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Introduction 1 the Analyst in Training Notes Introduction 1. Herbert (1935: 4) 2. Mitford (1956) 3. Jepson (1937) and Thouless (1930) 4. Sayers (1971: 53, 58) 5. Woolf (1942) 6. Orwell (2000) 7. Penguin Books company website (http://www.penguin.co.uk/static/cs/uk/0 /aboutus/aboutpenguin_companyhistory.html), accessed 16th February 2012. 8. Waithe (1995: xl–xli) 9. Witt (2004: 9) 10. A. E. Heath in his Introduction to the Thinker’s Library edition of II, 1948. 11. See, for instance, Witt (2004: 1) 12. See, for instance, Rorty (1991) 13. Barth (1992: 1) 14. Warnock (1996: xxxiv) 15. Stebbing (1942a: 518) 16. Peggy Pyke-Lees, personal communication 17. Annotation on a letter from Stebbing to Ursula Roberts, 22 October 1922, Stanford University Libraries. 18. Obituary, Manchester Guardian, 13 September 1943. 19. Stebbing (1928b: 237) 20. Russell (1946: 864) 21. Gallie (1952: 32) 22. Floyd (2009: 162) 1 The Analyst in Training 1. Wisdom (1943) 2. Peggy Pyke-Lees, personal communication 3. Ibid. 4. Letter to Miss Jebb, 31 October 1943, RHC BC AR 150/D381 Archives, Royal Holloway, University of London 5. Wisdom (1943: 1) 6. Hamann and Arnold (1999: 139) 7. See, for instance, Robinson (2009: 69–75) 8. MacDonald (1943: 15) 9. See, for instance, Megson and Lonsay (1961: 49) 10. Bradbrook (1969: 56) 11. Oakeley (1948: 39) 187 188 Notes 12. Bradley (1893: 550) 13. Moore (1942: 18) 14. Ducasse (1942: 225) 15. Moore (1903a: 433) 16. Moore (1903a: 444) 17. Moore 1903a: 445) 18. Soames (2003 :12) 19. Moore (1939: 146) 20. Ibid. 21. Moore (1939: 150) 22. Moore (1925: 33) 23. Moore (1925: 55) 24. Malcolm (1942: 351) 25. Levy (1979: 65) 26. Moore (1903b: vii) 27. Moore (1903b: viii) 28. Moore (1903b: 10) 29. Moore (1903b: 188) 30. Moore (1903b: 148) 31. Ibid 32. Cited in Levy (1979: 234) 33. Cited in Alkins (2002: 17) 34. Himmelfarb (1986: 33) 35. Levy (1979: 7) 36. See, for instance, Johnstone (1954: 20–45), Rosenbaum (1987: 214–215), Griffin (1989) 37. For instance, Stebbing (1925d,1926c, 1926d, 1926e, 1926h, 1928h, 1929b, 1934j, 1939e) 38. Stebbing (1939e: 219, see also Stebbing 1926e: 90) 2 Becoming a Philosopher 1. Peggy Pyke-Lees, personal communication 2. Peirce (1905: 262–263) 3. Peirce (1905: 271, original emphasis) 4. Peirce (1905: 271) 5. Pihlström (2004: 30) 6. Pihlström (2004: 41) 7. James (1910: 30) 8. Schiller (1903: 230) 9. Schiller (1903: xxv) 10. Stebbing (1914: 6, original emphasis) 11. Stebbing (1914: 163) 12. Stebbing (1914: 129) 13. Stebbing (1914: 31, original emphasis) 14. Stebbing (1914: 152) 15. Stebbing (1914: 146) 16. Russell (1914: 11) Notes 189 17. Stebbing (1914: 140) 18. Stebbing (1913a: 471) 19. Schiller (1912: 532) 20. Schiller (1913: 536) 21. Stebbing (1913a: 252, original emphasis) 22. Thorne (1915: 221) 23. Sait (1916: 220) 24. Lakatos (1970: 188) 25. Stebbing (1913b) 26. Stebbing (1915: 407) 27. This example is taken from Stebbing (1930b: 81) 28. Stebbing (1915: 411, original emphasis) 29. Stebbing (1915: 412, original emphasis) 30. Stebbing (1917: 473) 31. Stebbing (1942a: 530) 32. Stebbing (1918) 33. Cambridge University Library, G. E. Moore Papers (Add. Ms. 8330) 85/39/2 34. Woolf (1942) 35. Stebbing (1921: 479) 36. Stebbing (1924d: 346) 37. Stebbing (1934l: 533) 38. Stebbing (1926h: 250) 39. Stebbing (1928b: 238) 40. Stebbing (1927c: 406) 41. Stebbing (1942c: 281) 42. RHC BC AR 150/D381 Archives, Royal Holloway, University of London 43. In a letter to the Bedford College Secretary in March 1921, Vivian Shepherd wrote ‘I have lived with Miss Stebbing for the last nine years! and we run a school with another friend here!’ (RHC BC AR 150/D381 Archives, RHUL) 44. Pickard-Cambridge went on to make something of a name for himself both as a translator of Aristotle and as an editor of collections of carols and a writer on and of church music. 45. Valentine (2006: 44) 46. RHC BC AR 150/D381 Archives, RHUL 47. Waithe (1995: xix) 48. Mehta (1963) 49. Shapiro (2004: 219) 50. Evening Standard 28 October 1926 51. Daily Telegraph 5 February 1927 52. Westminster Gazette 10 February 1927 3 Science, Logic and Language 1. Emmet (1996: 51) 2. RHC BC AR 150/D381 Archives, RHUL 3. Wisdom (1943: 2) 4. MacDonald (1943: 16) 5. RHC BC AR 150/D381 Archives, RHUL 190 Notes 6. Cambridge University Library, G. E. Moore Papers (Add. Ms. 8330) 85/39/4 7. Letter from Whitehead to Ursula Roberts, 2 August 1924, Stanford University Libraries. 8. RHC BC AR 150/D381 Archives, RHUL 9. RHC BC AR 150/D381 Archives, RHUL 10. Saw (1948: 129) 11. Whitehead (1920: 3) 12. Whitehead (1920: 19) 13. Whitehead (1926: 22) 14. Whitehead (1926: 222–223) 15. Whitehead (1929: 497) 16. Stebbing (1930a: 300) 17. Stebbing (1925a: 313) 18. RHC BC AR 150/D381 Archives, RHUL 19. Stebbing (1925a: 305) 20. Stebbing (1925a: 321) 21. Stebbing (1924a: 297) 22. Stebbing (1927a: 38) 23. Stebbing (1929c: 152) 24. Stebbing (1926j: 384) 25. Stebbing (1927b: 234) 26. Stebbing (1927b: 237) 27. Stebbing (1928f: 372) 28. Stebbing (1928i: 129) 29. Stebbing (1930j: 475) 30. Stebbing (1930j: 473) 31. Cambridge University Library, G. E. Moore Papers (Add. Ms. 8330) 85/39/6 32. Cambridge University Library, G. E. Moore Papers (Add. Ms. 8330) 85/39/5 33. Stebbing (1930b: vii) 34. Whitehead and Russell (1910: 1) 35. Stebbing (1930b: 5) 36. Stebbing (1927g: 514, original emphasis) 37. Stebbing (1930b: x) 38. Stebbing (1926f: 104) 39. Stebbing (1930b: 22, original emphasis) 40. Stebbing (1930b: 48) 41. Stebbing (1930b: 71) 42. Stebbing (1930b: 117) 43. Stebbing (1930b: 103–104) 44. Stebbing (1930b: 390–391, original emphasis) 45. Stebbing (1930b: 466) 46. Stebbing (1930b: 468) 47. Stebbing (1930b: 474) 48. Wood (1931: 133) 49. Russell (1931: 110 and 111) 50. Thalheimer (1933: 431) 51. Eaton (1931: 608 and 609) 52. Mace (1931: 354–355) Notes 191 53. Whetnall (1934: 400) 54. Kelly (1932: 461) 55. Stebbing (1932c: 466) 56. Schiller (1934: 280–281) 57. Schiller’s coupling of her work with that of Eaton may not have been partic- ularly pleasing to Stebbing. A few years before she had published a review of an early book by Eaton that was rather scathing in tone (Stebbing, 1926g) 58. Schiller (1934: 48) 59. Schiller (1934: 57) 60. Porrovecchio 2008: n14) 61. Stebbing (1926i: 366, original emphasis). Brightman subsequently objected to Stebbing’s interpretation of his belief about philosophy, but Stebbing maintained that it was