Perceptions of Public Security and Crime in the Kathmandu Valley February 2012
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BRIEFING Working to prevent violent conflict Perceptions of public security and crime in the Kathmandu Valley February 2012 1 1. Introduction Following on from the decade-long violent conflict between the state and the Maoist Peoples Liberation Army which ended with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2006, the post-conflict era in Nepal has been witness to a period of unabated political instability, slow progress in the implementation of the peace agreement and a noticeable shift in the nature of violence and insecurity. In particular, previous research2 and recent media reports suggest a growing trend of criminal violence, especially in urban areas in the Terai and the Kathmandu Valley (comprising Kathmandu, Lalitpur and Bhaktapur districts) the largest urban area in Nepal. This is illustrated through the patchwork of criminal gangs that have formed in and around these particular geographic areas in the post-conflict era. Although the actions of these criminal gangs are sometimes connected with political aims, unlike during the conflict era where violence was predominantly politically motivated, their actions equally appear to be detached from political objectives and thus motivated by other non-political factors which often include economic inequalities, boredom as a result of unemployment, greed, and/or that crime offers a quicker and easier way to access money than through employment. Although some research has been undertaken over recent years to better understand criminal group activity and violence in the Terai3, little has been undertaken which seeks to explicitly understand crime, violence and insecurity in the Kathmandu Valley. Understanding these patterns in the Kathmandu Valley is critical for understanding the broader security situation in Nepal, as some forms of crime carried out in the Kathmandu Valley may connect with criminal activity taking place elsewhere in the country particularly organised crime and criminal gang activities. This research seeks to take the first step in filling this information gap, and provide an initial analysis of different stakeholders perceptions of crime, violence and insecurity at the community level in the Kathmandu Valley in the post-conflict era. It aims primarily to inform policy and programming of key stakeholders involved in public security, crime and conflict prevention in Kathmandu Valley, and to stimulate a discussion that might lead to more in-depth research and analysis being carried out. Findings are largely drawn from the perceptions and attitudes of communities, security agencies, civil society, government and the private sector gathered through focus group discussions and interviews, but also secondary data, such as media reports and police crime statistics where relevant. The key findings outlined in this briefing, based on the perceptions of research participants, include 1) the continued role that political youth wings play in undermining security in the post-conflict era, 2) a growth in the prevalence of organised crime, 3) 1 This research was one component of a Saferworld project to support community-based approaches on small arms control and armed violence reduction, funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2 See Interdisciplinary Analysts, Nepal Madhesh Foundation, Saferworld & Small Arms Survey, Armed Violence in the Terai (August 2011), & Housden, O, Nepals Elusive Peace, Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies Journal, Vol 155(2), April/May 2010, pp7077 3 Ibid threats to personal safety posed by an increase in randomly targeted violent crime, 4) emergence of newly formed criminal groups and 5) tensions between ‘original’ inhabitants of the Kathmandu Valley and ‘rural-urban migrants which are undermining people’s perceptions of public security. Political ‘youth wings’, ‘criminal gangs’ and ‘armed groups’ Throughout this report, reference is made to political ‘youth wings’ and ‘criminal gangs’ as two separate groups. The distinction between these groups is sometimes difficult to make as politics has become increasingly criminalised and the actions of political youth wings and criminal gangs are often blurred where criminal gangs sometimes take on a political identity, and youth wings sometimes act as criminals through actions that are seemingly detached from political aims. In addition, confusion is reinforced by the fact that both groups are comprised largely of youth, predominantly men (see Section 3.4 below). However, as suggested in research findings and for the purpose of this briefing, these two groups are distinct from each other in terms of motivation and membership. Criminal gangs and their members are thought to be motivated predominantly by economic gain, and usually only take on a political identity or make links with political actors when they are paid to do so, or are offered protection from prosecution in the state security and justice system in return (see Section 3.5 below for more details). Some of those gangs operate throughout the country or are even affiliated with organised crime in other countries such as India, China, Thailand or Pakistan. Political youth wings and their members on the other hand are thought to be motivated primarily by particular political beliefs and aligned to one particular political party, but are also perceived to be involved in obstructing tender-bids of government and non- government businesses, beating individuals who oppose their ideologies or plans and gang fights with other political youth wings. The use of the term ‘armed group’ is not used in this briefing to avoid confusion. However, it is recognised that both youth wings and criminal groups often use and have access to small arms and light weapons (SALW, see footnote 20). 2. Methodology The information contained in this report is based on research undertaken between February and May 2011 in the three districts of the Kathmandu Valley (Kathmandu, Lalitpur and Bhaktapur) and in three of the districts which neighbour the Kathmandu Valley (Sindhupalchok, Kabhreplanchowk and Makwanpur). The latter three districts were selected because, as reported by security agency personnel interviewed during previous research4 and various media reports, the criminal activities that occur in these districts appear to be interconnected with those taking place in the Kathmandu Valley. In particular, all three districts are believed to be strategic in terms of trafficking of goods and people from the Kathmandu Valley to China and India, where the highways from Kathmandu to China run through Sindhupalchok and Kabhreplanchowk, and the highway connecting Kathmandu to India runs through Makwanpur. Research activities consisted of: a. Key informant and semi-structured interviews with representatives from security agencies, civil society, relevant political groups and wings, private sector, local authorities, members of different groups/gangs/associations responsible for 4 See Interdisciplinary Analysts, Nepal Madhesh Foundation, Saferworld & Small Arms Survey, Armed Violence in the Terai (August 2011), & Saferworld, Common Ground? Gendered Assessment of the Needs and Concerns of Maoist Army Combatants for Rehabilitation and Integration, (November2010) 2 committing crime, community leaders, and relevant community members and family members. A total of 42 key informant and semi-structured interviews were undertaken (7 interviews per district). b. Focus group discussions (FGDs) with community members affected by crime and insecurity. In addition to mixed FGDs, separate FGDs were held with groups whose voices are often not heard, including youth and women from excluded ethnic and caste groups. A total of 14 focus group discussions were undertaken (4 in Lalitpur district and 2 in each of the other 5 districts). In total, eight FGDs were held with mixed participants, two separately with youth, two separately with women and two separately with men. 3. Key findings 3.1 Perception that public security is undermined by political youth wings A significant level of blame was placed on the youth wings of the main political parties5 for the perceived deteriorating security situation and increased levels of crime in the Kathmandu Valley– principally on the Young Communist League (YCL) attached to the United Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (UCPN-M), and the Youth Force (YF) attached to the Community Party of Nepal – United Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML) – by many informants from communities, civil society and the private sector interviewed during the research, in addition to criminal gangs (see 3.4 below). Although these youth groups are active across Nepal, their impact has been significantly felt in the Kathmandu Valley as the centre of all political activity in the country. Communities’ perceptions of the youth wings today are largely reminiscent of the pressures that UCPN-M cadres subjected them to when entering Kathmandu in 2006. While lobbying for the CPA, the UCPN-M cadres demanded food ‘donations’ and shelter from the communities. However, communities reported that youth wings are now less prevalent in the Kathmandu Valley than during the peak years between 2006 and 2009 when recruitment was most intensive and successful. The reason for this is unclear from the research and deserves further attention, although some community and civil society informants felt that this is because civil society in the Kathmandu Valley has become increasingly vocal in criticising YCL and YF activities. However, respondents from the surrounding