Designing Special Electoral Mechanisms for Group

CEU eTD Collection Designing Special Electoral Mechanisms for Mechanisms SpecialElectoral Designing In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of of Arts of Master for degree the requirements of the fulfillment In partial Group Representation Supervisor: Professor Gabor Toka Department of Political Science Political of Department Central Central University European Budapest, Hungary Budapest, Kristijan Vukelic Kristijan Submitted to Submitted 2012 By CEU eTD Collection for designingrepresentation group mechanisms. with ultimatethe goal institutional providingof with a clearsetof designers available options followed by an analysisis cases of presentation The country. inalmost every with aspects unique heterogeneous which tries to identifybe extremely to found cases The purpose. are that for explicitly established rules electoral the general patterns of set workingthe an of alternative through legislature in the represented areminorities where that the cases fall in knowledge,this part of firstcountries our the thesisthe gap a survey twenty delivers of two into, simplifying the existing variability than with in-depth comparison of cases. In order to remedy been more with on literature the concerned has topic theworld.around Thecurrent inparliaments groups various minority of descriptive representation produce mechanisms that electoral currently utilized of analysis is andsystematic of paperadetailed The purpose this Abstract i CEU eTD Collection Table ofContents 2. 1. Figuresand Tables of List ...... iii Contents of Table ...... ii Abstract i ...... 3. 5. 4. 8. 7. 6. 2.2. Purpose and planfor the study ...... 8 2.1. Representation theory, consociationalism andgroup representation ...... 3 3.23. Overview 3.23...... 40 Venezuela3.22...... 39 Taiwan...... 3.21. 37 Slovenia...... 3.20. 36 Singapore3.19...... 34 Serbia3.18...... 33 Samoa...... 3.17. 33 Romania3.16...... 31 Poland...... 3.15. 30 PhilippinesThe 3.14...... 27 Pakistan 3.13...... 27 Niger ...... 3.12. 26 ZealandNew3.11...... 24 Montenegro3.10...... 24 Mauritius3.9...... 21 Kosovo 3.8...... 20 Jordan...... 3.7. 19 Iraq 3.6...... 18 India 3.5...... 17 Germany...... 3.4. 16 Croatia...... 3.3. 14 Colombia 3.2...... 14 Afghanistan3.1...... 13 5.4.Appropriateness allocation seat of insurveyed the cases ...... 56 5.3.How many should seatsgroup be entitleda to? ...... 54 Whichshould5.2.groups represented? be ...... 50 5.1.Selecting beneficiarythe groups:self-determination pre-determinationor ...... 48 Stateofthefield...... 3 Introduction...... 1 An empiricalsurvey:group representation world the around ...... 10 Selectingallocatingandgroupsthe seats ...... 48 Implementingspecial the measures ...... 43 References...... 71 A Appendix 63 ...... Conclusion 61 ...... ii CEU eTD Collection Figure 1: Options for defining beneficiary groups for special mechanisms ...... mechanisms ...... for53 special groups for beneficiary defining Figure 1:Options Table Appropriateness 3: of seatallocation through themeasures special ...... 57 Table Modes 2: ofimplementation41 ... for special measuresrepresentation ...... group 44 for mechanisms electoral special of Overview 1: Table List ofTables and Figures iii CEU eTD Collection turn, so as to prepare the necessary ingredients for analysis. Finally, the main part of thesis of the main part the Finally, for analysis. ingredients prepare necessary the soasto turn, the analysis thatfollows. In the third Chapter the relevant cases are identified and examined in through which needthe improvement foris established andthe starting points identified for beginsliterature on topic My inquiry the representation,of with of a survey existing the group available for this particular purpose? The main question Itry that answerto in is: thesis this which electoral mechanisms are processes. decision-making country’s in the represented nevertheless are minority significant in who a are groups that would ensure mechanisms that special electoral of establishment is cases insuch possibilities the One of be fostered. to minorities of representation for need still amorestruggle butthere exists orless (asis systems), caseinpower-sharing the obvious primary forcepolitical of the relations are not the driving countries those wheregroup paid to molded orconfirmed aspolitical constituencies of theirA specialkind. own willbe concern In paperthis Iwill explorepolitical those where were systems minority through lawgroups Venice Commission. with improving purpose the of democracy, most the example prominent is of which the Convention for Protection the by of Minorities National and supported bodiesrelevant created Framework international multiple suchas treaties the in Itwasinscribed organizations. international and scholars by goal valuable a as set been has parliaments in representation simple protection and intothe area of affirmative action. Protection minorityof rights through minorities including inconstitutions,are enshrined often beyond specialprovisions go that In many aroundthecountries world provisionsguaranteeingrepresentation proper of 1. Introduction 1 CEU eTD Collection representation. of by forth goalsgroup fulfill the mechanisms set best advocates electoral the that about lawmakers theiradvisors lessonsformaterialize and andto second subsequently the part in accumulated information to systematize the in attempt an analysis comparative of consists 2 CEU eTD Collection argumentwas institutional noprevalently with theoretical but concrete haveothers solutions, Her 116). 1990, (Young voices” their representation of distinct the encourage institutions that issueswithin onsocial their perspectives assert differences, and occupational ethnic, gender, in “real actual with theirstructures people, which establishment of geographical, participatory for hascalled Iris repeatedly Young liberal famousegalitarianism, of critique nineties, inher nineteen the beginning atthe of First, of represented. the social characteristics important the mirror representatives that requires which moderepresentation of a – representation either link Avisible one. fruit forthis theemergence descriptiveof of arguments was with identical not is but theory, political multiculturalist and feminist with intertwined points issome It representativebe to andat andwhohastheright related is to represented. aproper 1967 andhas been preoccupied with such questions what as representation really means, who Representation theory was representation effectively established by the2.1. seminal work of Hannah Pitkin in on topicthe of representationspecial group mechanisms. focuses closely more that work of body analyze existing the to before proceeding both present briefly will I systems. electoral of study empirical and theory consociational of combination first can be ethnic,lingual,is religious groups) racial or angles. usually approached The one of from two summarized (suchas variously defined groups issue the of representation literature, of In theexisting under the label2. of representation theory, while the second is a Representation theory, consociationalism andgroup consociationalism theory, Representation State of the field 3 CEU eTD Collection championed by Arend Lijphart. He had first systematically analyzed the “non-PR methods” “non-PR the analyzed systematically first had He Lijphart. Arend by championed institutional forms has been integral an part of a specificgroup politics approach to both study the of seats, of from that reserved different as amechanism arrangements” issuethe representation. “consociationalAlthough Williamsof group understood a necessary, approaches to between various as ofyetdialoguebutthe to still underdeveloped contribution is than amore has initiated welcome Williams type of enquiry the Nevertheless, Canada. or as NewZealand such spectrum options, examplesfrom only available of citing particularly well countries known appreciate the full not does and on examples most obvious the shehowever, concentrates as districting and consociational (Williamsarrangements 1998,203-238). Heranalysis is limited, lista more thorough includinginstitutional mechanisms, race of reservedconscious seats, institutionalist territory. Melissa Williams hastried to remedy problem latter the by examining the into wander far enough to reluctance of theoretician’s a consequence been has indecisiveness (Mansbridgediscriminate against637-639).Inothercases,each other 1999, “essential identities” which exclude and therefore almost inevitably antagonize and of critiquethe Ward see: Another is 1991). warningagainstestablishing Jane Mansbridge’s unjustly treatmentindividualsdifferentiated for (Kymlicka 1995, 150;for formulation precise variationdiscard produces in that rules electoral stating reluctance liberal to the critique haveininclusiveness principle arguedfor 2000).One (seeMeier isKymlicka’sexample their support for “special” or “separate” mechanisms for group representation, even when in they careful very been generally have Authors however. reflection, critical without accepted The notion that groups should of “collectivedefended rights” ethnic groups. be treated separately means the of forsuch mechanismsas women,quotas whileWillKymlicka (1995)has within the electoralbuilt it.instance, For on Anne for has Philips argued (1995) “politicsthe of presence” through arena has not been 4 CEU eTD Collection considerations about appropriateness of appropriateness in on of special mechanisms will and focus about general, considerations aside leave analysis my of course in the therefore will I treatment. non-specific on insistence Horowitzian the than applicable more seems regimes consociational of typical mechanisms cases,comparatively smallpartof representation those of a society. In theprecision group in in makes need true protection a cases wherea attention of those up special group or Reilly’sdependsis more ofa 192). onfeatures case(Reilly all particular 2001, conclusion the as deserving ofmore it attention than butalsohas gotten, ashaving utility limited that model) “centripetalist” (the alternative Horowitz’s hasevaluated Benjaminproposition Reilly 2002). complexity the (Horowitz, electoral underestimate politics of into elites and much the trust puttoo elsewhere consociationlists the argued that also interest-politicsfor coalition-making givehigherweightto 1985,597-600).He and (Horowitz incentives create conflict, the disperse to strive should societies in divided systems political differences, ethnic ofinstitutionalizing instead that whohasargued Horowitz Donald voice of the is probably them among known best The heard. been have politicization group explicit the society. Just like in representation theory, skeptic voices about political systems built upon of as part status their of and reassured be accommodated minorities needto significant where but game, of political the heartat the not are divisions religious or ethnic where societies influencedebates hasalso institutional spilled overto about in includingdesign general, their butsocieties, systemsindivided designelectoral about of debate dominating the Lijphart’spower-sharing ideas about and amelioration of ethnic conflict havebeen systems. electoral into introduced be can mechanisms special in which ways the authors today mostly still build andother on this Lijphart’s when systematizework trying to 126). 2003 [1986], The term didnotmethods” survive“non-PR but in literature, the newer the minorities (Lijphart for ethnic exemptions andspecial mixedslates, ethnically predetermined including representation, fornon-geographic optional group ethnic districts, districts, ethnic 5 CEU eTD Collection systematic liesinthe lackof in probably studies these lack for the specificity Part of of reason the data on group representationproportionality (Ruedin 2009, 348). of levels varying and inclusiveness group of in terms implemented is mechanism special mechanisms, the way the concerning differences case-to-case on dependent highly is conclusion the that as case studies butalso notes little effect, has variable on average this finds that Ruedin variation. category intra- no includes focusing also variable measure special the of operationalization His parliaments. on one or minority mechanisms thingsin other influencespecial on the of ethnic representation Similarly, working with 746). 2011, Bochsler (Bernaurand diversity the of underestimatedtheir effects dueto a wider scope of cases, Didier(Bochsler Ruedin (2009) had exploredelectoral system, but generalize them under terms such as “quotas andamong non-territorial districts” 2011, of countries. Theyrecognize the of importance features post-communistpossible special the in success of ethnic party 221)have the determinants studied (2011) and and Bochsler Bernauer or of mechanismsspecial fullyis is itacknowledged, usually not fully explored. Bochsler (2011) simply measures for.accounted representation whichshe Even special hasnot group when existence implement admit countries these of some that fact the from stemming findings her in limitation thatinstitutions in twelve countries minorities,with significant buthad herself recognized a the electoral system.example, For Pippa analyzed Norris (2004,209-229) thesupportfor political effect of thetype as such institutions, therelevant of basicstructure only the into account often take of electoraldeeply societies.divided Studies focusing on ethnic minorities and minority representation directed at when ininterest the lacking andboth in to compared been somewhat rigor amount rules has infocusingThe thatIam on representation countries “lessdivided” the study of group mightused. be beenmade hasalready should specific instances be such adecision where that a mechanism 6 CEU eTD Collection minority-sensitive demarcation boundariesof constituency This and appointments. quotas, thresholds, from measures:electoral seats,exemptions reserved of special electoral election. Protsyk By resulting the hasidentified data, analyzing five (2010) general categories their of means and representatives minority about directly asking worldwide parliaments sent to of which a questionnaire was One survey 2009). part of consisted project the (IPU United Nations DevelopmentProgram in 2009 aspartof “Promoting Parliaments” Inclusive and Union by conducted from Inter-Parliamentary legislatures national on data a survey of recently, concerningMore by same the hasbeen based areport topic Oleh Protsyk produced for further examination. remainsand indicating therefore need the Shehadi their ambiguous 2005) and categorizations onconsociationalregimes1977; 2008; in literature Hudson 1976;Russell theory the (Lijphart communal seats. Yet, both these cases are routinely given as examples of power-sharing reserved of example an is considered Belgium of Senate in the seats of distribution linguistic ethno- the Similarly, modification. system electoral of instance an as is classified settlement Christian-Muslim Lebanese of result the example, For overlapping. are which of some multiple criterions, based is on thathiscategorization seemsIt though, 