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6. Strukturelle Schwierigkeiten Der Frühen TREVI-Kooperation

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6. Strukturelle Schwierigkeiten Der Frühen TREVI-Kooperation 6. Strukturelle Schwierigkeiten der frühen TREVI-Kooperation 6.1 Divergierende Zielvorstellungen 6.1.1 Terrorismus oder alle Gebiete der Inneren Sicherheit? Für die im Bundesministerium des Innern seit 1972 erarbeiteten Pläne einer euro- päischen Kooperation waren von Anfang an zwei Motivationen wesentlich: die Bekämpfung des grenzüberschreitenden Terrorismus und der Fortschritt der euro- päischen Integration. Im Rahmen der TREVI-Konferenz sollten deshalb nach bundesdeutscher Vorstellung einerseits schwerpunktmäßig Probleme der grenz- überschreitenden Terrorismusbekämpfung diskutiert, andererseits aber auch weit- reichende Möglichkeiten einer generellen Kooperation auf dem gesamten Gebiet der Inneren Sicherheit erörtert werden. Allerdings konnte, wie oben bereits aus- geführt, die deutsche Delegation während der Vorbereitungen für die erste TREVI- Ministerkonferenz im Frühjahr 1976 nur begrenzte Unterstützung für ihre Ziele gewinnen. Zustimmung äußerten Luxemburg1, die Niederlande2 und insbeson- dere Großbritannien. Im britischen Home Office waren, als im Herbst 1975 der Plan für die Konferenz lanciert wurde, intern sogar Zweifel formuliert worden, ob überhaupt alle Staaten bereit sein würden, das Thema Terrorismusbekämpfung auf die Tagesordnung zu setzen3. Die britischen Arbeitspapiere vom Frühjahr 1976 bezeichneten deshalb – allerdings in sehr allgemeiner Form – alle Themen „with regard to law and public order“ als mögliches Kooperationsfeld4. Zurück- haltend im Hinblick auf über die Terrorismusbekämpfung hinausgehende The- men gab sich vor allem Frankreich5. Maßgeblich für die französische Haltung scheint dabei auch die Befürchtung gewesen zu sein, dass eine Ausdehnung der Kooperation auf allgemeine Aspekte der Inneren Sicherheit möglicherweise auf eine Einmischung anderer Staaten in die inneren Angelegenheiten Frankreichs hinauslaufen könnte6. 1 Schreiben des RD Bracht (BMI), „Europäische Konferenz für innere Sicherheit am 29. Juni 1976 in Luxemburg, hier: Ergebnisse“, 2. 7. 1976, BArch, B 136/15684. 2 Ergebnisvermerk des RD Bracht (BMI) „über die Besprechung am 2. September 1976 im BMI“, September 1976, BArch, B 106/106774. 3 Brief by the Home Office and Foreign and Commonwealth Office for the European Council, Rome, 1/2 December 1975, Meeting of Ministers of the Interior, 26. 11. 1975, BNA, FCO 30/2592. 4 „Note by the British Government“ für das vorbereitende Treffen der hohen Beamten am 20. 2. 1976 in Luxemburg, 9. 2. 1976, BNA, FCO 30/3161. 5 Vgl. etwa Bericht des RD Bracht (BMI) „über die Gespräche zwischen Herrn Minister und seinem französischen Kollegen, Staatsminister Poniatowski im Rahmen der deutsch-französi- schen Konsultationen am 12. und 13. Februar 1976“, 16. 2. 1976, BArch, B 106/106861. 