Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann Consensus Mershon Series: Research Programs and Debates Author(S): Ole R
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Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann Consensus Mershon Series: Research Programs and Debates Author(s): Ole R. Holsti Reviewed work(s): Source: International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Dec., 1992), pp. 439-466 Published by: Wiley-Blackwell on behalf of The International Studies Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600734 . Accessed: 08/11/2012 03:12 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Wiley-Blackwell and The International Studies Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to International Studies Quarterly. http://www.jstor.org InternationalStudies Quarterly (1992) 36, 439-466 Public Opiniionand ForeignPolicy: Challenges to theAlmond-Lippmann Consensus MershonSeries: Research Programs and Debates OLE R. HOLSTI Duke University This articlesurveys and assesses theoriesand researchon public opinion and foreignpolicy. Most of the evidence is drawnfrom the literatureon the United States. Three twentieth-centurywars have had a significant impact on theoryand scholarship.World War I-the firstpublic rela- tions war-and postwar effortsto create a new internationalorder directedmuch attentionto the nature of public opinion and its impact on foreignaffairs, issues on which realistsand liberals came to quite differentconclusions. The period surroundingWorld War II coincided withthe developmentof scientificpolling. Much of the attentionduring and immediatelyafter the war focused on the extentto which the public might support or oppose an internationalistAmerican role. Extensive researchduring the firsttwo decades afterWorld War II yielded a broad agreement (the "Almond-Lippmannconsensus") on three propositions about public opinion: (1) it is volatile and thus provides inadequate foundationsfor stable and effectiveforeign policies, (2) it lacks coher- ence or structure,but (3) in the final analysis,it has littleif any impact on foreignpolicy. The VietnamWar and its aftermathstimulated a new outburstof researchactivity on public opinion and foreignpolicy, much of which has challenged each of these three propositions.The article concludes with suggestionsfor furtherresearch efforts,including: (1) case studiesemploying archival sources to assessmore directlythe impact of public opinion, (2) cross-nationalstudies, (3) developmentof stan- dard questionsin order to encourage bettercumulation of surveyresults, and (4) researchthat will enable us to distinguishfindings that are time- and context-boundfrom those thattranscend the Cold War period. Introduction Many questions about the role of public opinion in foreign policy are at the center of persisting debates between the liberal-democratic and realist approaches to foreign affairs.Is public opinion a force for enlightenment-indeed, a necessary if not sufficientcondition for sound foreign policy-as celebrated by the Wilsonians Author'snote: For helpfulcomments and suggestionson an earlier draftof this paper I am gratefulto Stephen Earl Bennett,William Chittick, Thomas Graham,Jon Hurwitz,Benjamin Page, Mark Peffley,Philip Powlick,Bruce Russett,Eugene Wittkopf,and twoanonymous reviewers for International Studies Quarterly. ?) 1992 InternationalStudies Association 440 Public Opinionand ForeignPolicy and otherliberals? There is a long,liberal-democratic tradition, dating back at least to Kant and Bentham,that foreign policies of democraciesare more peaceful,at least in part because the public can play a constructiverole in constrainingpolicy makers;only accountability to the public can restrainthe war-makingproclivities of leaders.1 Alternatively,are Hans Morgenthauand othersof the realistschool correctin describingpublic opinion as a barrierto thoughtfuland coherentdiplomacy, hin- deringefforts to promotenational interests that transcend the moods and passions of the moment?The realisttradition is intenselyskeptical of the public's contribu- tion to effectiveforeign policy. At the veryminimum, most realistswould distin- guish between foreignpolicy and other public policyissues; the public mightbe sufficientlyinformed to deal withlocal issues thatimpinge on theirdaily lives, but foreignaffairs are too remote fromtheir experience, and in any case theyhave littleinclination to become more informedabout such complex and remoteissues. Finally,the effectiveconduct of diplomacyrequires secrecy,flexibility, and other qualities thatwould be seriouslyjeopardized were the public to have a