2006). (Reynolds, category longerno existent historical, a beingonly latter - the representation minority ethnically defined regions, race-conscious districting andcolonial providingregimes for of over-representation settlements, power-sharing modifications, system electoral seats, communal reserved provisions: special of categories wide six identifies Reynolds (MRGI). International Group Rights Minority in2006for mechanisms conducted representation minority of survey comprehensive rather Reynolds’ Andrew is example primary The countries. of number larger a surveyed recently have scholars few a and however, changing, 2006), with Daniel Bochsler’s(2006)area importantbeingstudy exemption. an Thishasbeen beingseveral cases in Alionescu the norm generally (e.g. Bird field the Geddis 2004; 2005; 7 CEU eTD Collection group group representation by identifying more precisely detailedthe modes implementationof for for a biggerimprove The into knowledge piecesthe isgoal our possibilities of to picture. integrating caseswill into workingsthe of of with eventual the particular goal delve deeper To addressthatneed, paperthis upwhere will Reynoldstake have and Protsyk leftoff, and aspectis that absolutely indispensable for abetter understanding of issue.the itis an however, minority representation; aspectof one isbut representation parliamentary confirms needthe for even morein-depth andmore study of this Of topic. course, 2000; This 2004; 2008). minority surrounds thriving activity that representation today only (Venice Commission countries inEuropean representation minority concerning legislation of status electoral the on valuable aseriesreports of hasproduced Commission which Minority has beeninvolvedlikeIssues also insimilarprojects (ECMI2011),just the Venice improvement of democracy, representation and protection at has request Protsyk’s mission work whoseprimary been is of produced organizations of minorities. European Centre for One indicator2.2. of interest for the kind of researchUNDP’s project be supplemented with direct expert analysis. proposed like by and data kindIPU survey-type produced the isit that reasons, these necessary here declarationsfor of such measures,support rather indicatingthan theirFor existence. actual is that Reynolds’information.further Protsyk contends some of those positive answers shouldbe taken as and failedsupport that claimwith but measures,any to special existencewhen of aboutthe asked providedambiguities. contained answer anaffirmative Manyparliaments data important some carries less information.italsobut of Reynolds, that then andclear-cut more straightforward is certainly categorization Additionally, due to the self-administered nature of the survey the Purpose and plan for the study forthe plan and Purpose 8 CEU eTD Collection lower level. a highermake the and level senseof to at variety try the finally emerge backto generality of design,a particular to only to details specific the looking entity, at case asaseparate each Consequently, mechanismswork.approach I of at descriptions actual complete electoral the by categories produced (such works previous of ratheras thatReynolds) asindicators, than to get lost in less in-depth studies. I attempt to do the same here, on a smaller scale. I take to electoral approach andembracing systems full of the variations thatspectrum tend exiting the than valuable byrather succeeded acomprehensive, reductive results taking inproducing have Gallagher Theseauthors andWattenberg Mitchell or and (2005). Shugart (2001) like and analyzed by the exemplified onescompiled collections byvoluminous literature system electoral of astrand by inspired beused, will method comparative small-N A simple systematization that seems to appear in both academic and policy-making circles. for the need addressing thereby trade-offs, mechanismsassociated different their the and 9 CEU eTD Collection parties) to compete for seats in the legislature according to a different or a separate set of set of aseparate rules a different or to according inlegislature for seats the compete to parties) (or candidates minority allows law in which electoral mechanism” – aclause the “special a systems electoral in their implemented have who countries at looking be therefore will I than on the basis of survival of the system itself. rather protect underprivileged, the justice desireand to basis made onthe of are representation systems thatareexplicitly in politics,grounded andgroup where those propositions for group between difference isqualitative afundamental because there andalso literature, of amount vast of subject the been already have that cases the are these since excluded be will systems category. Power-sharing in latter be interested the of this study Iwill context primarily and In the (Krook O’Brien relatively2010, 262). smallcontingentwithin population” the a mean togroupswhich latter “allocatingpolitical the constitute system, seats whereas toaffect the entire former understood are clauses-wherethe andarrangements protection Diana Z.O’Brien identifywho twomainmodes of reservations:group power-sharing and explicit LenaKrook Mona mostwith is Thisdifferentiation political of the game. center balancing power isgroup of the primary feature, and politicswherethose in group not are the where systems those between made be should distinction important most the Hierarchically, substantial literature. already to the acontribution for producing conductive will bemost cases that those distil be to will therefore section this of goal The etc. appointments reservations, executive and legislative including power-sharing, representationforms, various can take Group around theworld 3. An empirical survey: group representation 10 CEU eTD Collection which differentiates persons present in the country and those who reside abroad. Finally, in reside abroad. thewhich country differentiates andpersons present who those country is absent in the case mechanism of living challenge of fora group creating aseparate representation the within of diasporamain The vote. to allowed are they which voters, through means and voters eligible the of definition since there is a clear of in terms issue aseparate represent and nevertheless they cases, interesting empirically are physical criterion Although these abroad. living citizens their of for representatives Colombia seats reserve or inonly Some upperhouses the likeAngola, Croatiatheir countries of parliaments. respective 2012).In Turkish conflictand(IPU Belgium, exist Ethiopia reservations Bosnia-Herzegovina due ongoing Greeko- to the forremain vacant theTurkish community where seats reserved were inclusion, Countries consideredbut include forultimately were that Cyprus rejected Romania, Samoa, Serbia, Singapore, Slovenia, Taiwan, and Venezuela. Poland, Philippines, Pakistan,Niger, New Zealand,the Mauritius, Montenegro, Kosovo, Jordan, Iraq, Germany, Croatia, India, Colombia, Afghanistan, areasfollows: countries purpose of providing for protection andminority representation particular The groups. explicit with system electoral the into implemented been have measures where countries houses of parliaments2004) and information from reviewed literature the in previousthe Onlychapter. lower (2000; from reports data Commission Venice the forFoundation Systems (IFES), Electoral were taken International of the Guide” “Election the database, PARLINE IPU the These included into consideration.Having inmind, criteria these of was across-comparison several conducted. available datasets The processpatchwork. producedmake-do itis just system in electoral of terms minority representation, fostered a caseof a listforemost of race conscious districtingof typical for the United States. Although this is obviously 22 and first here mechanisms”.Ithink “special as considerednot modify than are rather them than the candidates from the majority population. Practices that go around the existing rules 11 CEU eTD Collection available at the end of chapter. endof atthe the available between cases. representationgroup mechanismslook like ineach with country, accent strong variationsof An overview wereused andcomplete and of primary casestudies tocreate pictures what sources reports table of Multiple sources. available in asit currently the exists data of presentation condensed through the findingswas and chosen a summary becauseby cases.Acasecase approach 22selected bypresentingthe all of will This proceed Chapter of the it mainallows points reservations. and similar for analysisis lightandneeds moreKrook Mackay2011),while tobeshed cases on the of ethnic, religious of details already been thoroughly explored by authors other (Ballington andthat Karam 2009; Krook 2005; cannot party Furthermore,system the2004, 411). (Htun question women representation of has be efficientlya country’s governing cleavages political dominant the with coincide affiliations political conveyedwhereas ethnic typically minorities manifest of features a “coinciding” – group one whose meaninggroup, evenly theyare all spread about on sides of mainpoliticalthe cleavages, concludes thattwogroups differfundamentally insofara “crosscutting” aswomen represent She minorities. ethnic of and women mobilization political between difference the accentuates followedinlikeilluminating(2004) were titled this regard.Htun “IsGender Ethnicity?” text Mala Htun’s minority of Conclusions for combined groups. or were related reservations with Provisions regardingrepresentation consideredwomen of were only insituations when they at aparticular group. arrangement targeted special a than rather arrangement, a system-wide acaseof as excluded was Lebanon 12 CEU eTD Collection social and ethnic distinction(MRGI 2012). Kuchi people a sub-group are ethnic of Pashtun group,the but acquired over they have time elements of both candidates (IPU2012). candidates reserved for a socio-ethnic group for asocio-ethnic reserved are seats ten where reservation imposed adoubly features therefore system Afghan electoral Kuchis. for The ten outof the reserved seats including three each of constituencies, the in female candidates faring best to the be allocated areto seats The women. for reserved seats An interesting peculiarity of the 14). Art. Law, (Electoral people for thenomadic facilities Afghan system arises withvoting ofKuchis, Electoral the isCommission under providelawobligated to voting special respect to the distributionsubmit ofKuchi with nomination.1000 signatures together facilitate people their the To of 68 special A foris candidaturedistrict. requirement commanding set, candidates prospective to in vote the to is forvoter a necessary special 9andNo Law,Art. 19).requirement (Electoral the SNTVsystem alsoin district, utilizing a nationwide areelected Kuchi representatives 10 of Afghanistan. that On top of 34provinces the multi-member corresponding to districts ismembers electin vote 34 non-transferable 239 Wolesiused to single In Jirga, to elections Afghanistan Pashtun to native people and Pakistan. beingprovides suchgroups: women reservations andKuchis,nomadic for latter two the Wolesi Jirga) (the Afghan parliament of house the lower the to theelections governing law in currently Afghanelectoral The the groups society. of unprivileged representation years has toproper in beengiven recent more toademocracy, attention regime authoritarian from an aspartof transition country’s international forces the and of patronage Under the 3.1. 1 The adjective “ethnic” should be understood in a very lose sense in this instance. Strictly speaking, the speaking, Strictly instance. this in sense very lose a in be understood should “ethnic” adjective The Afghanistan 1 and further seats out of these ten are reserved for female 13 CEU eTD Collection Italians, one for Czechsandone Bosniaks, together, Montenegrins, forItalians, one Albanians, Slovaks for for Hungarians, one seat one are Serbs, for reserved three seats minority groups: various for further reservations butwith district, in special areawardedthe seats A eight of total minorities. national for with seats district reserved do who electoral citizens nationwide twelfth special and the Croatia of Republic of territory residethe on not Croatian for district electoral eleventh the districts: electoral additional two features system electoral the Inaddition, of representation. a5%legalthreshold formula with of a proportional bymeans 14representatives eachreturning territorial constituencies, ten features parliament Croatian to representative of for elections system electoral The current 3.3. districts. multi-member uneven in33 representation are members proportional while district, House elected restof the 161 of through the inanationwide filled are asimplerule The four plurality using reservedseats current303). 2005, was minorities” amember for by“other Franco-Cuervo reserved and (Jaramillo elected Constitution the seatan 2003changesto additional Prior tothe Colombians livingabroad. be areto elected by by one representatives Indians, by one Afro-Colombians, indigenous and for each:two reserved concernedand seats for groups the exactenumeration of substituted residing This abroad”. provision was amended thethat vague in2003so is expression andColombians minorities andrepresent“ethnic in to political groups Representatives order of Chamber country’s the five to deputies electup to to districts special electoral of UnderArticle 176of Colombian Constitution 1991 apossibilityof was provided for creation 3.2. Croatia Colombia 14 CEU eTD Collection due to unequal treatment of minority of Serb the unequal treatment due to late 2011,the CourtofCroatia inConstitutional hasdeclared Constitution breachof them the in of elections to test be put Law could newElectoral the of provisions the before However, ones. instituted it would almost certainly win at least one additional seat on top of the three reserved were rights voting double that event the in and however, occasions, two on threshold managedwin to a seatdue to the 5% threshold. It has come very closecrossing to the required never buthas is largest, the population where Serbian districts of general election the governingthe coalition in 2010,has already the introduced practice of running intheirlist one memberforhas Serbsandwhich everyseatreserved of whichwas apivotal since2000won virtue of Serb voters casting generalthe of electionsthe part having and onboth a chanceof accounts by winning seats two votes. The Independentallow Serbian Serbian would parties provision new The Law. DemocraticElectoral under activated to not was run but for Constitution the in for secure Party reserved (SDSS) allowed explicitly was that seats option an minority, national while Serb the of members for simultaneouslyintroduced running a list be forin tothe Law to voting rights In double Croatian called 2010 amendments Electoral districts – five single member districts and one three-member district. nationwide six represents in fact therefore district electoral special the purposes and intents all minorities andminority as above, listed groups including the threeSerb For representatives. together. Simple