6 So jedenfalls die französische Argumentation im Rahmen des NATO-Spezialausschusses im Mai 1977, wo Frankreich nachdrücklich betonte, dass die Beschäftigung des Gremiums mit 182 6. Strukturelle Schwierigkeiten der frühen TREVI-Kooperation Die im Ergebnis festgehaltenen Ministerbeschlüsse vom Juni 1976 blieben aufgrund dieser Interessenkonstellation ambivalent. Sie stellten zwar einerseits die Notwendigkeit einer europäischen Terrorismusbekämpfung in den Mittel- punkt, ließen aber insbesondere im Hinblick auf das Ziel des technischen Erfah- rungsaustauschs auch eine deutlich breitere Auslegung zu7. In der ab Herbst 1976 tagenden AG II war dementsprechend anfänglich eine allgemeine „Unsi- cherheit zu beobachten, wie die von den Ministern erteilten Aufträge zu verste- hen seien“8. Die Bundesrepublik, die Beneluxstaaten und Irland sprachen sich deutlich dafür aus, das Mandat der AG II auf den gesamten Bereich der Krimi- nalitätsbekämpfung zu beziehen. Frankreich hingegen vertrat die Ansicht, dass der Ministerauftrag für die technische Zusammenarbeit sich allein auf das Ziel der Terrorismusbekämpfung erstrecke9. Insgesamt verbrachten die Experten so während der ersten Sitzungen viel Zeit damit, darüber zu diskutieren, welche Themen sie eigentlich behandeln sollten10. Die bundesdeutsche Delegation legte dies als Versuch einzelner Staaten aus, „die Aufträge der Minister nicht voll aus- zuschöpfen, sondern im Gegenteil entgegen dem Wortlaut der Resolution hier- von noch Abstriche zu machen“11. Schließlich setzte sich jedoch in der Praxis der AG II und ihrer UAGs die Auffassung durch, dass hier auch allgemeinere Probleme der Öffentlichen Sicherheit zu behandeln seien – eine Auffassung, die im Juli 1978 offiziell von den hohen Beamten bestätigt wurde12. Aus bundesdeutscher Sicht freilich war dies nicht ausreichend. Bereits im Herbst 1976 wurde deshalb intern das Ziel festgelegt, zumindest mittel- oder längerfristig allgemeine Probleme der Öffentlichen Sicherheit, insbesondere auch im Hinblick auf eine eventuelle Abschaffung der EG-Binnengrenzkontrol- len, im Rahmen von TREVI zu diskutieren13. Das Bundesinnenministerium setzte sich hierfür sowohl auf bilateraler als auch auf multilateraler Ebene im- mer wieder hartnäckig ein. Im Frühjahr 1977 lancierte es auf Ebene der hohen dem Thema Terrorismusbekämpfung keinesfalls in eine „Befassung mit innenpolitischen Problemen der Mitgliedslaender“ münden dürfe. Vgl. Fernschreiben Pauls (bundesdeutscher Vertreter bei der NATO in Brüssel) an das AA, „Sitzung des NATO-Rats am 25. Mai 1977“, 25. 5. 1977, PA-AA, B 150, Bd. 368, Dok. 927. 7 Resolution der TREVI-Minister vom 29. 6. 1976, PA-AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 108.890. 8 Vermerk des RD Bracht (BMI), „Europäische Zusammenarbeit ‚Innere Sicherheit‘; Erfahrun- gen in der ersten Sitzungsrunde der fünf Arbeitsgruppen – Überlegungen für weiteres Vorge- hen“, 26. 10. 1976, BArch, B 106/106774. 9 Vermerk des französischen Ministère de l’Intérieur, „Compte-rendu de mission. Réunion à LA HAYE les 13 et 14 octobre 1976, du groupe de travail N° 2, sur la sécurité“, 20. 10. 1976, AN, Ministère de l’Intérieur, 19960183/28. 10 Vgl. auch „Rapport de la deuxième réunion du groupe de travail international II […] tenue les 10 et 11 novembre 1976 à La Haye“, AN, Ministère de l’Intérieur, 19960183/28. 11 Vermerk des RD Bracht (BMI), „Europäische Zusammenarbeit ‚Innere Sicherheit‘; Erfahrun- gen in der ersten Sitzungsrunde der fünf Arbeitsgruppen – Überlegungen für weiteres Vorge- hen“, 26. 10. 1976, BArch, B 106/106774. 