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A Hundred Years of Philosophy A HUNDRED YEARS OF PHILOSOPHY John Passmore -*\ I f,o, )t, \.*_ PENGUIN BOOKS l'\ ("(" NOTES NOTBS formulated in words, or ever ent€red anybody's mind as a thought'. Thus a proposition is neither a set ofwords nor a thought; and logic is certainly oot, as had been traditionally supposed, a 'science of thought'. The pro- Notes position exists independently of statements; at the same time it is what statements mean. It bears a family resemblance to what Meinong was to CHAPTER 9 call an 'objective'. See the Historical Introduction to the English translation (1950) of The Paradoxes of the Infinite; H. R. Smart: 'Bolzano's Logio' l. SeeRussell's autobiography in The Philosophy of Bertrand Russelland (both (PX, 1944); Y. Bar-Hillel:'Bolzano's Propositional Logio' (Arch.fiir Math. Moore's in The Philosophy of G. E. Moore ed. P. A. Schilpp). Seealso (1958); (1958); Los.,1952) and 'Bolzano's Definition of Analytic Propositions' (Metho- A. R. White: G. E. Moore the Moore numbet of Philosophy (1960); dos, 1950); J. Berg: Bolzato's Logic (1962), On Husserl and Bolzano see lhc Moore number of JP R. B. Braithwaite: 'G. E. Moore 1873- Farber, op. cir. and H. Felsl'Bolzano und Husserl'(Pililot. Iarhbuch dar l95E' (PBA,1961); N. Malcolm; 'G. E. Moore'in Knowledgeand Certainty Gdrre sge se I Ischaft, 1926). (1963); D, Lewis: 'Moore's Realism' in Moore and Ryle (Iowa Publica- 19. For reservations and complications see H, Spiegelberg: 'Phetromeo- tions,2, 1965). ology of Direct Evidence' (PPiR, l94l). Compare Meinong's'evidence' and 2. Moore's chapter on 'The Ideal' in Principia Ethica did, howcver, Brentatro's'perception'. The connexion with the Platonic-Carlesian tradi- grcatly affect the cultural life ofour century through its influence on 'the group'- tion, which distinguishes between'essence' and 'existence', will be obvious. llloomsbury Roger Fry, J. M. Keynes, Virginia Woolf, E. M. (1949); More recently, Lotzc in his Logic had defended the conception of an Forster. SeeJ. M. Keynes: Two Memoirs R. F. Harrod,:. The Life of 'immediate certainty which, whethercalled intuition or by some othername, J. M. Keynes (1951); J. K. Johnstone: The Bloomsbury Group (19541. must be admitted to exist'. 3. The poet, Moore's brother. *e W. B. Yeats and T. S. Moore: Their (ed. 20. See J. S. Fulton: 'The Cartesianism of Phenomenolory'(Pi, 1940). Correspondence V. Bridge, 1953), which largely consists of an attempt 21. See Chapter 19 below for details. Anerican phenomenologists aro by Yeats to understand G. E. Moore and by T. S. Moore to explain him, generally unwilling to accept Husserl's movement in an Idealist directioa. with an occasional admonitory note by G. E. Moore. SeeespeciallyM.Fat&t: Naturalismand SubJecttvtsm(1959).See also J. M. 4. 'Moore's Technique' in The Philosophy of G. E. Moore. 5. Seehis'Reply to My Critics'in ThePhilosophy of G. E. Moore. Edie: 'Recent Work in Phenomenology' (APQ, 1964) - with exte.nsino as Sorze Main Problems of bibliographies, and J. Q. Lzuer:. The Triunph of Subjecttvity (1958). 6. At John Wisdom's instigation, Philosophy. 