pluralityRoma, Rusyns Ukrainians, Romanians, (Ruthenians), Russians, Vlachs Turks, Jews and rule is Poles, Austrians, Germans, used Bulgarians, for and one together, Slovenes Macedonians and to determine the winners separately for each of the vis-à-vis 15 other ethnic minorities who were not who minorities ethnic other CEU eTD Collection minorities. For a different version of an objection to dual voting rights see Slovenia below. Slovenia see rights voting dual to objection of an version a different For minorities. rather ruled that if double voting rights are to be introduced, they must be introduced formembers of all ethnic granted the samedoublevoting rights Lander, minorities such as the Danish and Sorbian communities have won seats in land in seats won have communities Sorbian and Danish the as such minorities Lander, laws in federal of federal German of law have mimicked the the provisions been electoral since level. federal on However, the in a has elections role the neverplayed clause exemption a report submittedby the VeniceCommission tothe According German the government, to with and listsignatures candidate nominations. of submission regarding requirements from parties minority exempt also law same the of 27) in the based proportional Further only tier proportionon votes. their actual articles (20and of from minorities parties national representing legal the win allowing them thresholds, to seats Law exempts Electoral Federal the 6 of Article However, seats. win SMD three manage to levelor national the at a5%threshold surpass parties which to seats areallotted where tier proportional a with districts member single combining system electoral proportional lowerGermany. is theBundestag, houseof The amixedmemberparliament, electedthrough action is exists butwasneverputto A single of measure case aspecial where a country 3.4. making. electoral law it hasas yetbeenhasof been not enacted, although it is announced in that the center-leftgovernmentwas installed,directinvolvement time this without of SDSS and anew used A new therefore again in2011elections. was model described minority representation of above The Constitution. the with in accordance Law modifies the parliament until the 2 Inother words, the Court did not question the constitutionality of double voting rights themselves,but Germany 2 . The Court ordered that the old provisions be reinstated old be the that provisions ordered . TheCourt 16 CEU eTD Collection particular disadvantaged group can be elected into the parliament as district representatives. asdistrict parliament the into canbeelected group particular disadvantaged members of only delimitation commissions) by state the (determined reserved districts From Castes. and Tribes for Scheduled reserved get that districts those of some in fact is it and Sabha Lok the to elections for is used districts member single territorial with system first-past-the-post A simple seat. anyother very much unlike not aspects arein seats other reserved the fact that isthe reservations ofminority in terms case makesa special India What (the designated for Scheduled Tribes (the Tribes for Scheduled designated are legislature bicameral India’s Sabha)of Lok house lower(the in the representatives elected with multiple system changestothe taking over place time. Today, atotal of 120 outof 543 measures, but have been preserved ever since in India’s constitutional and electoral law, albeit inby Governmentof werefirstestablishedIndia Actastemporary 1935 reservations the system. in The social rigid Indian groups the “depressed” or disadvantaged representation of system theHeath 2005,138)designedboost (Heath,of Glouharova and reservation” to “remarkable been a termed democracyhas what populous The -Indiaemploys most world’s 3.5. special mechanism. make representation inthe cannot is through claims there to Germany substantial population which of communities immigrant is that clause thelater of significance practical The 11). 10- 2004, Commission (Venice Roma and Sinti Frisians, include also minorities these Sorbs, the and Danes the from Apart exemption. threshold the of benefits for eligible as minorities Germanlaw the “traditional” samereport, the only threshold. to recognizes According certain legal the from exempted been not they had won have not would they that seats – parliaments dalit India ). adivasi – the non Castes andScheduled –the Hindu tribes) 17 CEU eTD Collection Christian seats must be registered in different governorates. If this is not the case with the best the with case the not is this If governorates. in different be registered must seats Christian for winners all For the thisof reason seats. legislative of quota overall governorate’s particular is partof anda Kirkuk, DahukandErbil) each for(one seat Ninewa, Baghdad, governorate a particular islinkedto reservedfor eachof Christians that, country. 5seats In addition the to in lists entire Christian the castfor votes only arecalculatedthe on based and quota the the threshold in way, same the except are allocated Christians for Reserved seats are used). vote with lists preference one (open lists winning on faringthe candidates the best awarded to subsequently and threshold, the surpassing lists to district each of level the at proportionally aredistributed Seats district. particular inthe available castandseats of votes valid ratio the Alegalis country’s 18governorates. applied ineachandthreshold of is districts the equal to corresponding tothe multi-member topartiesin competingseats areallocated 18 districts proceeds follows: 310 non-minority as based Electoral Law,seats of allocation on the the Commission (IHEC) by High Electoral produced Independent detailedAccording the rules to Christians, 1for Yzidi, 1for Shabeans and1for Shabak. chamber of a lower in (the Councilof Representatives the seats of out 325 the that 2010 whichprescribes bicameral parliament)in Lawasamended Election tothe is according elected of Iraq Representatives Council of a total3.6. of 8 seats are reserved for minorities: 2005). around half one and Heath Glouharova (Heath, 5 foris shareusually thepopulation concentrated, more geographically are who Scheduled Tribes, Castes typically make upless than one quarter areservedof district’s population, whilefor Membersof reserved district. Scheduled rather by the population tribe, whole of but the casteor members of their bythe exclusively elected not are therepresentatives However, Iraq 18 CEU eTD Collection with nine seats ninenine forwith reserved for Bedouinsfor seats Christians, Circassians three and and – Majlis al-Nuwaa, the forlower of parliament house the the system electoral into the are built and well minorities for religious women (Dietrich as as 2001; Sweiss reservations 2005).The ethnic for seats asreserved provisions such feature nevertheless they competition, democratic Even inKingdom of though elections lack theHashemite some Jordan basicthe features of of 3.7. districts. in rightthe registered arenot candidates if losetheir seats partiesactually may factthat the The drawbackis,of course, account. into alsotaken butwith minority, some dispersed degreeof representation geographical a geographically to beallocated needs more to seat one than system electoral proportional governorates. Thisinnovation isanimportant for situations when confineswithin of a into locally particular eventually allocated – butare lists by candidates, of won nationally are seats in sofar asthe is interesting system Iraq’s seats, casesof reserved other to Compared UNAMI 2010). allocated toparties based on proportionthe of seats they have alreadywon(IHEC2010; are “compensatory” seats of remainder 7 the beenawardedasdescribed, 318 seatshave particular governorates, but voters can vote for them throughout the country. Finally, after the to linked also are seats These constituencies. member single in separate rule plurality simple (Yzidi, arethe other the groups three andFor basedon Shabak)determined winners Shabeans of reservedgeographical the is apportionment seats satisfied. pre-determined the lists, until even other or to votes, lesspreferential with candidates to byawarding seats is thenallocation of lists adjusted ranked winning the candidates Jordan 19 CEU eTD Collection nationwide electoral district with all lists being printed on the same ballot paper. The first one first The paper. ballot same the on printed being lists all with district electoral nationwide inasingle compete parties Albanian and minority Both Kosovo. of Republic in the Elections The details of the electoral rules for distribution of seats are prescribed in the Law on General parties. their respective performance electoral the of Roma,Ashkali orEgyptians, dependingon Roma,Ashkali and Egyptian community. Finally,is additional seat one either awarded to foris each Gorani reserved the community, seat Turkish seatto community and one one seats to the two Bosniak community, to the areawarded seats three community, Serb of the for representatives arereserved 10seats distribution: following the to according ethnic groups 2008 Kosovo Constitution. Of in 120 the seats Assembly,20arethe minority reservedfor The structure of the Assembly of 3.8. the Republic of Kosovo is laid down in the Article 64 of reserved (Sweiss seats 2005). are wherethere districts in those election for prioritized being minority with candidates vote, bysinglenon-transferable areelected representatives constituencies Bedouin and general withinmulti-member both otherhand,vote the districtsas the samegeneral population. In the on Circassians/Chechens, and Christians south). and centre (north, areas Bedouin-inhabited three of the one eachencompassing in districts, three their representatives elect Bedouin tribes Seats are not reservedwas increased from 110 to120 seats. in the same wayprovisions regarding ethnic andreligious although reservations, sizethe of lowerthe chamber for all of thechange law the not in electoral 2010 did the changes to The latest together. Chechens three groups, however. The nomad Kosovo 20 CEU eTD Collection which of the four Mauritian communities he or she belongs (Constitution, First Schedule Art. Every candidate submitting an official nomination for a seatin the parliamentmust indicate to andAfricanFrench-speaking European persons). descended being Hindus, Muslims, Sino-Mauritians and Generalthe Population (mostly made upof communities Mauritian four –the community” each of representation “fair andadequate eight additional parliamentaryMauritius of (Art. Constitution the of Schedule 3 First toseats the to 5),according However, followingvote. arenon-transferable single to thebe allocationallotted of withthe directly by elected with representatives district andtwo-seat one districts the 20three-seat features system explicitelected seats, electoral majoritarian rather purpose a country’s The maximumnature. particular very a of twist ofofproportional ensuring model,with a but are inWestminster roots obvious the whose system anelectoral features The island Republic of Mauritius is a social highly heterogeneous former British colony that 3.9. country. the in anywhere voter any to available and ballot single a on printed are lists the all as minorities for minorities) reserved arealso some positions (in which Commission by Election Central the certification prior needindicate their affiliation applyingfor special to when communal provision, competitors to thethe under seats win to eligible be to elections. order In threshold. legal the without but is used, formula Votersmight haveare already not won irrespective parties these any of seatsthat communities, minority the parties representing requiredin the allocation the to awarded seats to additional twenty the Only are ofthen method). Saint-Lague (the formula theregister first hundred seats.alllegal and aproportional areawardedto basedon threshold a 5% parties hundredas seats membersThe same proportional of Mauritius 21 CEU eTD Collection populationshares of Mauritian the communities have provedto be quitestable overtime (Mathur 1997, 61, 75). community.However, this decision has not resulted in astrong distortion of the compensatory effects, asthe amended to explicitly state that census data from 1972 will be used incalculationof the worst standing electoral system due to protestfrom some of the community-based organizations. Instead, the Constitution was collected about voters’ communal affiliation, but the compensatory mechanism was not removedfrom the census category of “communities” from the legal system of Mauritius. Census data was therefore no longer party who belongs to the currently most under-represented community community A ismay currentlymostbelongsparty party elected. tothe who under-represented such of fairing candidate best the that so seats, additional the of receivedany farnot so have that for be parties will these reserved leftin any still unallocated, there are Finally,seats case successful of most the party. such candidates. If not, then the seats will simply go to the bestloser running under the banner community if there are most under-represented the belong mostsuccessful to of party that the candidates to beawarded will These seats their rivals. went to that number the to equal seats other than the most successful one,parties to hadgone seats some fourthen seats first the of allocation the If during seats. contested the most successful party is entitled successfulto party”a is determinednumber –thisis the party which had won a plurality theof of 62 directly “most the First of rules. modified set asomewhat based on areallocated four seats The next community afteris eachawardedseat. repeated underrepresented most the determining Thecalculation in of votes their district. percentage highest the won whose ratio of population communities to belonging candidates unelected tothose aregranted four seats first the that The allocation itself is performed by Electoral Supervisory Commission after each election so whoto candidates must bemembers of party. a political principles loser” communitarian and a “best on areawarded seats in, additional are the results election the Once membership. communal declared a candidate’s to object elector an should This3.4). is information thenmadeis public by subject torevision and SupremeCourt the 3 In1982the unitarist anti-communalgovernment elected withlandslide a 100% victory removed the 3 and seats is the least favorable, and who have, although defeated, although have, who and favorable, least is the seats and 22 CEU eTD Collection allocated in a way allocated that governing distributionthe secondthe of of round makesseats compensatory suretheyare provision The communities. under-represented for the reserved seats arenecessarily all mentionnot makeis Mauritius 2006; (Reynolds of caseof the thatHtun 8 the of 2004), which accounts existing the from missing sorely is which point, second The seats. additional community which at some point becomes underrepresented will benefitfrom the attribution of none asendangered Mauritian four of isconsidered the communities provisions underthese First, arrangement. inrecognizepoints