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Strengthening Electoral Processes and Systems throughout the Hemisphere:

The Role of the Media in Electoral Campaigns and the Relationship Between Electoral Management Bodies and Political Parties

Second Inter-American Electoral Training Seminar OAS Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Inter-American Electoral Training Seminar (2nd : 2009 : ) Fortaleciendo los procesos electorales en el hemisferio : el papel de los medios de comunicación en las campañas electorales y la relación entre las autoridades electorales y los partidos políticos = Strengthening electoral processes and systems throughout the hemisphere : the role of the media in electoral campaigns and the relationship between electoral management bodies and political parties / [presentaciones a] la segunda Jornada Interamericana Electoral [la cual] se llevó a cabo en Ciudad de México del 28 de septiembre al 3 de octubre de 2009. p. ; cm. ISBN 978-0-8270-5484-4 1. --Study and teaching--America--Congresses. 2. Political culture--America--Congresses. 3. --Study and teaching--America--Congresses. 4. Press and --Study and teaching--America--Congresses. 5. Electioneering- -Study and teaching--America--Congresses. JF1001 .I58 2009 OEA/Ser.D/XX SG/SAP/III.10.2

Strengthening Electoral Processes and Systems throughout the Hemisphere: The Role of the Media in Electoral Campaigns and Relations Between Electoral Management Bodies and Political Parties

This is a publication of the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States (GS/OAS) in cooperation with the Federal Electoral Institute of Mexico (IFE).

Project Coordination: Betilde Muñoz – Pogossian, Head, Section for Electoral Studies and Projects, Department for Electoral Cooperation and Observation (DECO). Compilation of Report: Claudia Zambra, Consultant, OAS/DECO Editing: Charlotte McDowell, Specialist, Section for Electoral Studies and Projects, Department for Electoral Cooperation and Observation. Spanish Translation: Julia Almaraz Anaya, Dulce Govea Aguilar, and Gibbran Montero, Coordination of International Affairs, IFE. Spanish Editing: Lourdes Gonzalez Prieto, Director of International and Outreach, Coordination of International Affairs, IFE. This publication may not be reproduced in whole or in part without prior written authorization from the GS/OAS.

© General Secretariat of the Organization of American States

This publication was prepared with the financial assistance of the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of the Spanish and the Government of the of America. Index

Foreword ...... i Introduction ...... iii I. The Role of Electoral as Institutions that Strengthen Governability ...... 1 1.1 Electoral Authorities as Institutions that Strengthen Governability: The Case of Mexico ...... 3 1.2 Electoral Authorities as Institutions that Consolidate ...... 9 1.3 Transparency and Accountability of Electoral Authorities ...... 15 II. The Role of the Media in Electoral Campaigns ...... 21 2.1 The Relationship between the Media and Electoral Authorities ...... 23 2.2 The Effect of the Media on Electoral Processes and Governance ...... 29 2.3 Media and Elections in the English-Speaking Caribbean ...... 33 2.4 Case Study: How Manages Media Relations ...... 37 2.5 Country Case Study: New Technologies in the U.S. Electoral Process ...... 41 III. The Relationship between Political Parties and Electoral Authorities ...... 45 3.1 The Relationship between Political Parties and Electoral Authorities: Lessons from the Mexican Case ...... 47 3.2 Transparency and Electoral Legitimacy ...... 53 3.3 Oversight of Electoral Authorities: The Case of Ecuador ...... 57 3.4 The Case of Jamaica: The Role of Political Parties in Overseeing the Electoral ...... 61 3.5 The Case of the Dominican : Legislative over Political Parties ...... 65 IV. Next Steps ...... 67 Appendices

Speaker Biographies ...... 69 Recommended Reading List ...... 73

The Country Profiles were used as a working tool to provide a political, electoral, and institutional over- view of each participating country in the Second Inter-American Electoral Training Seminar. Country Profiles ...... 75 ...... 75 ...... 78 Bahamas ...... 81 Barbados ...... 83 Belize ...... 86 Canada ...... 89 Chile ...... 91 Colombia ...... 93 Costa Rica ...... 96 Dominican Republic ...... 98 Ecuador ...... 101 El Salvador ...... 103 Grenada ...... 105 ...... 107 ...... 109 Jamaica ...... 111 Mexico ...... 113 ...... 115 Paraguay ...... 117 ...... 119 Saint Lucia ...... 122 Suriname ...... 125 Trinidad and Tobago ...... 129 United States of America ...... 131 Uruguay ...... 133 Venezuela ...... 135 Foreword

he First Inter-American Electoral Training Semi- Its goal was to continue to improve institutional ca- nar, held in Mexico in 2008 by the Organiza- pacity within electoral authorities in three key areas: Ttion of American States, the Federal Electoral 1) professionalization through human capacity devel- Institute of Mexico, International IDEA, and the Latin opment; 2) the institutionalization of processes and American School of Social Sciences, was well received best practices; and 3) contributing to the improve- by its participants as the beginning of a continuous ment of technical electoral infrastructure. An im- process of learning and professional development ac- portant addition to the seminar was an element of tivities to build capacity within electoral authorities. capacity building that focused specifically on meth- Following the discussions of the First Inter-American odologies to formulate projects to improve electoral Electoral Training Seminar, there is little doubt that organization and administration. electoral authorities are a fundamental element to democratic consolidation in the Western hemi- The topics of discussion for the Second Inter-Amer- sphere. Members of the Organization of American ican Electoral Training Seminar were chosen by the States have legally prescribed their electoral authori- electoral management authorities themselves from ties as the institutions that guarantee the sovereign amongst several of the most pressing issues they are will of the people by organizing electoral processes facing. A survey conducted among high level repre- in an impartial, efficient and effective manner. In sentatives of the electoral management bodies in the carrying out this important job, electoral authorities identified two priority areas for institutional have identified shortcomings in the administration of development: the role of the media in the electoral electoral processes that they would like to address; process, and the relationship between electoral au- namely, they would like to benefit from greater insti- thorities and political parties. tutional capacity and the professionalization of their roles to enhance their credibility and strengthen This publication documents the primary discus- democratic processes in the region. sions that took place at the Inter-American Electoral Training Seminar in order to continue the debate Building upon this experience, the Second Inter- over these topics as part of the effort to consolidate American Electoral Training Seminar took place in equitable and efficient electoral and democratic Mexico City from September 28 to October 3, 2009. practices.

i

Introduction

Dr. Betilde Muñoz-Pogossian, Head of the Electoral Studies and Projects Section, OAS Department for Electoral Cooperation and Observation

hroughout the Americas, the region is united continuity through the consistent and effective or- in recognizing that elections represent the ganization of elections. Their greatest challenge is Tdemocratic method by which citizens elect effectively carrying out the electoral process itself their leaders. However, in terms of their interpre- while maintaining the trust of both political actors tation and implementation, there are several mod- and the public. The legitimacy of elected officials els in place. In modern times, the electoral process is proportional to the level of trust that political constitutes the closest approximation to a method parties and citizens place in the electoral author- of citizen oversight of the government. Under the ity and its ability to carry out its organizational re- umbrella of democracy, elections are organized, sponsibilities during elections. It is important that carried out, and adjudicated through several dis- leaders throughout the region focus their efforts tinct formal mechanisms and formulas, which cor- on reducing what International IDEA has named respond to different principles. The idea of the this “credibility gap” in electoral authorities. Cred- “democratic guarantee” is inherent to all these ibility gaps can be incredibly damaging to democ- principles, which form the pillars underlying the le- racy, which is one reason why it is important to gitimacy and recognition of elected . professionalize electoral authorities and focus on Democratic principles have common objectives: to building their human capacity. The OAS has taken ensure the legitimating capacity of elections and to a capacity-building approach in order to work with provide with normative importance. the region to close these gaps, with the goal of These elements generally guarantee democratic professionalizing electoral authorities throughout governability. Free and universal elections bring le- the region. gitimacy to elected leaders and to the democratic principles that government represents. Capacity building for electoral management bod- ies is important on several levels, the first of which Within this context, the main role of electoral is human capacity. In other words, it is important management bodies is to guarantee democratic to professionalize electoral institutions and the

iii Introduction

public servants employed by these organizations Electoral authorities should develop mechanisms to ensure the proper administration of electoral to collaborate with the media to ensure respect processes. The second level is institutional devel- for three basic democratic principles: the respon- opment. This implies constant support for the de- sibility to ensure equal access to information, the velopment of legal and organizational frameworks media’s right to inform, and citizens’ right to be in- by which the institution must abide, and which formed. These rights apply equally to political par- public servants can use as a platform to apply ties, candidates and even to electoral authorities. their skills. The third level of capacity building is Both political parties and candidates have a right the provision of technical assistance by promoting to inform the public about their proposals and the exchange of knowledge and experience. This platforms, and electoral authorities should inform includes knowledge sharing on electoral systems the public about the process itself. In carry- and tools, and disseminating technical knowledge ing out these tasks, the relationship between the at the national level, thereby allowing electoral media and electoral authorities is clearly an inter- authorities to fulfill the demands of their citizens. dependent one.

The annual Inter-American Electoral Training Sem- In determining the appropriate mechanisms for inars are a new effort led by the OAS to address collaboration between electoral authorities and these three key issues. The seminars attempt to the media, certain attributes should be considered: strengthen and clarify the roles of electoral au- thorities throughout the continent in a setting that 1. Electoral authorities have their own role benefits from the knowledge of practitioners as as communicators, and should educate well as academics, utilizing a participatory meth- the media on how to present informa- odology. Within this context of horizontal coopera- tion about the democratic process to tion, general frameworks are developed to clearly their audiences. Their role is fundamen- link the strengthening of electoral authorities with tal in educating voters on how to exer- improved governability. The general curriculum of cise their democratic right, and a strategic the seminar is designed to promote professional relationship with the media is beneficial. and academic exchanges along the lines of the two main topics of discussion. 2. Electoral authorities are news in and of themselves. Because the information they This year, the first discussion topic is the relation- manage is in high demand, they must con- ship of the media with electoral authorities and in stantly develop external communications electoral processes. In past years, and in spite of strategies to relay the proper message to the numerous obstacles, throughout the re- media, which will then disseminate to the gion have come to recognize the importance of the public. Electoral authorities should always freedom of expression and freedom of information be prepared to confront information cri- to democratic processes. Therefore, the media’s ses, and to counterbalance the permanent role in the electoral process—as an engine that pro- vulnerability of their image, and therefore vides information to the public about the electoral credibility, which is implied by their role. process as well as keeping citizens responsibly in- formed between elections—was an important topic 3. Electoral authorities should be especially to explore through several angles in this seminar. aware of media advances in the digital age,