42. See the Memoirs by C. A. Mtce (PBA, 1945); C. D. Broad (Mbtd, 5. One of the most controverted points in recent philosophy. See H. 1945),R. Kdght(Br.Jnl. &1. Psych., 1946); J. Passmore(in Stout's Godazd Joachim: The Natwe of Truth (19061; G. E. Moore:'Mr Joachim's.lValzre Natwe, 1952). ol' Tr uth' and J oachim's Reply ( Mind, l9O7); B. Russell :' On Propositions : What and How They Mean'(PIS,S, l9l9); F. P. Ramsey 43. See the Metwir by A. S. and E. M. S. (1900; J. Bryce: 'Henry They Are and Sidgwick' in Stadles ln Contemporary Biography (1903); L. Srcphen: G. E. Moore :' Facts and Propositions' (PAS S, 1927); G. Ryle :'Are There (P,{S, 'Henry Sidgvick' (Mirrd, l90l) and in DNB; C. D, Broad: 'Henry Sidg- Propositions?' 1929)and the subsequenldiscussion with R. Robinson vick' in Ethics and the lllstory ofPhilosophy (1952). (Mittd, l93l): M. Schlick: 'Facts and Propositions' and C. G. Hempel: 24. Sec his 'Some Fundamental Points in the Theory of Knowledgo' 'Some Remarks on "Facts" and Propositions' (Atalysis, 1935); C. A. (1911), reprinted in Studles in Philosophy atd Psychology (1930) in which llaylis: 'Facts, Propositions, Exemplification and Truth' (Mind, 1948); he claims to have worked out his views, although he did not publish them, A. Kaplan and l. Copilowish: 'Must There Be Propositions?' (Mr'zd, before Twardowski's article appeared (in 1894). Findlay in his Melrcng't 1939); A. Church: 'On Carnap's Analysis of Statements of Assertion and Theory of Objects draws attention to important points of difference between llclief ' (,42olysri,s,1950). Meinong aod Stout, especially on the nature of'content'. 8. For a later discussion ofthe same problem see Moore's'External and 25. See also R. F. Hoernl€: 'Professor Stout's Theory of Possibilities, lnternal Relations'(PlS, 1919,reprinted in Studies).Stebbing reports, in Truth and Enot' (Mind, l93l) and Stout's reply: 'Truth and Reality' hcr contribution to the Philosophy of G. E. Moore, that Moore later'ex- (Mirrd,832\. prcssedhimselfas unable to understand what he couldpossiblyhave meant by the views that he had previously stated and was quite convinced that they wcre wrong'. See Ch. 3 for Bradley and Ch. 5 for James on this same dis- tinction. Seealso A,C.Ewing's Idealism(1934)which draws attention to the rnunifold ambiguities in the whole controversy, and Russell's'The Monistic 'l'hoory of Truth' (Philosophlcal Essays, l9l0). 9. See C. A, Strong: 'Has Mr Moore refuted ldealism?' (Mind, l9O5\; A, K. Rogpts:'Mr Moore's Refutation of ldealism'(PX, 1919); J. Laird's 558 559 NOTES NOTES (Mittd, 192!); C, J. Ducasse: 'Moore'r review of Philosophical Stadies Russell's Loeic' (Philosophy of Bertrand RussetD; S. Waterlow: .Somc (it The Philosophy of G- E- Moore); B. Bosan' Refutation of Idealism' Philosophical Implications of Mr B. Russell's Logical Theory of Mathe_ qtet: in Contemporary Philosophy (1921). .Mr The Meet@ of Extremes matics'(P/,S, 1909); P. E. B. Jourdain: Bertrand Russell's First Work by Stout and Moore on 'The Status of Senso' 10. See the symposium on the Principles of Mathematics' (Monist, l9l2); F. p. Ramsey: Iila (PAS, Pratt: Moore's Realism (JP, 1923); M' C' Data' l9l3); J. B. 