The Quarterly Magazine of the Ecumenical Accompaniment Programme in Palestine and Israel

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The Quarterly Magazine of the Ecumenical Accompaniment Programme in Palestine and Israel Issue No 5, 2007 ChainReactionThe quarterly magazine of the Ecumenical Accompaniment Programme in Palestine and Israel How long O Lord? The EAPPI is a World Council of Churches programme Editorial By Rifat Odeh Kassis EAPPI International Programme Coordinator and Project Manager Dear readers, In 1977, the General Assembly called for the annual Israel managed to find its seat within the international observance of the 29 of November as the International community whereas the Palestinians became a refugee Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People. On that problem and a nation seeking self-determination and day, in 1947, the same Assembly adopted the resolution freedom. The resolution, which was taken to divide the on the partition of Palestine. country, was done in a rush and in an irresponsible way. In another resolution on 1 December 2004, it again The countries that took the decision did not understand requested the Committee on the Exercise of the the context. Instead of calling for one state where Jews Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People and the and Arabs would each enjoy self-determination, these Division for Palestinian Rights, as part of the observance same countries choose to divide the country as an easy of the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian solution. This “easy” solution paved the way to one of People on 29 November, to continue to organize an annual the world’ greatest tragedies and resulted in continuous solidarity day on Palestinian rights in cooperation with bloodshed between the two people. the Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the United Nations. It also encouraged Member States to continue The UN Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian people to give the widest support and publicity possible to this should not be only just another day, but a day to remind Day of Solidarity. the world that the injustice needs to end. Israel needs to end its occupation and the Palestinians should be I believe that the reason for all these resolutions is the able to at last see the realisation of their rights. The feeling of the assembly that the 1947 resolution same countries responsible for the resolution on the committed a major injustice against the Palestinian partition of Palestine in 1947 should be the ones to carry people. The resolution intended the creation of two states out this task. for both nations, but it was never completely enacted. Continued on Page 24 World Council of Churches Published by: The EAPPI EAPPI- 150 route de Ferney, International Programme Coordinator: Rifat Odeh Kassis, [email protected] P.O. Box 2100 CH-1211 Geneva 2, Editor: Gemma Abbs, Communication and Advocacy Officer, [email protected] Switzerland Web Sites: Cover Photo: by Gemma Abbs. www.eappi.org, www.wcc-coe.org Inset photo by Osten Gunnersson. Design and printing: Emerezian Est. [email protected] Palestinian Christians in Jerusalem 4 An interview with Bishop Munib Younan, By Gemma Abbs My home became my prison 7 By Madeleine Dahl A Demographic Threat (Home Demolitions in Al-Walaja) 10 By Goren Buren The E1 Plan A Step towards a Dead End 14 By Suhail Khaliliah Accessing medical care in Jerusalem 18 By Karen-Elizabeth Heskja We refuse to be enemies 21 By Goren Buren Leaving Jerusalem 24 By Ian Alexander No ordinary English lesson 28 By Karen-Elizabeth Heskja Contents Sections of articles and photos may be used freely, with proper attribution to the EAPPI and the author. For information regarding subscriptions, please contact the editor at: [email protected] The views contained here do not necessarily reflect those of EAPPI or the World Council of Churches. Issue No.5, 2007 Introduction Much ado about nothing? The relevance of international law in the Middle East conflict By Christiane Gerstetter (Ecumenical Accompanier) “Almost all nations observe almost Geneva Conventions. In addition, state does not comply? There is all principles of international law there are numerous other more simply no police to send in to and almost all of their obligations specific resolutions by the UN enforce international law. Moreover, almost all of the time”, stated Lou Security Council and General not all international law is legally Henkin, a famous international law Assembly, and, let us not forget, the binding. A big part of international scholar from the US, in 1979. One recent 2004 Advisory Opinion of the law is so-called ‘soft law’ - wonders whether the late Henkin International Court of Justice, which declarations, resolutions and other would have wished to modify this states the illegality of the separation documents that state what states statement had he taken a closer look barrier in its current form under should do, but do not legally bind at how the State of Israel has international law. them. While international human complied with its obligations under rights treaties and the Fourth Geneva international law so far. There is a None of the states in