A HUNDRED YEARS OF PHILOSOPHY

John Passmore

-*\ I f,o, )t, \.*_

PENGUIN BOOKS l'\ ("(" NOTES NOTBS formulated in words, or ever ent€red anybody's mind as a thought'. Thus a proposition is neither a set ofwords nor a thought; and logic is certainly oot, as had been traditionally supposed, a 'science of thought'. The pro- Notes position exists independently of statements; at the same time it is what statements mean. It bears a family resemblance to what Meinong was to CHAPTER 9 call an 'objective'. See the Historical Introduction to the English translation (1950) of The Paradoxes of the Infinite; H. R. Smart: 'Bolzano's Logio' l. SeeRussell's autobiography in The Philosophy of Bertrand Russelland (both (PX, 1944); Y. Bar-Hillel:'Bolzano's Propositional Logio' (Arch.fiir Math. Moore's in The Philosophy of G. E. Moore ed. P. A. Schilpp). Seealso (1958); (1958); Los.,1952) and 'Bolzano's Definition of Analytic Propositions' (Metho- A. R. White: G. E. Moore the Moore numbet of Philosophy (1960); dos, 1950); J. Berg: Bolzato's Logic (1962), On Husserl and Bolzano see lhc Moore number of JP R. B. Braithwaite: 'G. E. Moore 1873- Farber, op. cir. and H. Felsl'Bolzano und Husserl'(Pililot. Iarhbuch dar l95E' (PBA,1961); N. Malcolm; 'G. E. Moore'in Knowledgeand Certainty Gdrre sge se I Ischaft, 1926). (1963); D, Lewis: 'Moore's Realism' in Moore and Ryle (Iowa Publica- 19. For reservations and complications see H, Spiegelberg: 'Phetromeo- tions,2, 1965). ology of Direct Evidence' (PPiR, l94l). Compare Meinong's'evidence' and 2. Moore's chapter on 'The Ideal' in Principia Ethica did, howcver, Brentatro's'perception'. The connexion with the Platonic-Carlesian tradi- grcatly affect the cultural life ofour century through its influence on 'the group'- tion, which distinguishes between'essence' and 'existence', will be obvious. llloomsbury Roger Fry, J. M. Keynes, Virginia Woolf, E. M. (1949); More recently, Lotzc in his Logic had defended the conception of an Forster. SeeJ. M. Keynes: Two Memoirs R. F. Harrod,:. The Life of 'immediate certainty which, whethercalled intuition or by some othername, J. M. Keynes (1951); J. K. Johnstone: The Bloomsbury Group (19541. must be admitted to exist'. 3. The poet, Moore's brother. *e W. B. Yeats and T. S. Moore: Their (ed. 20. See J. S. Fulton: 'The Cartesianism of Phenomenolory'(Pi, 1940). Correspondence V. Bridge, 1953), which largely consists of an attempt 21. See Chapter 19 below for details. Anerican phenomenologists aro by Yeats to understand G. E. Moore and by T. S. Moore to explain him, generally unwilling to accept Husserl's movement in an Idealist directioa. with an occasional admonitory note by G. E. Moore. SeeespeciallyM.Fat&t: Naturalismand SubJecttvtsm(1959).See also J. M. 4. 'Moore's Technique' in The Philosophy of G. E. Moore. 5. Seehis'Reply to My Critics'in ThePhilosophy of G. E. Moore. Edie: 'Recent Work in Phenomenology' (APQ, 1964) - with exte.nsino as Sorze Main Problems of bibliographies, and J. Q. Lzuer:. The Triunph of Subjecttvity (1958). 6. At John Wisdom's instigation, Philosophy. 42. See the Memoirs by C. A. Mtce (PBA, 1945); C. D. Broad (Mbtd, 5. One of the most controverted points in recent philosophy. See H. 1945),R. Kdght(Br.Jnl. &1. Psych., 1946); J. Passmore(in Stout's Godazd Joachim: The Natwe of Truth (19061; G. E. Moore:'Mr Joachim's.lValzre Natwe, 1952). ol' Tr uth' and J oachim's Reply ( Mind, l9O7); B. Russell :' On Propositions : What and How They Mean'(PIS,S, l9l9); F. P. Ramsey 43. See the Metwir by A. S. and E. M. S. (1900; J. Bryce: 'Henry They Are and Sidgwick' in Stadles ln Contemporary Biography (1903); L. Srcphen: G. E. Moore :' Facts and Propositions' (PAS S, 1927); G. Ryle :'Are There (P,{S, 'Henry Sidgvick' (Mirrd, l90l) and in DNB; C. D, Broad: 'Henry Sidg- Propositions?' 1929)and the subsequenldiscussion with R. Robinson vick' in Ethics and the lllstory ofPhilosophy (1952). (Mittd, l93l): M. Schlick: 'Facts and Propositions' and C. G. Hempel: 24. Sec his 'Some Fundamental Points in the Theory of Knowledgo' 'Some Remarks on "Facts" and Propositions' (Atalysis, 1935); C. A. (1911), reprinted in Studles in Philosophy atd Psychology (1930) in which llaylis: 'Facts, Propositions, Exemplification and Truth' (Mind, 1948); he claims to have worked out his views, although he did not publish them, A. Kaplan and l. Copilowish: 'Must There Be Propositions?' (Mr'zd, before Twardowski's article appeared (in 1894). Findlay in his Melrcng't 1939); A. Church: 'On Carnap's Analysis of Statements of Assertion and Theory of Objects draws attention to important points of difference between llclief ' (,42olysri,s,1950). Meinong aod Stout, especially on the nature of'content'. 8. For a later discussion ofthe same problem see Moore's'External and 25. See also R. F. Hoernl€: 'Professor Stout's Theory of Possibilities, lnternal Relations'(PlS, 1919,reprinted in Studies).Stebbing reports, in Truth and Enot' (Mind, l93l) and Stout's reply: 'Truth and Reality' hcr contribution to the Philosophy of G. E. Moore, that Moore later'ex- (Mirrd,832\. prcssedhimselfas unable to understand what he couldpossiblyhave meant by the views that he had previously stated and was quite convinced that they wcre wrong'. See Ch. 3 for Bradley and Ch. 5 for James on this same dis- tinction. Seealso A,C.Ewing's Idealism(1934)which draws attention to the rnunifold ambiguities in the whole controversy, and Russell's'The Monistic 'l'hoory of Truth' (Philosophlcal Essays, l9l0). 9. See C. A, Strong: 'Has Mr Moore refuted ldealism?' (Mind, l9O5\; A, K. Rogpts:'Mr Moore's Refutation of ldealism'(PX, 1919); J. Laird's 558 559 NOTES NOTES (Mittd, 192!); C, J. Ducasse: 'Moore'r review of Philosophical Stadies Russell's Loeic' (Philosophy of Bertrand RussetD; S. Waterlow: .Somc (it The Philosophy of G- E- Moore); B. Bosan' Refutation of Idealism' Philosophical Implications of Mr B. Russell's Logical Theory of Mathe_ qtet: in Contemporary Philosophy (1921). .Mr The Meet@ of Extremes matics'(P/,S, 1909); P. E. B. Jourdain: Bertrand Russell's First Work by Stout and Moore on 'The Status of Senso' 10. See the symposium on the Principles of Mathematics' (Monist, l9l2); F. p. Ramsey: Iila (PAS, Pratt: Moore's Realism (JP, 1923); M' C' Data' l9l3); J. B. 'Mr I.'oundationsof Mathenutics and Other Logical Essays(1931); F. Wais- E. Moore's Discussion of Sense-Data' (Monist, 1924)i Swabey: 'Mr G. mann: Introduction to Mathenatical Thinking (1930; J. Jorgensen: ,{ of Critical Philosophv' (PzaS, 1937); Joha .Whitehead A. E. Murphy: 'T\vo Versions Treatice of Formal Ingic (1931); E. J. Nelson: and Russell's (PlS' T. P. Nunn :' Sens€-Dat' Wisdom :' Philosophical Perplexity' 1936); Theory of Deducti ot' (Bul l. Am. Ma th. Soc., 1934\. (PAS, and Physical Objects' l9l5). 15. SeeJ. A, Chadwick: 'Logical Constants, (Mind, 1927,). 1963 A. E. Murphy :' Moore's Defence of Com' I l. Seethe articles in RM, ; 16. See particularly the summary in the second ler;fixe of Ow Ktrowledge mon Sense' it Reason and the Common Good (1963); A' F' Holmes: of the External lltorld (1914\, (.tP, 1961); N. Malcolm's article in 'Moore's Appeal to Common Sense' 17. SeePrinciples of Mathematics. Ch. XXVI, for details. Moote's later essays are collected in The Philosophy of G, E, Moore. 18, For the Frege-Russell correspondence seeJ, van Heijenoort: ,Sou,,cs Philosophica I Papers (I 9 59)' Book in Mathematical Logic 1879-1931(1964). Analysis' in Arulysis (1934)' That jour' 12. Seealso'The Justification of | 9. First in Appendix B to The principles of Mathematics, then in articles (1933) as a medium of publication for short studies in tho nal was founded on 'Mathematical Logic as Based on the Theory of Types' (Am. Jnl, consulted for examples of, and papers ont analytic manner, and should be Maths.,l9O8) and 'La Th6orie des types logiques' (RMM, lgl}\, but most generally see Ch. 15 below; J. O' Urmson: analysis. On analysis lully in Principia Mathematica. There is a relatively popular presentation in (1956); M' Black, John Wisdom and M. Cornforth: ' ophical Arulysis Russell's articles on 'The Philosophy of Logical Atomism to July l9l9' in Philosophv?' (PISS' 1934); A. E. Dunca Analysis a Useful Method (Monist, l9l8-19). His hesitancies are most marked in his Introduction to Analyse Common-Sense?'(Pl Jones and A. J. Ayer: 'Does Philosophy Mathematical Philosophy (1919). Since the theory of types was presented Method of Analysis in Metaphysics' (P. 1937); L. S. Stebbing: 'The independently by Russell in these various places, it is reasonable to refer to 1938);M. Black:' 1932)and'Some PuzzlesAbout Analysis'(PlS' it as 'Russell's' although Whitehead no doubt had some effect upon (Mbtd, its sophical Analysis' (PAS, 1912), 'The Paradox of Analysis' lg44,, method of formulation. Informative?'