The 1711 Expedition to Quebec: Politics and the Limitations
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THE 1711 EXPEDITION TO QUEBEC: POLITICS AND THE LIMITATIONS OF GLOBAL STRATEGY IN THE REIGN OF QUEEN ANNE ADAM JAMES LYONS A thesis submitted to the University of Birmingham for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of History School of History and Cultures College of Arts and Law University of Birmingham December 2010 University of Birmingham Research Archive e-theses repository This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation. Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder. ABSTRACT To mark the 300th anniversary of the event in question, this thesis analyses the first British attempt to conquer the French colonial city of Quebec. The expedition was a product of the turbulent political environment that was evident towards the end of the reign of Queen Anne. Its failure has consequently proven to be detrimental to the reputations of the expedition‘s commanders, in particular Rear-Admiral Sir Hovenden Walker who was actually a competent and effective naval officer. True blame should lie with his political master, Secretary of State Henry St John, who ensured the expedition‘s failure by maintaining absolute control over it because of his obsession with keeping its objective a secret. After recently celebrating a succession of tercentenaries concerning the War of the Spanish Succession, this thesis hopes to draw attention away from the famous military commander, the Duke of Marlborough, and instead focus upon a little known combined operation. The expedition helped to alter British strategy by renewing an interest in ‗blue-water‘ operations that would see huge success later in the century, ultimately resulting in the eventual conquest of French North America in the Seven Years War. This thesis is dedicated to the memories of my father and grandparents ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Firstly, I must thank my supervisor, Dr Michael Snape, for all of the support he has given to me over the years. In addition, I am very grateful for the many drinks that he bought which sustained me throughout the writing of this thesis. I owe him several in return. Additionally, I would like to express my gratitude to Victoria Henshaw, another doctoral student at the University of Birmingham under the supervision of Dr Snape. She has been of great help on numerous occasions and has been a source of constant support. For the huge encouragement given to me, concerning my subject, whilst chairing my panel at a memorable conference at Queens University, Belfast, I would like to extend my thanks to the independent historian, Dr Stephen Brumwell. I am also extremely grateful to Dean Jobb, Associate Professor in the School of Journalism at the University of King‘s College, Halifax, Nova Scotia, who provided me with valuable assistance in finding some sources. Dr Keith McLay, Head of History and Archaeology at the University of Chester, offered some very valuable discussion concerning the 1711 expedition, for which I am thankful. I am also indebted to Dr John McAleer, Curator of Eighteenth-Century Imperial and Maritime History, for considering my subject worthy of inclusion in the National Maritime Museum‘s British Maritime History Seminar programme. The kindness of Colonel H. G. R. Boscawen must be acknowledged for the advice he has given to me and for making available segments of his book, The Capture of Louisbourg, 1758, which is awaiting publication. I am sure the book will be warmly received. Finally, I must reserve my greatest thanks to my mother for her patience and for the financial support she gave. This allowed me to briefly visit Quebec, which consequently gave me a greater understanding of the events that I have written about in this thesis. CONTENTS LIST OF MAPS……………………………………………………………………. iii MAPS………………………………………………………………………………. iv NOTES……………………………………………………………………………... vii INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………………. 1 CHAPTER 1 COLONIES AND POLITICS………………………………………. 22 I: The North American Colonies…………………………………………....22 II: The Decision to Dispatch the 1711 Expedition………………………….57 III: Conclusion……………………………………………………………....68 CHAPTER 2 THE EXPEDITION‘S COMMANDERS…………………………....71 I: Hovenden Walker…………………………………………………………72 II: John Hill…………………………………………………………………100 III: Hill‘s Subordinates……………………………………………………...106 IV: Conclusion……………………………………………………………... 112 CHAPTER 3 ORGANISING THE EXPEDITION………………………………...114 I: Initial Preparations………………………………………………………..117 II: The Train of Artillery…………………………………………………… 119 III: Nicholson‘s Dispatch…………………………………………………...127 IV: Promotions……………………………………………………………...133 V: The Foot Regiments…………………………………………………….. 