Susan Stebbing's Role in Early Analytic
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SUSAN STEBBING ON INCOMPLETE SYMBOLS AND ANALYSIS FREDERIQUE JANSSEN-LAURET 1. Introduction: Susan Stebbing's Role in Early Analytic Philosophy Susan Stebbing (1885-1943) was a pivotal figure in early analytic philosophy. She made vital contributions to philosophical logic, metaphysics, the philosophy of physics, critical thinking, and applied philosophy. Yet she has thus far largely been overlooked by historians of analytic philosophy. Although a handful of good historical publications on Stebbing have recently appeared, they are either primarily biographical (Chapman 2013) or tend to concentrate on her criticisms of more central canonical figures (Beaney 2003; Milkov 2003; Beaney 2016). In particular, most of these works tend to describe Stebbing as a follower of G.E. Moore. In this paper I present a short version of the argument of Janssen- Lauret 2017, Janssen-Lauret forthcoming-a, and Janssen-Lauret forthcoming-b, uncovering Stebbing's positive and original contributions to those fields and to the development of analytic philosophy. My focus in this paper will be on Stebbing's distinctive contributions to incomplete symbol theory and her views on philosophical analysis. I show that she made a significant advance on Russell and Moore, presenting a solution to what was later to be called `the paradox of analysis' in 1932. 2. Susan Stebbing: Life and Works Susan Stebbing was born in London in 1885 and orphaned as a young girl. Her early ed- ucation was rather neglected because of her disability, M´eni`ere'sdisease, which caused fre- quent attacks of vertigo, dizziness and nausea. She studied at Girton College, Cambridge, a woman's college whose Mistress was the logician E.E.C. Jones (for Jones's contributions to logic, see Janssen-Lauret 2021). She studied History, followed by Moral Sciences (Philoso- phy). Stebbing's main philosophy tutor was W.E. Johnson, and initially took to the idealist philosophy of McTaggart and Bradley. As Cambridge allowed women to sit exams, but not to actually graduate with their degrees, in the early 1910s Stebbing moved to the Univer- sity of London for her MA. Stebbing completed her thesis in 1912 and regularly spoke at the Aristotelian Society and published papers in its Proceedings, while teaching for Girton on a casual basis. In London she met Moore, Russell, and Whitehead, who were to become her main philosophical interlocutors, although she remained wedded to idealism for a few more years (Stebbing 1916-17, 1917-18). Around this time Stebbing, who had always re- gretted her lack of early education in science due to her disability, also began a programme of self-education in physics and its philosophy. She began by publishing on Whitehead's philosophy of science (Stebbing 1924, 1924-25, 1926). Having taking up a lecturing post in 1 2 FREDERIQUE JANSSEN-LAURET 1920 at Bedford College, a women's college in London, she enjoyed great success there, ris- ing through the ranks to become the UK's first female professor of philosophy in 1933. She published primarily on philosophy of science, formal and philosophical logic, metaphysics, and language, including the first accessible book on the new polyadic logic (Stebbing 1930), and important rebuttals of idealist interpretations of physics (Stebbing 1937). Stebbing continued to suffer severe attacks of M´eni`ere'sdisease, but used these periods of illness to read books in English, French, and German, often publishing her thoughts as a book review. As a result of her extensive reading and trilingualism, Stebbing was one of the first outside continental Europe to see the significance of logical positivism. Her publications on the movement did much to introduce it to the British philosophical scene (Stebbing 1933b; also see Janssen-Lauret forthcoming-b). In the late 1930s, Stebbing, increasingly alarmed by the rise of fascism, began to write on the application of critical thinking to ethics and politics, and also worked with Jewish refugees, work which she continued until her death in 1943. 3. Against the `Moorean' Interpretation of Stebbing Stebbing took philosophical and scientific investigation to rest on a basis of ordinary- language truths|such as `I am perceiving some paper' and `Other people have seen this paper before me' (1929: 174)|and emphasised that to know a truth is by no means the same as to know its analysis. As a result, it has become de rigueur to portray her as, in Ayer's words, `very much a disciple of [G.E.] Moore' (Ayer 1977: 71). Twenty-first century commentators still largely describe Stebbing as engaging in Moorean common-sense philosophy or Moorean analysis (Milkov 2003: 354; Beaney 2016: 249-250). Even those who consider Stebbing an original thinker in her own right, like Beaney and Chapman, still describe her as `a committed Moorean' with respect to analysis and common-sense truths (Beaney and Chapman 2018: xx3-4). My interpretation of Stebbing