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England-In-The-War-Of-The-Spanish ENGLAND in the WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION A Study in the English View and Conduct of Grand Strategy, 1701 - 1713 A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Modern History in the University of Oxford for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy by John B. Hattendorf Pembroke College Oxford 1979 PREFACE This study has reached a far different result from that originally intended. Initially, I undertook it as an examination of the strategic inter-relationship of an army and a navy in the conduct of a war. This seemed to be a manageable topic for a thesis, and the War of the Spanish Succession seemed to be a good example, as well as the origin, of the controversy between 'blue water 1 and 'con­ tinental 1 strategies. The basic English language studies for the period, G. N. Clark's The Later Stuarts and G. M. Trevelyan's England under Queen Anne provided no broad perspective into the strategic conduct of the war, and the general literature on the war seemed to divide itself into several small classes of special studies. There were numerous studies on Marlborough and his military campaigns, along with a few studies which dealt with the campaigns in Spain. Then there were studies of the navy, very few of which even mentioned Marlborough and the army, studies of the colonies, government administration, party politics, and a range of biographies. After making an initial survey of the studies which had been done, I concluded that I could fill a small gap by contrasting Marlborough's direc­ tion of the war on the continent with the ideas of his political opposition and the actual operations of the navy. In this way, I thought that I could explore an area which military and naval theorists such as Clausewitz, J. S. Corbett and A. T. Mahan had largely ignored. I began my work in what I considered the most impor­ tant archive, the papers at Blenheim Palace. After a month or so of work in the Muniment Room and in the Long Library, it was clear that Marlborough had not directed the broad strategy of the war, although he was clearly a key figure. The very positive evidence for this forced me to take a new approach and to ask new questions. First of all, if Marlborough was not the strategic genius behind the war, how were strategic decisions reached? On the basis of the answer which I found to that question, I used all the obtainable documents that were used in the strategic decision making process to determine what national goals were and how the army and navy were used to reach them. This, in turn, led me to see that the forces were com­ plementary to one another as well as to the use of diplo­ macy, money and privateers. Throughout this investigation, I was disturbed to find so little reference to the public debate over war strategy in the conduct of war policy. When I turned to a study of the debate in newspapers, pamphlets and speeches I found that public comment over the conduct and strategy of the war was not in itself the object of the debate, but a superficial aspect of the political controversy over the nature of the English government. Having begun with a narrowly defined issue, my research has led me to a general reassessment of the English view and conduct of grand strategy in the War of the Spanish Succession. I have attempted to explore and iii to survey the range of manuscripts and I have considered some of the major problems in English war conduct. The result is a broad analysis and presentation of the general pattern of English activity in a complex war. While this broad view seems a useful one to present, the method and the results cause some regrets. My conclusion about the methods by which decisions were made has forced me away from the more easily understandable and traditional habit of linking actions to individuals. In place of naming individuals, I have had to use abstract terms such as 'England 1 , 'the Government' and 'the ministry'. The search for broad patterns has obscured personalities, and simultaneously, it has tended to replace movement in time with a static view. However, I have chosen to take the method that I have used because the chronological analysis and narrative which would have corrected these problems could not have been presented in the space available. Acknowledgements This study is the result of my own research, but in the course of my work I am grateful for the assistance which so many people have offered me. In that very long list of debts, I am particularly grateful to Dr. Ivor Burton of Bedford College, London, for giving me permission to use the results of his research into the numbers of effective troops sent into different theatres of the war which he included in his unpublished thesis, 'The Secre­ tary of War and the Administration of the Army during the War of