(PPX,1945) and his introduc' 1945),'How Can Analysisbe 20. For subsequent criticisms of Russell's account of vicious circles, see A. C. Ewing:'T\r'o Kinds of Analysio' tionto PhilosophicalArulysis,1950; Kurt Giidel: 'Russell's Mathematical l-ogic, (philosophy of Bertrand Rus- (Analysis, 1935) and'Philosophical Analvsis' (Philosophical Studies: sell). Stebbrzg, 1948); C. Lewy: 'Some Remarks Essaysin Memory of L, Susan 21. Particularly'the Dedekind cut'. SeeGiidel, op. cir. and G. H. Hardy Analysis' (Amlris, 1937); M. Macdonald'sIntroductioo to A Cowse of Pwe Mathenarics (1908). (1954). and Arclysis 22. ln Proceedings of the Inndon Mathematical Sociery, reprinted in the particularly Philosophv of Bertand Russell (ed. 13. See The posthnmons collection The Foundatlorrs of Mathenattcs and Other Loglcat Bertrand Russell's Conslruction of the External 1944): C. A. Fritz: trssays (ed. R. B. Braithwaite, I93l). See also R. Carnap's discussion of (1952); perciero di Bertrand Russe//(1958); articles in PiUl., E. Riversq: Il 'The Antinomies' inThe logical Syntax ofLanguase (1934, English version Russell (in German, 1962); A. lVood: 1960; H. Gottschalk: Bertrand f 937), the article on 'Logical Paradoxes' by A. Church in The Dictionary of The Passionate Sceptic (1958 a somewhat journalistio Bertrand Russell: - l'hllosophy (ed, D. D. Runes), and the lengthy account in Vol. III of Philosophy of Bertrand Russell'in' Witdt biography); G, Santayana:'The Jorgensen,op. cit. On the Axiom of Reducibility, s€eW. V, O. .On Logical Analysis' euine: of Doctrtne (1913); the chapter on 'The Philosophy of thc Axiom of Reducibility' (Mind, 1936). Philosophy (19a5); P. E. Jourdain: Ila in Russell's Hlstory of Western 23. There were, ofcourse, other proposals for dealing with th€ paradoxes. Bertand.Rasse// (1918); the Russell number (1953) of Philosophy of Mr The 'intuitionists' - of whom the most prominent were L. J, Brouwer and Filosofa; A. Dorward: Bertratd Russell Rivlsta Critlca di Storia della ll. Weyl - were willing to abandon as unsound those pbrts of mathematical (1951) Philosophical Developmed (1958). and Russell's My unulysiswithin which the paradoxes - or at least the mole intractable ones the French logician-mathematic' - 14. Russell had also been influenced by rrose, E, Znrmelo in an article entitled.Investigations into the Foundation difrcult to distinguish what is Whitehead's and what iarft-. Couturat. It is of'the Theory of Sets' (Mathenatische Annalen,1908) approached the prob- except that "Whitehead disclaims all Russell's in Principia Mathenatica, lcnr by distinguishing those predicates which do, and those that do not, and appendices to the second editio[ responsibility for the'introduotion hrvc an extension. W. Quine in his 'New Foundations for Mathematical and Principia Mathematica' (Mlnd (1925). See also Russell's 'Whirehead Logic' (American Math. Monthly, 1937) and later in his Mathematical and the Rise of Modern Loeic'(Phil' 1948); W. V. O. Quine: 'Whitehead Lo[lc (194O)tried to bring together Russell's theory oftypes and Zermelo's ed. Schilpp, 1944);H. Reichenbach: 'BertraDd osophy ol A. N. Whitehead, lf fcory of sets. See Quine's.Ser Theory and its Ingic (1963); A. A. Fraenkel 560 561 NOTES NOTBS Btructions' (PAS, 1931).Russell thought that the risk of error is diminished and Y. Bar-Hillel; Foundatiow of Set Theory (1959) and the symposium cvery time we get along without asserting, as distinct from positively deny- in Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science (ed' E' Nagel' P' Suppes' ' (Mind, ing, that an entity efsts. 'You diminish the risk of error,' he wrote (Mozirt, ,A..Tarsid, 1962). See also K. Grelling: 'The Logical Patadoxes' l9l9) 'with every diminution of entities and premises.' This is the mathe- 1936), A. Fraenkel and Y. Bar-Hillel: 'Le probldme des antinomies et ses nratical logician speaking; in metaphysics as in logic he is looking for the d6veioppements r€cents' (RMM, 1939). On the relation between Quine's (Mi"d' bare minimurr out of which a system can be constructed the solution and Frege's see W. V. O. Quine: 'On Frege's Way OtJt' - 'minimum vocabulary', which, conjoined with the laid down in. Principia 1955). 'syntax' Mathematica, would constitute an ideal language. 24. See Chapters III and IX in L. S. Stebbing: A Modern Introduction to 29. See the articles with that title in The Monist (1918) and Logic (2ndeC., tSf:); J. W. Reeves:'The Origin and Consequencesof the 'Logical Atomism' (CPB See also J. O. Urmson: Philosophical Analysisi D, F. T*ory of Descriptions' (PAS, 1931); R. J. Butler: 'The Scaffolding of D. I)cars: 'Logical Atomism' (in The Revolution in Philosophy, 1956). Russell Russeil's Theory of Descriptions' (PX, 1954); G. E' Moore: 'Russell's met Wittgenstein at Cambridge in 1912; he explains in the preface to his Theory of Desciiptions' in The Philosophy of Bertrand Rrssell, and other Monist atticlesthat he had decided to publish them because he did not know contributions to that volume; Russell's innovations are criticized by the cven whether Wittgenstein was alive. But one should not overestimate his logician,E.E.C.Jones,inseveralafticlesir.Mind(l910-11)'Russellreplies indebtednessto Wittgenstein: in many respects Russell, in these articles, is in-M ysicfsm and Logic ; for rec'entcriticisms seeP' T' Geach : Referenceand simply restating the pluralism he had learnt from Moore and from James Generality (1962); M. Lazerowilz: 'Knowledge by Description'(PR' 1937); - (1957-9)' whom he described as 'the outstanding critic of monism'. See also what is P. F: Strawson: 'On Referring' (Mind, l95O); articles in Awlysis said of W. E. Johnsonin Ch. 6. 25. Although Russell acknowledgeshis indebtednessto James,his way of 30. SeeCh. l1 Russell was particularly influenced by Holt Perry. making the distinction is different from James's' Russell's essayon 'Know- ; and in 31. See E. P. Edwards:'Are Perceptsin the Brain?' (AJP, 1942);D. ledge Uy Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description' first appeared atd Cory: 'Are Sense-Data"in" the Brain?'(/P, 1948).See also Ch.20. p l-5, tg tO : ii is reprinted with modifi catio ns in Pr obl ems of Philo sophy 32. See E. Giitlind: Bertrand Russell's Theories of Causation (1952); in ltiysticism andlogrc. SeeG. D. Hicks, G. E. Moore and others: 'Is there Thero A. C. Ewing, R, I. Aaron, D. G. C. MacNabb:'The Causal Argument for "Knowledge by Acquaintance"?'(P,4SS, l9l9) and G' Hughes:'Is Physical Objects' (PISS, 1945). Knowledge by Acquaintance ?' (P/SS, 1949).See also Russell's articles 'On 33. See especially his comments on M. Weitz's contributions to Tle the Nature of Acquaintance' (Monist, 1914)' Moore's distinction in Some Philosophy of Bertratd Russell. Main Problems of ihilosophy betweet'direct' and'indirect' apprehension is 34. W. Hay: 'Bertrand Russell on the Justification Induction, (PSC, another form of the' acquaintance' and' description' contrast' But Moore's of 1950); N. Malcolm; 'Russell's rllanun Knowledge, 1950); H, Reichen- mature view, as expressed in a note added to that volume, is that'know- {PR. bach: 'A Conversatioa between Bertrand Russell and David ledge by acquaintarice' is neither ' knowledge ' nor ' acquaintance 'There is,' Hume' (JP, 1949). he says, 'no common sense of "know" such that from the" mere fact that i am seeing a person it follows that I am at that moment knowing him.' 26. S. Alexander's'The Basis of Realism'(PBl, 1914); T' P' Nunn: 'Are Notes E' B' Holt's Secondary Qualities Independent ofPerception?' (PAS' 1909); CHAPTER 10 'The Place ollllusory Experience in a Realistic World'inThe New Realism (ed. Marvin, 1912).See also Ch. 11 below. I . See the memoir by A. S. L. Farquharson in Statement and 2?. On Russell's theory of sense-data,see G. D' Hicks 'The Nature of lnference; nremorial articles by H. A. Prichard (Mind, l9l9) and H. W. (Mind, and Russell's rcplv (Mind, 1913); J' E' Turner: B. Joseph Sense-Data' l9l2) (l'BA, l9l5); Prichard: R. Robinson: The Province of Logic: An Interpretation of 'Mr Russell on Sense-Data and Knowledge' (Mind, l9l4); H' A' ('ertain (Mid' Parts of Cook Wilson's' Statementand Inference' (1931); the chapter 'Mr Bertrand Russell on the Knowledge of the External World' on Cook Wilson in C. R. Morris: Ideatisric Logic (1933); Jqhn Anderson: Bertrand Russll's Outline of Philosophy' (Mind,1928); M' l9l5): and 'Mt ' The Science of Lo gc' (AJp, 1933). H. A. Newmah: 'Mr Russell's Causal Theory of Perception' (Mind' 1928); 2. See E. J. Furlong: 'Cook Wilson and the Non-Euclideans, (Mind, C. A. Strong: 'Russell's Theory of the External Wotld' (Mittd, 1922); .exemplify' l94l). For a later attempt to knowledge, under Cook Wilson's J, H. Woodger:'Mr Russell'sTheory of Perception' (Monist, 1930) as irrlluence,see R, L Aaron: TheNature of Krcwins e930). well as C. A. Fritz, op. cit' andvarious essaysin P' A' Schilpp z Thi Philos- 3. This is perhaps the most generally influential of all Cook Wilson's ophy of Bertrand Russell. - touchings. See, to mention the less obvious examples, G. F. Stout: .Im- 2'8. Compare John Laird:'The Law of Parsimony' (Monist,1919); John nrodiacy, Mediacy and Coherence' (Mittd,lg}g arrd Studies); G, Ryle: .Arc Wisdom: 'Logical Constructions' (Minil, l93l-3); L. S. Stebbing: 'Con' 563 562 NOTES NOTES 19. See Alexander's (Hibbert in 'Natural Piety) Jnl,, 1922, reprinted of the Mind?' (PlS, 1916), On his theory of the cognitive act see the Philosophical and I.iterary 1939). Pieces, nymposium in PIS (1920) with contributions by Laird, Moore, Broad and 20. presentation For a of this view, seeparticularly 'Some Explanations', lhwes Hicks. and for (op. criticism seeBroad and Mtrphy cit.),lf we cut acube into slices, 7. Seethe articles on Lovejoy in./fII (1948) and PP.R(1963) together with Alexander argues; the slicesdo not'add themselvestogether' to a cube; they A. J. Reck: 'The Philosophyof A. O, Lovejoy' (RM,1963). are not, as separateslices, obviously slicesofa cube. In contrast, ifwe move 8. See Santayana on Strong in The Philosophy of G. Santayana (ed. P, around a cube and perspectives perspectives take of it these overlap - 'one Schilpp, 1940); W. P. Montague:'Mr C, A. Strong's Creed for Sceptics' cries out for the next to complete it'. In the same way, spatio-temporal (JP,1938). peNpectives 'demand' Space-Time for their completion, as slic€s of simul- 9. See the account of Sellars by J, L. Blaaz Men and Movements in taneous eventswould not. American Philosophy (1952); Sellars: 'A Statement of Critical Realism' 21. SeeW, S. Urquhart's obituary in PBA,1946. (fr/P, 1938); and the symposium on the work of Sellars in PPR (f954), 22. Kemp Smith's first important contribution to scholarship, his ^Stzdies tugether with Sellars' reply (1955). in the Cartesian (1902), played part Philosophy had already a considerable 10. Thus Russell is the only British contributor to The Philosophy of in the development points ofrealism by drawing attention to weak in the GeorgeSanlayana (ed. P. A. Schilpp, 1940).Santayana's reputation in Great Cartesian dualism, SeeA. Ewing (P 19 C. :' N. K. Smith' B A, 59), Ilritain has mainly been at the level of 'Great Thoughts'or'Gems from 'A 23. See Realist Philosophy of Life' in CBP Il and, for a longer version, Santayana', to which his epigrammatic style admirably lends itself. A Sydney Matter (1929'). , Life , and Yalue ncwspaperonce referred to'the Eastern Sage,Santayana'. SeeG. W, How- gstei George Santayana (1938); the Santayana number of,IP (1954) and RIP, 19631'other articles in the former journal include S. P. Lamprecht: Notes 'Santayana, Then and Now' (1928) and 'Naturalism and Agnosticism in Santayana'(1933); J. H. Randall: 'The Latent Idealism of a Materialist' CHAPTER 12 (1931); see also M. R. Cohen in Canbridge History of AmericanLiterature (Vol. IV, l9l7-21); D. L, Murray: 'A Modem Materialist' (PAS, l9ll). 