143 VI: Procuring Supplies……………………………………………………... 157 VII: Naval Vessels…………………………………………………………. 164 i VIII: Conclusion…………………………………………………………….168 CHAPTER 4 THE QUEBEC EXPEDITION ………………………………………171 I: St John‘s Instructions……………………………………………………..172 II: The Transatlantic Voyage………………………………………………..177 III: The French Squadron…………………………………………………... 184 IV: At Boston ……………………………………………………………... 191 V: Pilots……………………………………………………………………..204 VI: Sailing for Quebec……………………………………………………... 208 VII: Nicholson‘s Expedition……………………………………………….. 217 VIII: The Loss of the Feversham ………………………………………….. 231 IX: Quebec…………………………………………………………………. 233 X: The Homeward Voyage………………………………………………… 238 XI: Conclusion……………………………………………………………... 244 CHAPTER 5 THE AFTERMATH OF THE EXPEDITION……………………… 246 I: The Effect of Failure…………………………………………………….. 248 II: Walker‘s Fall from Grace……………………………………………….. 267 III: The Path to Success……………………………………………………. 278 IV: Conclusion……………………………………………………………... 285 CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………………….. 288 BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………………….. 315 ii LIST OF MAPS Map 1: Northeast America…………………………………………………………. iv Map 2: The approach to Quebec…………………………………………………… iv Map 3: Colonial area of operations………………………………………………… v Map 4: The route to Montreal……………………………………………………… v Map 5: Chart from The English Pilot, (London, 1706)……………………………. vi Maps 1-4 have been adapted and edited from outline maps freely available from d-maps.com. 1: http://d-maps.com/carte.php?lib=east_coast_of_north_america_map&num_car=1686&lang=en 2: http://d-maps.com/carte.php?lib=quebec_map&num_car=1868&lang=en 3: http://d-maps.com/carte.php?lib=north_east_usa_map&num_car=1818&lang=en 4: http://d-maps.com/carte.php?lib=new_york_map&num_car=7478&lang=en iii MAP 1 Northeast America MAP 2 The approach to Quebec iv MAP 3 Colonial area of operations (See map 4 for inset detail) MAP 4 The route to Montreal New Haven v vi Notes All dates follow the ‗Old Style‘ convention, which is prevalent in the source material, unless otherwise specified. The Julian calendar was ten days behind the ‗New Style‘ Gregorian calendar in the seventeenth century and eleven days behind after 1700. For clarity, the year begins on 1 January and not 25 March. This thesis covers the period surrounding 1707 when the Act of Union came into force, therefore ‗England‘ and ‗Britain‘ are both used where appropriate. Spelling and punctuation in quotations have been modernised. Names of people and places have been standardised as there are numerous spellings in the manuscripts. vii INTRODUCTION The abortive expedition to capture Quebec, sent under the auspices of Secretary of State Henry St John towards the close of the War of the Spanish Succession (1701- 1714), was the first large-scale British military endeavour to combat the French in Canada. Led by General John Hill, it comprised an impressive array of units needed to conduct military operations in Canada, and was then the largest military force ever assembled in that part of the world. The fleet which carried them, commanded by Rear-Admiral Sir Hovenden Walker, met with ruin on the approach to Quebec on the night of 23 August 1711. Several troop transports and hundreds of lives were lost off the rocky north shore of the notoriously dangerous St Lawrence River, which brought to an end this unprecedented combined operation. Upon receiving news of the disaster, the colonial force making its simultaneous landward thrust towards Montreal, under Lieutenant-General Francis Nicholson, also withdrew.1 The expedition could easily have succeeded given better political leadership. As this was lacking, it was doomed to fail from its very conception. The ambitious St John had enforced a culture of secrecy surrounding the expedition‘s organisation because it was his personal project and so it needed to be hidden not only from the French, but also from the scrutiny of his political opponents. He did this by acquiring an insufficient quantity of provisions, which would imply that the fleet being assembled would be sent somewhere in Europe. This proved to be extremely detrimental to the expedition‘s chances of success as not only was it dispatched from England precariously late in the year for a Canadian campaign, but this plan also 1 Hill and Nicholson temporarily held these ranks for the purpose of the expedition. At the time Hill was a brigadier-general, whilst Nicholson was a colonel, Dalton, Charles, (ed.), English Army Lists and Commission Registers, 1661-1714, VI, (London, 1904), p. 20. 1 required the fleet