this to important There aretwo criteria. party- andcommunity-based possible that some of the seats remain unfilled if there are no candidates leftfulfilling both the again,so forth, is belongs mostthe underrepresentedcommunity. provided thecandidate to It party and successful most third the party, successful most of candidates second the to awarded of Mauritius, Art. 5). Finally, Constitution Schedulethe of (First community underrepresented most currently tothe belongs if still not all of the eight if seats of one their only candidates they receive can but for allocation, further are prioritized seats are filled, further seats have receivednot any additional that thenthe seats mostsuccessful of parties undistributed, will be only receive one seat in this way. In the event that some of the eight seats remain independence parties at the time preceding Mauritius’ independence from from independence British atthe the Crown parties independence time Mauritius’ preceding pro- majoritarian-oriented and parties basedanti-independence between ethnically majority inlegislative losers” results “best to seats compensatory of the allocation the that impossible being transferred it havealmost made constitution Mauritian the of designers the communal representation, balanced bolster not does if that even party strongest the to go must seats additional from one party some By vote. that by prescribing popular the created of maintain balance the power to another. is to allocation four-seat second function the of theprimary In truth, so. necessarily not This was a compromise solution could increase the proportionality of community representation, but 23 a priori . Rather, any . Rather, CEU eTD Collection that began in 1867 when the Maori Representation Act introduced four Maori introduced into beganinthat Act the seats Representation 1867whentheMaori atradition of incarnation latest only the represent reservations Maori the of version current probably among the most knownSpecial guaranteeing inof provisions Maori the parliamentrepresentation New Zealand are and most cited such examples3.11. in the world. However, the representation. proportional with district multi-member a in allocated being seats of reserved Iraq) to case(next a rare Montenegro makes this perspective, comparative 118). In 12, Law, Art (Electoral of of Montenegro Assembly by anact each elections to prior localities in as residents registered designated persons the available of one only to rights five-seatfrom in constituency 2006)for the4 (increased Albanian minority,but voting with inand (PR usedin 3%threshold) The samefeatures are special elections. at-largethe district inof the part regular the parties elected by respective their represented ethnicities are other the while minority, Albanian the of representation the for only exist mechanisms electoral special minority), Croat smaller a as well as minorities Bosniak and Serbian composition of Republicthe is of heterogeneousMontenegro (including rather populous representation system with anationwide and constituency Although a 3% threshold. ethnic The system forelectoral parliamentary isused in a elections Montenegro proportional 3.10. parties. shares for seat of interms majoritarian highly remaining while communities, of proportionality boosts which (KrennerichThe finalis 1999, 605-606). aunique product exampleof an electoral system New Zealand New Montenegro 24 CEU eTD Collection figure being the number of voters registered on the Maori roll. This recalculation is performed population Maori relevant the with districts, electorate general asfor the population quota general roll. The number and boundaries of Maori districts aredetermined based onthe same the on voters the like just district nationwide in the vote second their cast they while districts, member single Maori special the of one in vote (candidate) first their casting of option person can demonstrate any degree of Maori origin. Voters enrolled on the Maori roll gain the a provided is optional, latter the on Registration roll. Maori the and roll general the rolls: electoral two are there fact is that the recommendations from Commission’s the Departure votes, one to cast for a candidate in their district and one to cast for a party list (Vowels 2005). havetwo Voters below). (see is changeable tier proportional the and SMD the between seats fixed of The distribution is120 inprinciplearepossible. butoverhang parliamentthe seats at size The of of seats. allocation proportional and district nationwide a second with rule, andthe and plurality member districts with firstsingle two tiers: the features system mixed electoral representation through the proportional tier. Consistent with the Commission’s draft, the 1993 secure Maori be enough to MMP would ideathat basedonthe recommendation was its Instead, districts. Maori special the recommend not did Commission the Interestingly, recommendations (The Royal Commission 1986, 11). its in drafting Commission by the used key criteria the of one was representation” country’sthe nowfamous mixed in electoral system enacted 1993. “Effective Maori Zealand Commission Royal on would Electoral the whose System 1986 report be thebasis of settlers and population. theindigenous This trend was reflected in positionsthe of New the in would between inequalities European the amelioration gradually political the of result Geddis 2006, 352-353).Duringyears the following 150 many tothoseprovisionschanges proportion of Maori (Banducci,people livinginNew Zealand andKarp Donovan 2004,536; New Zealand Parliament -anumber that was at the time grossly at odds with the much higher 25 CEU eTD Collection group’s feelingsgroup’s marginalization of 678). (Basedau 1999, country’s population and hasfor longbeen in conflictwith central the governmentdue to the of the 10 percent 9 and makes upbetween which group for Tuaregethnic the representation provide is to their purpose effective districts”, of “special precisethe assignment the asto Although lawremainsthe byplurality representatives unspecific 2012). elected (IPU For the 2011 elections unicameral Assembly National of Niger. the to elections general for districts eightregional multi-member eight the to next districts such specialprovision was enshrined in these laws which allowed for creation of special minority electoral districts a insystem, electoral of Electoral 2010.Justasinthe incarnations Law Niger’s previous were createdAfter a period of political and social turmoil, Niger has adopted a new Constitution and anew with one3.12. seat each and induced, is nor principlethe geographical of representation surrendered. is votes of no unevenness cases, in some other Unlike voters. Maori for seats reserved the The unique appeal of the New Zealand count of seven (Geddis 2006,356;IPU2012). system consists in its current the fivein from 1996to has grown also Maori seats numberof the increased and so ability to seamlessly integrate (Electoral Act1993). Since 1993thenumber voters registered of on Maori the rolls has rolls general the and Maori the between switch to opportunity the given are voters which every prior to election followingmonthand a four Maori Electoral Option duringperiod Niger 26 CEU eTD Collection contested such in contested provisions world.the and conflicting rules introduced, mechanismthis will become arguably one mostthe of farthus provision dormant 1987Philippinethe of butdue totheodd,imprecise Constitution, to the enacted pursuantproportionally mechanism. newprovision based The was electoral amended with provisions for election minority of representatives group a through In March 1995 the previously entirely majoritarian Philippine electoral system has been 3.14. parties,including MPs from the conservative Pakistan Muslim League of Nawaz Sharif. successful most four from came the minority seats fill reserved the to elected representatives disenfranchisement of non-Muslim the population. In lastthe elections of 2008, the effective approaches asit rules of newelectoral the aspect of this nature democratic serious lawThe doubtsaboutthe hasintroduced 2001, 670). change electoral inthe Ahmadis and one for Sikhs, Parsi Buddhist, non-Muslimsother and (Zingeltaken together) districts (one for Christians and one for Hindus), and two singlefour-seat member two in districts plurality by (one for elected been have representatives non-Muslim 2002, to Prior contesting in elections 272 single-member districts(Election Commission of 2008). Pakistan, by already won they have of seats proportion the to parties inaccordance to allocated National Assembly. tothe seats other of allocation from the longer separate isno Rather, seats these of allocation and the seats for non-Muslims,Muslim minorities in house lower the Sincehowever, voting the of Parliament. the 2002, for as wellnon- arereserved for 10seats 51), Pakistan of (Art. Constitution As perthe religious basis. as 60 seats for women, Theare Islamic Republic3.13. of Pakistan belongs to the category of countries reserving seats on The Philippines Pakistan 27 CEU eTD Collection immediately new issues have arisen with regards to the calculation of the seats to be awarded to seats the of calculation the to regards with arisen issues have new immediately Nevertheless,representation of minorities and simply became a second tier in a two-tier electoral system. thebe for amechanism to would cease elections of the proportional part the competition, Party-List the from largestparties bybarring the goaround thatproblem beingand ablewithout to from national parties andthe sectors groups marginalized the representing organizations the System between differentiate to beingable without since Act the of purpose the defeated effectively Act was The defects two (Wurfelmade 1997,22-23). which inany case only temporary was implementedfailure toimplement prohibitionthe of by majorparticipation parties fiveones) (the largest inparticipants the of categorization redundant the Act: the of version final in the 1998defects major two identified into electionsnational from very the In beginning,his however. 1997detailed analysisof David Act, the Wurfel parties, democracy in (Teehankee Philippines the 2002,180).Its failuredo sohas to and been evident regional activate a legaldormant in provision hopesofincreasing parties, perceivedthe quality deficient of sectoralrepresent(Wurfel The Act of 1997, 21). 1995 should beviewed therefore asanattempt to partieswhat to backgroundspoliticaltheir or stanceswerewith groups regards tothe they were to and coalitions,particular no as sometimes with regard by wereappointed president, marginalizedthe groups and of representatives the theproposed between1987and1995, legislative mandates In thethree the 5). (Art. religiousprovided bylaw,exceptthe 6, Sec. sector” urban indigenouspoor, cultural communities, women,youth, and such sectors as other may be peasant, “labor, provision: this of beneficiaries intended the enumerates itself Constitution organizations and parties” a party-listthrough proportional system (COMELEC 1995).The sectors, marginalized “Filipino the andunderrepresented belongingranks to citizens of from the Representatives) of House (The of Congress lower House the to representatives 20% of for of election defined rules the Act” System “Party-List The new1995 28 CEU eTD Collection radical. Courtruled2009 the In the 2%threshold unconstitutional itprevented as the more much was in 2007 (BANAT) Transparency and Advancement National for Association The Supreme Court’s won within proportional the (SupremeCourt tier of 2000). Philippines the has party decision strongest the votes the and won have they votes the between ratio the on depending in the other toparties seats finallyand additional awarding any 2% threshold, crossing the 1 seatto party case, filed by1andparty,between be seatssubsequently strongest 3seats the calculated to the awarding againstthreshold and the principle of proportionality. Ithas ordered a modification inCOMELEC the rules so that Court ruled thatby the applied rules for allocation seatsof were inconsistentBarangay with the 2% percent on thatthe grounds the proportionalitynotbeen has upheld.In principle Supreme2000, the intimes haveparties 2007.Both againparties the COMELECin2000,and sued againstthe in The failure Supreme wasmirrored the filedsuits of to Court Philippinesbyseveral the elections. of the aspect in and legislation practical of the the aspect procedural inthe both failed therefore has society Philippine the of groups marginalized the representing inIndeed, maximum 1998 only of 13 out were52 seats (IPU2012).The distributed idea of – apossibility which was openedof bythecombination cap. 2%thresholdthe with 3seatthe be filled would elections the section of in proportional the for parties reserved constitutionally seats all the not 20%of of that This possibility strengthened2001, 196). the decision Santos and Hassall (Hartmann, won votes the of 2% additional every for awarded be will by interpreted Commissionthe (COMELEC)on Elections asmeaning thatan additional seat butlistno provided thatmore The shall seats. than win clause proportionality hasbeen3 votes, thegarnered of proportion the to inaccordance seats further and immediately seat one – votes for wouldone lists the insinglebe andonefor candidates awarded member districts) winning at least 2% of the nationwide thatparties Actstipulates 11 of Section the elections. section of inthe proportional the vote for the party-lists (as the voters were given two 29 CEU eTD Collection magnitudes 7 between and 19,with aggregatesthresholds areapplied for vote nationwide. with districts multi-member in 41 elected are Sejm Polish the to representatives 460 The 3.15. Party-List System Act. by cited 24-25) asone Wurfel (1997, performanceof reasons for poor prime the of 1995 the question. Confusion and ignorance on part of Congress and COMELEC members and staff is learning andappropriate amountof academic inputwhen electoral system isin design importance of cross-country the underscores rules constitutional and electoral the of details harmonize failure lawmakersSecond, the appropriately specify and Philippine the to of the marginalized. No definite criteria have arise as a result of the suits. aretobe considered and groups become of a marginalizedgroups which arepresentative cannot who can, and who regarding deal cases with forced to been has Court repeatedly Supreme the Asaconsequence, for specialrules. election the under contenders legitimate constitutionally marginalized groups impossiblemaderecognized italmost discern to the listof long the heterogeneous andin extremely countries.First, designers other representation ofminority valuablelessonsforlawmakersprovides institutional groups and As asitunfortunate is, the surrounding incredible disarray the Philippine for provision elections. subsequent in the mid-term anewand according to formulawhich prescribedbe bytheCourt was usedalso to of intoRepresentatives House the elected were anddeputies additional recalculated therefore Constitution of Philippines,the The(Supreme Court results 2009). of 2007electionsthe were number tobefilledappropriate of in seats (20%) with proportionally the accordance Poland 30 CEU eTD Collection districts with an absolute majority requirement, before the unallocated seats together with the with together seats before unallocated the majority requirement, anabsolute with districts mixedpost-2004 member proportional system all seats arefirst in contested single member were elected using a proportional formula in 42 regional constituencies, whilein the reformed Underfrom electoral previous the allsystem effect 1990to2002) (in non-minority deputies (Protsyk and Matichescu2010). provisions electiongoverning minority of representatives have remainedvirtually unchanged mixedin 2002,the system to from proportional law well as alargeoverhaul as electoral to the et al (Birch measure fostering aspecial representation minority Chamber of hasincluded Deputies, regime in 1989, the electoral system for elections tothe Romanian Parliament’s lower house - communist Romanian collapsethe of the following elections democratic thefirst Ever since 3.16. parliament. the to elections in and Armenians are numerically the most significant ones, have farso not fielded minority lists 1993 and seven in seats minorities 1991. Other in Poland, of which Ukrainians, Belarusians elections (in having between2007 and2011)after seats two four seatsin1997 and2005, latestin two the seat only one winning candidates its with time however,reduced over has, win seats listto German the of capacity The minority. German of the representation parliamentary the facilitating Poland, in provision relevant a been has threshold the from exemption the in Germany, Unlike minorities. national of lists for abolished are coalitions) However, much like for Germany’s Bundestag, the legal (5%forthresholds parties, 8%for . 