1. In Germany, a variety of 'Critical Realism' was maintained by A. Santcyana's autobiographical volumes Personsand Places (19{{-9) can also Riehl as early as 1887. See the historical note in J. B. Pratt: Personal be consulted for both pleasure and profit. Realism (1937) and Ueberweg (Vol. 4) realistische Richtung'. on 'Die I |. SeeH. M. Kallen: 'America and the Life of Reason' (JP,l92l\. For Pratt himself seeSelf, Religion and (ed. G. E. Myers, 1951). Metaphysics 12. Seethat remarkable summary account ofhis philosophy,the Apologla Seealso in that volume W. Sellars: R. 'American Realism'. pro Mente Sua appendedto The Philosophy ofGeorge Santayata, 2. His Synthetica (1906) was an intensely personal attempt to be an 13. Seehis Herbert Spencerlectureon'The Unknowable'(1923). Idealist in metaphysics but a Realist in epistemology. See J, B. Baillie: 14. See Freedom and Reason: Stadies in Philosophy and Jewish Culture tn 'Professor Laurie's Natural Realism' (Mind, 1908-9), and the writiags of Memory of Morris Raphael Cohen,ed. S, W, Baron, E, Nagel, K. S. Pinson, Laurie's French disciple G. Remacle, especially La Philosophie de S. S. l95l; Cohen's posthumously published autobiography: A Dreamer's Laurie (1909), Journey,1949;L. D. Rosenfield: Portrait of a Philosopher (1962); E. Nagel's 3. See Ch. 4 above. Pringle-Pattison's Balfow Lectwes on Realism obituary in"/I/1(1957) and bibliographical supplement to,DZ(t958). appeared in The Philosophical Review (18924) shortly after their delivery, 15. For his views on Dewey's subordination ofontology to morals, seehis but were not published in book form until 1933. See the accompanying 'Some Difficulties in Dewey's Anthropocentric Naturalism' (PX, 1940). memoir and John Laird's review in Mind,1934. His social interests lay particularly in the field oflegal philosophy. See his 4. See Sorley's introductory memoir; articles Adamson and on by H. I.aw and the Social Order (1933\. lones (Mind, 1902), G. Dawes Hicks (Mind,1904), D, A. Rees (PQ, 1952). 16. SeeD. J. Bronstein: 'The Principle of Polarity in Cohen's Philosophy' Like S€th, Adamson had come under Lotze's influence. Lotze's dictum: (in Freedom and Reason). 'It is only inquiries conducted in the spirit ofrealism which will satisfy the 17. Best known for his contributions to University of Califurnia Publica- aspirat$ns of Idealism'could stand as the of Adamson's philosophi- motto tlons in Philosophy, volumes of essays issued by the Department of Phil- cal investigations, In the United States, G. S. Fullerton's A System of osophy in the University of California since 19O4,each volume centring on Metaphysics (1904) belon'gs to the same movemetrt of ideas. See E. A. u single topic. Singer on Fullerton in"/P(1925). 18. Brought together as Sovereign Reason (1954) and Logic withoat 5. SeeW. G. de Burgh's memorial notice in PBA,l94l. Mttaphysics (1957). Nagel's The Structwe of Science (1961) is restricted to 6. See Dawes Hicks and Moore on'Are the Materials Sense of Affections more purely methodological topics. SeeChapter 20. 568 569 NOTES NOTES

19. See' TowardsaNaturalisticConceptionof Lo glc' (AmerlcanPhtlosophy known for his work in introducing first Bergson and then Italian Idealism Today and Tomorrow, ed. M. Kallen and S, Hook, 1935) as well as'Logic to u British audience. Without Ontolo gy' it Naturalism and the Hun on Spirit, 8. The title Croce gave to a short work which was later revised and incor- 20. See his Survey of Symbolic Logic (1918), together with the amend- porated in Saggio sullo Hegel (1913). Croce habitually published his writings ments and corrections in Appendix II to C. I. Lewis and C. H, Langford: in t preliminary form, usuarly in the proceedings of a learned society, and Symbolic Logic (1932).His systemhas paradoxes ofits own - the'paradoxes lhcn revised them for publication as a book. In both text and bibliography I of strict implication'. If, for example, it is logically impossible for4 to be have quoted the date of frst publication in book-form, following the false, then, clearly, it is logically impossible for p to be true and q to be ' Cronologia delle opere del Croce' included in Volume 75 of La Letteratura false, i.e. any proposition whatsoever implies those propositions which are Ituliana (1951). necessarily true. But these paradoxes, according to Lewis, do not conflict 9. Italianphilosopherofhistory,whogreatlyinfluencedtheltalianldealists, with our intuitive logical feelings, See also W. Kneale: 'Truths of Logic' SeeCroce'sThePhilosophy of G. B. Yico (l9ll,trans. by R. G. Collingwood, (Pls,1945). l9l3); and the translation of Vico's Autobiography by H. Fisch and G. 21. See P. Devaux: 'Le pragmatisme conceptuel de C. I. Lewis' (,RMM, Itergin (19tt4). The philosophical framework of Joyce's Finnegan's Wake 1934); J. B. Pratt: 'Logical Positivism and Professor Lewis'(.1P, 1934). derivesfrom Vico. 22. SeeC. G. Hempel's review (JSZ, 1947). 10. Compare P. Romanell: Croce versus Gentile (1947), with biblio- graphy. Seealso R. W. Holmes: Theldealism of G. Gentile (1937\; C. Pellizi: 'The Problem of Religion for the Modern Italian ldealists' (PAS, 1923'). Notes 11. See E. W. F. Tomlin: R. G. Collingwood (1953); R. B. McCallum, T. M. Knox, I. A. Richmond in PBA (1943); T. M. Knox's preface to The CHAPTBR 13 Idea of History (lgaO; G. Ryle: 'Mr Collingwood and the Ontological Argument' (Mind, 1935); C. J. Ducasse:.' Mr Collingwood on Philosophical l.See Bertard Bosanquet and his Friends (ed, J. H, Muirhead). Webb Method' (JP, 1936); A. D. Ritchie: 'The Logic of Question and Answer' summarizeshis views in'Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion'(CaP, ID. (M ind, 1943); E E. Harris :' Collingwood on Eternal Problems' (PO, I 95 l). 2. See p. 114 above, and criticisms of The Natwe of Truth by R. F. A. This essay is included, in a revised form, in Harris's Nature, Mind, and Hoernl6 and B. Russell (Mind,1906); G. E. Moore (Mr'zd, 1907); c. Dawes Modern Science (1954) which is an attempt to show that modern develop- Hicks (Hibbert tnl., l9M\: L. A. Reid: 'Correspondence and Coherence' ments in science presuppose a philosophy very like Collingwood's earlier (PR,1922\. theories, not at all the empiricism which most 'scientifically-minded' 3. Seehis rPhilosophy as the Development of the Notion and Reality of philosophers avow. See also G, R. Mure: 'Benedetto Croce and Oxford' Self-Consciousness'(CBP, II). (PQ,res4). 4. See G. Marchesini: La vlta et il pensiero di R. Ardigo (1907). Most of 12, For Collinryood's later thought see A. Donagant The Later Phll- Spaventa'swork was posthumously published (1901)by Gentile. osophy ofR. G. Collingwood(1962). 5. SeeG. de Ruggierc: ModernPhilosophy (1912),trans. by A. H. Hailtay 13. He translated two books.by Croce, and two by Ruggiero, Compare and R. G. CollinWood (1921). what he says about Croce in The ldea of Hisrory (written 1936,although not 6. H. WildonCarrlThe Phllosophy of Bewdeuo Croce(1917); R. Piccoli: published until 1946) with his own doctrine in the Autobiography. Bttt Beradetto Croce: An Introduction to his philosophy (1922); C. Sprigge: Collingwood would have agreed with Croce that to talk of influence'is to Benedetto Croce (1952\; the Croce number ofRIP (1953). There are lengthy treat the development of human thinking as if it were subject to mechanical bibliographies in G. Castellano: Benedetto Croce (1936) and in L'opera pushes; one can be influenced only by that with which one already largely filosofica, storica e letteraria di Bercdetto Croce (1942\. For a brief state- sympathizes. Croce, incidentally, criticized Speculum Meztis on the ground ment by Croce of his own philosophical position see 'My Philosophy', that it did not allow sufficient'distinctness'to the activities ofthe human translated as part of a volume of essays with that title by E. F. Carritt spirit. (1949). 14. SeeCh. 8 above. Scealso John Wisdom: Problems of Mind and Matter 4''' 7. An enthusiastic ex-businessmanwho made his way through the Aris- (1934); C. D. Broad's review of Mind and Matter (Mind,1932). qThe totelian Society to the Professorship in Philosophy at King's College, 15. Nature of Universals and Propositions' (PBA,1921, reprinted London, to which he was appointed at the age ofsixty-one (1918); in 1925 in Studies) and 'Universals Again' (PISS, 1936). See also bibliographical he moved.to the University of Southern California at Los Angeles. His own note in God and Nature (footnote, p.77), For criticism, seethe symposium philosophy was an eclectic Idealism of a monadistic, Leibnizian, kind, so 'Are the Characters of Particular Things Universal or Particular ?' with con- that he fitted happily into the'personalist'atmosphere at Los Angeles. See tributions by G. E. Moore, G. F. Stout, G. Dawes Hicks (PISS, 1923); his A Theory of Moruds (1922) and Cogitarc Cogitata (1930). But he is best N. K. Smith: 'The Nature of Universals' (Mind, 1927); H. Knight: 'Stout 570 571 NOTES NOTBS 6. First published in Phtlosophy (1949), reprinted in Rellsion, lroposition caa be constructed out of simultaoeous &nial Qpt'p and rct'q). and Psychical Research (1953), See, in the same volume, 'Henry $heffer has published little, but has been an influentialteachet.See Stucture, and Psychical Research' for the earlier history of psychical research at Method and Meaning: Essays in Eonow of Henry M. Shefer' ed. P' Henle Cambridge. See,forexample, A. G, N. Flew: I New Approach to (1951).For a clear account ofthe truth'table method and Sheffer's 'suoke- Research(1953); H. H. Price: 'Some Philosophical Questions about Telo. notation' see P. F. Strawson: Introduction to Logical Theory (1952\' Cf' pathy and Clairvoyance' (Phil,,1940'); M. Kneale, R. Robinson, C. W. K. p. 136above on Johnson. Independently, E. L' Post and Lukasiewicz hit on Mundle: 'Is Psychical Research Relevant to Philosophy?' (PASS, 1 ' truth-table' methods