iv Introduction

and the appearance of so-called “new me- As the relationship between dia”. People are more informed than ever electoral authorities and political through numerous sources, moving beyond traditional formats such as radio, televi- parties narrows based on mutual sion, and newspapers to the internet and respect and credibility, the electoral other digital media, which has become ex- process will yield optimal results tremely influential in the way that informa- and be universally accepted. tion is both produced and disseminated. On the one hand, as a new world of informa- -Dr. Betilde Muñoz-Pogossian tion has emerged on the internet, the type of available information and its mass dis- tribution provides an opportunity to reach electoral authorities. It is common practice in more voters. On the other hand, this new most democracies for intermediary actors such as media presents a challenge to electoral au- political parties to represent public interests and thorities in regulating the quality of infor- participate on their behalf in political processes. mation. While traditional media are easy In these cases, democracies depend on strong po- to pinpoint, anyone can post information litical parties that represent varied public interests or misinformation on the internet, allow- and provide platforms for the discussion and im- ing various actors to establish their own plementation of policies. While the discussion of agenda. Studies on internet the relationship between political parties and the during electoral periods suggest that this electoral authority often centers on mechanisms is a nascent element in the electoral pro- for oversight of political parties, it also needs to fo- cess that requires significant consideration. cus on how to strengthen political parties’ abilities to represent and interpret the interests of the citi- 4. Lastly, in exploring the intricate relationship zens. When political parties are strong, represen- between electoral authorities and the media, tative entities competing under transparent and it is important to consider the role of media accountable electoral procedures with oversight coverage in influencing electoral campaigns. by the electoral authority, political leadership will One aspect that is frequently debated and of benefit from greater legitimacy. In other words, as growing concern for countries in the region the relationship between electoral authorities and is the role of media in electoral cam- political parties narrows based on mutual respect paigns, given their frequent support for the and credibility, the electoral process will yield opti- incumbent. Another element of concern ex- mal results and be universally accepted. ists in non-electoral periods, when govern- ments are challenged by media groups, mo- The Second Inter-American Electoral Training nopolies or consortia with political agendas Seminar was important in that it brought electoral of their own. The role of the media as a de authorities from the entire region together under facto power in some countries is an impor- one roof. Electoral authority representatives were tant topic for further discussion. able to exchange information and experiences that will deepen the analysis of the practice and The second discussion topic of the seminar was organization of elections in these two key areas. the relationship between political parties and As the primary political forum for the discussion of

v Introduction

regional problems, the OAS’s recent work has vali- toral Institute of Mexico (IFE), the Latin American dated multilateral approaches and negotiations School of Social Sciences (FLACSO), and the In- as a means to achieve and governability. ternational Institute for Democracy and Electoral The Inter-American Democratic is highly Assistance (International IDEA). The immense ef- regarded and respected by its members, and the forts that have gone into the organization of these OAS is committed to the of democratic seminars are paying off, and the discussions and principles, with serious consequences for coun- lessons learned from these seminars are currently tries that violate them. These democratic values being adapted to a virtual format which the orga- include freedom, political pluralism, equality and nizers hope to use as part of a new certificate pro- social . gram on electoral studies. This program would be the first in the region, thereby leading to the con- The Second Inter-American Electoral Training tinued strengthening of regional electoral authori- Seminar was made possible by the cooperation of ties and improved democratic governance. several counterparts, specifically the Federal Elec-

vi I. The Role of Electoral Authorities as Institutions that Strengthen Governability

he evolution of democracy in Latin America tions while ensuring fairness, electoral authorities has been marked by a series of challenges, would benefit from capacity building and profes- Twhose persistence have invariably failed to sional development. Governability, which rests derail the continent from its democratic path. On largely on the government’s legitimacy, is only the other hand, they have shed light on the impor- sustainable when electoral authorities are able to tance of building effective and solid institutions, perform their main duty (delivering elections) in electoral authorities among them, as a means to an effective and credible manner. bring about democratic continuity in spite of the challenges that are inherent to any political sys- What are the characteristics of an electoral author- tem. The frequently independent nature of elec- ity that render it credible? The speakers discussed toral authorities can provide stability, impartiality several of these characteristics in the Inaugural and credibility to most democratic systems. So far, Session of the Second Inter-American Electoral electoral authorities have lived up to the challenge Training Seminar, including: the credibility of elec- in Latin America, as evidenced by the pervasive- toral results; the transparency of the electoral au- ness of democratic rule on the continent, and by thority and its willingness and ability to provide the number of clean, fair elections that take place credible and timely information; the influence of in the region. political parties on the electoral authority, spe- cifically related to its composition or membership; Electoral authorities are responsible for the tran- public knowledge of the electoral process, usu- sition of power that characterizes democratic re- ally encouraged by the electoral authority; and ac- gimes. They provide legitimacy and credibility to countability. the electoral winners, whose recently endowed power reflects the will of the electorate. To fa- Striking the perfect institutional balance to en- cilitate these transitions by enhancing their ca- hance the credibility of electoral authorities is an pabilities to administer complex electoral opera- ongoing, ever-changing process. Electoral authori-

1 I. The Role of Electoral Authorities as Institutions that Strengthen Governability

ties, like other democratic institutions, are faced time to reflect this gradual progression, in terms of with challenges; their inherent challenges should its composition, credibility, transparency and rela- be catalyzed as opportunities for improvement tionship to political parties. As such, this chapter over time. Mexico is an example of a democratic presents both the conceptual overview of these is- system that has gradually moved from one-party sues and details the Mexican case to demonstrate rule to a system of plurality. The nature of its elec- the evolving relationship between electoral au- toral authority has consequently changed over thorities and governability.

2 1.1 Electoral Authorities as Institutions that Strengthen Governability: The Case of Mexico

Dr. Leonardo Valdés Zurita, President Councilor of the Federal Electoral Institute of Mexico

r. Valdés Zurita began his presentation by pointing out that governability, as per Electoral Systems and Governability Dthe definition of Spanish political scientist Manuel Alcántara, is a condition in which national Electoral systems have a direct effect on govern- actors agree to participate in political processes ability in two main ways. First, electoral systems under the established procedures, or rule of .1 allow for the institutional integration of relevant Simultaneously, the must be set by and active political tendencies, or forces, within a institutions that have the capacity to design and implement policies that respond to the needs and demands of those national actors. This interde- pendent cycle is only made possible when demo- 1 Manuel Alcántara Sáez, Gobernabilidad, Crisis y Cambio (Madrid: cratic institutions exhibit certain key attributes, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 1994). such as impartiality and credibility, which in turn 2 The principle of plurality/majority systems is simple. After votes have been cast and totaled, those candidates or parties with the lead to greater governability and legitimacy. Elec- most votes are declared the winners (there may also be additional toral authorities play a role in this cycle as key ac- conditions). However, the way this is achieved in practice varies widely. Five varieties of plurality/majority systems can be identi- tors in the transition of power inherent to every fied: First Past The Post (FPTP), Block Vote (BV), Party Block Vote electoral process. Their ability to successfully carry (PBV), Alternative Vote (AV), and the Two-Round System (TRS). First Past The Post is the simplest form of plurality/majority elec- out their role has a direct impact on governability. toral system. The winning candidate is the one who gains more Their challenges, however daunting, can be use- votes than any other candidate, even if this is not an absolute ma- jority of valid votes. The Two-Round System is a plurality/majority ful over time if they are used to help correct and system in which a second is held if no candidate or party perfect the political institutions in any given coun- achieves a given level of votes, most commonly an absolute ma- jority (50 per cent plus one), in the first election round. The ratio- try. As institutions become more effective and nale underpinning all PR systems is the conscious translation of a their legitimacy is enhanced, citizen buy-in and party’s share of the votes into a corresponding proportion of seats in the . For more information see De- participation also increase, completing the cycle of sign: the New International IDEA Handbook 2005 at http://www. governability. idea.int/publications/esd/.

3 I. The Role of Electoral Authorities as Institutions that Strengthen Governability

country. The representation of different political The single most important factor parties and in the representative bod- that determines the merit of ies of government (i.e. Congress or ) augments governability by making a democracy an electoral system is not the more pluralistic. Mexico’s 2009 legislative elec- system, nor the method, to which tions demonstrated that the country has taken it adheres. It is, instead, its ability yet another step in the direction of pluralism and to clearly identify winners and democratic “normality” by welcoming seven out losers through a legitimate and of Mexico’s eight eligible political parties into the effective electoral process. . -Dr. Leonardo Valdés Zurita Electoral systems tend to follow one of three ma- jor models, whose merits are a source of constant debate: simple majority (also known as first past ties. However, it is the inclusion of impartial and the post), absolute majority, or proportional rep- politically independent representatives that leads resentation.2 Regardless of the model, electoral to greater credibility in electoral processes in gen- systems share the same goals; namely, the regu- eral. Impartial electoral authorities can enhance lation of electoral processes and the adequate the public’s confidence in its democracy, rendering distribution of political representation in each ju- it more legitimate and governable. risdiction. The single most important factor that determines the merit of an electoral system is not the system, nor the method, to which it adheres. It is, instead, its ability to clearly identify winners The Mexican Case: and losers through a legitimate and effective elec- Improving Electoral Legitimacy toral process. The credibility of electoral results is one key ele- The legitimacy of electoral systems is the second ment to the legitimacy of electoral institutions, as way in which they affect governability, as these was the case in Mexico’s 2009 legislative elections. tend to be proportionally related. An elected gov- Its results went largely unquestioned because of ernment is viewed as legitimate when backed by the efficacy of the electoral process, which was an electoral system and institutions that are highly technically and logistically sound, and well execut- trained, with ample experience in running elector- ed by IFE. Credibility was maintained throughout al processes. Institutional legitimacy is essential the electoral process, leading up to the final vote for gaining the public’s trust in its electoral system; count, by a new system called the Programa de when the public is confident in their system, it in- Resultados Electorales Preliminares (Preliminary creases their desire to live in democratic continu- Electoral Results Program, also known as PREP). ity, thereby rendering a system governable. PREP is a system that provides real-time informa- tion on all events during the electoral process, The composition of the electoral authority may including the time when voting centers open and also influence the legitimacy of an electoral sys- close, and that registers and calculates the vote tem. In some countries, electoral authorities are as each voting center transmits its final re- composed of representatives from political par- sults. This new system brought renewed legitima-