2002,Alionescu 2004).Even has boththough Romania seen a numberofminor changes Romania 31 CEU eTD Collection party orcoalition takes part in the proportional allocation if it has wonsix single member constituencies. coalitions of two parties need 8%,three parties need 9%,and fourmoreor parties need 10%. Alternatively any through through specialthe mechanism (Birch only “referring party inone name its may to same the ethnic group” gain representation current 10%in 2004 (Protsyk andMatichescu 34).Additionally, 2010, lawprescribes the that special thresholdThe cost (Alionescu 2004). vote average of the fora seat) election (i.e.of needed deputy one was originally minority surpasses party which aminimum of 10% of threshold averagethe votes numberof set at 5% toa begranted will of inRepresentatives seatone Chamber the that mandating activated of the averageis measure aspecial procedure, electoral described the through win seats fail to case they seat cost, but in but with together parties, all compete minorities other ethnic was representing systems parties raised to the representatives elected into the Chamber of Representatives through the special mechanism. special the through Representatives of Chamber the into elected representatives minority of number in increase a stark to lead have measure, special the of beneficiaries The minimal for winningrequirements aseat and a loose definition potential the of regardless of their 2004; backgroundethnic own (Alionescu Protsyk 2010). and Matichescu any on same forpartiesthe areprinted paper, may voter any vote ballot party ethnic since Also, all (Alionecu 2004,68). a voting through procedure individual representatives andinvalidating or election of toby resolvedthe confirming submitted Parliament the label indeed representsrepresent.whether arising Disputes aparticular about party torun underclaiming an ethnic that particular to itminority proposes whichever of name inthe claim arepresentative maymake minorityany party or whether such There arenowhich predefinedminority from benefit may groups special Instead, the rules. a minority exists at all are threshold required the surpassing andcoalitions parties to distribution level forproportional national atthe arepolled of all votes candidates 4 Avaried threshold isapplied so that parties running alone need toobtain 5%of votethe nationwide, et al . 2002,. 94). 32 4 (Birch et al . 2002; IFES 2012). In both . 2002;IFES2012). CEU eTD Collection district exceptionally did not need to hold needof to title not did the exceptionally district determine the inwinning candidates alldistricts. Until 2010 candidatesinthenon-Samoan individualdistricts beingfor (So’o voters 2001,783).Simpleis reserved plurality used to rule two-seat of the one each)seats with two or (one in 49 districts areconducted Elections Art.19). such person (SamoaAct, Electoral married to or heritage must persons benon-Samoan of either voters, asindividual register to be eligible To roll. electoral a nationwide on vote and are registered voters individual non-Samoans or based Electoral Art.16), Act, theirapplicable, (Samoa on residence voter rollsdecent. While on areregistered ofnon-Samoan being Samoans (mostly persons European) in territorial latter the voters”, and“Individuals Samoans sections: native two isinto divided electorate The representatives. parliamentary become districts to eligible persons only the being by politics based on their relationship to single nationwide district based on a proportional formula and with a legal threshold of formulalegal nationwidebasedsingle a of threshold 5%. andwith proportional on districta The Assembly National of of Republic the Serbia consists from of 250 members a elected 3.18. in candidates all districts. Act (Art. 5) have prescribed that the requirement shall henceforth be applicable to all and land ownerships, with land or and with chiefs tribal ownerships, a system family relations to of according is arranged Samoa nation of Pacific of The society 3.17. for which lessaccount in than 0.001percent of population the Romania. The number minority of currently seats stands includingat 18, representatives ofminorities Serbia Samoa matai 33 still playing a key still country’s playing inthe akey role matai, but 2010 changesbut Electoral tothe matais or, if that is not CEU eTD Collection Constituencies” or GRCs Representation number “Group so called a features of electoral system The country’s wherein voters electlarge perceivedbenefits thatthey incurfor ruling the People’s party (the Action Party – PAP). from 3 to 6 representatives andin provisionsof strength the criticismsthe dueto thathavebeenvoiced againstthose utilizing a represents uniqueSingapore in caseboth mechanisms designthe minority-representation of a block 3.19. Bunjevci, Gorani and Vlachminorities, as well as anotherHungarian 2012).(IPU party Montenegrins, representing includedthose of effective threshold the representation cross without the threshold being applied. Other minorityeven seat lists a thatbe granted did to not garner votes enough enoughwon votesneither to but separately ran again parties Roma two The seat. one won list Albanian and seats two again won list Bosniak the seats, four won list followingin dissolution Assembly. 2008, Hungarian apremature of This time the around, the held already were elections next The Party. Roma and seateachbyRomaUnion Serbia one of (representing the Bosniak minority), one seat by the Albanian Coalition of Presevo Valley and won by Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians, twoseats by Coalition list for Sandzak seats were In2007three minorities. particular representing byparties seats won number of to the respect with haveoccurred changes however, election, After each clause. exemption beenminoritiesRomaAlbanian haveparliament tothe elected activation through and the of Since theintroduction lawof currentthe in2004,representatives Hungarian,of Bosniak, inof minorities ethnic the Serbia. coalition isparty or for elections indeedlegitimately with running goal the of one representing from The Republic requirement. this is Electoral Commission in ofcertifying charge a that UnderArticle 81of amendedthe law, partiesofethnic minorities exemptedare, however, Singapore 34 CEU eTD Collection electoral law might be significantly changed as PAP continues its dominance in the political in the dominance its continues PAP as changed significantly be might law electoral themselves has been only partial There(Mutalib 2002,665). is nosign, that though, the minority-relatedthe electoral whilerules, support for legislation the by minority the groups in racism theinherent contained about havealsobeenvoiced concerns engineering, electoral leadersrulingin of from favor GRCs (Lay party Hwee 2002, 206).Apart criticisms for longhas for being hadanon-Chinesemajority, latter the forward anargument by put the winable in to single even memberdistricts dueto though policythe housingnodistrict quotas been have minority candidates hasshown that goes, their argument inSingapore, elections carry in popularthereby to History campaignthe multiple GRCs, candidates of seats. winning positionthe longof Singapore’s People’s dominant Action by Party allowing theirmore strengthen manipulation by to designed as aform opposition been interpreted electoral of the long has GRCs of existence the representation, minority for tools necessary being than Rather 2012). Elections Department (Singapore communities minority other or Indian of representation for reserved been have GRCs six while community, Malay the of for representation been havedesignated Nine GRCs districts. of least 75 MPs, at 15of whom minorities),must belong while to only12are singleseat asGRCs (electing aredesignated atotal constituencies electoral Currently Singapore’s 15 of elected from surpassingGRCs soon numberthe of those electedfrom single member districts. Since their introduction in 1988, the number of GRCs has risen steadily, with number of MPs theact of President. the performed through Constitution also prescribes that the designation theof districts for each of the communities is minorityleast one of the candidates on each listcommunities competingin a GRC must be a member of one of the has won the most individual votes. The Constitution of Singapore (Art. 39A) stipulates that at that list the from ateam bloc or asa areelected GRC from one –all representatives vote the (either Malay or “Indian and other”). The same article of the 35 CEU eTD Collection the size of the three autochthonous communities (Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, 2002). registered oncommunal by which rolls are administered bodiesself-governing of two the one deputy each (Art.80). These deputies two areelectedin nationwide by districts voters mandates that they “shall be directly represented […] communitiesHungarians twoof For Constitution three the the autochthonous - Italians, and in the National Assembly” (Art. 64) by some othersmaller non-immigrant groups, such as Germans Austriansor (Komac 2002,13). for is applied also treatment undifferentiated same The laws. theelectoral or Constitution and are considered givenimmigrants nospecialby as aretherefore the recognition formerof Yugoslavia (Albanians, Bosniaks,Croats, Macedonians, Montenegrins and Serbs Other especially from 64-65). ethnic(ConstitutionArt groups, territory the Slovenia, those of Roma and Italians Hungarians, namely category, first the to belonging minorities the of treatment special for provides which Constitution Slovenian the of provision the from stems differentiation The 2002). (Komac minorities immigrant or “new” and communities historical or categories:into autochthonous two divided arecommonly The minority groups ethnic With only two millionabout inhabitants Slovenia ishome agreatvariety to ethnicof groups. 3.20. such provisions. desirability of about hastened conclusions warn against to mechanism serves representation is is byan possible that being as arrangement presented made in a largepart a minority in lastthe 87 seats one it 2011 when with won 81 out That such 60% of vote. the an outcome life of winningSingapore, overwhelmingmajorities in every includingparliamentary election 5 All of which constitute a substantial number of persons living in Slovenia, comparable to or far surpassing far or to comparable Slovenia, in living of persons number substantial a constitute which of All Slovenia 36 5 ) CEU eTD Collection lower chamber of parliament (The Legislative Yuan) after the 1991 constitutional Legislative(The the1991constitutional Yuan)loweramendment after parliament of chamber of highlands.the The aboriginal population hasfor first the timein been represented Taiwan’s those and lowlands the of as aborigines Peoples) Indigenous for Act law (Status by classified itself with ishighly heterogeneous, thirteen officially recognized tribes 2012) (MRGI half (about individuals)a million arethe and oldest group toinhabit island.the The group The aboriginal people island of the of Taiwan makeupabout 2%of country’sthe population 3.21. Constitution 2002,24). (Komac whichConstitutional Court has dual the in that ruled voting breach isnot provision of the citizenshigher of importance Thethan question hasbeenbroughtothers. before Slovenian equality. rightwing politiciansmakes Some minority this that suggested have members The double voting rights of minority members have been questioned on grounds of political thereby giving the minority representatives veto powers over any changes in their own status. may not be adopted without and constitutionally the communities exclusively, national of rights position the provided the the of consent exercise “the concerning legislation that stipulates 64) (Art. of Constitution the representativesAdditionally, of these is (IFES2012). highestscore the with elected candidate and the which totaled are then national communities”,candidates to – voters preferences assign numerical count usingBorda areelected minorities national two for the representatives However, formula. proportional the according to areheldgeneral electorate in each,11 seats 8constituencies with of performeddistribution for the (Komac Theelectionselection of representatives of the 2002,22-23). their community the for one and elections general in the representatives 88 of election for one votes: two casting by rights voting their exercise roles communal the on registered voters The minorities. Taiwan 37 CEU eTD Collection =259762&ctNode=2300&mp=12 aboriginal legislative seats largest tribes are more likely to be represented, while others remain marginalized whileremain others bemore likely represented, are tribes largest to tribal cleavages real the ignores which aborigines highlands and withinlowlands the between distinction simplified the groups. Concerns have and artificial been has perceived the system of Taiwanese the feature The most criticized been raised this may mean that the for(Status Act Indigenous Peoples, Sec.2). three administration local keptbythe records census against aschecked ties marital and family ofbelonging isbasedhaving communities. one ofthe status indigenous The on to the status are acquiredThe voting in aboriginal Legislative Yuan2012). rights through the districts population) andin onefor party-lists district anationwide