in 1920. See also Btoad's Lectwes on Psychical Research (1962) and H. H. Price'r 12. See W. H. Watson: On Understandtng Phystcs (1938), for a theory of review (Mind,1964). physics worked out under the iDffuence of the Trdctatus. S. Toulmin's 7, The translation, one should add, is extraordinarily bad. It was re- 'l'he Philosophy of Science (1953) is a detailed application of Wittgenstein's translated by D, F. Pears and B. F. McGuiness in 1961. point of view, worked out in a way which bringp Toulmin close to Duhem; 8. Commentaries on the Troctatus include the cornmentary in G. C. M. ln particular, he sharply distinguishes between physical laws and empirical Colombo's Italian translation and G. E. M. Anscombei Introduction to Icneralizations, between'physics' and'Datural history'. See reviews by Wittgenstein'sTractatu.s (1959); E. Stenius: Wittgenstein's Tractatus (1960); E.Nasel(Mind,1954), and H. Dinele (Pnll., 1955). A. Maslow: A Study in Wittgenstein's Tractatus (1951); M. Blackz Cottt- 13. Best known as a phitosophjcal psychologist, who continues the wolk panlon and Critique of Wittgewtein's Tractatus (the most detailed, 1964)i of Brentano and Stout, he has as well a lively awateness of contemporary D. Favrholdt: lnterpretation and Critique of Wittgenstein's Tractatus (1964)i philosophy. IJris Prilrlples of Logic (1933) was one of the first text-books J. P. Griffn: Wittgenstein's Logical Atomism (1964). Help can be derived written along Cambridge lines, and he has written a number of aticles on the from G. K. Pfochmann and J. B. Lawson: Terms in their Proposltioral rclation between thought and language. For this period in the history of Contexts in Wittgenstein's Tractatus; an Infux (1962) and the edition of llritish philosophy, seeJ. O. Urmsoni PhilosophlcalArulysis(1954. Wittgenstein's Note-books 1914-16 by G. E. M. Anscombe and H. G, von 14. For specimens, apart from those mentioned in this chapter' ses Wright (1961). See also D. A. T. Gasking: 'Anderson and the Tractatus Ch. 9, footnote 12, p. 560, Logico-Philosophicus: an Essay in Philosophicat Tramlation' (AJP, 1949\; ll.Her A Modern Intoductlon to Logic (1930) did much to introduce J. R, Weinberg? An Examitation of Logical Positivism (1936): M. Black: modern logic, particularly as taught at Cambridge, to a wider audience. She Language ard Philosophy (1949); the critical notice by F. P. Ramsey in wove together threads from Moore, Russell, Johnson, Whitehead and Mind (1923\, reprinted irt Foundarions of Mathematics (1931); RusseU's llroad. In her Pl tlosophy and the Physicists (1937) she delivered a broadside' Introduction to the English edition of the Tractatus; G. Pitcher: Ile In the nane ofcornmonsense, against the speculations ofJeans and Edding- Philosophy of luiltgerutein (1964); J. Hartnack: Wittgenstein and Modern ton. See various references in Philosophical Stadtes: Essays in Memary of Philosophy (trans. M. Cranston 1965); J. O. Urmson: Plilosophical Awlysis L, SusanStebbing (1948); E' D. Bronstein: 'Miss Stebbing's Directional (1956), On Wittgenstein generally, s€e the memorial notices by D. A. T. Analysis and BasicFacts' (Arulysts, 1934'). G[asking] and A. C. J[acksonl (AJP, l95l); G. Ryle (Amlysis, l95l); J. 16. See also, however, L' S. Stebbing: 'Logical Constructions and Know' Wisdom (Mtzd, 1952); B, Russell(Mind,195l); K. Britton (Cambridge!n1., ledge tbrougb Descriptions' (Proc. of 7th Intengt. Cons. of Phil', l9t0)' 1954); G. von Wright (PX, 1955); N. Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein: A How much of what Stebbing and Wisdom wrote in thcse years derived from Memoir (1958\. Moore's lectures I do not know: according to their own avowals, a great 9. It is a matter of controversy whether these objects are all of them par- deal. ticulars, or whether they include properties and relations. See I. M. Copi: 'Objects, Properties and Relations in the Tlactatu!', (Mirld, 1958) and his review of Stenius's comrnentary (PX, 1963). G. E. M. Anscombe replies in Notes Mind (1959r. See also D. Keyt:'Wittgenstein's Notion of an Object'(PQ 1963). CHAPTER 16 10. For discu*ion of this point, and as illustration of the difficulties which arise in interpreting Wittgenstein, see E. Daitz: 'The Picture Theory of t. For a full accountof its formation and subscquenthistory seeV. Kraft: Meaning' (Mirrd, 1953) and, in reply, E. Evans: 'Tractatus 3.1432' (Mind, The Vienru Circle (195O,English translation 1953)and O. Neurath: 'Le 1955). See also D. Keyt: 'Wittgenstein's Picture Theory of Language' ddveloppementdu Cercle de Vienne et l'avenir de I'empirisme loerque' (Pft, 1964). (Actualitds,1935).The pbrase'The Vienna Circle'datesback to 1928;the I l. Wittgenstein makes use of the work of an American logician, H. M. Circle's'programme'was published in 1929as 'WissenschaftlicheWeltauf- Sheffer, who, in'A set offive independent postulates for Boolean Algebra' l'assungder Wiener Kreis'; its maitr medium of publicity was the journal (Trans. Am. Math. Soc.,19l3) proved that all the truth-functions of a tirkenntnls (1930), renamed for 193940 The Jownal of Unified Sclence. 578 579 NOTES NOTBS

The best-known members of the group were M. Schlick, R. Carnap, F. W. C. Kneale: 'Veritrability' (PIS^S, l9aD; special nunbers of .RIP itr Waismann, O. Neurath, H. Feigl, B. von Juhos, F. Kaufmann, H. Hahn, 1950, l95l; C. G. Hempel: 'Conceptions of Cognitive Significance' in his K. Menger, K. Giidel. It worked in olose association with the.Society of Aqects of Scientific Explanation (1965). Empirical Philosophy'at Berlin, which included as members H. Reichen. tl. Seehis'L'€cole de Vienne et la philosophie traditionnelle' (Actualitds, joint bach - editor with Camap of Erkenntnis -F. Kraus, W. Dubislav, K. 19.17).Seo also F. Waismann's preface to Schlick's Gesammclte Aufsane, Grelling. See also A. J. Ayer: Logical Positivtsn (1959) which includes a 1926-36, and obituary notices by H, Reichenbach (Erk., 193Q, P. Frank useful collection ofessays by logical positivists and a lengthy bibliography; llik.,1937) ardH. Feigl (Er&., 1939). R. Carnap's intellectual autobiography iathe Philosophy of Rudolf Carrup 9. Publications inPhilosophy,e6.Tbe College ofthe Pacific (1932). (ed, P. A. Schilpp, 1963); P. Frank: Modern Science and its Phllosophy 10. Se€the lectures on'Form and Content'delivered in London in 1932, (1949). nrrt published by Schlick himself, but printed in GesammelteAufsdtze, ln 2. What Wittgenstein may have told Schlick and Waismann can bo erscntials, Schlick had already worked out his epistemology in his pre- gathered partly from his paper'Some Remarks on Logical Form'(PISS, Wittgenstein ,4//ga meine Erkenntnislehre (1918'). partly 1929), from the manuscripts brought together as Philosophischc ll. In America it inspired the wo.k of Nelson Goodman whose ?re (ed. Bemerkungen R. Rhees, 1965)which clrte back to 1929-30. Structure of Appeararce (1951) includes an illuminating critical account of 3 . But cf, John Anderson (AJP : ' Empiri cism' , 1927). ('ornap's book. On Goodman's own attempt at a 'constructional' phil- 4. The anti-metaphysical mathematician, H. Hahn, first drew the Circle's onophy, seethe critical notic€ by M. Dummett (Mtnd,l955); G. Bergmann: attention to the Tractatus. S*bis Logique, math'natique, et conraissance de ''l'wo types of Linguistic Philosophy'(RM,1952,and The Metaphyslcs of (Actualit^s,7935) Ia realitd and' Die Bedeutung der wissenschaftlichen Wel- l,olqlcalPositivism,1954);Y, Lowe and H. Wang on Goodman's conc€ption tauffassung' (Erl<., 1930).See P. Frank's obituary ofHahn (Er&., 1934), ol'un individual, and C. G. Hempel's review (all in PX, 1953). See also N. 5. By Blumberg and Feigl: 'Logical Positivism'("IP, 1931). Schlick pre- (ioodman: 'The Significance of Der Logische Aufbau der llelt' it The ferred the name 'consistent empiricism'. See also J. R. Weinberg: lz I'htlosophy of RudolfCarnap (ed.P. A. Schilpp, 1963). Examina t io n of Lo g ica I Po I i, ivlsm (193 6'1: C. W. Morris : I ogi ca I Posit ivism, 12. For the controversy between Scblick and Neurath, see Actualids g Pra mat ism a nd Sc ie nt ific Empir ic ism (Ac t wl it 6s, 1937) ; G. Bergurann : Iie (t935), which includes a French translation of Schliok's 'Uber das Funda- Metaphysics of Logical Posilivism (1954); R, von Mises: Posttivism (1939, nrcnt der Erkenntnis'- the article which particularly aroused Neurath's English translation, 1951); J. Jorgensen:'The Development of Logical hostility -'Facts and Propositions', and Schlick's essay 'Sur les constata- (US, Empiricism' 1951); L. S. Stebbing: 'Logical Positivism and Analysis' tions'. Seealso Neurath's reply in 'k ddveloppement du cercle de Vienne', (PBA,1933); E, Nagel: 'Analytic Philosophy in Europe'(./P, 1936); W. H, C, G. Hempel's criticism of Schlick in 'The logical positivist's theory of Werkmeister: 'Seven Theses of Logical Positivism Critically Bxamined' Ituth' (Atulysis, 1935), and B. von Juhos: 'Empiricism and Physicalism' (PR, 1937); B. von Juhos: 'Principles of Logical Empiricism' (Mind,1937\; (rlid.). This latter article illustrates the reaction of the more orthodox J, A. Passmore: 'Logical Positivism' (AJP, 1943, 1944, 1948): H. Feigl: positivists to Neuath's innovations. 