4 I. The Role of Electoral Authorities as Institutions that Strengthen Governability

cy to the Mexican electoral process by enhancing mentioned requirements. Although political par- the credibility of electoral results. ties cannot vote, their representatives are allowed to participate in and share their thoughts with the Mexico has yet to overcome several internal ob- General Council, as are Congressmen, who by na- stacles in its path toward democratic governability, ture represent political parties. and several external obstacles, such as the ongo- ing economic crisis. In times of great uncertainty, Due to the emergence of political pluralism in there is a stronger need for legitimate institutions Mexico in the 1990’s, this system guarantees that and elected leaders to become the pillars of a no single party will have enough votes to reach a stable democracy. Electoral authorities must be two-thirds majority, thereby avoiding a one-sided consistently strengthened, trained and improved or “stacked” electoral authority, even with the ex- in order to promote a culture of democracy that istence of these new independent councilors. As will be flexible and strong enough to outlast the a result, at least three of the political parties with challenges that are imposed by domestic and in- congressional representation must achieve con- ternational pressures. sensus in selecting candidates to serve as Electoral Councilors. To a large extent, smaller political par- ties also back these candidates with representa- tion in the Chamber of Deputies. Political Parties’ Influence on the Electoral Authority in Mexico In 2003, when the first independent General Council was up for election, the outgoing Council- Mexico has accumulated significant experience in ors spoke out against the existing model in favor debating the role of political parties in the com- of a more gradual process of Council turnover. The position and operations of its electoral authorities. 1996 reform designated seven-year terms for the The 1996 electoral reform ended a long-standing General Council, with no possibility for reelection. tradition by taking away political parties’ right to Seven-year terms were deliberately chosen in or- elect the leading representatives of the electoral der to avoid overlap with presidential elections, authority. This right was instead transferred to which take place every six years in Mexico. Howev- Congress, where the Chamber of Deputies is re- er, if all nine members were to be replaced at the sponsible for determining the composition of the same time, the General Council would retain no electoral authority (IFE) by a two-thirds majority institutional memory. Under the newly proposed vote among those present on the day of the vote. model, turnover would happen at different times The Deputies themselves nominate potential can- so that experienced councilors would preserve in- didates, but they must fulfill certain criteria: they stitutional knowledge and experience to pass on should not be influential members of a political to incoming members. An unsuccessful informal party, nor have been a director of a , proposal was made before Congress to reform the nor should they have run for public office in recent General Council’s electoral schedule. It was not years. until the 2007 electoral reform that a new system was approved. As a result of the 1996 reform, the General Council of IFE is integrated by one President Councilor and The President Councilor is now elected for six years eight Electoral Councilors who fulfill the above- and is eligible for reelection for a second term.

5 I. The Role of Electoral Authorities as Institutions that Strengthen Governability

The rest of the Council members are elected every party financing. Prior to 2007, oversight activities three years, and may hold office for a maximum were conducted on a yearly basis and sub-con- of nine years. Under the current organization of tracted to external accountants. The 2007 elector- the General Council, one-third of the Council is up al reform limited political parties’ access to private for election in each electoral period, guaranteeing capital, and public financing must exceed private that two-thirds of its members at any given time contributions for any activity. will have at least three years of experience. A new, permanent unit was created within IFE to These examples illustrate the complexity of the exert oversight over the origins, management, and relationship of political parties to the electoral spending of both public and private political party authority in Mexico. While political parties are ac- finances. This Oversight Unit for the Resources tive yet indirect participants in the nomination and of Political Parties is an autonomous, technically election of Electoral Councilors, these individuals specialized unit that reports to the General Coun- must be of an independent nature. In Mexico, the cil and whose sole function is to oversee these electoral authority has undergone a “citizeniza- activities. Since 2007, political parties have been tion” (“ciudadanización”) of sorts as a result of required to submit quarterly financial reports to its composition. “Citizenization” has also resulted the Oversight Unit, and in electoral periods, they naturally in a country like Mexico, which is a fed- must submit detailed pre-campaign and campaign eration of 31 states and one federal . Each expense reports. Irregularities of any nature, from has a local electoral council (which is accounting errors to suspected illicit activity, must elected by the General Council), where political be reported to the General Council, which has the parties also have vocal participation but no right right to impose sanctions on political parties. to vote. A total of 300 follow a similar structure with the composition of district electoral The relationship between IFE and political parties councils. In addition, every council member is a was further modified in 2007 as IFE was given the career civil servant whose performance, indepen- institutional responsibility for arbitrating compe- dence and impartiality undergo frequent evalua- tition and electoral campaigns. The electoral re- tions. Therefore, although political parties do par- form imposed strict limitations on the nature and ticipate in the activities of the electoral authority, financing of campaign advertising, including the IFE has gradually emerged through its numerous use of air-time on electronic media outlets, limita- reforms as an institution of the Mexican people. tions on the content, placement, and raw materi- als (such as paper, cardboard, plastic) used in ad- vertisements, etc. Strict rules are in place to keep visual, as well as environmental contamination at Electoral Authority Oversight of a minimum during electoral campaigns. IFE was Political Parties in Mexico always responsible for overseeing electoral adver- tising, but in 2007 its role was extended to make IFE’s relationship with political parties extends be- rulings on and impose sanctions on any legitimate yond its role as the electoral institution in charge violations. of organizing elections. While local and district electoral councils are active only during electoral The procedure established under the 2007 reform periods, the General Council is a permanent organ has been subject to much debate. When accusa- whose duties include the supervision of political tions or complaints are brought before IFE, it has

6 I. The Role of Electoral Authorities as Institutions that Strengthen Governability

five days to investigate and adjudicate the case. A Allowing citizens and political formal complaint is followed by a preliminary in- vestigation in order to assess its validity. If a case parties to voice their opinions is accepted, the relevant parties are contacted to and concerns is essential, but prepare for a brief hearing in 48 hours. After the these voices should fall on the hearing is over, the Executive Secretary has 24 impartial and independent ears hours to render its decision to the interested par- of the electoral authority, which ties, and impose sanctions where relevant. This is ultimately responsible for new sanctioning process forced the General Coun- maintaining fairness, equality, and cil to double the number of sessions it held during legitimacy in the electoral system. the 2009 legislative elections. Compared to previ- ous elections, IFE spent twice as much time inves- -Dr. Leonardo Valdés Zurita tigating complaints and adjudicating cases. This led to some controversy, as many believe that the five-day period is too brief, whereas others believe that a judicial body, and not an administrative one Conclusion like IFE, should have the to try these cases. It is worth noting that the majority of cases Governability goes hand in hand with legitimacy, were related to the misuse of electronic media without which a democratic system cannot endure advertising. the numerous challenges it faces. An electoral sys- tem is legitimate and credible when supported The 2007 reform completely changed the role of by a competent, impartial and effective electoral the media in electoral processes by prohibiting authority. In turn, credible electoral results bring political parties from purchasing airtime on radio about public confidence in the electoral system and television. Radio and television airtime is now and its leaders, and allow for democratic continu- granted freely to all contenders, and IFE’s role is ity. In Mexico, there have been ongoing efforts to to administer and allocate airtime under the prin- improve the quality of the electoral authority, IFE, ciples of equality and fairness. Under the new to render it a more credible and legitimate institu- formula, 30 percent of all slots are divided equally tion in the eyes of the public and the country’s po- amongst all the contenders. The remaining 70 per- litical actors. A delicate balance is always at stake cent is distributed proportionally in accordance between the roles and responsibilities of the elec- with the number of votes received by each party toral authority and other essential actors in the po- in the previous election. New political parties are litical process, namely political parties, the media, granted airtime, but only their share of the 30 per- and voters. Allowing citizens and political parties cent that is divided equally amongst all parties. to voice their opinions and concerns is essential, Airtime runs from 6 a.m. to 12 a.m. daily. IFE is not but these voices should fall on the impartial and only in charge of verifying that political parties ad- independent ears of the electoral authority, which here to their airtime allocations, but also monitors is ultimately responsible for maintaining fairness, media compliance with the new rules. equality, and legitimacy in the electoral system.

7

1.2 Electoral Authorities as Institutions that Consolidate Governance

Dr. Rafael Roncagliolo, Director, International IDEA Peru

r. Roncagliolo began his presentation by Development Program (UNDP), the International mentioning that International IDEA is an Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), and oth- Dintergovernmental organization with an ers hosted an event on the subject of electoral exclusive mandate to support the consolidation authorities as institutions of governance. The con- of democracy around the world. Created in 1995 clusion that was reached ten years ago was that as an of several Scandinavian countries, democratic governance would benefit by strength- it is now a global organization. IDEA’s work re- ening electoral authorities and turning them into volves around three fundamental themes: the permanent and independent institutions of the improvement of electoral, political and govern- executive branch. At this time, the field ofelec- ment systems. Aside from electoral reforms and toral institutional development was nascent, but collaborative work, IDEA also has a strong focus nonetheless, it became an important one in stud- on constitutional reform, or the reform of govern- ies on democratic consolidation. As a universal ment systems. The latter has become a topic of tendency emerged to embed these institutions great importance in Latin America in recent years, into democracies as permanent and independent as many countries are contemplating or imple- bodies, there was greater professional specializa- menting these types of reforms. tion on the subject.

It is interesting to note that when these studies took place ten years ago, 70 percent of the elec- Electoral Authorities and Governance toral authorities in Latin America were indepen- in Comparative Perspective dent. Those few exceptions included some mixed institutions, in Argentina and other countries, Studies on the contribution of electoral authorities where part of the electoral authority depended to democratic consolidation commenced many on the government. Clearly, though, Latin America years ago. As far back as 1999, the was the most advanced region in this respect. In

9 I. The Role of Electoral Authorities as Institutions that Strengthen Governability

Africa, 53 percent of electoral authorities were in- and , date back to that time. Although dependent and 52 percent in the Middle East. The many of these party systems are presently in crisis, numbers were much lower in North America and they follow a long tradition that distinguishes Latin Europe, where only 14 percent of countries had America from other . independent electoral authorities. In these coun- tries, however, there was much less debate about With its numerous instances of and one- the potential role of these institutions because sided parliamentary procedures that adjudicated these democracies were characterized by great- elections, a second wave of democracy emerged in er consensus. In other words, there was limited Latin America around the 1920s. This second wave discussion on electoral issues, whereas in Latin was characterized by the creation of strong elec- America, the opposite was true. It was considered toral authorities that were put into place to end that independent institutions provided greater le- these anti-democratic practices. In 1924, Uruguay gitimacy to a system, especially in younger or un- adopted the Corte Electoral (Electoral ) and stable democracies, and studies showed that inde- the Registro Cívico Nacional (National Civic Reg- pendent institutions were also more cost effective. istry). In 1930, Peru declared its Jurado Nacional de Elecciones (National Elections ) as a fourth branch of the government. These were among the first electoral authorities in the region. The no- Historical Context of Democratic tion that electoral authorities could be the fourth Progress in Latin America branch of government began to take hold, but a wave of coups then swept the region. Nev- Before examining the inherent challenges to ertheless, some electoral authorities, like those strengthening electoral authorities, it is impor- of Chile and Uruguay, managed to survive these tant to discuss the historical context of democratic coups because of their outstanding legitimacy. progress in Latin America. While many consider Latin America’s democracies to be new, this per- The third wave of democracy in Latin America ception is incorrect. Upon closer examination of commenced around 30 years ago in the Dominican the history of democratic processes, Latin America Republic and Ecuador. In 1978, only four countries followed only the first European democracies and in the region did not have military governments: the United States. Democracy in Latin America is Mexico, Costa Rica, Colombia and Venezuela. now, in fact, almost 200 years old. Although this The latter two were considered democracies, but democratic history encountered considerable ob- these democracies rested on non-inclusive, tran- stacles, it remains a history of democracy. sitional political pacts that brought their military governments to an end. They provided stability, The 19th Century in Latin America was character- but their non-inclusive nature bred a great deal ized, by and large, by military , but of corruption and disabled these countries from also by many nascent electoral processes and broadening their political and democratic spec- the emergence of several political parties. Some trum, resulting in political crises several years of the oldest political parties in the world are in down the line. During this third wave, the central Latin America, for example the Liberal Party in Co- topic of discussion regarding Latin America was lombia, which was founded in 1849. Party systems the concept of free and fair elections. It was this in several countries, including Uruguay, Paraguay collective concern that brought about reflection

10 I. The Role of Electoral Authorities as Institutions that Strengthen Governability

on the role of electoral authorities and their role in As leaders seek to reinstate strengthening democracy. During this period, sev- reelections or legalize them for eral other institutions, such as central banks and ombudsmen, were strengthened and made inde- the first time, in some cases pendent. Spain’s under Franco served successive reelection, there is as a guide for many of the new that heightened concern about keeping were born during this period. checks on the executive power. Independent electoral authorities are one of the institutions that can keep the executive power Current Challenges for Electoral Authori- in check, at least through its ties as Institutions of Governance control of electoral processes.