legal with (The threshold 5% aboriginal of case in the districts (three-member districts member single in candidates even though the rest of the MPs are elected through a parallel system with two votes – one for districts in those be used to continues SNTV tribes. lowland the for one and tribes highland inindigenous by districts:be population onefor six ofwhichtwo the elected the are to 113 members, parliament) wasreducedto soleTaiwanese(now the chamberof a unicameral in225 membersFinally, Yuan The Legislative sizeof the to (Rinza 2004 2001, 530-531). increased sizewas chamber’s when the in 1997, eight to wasraised seats of reserved number The system. vote non-transferable single the using districts nationwide multi-member in two be elected wereto representatives These (out 161total). of the forsix seats them reserved has 6 Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the U.S. the in Office Representative Cultural and Economic Taipei . Press Release: 2012 http://www.roc-taiwan.org/us/ct.asp?xItem 7 March 38 Experts urge reshuffle ofTaiwan urgereshuffle Experts 6 . CEU eTD Collection members of the indigenous communities in the official electoral register (Art. 178). (Art. register electoral official in the communities indigenous the of members years. In order to be eligible hasleast in for been at indigenousfor peoples that three organization of operation constituted voting in the special districts,actions to benefitindigenous peoples and communities andmember being a of a legally the voters need to registerparticipating inthesocial struggle for recognition of identity,their cultural having taken as exercised aposition authority of traditional in theircommunity,having of arecord established representative indigenous fulfill of communities, onemust four requirements:having for a becomea candidate To South. and the East the West, the member districts: single defined in territorially three plurality by simple be elected to are representatives three electoral law ( electoral The of details mode forare of representatives the indigenous in the definedelection the representatives ofindigenous communities (IPU2012). formula, 52electedproportionally,inbut small two-andfour-member and districts, 3 majoritarian a using andthree magnitudeone between with elected inconstituencies of Assembly National 2009, the thereforeof 110 consists Venezuela of 165 representatives: into electoral the law by forreserving indigenous three parliamentary seats communities. As implemented was provision The 125). (Art. Assembly” National the in representation “native included arange of provisions aimed atprotecting nativethe peoples, including aguaranteeof The subsequentAssembly2005, 551). Constitution 1999Venezuelan andThibaut (Molina organizationsindigenous peoples of and havejoined the 128 electedrepresentatives in the by werechosen representatives three The Assembly. Constituent National Venezuelan 1999 forthe appointed first in were peoples Venezuela indigenous of Special representatives 3.22. Venezuela Ley OrgánicadeProcesos Electorales 39 ) under Articles 174through 182. The CEU eTD Collection measures, includingmeasures, choice the of beneficiary and groups allocation of to seats groups. those special on of particular aspects concentrates Chapter fifth while the such atask, performing of way innovative hopefully and uncommon rather one offers follows that Chapter The information. precious sacrificing without and way useful in a options available the summarize identify(see the for instance:similaritiessurprising given knowncomplexity the and diversity contemporary the of electoral systems Blaisebe This not should alike another. one are completely mechanisms that representation and Masicotte and dissimilarities implementationsspecial group it of notwo seems clear arevirtually page), that there 1996). The realUpon examiningtask atthe hand22 cases willin3.23. and looking thetherefore at thepresent summary be of tothe data incases Table 1 (on next that will allow me to Overview 40 CEU eTD Collection Jordan Iraq The Middle East Taiwan Singapore Samoa Philippines Pakistan Zealand New India Afghanistan Asia andthe Pacific Niger Mauritius Africa Table 1: Overviewmechanisms for grouprepresentation ofspecialelectoral Chechens and Circassians Christians Bedouins Shabak Sabeans Yzidi Christians Lowland aborigines aborigines Highland Indians and others Malays Non-Samoans sectors underrepresented and Marginalized Non-Muslims Maori Tribes Scheduled Castes Scheduled Tuareg communities Under-represented Beneficiary groups Kuchis 3 9 9 1 1 1 5 3 3 6 9 2 (52)* 20% 10 7 41 79 8 Up to 8 of seats Number 10 41 districts three-member Two group either for reserved is vote bloc by elected In 15 multi-member districts one place on a list Single nationwide district Single nationwide elections ingeneral seat-share their Proportional distribution to parties in accordance to (overlapping) SMDs SMDs Designated (overlapping) SMDs Nationwide districts exclusive multi-member in non- elected others districts forBedouins; Thre groups other of the each for SMD nationwide Christians and one for district member One nat type district Electoral nationwide Single separate e three ionwide five ionwide - member - SNTV SNTV 3 seats cap per party Proportional formula; Plurality Plurality Plurality mixed districts) electionfor minorities in SNTV (with priority three other district and plurality in the openlists in the Christian Proportional formula with Rule communal representation out balance to losers” “best to awarded are Seats reserved for women for reserved SNTV; 3 out of 10 seats CEU eTD Collection Sources: see Chapter 3 for individual country sources; also see Appendix A. used. are elections 2008 the from numbers where Serbia for except election, latest the in parties minority by won of seats number the represents Notes: For countries where the number of reserved seats is notfixed, the value in the “Number of seats” column Venezuela Colombia AmericaLatin Slovenia Serbia Romania Poland Montenegro Kosovo Germany Croatia Europe Table 1 (continued): OverviewTable ofspecial 1 (continued): electoral representation for mechanisms group Indigenous 3 communities Indigenous peoples Afro-Colombians Italians Hungarians National minorities National minorities National minorities National minorities Beneficiary groups Albanians Egyptians Ashkali Roma Gorani Turks Bosniaks Serbs others Albanians, Bosniaks and others and Roma Slovaks and Czechs Italians Hungarians Serbs 1 2 1 1 7* 18* 1* 0* 1 or 2 1 or 2 1 or 2 1 2 3 10 1 1 1 1 1 3 of seats Number 5 42 SMDs (overlapping) group each for district Separate nationwide districts Separate nationwide majority group togetherwith the Nationwide district majority group the with together district Single nationwide districts Six separate nationwide type district Electoral majority group the with together district Single nationwide majority group the with together district Single nationwide between 7 and 19 districts with magnitude 41 multi district Separate nationwide - member Plurality FPTP rights Borda count; dual voting threshold Exemptionfrom 5%legal reservations Proportional formula with Plurality Rule threshold Exemptionfrom 5%legal 3% district-level threshold Proportional formula and minority seat cost; one seat per Threshold of 10% average totals nationwide vote for applied threshold Exemptionfrom 5%legal CEU eTD Collection being used and isthis exactly linkthe that Iintend exploitin to further examination. Iwill do type of competitors onopposite the ballot situation. is directly the “X”indicates “=”,while reads than table the of type competitors faced same the are with The relatedtwo types to includethe typevoters If intwo the place. rules special if no were there wouldbe equivalent voter minority candidatesof electoral and rules lists whichof ofpolitical candidates. are competitors type same the with isfaced country given in a voter minority Of if the on indicates hiscourse, ballot of “Type” ballot asthe is The a membervoter. minority a of perspective the from of the perceived when produce general rules of sets two population to whom the the that differences the indicates “Ballot”, captioned table, the of column Thethird sample. in forrules my in countries systems of electoral sections both information conveysused about set of rules that is usednextto the voters, and/or minority candidates for rules of electoral set to second a introducing elect representatives constitutes infact is measure by aspecial My introducing driven a basicideathat analysis of the general population. Table implementation. of modes recognizable forming - 2 therefore another alike one aremore somealsothat cases but is a variety possible, combinations that of find countries. I of different contexts into institutional various the introduced measures were in virtually all than As another. evidentfrom presentation the of majormy 22 cases, special measures canbe found types of electoral system typeone of of electoral more characteristic special are mechanisms saidthat longer be systems. no measures it can special electoral useof morebutstudied, of advent widespread the with In this Chapter, hehad countries six of limitedpool atthe looking stance wasaplausible This representation. I look at the waysrepresentation, Lijphart thought of themthese as substitutions or supplements for proportional When he taken hadfirst up studyingspecial fostering electoral provisions group 4. Implementing thespecialmeasures 43 CEU eTD Collection Pakistan Mauritius Croatia Colombia Niger Slovenia Samoa Venezuela Taiwan New Zealand Serbia Romania Poland Philippines Singapore Montenegro Jordan Iraq India Kosovo Germany Table 2:Modesof implementation for special measures FPTP SNTV PR PR PR PR SNTV parallel Mixed parallel Mixed MMP PR PR (with MMP lowered / PRthreshold) (see text) PR FPTP Bloc vote PR SNTV PR FPTP PR MMP elections Rule for general won by parties in direct elections direct in by parties won seat-shares on based Proportional; shares community predefined on based Proportional; FPTP FPTP FPTP Borda count; dual voting rights SNTV FPTP SNTV FPTP PR (with threshold exemption) PR (with threshold exemption) PR Quota on bloc slates PR minorities in mixed districts for quota priority with SNTV PR;FPTP FPTP PR MMP (with threshold exemption) representatives Rule for election of minority 44 = / = X / X Type X X X = = = = / = X = / = X = / = X ======/ = X = = = = = Ballot Cont ent X X X X ======(different rules) (different rules) (different rules) Post-election Post-election (dual voting) modification modification (same rules) (same rules) (same rules) (same (same rules) (same Integrated* Integrated Integrated Integrated Integrated Integrated Integrated Integrated Integrated Integrated Integrated Parallel Parallel Parallel Parallel Parallel Parallel Parallel Parallel Mode CEU eTD Collection of the content of the ballot papers or in terms of both contentvoters belonging to the generaland population face substantivelytype different of choices,competitors either in terms on the and minority voters where is madeof upof cases thosecountries The secondcontingent elections through SNTV. for was thisminority study inselected placeis havefor priority thefirst that candidates the inunimportant contextthis as itis merely a practicality, themain while reason why Jordan ballots since they vote face will different voters butBedouin counterparts, in majority as ballots their same exactly the geographically separate will face voters andCircassian is whereChristian Jordan, category case inthis different districts. The latter Onesomewhat by special rules. are governed of that rules candidacy is the and same choices detail I consider the with faced be all will inSingapore voters toSimilarly, votes. be Albanian of basis the on only for Albanian lists in Montenegro will have a threshold applied to them which was calculated cast votes instance, For differently. getor treated counted that are theones lists of candidates minority for cast votes but voters, other any as ballots same the exactly face voters minority modeimplementation of “integrated” the asemploying designated of cases, set In thefirst implementation. labeled last underthe column of 2,undertheheading“Mode”Table modefor –standing of are types The thegeneral population. for rules electoral the “nextto” or “into”, may bebuilt mechanisms electoral special in which ways several reveals way in this cases the Presenting ballot. the on listed competitors actual but the rather thatis relevant, of competitors “type”is in except the not case it ornot, ballots this are faceddifferent with voter population anda general ifvoter minority the indicates again “Content” captioned The column actual content of the ballot. by linkinginformationtype underthis aboutthe specialruleswith the competitors the of the 45 CEU eTD Collection the relevant fields for Slovenia. relevant the of in both marked “X”“=” are and both Hence, rules of competition. anddifferent candidates non-minorityas rules same the and options same the absolutely with vote to voters,voters minority enables right but also to cast Occupying middle between latesttwo the the options ground is Slovenia voting dual where an additional vote on a separatedo not have two votes, but rather there are two types of voters: minority and non-minority. ballot with voters in countries is these that course, of difference, The separate. logically are tierstwo that different invotes casttwo voters where issystems – that systems electoral “segmented” or “parallel” what are termed normally similarmost to are and Colombia Croatia, in used systems, Niger, These encounter. will they that ballot of “Type” in a difference hence – rules different to differing optionsaccording whenenteringvotes booth, buttheircounted are also the polling voters faceonly not whereminority group of A thirdismadeupof significantcountries cases in choice plurality tier. different the three cases these for – column the“Content” in the “=”marked are “X” and “=” both signifiesHence, voters. non-minority the same choice in thevote for acandidate – at whichproportional pointminority voters are faced with a different choice-set than tier, whilesegment of the elections faceand the same choices“X” as they do that, but they also cast asecondsignifies in vote a proportional castone voters all where systems two-tiered of instances cases are three other The neighbor. hisSamoa-born than candidates different andfor district a different in vote Samoan will descended a European meaning that link two, the between isno there that so each other in over terms geographical been superimposed have areelected) representatives minority where nationwide, is which of (one districts layersof two where –arecases Samoa and Afghanistan – those of Two representatives. non-minority and minority both of elections for apply same rules the where competition electoral separated of areexamples Venezuela) ballot. In the first bloc of countries (Afghanistan, New Zealand, Samoa, Taiwan and 46 CEU eTD Collection systems at the same time with their voting counting twice. counting voting their with time same