12 Protokoll der Sitzung der hohen Beamten am 3. Juli 1978 in Bonn (französische Überset- zung), [o. D.], AN, Ministère de l’Intérieur, 19960183/30. 13 Ergebnisvermerk des RD Bracht (BMI) „über die Besprechung am 2. September 1976 im BMI“, September 1976, BArch, B 106/106774. 6.1 Divergierende Zielvorstellungen 183 Beamten den Vorschlag, der nächsten Ministerkonferenz die Einbeziehung neu- er Themen „außerhalb der bisher behandelten Bereiche“ in die TREVI-Koope- ration vorzuschlagen, die auf das Problem des Grenzkontrollabbaus bezogen waren14. Die britische Präsidentschaft konstatierte im Vorfeld der Ministerkon- ferenz, der Schlüssel für ein erfolgreiches Treffen würde darin liegen, „to keep a balance between German enthusiasm and French scepticism“15. Im Hinblick auf das Thema „Grenzöffnung“ gelang dies der Präsidentschaft offensichtlich, denn die Minister bestätigten, dass eine TREVI-Arbeitsgruppe mit diesem The- mengebiet befasst werden sollte. Die in diesem Forum gewonnenen Erkennt- nisse sollten dann in die Verhandlungen auf EG-Ebene eingebracht werden16. Bundesinnenminister Maihofer erklärte daraufhin in einem Interview mit dem Deutschlandfunk, auf dem Ministertreffen seien kräftige Fortschritte in Rich- tung einer europäischen Innenpolitik gelungen, bei der es nicht allein um die Bekämpfung des Terrorismus, sondern der „internationalen Kriminalität insge- samt“ gehe17. Der Auftrag der hohen Beamten an die UAG 11, die aufgrund der Ministerre- solution von 1977 eingerichtet worden war, ging weit über das Aufgabengebiet der AG I hinaus. Die grundsätzlichen Differenzen zwischen den EG-Staaten so- wie die Zuordnung der UAG 1118 führten in der Folge zu langanhaltenden und teilweise bissigen Diskussionen darüber, mit welchen Inhalten sich die TREVI- Experten beschäftigen sollten. Die eigentliche Tätigkeit der UAG wurde hier- durch teilweise völlig gelähmt. Eine vermeintliche Klarstellung der hohen Beam- ten vom Juli 1978 schaffte letztlich auch keine Abhilfe: Konstatiert wurde hier, dass das Mandat der AG I auf die Terrorismusbekämpfung beschränkt sei, wäh- rend das der AG II darüber hinausgehe. Die Zuordnung der UAG 11 sei zweifel- haft, die AG I solle deshalb prüfen, ob diese in eine eigene AG umzuwandeln sei19. Auch zu dieser Frage konnten die Experten der AG I jedoch in den darauf- folgenden Diskussionen aufgrund der unterschiedlichen Zielvorstellungen der Delegationen keine Einigkeit herbeiführen. 14 Vgl. „Message from Federal Ministry of the Interior, Bonn, 4 Mai 1977“, BNA, FCO 30/3421; Fernschreiben des MD Smoydzin (BMI), „Vorbereitung der nächsten Sitzung der Europäi- schen Innen- beziehungsweise Justizminister am 31. Mai 1977 in London; hier: Sitzung der ,Hohen Beamten‘ am 21. und 22. April 1977 in London“, 31. 3. 1977, PA-AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 119.486; sowie Fernschreiben des Home Office, London, an alle TREVI-Ministerien, „Conference of Ministers of the Interior of the Nine. Report of the Meeting of Senior Offi- cials 21 April 1977, 29. 4. 1977, AN, Ministère de l’Intérieur, 19960183/29. 15 Vermerk von R. Armstrong (britisches Home Office) für Innenminister Merlyn Rees „MEET- ING OF EEC MINISTERS OF THE INTERIOR“, [o. D.], BNA, FCO 30/3422. 16 TREVI-Bericht, „CONFERENCE DES MINISTRES DE L’INTERIEUR DES NEUF; REU- NION DU 31 MAI
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