the region, and Convention, which deals with the myriad of international legal especially not Israel, seem to feel behaviour of an occupying power in instruments pertaining to the Middle any urge to bring their behaviour the territories occupied, are legally East conflict and stipulating into compliance with what is set out binding, this is not true for obligations for both Israel and its in these instruments, however. As resolutions of the UN General neighbouring countries. They include some of the articles in this issue of Assembly and with few exceptions binding international agreements ChainReaction will show in more for resolutions and recommendations which are not specifically designed depth, Israel obeys its obligations by the UN Security Council. Equally, for the Middle East conflict - under international law almost none an ICJ Advisory Opinion like the one international human rights treaties of the time. It is true to say that in on the legality of the Separation and international humanitarian law many cases, and not only the Israeli Barrier is - as one might guess- only such as the Fourth Geneva one, compliance with international advisory, i.e., non-binding in nature. Convention. Israel has ratified law is less automatic than with several human rights treaties and the domestic law. What happens when a Yet more UN resolutions have been 4 Chain Reaction Issue No 5, 2007 adopted concerning Israel, than desirable to do so, because Very often, and most other member states of the international law is incorporated especially when it United Nations. Why is it that with into municipal law (for which the comes to universally such regularity the UN bodies adopt compliance record is much better) applicable pieces of new resolutions aimed towards a or because a state’s government international law like more peaceful and human rights fears for its reputation and resulting human rights treaties or observant Middle East? Window negative consequences, e.g., that the Geneva dressing by diplomats that have other states will decrease foreign Conventions, the rules nothing better to do? The answer is investment or political support. contained in obviously a bit more complex. Firstly, international law are it can generally be observed that Let us take a look at the last one of the written embodiment although the degree of compliance those: reputation. Very often, and of a moral consensus. with international law is lower than especially when it comes to what can be observed within universally applicable pieces of domestic legal systems, it is equally international law like human rights true that many countries comply treaties or the Geneva Conventions, with their international legal the rules contained in international obligations most of the time. Recent law are the written embodiment of research by political scientists has a moral consensus. Most of us would convincingly demonstrated that agree that nobody should be there are several factors why states subjected to arbitrary arrest or do often comply with international detention to cite just one example law, among those that the of a human rights norm that the competent decision-makers at state Israeli state continues to violate in level consider it normatively the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Chain Reaction Issue No 5, 2007 5 Governments in general are quite Fourth Geneva Convention is not Palestinian Territories. Their success reluctant to appear as the bad guys- applicable to Israeli behaviour in the may sometimes only be minor when those that act against the moral and Occupied Palestinian Territories (this it comes to inducing more lawful political consensus embodied in can, for example, be found on the behaviour of Israeli state actors. international law. It’s bad publicity. website of the Israeli Foreign However, by evoking relevant Rather than admitting that they are Ministry). international law as a moral, neutral in breach of international law, yardstick for how states in general governments tend to try to interpret The fact that governments, among and the Israeli state in particular the law in a way that they would them the Israeli government, try to should behave, they manage to not be breaking it. This is what the avoid appearing to be acting against generate a great deal of political Israeli government does when it their obligations under international solidarity with Palestinians suffering comes to the Fourth Geneva law has something to say about how from human rights violations. This Convention. This Convention important they think compliance in turn may enable them to directly regulates how an occupying force is with international law is for their alleviate some human suffering. Its supposed to behave in the territory reputation. Even if a government character as a moral yardstick for it occupies. For example, the Fourth does not ultimately comply, there is state behaviour is thus one of the Geneva Convention prohibits the the possibility to capitalise on the more indirect ways in which permanent transfer of civilian fact of non-compliance for other international law may help to foster population to the territories actors.
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