'Logical Empiricism' (Twentieth-Centwy Philosophy,ed. D. D. Runes,1943); 13. Note also the resemblance between what Neurath says and James's W. T. Stace:'Positivism' (Mind,1944); T. Storer:'An Analysis of Logical thcory ofreality (Chapter 5). Logical positivism acclimatiz€d very easily in (Me Positivism' thodos, 19 5l\. America: Schlick was invit€d to lecture there in the late twenties and a 6. By D. A. T. Glaskingl and A. C. J[acksonl, (lJP, l95l). But compare number of the leading positivists (Carnap, Bersmann, Feigl, Frank) settled PhilosophischeBemerkangen (1965), for his views in 1930. In America when the persecutions began in Germany and Austria. C. W. 7. Schlick's 'Positivismus und Realismus' (Erk., 1932) is another early Morris has especially devoted himself to acting as liaison-officer between statement. See the commentary by D. Rynin attached to a French transla- prugmatism and positivism. See his 'Logical Positivism, Prasmatism and tion ofthis article in SynthCse,1948.See, as well as general works on logical scicntific Empiricism' (ActMl it4s, 1937). positivism, C. I. Lewis:'Experience and Meaning'(PR,1934);L, S. Stebb- 14, The distinction between natural aDd spiritual sciences, as we have ing, A. E. Heath, L. J. Russell: 'Communication and Verification'(PISS, nlrcady seen(Chapter 4, Note 16'),was widely accepted on the Continent of 1934); M. Black: fie Principle of Verifiability'(Analysis, 1934); E.Nagel: liurope, although it made little headway in England. A sociologist by train- 'Verifiability, Truth and Verification'(JP, 1934); W. T. Stace: 'Metaphysics lng, Neurath was particularly conoemed to combat the view that sociolory (Mind, and Meaning' t935): C. J. Ducasse:'Verification, Verifiability and lN by its nature not an empirical inquiry. The'thesis of the unity of science' Meaningfulness' (JP, 1936') G. Ryle :' Unverifiability-by-Me' (Analysls, ; rt(lod very near to his heart. He organized congressesin its name - five of 1936); A. C. Ewing: (Mind, 1937); M. Lazerowitz: 'Meaninglessness' lhcm, fully reportedin Erkerntnis, in the years 1934-40 - and was editor-in- 'The Principle of Yerifiability' (Mind,1937) and 'Strong and Weak Verifica- efricf of tbe Encyclopedla of Unirted Science (1938-). His philosophical tion' (Mind, (Mind, 1939); J. Wisdom: 'Metaphysics and Verification' tx)sition was never worked out in detail: agitation was his/o/te. SeeVouille- f938); I. Berlin:'Verification'(Pl^S, 1938); D. MacKinnon, F. Waismann, rrrln's introductiotr to Neurath's'Le d6veloppement du Cercle de Vienne'; 580 581 NOTES NOTES

lI. M. Kallen's obituary ia PPR(1946); J. Laird on Neurath in Innguage?'(PI,S,S, 1954) and'Privacy'(Pal, 1959), both reprhted io fte Encyclopedia(1950).Forphysicalism generally seeC. A. Mace:' (' onc e pt of a Person(19 63). (P,4S, 1936) and Feigl's article in The Philosophy of Rudolf Carmp. 29. See also Ayer's 'Basic Propositions' (Philosophlcal Awlysis, ed. M, 15. First publishedin Erk., 1932under the title' Die physikalischeSpracho fllrrck, 1950, rcpfinted it Philosophical Essays,\ als Universalspracheder Wissenschaft';Eanslated into English as a.PsycrtG 10. Seealso ' Statementsabout the Past' (Pl,S, l95l) and 'Our Knowledge Miniaturein 1934. rrl' Other Minds' (Theoria, 1953), both it Phi losophical F"savr. For Ayer's 16.A Pap: 'Reduction Sentencesand Dispositioo Conoepts'in 2t criticism of Carnap see'Carnap's Treatment of the Problem of Other Minds' PhiI o s ophy of R, Carnap. (I'he Philosophyof Rudolf Carrup,ed. P. A. Scbilpp, 1963). 17.On this question,see also N. Malcolm: 'Certainty and Empirical 3 1. SeeA. P. Grifrths :'Ayer on Perceptio' (Mind, 1960). In TheProblem Statements'(Mind, 1942);P. Henle: 'On the Certainty of Empirical State- ot' Knowledge, Ayer defines setrse-data more carefully and more narrowly ments', and \il. T. Stace: 'Are all Empirical StatementsHypotheses?' llrun in his earlier writings. (JP,1947\. 32. H. Reiohenbach: 'Logistic Empiricism in Germany'(.rP, 193Q. 18.On the whole, Ayer has been 'logical positivism' to conservativo British critics; C. E, M. Joad in his Crltique of Logical Positlytszr(1950) scarcelyrefers to anybody elae,Language. Truth and Logic contains little Notes that is unfamiliar to readersof Continental positivism; but it createdsome- thing of a sensationin England where such familiarity was by no means CHAPTER 17 widespread,and eventhe positivism of Clifford and Pearsonseems to haye beenforgotten. Peopleheard with a senseofshock that metaphysicalpropo- l. There are signs, however, that British philosophers are beginning to sitions are neither true nor false,but nonsense. lbol a new interest in symbolic logic; that is why I have included a briefguide 19. See L. Stebbing: Loglcal Posittvism arrd Aralysls and M. Black: fbr such philosophical explorers. I do not pretend that what I have written is 'Relations betweenLogical Positivism and the Cambridge School of rn adequate account of a vast, diversified and difficult literature. For this Analysis' (./zl. UzifiedScience, 1939\. consult the extensive reviews and bibliographies inJSZ. See also R. Feys: 20. A similar view had already been adopted, under Wittgenstein's 'Directions nouvelles dela logistiqueaux Etats-Unis'(Revue n4o-scholastique influence, by G. A. Paul in his 'Is there a problem about s€nse-data?' de philosophie,1946); M. Boll and J. Reinhart: 'Logio in France in the (PASS, 1936, reprinted in LL l). This article has the status of a locus Twentieth Century' (in Philosophlcal Thought ln France and the United classicw in recent epistemologicaldiscussion. Paul otherwise wrote littlc, States, ed. M. Farber, 1950); Hao Wang: I Survey of Mathematical Logic but was atr influential teacher,both in England and in Australia, to which (1963); H. Mehlberg: 'The present Situation in the Philosophy of Mathe- country he introduc€d the teachingsof Wittgensteitr. matics' in Logic and Innguage (Synthdse Library, 1962); Essays on the 2 I . For subsequentcontroversy on this point se€Ayer's ' The Terminolory Foundations of Mathematics (A. A. Fraenkel Festschrift, 196l). See also of Sense-Data'in Mind, 1945(reprinted ia PhilosophicalEs.ra7s, 1954) and bibliography on p. 549 above. the literature referredto therein, 2. See Chapter 9, p.222 for the theory of types; that the Russellian 22. S*, for other contemporary discussionsof this subject, articles oo axioms could be reduced to a single axiom was first shown by J. Nicod in'A phenomenalismin PIS by R. B. Braithwaite (1937), G. F. Stout (1938), Reduction in the Number of the Primitive Fropositions of Logia' (Pro- R. I. Aaron (1938),D. G. C. McNabb (1940),W. F. R. Hardie (1945),and ceedingsof the Cambridge Philosophical Society, l9l7). Ayer's secondthoughts (1946). An elaborate phenomenalismis presentcd 3. For the points in dispute see M. Black: The Natwe of Mathenatics by W. T. Stacein lljs TheTheory of Knowledgeand Existence (1932\. (1933); ed. F. Gonseth: Philosophie Mathcmatlque (Acruolitcs,1939); the 23, On basic propositions seealso Ayer's essayii PhilosophicalAralysls, more technical discussion in S. C. Kleene: htroduction to Metanathenatlcs ed. M. Black(1950), republished inPhilosophlcal Essays. (1952) and S. Kttrner: Ihe Philosophy of Mathematics (1960). 24. SeeI. A. PassmorciHume's Intenttons (1952). 4. See D. Hilbert: 'On the Foundations of Logic and Arithmetic' 25. Seefor criticismA. Churchin tSL, 1949, (Monist, 1905); D. Hilbert and P. Bernays: Grundlagen der Mathematik 25. Seefor the earlier vicw A. J. Ayer, C. H. Whiteley, M. Black: 'Truth (1934, 1939); D. Hilbert and W. Ackermann: Principles of Matherrutlcal by Convedion' (Arulysis, 1936);see also N. Malcolm: 'Are Necessary Logic (1928; English translation ofsecond edition with notes by R. F. Luce, Propositions really Verbal?' (Mind, l94O); A. C. Ewing: 'The Linguistic 1950); H. B. Curry: Outlines of a Fornalist Philosophy of Mathematlcs Theory of a priori Propositions'(PlS, 1939);W. C. Kneale,K. Britton, J. (1951). Attempts have also been made to formalize empirical sciences.See O. Urmson:'Are NecessaryTruths True by Convention?'(Pl.9S,1947). particularly th€ works of J. H. Woodger. IIis The Technique of Theory 27. A.Pap : Semanttcsond Necessary Truth (1959). Construction (US, 1939) is a good introduction to the whole field. The 28. For Ayer's defenoeof private languagpsseo 'Can there be a private formalist point of view is most fully worked out in his Axlomatlc Method s82 583 NOTES NOTES view, the equivalent proposition 'ifanything is not black, it is not a ravetr'. ftrrch(p.417 above). SeeW' Salmon: 'Vindication of lnduction,,in Current But also, and paradoxically, 'tb:is is not black and not a raven' confirmr lr:tuL.son the Philosophy of Science, ed. H. Feigl and G. Maxwell (1961), 'ifanything is not black, it is not a raven' and, therefore'ifanything is a Itrgcther with S. Barker's criticism and Salmon's reply. In his problems raven it is black'. So the existenceofany non-black non-raven - e.g. a whito nl lnalysis (1954) Black criticizes the 'practical, defence of induction, in a .justifications' swan - confflns the hypothesis that all ravens are black. Hempel tries so to number ofits forms. Black argues that all these turn out to define confirmation as to avoid both these extremes. Revised versions, witb' lE trutologous; they assert that inductive policies are the only ways of additional notes, of Hempel's essays are included in C. G. Hempe|:, Aspectt nchicving those particular objects the achievement of which distinguishes of Scientific Explanation (1965). For criticism of con-firmation theory sco hrtlLrctivefrom other policies. Black himselfdefends the view that induction the controversy betwe,en Carnap and Goodman in PPR, 1947, and N. onft, without circularity, be inductively justified. So also his Models and Goodman: Fact, Fictionand Forecast (1954')' Goodmatr sketches a theory of Mtaphors (1962) and the criticism by P. Achinstein in a seriesof articles in .ordinary 'projectibility' by which he hopes to avoid the paradoxes of confrmatioo irulysis (1960, 1962,1963). For the closely related language' theory. See also Popper's discussion of deerees of falsifiability it The I'ogtc tpproach to induction see pp. 458 below. For the relation between of Scientifc Investigarion; F. B. Fitch and A. W. Burks: 'Justification in rlrftistics and induction see also H. Leblanc: Statistical and Inductive Science' (ed. M. White: Academic Freedom and Religion, 1953); the con' l'robabilities (1962). G. S. Brown inhts Probability and Scientific Inference troversy between Y. Bar-Hillel and Carnap in aIPS (1952); J. Hosiasson' (1957) has raised some critical questions about probability theory, but Lindenbaum: 'On €onfrmation'(J,SZ, 1940); L J. Good: 'The Paradox of hnswon few converts. So, from a different standpoint, has R, F. Harrod in Conirmation' (BJPS,196M2); the discussion between Hempel and J. N. 