Business As Usual: the US-Turkey Security Partnership
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MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XXII, NO. 4, WINTER 2015 BUSINESS AS USUAL: THE U.S.-TURKEY SECURITY PARTNERSHIP Mustafa Kibaroglu and Selim C. Sazak Dr. Kibaroglu is the chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations and director of the Center for International Security Studies and Strategic Research at MEF University in Istanbul. He has held positions at Harvard’s Belfer Center and the Monterey Institute of International Studies. Mr. Sazak is a researcher in the Century Foundation’s foreign-policy program and a non-resident affiliate of the Center for International Security Studies and Strategic Research at MEF University in Istanbul. hilip Robins’s famous question, The direction Turkey’s domestic politics “What on earth is happening in has taken in recent years, Turkey’s aspira- Turkey?” has been echoing around tions for greater latitude in shaping region- the capitals of the Atlantic com- al politics, and the incongruity of Turkey’s Pmunity, uttered variously in exasperation, security interests with the policy objectives in admiration and in wonder.1 The same of its Western allies have all contributed to refrain recently has been repeatedly raised these troubles. Yet, the alarmists accusing around Turkey’s careening towards an Turkey of abandoning the West are em- activist foreign policy in the Middle East, bracing a one-sided and distorted narrative its increased willingness to break with its that further antagonizes Ankara and deep- trans-atlantic allies on critical decisions ens the rift with its Western allies. and over its policies in Syria. A closer look The path to a robust alliance that at the structural dynamics of the U.S.-Tur- can address the myriad challenges in the key security partnership, however, reflects Middle East and beyond is a constructive that the systemic factors underpinning the dialogue between Turkey and its allies alliance are alive and well. The alarmist aimed at identifying the fulcrum that bal- discourse is giving primacy to agency over ances Turkey’s legitimate security interests structure and is hampered by “presentist” with the broader objectives of its allies. conceptions, leading to a distorted under- standing of the half-century partnership LOSING — AND REDISCOVERING between the United States and Turkey. — TURKEY It is true that the U.S.-Turkey security Turkey’s opening of the Incirlik Air partnership is going through a rough patch. Base to coalition forces fighting Islamic © 2015, The Authors Middle East Policy © 2015, Middle East Policy Council 98 Kibaroglu and Sazak.indd 98 11/20/2015 2:37:43 PM KIBAROGLU / SAZAK: THE U.S.-TURKEY SECURITY PARTNERSHIP State (IS) militants was widely welcomed, both ousted Assad and denied the Kurds an reflecting worries about the allegedly independent enclave in the north, proved moribund state of the U.S.-Turkey alli- a challenge to NATO’s broader policy ance. “The [Incirlik] agreement seems objectives. a watershed moment,”2 the Washington In more sensationalistic accounts, Institute for Near East Policy’s Andrew J. Turkey’s divergent interests were ex- Tabler told The New York Times. Tweeting trapolated into an alleged complicity with on the news, “Incirlik, at last!”3 exclaimed ISIS. According to this narrative, Turkey’s Ambassador Martin Indyk, former U.S. frustration with U.S. hesitancy to push for peace mediator. James Stavridis praised Assad’s ouster in full force had led it to the deal as a triumph for NATO: “[Its secretly support ISIS and other Islamist Syrian] border is not Turkey’s alone: It groups as a means of containing the Kurds is NATO’s border as well.”4 The senti- while further weakening the Assad regime. ment was similar on the Turkish side. TRT These were allegations of doubtful verac- World, the English-language service of ity. A study by the Carter Center had actu- Turkey’s state broadcaster, ran the news ally found that the Assad regime spared with the title “Turkey-U.S. realignment ISIS in 90 percent of its attacks,9 and a reaches top point.”5 separate study by the IHS Jane’s Terrorism The jubilation was not untimely. Over and Insurgency Center (JTIC) found that the last years, the U.S. foreign-policy the regime targeted ISIS in only 6 percent establishment had grown increasingly dis- of its attacks.10 illusioned with its allies in the Middle East Yet, Turkey’s alleged support for ISIS over their inaction against (and alleged remained a persistent theme in the public complicity in) the rise of the Islamic State discourse. A July 2014 report in Newsweek of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS). A slew of es- quoted a former ISIS member that “ISIS tablishment figures from Richard Haass6 to saw the Turkish army as its ally, especially Leslie Gelb7 to Ryan Crocker8 had publicly when it came to fighting the Kurds.”11 questioned why America should remain There were also wilder allegations vary- committed to allies that haven’t been doing ing from weapons smuggling12 to illicit oil it much good against ISIS, whereas Assad trade13 to turning a blind eye to Islamist is fighting the good fight, and Iran seems recruitment in suburban neighborhoods.14 much nicer than it was. The watershed moment in U.S.