the at systems dual voting rights have putminority invoters a unique position of voting in electoral two immediate link to votes without of but results in tothe elections, seats allocated accordance which modifications cast by the post-election finally and minority differ; candidates non-minority and minority of election voters. A stand-alonecompetition; parallel systems where both the contentcase of the ballots and the rules governing the of isrules same the Slovenia,otherwise but voters, non-minority and minority of ballots on content where options, but some votes are counted according to varying rules; parallel systems with differing similar face voters all –where integration identified: were implementation of modes main Four system country. the someinto introduce their of special measure electoral to type of identify lawmakers if was to of the waysChapter that The purpose take this could wish they were notincluded in survey.that in this countries some representatives appointed similar to respect in are that Theserepresentatives process. electoral regular supplementthe of as aby-product or into parliamentintroduced the are rather but voters, castbyminority based votes elected the on arenot minority representatives this case the in but options, same the exactly are facedwith voters asall insofar category first of the those Finally, thelast two cases in Table 2are Mauritius and Pakistan, whose systems are similar to 47 CEU eTD Collection on identity on the of groups” the 1995,(Lijphart 275). manifestprinciple to which“allows in themselves insteadthese groups advance deciding of design institutional isan groups social of “self-determination” as denotes Lijphart what invoke. Rather, might movements secessionist that –aprinciple self-determination” “national is Thelatter used hereinof term and not self-determination groups. typical sense of the Lijphart(1995) hasaddress tried to issuethis bydistinguishing between pre-determination completely vindicate on normative grounds. In the context of consociational theory, Arend is impossible to nearly markedasa that task representation haslong been to have a“right” be termed the“inclusiveness which of problem. definingdimension” groups the However, The question of should which groups benefitfrom special mechanisms describes whatmight pre-determination 5.1. in aspects. these mechanisms issection dedicated identifyingto the individual and comparative performance of special the and represented, In Willgroups. Kymlicka’s whatweneed todefineiswords, should at look effectivenessthe with which special mechanisms have benefited particular selection of groups to representationgroup mechanisms involves asking questions appropriateness aboutthe of the whom the electoral benefitsAs I have indicated in the closing lines of Chapter 3, a necessary part of analysis of the specialwill be available. It also5. means that we Selecting thebeneficiary groups:self-determination or Selecting the groupsand allocating seats how how many seats they seats be should awarded(Kymlicka This1995, 144-146). 48 which groups should groups be CEU eTD Collection problems byrepresentation lack measures.Sheposed group that hasconcluded of opportunity of essentialization in context the issue this with hasdealt Meier (2009) Petra elsewhere. been has it but cases, of presentation my in explored fully been not has identification these, only the fourth function is necessarily decided in elections Of (4). candidates and/or parties particular seats to andallocation of (3), groups seats tothese beneficiary (1), selection themselves of (2),allocation a group groups belonging of (voters) to individuals of selection representatives: leadelection of group to thattogether processes But as elegant as Lijphart’s elections. proposition is, it also a–the decided process single representation are therefore of through group All features conflates into onebe political the group’s representative. claimsto party byvotingpolitical which fora group a what are actually fourvotersmodel, self-identifyof part as 281). In this form (Lijphart1995, relatively PR” of pure Of solutionsthe hesuggests, only canbe one describedas mechanism: electoral an “a measure, but a basis for a consociational system in which relevant groups may freely emerge. in aspecial interested creating an issue,he not as was was not point latter Lijphart the For countries. insome legislators to clear entirely been always not has this that Chapter this of progress We seeinthe be in shall any meaningful way. “special” to immediately factseize of that a special measure from benefitswhich any would beavailable to Itwouldgroup. bythevirtue is enactit possible to not that however, immediately, should benoted It minorities”. “national suchas set ofgroups, an abstract at addressed measures toenactspecial choose could they or treatment, special are entitled to that groups the (pre-define) enumerate to choose may legislators mechanisms: special of context in the applicable is differentiation same The 7 Necessity exists only by definition since I am not examining the cases of appointed group representatives. group of appointed cases the examining Iamnot since definition by only exists Necessity 49 7 . The question of individual. The of question CEU eTD Collection minorities. The law proceeds to enumerate a total of 13 such groups (Art. 2-3)which by (Art. are enumerate groups atotal of 13 such to Thelawproceeds minorities. residing in Poland for over onehundred yearsshall be national considered ethnic or Minorities and on theRegional in stipulates Languages Article 1 only that communities (Venice InPoland, Commission 2004, 10-11). 2005Act the National on and Ethnic Germany in population Turkish large the as such communities immigrant not but minorities, Sinti/Roma and Frisian, Sorbian, Danish, the includes minority” “national term the instance, in most of these countries includeto some groups, and exclude others. In the German casefor this is limitedly only so because ethnic category national of the minoritiesor islegally defined However, Lijphart. by imagined as mechanism a self-determination to close seem measures special Their countries. groups of thetwo of smaller consideration the into take me first Let diversity. more much casesreveals of particular further examination as however, glance,first atthe only situation is the This measures. special the from benefits incur to beeligible may which groups the in 5countries (Germany, Philippines, Poland, the Romania Serbia)label and lawdoesnot the secured are labeled explicitly. Thishas been the case in 17 out of 22 cases. On the other hand, be should representation whom parliamentary to groups the cases in most that indicates 3 Chapter in survey empirical my pre-determination, against advice Lijphart’s to Contrary 5.2. using Lijphart’s pure PR as an orientation beacon. as Jordan or Lebanon. for self-identificationI will on the individual level is not a very oft occurrence,therefore limited to cases such turn my attention to the second and third functions, Which groups should be represented? should groups Which 50 CEU eTD Collection everyone and would effectively seize to be “special”. The Philippines are a borderline casein are Philippines aborderline be The seizeto “special”. effectively would everyone and no forsuch the formal laws, despite open wording of the become would, measures the review was there If measures”. “special as countries these of systems in the electoral modifications inParliament theRomanian in theSupremecase, and Court –definethe Philippines the herenote is thingAn important of to existence thatthe finalinstances these revision of – the competitors – with a rather permissive, albeit unstable policy being in place thus far. legitimatehaving repeatedly Courtdetermine Commission the to Electoral and Supreme inthe hasresulted and groups sectors underprivileged forof representation mechanism mandatinga special vague constitutional inthe provision the wording of the Philippines butalso played “akeyrole inconstructing in ofthesegroups some place”. first the Similarly, note that as a consequence, the special provision has not only enabled minority representation, additional loyal (Alionsecu Protsykparliamentarians 2002,68-70). andMatichescu (2010,29) this has tobeproved an ineffective mechanism by governed majority’sthe interest toco-opt The post-electoral revision is performed by the Parliament in case of formal objections, but finite definition is in used Serbian A less law. electoral in the specified threshold abolished the from benefit to eligible extension and program that it is running for some conceivable national minority (Birch minority national conceivable some for is running it that program and wanting compete under special to rules.InRomania,must aparty simply inits name declare Romania muchimpose lessstringentIn criteria ongroups and thePhilippines contrast, for groups who belong to acertain pre-defined set. in ispresent only but countries group representation therefore these aspect of determination self- The 2). (Art. Serbia of territory the with bond” firm and term long “a requiring clause historical similar a contain does but minorities, ethnic enumerate not does which 8 Inherited from the Federal Republic of Yugoslaviaand unmodified since 8 Law on Protection and Freedoms of National Minorities National of Freedoms and Protection on Law 51 et al . 2002, 94). . 2002, CEU eTD Collection Slovenia is entirely pre-defined, whereas status in Maori is status of not. New Zealand whereas is Slovenia entirely pre-defined, had registeredlittle voter as hypothetically, asone filled,even if,be always Slovenian parliamentthe would on the in Italian for Italian representative in seat sameeffectasThe Zealand. have the not quite New would rolls communal on register to voters minority of roll.failure Venezuela), or Slovenia, Croatia, Therefore, (e.g. aswell countries in other voters are kept minority for rolls electoral separate though status only the mechanism whichmay beof used as avehicle for Even self-determination of groups. Italiansnot are elections that shows becauseitits isimportant lesson but isalone case, New Zealand as a beneficiary(Geddis 2006,255). group in existlegislation existing to under the would“naturally” cease roll, Maori seats separate the the on byregistering entity political separate a as self-determine longer no to decided Maori seats. If reserved of desirability about the population Maori among periodical referendum periods registration Option Electoral Maori pre-election the observes, As Geddis roll. electoral Maori on registration to connected voting and of from act the separated is act this Zealand in New that is difference The in elections. lists minority fielding itself, much like minorities in Germany, Poland or Serbia can “de-select” themselves by not can“de-select” an this group for option that lawthe provides but also seats, receive reserved can which a group law as the by selected are Maori only that is It true more complicated. is slightly situation the basis, non-flexible on acompletely seatsaregranted where countries of that resembles much very mechanism seats reserved country’s that Although Zealand. New – as deservingattention out special explicitly, casestands one measures wereenumerated Turning thelarger entitled to setof countries wherebenefit groups from to special the law. electoral underprivileged in some wayand warranted therefore special undertreatment Philippine as this infinite respect, may arevirtually there an number that of groups bemake aclaim to 52 de facto constitute a CEU eTD Collection why this type of practice can result in serious representational shortcomings in cases when in cases shortcomings representational in serious result can type of practice why this in population whose exceed does not Croatia is a individuals, another thousand there reason lawin as Bulgarians purposefulness of such ethnic Vlachs or electoral enumerating the groups memberfor by amomentrepresented each. aside parliament suspicious Putting the one into constituencies together havebeengrouped minorities smaller where of Croatia is that example illustrative A particularly cases. few in a observed been has that inclusiveness of artificial inflation needsbe madeabout to final note a selection groups, of to Related Examples: selection mechanism. selection by determined both cases are goes, designprinciple general the as far As details. practical of matter a is simply this but Romanian, than permissive more ishave,is as Philippine argue, I completely the that arrangement pre-defined. possible It to individual Options fordecisions. special mechanisms are then from ordered leastthe rigid to of by an aggregate solely is representation determined of group existence under which self-determination pure is representing usedasastandard pure PR mechanisms. Lijphart’s institutional designers whenitdefiningcomes to relevantthe beneficiary for special groups to available options the presenting by section this of findings the summarizes 1 Figure Figure 1:Options for defining beneficiary groups for special mechanisms The Netherlands The mechanisms Non-special Pure PR determination The Philippines The with ex post Romania review Self- 53 Selection via Selection registration New Zealand New Flexible pre-defined setof pre-defined Flexible Special mechanisms groups ex post Selection via Selection elections Germany Serbia review as the final asthe review Rigidly pre- Rigidly Slovenia defined groups Iraq CEU eTD Collection New Zealand, the Philippines and Romania. New Zealand’s method of calculating the number for theirimmediately countries Four stand uniqueallocation Mauritius,obvious. rules: out is then variation more look reveals again in-depth amore However, performance. as electoral such criterion, someon other dependent fixed,but isnot allocation where seat allocated a precise number of seats to particular groups. On the other hand, there are countries constitution or law through have countries some hand, one On arrangements. of kinds Glancing 22casesin the over two could evenacasual this study, easily distinguish observer isbutanswered simultaneously, there nonecessity for link. that sometimes are questions two The seats. the receive should candidates or parties which be entitled tothrough a special mechanism? This isaseparate issue from about questions the inreferring to section.this Thequestion is:manyI am dealing with how shouldseats agroup allocation I am kindexactly of what madebe about to needs statement off, aclear First 5.3. groups. This being in said, Iturn final the section Chapter to thequestion this of allocationseatof to minorities. multiple to seats award single that in countries seats awarded areactually groups should therefore be examined with caution. Researchers need to pay close attention to which selection typeof group This candidate. Albanian the narrowly defeated candidate Bosniak the when elections last in the obvious very become has This them. for reserved was that theoneseat obtaining to regards with inbutin relationship acompeting are together, actuality representative one elect formally who