'l'he Foundations of Inductive Logic (1956) in the course of his defence of .subjective Watkins (Phil.,1957-3\; L Schefler: The Arutomy of ltt4uiry (1963); J' L. lrrductive reasoning. For recetrt work on probability' and its Paradox of Confirmation' (BJPS, 1963) which includes a rclotion Mackie: 'The to induction - an approach deriving in the long run from Ramsey - general account ofthe whole controversy. rcc H. Kyburg: Probability and the Logic of Ratiowl Belief (1961) and H. 42, See also Williams: 'Probability, Induction and the Provident Man' Kyburg and H. Smokler (eds): .Readingsin Sublective probability (1964). in M. Farber: Pfr ilosophic Thought in France and the anitud Stales, in which 47. See reviews of Braithwaite's book by L. J. Russell (phit.,1954\ and, .Braithwaite Williams relates his position to Carnap's. The slmposium on Probability io R, J. Hirst (PQ, l95g;' A, Shimony: on Scienffic Method' PPR (t944-A is very largely devoted to criticisms of Williams's t€merarious lRM, 1954) and R. C. Coburn: 'Braithwaite's Inductive Justification of defence of the classical theory of probability. See also reviews by Nagel lnduction'(PSC,l96l).Carnap had also paid someattention to the Neyman- (JP,1947),Ktale (Phil.,1949),and Black (J,SI' 1947),with Williams's reply Pcurson School, but most probability-philosophers read no statisticians 'On the Direct Probability of Inductions' (Mitd' 1953). oxceptR. A. Fisher. See, for example, J. Neyman and E. S. pearson: .The 43. Von Wright, a Finnish philosopher, was for a time Wittgenstein's 'lcsting of Statistical Hypotheses in relation to Probabilities a pr iorf (proc. (ambridge suc@ssor in the Cambridge Chair, but has now retumed to Finland. Ho Phil, Soc-,1933) and the work of A. Wald, sununed up in his studied under E. Kaila, who had participated in the discussions of tho l;kttistical Decision Functiorrs (1950). For the theory of games see J. Neu- Vienna Circle. See C. D. Broad: 'Ilr. von Wright on the Logic of Induction' nrnn and O. Morgenstern: Theory of Gamesand Ecorcmic Behaviow (1944\. (Mirld, lg4y''rt J. G. Kemeny: 'A Treatise on Induction and Probability' 48. For inductive theory subsequent to Braithwaite s@ Itduction: SonE (Pi, 1953) and the review by H. Jeffreys (r/PS, 1953). Wright's views on ('urrent Issues(ed. H. E. Kyburg and E. Nagel, 1963) and H. E. Kyburg: probability are briefly summarized in his article'On Probabili9' ia Mhrd 'Recent Work in Induct{ve Logc' (APQ, 1964), which includes a bibtio- (1e40). jruphy ofthe copious articles devot€d to a working out and criticism ofthe 44. In particular, he restates Mill's methods as 'a logic of conditions'; thcories discussed in this chapter. For an indication just how controversial here he has been influenced by C. D. Broad's 'The Principles of Demon' lhc interpretation of probability still is, see the discussion in Obsertation strative Induction' (Mittd, l93O). .,,u1Interprelation (ed. S. Kiirner, 1957), 45. SeeBroad's review in Mind (195O');F. L. Will: 'Kneale's Theories of Probability and Induction' (PR, 1954); F. J. Anscombe: 'Mr Kneale on Probability and Induction' and Kneale's rcply (Mittd, l95l). Notes See also H. Feigl: 'The Logical' '146. As Peirce had sometimes suggested. Character of the Principle of Induction' (PSC,1934),'De Principiis non, CHAPTER 18 est disputandum' (Philosophical Arclysis, ed. Black, 1950) and 'On thc Vindication oflnduction' (PSC,196l). Feigl suggeststhat although induc- l. Of what Wittgenstein taught at Cambridge between 1930, when he tive inference cannot be justified, it can be 'vindicated', by showing that it is lrcganto lecture there, and 1947, when he resigned from the Chair in which at least 4 way of predicting the future. (Unlike Kneale he does not commit hc had succeeded Moore, no full record has as yet been published, The himself to saying that it is the rert way.) Compare what was said of Reicheo- 'lllue Book'and the'Brown Book'first published in l95S (ed. R, Rhees) 590 591 NOTES NOTES record lectures delivered by Wittgenstein at Cambridge in 1933-5. hrflfding metaphor see R, Rhees: 'Wittgenstein's Builders' (PAS, 1960), circulated in various forms before the publication of Philosophical 6. See A. J. Ayer and R, Rhees:'Can there be a Private Language?' troru and were the meansby which nany of his contemporariesfirst (l'uf.S,S, 1954); A. J. Ayer: The Corcept of a Person (1963); J. J, Thomson: to be aoquainted witb Wittgenstein's later philosophy. So also ed. R. 'frrivate Langu.ages' (APQ, f964); H. N. Castafieda et al.: 'Tbe Private' Philosophische Bemerkungen (1965). These 'remarks' date back to l,nnguage Argument' in Knawledge and Experience (ed. C. D, Rollins, Wittgenstein'sP/, llosophical Inve stigatlons is in many respects a very lq('4); J. W. Cook:'Wittgonstein on Privacy' (PR, 1965); C. S. Chihara and controversiat work. AII I have done is to pick outofthat'album' rntf J. A. Fodor: 'Operationism and Ordinary Languago' (APQ, 1965); Wittgenstein himself describes it - one or two lines of thought which W. C. K. Mundle: 'Private Language and Wittgetrstein's Kind of Be. exercised a gsneral influence during the last three decades. See also the hnviourism'(PQ, 1965). on Wittgenstein referred to above (p. 578); G. E. Moore: 'W 7. The contrast between 'first person' utterances such as'I am in pain' Irctures in 1930-3' (Mtttd, l9:A-5'); J. N. Findlav: 'Some Reactions lnd 'third-person' utterances such as 'he is in pain' was to be much Recent Cambridge Philosophy' (AJP, l94$-t), and' Wittgenstein's enrployed in subsequent'philosophical psychology', In G. Ryle's lne sophical Investigations' (n/P, 1953); the reviews by N. Malcolm (i,,,cept of Mind (1949) such 'first-person' statements are described as 1954),P. F. Strawson(Mttrd,1954\,J. N. Findlay(Pftrr.,1955)'P. 'nvowals', Ryle argues that in their'primary employment'utterances like (PR, 1955), P. L. Heath (PQ, 195A; G. A. Paul: 'Wittgensteir' in '/ hate', '1 intend' are not used to give the listener facts about the speaker. Revolutton in Phitosophy (G. Ryle and others, 195O; David Pole: The Nor are they based on some sort of self-observation by the speaker of his Philosophy ol Wittgenstein (1958); E' K' Specht: Die 'lnner states'. Rather, they are part ofthe behaviour characteristic ofbeing md ontologischen Gr undlagen im Spiitwerk Ludwig Witt genstein (1963). fn that state,'He bates', 're intends', itr contrast, are statements ofthe 2. See H. K-hatchadourian: 'Common Names and "Femily normal, information-giving kind. See also D. Gasking and M. Lean: blances"' (PPX, 1958);J. R. Bambrough:'Universals and Family 'Avowals' (Analytical Philosopiy, ed. R. J. Butler, 1962); F. E. Sparshott: semblances'(Pl^S, 1961) ; H. Hervey :' The Problem of the Model 'Avowals and their Uses' (PlS, 1962).For an alternative, but related, theory Game' (Phi|.,1961); R. J. Richman: 'Something Common' (JP, of pain seeK. B. M. Baier:'Pains'(AlP,t962). See also J. L. Mackie: M, Mandelbaum: 'Family Resemblancesand Generalization 'Are there any incorrigible empirical statements?'(,4IP,1963); R. D. Brad- the Arts'and K. Campbell: 'Family ResemblancePredicates'(lPQ' lcy: 'Avowals of Immediate Experience ' (Mind, 1964). There is a general 3. SeeB. A. Farrell: 'An Appraisalof TherapeuticPositivism' (. criticism of Wittgenstein's approach, with special reference to pain, in H. t946). lhtnam: 'Brains and Behaviour' (fualytical Philosophy,2nd series, ed. 4. If I were asked to mention the two books, apart from the It. J. Butler, 1965). (and the Frege-Russell tradition it incorporates), most suitable as 8. Ed. G. H. von Wrigfit, R. Rhees, G. E. M. Anscombe, trans. G. E. M. ground reading to the Phllosophlcal ltvestigations, they would be Anscombe, It includes only maouscripts from the period 1937-44. Some Gesammelte Aufsdtze (especially his lectures otr 'Form and ourlier manuscripts are included in Philosophische Bqmerkungen (1965). and William James's Prlnciples of Psychology, supplemented by his 9. In his Philosophy of lryilEenstein, Pitcher excuses himself, on the matism.Wittgenstein several times refers to James- a rare distinction - grounds of not being a specialist in the philosophy of mathematics, from not, I think, quite so as to bring out the nature ofhis relationship to nrryinganything about Wittgenstein's Renarks. For brief expositions and Wittgenstein also refers to the Confessions of St Augustine, which criticisms see: reviews by G, D. Duthie (P0, 1957); R. L. Goodstein (Mr'rrd, illustrate, he thinks, the way in which philosophical problems 1957); P. Bernays (Ratio, 1959), together with A. Ambrose: 'Wittgenstein arise. (I had written of James's influence on pwely internal evidenoe. on Some Questions in Foundations of Mathematics' (.tP, 1955); A, R. of his former pupils, Mr A. C. Jackson, tells me that Wittgensteio Anderson: 'Mathematics and the "Language-Game"' (RM, 1958); M. frequently referred to James in his lectures, even making on one ocrasion l)urnmett: 'Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics' (P.R, 1959); C. F. to everybody's astonishment - a precise reference to a page-numberl Kielkopf: Ludwig Wittgenstein's Renarks on the Fomdations of Math* one time, furthermore, James's Prineiples was the only philosophical natics (1965); A. B. Levison:'Wittgenstein and Logical Laws'(PQ,1964); visible on his bookshelves.) C. S. Chihara: 'Wittgenstein and the Logical Compulsion' (P1.9, 1961) 5. There ffrs been a good deal of controversy on this point nnd'Mathematical Discovery and Concept Formation'(Pft, 1963); J, L. followersof Carnap and'ordinarylanguage' philosophers' See,for (bwan: 'Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Logic' (PX, 1961); B. Stroud: Y. Bar-Hillel: 'Analysis of "Correct" Language' (Mind' 1946)' and' ' W itt gensteinand Logical Necessity' (PrR,1 965). Wittgenstein's side, A. Ambrose: 'The Problem of Linguistic 10. See also Ch. 15 above. He has written no books sincn Problems of (Philosophical Analtsis, ed. M. Black, 1950). Reviewers in "LSZ Mind ard Matter btJt has collected his articles together in. Other Minds complain with some acerbity that the writings of British philosophers 11952),Philosophy and Psycho-Arulysts (1953\ and Paradox and Discovery logcal topics are insufrciently formalizBd to be discussable. On (1965), His work is composed in an unusual stylg which keeps close to the 5r2 593 NOTES NOTES rhythms of his speech, as distinct from the rhythms of written English; it writings of symbolic logicians, Oxford philosophers discuss logical issues obscure, therefore, in a unique manner. See D. A. T. Gasking's discussioo In an informal way, without recourse to special invented languages, and . of Wisdom's philosophy it AJP, 1954, to which my own account owes I rccondly they believe that a consideration of What we ordinarily say, is at great deal. For other examples of post-Wittgenstein Cambridge philosophy, loust a useful preliminary to the discussion of philosophical problems. But see the writings of Norman Malcolm, C. Irwy, Alice Ambrose, G. E. M+ those points of agreement cover a great many disagreements about the Anscombe, G, Paul, D. A. T. Gasking. See the two volumes of Logic an{ precise importance offormalized logics, and the extent to which the detailed Ianguage (ed. A. G. N. Flew, 1951 and 1953) and M. Black's collection Investigationof usagesis ltse{/of philosophical interest. .A of essaysPhilosophical Arulysis (1950\. 