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Settlement Monitor Author(S): Geoffrey Aronson Source: Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol Settlement Monitor Author(s): Geoffrey Aronson Source: Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Winter 2007), pp. 150-161 Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Institute for Palestine Studies Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/jps.2007.36.2.150 . Accessed: 26/02/2015 16:25 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. University of California Press and Institute for Palestine Studies are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of Palestine Studies. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 108.45.56.202 on Thu, 26 Feb 2015 16:25:56 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions SETTLEMENT MONITOR EDITED BY GEOFFREY ARONSON This section covers items—reprinted articles, statistics, and maps—pertaining to Israeli settlement activities in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights. Unless otherwise stated, the items have been written by Geoffrey Aronson for this section or drawn from material written by him for Report on Israeli Settlement in the Occupied Territories (hereinafter Settlement Report), a Washington-based bimonthly newsletter published by the Foundation for Middle East Peace. JPS is grateful to the foundation for permission to draw on its material. Major documents relating to settlements appear in the Documents and Source Material section. Settlement after Lebanon “Standing Up Straight” after Lebanon: A Second Wind for Settlements ...... 150 After War in Lebanon, Israeli Settlements Growing Again, by Ilene R. Prusher . 152 Building on Palestinian-owned Land Fifty-Five Minutes from Tel Aviv, by Yehuda Litani ................. 154 Settlements Grow on Arab Land, Despite Promises Made to U.S., by Amos Hare . 154 Israeli Settlement Building on Private Palestinian Property (excerpts) ...... 156 Update on Israeli Settlement and Wall Activity, by PLO Negotiations Support Unit ........... ........... ........... 158 SETTLEMENT AFTER LEBANON the convergence plan will be much more militant than the struggle against the [Gaza] “STANDING UP STRAIGHT” AFTER LEBANON:A disengagement,” explained one participant. SECOND WIND FOR SETTLEMENTS This militant minority opposed to set- From Settlement Report, September– tlement evacuation stands at the fringe of October 2006. what was, even before the war in Lebanon, a On 13 June, a group of Israelis deter- growing popular uneasiness about Olmert’s mined to scuttle Israeli Prime Minister intentions. This concern was apparent even Ehud Olmert’s promise to evacuate West within the ranks of Olmert’s Kadima party, Bank settlements gathered in Jerusalem. which only a few months before had staked In their view, neither opposition like that its electoral victory on Olmert’s undefined waged unsuccessfully against the August plan to remove settlers from the West Bank. 2005 evacuation of the Gaza Strip nor the On 10 July, Olmert declared, “I am absolutely more confrontational tactics used in a failed committed to continue, in order to finally attempt to prevent the destruction of per- separate from the Palestinians and establish manent dwellings at the settlement outpost secure borders that are recognized by the of Amona in January could avert future international community.” withdrawals. The very next day, on 11 July, MK Otniel According to a report in Yedi’ot Aharonot Schindler, a former settler advising Olmert, on 15 June, participants discussed tactics sought to placate the growing settler op- that included destroying property of the Is- position to withdrawal. He noted that the rael Defense Force (IDF), firebombing army number of settlers east of the separation vehicles, hacking into IDF computers, taint- barrier who would be compelled to vacate ing IDF food supplies, destroying Arab prop- had been reduced to 30,000. That is, only erty, and inciting Palestinian rebellion to half of those settlers residing east of the keep IDF forces too busy to mobilize for set- separation barrier would be withdrawn. tlement evacuations. “The struggle against Implementation of the plan would take at Journal of Palestine Studies Vol. XXXVI, No. 2 (Winter 2007), pp. 150–161, ISSN 0377-919X, electronic ISSN 1533-8614. C 2007 by the Institute for Palestine Studies. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permission to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press’s Rights and Permissions website, at http://www.ucpressjournals.com/reprintInfo.asp. DOI: jps.2007.XXXVI.2.150. This content downloaded from 108.45.56.202 on Thu, 26 Feb 2015 16:25:56 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions SETTLEMENT MONITOR 151 least three years, he explained. And un- missiles of the variety now being fired at like the Gaza withdrawal, settlers would Israel from Gaza and Lebanon that could be “evacuate of their own free will.” Foreign expected to be deployed in areas of the West Minister Tzipi Livni asserted that the IDF Bank evacuated by Israel. would remain in many of the still-undefined Olmert had embraced a unilateral Israel areas from which settlements were to be evacuation of some settlements as a half- evacuated. baked solution to myriad problems con- On 12 July, the war against Lebanon fronting Israel as a consequence of its deter- erupted. Olmert initially claimed that the mination to remain in control of the West battle waged against Hizballah would facil- Bank. Today, a West Bank disengagement in itate the removal of settlements. The war, the Gaza model has been “frozen”—a victim however, dramatically weakened Olmert’s of its own shortcomings, instability in Gaza political standing and heightened already after disengagement and Hamas’s electoral substantial Israeli doubts about the wisdom victory, and the explosion of war on Israel’s of another unnegotiated retreat, after which northern frontier and the ensuing recrim- Israel would remain within range of Pales- inations in Israel. Embroiled in a fight for tinian missiles. his political life, Olmert has chosen to sur- On 24 July, the prime minister told an render the idea at the heart of his political audience of former Gaza settlers, “I want you program and Kadima’s raison d’ˆetre, leaving to know that your evacuation won’t be the Israel without a declared strategy for pre- last. We will be removing more [settlement] serving its settlement and security interests communities.” Asked by a reporter on 2 in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. August whether the war and attacks from “Evacuating settlements in the Gaza Strip Gaza would affect the implementation of his was not a mistake,” observed Deputy Prime “convergence” plan, Olmert replied, “I will Minster Shimon Peres on 8 September. surprise you. I truly believe the creation of “They had no business being there. It is a new order [in Lebanon] that will provide best that they have been removed, not least more stability will produce an environment for the settlers themselves. But the unilater- that will create a new momentum between alism of the disengagement was a mistake. us and the Palestinians. It will assist me to The concept of a unilateral withdrawal [on create an atmosphere for disengagement the West Bank] or realignment is dead polit- from the Palestinians.” ically, psychologically, and practically. There The surprise, however, was on Olmert. will be no large-scale version of the dis- “Within two hours of his words being pub- engagement in the West Bank; no massive lished,” wrote one commentator, “he had evacuation of settlements. received an ultimatum: if convergence is “The concept of realignment is dead for still on the table, settler representatives told three reasons. First, we are being fired upon him, we’re calling our people back home. from the Gaza Strip after withdrawing from You cannot use settlers from Yitzhar, Eli, and there. Second, because of the schisms in other settlements to fight [as Israeli soldiers] the Palestinian political landscape, there is for you in Lebanon and at the same time no one willing to take responsibility. The threaten to raze their homes.” third reason is that Israel is a democracy and Olmert hastened to apologize to his right- public opinion today rules out the idea of a wing political opponents. “The war is a unilateral withdrawal. That is why it will not consequence of Hizballah’s attack against happen; at least, not in the next five or ten Israel. There is no connection whatsoever years. Kadima has to create a new agenda; to future political moves on other fronts.” otherwise it will not survive.” Olmert had made an “own goal” against The Gaza disengagement marked the high convergence. point of an era that witnessed an absence Days later, more bad news, this time of productive formal negotiations, but re- from his own foreign ministry. A top-level sulted in tangible territorial withdrawals by inquiry reported that a unilateral withdrawal Israel and the de facto creation of a tenuous that left some settlements and continuing modus vivendi between Israel and its Is- military control in the West Bank would lamist antagonists in Palestine and Lebanon. not result in international recognition of the A broad application of this option to the West “end of occupation.” Not only did the idea Bank is no longer in the cards. Prominently lack an international political payoff, the absent in the current, half-hearted Israeli report noted that the IDF had no answer to effort to engage diplomatically is an inten- the security threat posed by the short-range tion to implement significant evacuations This content downloaded from 108.45.56.202 on Thu, 26 Feb 2015 16:25:56 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 152 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES of West Bank territory regardless of who three serious incidents of felled olive trees speaks for the Palestinians.
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