'Mr I.'oundationsof Mathenutics and Other Logical Essays(1931); F. Wais- E. Moore's Discussion of Sense-Data' (Monist, 1924)i Swabey: 'Mr G. mann: Introduction to Mathenatical Thinking (1930; J. Jorgensen: ,{ of Critical Philosophv' (PzaS, 1937); Joha .Whitehead A. E. Murphy: 'T\vo Versions Treatice of Formal Ingic (1931); E. J. Nelson: and Russell's (PlS' T. P. Nunn :' Sens€-Dat' Wisdom :' Philosophical Perplexity' 1936); Theory of Deducti ot' (Bul l. Am. Ma th. Soc., 1934\. (PAS, and Physical Objects' l9l5). 15. SeeJ. A, Chadwick: 'Logical Constants, (Mind, 1927,). 1963 A. E. Murphy :' Moore's Defence of Com' I l. Seethe articles in RM, ; 16. See particularly the summary in the second ler;fixe of Ow Ktrowledge mon Sense' it Reason and the Common Good (1963); A' F' Holmes: of the External lltorld (1914\, (.tP, 1961); N. Malcolm's article in 'Moore's Appeal to Common Sense' 17. SeePrinciples of Mathematics. Ch. XXVI, for details. Moote's later essays are collected in The Philosophy of G, E, Moore. 18, For the Frege-Russell correspondence see J, van Heijenoort: ,Sou,,cs Philosophica I Papers (I 9 59)' Book in Mathematical Logic 1879-1931(1964). Analysis' in Arulysis (1934)' That jour' 12. Seealso'The Justification of | 9. First in Appendix B to The principles of Mathematics, then in articles (1933) as a medium of publication for short studies in tho nal was founded on 'Mathematical Logic as Based on the Theory of Types' (Am. Jnl, consulted for examples of, and papers ont analytic manner, and should be Maths.,l9O8) and 'La Th6orie des types logiques' (RMM, lgl}\, but most generally see Ch. 15 below; J. O' Urmson: analysis. On analysis lully in Principia Mathematica. There is a relatively popular presentation in (1956); M' Black, John Wisdom and M. Cornforth: ' ophical Arulysis Russell's articles on 'The Philosophy of Logical Atomism to July l9l9' in Philosophv?' (PISS' 1934); A. E. Dunca Analysis a Useful Method (Monist, l9l8-19). His hesitancies are most marked in his Introduction to Analyse Common-Sense?'(Pl Jones and A. J. Ayer: 'Does Philosophy Mathematical Philosophy (1919). Since the theory of types was presented Method of Analysis in Metaphysics' (P. 1937); L. S. Stebbing: 'The independently by Russell in these various places, it is reasonable to refer to 1938);M. Black:' 1932)and'Some PuzzlesAbout Analysis'(PlS' it as 'Russell's' although Whitehead no doubt had some effect upon (Mbtd, its sophical Analysis' (PAS, 1912), 'The Paradox of Analysis' lg44,, method of formulation. Informative?'(PPX,1945) and his introduc' 1945),'How Can Analysisbe 20. For subsequent criticisms of Russell's account of vicious circles, see A. C. Ewing:'T\r'o Kinds of Analysio' tionto PhilosophicalArulysis,1950; Kurt Giidel: 'Russell's Mathematical l-ogic, (philosophy of Bertrand Rus- (Analysis, 1935) and'Philosophical Analvsis' (Philosophical Studies: sell). Stebbrzg, 1948); C. Lewy: 'Some Remarks Essaysin Memory of L, Susan 21. Particularly'the Dedekind cut'. SeeGiidel, op. cir. and G. H. Hardy Analysis' (Amlris, 1937); M. Macdonald'sIntroductioo to A Cowse of Pwe Mathenarics (1908). (1954). and Arclysis 22. ln Proceedings of the Inndon Mathematical Sociery, reprinted in the particularly Philosophv of Bertand Russell (ed. 13. See The posthnmons collection The Foundatlorrs of Mathenattcs and Other Loglcat Bertrand Russell's Conslruction of the External 1944): C. A. Fritz: trssays (ed. R. B.
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