15, For criticism, see J. J. C. Smart: Note on Categories, (.R,/p.S, 11. Wisdom's version of the squirrel example used by James in bil 1953),in which he argues that on Ryle's showing no two expressions would .Category Pragrratismto make substantially the same point. bclong to the same category; A. J. Baker: Mistakes'(,{.Ip, 1956); 12. It strikes one as odd that a philosopher should be called 'Wisdom'; Manley Thompson: 'On Category Differences, (pR, 1957); R. C. Cross: passeg .Category that two bearers of the name should be contemporary philosophers 'Category Differences'(PlS, 1958); B. Harrison: Mistakes and beyond the limils ef fls vsasonable; that they should both be interested iD Rufes of Languaep' (Mind, 1965); J. A. Passmore: philosophical Reasoning psycho-analysis has produced in many minds the justifiable conviction that (le6l). the two are one. But it must be none the less insisted that J. O. Wisdom 16. Compare Russell's 'theory of types'. the London School of Economics, who in his The IJrconsciout Ortgin d 17. See also Ryle's'Heterologicality' (Atulysls,l950); J. L. Mackie and Berkeley's Philosophy (1953) has tried to show in detail how it is possible to J. J. C. Smart: 'A Variant ofthe "Heterological" paradox, (ibid.1952). philos' account in psycho-analytic terms for the peculiarities of Berkeley's I 8. SeeN. R. Hanson :' Professor Ryle's'. Mind',' (p e, 19S2). ophy, is not identical with his cousin Professor John Wisdom of the Univer' 19. Seeparticularly S. Hampshire's review (Mind,l950). Hampshire, one sity of Cambridge. of the most versatile and unorthodox of recent Oxford philosophers, has .On 13. For criticism see A, Flew and D. C. Williams it Psychoarulysts dcvoted special attention to the philosophy ofmind. See his Referring Scientific Method and Philosophy (ed. S. Hook, 1959) and B. Blanshard in nnd Intending'(PX, 1956),in which he tries to lay down a way of distinguish- Metaphysics: Readings ond Reappraimls (ed. W. E. Kennick and M. Ing between what is, and what is not, 'overt'. See also M. MacDonald: l-azerowitz,1966). 'Professor Ryle on the Concept of Mind' (pR, l95l); John Wisdom: .The 14. See M. Weitz: 'Oxford Philosophy' (Px, f953); and for discussionl Conc€pt of Mind'(PAS,l949)i A. C. Garnett:.Mind as Mirlding, (Mtnd, of the precise nature of the appeal to ordinary languago, K. Baier: 'Tho 1952); A. C. Ewing: 'Professor Ryle's Attack on Dualism' (pAS, 1952); Ordinary UseofWords'(P,{S, 1951); G. Ryle: 'Ordinary Language'(PrR, L. Addis:'Ryle's Ontology of MilLd' in Moore andRyle flowa publications, 1953); A. G. N. Flew:'Philosophy and Language' (P8, 1955). Criticisms 2, 1965).See also J.Holloway:. Ianguage and Intelligerce (1951) which deals include J. A. Passmore: 'Reflections on Logic and Language' (AJP,19521, with conDected topics in a similar manner. The ltalian translation Io and 'Professor Ryle's Use of "Use" and "Usage"' (PR, 1954); R. M. Spirito conv Comportamento (trans. F. Rossi-Landi) contains a very useful Chisholm: 'Philosophers and Ordinary Language'(PR, 1951) together with lntroductory essayby the translator. N. Malcom's reply 'Philosophy for Philosophers'; the essays in C/arill 20. It is a good idea to read C. D. Broad's Mind and lts ptace in Nature is rnt Enough (ed. H. D. Lewis, 1963); B. Mates: 'On the Verification alongsideThe Concept of Mind. Statements about Ordinary Language' (Inquiry,1958); J. J' Katz and J. 21. For criticism see D. Pears: 'The Logical Status of Supposition, Fodor: 'What's wrong with the philosophy of language?' (htquiry, 1962). (PISS, 1951);S. Hampshire: 'Dispositions'and A. R. White: .Mr Hamp- For the controversy between ordinary language philosophers and their nhire and Prof. Ryle on Dispositions' (Analysb, 1953); G. H. Bird: .Mr critics see Philosophy and Ordinary Language (ed. C. E. Caton, 1963). llampshire on Dispositions'(r6rd). See also the literature on the clos;ly- Ordinary Ianguage (ed. V. C. Chappell, 1964) is a useful collection. For a rclated subject of'counter-factual conditionals', i.e. hypothetical proposi- general discussion^end a fuller bibliography see A. Quinton: 'Linguistic (ions such as 'if Caesar had not crossed the Rubicon, the Republic would Analysis' in Philosophy in the Mid-Centary (ed. R. Klibansky, 1958, Vol. not have fallen'. Recently, such propositions havo been widely discussed IL) See also La Philosophie Amlytiq4e, Cahiers de Royaumont, IV (1962) bccause (1) they immediately arise within any phenomenalist or disposi- for discussions between ordinary language and continental tionalist account of body or mind, (2) the difference between natural laws The very great difference between Oxford ordinary language philosophy and tnd bare regularities has often been supposed to consist iD the fact (see Ch. logical positivism can be seenin G. J, Wamock's'Verification and the Use 17 on Kneale) that laws do, whereas regularities do not, imply such con- of Language' (nP, l95l) and in Ryle's review of Carnap's Meaning ditionals, (3) they are distinctly awkward to interpret on a truth-functional Necessity (Phil,,1949), See also the essays by P. F. Strawson and G. J. logic.(Onthematerialimplicationanalysisof if...,then...',everycounter- philosophy Warnock in The Revolution in Philosophy (1956). Recent Oxford tirctual conditional is true in virtue of the bare fact that the antecedent is . is'ordinary language'in two senses:first, in contrast with th€ formalized litl se; yet on the face of it some such propositions - for example, if the stone 594 595 NOTES NOTES

had hit the glass it would have broken it' - ar€ true, whereas others - Austin's criticisms did not spare himself. See the obituaries by S. Hampshire the feather had hit the glass, it would have broken it' - are false.) Seo R. (r',{.9, 1960) and by G. J. Warnock (PBA, 1963). (ln Mind,196l, Warnock Chisholm: 'The Contrary-to-Fact Conditional' (Mittd, l94O; .N. end J. O, Urmson comment critically on Hampshire's obituary.) Wamock man: 'The Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals'("/P, 1947),reprinted oxuggerates,I think, in denying that Wittgenstein had any influence what- Fact, Fiction and Forecast (1954) which is largely devoted to this svcr on Austin. But Austin strikingly exemplifies the continuity of the F. L. WiIl :' The Contrary-to-Fact Conditional' ( M itd, 1947); K. R. Popper Oxford Aristotelian tradition, a continuity more explicable if one remembers 'A Note on Natual Laws and So-called "CoDtrary to Fact" that Odord rarely appoints as teachers of philosophy men who have been (M ind, 1949); D. Pears:' Hypotheticals' and W, Kneale :' Natural Laws and trained anywhere else but at Oxford, and that most of them have been Contrary-to-Fact Conditionals' (Analysis, 1949) ; B. J. Diggs : ' Counterfao" trained as classical scholars. Se€ the critical studies of Austin by A. Am- tual Conditional s' (M itd, 1952); S. Hampshire :' Subjunctive brose,M. Black,W. F. R. Hardie, R. Harrod, M,Lazerowitz(Phit.,1963) (Analysis, 1948); R. M, Chishokn: 'Law Statements and Counterfactual rnd R, Brown (1JP,1962,1963); M. Furberg: Locutiorary and lllocutionary hfetene' (Atulysis. 1954); J. R.Weinberg:' Contrary-to-FactConditionals' lcts (1963), which has a broader theme than its title suggests; the sym- (.rP, (1957); 1951); G. H .vonWight:Losical Studies E.Nagel: ?fie posium on Austin by J. O. Urmson, N. Malcolm, W. V. Quine, S. Hamp- of Science (1961); J. L, Mackie: 'Counterfactuals and Causal Laws' (ia nhire ("/P, 1965); S. Cavell: 'Austin at Criticism' (PX, 1965). On Austin's Arwlytical Philosopfty, ed. R, J. Butler, 1962). Philosophical Papers see R. M. Chishotm (Mind, 1964\ and A. Duncan- 22.See R. S. Peters: The Corcept of Motivation (1958); A, R. White: Jones: 'Perfomrance and Promise' (PQ, 1964); on Sense and Sensibilia, 'The Language of Motives' (Mind, 1958); N. S, Sutherland: 'Motives ar R. Firth: 'Austin and the Argument from lllusion' (PR, 1964); the Explanations' (Mtnd, 1959); A. Kenny: Action, Emotion and Will (1963)i (very) critical study by R. J. Hirst (PQ, 1963>.For a related criticism of D. S. Shwayder : The St rct ifi cation of Behav io w (1965), rense-data see A. M. Quinton: 'The Problem of Perception' (Mrzd, 23. See, apart from the reviews of The Concept of Mittd, J. M. Shorter: r955). 'Imagination' (Mird,l952') with A, G. N, Flew's reply'Facts and Imagina. 