Today, due to the evolving nature of electoral -Dr. Rafael Roncagliolo authorities, the challenges are somewhat differ- ent. Electoral authorities have become one of the fundamental pillars of representative democracy, with two plausible explanations: their legal auton- on special interest groups as a result of new omy, and/or that they have developed into socially that regulate financing for political par- legitimate and credible institutions. Regardless of ties. Some countries maintain mixed formu- the reason, they are now central to democratic las for party financing, including public and “guarantees” in a representative system. Some of private resources, whereas in other coun- the following concerns are at the forefront of to- tries, political parties are prohibited from day’s discussions on the current and evolving role accepting private funds. of electoral authorities: 3. Appropriate regulations for electoral cam- 1. Control over the executive branch is a grow- paign financing are a work in progress. ing concern in the midst of an ongoing wave of reelections throughout the region. As 4. Appropriate regulations or formulas for me- leaders seek to reinstate reelections or le- dia access during electoral campaigns also galize them for the first time, in some cases continue to be a challenge. successive reelection, there is heightened concern about keeping checks on the ex- 5. Civic education has become, and will likely ecutive power. Independent electoral au- remain to be a major concern for electoral thorities are one of the institutions that can authorities. Encouraging democratic values keep the executive power in check, at least in society is essential but costly. It also cov- through its control of electoral processes. ers a wide spectrum, ranging from the edu- cation of citizens that staff electoral centers 2. There is a crisis of political power, due in during elections, to more permanent civic part to legislative exuberance, which has led education for all citizens. The promotion of to more and more restrictions on political democratic culture is a central responsibility parties. Political parties depend increasingly of electoral authorities, which are now per-

11 I. The Role of Electoral Authorities as Institutions that Strengthen Governability

manent organisms and therefore must fulfill More equitable elections, whereby this duty between electoral periods. candidates have equal access to 6. In dozens of countries, electoral authorities financial resources and media can undertake legislative . In other coverage, lead to more free and countries, such as Costa Rica, they do not fair elections. As the authorities have the power to make legislative initia- on electoral matters, electoral tives, but they are able to intervene in leg- management bodies should take islative processes. In the first group of coun- a leading role in shaping the tries, Congresses must consult with electoral electoral code and proposing authorities when they are debating electoral on how to better perform legislation. Where governments allow elec- its functions, thereby creating a toral authorities to take legislative initiative, stronger democratic system. the message is clear: electoral authorities are not only responsible for electoral orga- -Dr. Rafael Roncagliolo nization and , but also for the development of the . They can support and encourage legislation not sources and media coverage, lead to more free only in regulatory matters, but legislative and fair elections. As the authorities on electoral ones, which can eventually translate to con- matters, electoral management bodies should stitutional matters. take a leading role in shaping the electoral code and proposing legislation on how to better per- form its functions, thereby creating a stronger democratic system. Considerations for Improving Elec- tions and Governance Second, politics needs to break its dependence on special interest groups. This is a central problem In trying to overcome these challenges, there that stems from the current crisis that political are several other factors to consider. First, and parties are undergoing. In the past, political par- in spite of these challenges, Latin America gen- ties would choose their candidates based on their erally has clean elections. There have certainly political skills and experience. Today, they choose been controversial ones, but this is an expected the candidates who can potentially attract or con- outcome of close elections. Unfortunately, con- tribute the most money for the campaign and the troversy tends to have a negative impact on the party. In the past, party politics consisted of a ca- legitimacy of electoral authorities. Nonetheless, reer path whereby party members sought to even- the predominance of clean elections has been an tually become members of Congress; today, party important accomplishment for the region. Build- membership is based more on an individual’s mon- ing on that record, elections still need to be more etary contribution to the party. This pattern is not free and fair. This concept is not black and white, as widespread among the older political circles as as there are varying degrees of freedom, fairness among new parties and younger politicians. Past and justice. More equitable elections, whereby dreams of owning a home, or starting a non-gov- candidates have equal access to financial re- ernmental organization, were replaced with the

12 I. The Role of Electoral Authorities as Institutions that Strengthen Governability

dream of having one’s own political party. While Lastly, and most importantly, governments continue to view political parties as electoral authorities should focus on the main contenders in the political arena, and consistently promote legislation to control these consolidating democracy through parties, these are no longer the real competitors. the legitimacy of results. Democratic Electoral authorities should keep this in mind as governments gain legitimacy not they invent and implement new regulations to only through the electoral process, provide all electoral contenders with equal access but by following through on the to resources. delivery of their promises.

Third, electoral authorities must not shy away -Dr. Rafael Roncagliolo from participatory elements in a representative democracy. Representative democracy is not at odds with the principles of participatory democra- decrease inequality, and this has been one of its cy; they are, in fact, complementary. For example, greatest failures. While electoral authorities are the electoral authority of Ecuador is in the process not directly responsible for the legitimacy of re- of developing the standards and rules for a merit- sults, they do have a role to play. In 2004, UNDP based competition through which they will elect published a report on the state of democracy in the members of a new citizens’ participatory coun- Latin America, whose conclusion was that most cil. Electoral authorities, as in the case of Ecuador, countries in the region had electoral democracies, must adapt to changing circumstances because but not citizens’ democracies.4 It remains true that democracy is a dynamic process whose actors are electoral democracy is the main area of compe- constantly in flux, as per Norberto Bobbio’s defini- tence and responsibility of electoral authorities. tion of democracy.3 Representative democracy has However, as they evolve, they should consider ad- been subject to many changes over time, which vancing toward better political systems and quality the founding fathers of American democracy could representative systems with sound political agen- never have foreseen. When representative gov- das. Otherwise, the legitimacy “deficit” is bound ernments face a crisis of legitimacy, there is an op- to increase. Electoral authorities should be more portunity to open up the political system, increase ambitious and take on the responsibility for devis- participation, and steer the government back in ing policies to improve democratic governance, in- the direction of a truly representative system in cluding the quality of democracy as measured by line with the evolving needs of its citizens. its results.

Lastly, and most importantly, electoral authorities should focus on consolidating democracy through the legitimacy of results. Democratic governments gain legitimacy not only through the electoral pro- cess, but also by following through on the delivery of their promises. The failure to deliver has been 3 Bobbio, Norberto; The Future of Democracy (Great Britain: Uni- one of representative democracy’s greatest prob- versity of Minnesota Press, 1987). lems in Latin America. Decades of democratic rule 4 United Nations Development Program, Democracy in Latin in the region have done little to reduce poverty or America: Towards a Citizens’ Democracy (Buenos Aires: Aguilar, Altea, Taurus, Alfaguara, S.A., 2004).

13

1.3 Transparency and Accountability of Electoral Authorities

Dr. Francisco Valdés Ugarte, President of the Superior Council, Latin American School of Social Sciences (FLACSO)

n his presentation, Dr. Valdés Ugarte began removed from the functions of their government. by pointing out that transparency and ac- This would hardly fulfill the ideal of a citizens’ de- Icountability are essential elements to a well- mocracy. Democratic representation, therefore, functioning government, and to the electoral depends on the coexistence of both. Naturally, authorities who legitimate it. Both are delicate this coexistence depends strongly on how well matters in the electoral arena, where the elec- transparency and accountability are conceptual- toral authority is responsible for providing justice ized in the public sphere, and then translated into for citizens through transparent and accountable legislation. The devil is in the details, and the de- elections which bring legitimacy and quality to tails can determine whether or not a government elected governments. Transparency and account- effectively abides by these concepts. ability are different concepts, even though they are strongly interrelated. Their complementa- rities are best understood by exploring their dif- ferences in greater detail. Dr. Valdés Ugalde de- Transparency: tailed their distinctions, their relationship to one Citizen Access to Public Information another, and their roles as essential components to modern democracy. Democracies often institutionalize transparency through legislation that regulates the govern- Transparency without accountability represents a ment’s need to provide accurate and timely in- violation of citizens’ democratic rights. A govern- formation to its citizens. In other words, trans- ment can make information available to its citi- parency is frequently equated with the right to zens and exhibit transparent behavior, but with information about the government and the politi- no real legitimacy in terms of accountability for cians who administer it. The right to information its actions. Accountability without transparency targets the citizen as its main subject or benefi- is also possible, and its effect is to keep citizens ciary. In some countries, however, the term citi-

15 I. The Role of Electoral Authorities as Institutions that Strengthen Governability

zen can be rather exclusive, since it does not en- In Mexico, the push toward compass minors who should have equal access to information, even if they do not yet have the right greater transparency through to vote. There are limits to the manner by which its legal institutionalization has one can prescribe the right to transparency. Fun- marked the clear distinction damentally, the concept should be governed by between Mexico’s authoritarian laws, incentives and procedures that will instruct past and its democratic present. both government and citizens to provide and ob- tain the information they desire. -Dr. Francisco Valdés Ugarte