-Turkey These criticisms were explicitly aimed relations came with the siege of Kobani at Arabian Gulf monarchies like Saudi in October 2014. Despite Turkey’s well- Arabia and Qatar, but they were also im- known concerns about the objectives and plicitly addressed to Turkey, NATO’s only character of the Kurdish Democratic Party Muslim-majority member and an unruly (PYD) and its embedded militia, the Kurd- partner that increasingly frustrated its ish People’s Protection Units (YPG) — a trans-atlantic allies. These latent tensions fighting force with ties to the Kurdistan in the U.S.-Turkey security partnership, Workers Party (PKK) that has been des- which were by no means new, as discussed ignated a “foreign terrorist organization” below, culminated over Syria. Turkey’s by the U.S. Department of State — the continued support for opposition groups, United States decided to provide military and its intransigence on a solution that and humanitarian aid into Kobani to help 99 Kibaroglu and Sazak.indd 99 11/20/2015 2:37:44 PM MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XXII, NO. 4, WINTER 2015 the Kurds push the ISIS offensive back.15 A tration. As Simon Tisdall astutely observed second concern was the accusation that the in his commentary on the Incirlik deal, Kurds were conducting ethnic cleansing “demands for Turkey’s assistance [in Syr- against Sunni Arabs and Turkmens with ia] were doubly unwelcome given Wash- the intention of creating a de facto Kurd- ington’s criticism of Erdoğan’s authori- ish enclave in northern Syria.16 Although tarian, neo-Islamist leadership style, his PYD has been adamantly denying these attacks on human rights and press freedom, accusations, a recent report by Amnesty and his open hostility to a key U.S. ally, Is- International alleged that the “Kurdish rael.”23 “[NATO] is a coalition of countries forces have carried out a wave of forced with shared values,” wrote Columbia Uni- displacement and mass house demolitions, versity’s David L. Philips; “If NATO were amounting to war crimes.”17 being established today, Turkey would not At the time, Turkey’s policies on qualify as a member.”24 As Michael Werz Kobani were largely portrayed as refus- and Max Hoffman observed, “The White ing to help the besieged Kurds, a narrative House’s frustration about Turkey’s ap- that dovetailed with allegations of Turkish proach and President Erdoğan’s constant support for Islamist groups in Syria. This, public sniping and populist demagoguery however, was a factually erroneous charac- provided some context for the military and terization. More than 130,000 Kurds were strategic decision to save Kobani.”25 allowed to cross into Turkey in the first While Syria was an important aspect of days of the ISIS offensive,18 and eventually the mutual frustration between Turkey and the number exceeded 400,000.19 the United States, it was by no means the Nonetheless, Kobani emerged as a only one. Another point of contention was foil for those questioning whether Tur- Turkey’s long-range missile-defense tender key really deserves to belong in NATO. after Ankara rejected bids by its NATO On October 9, Jonathan Schanzer of the allies in favor of a Chinese-built one.26 Foundation for the Defense of Democra- “Turkey is recasting itself as a nonaligned cies wrote for Politico a sharply worded country in its rhetoric, which is making criticism arguing, “Turkey under the AKP NATO very uncomfortable,” a Western is a lost cause” and asking whether it was official in Brussels was quoted as saying “time to kick Turkey out of NATO.”20 in a Wall Street Journal article discussing A few days later, the influential French the Chinese deal; “Turkey’s stance will intellectual Bernard Henri-Levy echoed be an issue for years to come, not only if the same sentiment in The New Republic: the Chinese missile deal happens, but also “If Kobane [sic] becomes the name of because of its politics.”27 yet another Turkish default [on its NATO Michael Merz and Max Hoffman allies], this one inexcusable — its future perfectly summarized Washington’s senti- in NATO is in doubt.”21 Historian Conrad ment: “[Turkey’s] role as a reliable NATO Black wrote in even less uncertain terms: ally has been questioned [as it] signed “Tell the Turks to stop supporting terror- accords with Russia and China that under- ism — or get out of NATO.”22 mine NATO positions, routinely bargains The troubles over Kobani were also with the U.S.