the Spanish Succession 1 , (University of London, 1960). Mr. Martin Gilbert of Merton College, Oxford, very iv kindly allowed me to read in his home several files relating to Marlborough that were among the Churchill Papers from Chartwell in his custody. A number of scholars and specialists have given me general guidance. Professor R. M. Hatton of the London School of Economics pointed out to me the importance of Dutch and German writing and made some very useful criti­ cisms of my projected plan of study. Dr. Henry L. Snyder of the University of Kansas was helpful in locating some Marlborough documents. Professor Ralph Davis, University of Leicester, kindly replied to my query on trade protec­ tion and the accuracy of trade statistics. Henry Kamen of the University of Warwick gave me some broad general advice at the outset of the study as did Dr. G. T>. Ramsay of St. Edmund Hall, Oxford, and Professor Geoffrey Holmes of the University of Lancaster. Professor Michael Roberts of Grahamstown, South Africa, kindly offered some very useful guidance on the general literature of Scandinavian history in this period. D. D. Aldridge of the University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne gave me useful information on sources of naval material as did A. W. H. Pearsall and Dr. R. J. B. Knight of the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich. Librarians and archivists were extremely helpful at every place I visited. In particular, I am grateful for the facilities of the Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts without whose help I should have overlooked much important material. The generosity of the Modern History Board in nominating me, in three successive years, to one of its free places at the Institute of Historical Research in London provided a very useful collection of reference material and a place to meet with others working in related fields. In Stockholm, my father-in-law, r.edaktor Gunnar Sundell, introduced me to work at Riksarkivet, and made photocopies of articles when I needed them from afar. Anthony Sarro did a superb job in turning my rough and crowded sketches into clearly readable maps. I am grateful to Elizabeth Jenkins, Barbara Campbell and Grace Garth for typing successive drafts and to P. G- M. Dickson, Charles Ingrao, R. J. B. Knight, Piers Mackesy and Gunnar Sundell for their constructive criticism on them. On a personal note, I am deeply grateful to S. E. Morison for giving me the initial encouragement to study at Oxford and to Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN, who inspired me to persevere while I was still a naval officer on his staff. The Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, made it all possible by a generous research grant and a subsequent appointment as visiting associate professor of strategy. Above all, N. H. Gibbs of All Souls College, Chichele Professor of the History of War in the University of Oxford, has given me the day to day advice and encouragement which has allowed me to learn. His friendship and kindness, along with that of his wife, Kate, have sustained me over the years. J. B. Hattendorf VI TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE PREFACE ..................... ii LIST OF MAPS AND TABLES ............. viii A NOTE ON DATES, QUOTATIONS AND USAGE ...... ix CHAPTER I. THE MACHINERY FOR THE CONDUCT OF WAR ... 1 II. ENGLAND'S STRATEGY OF ALLIANCE ...... 55 III. A WEB OF TREATIES ............ 98 IV. DEALING WITH SOME OBSTACLES TO ENGLISH GRAND STRATEGY .............. 134 V. THE ALLOCATION OF ENGLISH RESOURCES FOR THE WAR ABROAD .............. 197 VI. DEFENSIVE STRATEGY ............ 246 VII. THE PUBLIC DEBATE AND WAR STRATEGY .... 281 VIII. ENGLISH CONDUCT OF THE WAR DURING THE SEARCH FOR PEACE, Part I: 1705-10 .... 319 IX. ENGLISH CONDUCT OF THE WAR DURING THE SEARCH FOR PEACE, Part II: 1710-13 .... 340 X. CONCLUSION ................ 389 APPENDICES A. Dramatis Personae: ........... 394 B. Chronological Listing of England's International Agreements, 1701-1713 . 401 C. General War Expenditures, 1701-12 .... 421 D. Expenditure for the War on the Continent . 422 E. The Employment of the English Fleet . 423 F. The Employment of the Dutch Fleet .... 426 G. Letters of Marque Issued by the High Court of Admiralty ............... 427 H. Locations of Prizes Captured, 1702-12 . 428 BIBLIOGRAPHY .................. 429 ABSTRACTS .................... 454 vii LIST OF TABLES PAGE I. The division of responsibility in foreign affairs among the Secretaries of State, in general practice 1702-12 ....... 11 II. General War Expenditure and Expenditure for the English Army, Foreign Troops and Subsidies, 1703-12 ......... 199 III. Annual Subsidies ............ 201-2 IV. Employment of the Army on the Continent, 1701-12 ................. 206 V. Army Establishment Abroad, 1701-12 . 207 VI.
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