In Mexico, it was not until the approval in 2002 of the Law of Transparency and Access to Public Information (Ley Federal de Transparencia y Ac- ceso a la Información Pública Gubernamental) Access to Public Information in Mexico that any regulation changed the government’s behavior in the direction of greater transpar- As information flows have increased, the govern- ency. The only exception was Mexico’s electoral ment has categorized information into three sep- authorities, which prior to this law had a direct arate groups. The first group comprises personal relationship with citizens. In Mexico, the push data, and this type of information is not publicly toward greater transparency through its legal accessible to anyone except the concerned indi- institutionalization has marked the clear distinc- vidual. The second group comprises information tion between Mexico’s authoritarian past and its that the state regards as confidential and with- democratic present. holds for reasons of national security. The third group comprises all other information, which can In his upcoming book, Dr. Valdés Ugalde will ex- be requested by any individual through the le- plore state reform in Mexico. He concludes that gally established mechanisms. This type of infor- Mexico’s democracy consists of a number of mation is wide-ranging and may include, for ex- flexible elements, but the only two which dis- ample, data on how political parties utilize public tinguish it from an authoritarian government funds during an election. are the following: new legislation that regulates the electoral process and the , and At the federal and state level, IFE and other par- legislation which grants citizens access to public ties involved in the electoral process, such as information. Mexico’s transparency law was de- electoral , comply satisfactorily with in- rived from its Constitution, which stipulates that formation requests. IFE is in charge of tracking citizens have the right to information. There are public information requests and also keeps track two separate institutes that deal with transpar- of its responses. Although it demonstrates a clear ency issues, at the federal and state levels, which willingness to comply with these requests, it has facilitate the flow of information and respond to problems fulfilling its role on an organizational citizens’ requests. level. Not only does IFE process huge amounts of information and data, but also much of it is highly technical with respect to the role and behavior of the media during an election, campaign financing

16 I. The Role of Electoral Authorities as Institutions that Strengthen Governability

and spending, etc. In addition, there is no way to Accountability is really an filter requests for public information, since they need have no justification. In order to process equilibrium function between and share information of such a technical nature, government institutions and powers, IFE needs to have specialized personnel and a ro- whereby each one is submitted bust budget to support this function. A second to the oversight of others. limitation is IFE’s internal capacity to process and deliver the requested information, which usually -Dr. Francisco Valdés Ugarte comes from a secondary source, such as politi- cal parties. There are no mechanisms by which to hold secondary sources accountable for the man- many in Latin America, are subject to legislation ner in which they present the requested infor- that was formulated in less democratic times. mation to the IFE. This causes significant disrup- They lack accountability because the laws were tions in the flow of information from the original formulated in times when accountability was eas- source to the final recipient. ily evaded or in less demand.

Second, government institutions whose main purpose is to provide oversight should have the Accountability and autonomy and obligation to act impartially and Intra-Governmental Oversight beyond their personal interests. If this type of be- havior is not compulsory under the law, it leaves Accountability, like transparency, works in favor considerable loopholes for impunity. of the citizen, who is supposed to be the “boss” of an elected government. However, this rela- Third, it is absolutely necessary that legal trans- tionship tends to be inverted for numerous rea- gressions are in equilibrium with their respective sons, efficiency chief among them. Accountability punishment. Legislation should provide disin- is really an equilibrium function between gov- centives for legal transgressions and go hand in ernment institutions and powers, whereby each hand with exemplary sanctions whose costs far is submitted to the oversight of others. Some outweigh the benefits of the violation. Other- institutions are created exclusively to serve the wise, it is preferable to break the law and assume role of watchman, but these institutions must be the penalty. This relationship applies equally to equally scrutinized. The roles of each institution electoral competition, where political parties and should be clearly spelled out in the law to avoid candidates are more likely to break the law if it ambiguities and loopholes, whether these are de is ambiguous, lacks clarity, or the ensuing pun- facto, de jure, or interpretable. Ambiguity and ishment is insignificant compared to the gains. loopholes create incentives for distortion, misin- Achieving accountability is considerably more terpretation and non-compliance with the law. complex than achieving transparency.

There are three important considerations that underlie accountability. First, legislative quality is essential in making governments accountable to their citizens. Modern democracies, including

17 I. The Role of Electoral Authorities as Institutions that Strengthen Governability

and pluralism, there was a parallel deterioration The Balance of Powers and in the legitimacy of the electoral authority. Accountability in Mexico The accountability of electoral authorities is sub- In Mexico, the balance of power between insti- ject to several considerations: tutions has changed considerably, with visible ef- fects on accountability. The balance of power be- 1. Electoral authorities should evaluate tween the electoral authority and Congress has whether or not political parties should par- been transformed by the current system of politi- ticipate in their decision-making body. Ac- cal representation. As Mexican politics struggled cording to Dr. Valdés Ugalde, political par- to overcome a situation in which most parties ties should not be involved. were subject to the partial and imbalanced gov- ernance of one , the public began to 2. Electoral authorities should not be subject rely on IFE as a respected, autonomous institu- to the control of or illegitimate tion that satisfied the Mexican public’s needs. powers or interests such as special interest That benefit, however, brought about a new set groups or the media. of problems, namely the strengthening of politi- cal parties. With a divided Congress, the legisla- 3. Electoral authorities should avoid interfer- tive function has gained much power over the ence by other state or political powers, such executive and . Deep congressional party as political parties, private corporations, the divisions gave birth to a system of representative executive branch and the president. quotas for political parties. 4. The designation of members of the elector- Now that greater equilibrium has been reached al authority should take into consideration among parties, their interests are more ambi- the political circumstances in the country. tious, particularly in regard to the selection of In Mexico, Congress is in charge of electing individuals to serve in the state’s autonomous in- IFE’s General Council. Therefore, these des- stitutions. It seems, therefore, that under anoma- ignations are tied to party divisions within lous democratic conditions (i.e. single party rule), Congress. If there is a fragile or catastrophic the referee was unquestioned. Under normal representative equilibrium, the designated democratic conditions, the anomaly is that every- members of the electoral authority could one wants to question, to be the referee, and to affect the medium and long-term legitima- interfere in decisions, even if they themselves are cy of the electoral authority, regardless of the players in question. the efficacy of its design.

In the 2006 elections, this situation reached a cli- The latter point makes reference to the single max. The autonomy and impartiality of the elec- most important problem with democracy, which toral authority came into question because, with- is its ability to be truly representational. Partici- in an electoral system that has no runoff vote, the patory democracy is an option that should be ex- results of the election were so close and the op- ercised in certain areas, but Latin America is still posing parties were so ideologically opposed. As in the early stages of achieving truly representa- Mexican democracy reached greater openness tive democracy.

18 I. The Role of Electoral Authorities as Institutions that Strengthen Governability

There are two main deficiencies that are respon- be autonomous in order to exhibit transparency sible for this fragility of participatory democracy, and accountability, and encourage a system that specifically in the areas of education and auton- is more representational and legitimate. In order omy. When educational levels are extremely pre- to achieve that, electoral authorities should be carious, this affects a country’s democratic and able to impose mechanisms for transparency and political culture. Simplistic political cultures lead accountability on its main stakeholders: political to weak representation and affect the quality of parties, the media, and the citizens. democracy. Secondly, electoral authorities should

19

II. The Role of the Media in Electoral Campaigns

s a public institution, and given its respon- efforts at transparency and credibility. Similarly, sibilities not only to disseminate electoral the media is a tool for large scale dissemination of Ainformation and determine electoral re- electoral information to the public. As a result, the sults, but also to encourage civic electoral educa- management and coordination of this relation- tion, the electoral authority takes on a very public ship is a critical aspect of the functioning of elec- role. Its relationship with the media is therefore toral authorities throughout the hemisphere, and essential to the effective dissemination of its mes- an essential point for strengthening the electoral sages. However, unlike the electoral authority, the process. media is not, despite its public character, a public good. In Latin America, the media is usually pri- As such, the presentations in this chapter reflect vately owned, has its own political interests, and the idea that, rather than disallow the media from therefore represents one more actor in the elec- providing coverage during the electoral process, toral process. Its ability to reach wide audiences electoral authorities should formulate solutions makes it a powerful actor, at that, capable of set- or regulations to procure balanced coverage dur- ting the mood for an election. The media deter- ing electoral processes. In doing so, electoral au- mines who, what, and how they will cover an elec- thorities in each country should be mindful of the toral process, the effect of which spills over onto political context within which they and the media the general public’s opinion. operate.

As such, the relationship between the media and In this chapter, Dr. Rafael Roncagliolo of Interna- electoral authorities can become delicate and tional IDEA and Dr. Raul Trejo of the Universidad even contentious during the electoral campaign. Autónoma Nacional de México provided a general Nonetheless, this relationship also has a poten- overview of this relationship and its implications tially positive dynamic in which the media serve for governance throughout the region. In addition, as a helpful ally to electoral authorities in their as Mr. Wesley Gibbings explained in his presenta-

21 II. The Role of the Media in Electoral Campaigns

tion on Media and Elections in the English-speak- the media relations strategy of Canada’s electoral ing Caribbean, media regulation is something that authority, which has led to a streamlined, trans- needs to be weighed carefully depending on the parent relationship. Lastly, Gineen Beach of the context, given potential negative effects on access U.S. Federal Electoral Commission, discussed the to information. John Enright, Director of Media impact of the media on U.S. elections, with a spe- Relations at Elections Canada, explained in detail cial emphasis on the role of new technologies.

22 2.1 The Relationship between the Media and Electoral Authorities

Dr. Rafael Roncagliolo, Director, International IDEA Peru

r. Roncagliolo opened the discussion about the media’s relationship with electoral au- Types of Media Relations Dthorities by focusing on two main subjects: with Electoral Authorities the character of this relationship during electoral periods, and the different models that are used to The media relates to electoral authorities in four distribute media access to candidates and parties different ways. The first is the electoral authority during electoral campaigns. as a subject for media coverage. Because the elec- toral authority is often the source of news in itself, In Latin America and other regions around the its relationship with the media should be transpar- world, politics have undergone a privatization of ent and collaborative. The second is the electoral sorts, with special interests gaining the upper hand authority as an influential agent over the media. in politics. The media is one of these special inter- The third is the media as a tool for transmitting ests, or de facto powers, and is as powerful as the and diffusing not just news, but also information electoral authority in many countries. The elector- about the electoral process. Lastly, electoral au- ate receives numerous promises from candidates thorities can relate to the media as agents charged that are running for office, from governments that with oversight capacities. Regardless of the type are trying to maintain support and from special of relationship between these two actors in a par- interests and the media with their own agendas. ticular country, the inherent challenges to all such Electoral authorities, in theory, are removed from relationships include transparency, independence, these other actors because it is their role to act as openness, collaboration, training, dissemination the referee. This is particularly true of its relation- and oversight. ship with the media, which is one of the most im- portant of the de facto forces in any system. The media stands side by side with other ac- tors who try to exert influence over an election, namely candidates and political parties, but they