significant impacton foreignpolicy. Thus, to permitthe public a strongvoice in policywould be to place the democracies,if not the stabilityof the internationalsystem itself, at a distinctdisadvantage. Moreover, it would permitthe emotional to govern the rational.Hans Morgenthausummarized the case againstan activerole for public opinion in words that would gain the support of most if not all realists:"The rationalrequirements of good foreignpolicy cannot fromthe outsetcount upon the support of a public opinion whose preferencesare emotional rather than rational"(Morgenthau, 1978:558). The long-standingdebate betweenliberals and realistswas intensifiedby World War I, whichmight be describedas the firstpublic relationswar. From its inception both the Allied and Central Powers tried to win over "worldopinion" in various ways,including publication by many governmentsof highlyselective document collections-the so-calledcolor books-all of whichwere intendedto absolve them and to place the blame for the war on their adversaries.The propaganda war duringthe conflictwas almostas intenseas thaton the battlefield. PresidentWilson's hopes fora new postwarworld order depended significantly on democratizingforeign affairsand diplomacy. Elihu Root, a distinguished Republican and formerSecretary of State,effectively summarized the positionof those who welcomed an increasingrole for the public in the conduct of foreign affairs. When foreignoffices were ruled by autocracies or oligarchiesthe danger of war was in sinisterpurpose. When foreignaffairs are ruled by democraciesthe danger of war will be in mistakenbeliefs. The world will be gainer by the change, for, while thereis no human wayto preventa kingfrom having a bad heart,there is a human way to prevent a people from having an erroneous opinion. (Root, 1922:5) By more effectiveinternational education, "the people themselveswill have the means to testmisinformation and appeals to prejudiceand passion based on error" (Root, 1922:5). But not all observersjoined Wilson and Root in applauding the prospect of popular diplomacy. During the postwar era, the journalist Walter Lippmann published two trenchantcritiques of the central premisesof classical liberalism (Lippmann, 1922, 1925). Accordingto Lippmann, the common man is too fully engaged in the requirementsof earning a livingand otherwiseattending to his 1 Recent research has found that the foreignpolicies of democracies are indeed differentfrom those of other politiesand, further,that democracies do n-otengage in war againsteach other. OLE R. HOLSTI 441 most immediateneeds to have the time or inclinationto satisfythe heroic, but clearlyunrealistic, assumptions about the informedand engaged citizencelebrated in classicaldemocratic theory. The chasm between theoryand realityis especially wide on foreignaffairs, which are typicallyfar removed from the directexperiences of the mass public. Consequently,the "picturesin the head" of the average citizen are unlikelyto have much correspondencewith the real world of international affairs.Moreover, journalist Lippmann became increasinglyskeptical about the abilityof his own professioneffectively to fillin the gap betweenthe real worldand the averagecitizen's stereotypes. His studyof the Russianrevolution, as depicted in the pages of the NewYork Times during the period 1917-20, did nothingto assuage his pessimism about the ability of the media to serve as a source of valid informationabout the world for the public (Lippmann and Metz, 1920). The events of the 1930s and the outbreak of World War II, which seemed to raise serious questions about Wilsonian assumptions while apparently providing compelling empirical confirmationfor the realist approach to international relations,further tipped the balance of the debate on public opinion and foreign policyin favorof the skeptics. The period encompassingWorld War II and its immediateaftermath coincided withthe inceptionof scientificpublic opinion polling. Despite the wounds to the reputationof polling and pollstersinflicted by the LiteraiyDigest debacle in the Roosevelt-Landonelection, we can date the era of scientificsurveys from the establishmentof the Gallup poll in 1936 or of the Public Opinion Quarterlytwo years later.It maybe worthnoting that President Roosevelt was a pioneer in the use of a public opinion consultant-Hadley Cantril,one of the foundingfathers of the new science-for guidance on policy. Policy makersand manyothers who feltthat an irresponsibleAmerican isola- tionismafter 1919 had contributedto the outbreakof World War II worriedthat the public mood might trace out a pattern resemblingthe