26. And a fortiori Nowell-Smith was mistaken in supposing that it rt,d,t tion' (Mind, 1956). B. S. Benjamin on 'Remembering' (rDid.) discusses consistent.The classicalmodern exposition ofthis latter view is 'Freewill as connected questions, as does W. Ginnane in'Thoughts'(Mind, 1960). See lnvolving Determinism and Inconceivable without it' (M ind, 7934'),wtitten also E. J. Furlong: Imagination (1961) and K. Lycos: 'Images and the by D. S. Miller under the pseudonym of R. E. Hobart. Seealso M. Schlick: Imaginary' (lJP, 1965). Problemsof Ethlcs (1939); for Moore, Nowell-Smith and Austin's criticisms 24. P, Winch: 'Understanding a Primitive Society' (APQ, 1964) is an see M. Warnock: Ethics since 1900 (1960). See also P. Foot:'Freewill as extreme instance of the sceptical interpretation of the 'Ianguage game' involving Deterninism' (PR, 1957); R. Taylor: 'I can'(PR, 1960); V. J. approach. Seealso J. J. C. Smart: 'The Existence ofGod' in New Etsays in Can-6eld: 'The Compatibility of Freewill and Determinism' (Pn, 1962); Philosophical Theology (1957) and, in reply, J. A. Passmore: 'Christianity A. M. Honord :' Can and Can't' ( M ind, 1964). and Positivism' (AJP,l957).Smart, as we shall see,has now reacted strongly 27. See the discussion which followed his paper on 'Performative or Con- against the 'separatist'conception of philosophy. See also the concluding stative' (Cahiers de Royaumonr, Philosophie No. IV, 1962, translated in remarks in N. Malcolm's defence of an ontological argument (Pn' 1960, Philosophy and Ordinary Language, ed. C. E. Caton, 1963), reprinted in.Kzowledgeand Certainty,l96!).Malcolm's essayis criticized by 28. On this point, see, for example, the critical articles by R. J. Hirst various writers in PX, 1961, and by J. Shafer: 'Existence, Predication and (P0, 1963)and R.Brown (AJP,1962); L. J. Goldstein:'On Austin's Under- the Ontological Argument' (Mind, 1962). For a criticism of what he calls standing of Philosophy' (PPX, 1964).See also S. Cavell :'Austin at Criticism' 'the new scepticism' see S. Hampshire: 'Identification and Existence' (PR,1965). (cPB,rrD. 29. For a defence ofsense-data against the ordinary language critics see 25. Austin completed no books and made not a single contribution to a H. H. Price:'Appearing and Appearanoes' (APQ,1964). phil&ophical periodical. Of the ten papers brought together by J. O. Urm- 30. See, in contrast with Austin, D. M. Armstrongi Perception and the gon and G, J. Wartock as Philosophical Papers (1961) four are contributions Physical lltorld (1961) and, especially for the historical background, M. to symposia, one a radio talk, the other five were delivered to learned Mandelbaum : Pl ilosophy, Scienee ard Sense-Perceptton(1964),C.D. Broad : societies. Austin published only such of these as he was obliged to publish, 'Some Elementary Reflexions on Sense-Perception'(PiIl., 1952) sums up as a condition oftheir being delivered. Warnock has skilfully reconstructed the points at issue. This essay is reprirted,in,Percelvlng, Sensing and Knowing from Austin's (by no means full) lecture notes the course of lectures he was (ed, R. J. Swartz, 1965), an unusually wide-ranging volume of readings in accustomed to offer to undergraduates on the theory of perception; this contemporary epistemology, with a lengthy bibliography. constitutes Senseand Sensibilia (1962). In 1955 Austin delivered at Harvard 31. Austin's work has been particularly interesting to moral and legal the William James lectures; these have been reconstructed by Urmson - philosophers, who have suggestedthat it is a 'descriptive fallacy' to suppose again from notes - as IIow to do things with lhrds (1962').lt is obvious that that, for example, in calling something good we are describing it or that in 596 597 NOTES NOTES saying that somebody did something we are describing the person's bodil; tfcrive " Ought " from "Is " '; the discussion of 'ouglrt' and ' is' in Arclysls, Dovements, as distirct from ascribing responsibility to him. See f964-5; R. Montague: ' "Ought" from "Is" ' (AJP, 1965\; M. F. Cohen: the distinction between'description' and'ascription' itr H. L. Hart: "'ls" and "Should": an unbridged gap'(PR, 1965); R, M. Hare:'The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights' (PAS, 1949, reprioted itr U.L l'romisingGame' (XIP, 1965). For criticism of Hart's approach seeP. T. Geach: 'Ascriptivism' and Gr 38. Seeespecially' Pretending' (P,4SS, 1958), Pitcher: 'Hart on Action and Responsibility'(both in Pi, 1960);J. Lr 39. Contrast L. J. Russell's contribution to the same symposium. 'Is a Mackie: 'Responsibility and Language' (AIP, 1955\; J. Feinbergt rcientific theory ofdynamics to be tested by its ability to explain andjustify 'Action and Responsibility' it Philosophy ln Amertca (1965); fot (or even justifying) .Meaning explain without our usagesof words like force, motion, similar viewson ethicssee J. R. Searle: and'SpeechActs'(PX, cuuseand so on in the ordinary affairs oflife? . , . Ifordinary concepts are r962',). vugueand inexact, they have to be replaced by more precise ones; and the 32. Austin fust usedthe word'performative'in print in his symposiumr rcientist should have his eye on the development ofhis subject rather than on contributionon'Truth'(P,4,SS, 1950). For criticismsee Jonathan Harrison! ordinary usages'. Toulmin's article, indeed, brings to a head the controversy 'Knowing and Promising' (Mind, 1962);W. H. F. Barnes:'Knowingl bctween those who hold that probability theory ought to analyse our or- (PX, 1963);M, Wright: and PerformativeUtterances'(lJ4 dinary use of the word 'probability', and those who think it should con- 1965). For ao attempt to develop a formalized theory of knowledge, see ccntrate its attention on the use of probability statements in scientifc Hintikka: Knowledse and Belief (1962). hrquiry. Totlmin's own views are closely related to Ramsey's theory of 33. Strawsonwas unconvinced by this reply, and Austin by his criticismsr probability - or, rather to Ramsey's various attempts to satisfy himself See the Austin-Strawson symposium (Pl^9, 1950), together with a defence rrbout probability - in Foundations of Mathematics, See also J. N. Findlay: (ed. Austin by Warnock and a reply by Strawson in frari G. Pitcher, I ' Probability without Nonsense' (P Q, 1952) and I. King-Farlow:'Toulmin's Austin's 'Unfair to Facts' in Philosophical Papers,' Strawson's 'Truth, Analysis of Probability' (Theoria, 1961). reconsideration of Austin's Views' (PO, 1965) and Warnock's 'Truth and 40. See also P. Edwards:'Bertrand Russell'sDoubts about Induction' Correspondence' it Knowledge and Experience (ed. C. D, Rollins, 1962). (l-L D; C. Lewy:'On the "Justification" of Induction'(Analysis, 1939)and See also S. Cavell: 'Demonstrative and Descriptive Conventions' (Plil thediscussion which followed (Arwlysis,1940);A, Ambrose:'The Problem 1965). of Justifying Inductive Inference' (JP, 1947); M. Black ; Problems of Analy sis 34. SeeWarnock's description of Austin's plans for cooperativeinquiry (1954);N. R. Hanson:'Good Inductive Reasons'(PQ, 1961).In his'Some into 'what we say' (Obituary,P&A,1963) and J. O. Urmson'saccount Questionsconcerning Validity'(RIP, 1953), J.0. Urmson, while accepting them based on 4n unpublished manuscript fragnent, in JP' 1965. His Strawson'sgeneral line ofreasoning, arguesthat it is still possible and desir- method is sketched ia 'A Plea for Excuses' and 'On Pretending' (both uble to ask uly we value inductive more highly than other kinds of reason- Philosophical Papers). See, in criticism, B. Mates: 'On the Verification lng. Statementsabout "Ordinary Language"' (Inquiry,1958); J. A. Fodor and 41. See W. C. S'lmon, S. F. Barker, H. E. Kyburg: 'Symposium oo J. J. Katz: 'The Avaitability of What We Say'(PR, 1963);L. J. Cohen: lnductive Evidence' (A P Q, 1965). The Diversity of Meanlng(1962); in defenceS. Cavell:'Must We Meaq 42. lwith P. Grice] 'In Defence of a Dogma'(Pn, 1956). Grice, Straw- WhatWe Say?'(Inquiry,1958) and R. G. Henson:'WhatWe Say'(APQ don's tutor, has greatly influenced not only Strawson but other 'ordinary 1965), See also the introduction by J. A. Fodor and l. I. Kttz to The language'philosophers; a lively, critical teacher, he has written very little. Structure of Language (1964), the essay by N. Chomsky in tbat volume oo On'informal logic'see also Ryle's Dilemmas,and his'If, So and Because' 'Current Issues in Linguistic Theory' and the discussion of linguistics by (Philosophical Arulysis, ed. M. Black, 1950), in which he works out more €homsky and others it Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science fully the suggestionhe made in The Conceptof Mind that general statements (ed. E. NagBl eral.,1962). ure'inference licences'- a view which has interesting relations to some of 35. Fordevelopments ofAustin's views seeP, F. Strawson:'Intention and the things said about universal propositions by Mill and by Ramsey. See Corvention in SpeechActs'(PX, 1964) and D. S. Shwayder: The Stratifca' also H. G. Alexander: 'General Statements as Rules of Inference' (Mrh- ti6h of Behavtour (1965). See also W. P. Alston: 'Linguistic Acts' (APQ nesota Studies, Vol. II, 1958); H. N. Castafreda: 'Are Conditionals Prin- r964). ciplesof Inferencr?' (Awlysis, 1958). 36.See L. J.Coher:'Do Illocutionary Forces Existl'(PQ'1964'). 43. I have interpreted this article in the light of Loglcal Theory. Soe W. 37. As early as ' Are therc a priori concepts ?' (Pl,S^9, 1939) he had thrown Sellars: 'Presupposing'and Strawson's reply (P.R, 1954) in which he in doubts on the analytic-synthetic contrast, At a great many points, he attacks $ome measure modifies his views; R, Clark: 'Presuppositions, Names and the habit of dichotomizing. On'factual' and'evaluative' seealso (all inPR, Descriptions' (PQ, 1956); B. Russell: 'Mr Strawson on Referring' (Mizd, 1964) M. Black: 'The Gap between "is" and "should"'; J. R' Searle: 1957); M. Black: Models and Metaphors (1962); G, Nehrlich: 'Presupposi- 'How to derive "Ought' '; J. and J. Thomson: 'How not to tion and Entailment' (APQ, f 965); W. Wolterstorff: 'Referring aod Exist- 598 599 NOTES NOTES

ing' (PQ,1961); P. F. Strawson: Izdividuals (1959).See also what has htsy' (APQ,1964) and ed. J. M. Edie: Invitatioa to PherrontenolosyQ9651. said of Brentano (Ch. 8, n, 7) and F. C. S. Schiller, p. 170). A similar lfcc also H. Spiegelberg: The Phenomenological Movement (1960); the had been suggestedby J. L. Austin in 'The Meaning of a \Mord' - a llristentialism number of RIP, 1949; H. E. Barnes: The Literatwe of delivered in 1940,fust publishedin Philosophical Papers (1961). P,T l\t,rslbility (1959); M, Natanson: Literature, Philosophy and the Soclal 'Russell'sTheory of Descriptions'(Arulysis, 1949) and H. L, Hart in llrlences (1962); R. Jolivet: Ies doclriros existentialisles de Kierkegaard d Logician's Fairy-Tale' (PR, l95l) make use of similar doctrines in a Joun-Paul Sartre (1948); J. Collins: The Exlstentialists (1952); K. F. Rein- consideration of the traditional Aristotelian logic. Ilart, who ie lnr