Matter of Green & others late of the Brig Francis, now of HMS Comet, 1st Class 0.12.0

24 February David Picket - for Larceny, sent to Navy 0.12.0

19 March Drawing Warrants to apprehend Deserters 0.10.0

Easter Quarter 1810

8 May In the matter of John Anderson, 1st Class 0.12.0

22 May John Macnamara a Breach of the Peace - sent to the Navy 0.12.0

Do. Peter Lister, Breach of the Peace - sent to the Navy 0.12.0

Midsummer Sessions 1810

23 July Prosecuting Joseph Millar convicted of Larceny, punished and sent to Navy £1.1.0

Do. Examination of John McPherson for a Breach of the Peace, sent to Navy, 1st Class 0.12.0

Source: Duckworth Collection, PANL, MG 204, pp. 3926-39.

367 Appendix 16 A Closer Look at the Boats of the Royal Navy

Guard boats were usually cutters, a small boat that was carried aboard British warships during the Napoleonic Wars. They were 24 to 32 feet in length, clinker-built, fitted for both rowing and sailing, and were used to carry light stores and passengers. Cutters were larger than jolly boats, pinnaces and skiffs, but smaller than launches, the largest ship's boat in the Navy. The latter was a more flat-bottomed craft. Commonly rigged with fore- and-aft sails, launches were capable of short autonomous cruises. While they were sometimes used as guard boats in St. John's, their main purpose was to carry water and firewood from shore to warships in the harbour. As discussed in the case of HMS Camilla in 1806, cutters were also capable of cruises On the open ocean, indeed as far south as Cape Spear. The other large ship's boat in the Navy was the barge, a flat- bottomed craft that was reserved for state ceremonies and formal occasions. Most of these boats were stowed athwartships between the gangways, one fitted into another with their masts removed. Cutters, however, were fastened on each side of the stern, which allowed them to be lowered quickly during emergencies. The range of boats that a warship carried depended on its class, but frigates and sloops, the small cruisers that made up the bulk of the Newfoundland squadron, always carried one or two cutters. The cutter should not be confused with the vessel by the same name, a small warship about the size of a schooner. Nor should a guard boat be confused with a , a small craft with one heavy gun in the bow or stern. They were used in harbours and close to shore, often in the Mediterranean, where they functioned like galleys.

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