Bosniaks and Albanians with case the primarily is this Croatia of case In the together. aregrouped minorities large more substantially or two How manyHow seats should a group be entitled to? 54 CEU eTD Collection of reserved seats, but variations are possible either in the form of census-based allocation or in selection.group Thepreferredbe option among surveyed seems afixed countries to number of methods the than features systematic less show allocation seat of methods the all, in All mechanism. the of proportionality the limits nevertheless but variation, some for allows still maximum 3-seat a of provision limiting the has effectively into Romania acase turned non-flexibleinof while allocation, the Philippines cap The one-seat group. a single to can beallocated that seats of number the capson impose seats nominally group butsimultaneouslyon basisthe proportional allot representation, of category ofvariations in the and Romania, interest,cases thePhilippines represent of The other two countries wherehas itbeen codified asin Mauritius. pre-1982 the numberin deriving the numberof reservedin seats where thatnumbercountries is fixed, butnowhere of seats hadhas arole data iscensus It possible that quite groups. for underrepresented seats reserved initially of allocation determine the to data census usedperiodical explicitly some point, at least at seems flexible.abandonment. As ithappens, Mauritius is only the country identified in this survey has,which Both countries Here,however,1992; Mathur 1997). Iam in moreinterested previous itsthe than arrangement society yet(Christopher well integrated of anexample a heterogeneous, as a success-story, widely now isconsidered country the underway. Indeed, well already time atthe which was data, but this practice has been abandoned in in1982 name the of a nation-building project census gathered based periodically on wasoriginally seats compensatory of The allocation provision create balanced designed to communal representation in the country’s parliament. aspecial in Mauritian system 3,the contains inelectoral As described Chapter detail in threecases turn. other the examining by proceed in Itherefore and detail, Ihave seats addressed already of Maori reserved 55 CEU eTD Collection reservations have beenmade almost entirely in with proportion regards to populationthe of reservationsReservations offive seats or less are prevalent, butin some countries such as Kosovo orIndiaareone-sided. not is picture the substantial.legislatures, in the votes minority of weight of terms In At the socialnumerous for groups which specialthe measure in isintended.Philippines same time, the to accordingbreakdown population the dataabout unavailability of due to left out India is one were In Philippines Bundestag. in addition, the for elections beenactivated neverthe actually of the rareconsidered in study.this Germany from was omitted tablethe asits special mechanism has countries for 20out 22cases of isthe measures described two the presented In Table3datarelating to where minority. a given of share seat and the share population the between relationship the at wemay look or legislature, national inthe votes minority the of weight the at look might we angles: two from approached appropriatenessin of be allocation comparisonthat group’s with size. The issuecan the What probably matters morecases than the absolute number5.4. of seats allocated to a group is the population? group’s the of size the to corresponds that representation of level the in resulted mechanisms innumerical representation special –havethe terms question the group of appropriateness of parties. With explained,in section design Ibrieflythe final options Chapter, of this address is comparatively allocation flexible Completely rare mechanisms. proportional otherwise on andlimits cap of form the limited to countries which use threshold exemptions for minority Appropriateness of seat allocation in the surveyed inthe allocation of seat Appropriateness 56 CEU eTD Collection Poland Pakistan Niger New Zealand Montenegro Mauritius Kosovo Jordan Iraq India Croatia Colombia Afghanistan Table 3:Appropriateness ofseat allocation through the special measures Germans Non-Muslims Tuareg Albanians Sino-Mauritians Population” “General Muslims Hindus Others Serbs Chechens Circassians and Christians Bedouins Tribes Scheduled Castes Scheduled Indigenous peoples Afro-Colombians Kuchis groups Beneficiary Maori Shabak Sabeans Yzidi Christians others and Bosniaks Albanians, others and Roma Slovaks and Czechs Italians Hungarians Serbs Pop. (%) 30.7 16.1 50.3 4.18 16.2 10.5 15.3 0.64 0.02 1.93 0.41 1.32 0.35 0.44 0.37 4.54 2.9 8.2 3.4 0.4 9.3 5.3 1 6 5 5 7 5 3 Chamber 57 545 165 460 113 120 342 120 249 121 325 151 Size 69 81 et# Seat Seat % # 21(5) 11(2) 36(0) 1(0) 41 79 10 10 10 10 1 2 1 8 3 9 9 5 7 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 5 1.45 30.4 15.9 52.2 14.5 7.5 0.6 1.2 0.2 2.5 7.5 7.5 8.3 8.3 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.3 1.5 6* 3 7 4 6 2 +3.32 +0.29 - 0.62 +0.35 +0.28 +0.33 - - 0.34 +0.28 - 1.63 Diff. Ratio Diff. -1.45 - 0.7 - 1.7 - 2.8 - 9.3 - 0.2 - 2.3 - 1.4 - +1.9 +1.5 +1.5 +0.7 +3.3 +1.3 -0.3 -0.2 2.54 - 2 - 1 1.5 0.99 0.99 1.04 1.25 1.79 0.91 1.13 0.18 0.11 1.66 1.19 0.75 0.39 1.59 1.89 0.44 1.71 0.53 0.47 0.16 0.5 2.5 0.9 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.5 15 2 CEU eTD Collection (2012); forJordan: Sweiss (2005); forRomania Protsyk and Matichescu (2010); forVenezuela: Van Cott (2003). India, Kosovo, NewZealand; Serbia, Slovenia, Poland –see Appendix A; forColombia: Bushnell andHudson Sources: Population figures from CIAWorld Factbook (2012);MRGI (2012); exceptAfghanistan, for Croatia, in measure. special numbers the the through allocated Mauritius, seats to For refer brackets Taiwan). Kosovo, (see conflated were groups available was data population detailed no Where text). (see competition electoral regular through won were seats Maori Additional counted. are seats only reserved New Zealand For members. appointed without Singapore for size Legislature elections. 2008 to refer seats where Serbia for except elections; latest the for are figures seat countries all For Notes: Venezuela Taiwan Slovenia Singapore Serbia Samoa Romania Table 3(continued):Appropriateness of seat allocation through thespecial measures communities Indigenous Italians Hungarians Indians and others Malays Hungarians Bosniaks Albanians Non-Samoans Ukrainians Turks Tatars Slovaks / Czechs Serbs Ruthenians Roma Poles Macedonians Jews Russians Lipovan Italians Greeks Germans Croatians Bulgarians Armenians Albanians groups Beneficiary Lowland aborigines Highland aborigines 0.001 0.003 0.008 0.002 Pop. (%) 0.28 0.14 0.11 0.09 2.46 0.01 0.02 0.16 0.01 0.02 0.27 0.03 0.03 0.32 0.11 13.9 3.91 1.82 0.82 0.1 1.5 7.4 9.3 2 58 Chambe r Size r 334 165 250 113 49 90 97 Seat # 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 1 1 6 9 4 2 1 6 Seat 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 1.8 1.1 1.1 1.6 0.8 0.4 5.2 % 4 6 9 +0.292 +0.298 +0.297 +0.299 +0.28 +0.14 +0.29 +0.28 +0.03 +0.27 +0.27 - 2.16 +0.29 +0.02 +0.16 +0.19 +0.21 +0.03 +0.78 +0.99 - 2.31 - 1.02 - 0.42 Diff. - 3.4 - 3.3 - 4.9 +0.2 +3.2 ratio 1.07 2.14 2.73 3.33 0.41 0.44 0.49 0.12 1.87 1.11 37.5 2.91 0.54 0.65 0.65 150 300 100 1.2 2.6 A- 30 15 30 15 10 10 10 3 CEU eTD Collection standards that were employed by institutional designers in the aforementioned countries. aforementioned in the designers institutional by employed were that standards of special rules. However, it is neither an explanation, nor a justification for the minimal invariablyalmostis –thatin strongest factthe true argumentintroduction canbefor that used is This inplace. measures if were nospecial there whatsoever representation parliamentary never might any haveacquired can be groups any argumentOf madethatthese course of underrepresented. somewhat remaining mean always will mechanism special the from benefiting that meant has system, electoral Romanian the of rules special under lists minority national limitimposed on for whom seat one aretheRomanian Roma the group underrepresented like ininterestingjustunder Iraq.Another the existingmeasure, theYzidi an group caseof underrepresentation suffersfrom strong Colombian –Amerindians minority –also group other The population. the of their share to compared when representatives parliamentary most groupareAfro-Colombians grossly underrepresented with 10 times asless Romania. If itis excluded, the ratio falls down to 16 overrepresented minorities out of 42. The case of by deviant skewnessproduced the mostly thisdue to is However, overrepresented. which in is for 3 are Table included 33outof shown a total 60 groups of data the groups. among the ismore common slightly overrepresentation showsthat picture The overall country. the in population Ruthenian of presence the than parliament Romanian in the strong as times – in group presence is the of of overrepresented representative Ruthenians one Romania 300 as mostwell asthe groups numberof overrepresented where thehighest we find inclusivenesshigh itof Romanian measure,special isnotsurprising thatthis is country the the about told already was what Given cases. within and between both differences amazing are there each weseethat group, to assigned seat percentage population and the between the relevant minority. Looking at the last column of Table 3 which represents the ratio 59 CEU eTD Collection the need to make the knowledge about these provisions more readily available to lawmakers. to available more readily provisions these make about knowledge the needthe to confirms only systems across be transferred could heavily criticized wasso measure which a That 2011). basis (Renwick a nationwide on calculated of a Harequota to obtain a quarter manage if they legislature national in the aseat win to able be will lists minority national law, new the Under beacoincidence. hardly can solution Romanian the to whose resemblance minority representation for mechanism a special creates law a which new electoral adopted Hungary half yeara ago about Yet, for selection. littlecapacity so show that mechanisms desirabilitythe special to of The case of commandswith regards Romania caution for. strive always should we something is if overrepresentation however, remains, A question 60 CEU eTD Collection How the How rulespolitical reduced isplayedunder special space game isan and with policy work when areenacted. study at measures andparty competitive forces of special dynamics notGround coveredby for inexploration paperandopen this includes studies further the under specialmeasures. is common surprisingly cases hasacross been that underrepresentation showing performed, analysisappropriateness togroups.Additionally,seats short allocation existing the of of a the choice of groups which may benefit several includingaxes themode of integration of special measures into electoral the system; from the special arrangements along was performed way. Systematization in anda clear coherent delineated designers and ways to allocate systematization of the acquired information was provided, with exact options for institutional a Second 2010). Reynolds 2006; Protsyk (e.g. collections existing similar the to adding depth wasconducted, measures special electoral cases of empirical of survey and comprehensive The contributions of paperinthis the lightitsof defined goalsfirst, werethreefold: adetailed point. starting a forlogical most as place it the appears but representation, ideal descriptive of or phenomenon the to approaches therelevant exhausts noway in representation aspect of descriptive lingual minorities – byspecially representatives. Exploringdesignated the parliamentary descriptive is representation – that representation such of groups, as ethnic, religious or to have assigned practitioners that and from theoreticians importance inquiry type the of stems inproviding groups particular society the with parliamentary representation. The valuethis of withof goal implemented a specific are measures wherespecial countries setof of a particular The aim of this thesis was to add to our knowledge about electoral6. systems through analysis Conclusion 61 CEU eTD Collection future inquirers. future be is therefore stillthe level of open,the system. The withdebate about howmy useful work or but not onlyjeopardizing alsohowprotectingof minority groups, their purpose the at democracy dangerous here special measuresbeing can just defeating elite, thereby of current the interests by the become captured can measures special an offeringthe that shown have Romania, or Singapore of of that as such cases, toolsIndividual measures. special useful to any of preservation and theenactment surround that interests of question is the here explored when it comesminds scientist’s to political the of some desirabilitychange might which to answer question, important or undesirability of special measures. Another alley not fully 62 CEU eTD Collection 2005/CDL-AD%282005%29009-e.asp. http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/ May Accessed:25 2012. Minorities.” Law and National “Electoral 2000. Law). Democracy through for Commission (European Venice Commission http://www.legislationline.org. and“Constitutions” Legislation “Elections”. Accessed:25May. Online. 2012. http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp. Inter-Parliamentary Inter-Parliamentary 2012.“PARLINEUnion (IPU). database 25May Accessed: http://electionguide.org/country.php?ID=195. 2012. for Electoral (IFES).2012.“IFESFoundation International Election Systems Guide.” www.psephos.adam-carr.net. Carr, Adam. 2012 “Adam Carr’s Psephos Election Archive.” Accessed: 25 May. results: and rules For electoral usedfor moreSources than listed “General country one underare Sources”. in creation of thesis. of this in creation were used population and that legislation,results election on online lists sources This section 7. 9 Where bibliographical sources were used, they are listed under “References”. under listed are they used, were sources bibliographical Where Appendix A 9 For easier navigation, the sources are listed on per county basis. General sources 63 ” Accessed:25May. CEU eTD Collection framework/law/electorallaw_eng.pdf?phpMyAdmin=84dcac90c9ded2016426264a0e469bc0. and IFES Translation byUNAMA “Electoral Afghanistan. 2010. Law”[ Commission of Independent Election Indigenous Peoples.”Indigenous Accessed:25May.http://www.minorityrights.org/directory. Minority Rightshttps://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html. Group International Accessed:World “The 25May. Agency(CIA). 2012. Central Factbook”. Intelligence (MRGI).For population data: 2012. “World Directory ofhttp://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2008/CDL-AD%282008%29013-e.asp. MinoritiesDual for PersonsVoting Belonging National to Minorities.” Accessed: 25May 2012. and Venice Commission (European forCommission Democracy Law).2008. “Reportthrough on http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2005/CDL-AD%282005%29009-e.asp. 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