is a different one. I argue that the resemblance between Stebbing's method and Moore's are more superficial than they appear at first sight. Steb- bing's ordinary-language truths, such as `I am perceiving some paper' and `Other people have seen this paper before me' (1929: 174), which she describes as jointly comprising `real- ism' rather than `common sense', are different from Moore's both in their content and in the purpose for which they are used. Moore mentioned as paradigm examples of common-sense truths such ordinary English statements as `There exists at present a living human body, which is my body', and `The earth has existed for many years past'. Stebbing's truths have a narrower focus, on perceptual content shared between the minds of different perceivers. And she is explicit that these `realist' truths make up a basis for both philosophical and scientific investigation, which she connects to her extensive work in philosophy of physics. What's more, I will show that Stebbing's careful work on incomplete symbol theory and metaphysical analysis, which was in part motivated by, and applied to, her opposition to idealist analyses of modern physics, yielded a solution to the paradox of analysis ten years before Langford first formulated this paradox as a problem for Moore. I conclude that we ought to regard Stebbing as the originator of a distinctive position of her own, grown out SUSAN STEBBING ON INCOMPLETE SYMBOLS AND ANALYSIS 3 of dialogue with Russell and Whitehead as well as Moore, rather than as an exponent of Moorean common-sense philosophy. Historians have so far overlooked or minimised Stebbing's originality because they take Stebbing's respectful tone towards Moore and her (perhaps gendered) humility in describing her own achievements at face value, and because there has been relatively little investigation into Stebbing's philosophy of physics. Historians (e.g. Beaney and Chapman 2018 x3) correctly note that Stebbing|who had begun her philosophical career working in a spirit sympathetic to idealism (e.g. Stebbing 1916-17)|credited her original conversion to the Cambridge School of philosophy to Moore's mentorship (Stebbing 1942). But Stebbing had intended the paper in which she claimed this as an homage to Moore. Given that context, she naturally concentrated on the influence of Moore rather than her other influences or her own originality, but this does not imply that she had few other influences or original views. Stebbing also allied herself with Moore, and self-identified as a member of the `Cambridge School', while discussing logical atomism (Stebbing 1933b: 5). But, there, too, further context must be taken into account. Her goal in that discussion was to draw a contrast between the Cambridge School and logical positivism with respect to their views on analysis. Stebbing placed herself on the same side of the divide as Moore specifically in the context of a quotation from Wisdom which set up Moore, representing the Cambridge School, in opposition to Wittgenstein, whose approach to analysis Stebbing tentatively classes with the positivists'. Wisdom describes a prevailing kind of Moore-Wittgenstein rivalry in 1930s UK analytic philosophy. I note that several well-known early and mid- analytic philosophers were influenced by Moore or declared themselves to be on Moore's side rather than Wittgenstein's. Besides Wisdom, we might mention Austin, and Ryle, and even David Lewis and D.M. Armstrong. Grice, for example, quotes Austin saying, ` Some like Witters, but Moore is my man' (Grice 1989: 381). Yet these male philosophers are rarely if ever described as `Mooreans' tout court. Their original views are never prefaced with `Moorean'; but, as I will show, this certainly happens to Stebbing's original views. There is a gendered trap here which historians of philosophy should avoid falling into. If cited in isolation, Stebbing 1942 and Stebbing 1933b may well provide a misleading impression about Stebbings originality and the breadth of her expertise. Her areas of specialisation, unlike Moores, included philosophy of science. Moore's philosophy had grown out of interaction with ancient philosophy during his Classics degree on the one hand, and with Kant on the other hand. He never made any serious venture into the philosophy of science. Stebbing saw the importance of a scientifically informed philosophy fit for the new science and mathematics of the age. In this respect she resembled Russell and Whitehead more than Moore. As a woman with a disability born in the Victorian era, Stebbing had not been offered the kind of deep immersion into physics and mathematics from which the young, able-bodied men Russell and Whitehead had benefited.3 After her move to London and her discovery of analytic philosophy, Stebbing embarked on a programme of self-education in the philosophy of physics. In the early 1920s, she began by writing on Whitehead (Stebbing 1924, 1924-25, 1926b) on whose views she wrote more papers than on Moores.