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Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance Assessment of Nepal Final Report

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DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND GOVERNANCE ASSESSMENT OF NEPAL FINAL REPORT OCTOBER 2012 This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by Tetra Tech ARD. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This report presents the findings of a Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance (DRG) Assessment of Nepal. The field research and interviews were conducted from July 9 through July 27, 2012. The assessment team consisted of Guilain Denoeux (Team Leader), Harry Blair, Ameet Dhakal, Christopher Hobbs, and Mike Calavan. Dr. Denoeux is the report’s primary author. The team would like to express its gratitude to Maria Barrón, Director of USAID/Nepal’s Democracy and Governance Office, which offered unparalleled logistical support. During their many decades of combined field experience, the three expatriate members of the team have been privileged to benefit from significant support from USAID missions abroad. None of them, however, ever had received logistical assistance that, in its scope and quality, matched that which USAID/Nepal offered during this particular exercise. Deputy Mission Director Sheila Lutjens, Maria Barrón, and Christopher Hobbs (Crisis, Stabilization & Governance Officer at the Mission) deserve particular credit for having made that situation possible. Chris Hobbs’ full-time participation in the assessment, and his many contributions to the analysis contained in the report, made him an invaluable member of the team. The team’s gratitude extends to all those at USAID/Nepal and the US Embassy in Kathmandu who took time to share their insights and expertise. The team is particularly grateful for the interest that Deputy Chief of Mission Patricia Mahoney showed in the assessment and for her many insights into Nepal’s politics. The courtesy that she, Sheila Lutjens, and Maria Barrón extended to the team made the latter’s task both much easier and more pleasant. The team is also pleased to acknowledge Ganga Maharjan in the DRG office for her assistance in coordinating interviews and travel arrangements, often on short notice. Last but not least, the team is grateful for the support that members of the Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights and Governance (DCHA/DRG) and others at USAID/Washington have extended to it, and for the sustained interest they have shown in its findings. We extend particular thanks to Meghan Nalbo and Ashley Quarcoo, who have played a leading role in coordinating the exercise on behalf of USAID’s Washington, DC staff. This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development by Tetra Tech ARD, through Task Order 002 under the Analytical Services III Indefinite Quantity Contract. Team: • Guilain Denoeux, Assessment Team Leader and Principal Author, Consultant to Tetra Tech ARD and Professor of Political Science at Colby College • Harry Blair, Country Expert, Consultant to Tetra Tech ARD, and Senior Research Scholar of Political Science at Yale University • Michael Calavan, Crosscutting Program Development Specialist, Consultant to Tetra Tech ARD • Ameet Dhakal, Nepal Political Analyst, Consultant to Tetra Tech ARD • Christopher Hobbs, Senior Democracy and Governance Field Advisor, USAID/Nepal This report was prepared by: Tetra Tech ARD 159 Bank Street, Suite 300 Burlington, Vermont 05401 USA Telephone: (802) 658-3890 Fax: (802) 658-4247 Tetra Tech ARD Contact: Maria Echevarria, Project Manager Tel: (802) 658-3890 ext. 2319 Email: [email protected] DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND GOVERNANCE ASSESSMENT OF NEPAL FINAL REPORT OCTOBER 2012 DISCLAIMER The author’s views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government. TABLE OF CONTENTS ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................. III EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................... V 1.0 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 1 2.0 KEY CHALLENGES TO DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND GOVERNANCE IN NEPAL ....................................................................................... 3 2.1 THE KEY DRIVER BEHIND NEPAL’S CURRENT CRISIS ............................................... 4 2.2 THE CORE DRG PROBLEM ................................................................................................... 5 2.3 BRINGING SECOND-ORDER VARIABLES INTO THE ANALYSIS ........................... 5 2.3.1 SOV 1: Political Parties ................................................................................................. 6 2.3.2 SOV 2: Nature and Scope of Societal and Political Demands ............................ 8 2.3.3 SOV 3: Systemic, Institutionalized Corruption ...................................................... 9 2.4 ACCOUNTING FOR RULE OF LAW AND COMPETITION DEFICITS…AND FOR THESE DEFICITS’ CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE CORE DRG PROBLEM ........ 9 2.4.1 ROL Deficits ................................................................................................................... 9 2.4.2 Competition Deficits .................................................................................................. 10 2.5 ADDITIONAL STEP-ONE BACKGROUND ANALYSIS ................................................. 11 2.5.1 Consensus...................................................................................................................... 11 2.5.2 Inclusion ......................................................................................................................... 12 2.5.3 Competition and Political Accountability .............................................................. 13 2.5.4 Rule of Law .................................................................................................................... 15 2.5.5 Government Effectiveness and Administrative Accountability ........................ 17 3.0 STEP TWO: KEY ACTORS AND INSTITUTIONS ............................................ 19 3.1 KEY ACTORS ............................................................................................................................... 19 3.1.1 The Nepali Congress .................................................................................................. 20 3.1.2 The Communist Party of Nepal—United Marxist Leninists ............................. 22 3.1.3 The Maoist Parties ....................................................................................................... 23 3.1.4 Madhesi Parties ............................................................................................................. 29 3.1.5 The Janajati .................................................................................................................... 30 3.1.6 Dalits ............................................................................................................................... 31 3.1.7 Conservatives ............................................................................................................... 33 3.1.8 Concluding Comments on Key Actors .................................................................. 35 3.2 INSTITUTIONS AND ARENAS .............................................................................................. 36 3.2.1 The Executive ............................................................................................................... 36 3.2.2 Security Agencies ......................................................................................................... 37 3.2.3 The Legislature ............................................................................................................. 38 3.2.4 The Judiciary and Legal Professionals ..................................................................... 38 3.2.5 Local Government ....................................................................................................... 39 3.2.6 Political Parties and Electoral Institutions ............................................................. 40 3.2.7 Civil Society ................................................................................................................... 41 3.2.8 The Media ...................................................................................................................... 43 3.2.9 Private-Sector Business Interests ............................................................................ 43 3.2.10 Non-State Actors ........................................................................................................ 45 3.2.11 Regional Actors ............................................................................................................ 46 4.0 OPERATIONAL AND PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENT ............................ 49 5.0 DRG STRATEGIC AND PROGRAMMATIC RECOMMENDATIONS ............. 56 5.1 GUIDING PRINCIPLES AND ASSUMPTIONS ................................................................... 58 5.2 PRIORITY PROGRAMMATIC RECOMMENDATIONS AND ILLUSTRATIVE ACTIVITIES................................................................................................................................. 58 DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND GOVERNANCE ASSESSMENT OF NEPAL i BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................... 63 ANNEX 1. CROSS-SECTORAL SYNERGIES.................................................................
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