explicit in his writing. See Stebbing (1927d) 62. Cambridge University Library, G. E. Moore Papers (Add. Ms. 8330) 85/39/7 63. Letter to Miss Monkhouse, 5 March 1933, RHC BC AR 150/D381 Archives, RHUL 4 Cambridge Analysis 1. Stebbing (1933a: 55) 2. Whitehead and Russell (1910: 2) 3. Russell (1905: 488) 4. Russell (1918: 179) 5. Russell (1918: 185) 6. Wittgenstein (1922: 1, 1.1 and 1.11) 7. Wittgenstein (1922: 2.02) 8. Wittgenstein (1922: 4.112) 9. Urmson (1956: 31) 10. Stebbing (1930b: 155, original emphasis) 11. Stebbing (1931b: 441) 12. Stebbing (1930b: 139) 13. Letter to Ann Hook, 4 June 1935, RHC PP33/1, Archives, Royal Holloway, University of London 14. Valentine (2006: 48) 15. Magg (1946: 166) 16. Cambridge University Library, G. E. Moore Papers (Add. Ms. 8330) 85/39/15 17. Cambridge University Library, G. E. Moore Papers (Add. Ms. 8330) 85/39/17 18. Letter to Ann Hook, 7 September 1935, RHC PP33/1, Archives, RHUL 19. Joseph (1932: 424) 20. Prichard (1944: 190) 21. Joseph (1932: 439) 22. Wisdom (1943: 3) 23. Stebbing (1933c: 338) 24. Stebbing (1933c: 338) 25. Stebbing (1933c: 340) 26. Stebbing (1933c: 351) 192 Notes 27. Joseph (1933), Stebbing (1934h), Joseph (1934) 28. Stebbing (1934h: 156) 29. Cambridge University Library, G. E. Moore Papers (Add. Ms. 8330) 85/39/7 30. Stebbing (1930b, 2nd edn 1933: 507) 31. See, for instance, Berlin (1939: 518) summarising a commentary offered by Karl Britton, and Linsky (2007: 107–108) 32. Stebbing (1942a: 528) 33. Stebbing (1932b: 310) 34. Stebbing (1932b: 314) 35. Stebbing (1932b: 320) 36. See, for instance, Stebbing (1934c, 1939d) 37. Stebbing (1932a: 70) 38. Stebbing (1932a: 73) 39. Stebbing (1932a: 80) 40. Stebbing (1932a: 91) 41. Stebbing (1932a: 78–79, original emphasis) 42. Stebbing (1934c: 35) 43. Collingwood (1933: 145) 44. Wisdom (1931a, 1931b, 1932, 1933a, 1933b) 45. Wisdom (1931a: 188) 46. Wisdom (1931a: 202) 47. Wisdom (1933a: 53). The italics, capital letters and the spelling of ‘Specifies’, denoting a technical usage, are original. 48. Wisdom (1931a: 193), (1931b: 473) and (1933a: 48) 49. Wisdom (1933b: 196) 50. Whetnall (1932: 129) 51. Ryle (1932: 139) 52. Ryle (1932: 167) 53. Duncan-Jones (1933: 1) 54. Ewing (1935: 60) 55. Ewing (1948: 74) 56. Black (1933: 255) 57. Black (1933: 257) 58. The Schoolmistress 25 May 1933 59. RHC BC AR 150/D381 Archives, RHUL 60. The Observer 18 May 1930 61. Evening Standard 11 December 1930 5 Logical Positivism and Philosophy of Language 1. RHC BC AR 150/D381 Archives, RHUL 2. Blanshard (1930: 603) 3. Schlick (1931: 112) 4. Stebbing (1931d: 117) 5. RHC BC AR 150/D381 Archives, RHUL 6. Stebbing (1933a: 67n) 7. Black (1938a: 33) 8. Black (1933: 237) Notes 193 9. Schlick (1932: 107) 10. Black (1938b: 51) 11. Quotation from Schlick’s London lectures in Black (1939: 44). 12. Stebbing (1933g: 184) 13. Stebbing (1933a: 77, original emphasis) 14. Stebbing (1934n: 168) 15. Stebbing (1933a: 86) 16. Stebbing (1934h: 169n) 17. Stebbing (1934n: 169) 18. Stebbing (1933a: 82, original emphasis) 19. Stebbing (1934e: 29) 20. Ayer (1933: 2) 21. Rogers (2000: 124) 22. Black (1938b: 51n) 23. Urmson (1956: 107) 24. Lewy (1976: 45) 25.
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