23 II. The Role of the Media in Electoral Campaigns

Regardless of the type of The media is responsible for setting relationship between these two the tone during an election and actors in a particular country, determining the electoral landscape the inherent challenges to upon which candidates compete. all such relationships include transparency, independence, -Dr. Rafael Roncagliolo openness, collaboration, training, dissemination and oversight. authorities view the media not only as an agent -Dr. Rafael Roncagliolo that transmits information to an audience, but also as actors in the electoral process. also act in parallel to the electoral authority be- There are two separate theories of communica- cause they like to think of themselves as referees tions regarding the effect of the media on the in the electoral process. The media is respon- population. The first theory is that the media be- sible for setting the tone during an election and haves like a hypodermic needle that introduces determining the electoral landscape upon which ideas with absolute authority and omnipotence candidates compete. In trying to conceptualize for a direct, immediate and powerful effect on its the ideal relationship between electoral authori- audience.5 This theory has been disproven over ties and the media during electoral processes, Dr. time because the media is clearly not omnipotent Roncagliolo gave the following six warnings for nor can it control every outcome in an election. consideration: For example, in Peru’s 2000 electoral election, the media was strongly in favor of Vargas Llosa; it was 1: Media as an Actor with Interests Fujimori, however, who won the election. The me- dia is in fact considered impotent at times because The media is not neutral; they have interests and it is merely capable of informing the public about positions and will try to steer electoral processes situations that have already taken place, rather in favor of these interests. As such, the media than instigating them. acts in a similar way to a candidate or political party. Legislation in some parts of the world has The fact is, the media is neither omnipotent nor tried to counterbalance the nature of media bias. impotent; it is responsible for agenda setting In Europe, constitutions incorporate neutrality above all else. Once they set the agenda, any can- and pluralism of information as criteria for me- didate not included in that agenda is practically in- dia coverage, and specify that the role of the me- existent. Their ability to set the agenda also means dia should be pluralistic, presenting a balance of that if there is a diverse or pluralistic media, sever- opinions whereby different tendencies neutralize each other. In the United States, there is a culture of checks and balances that tries to balance out media bias. In Latin America, however, there are 5 Davis, D.K. & Baron, S.J. (1981). A History of Our Understanding of Mass Communication. In: Davis, D.K. & Baron, S.J. (Eds.). Mass no mechanisms to make the media a more neutral Communication and Everyday Life: A Perspective on Theory and force. Therefore, it is fundamental that electoral Effects (19-52). Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing.

24 II. The Role of the Media in Electoral Campaigns

al agendas will be exposed at once to balance out in an environment where the news is focused on the information. The real problem, therefore, is the “bad” and not the “good”. The candidates’ or in countries with media monopolies, duopolies or political parties’ platforms are not profitable news; oligopolies in which the breadth of media agendas it is the face of the candidate. Because the media is extremely limited. This usually results in dispro- will always outlast politicians, and is allegedly im- portionate media coverage of a particular candi- partial, it is generally more powerful than politi- date, or worse yet, disproportionate propaganda cians and the parties that stand behind them. against a candidate. Media empires usually act like impartial observers in the electoral process, but 4: Power regarding Legitimacy they remain powerful actors. The media tend to have more power than electoral 2: Competition with the Electoral Authority authorities in this regard. When electoral authorities question the legitimacy of the media, the first defense The media tries to compete with electoral authori- tactic is normally to attack the legitimacy of the elec- ties and act as the sole and accurate interpreter toral authority. The latter’s reputation is more delicate. of public sentiment. They assume they have the 5: Media Interests and Influence ability to interpret the sentiments of an entire (na- tional) population and will not desist from airing The media’s actions are not guided by the same these unsubstantiated messages. The media also logic as the electoral authority, whose purpose is keeps careful watch over the actions of electoral to serve the public good. The media is not a public authorities and behaves like a pressure group that good, although it is often perceived as such. In the aspires to the role of referee over both the elec- Peruvian presidential elections in 2000, Alberto toral process and the electoral authorities. The re- Fujimori’s second reelection, all of the television lationship, therefore, is competitive. stations in the country decided to ban electoral propaganda for any presidential candidate. The 3: Competition with other Actors reason for this decision was supposedly to uphold the freedom and equality of expression. Candi- The media also competes with other actors in dates were not even allowed paid advertising dur- the electoral process, especially political parties. ing the campaign. Political parties are currently undergoing a crisis, and part of that crisis stems from Latin America’s Fujimori, however, as the incumbent, was the cultural and communications landscape. This land- only one who had access to television spots. The scape is the result of the emerging media culture in legitimacy and fairness of this electoral process the region, which has crowded out the old political obviously came into question. After Fujimori left culture of political meetings, halls and other the country and went into exile, a roundtable dia- techniques for introducing candidates to the pub- logue was led by the OAS to discuss the conditions lic. That culture has been replaced by the mercan- for the next elections, with the goal of correcting tile logic of television and radio media, to whom the obvious distortions in the electoral process of news is not a public good, but rather a source of 2000. The government, the opposition and mem- profit. Scandals and spectacles make for the most bers of participated in the roundtable. profitable kind of news, and politics has taken on At first, all political parties were in favor of a sys- these same characteristics in order to stay afloat tem comprising free, regulated airtime for politi-

25 II. The Role of the Media in Electoral Campaigns

cal advertising in the 2001 elections. The following III = Panama day, they changed their minds and opted instead IV = , Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru for unlimited, paid advertising. This example illus- V = Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Ecuador trates the power of the media over political par- ties, who seemed to succumb to its pressure for In Latin America, the tendency is moving toward unknown reasons. Clearly, the media was opposed model V, which consists exclusively of free air- to the provision of free airtime to all candidates. time or campaign broadcasts; in other words, paid advertising is not permitted. Free campaign 6: Public vs. Government-run Media broadcasts have several implications in terms of their visibility and financing. Because campaign- One of the biggest problems in the region is that ing is restricted to the broadcasts, the messages countries lack solid public media. There is a dis- contained may be tailored to the length of time tinction to be made between government-run me- of the broadcast rather than the broadcast be- dia, which is abundant in Latin America, and public ing tailored to the campaign message. In terms media that are built on the idea of . of financing, telecommunications laws have gone back and forth on placing restrictions on the use of public funds to disseminate campaign messages. Most countries have restricted the use of public Models for Allotting Airtime to Candidates funds for campaign financing, which means that in model V countries, the media have to absorb the Keeping these warnings in mind, there are five dif- financial loss that is implicit in their provision of ferent models for allotting media airtime to can- free airtime. didates, particularly television, during electoral campaigns, as demonstrated in the chart below. The role of electoral authorities differs from model These models offer different combinations with to model. In model I, the electoral authority has no respect to paid publicity and free airtime or cam- role. In model II, electoral authorities have a diffi- paign broadcasts. The combinations range from cult and costly role: to provide oversight over paid paid publicity to combinations of paid and unre- advertising. It is further complicated by the fact stricted advertising, paid and limited advertising, that parties can get around advertising limits by or free advertising. Within these categories, some having third parties act on their behalf in - countries also allow for free airtime or campaign ing their advertisements. In model III, the electoral broadcasts. authority has to assign airtime to all candidates. Model IV is perhaps the most complex because FREE TIME electoral authorities are in charge of monitoring NO YES paid and free advertising, in addition to assigning PAID ADVERTISING NO V airtime to candidates. Model V is similar to mod- YES, LIMITED II IV el III in terms of the role of electoral authorities, YES I III which is to assign and monitor free air time. With- in model V, the tendency is moving toward the Examples use of free campaign broadcasts, the first of which I = Honduras, El Salvador, Dominican Republic were used by Brazil and Chile and more recently, II = Costa Rica, , Venezuela by Mexico and Ecuador. Model V encourages the

26 II. The Role of the Media in Electoral Campaigns

notion of more equitable elections by providing With a plethora of surveys and equal access to the media to electoral contenders. polls, politicians have become It is also based on the notion that the citizens have marketing strategists and the right to submit an informed vote. political debates have all but disappeared in many countries.

-Dr. Rafael Roncagliolo When the Media plays a Predominant Role in Elections, is Democracy Reduced to the Notion of Free and Fair Elections? In spite of these transformations, the media should Fair elections are a necessary but insufficient con- not be eliminated from electoral campaigns. In- dition for modern democracy. Many , stead, governments and electoral authorities such as Hitler, were elected through what were should devise creative solutions to improve our considered fair elections. Many people argue that democracies through regulations and effective elections tend to be aristocratic in their selective sanctions. At present, many electoral authorities nature. Is democracy, therefore, a government of have the jurisdiction to monitor and detect irreg- the people? The answer to this question rests on ularities in the media’s behavior, but they either the legitimacy and credibility of the elected gov- have no sanctioning power, or the sanctions are ernment, an element of which rests on the elec- not proportional to the offenses. toral process. If a government lacks legitimacy and credibility, the free and fair electoral process that It is also important to develop the political culture brought them to power is no longer important. within a country, and create a collective conscious- Democracy and electoral processes should be ness about the need for balanced media coverage more equitable, and address the problems of pov- and information. The substantive elements of elec- erty and inequality that plague many democratic toral campaigns, such as political debates, should societies today. also be part of this consciousness. Electoral obser- vation can also contribute to electoral authorities’ The progression of modern democracy has been media coverage oversight. New media outlets, from a parliamentary democracy, to a party de- such as internet and cable television, are addition- mocracy, to a media democracy. The democratic al tools for electoral authorities and candidates to revolution transformed people from subordi- make information widely available to the elector- nates into citizens: citizens who can no longer ate. Most importantly, aside from sanctioning po- be given orders, but who must be convinced or litical parties or the media whenever they abuse seduced by politicians and their messages and the system, authorities should focus on correcting promises. This has been one among several chang- the system and its incentive structures. Electoral es that have resulted from the transition to a media authorities in Latin America have the legitimacy democracy. With a plethora of surveys and polls, and responsibility to contribute to this process. politicians have become marketing strategists and political debates have all but disappeared in many countries.

27

2.2 The Effect of the Media on Electoral Processes and Governance

Dr. Raúl Trejo, Head Researcher at the Institute for Social Research, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM)

n his presentation, Dr. Trejo began by point- placing their trust in the media and the messages ing out that the media is an indispensable, they spread about competing candidates. The me- Iunavoidable and irreplaceable instrument and dia, therefore, is responsible to some extent for protagonist in the electoral process. Consensus, citizens’ decisions at the polls, and for the consen- which is essential to democratic governability, is sus that enables democracy. They are not alone in unattainable without the support of the media. trying to influence the opinions of the electorate, However, while the media represents a tremen- nor in political agenda setting, but work alongside dous resource in the consolidation of democracy, other forms of persuasion and socialization. These it can also be one of its greatest impediments by may include families, schools, colleagues, as well incorporating its own interests in public affairs. In as individuals’ experiences and aptitudes for rea- addition to disseminating information, they are soning. All of these settings and circumstances are responsible for simplifying and distorting the mes- influential at the polls, which explain why, in some sages they send to the public in pursuit of their countries, the candidates with the greatest media interests. In this way they may in fact weaken de- coverage do not always win elections. mocracy and the electoral authorities that under- pin its electoral legitimacy. The media is a necessary player, but is by no means omnipotent. Some communications theories as- sume that the media can introduce information into societies in an almost mechanical manner. This Media Role in Influencing Voter Decisions assumption rests on the notion that people are all the same, and react in the same way to the mes- Citizens their leaders at the polls. Innon- sages they receive. However, the aforementioned electoral periods, however, they judge their lead- conditions distort citizens’ preferences, personal ers based on their actions, which are publicized contexts and personalities, and their acceptance or by the media. depends largely on citizens perception of media messages is also different.

