Supreme Court of the United States John H. EVANS, Jr., Petitioner V
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112 S.Ct. 1881 FOR EDUCATIONAL USE ONLY Page 1 504 U.S. 255, 112 S.Ct. 1881, 119 L.Ed.2d 57, 60 USLW 4411 (Cite as: 504 U.S. 255, 112 S.Ct. 1881) Supreme Court of the United States John H. EVANS, Jr., Petitioner v. UNITED STATES. No. 90-6105. Argued Dec. 9, 1991. Decided May 26, 1992. Defendant was convicted, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Horace T. Ward, J., of attempted extortion under color of official right in violation of the Hobbs Act and of subscribing to materially false federal income tax return. He appealed. The Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit, Circuit Judge, affirmed, 910 F.2d 790. Following grant of certiorari, the Supreme Court, Justice Stevens, held that affirmative act of inducement by public official was not an element of offense of extortion “under color of official right” prohibited by Hobbs Act. Affirmed. Justice O'Connor and Justice Kennedy filed separate opinions concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Thomas filed dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia joined. West Headnotes [1] Extortion and Threats 165 6 165 Extortion and Threats 165I Official Extortion 165k3 Elements of Offenses 165k6 k. Color of Office or Authority. Most Cited Cases Affirmative act of inducement by public official, such as a demand, was not element of offense of extortion “under color of official right” prohibited by Hobbs Act; government was only required to show that public offi- cial obtained payment to which he was not entitled, knowing that payment was made in return for official acts; overruling U.S. v. O'Grady, 742 F.2d 682; U.S. v. Aguon, 851 F.2d 1158. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1951. [2] Extortion and Threats 165 6 165 Extortion and Threats 165I Official Extortion 165k3 Elements of Offenses 165k6 k. Color of Office or Authority. Most Cited Cases Offense of extortion under color of official right in violation of Hobbs Act is completed at time when public of- ficial receives payment in return for his agreement to perform specific official acts, and fulfillment of the quid pro quo is not an element of offense. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1951. © 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 112 S.Ct. 1881 FOR EDUCATIONAL USE ONLY Page 2 504 U.S. 255, 112 S.Ct. 1881, 119 L.Ed.2d 57, 60 USLW 4411 (Cite as: 504 U.S. 255, 112 S.Ct. 1881) [3] Extortion and Threats 165 9 165 Extortion and Threats 165I Official Extortion 165k9 k. Defenses. Most Cited Cases It is not a defense to charge of extortion under color of official right in violation of Hobbs Act that defendant could also have been convicted of bribery. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1951. [4] Extortion and Threats 165 6 165 Extortion and Threats 165I Official Extortion 165k3 Elements of Offenses 165k6 k. Color of Office or Authority. Most Cited Cases Affirmative step on official's part is not element of offense of extortion under color of official right in violation of Hobbs Act. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1951. [5] Extortion and Threats 165 1 165 Extortion and Threats 165I Official Extortion 165k1 k. Nature of Offense in General. Most Cited Cases Common-law extortion was not limited to wrongful takings under false pretense of official right; although extor- tion accompanied by fraud was well-recognized type of extortion, there were other types as well. FN* **1882 *255 Syllabus FN* The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 287, 50 L.Ed. 499. As part of an investigation of allegations of public corruption in Georgia, a Federal Bureau of Investigation agent posing as a real estate developer initiated a number of conversations with petitioner Evans, an elected member of the DeKalb County Board of Commissioners. The agent sought Evans' assistance in an effort to rezone a tract of land and gave him, inter alia, $7,000 in cash, which Evans failed to report on his state cam- paign-financing disclosure form or his federal income tax return. Evans was convicted in the District Court of, among other things, extortion under the Hobbs Act, which is “the obtaining of property from another, ... induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right,” 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2). In affirming the conviction, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that the trial court's jury instruction did not require a finding that Evans had demanded or requested the money, or that he had conditioned the per- formance of any official act upon its receipt. However, it held that “passive acceptance of the benefit” was suffi- cient for a Hobbs Act violation if the public official knew that he was being offered the payment in exchange for a specific requested exercise of his official power. Held: An affirmative act of inducement by a public official, such as a demand, is not an element of the offense of extortion “under color of official right” prohibited by the Hobbs Act. Pp. 1885-1891. © 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 112 S.Ct. 1881 FOR EDUCATIONAL USE ONLY Page 3 504 U.S. 255, 112 S.Ct. 1881, 119 L.Ed.2d 57, 60 USLW 4411 (Cite as: 504 U.S. 255, 112 S.Ct. 1881) (a) Congress is presumed to have adopted the common-law definition of extortion-which does not require that a public official make a demand or request-unless it has instructed otherwise. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263, 72 S.Ct. 240, 249-250, 96 L.Ed. 288. While the Act **1883 expanded the common-law definition to encompass conduct by a private individual as well as a public official, the portion of the Act referring to offi- cial misconduct continues to mirror the common-law definition. There is nothing in the sparse legislative history or the statutory text that could fairly be described as a “contrary direction,” ibid., from Congress to narrow the offense's scope. The inclusion of the word “induced” in the definition does not require that the wrongful use of official power begin with a public official. That word is part of the definition of extortion by a private individual but not by a public official, and even if it did apply to *256 a public official, it does not necessarily indicate that a transaction must be initiated by the bribe's recipient. Pp. 1885-1888. (b) Evans' criticisms of the jury instruction-that it did not properly describe the quid pro quo requirement for conviction if the jury found that the payment was a campaign contribution, and that it did not require the jury to find duress-are rejected. The instruction satisfies the quid pro quo requirement of McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 111 S.Ct. 1807, 114 L.Ed.2d 307, because the offense is completed when the public official re- ceives payment in return for his agreement to perform specific official acts; fulfillment of the quid pro quo is not an element of the offense. Nor is an affirmative step on the official's part an element of the offense on which an instruction need be given. Pp. 1888-1889. (c) The conclusion herein is buttressed by the facts that many courts have interpreted the statute in the same way, and that Congress, although aware of this prevailing view, has remained silent. Pp. 1889-1890. 910 F.2d 790 (CA11 1990), affirmed. STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE, BLACKMUN, and SOUTER, JJ., joined, in Parts I and II of which O'CONNOR, J., joined, and in Part III of which KENNEDY, J., joined. O'CONNOR, J., post, p. 189, and KENNEDY, J., post, p. 1891, filed opinions concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and SCALIA, J., joined, post, p. 1894. C. Michael Abbott, by appointment of the Court, 501 U.S. 1229, argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner. Deputy Solicitor General Bryson argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Starr, Assistant Attorney General Mueller, Christopher J. Wright, and Richard A. Friedman. Justice STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. We granted certiorari, 500 U.S. 951, 111 S.Ct. 2256, 114 L.Ed.2d 709 (1991), to resolve a conflict in the Cir- cuits over the question whether an affirmative act of inducement by a public official, such as a demand, is an element of the offense of extortion “under color of official right” prohibited by the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 . We agree with the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit that it is not, and therefore affirm the judgment of the court below. *257 I Petitioner was an elected member of the Board of Commissioners of DeKalb County, Georgia. During the period between March 1985 and October 1986, as part of an effort by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to in- vestigate allegations of public corruption in the Atlanta area, particularly in the area of rezonings of property, an © 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 112 S.Ct. 1881 FOR EDUCATIONAL USE ONLY Page 4 504 U.S.