29 II. The Role of the Media in Electoral Campaigns

Although the media is effective in influencing the The media often claims that it is electorate, we must recognize that external cir- cumstances have equal weight and are able to the voice of public opinion, and counterbalance the media’s power. Politicians of- many politicians and citizens ten view the media as a great mobilizing and ma- surrender to this false notion. nipulating force. The media itself is responsible for this perception, since it tends to often magnify its -Dr. Raúl Trejo influence over society in order to prove its impor- tance. The media often claims that it is the voice of public opinion, and many politicians and citizens Audiovisual media forms, especially television, surrender to this false notion. can be especially dangerous because of their ten- dency to trivialize, discriminate and disguise public events. Television formats are based on brief clips, aggressive headlines and slogans that substitute Media Competition, Mass for rational oral and written discourse. Giovanni Media and Political Messaging Sartori, an Italian political scientist, theorized that this media model implies a regression from civi- Media influence is inversely proportional to the lized societal practices and effectively diminishes number of media options in the market. Greater people’s abilities to grasp complex matters.6 The media concentration limits the diversity and plu- trivialization of television messages is proportional rality of opinions, and stunts the development of a to its audience’s ability to sift through the informa- sound political and democratic culture. When me- tion and discuss it intelligently. dia outlets lack competition, they are also better equipped to compete against electoral authorities by promoting their interests and opinions. Greater media concentration limits the diversity and plurality In larger societies, mass media outlets are the only of opinions, and stunts the ones that are able to reach citizens at an extensive development of a sound political level. These outlets may choose to either build or and democratic culture. undermine governability, depending on their politi- cal tendencies and relationship to the government. -Dr. Raúl Trejo Mass media, such as newspapers, television and radio, are naturally authoritarian in their composi- tion. Journalists and reporters, and particularly the owners of these media outlets, have the privilege of This has important consequences on political selecting their messages to the public, and the man- growth; television’s inability to transmit full mes- ner in which they transmit them. Metaphorically sages and explain public issues leads to the in- speaking, a small group of individuals at the tip of a pyramid disseminates messages to the rest of the population. Given the antidemocratic nature of mass media, checks and balances must be in place to en- 6 Giovanni Sartori, El Homo Videns: La Sociedad Teledirigida, (Mex- sure that information is balanced and accurate. ico: Taurus, 1999).

30 II. The Role of the Media in Electoral Campaigns

tellectual impoverishment of both the messages Electoral authorities are instruments, and their recipients. They disseminate facts and opinions with incredible speed, which requires ab- though not protagonists of the breviated formats and general ideas that lack ex- electoral process and their failure planation and depth. Consequently, government to adhere to this role can cause leaders, including members of electoral authori- serious distortions in the system. ties, feel compelled to compress and oversimplify their messages. By omitting relevant information, -Dr. Raúl Trejo they fail to encourage understanding and dialogue and remain far removed from the citizens they represent. Their oversimplification of issues also should base their messages on hard facts. Their encourages political polarization. sole objectives are accuracy and impartiality, and should obtain them through transparent public The expansion of information technology has messages that pertain only to the tasks of organiz- broadened our sources of information, although ing elections and determining their results. Elec- they have yet to reach their full potential. Citizens toral authorities are instruments, though not pro- have a new level of involvement and awareness tagonists of the electoral process and their failure with respect to information since they have access to adhere to this role can cause serious distortions to a plethora of different sources and they can in the system. A former ’s IFE choose to be active participants. This increased used to compare the electoral process to a foot- awareness, understanding and experience is a ball match. In a football match, it is the players, good foundation for citizens’ understanding of po- not the referee, who play the game and score the litical issues. Yet on the other hand, if digital in- goals. Likewise, electoral authorities were created formation platforms are not adequately regulated, to organize, monitor and sanction political actors. people can drown in a sea of information and mis- Electoral authorities should try to have a good re- information. lationship with the media, based on their efforts to carry out their responsibilities effectively, and Political actors often compete against each other not on marketing strategies that stray from their for public attention because they use the same legal duties. public spaces to disseminate information. Elector- al authorities are often confused with political ac- tors because they also compete for these spaces. Electoral authorities’ messages should differ, how- How then, should Electoral Authorities keep ever, from the messages of political actors. Politi- Citizens Informed about the Electoral Process, cal parties and actors aim to persuade their audi- and how should they Relate to the Media? ences and market themselves favorably in order to garner support. They offer choices and marketing Electoral authorities should use their communica- pitches and often undermine their competitors. tion with the public as a platform for building trust amongst voters. There are no definitive formulas Electoral authorities, in contrast, are not there to achieve this, other than the dissemination of to persuade voters, but to inform them about clear, transparent and timely information that is electoral processes. Unlike political parties, they easily accessible. The appropriate model depends

31 II. The Role of the Media in Electoral Campaigns

on the particular situation of each country. Elector- al authorities should approach their relationship to the media with caution, bearing in mind that they may not share similar priorities. The media is not always interested in spreading information for the greater good, and often filters its messages for its own benefit. Regardless of the popularity of the content of its messages, electoral authorities should always stick to the truth.

32 2.3 Media and Elections in the English-Speaking Caribbean

Wesley Gibbings, President of the Association of Caribbean Media Workers

r. Gibbings commenced with a brief in- troduction to his organization, the As- The Role of the Media in the Electoral Process Msociation of Caribbean Media Workers, which is a grouping of media organizations and Most democracies recognize the role of the mass individual journalists.7 The Association was cre- media in ensuring that elections are legitimate and ated to promote networking among journalists in backed by broad public support. If and when the the English-speaking Caribbean, but it also more media abuses its role during the electoral process, recently includes journalists from the Spanish, it is likely to result in disaffection, turmoil, and French and Dutch speaking countries in the Carib- general distrust of electoral processes and results. bean. The organization mainly promotes profes- A well-informed and vigilant media can ensure sional journalistic development and training, as that transparency and accountability prevail. The well as advocacy and freedom of the press. notions of transparency and accountability apply equally to the media and to electoral mechanisms. Members of the Association are increasingly con- The English-speaking Caribbean holds these val- cerned with emerging versions of democracy that ues in high regard and several countries have de- preclude the freedom of expression. The hemi- veloped specific guidelines for media conduct at sphere is undergoing a dangerous trend whereby the polls. Efforts are always underway to ensure cultural relativism is being used as an to that the media’s outputs are accurate. threaten many freedoms, including the freedom of expression. Freedom of expression, along with its Checks and balances should be in place to ensure subsidiary freedom of the press, must be promot- that the media’s conduct is acceptable. However, ed and supported regardless of the circumstances. This freedom is not limited to the act of expression itself, but also includes the right to seek expression and receive it. 7 For more information, see http://www.acmediaworkers.com/

33 II. The Role of the Media in Electoral Campaigns

these checks and balances should not be in the Checks and balances should be in form of impositions or regulations. In other words, the best media law is no media law. Instead, there place to ensure that the media’s should be a greater focus on elements that facili- conduct is acceptable. However, tate the media’s work. The state has a role to play these checks and balances in this facilitation, as does the rest of society. The should not be in the form of state should give the media wide access to infor- impositions or regulations. mation about the electoral process; on the other hand, the media should give coverage to all com- -Mr. Wesley Gibbings peting political elements. In several countries, like Mexico and Chile, electoral authorities control these public advertising spaces through propor- tional allocation systems. However, in the Carib- bean, where there have been substantial changes Trajectory of the Mass Media in the in the political landscape, quota systems could be English-Speaking Caribbean more problematic than helpful. The mass media in the English-speaking Carib- The role of state media is another area that re- bean has had peculiar experiences to date. The quires further scrutiny. State media tends to be liberalization of broadcast media came along with partisan media, since public service broadcasting a wave of political change where long-time oppo- has never taken hold in the English-speaking Carib- sition forces came to power after many years of bean. The state media is therefore seen as a tool single-party rule. This happened, for example, in for governments to preserve their political power. Saint Lucia, Trinidad & Tobago, Guyana, the Baha- Private media, on the other hand, are often at- mas and Antigua & Barbuda. In almost all these tracted by the lure of advertising income and pay countries, broadcast media were characterized as little attention to the allocation of advertising state monopolies that favored the ruling parties. space across the political spectrum. Mechanisms In some cases the liberalization arose from the should be in place to uphold the principle of politi- common, public view that opposition parties were cians’ equal access to the media, with special con- victimized by their restricted access to the media, siderations for each country’s political situation. specifically radio and television. The liberalization Nevertheless, these reforms should not be sub- of broadcast media created an opening in the po- jected to official regulation. In the Caribbean, the litical arena as opposition parties also gained ac- media should be given the opportunity to devise cess to media spots. their own mechanisms and electoral authorities should cooperate by encouraging conditions that This transition occurred, however, without regard facilitate equal access to the media. for an appropriate regulatory environment or for- mal commitments to the freedom of expression. Today, in countries like Trinidad & Tobago, Guy- ana and Jamaica, there is ongoing debate about self-regulation versus official regulation and cen- sorship of the media. In most other countries, the debate stems from the governments in power that

34 II. The Role of the Media in Electoral Campaigns

are dissatisfied with media coverage and content. Media independence does not Where the phenomena of media liberalization and political change have intersected, they have signify the absence of bias, but brought a new focus on the work of media during the freedom to be biased, to elections. hold opposing views, or to be extremely liberal or conservative. The perception remains that media coverage has In short, independence is a linear impact on electoral results. Political par- tantamount to freedom, and ties and civil society organizations have been pay- is an essential element to the ing more attention to the distribution of airtime integrity of electoral processes. to electoral candidates, regardless of whether that time is free or paid. In Guyana, a media-monitor- -Mr. Wesley Gibbings ing unit was established in 2006 to measure media performance during the 2006 elections. The unit measured broadcast times and monitored general media performance. Many attribute the relatively peaceful nature of that election to this mecha- Media Regulation in the Electoral Process nism, which involved of panel of independent ref- erees, and a voluntary and self-regulated code of An independent media should be able to express conduct for the media. The code of conduct was information, analysis and opinions in an unregulat- not imposed, but it was endorsed by nearly thirty ed manner. Media independence does not signify newspapers and television stations, except the ra- the absence of bias, but the freedom to be biased, dio which remained a state monopoly. The effec- to hold opposing views, or to be extremely liberal tiveness of this media unit challenged the precon- or conservative. In short, independence is tanta- ception that the media is a necessary evil during mount to freedom, and is an essential element to the electoral period. the integrity of electoral processes. Governability depends largely on the existence of real choices In fact, the media is capable of portraying the free among candidates and parties who can campaign and transparent nature of elections. If elections openly, and who abide by the rules that are known are considered free and transparent, and citizens and respected by all. The law should protect the are confident that the results are representative practice of journalism, and the basic journalistic of the will of the electorate, better governance is tenets of accuracy, impartiality and sound judg- achieved. Governments that rise to power under ment are important assets within the framework these conditions are more likely to obtain consen- of democratic elections. Without good journalism sus among the population and govern in relative there cannot be good electoral reporting. peace. However, if elections are not conducted in a manner that involves the free exchange of ideas, Electoral authorities should and do play an impor- and where the voting process is not transparent, tant role in setting the news agenda during elec- the outcome can have a negative impact on gov- tions. It is often believed that the mass media are ernance. responsible for agenda setting, but this function is multilateral and ever changing. During elections, it is electoral authorities who set the news agenda

35 II. The Role of the Media in Electoral Campaigns

and determine the relative importance of factors need to abide by more rigorous standards before such as , political parties, training they accept survey results and publish this type of of electoral staff and conduct at the polls, candi- information. This requires specific training, which date nomination, and the declara- is one of the goals of the Association of Caribbean tion of final results. Electoral authorities provide a Media Workers. blueprint for the news agenda, and in many cases they employ media liaisons for this purpose. The value of media-monitoring by electoral au- thorities cannot be underestimated. The media In the English-speaking Caribbean, this practice have an important role to play in validating elec- has had limited success in dealing with the me- toral processes and uncovering transgressions dia due to limited resources. In many cases, the when they occur. Media monitoring should take heads of the electoral authorities are the de facto place, moreover, within the context of a voluntary media liaisons, which can detract from their fulfill- process of self-regulation through the establish- ment of the roles that are specific to their posts. ment of codes of conduct and independent ref- Electoral observation missions are a relatively new eree system, much like the system in Guyana. This phenomenon in the English-speaking Caribbean model has the potential to improve the relation- whose work has enhanced the news agenda. ship between electoral authorities and media and to eliminate their mutual distrust. It can also help Public opinion surveys and polls have also become to increase public awareness of the work required increasingly important in determining the outcome during electoral processes and produce better me- of elections. Surveys are now an integral part of dia performance at election time. media coverage of elections. However, journalists

36 2.4 Country Case Study: How Elections Canada Manages Media Relations

John Enright, Manager of Media Relations, Elections Canada

r. Enright’s case study described the trative in relation to elections. These efforts have actors and established procedures that been successful in raising journalists’ awareness, MElections Canada utilizes for media allowing media messaging to be better positioned communications and messaging. Media relations and reinforcing the agency’s role as a non-parti- at Elections Canada are focused on controlling the san source of electoral information. message, rather than the messenger. The purpose of this case study is to provide a model for other During electoral campaigns, Elections Canada has electoral authorities, which could be adapted to a system in place to ensure that media requests country circumstances, or used in media relations are handled efficiently and effectively. An Ottawa- and communications training sessions. The case based Media Center is supported by a network of study outlines policies and procedures to manage field personnel. For the first time in 2008, a gov- media messaging, internal processes to manage ernance structure was put in place for the gen- the relationship with the media, and the resourc- eral election to respond to media inquiries under es in place for the development and dissemina- a management model. The model ensures that tion of messages. It also discusses the roles and journalists receive rapid responses to their ques- responsibilities of various actors, whose role it is tions and maintains clear lines of communication to react swiftly and accurately to situations that with internal experts. may occur during an electoral campaign, and to deal with possible crisis situations.

Elections Canada, like many electoral authorities, Who are the Players in the Model? has struggled with the perception that it is affili- ated with the government and governing political Electoral Media Center (EMC) in Ottawa: This is structure. Over time, it has educated journalists Elections Canada’s direct link with the media dur- to understand that their role is strictly adminis- ing and between elections. It ensures a reliable

37 II. The Role of the Media in Electoral Campaigns

electoral information service during elections, Returning Officers: Returning Officers are sta- and between elections it responds primarily to tioned in each of the country’s 308 electoral dis- media inquiries from the national media covering tricts. They are chosen via a competitive staffing Parliament. During electoral periods, the team ex- process and serve for a period of ten years as they pands to include additional media advisors, most administer the electoral process in their federal of whom have previous experience as journalists . Political parties have no role in or spokespersons. the selection of Returning Officers. Returning Of- ficers are in charge of managing the elections in The EMC hires Regional Media Advisors across their respective electoral district, which may com- Canada to work with Field Liaison Officers, who prise up to 120,000 electors. They are responsible support Returning Officers in the field. Regional for all key aspects of elections, from updating Media Advisors handle local and regional media in- lists of registered voters, to , to staffing quiries. They are also in charge of drafting respons- polls and transmitting results. Returning Officers es to inquiries and handling interview requests. are experienced in areas like financial planning, The EMC also supports the Chief Electoral Offi- public relations and human resources manage- cer to prepare for his media interviews, prepares ment. They receive general media training, but questions and answers and conducts background their role with the media is limited and in fact dis- research for media lines, and drafts analyses and couraged so that they can focus on delivering the summaries. The EMC coordinates the activities of election. The media is allowed to contact them to Regional Media Advisors in the field and responds solicit basic information, which they are autho- to questions that neither Field Liaison Officers nor rized to provide. Any interview requests must be Returning Officers are able to answer. pre-approved by Elections Canada. Interview re- quests and their subject matter are forwarded to Subject Matter Experts at Elections Canada: Field Liaison Officers or Regional Media Advisors This is a network of experts in various program who first decide if the interview should proceed. areas including operations, elections financing If so, they consult with the EMC to decide who and legal services. Most of these experts are at should conduct it, and what the official response middle to senior management levels and are the will be. primary contact points and information providers to the Media Relations Team, who work together Field Liaison Officers: Field Liaison Officers sup- to draft responses to questions from journalists. port and coordinate several Returning Officers Their contribution is their high level of expertise within a geographic area. They are often former within their program areas. However, in order to Returning Officers with election coordination reflect the key messages that Elections Canada experience. Significant effort is put into training wants to convey, all Subject Matter Experts re- Field Liaison Officers in media relations skills, and ceive formal media relations training, particularly they are given the tools to act as spokespersons for developing media lines. This training helps and subject matter experts. The Field Liaison Of- them to understand how questions from journal- ficer’s role is critical, since they are the primary ists are answered and provides an overview of contact for the EMC and Regional Media Advisors the newsroom and of the day-to-day functions of during elections to respond to operational ques- journalists so that subject matter experts can bet- tions in the field. ter understand how information is used by media.

38 II. The Role of the Media in Electoral Campaigns

Regional Media Advisors: These advisors are con- go beyond public information must be approved tracted during electoral periods to support the centrally. Returning Officers do not conduct inter- media relations program. They are usually former views, although their participation can sometimes journalists or public relations experts and are the be an advantage with local or regional media. primary contact points in the regions. They are These interviews are the exception and must be stationed across the country to guarantee all me- approved centrally and in consultation with the dia access to reliable, efficient and rapid informa- Field Liaison Officer, the Regional Media Advisor, tion. When journalists call the central EMC num- and the Manager of Media Relations. They will ber they are automatically redirected to these assess whether there is an advantage to the Re- advisors to ensure that there is a regional flavor turning Officer conducting the interview and will to the stories. Because they are in the field, they consult with the ’s supervisor to tend to know local journalists and have estab- determine if the interview should proceed. lished networks of contacts. In addition to coordinating media relations in the Regional Media Advisors proactively target lo- regions, the Field Liaison Officer and the Regional cal media outlets and answer media inquiries media Advisor report directly to Elections Canada while also alerting the EMC to any controversial and prepare daily reports on all activities, media and immediate issues that are developing in the requests and respective responses, highlighting field. In other words, they are the eyes and ears relevant sensitive issues. These reports are re- of the EMC on the ground. Aside from respond- viewed daily at the central level and summarized ing to journalists’ questions and assisting with the into a briefing for the Elections Canada Executive preparation of media lines, they maintain regular Committee. contact with Field Liaison Officers to keep a pulse on election activities and follow emerging trends. This way, they can deal in a proactive, rather than reactive way to any problems that may arise. With Governance Structure of Elections Canada this mechanism there is no delay in response times, and media messaging is already prepared The internal governance structure, or hierarchy when journalists pose questions about the rel- regarding media requests, in its simplest form, is evant issue. like a traffic signal, with each color signifying the complexity and urgency of the media request. Field Liaison Officers vis à vis Regional Media Advi- Questions are classified as green when the an- sors: These actors are in constant contact to dis- swer can be found in the public domain. There cuss media requests. When the requests are basic, are no approvals required to respond to green either one of these actors can provide answers questions, and the service standard requires that without seeking central approval. They are also al- answers be provided within the hour. Answers lowed to conduct fact-based interviews for print to green questions are usually on the website, or broadcast media when they refer to publicly or they are questions which have been recently available information. However, when questions asked and answered. are complex or require background research, they are directed to the EMC via a defined governance Amber questions are more complex and require structure. Likewise, interviews whose content may the assistance of Subject Matter Experts to be

39 II. The Role of the Media in Electoral Campaigns

answered. Usually, the information is not avail- Governance and service standards have helped able publicly, but it is not deemed sensitive in to improve the relationship with the media by es- nature. Amber questions can also be requests tablishing clear lines of communication, both ex- for clarification on the administration of electoral ternal and internal and allowing Elections Canada legislation. They tend to be about a specific and to respond to journalists within their deadlines. isolated incident that is unlikely to gain national In Canada’s 2008 elections, Elections Canada met coverage. These requests are responded to within the service standard for 87% of the calls received. three hours as per the service standard of Elec- tions Canada. Subject Matter Experts, Regional Elections Canada conducts post-election evalu- Media Advisors and the EMC discuss the requests ations to measure the effectiveness of its media in order to determine if someone else needs to communications, and surveys journalists directly be brought in to assist, such as , informa- to obtain their feedback on the process. In the lat- tion technology experts, etc. They also determine est elections, 95% of all incoming calls were clas- whether or not the questions are complex or seri- sified as green and responded to within an hour. ous enough to be escalated to a red question. The remaining four to five percent were amber, and mostly answered within the three-hour lim- Red inquiries are the most complex in nature, and it. The Chief Electoral Officer was consulted only have the possibility of creating a negative story with for red inquiries during the election. In addition national implications. These questions may under- to those findings, Elections Canada also deter- mine credibility in the electoral process, or they mined that journalists appreciated the speed and relate to an individual or group whose reputation effectiveness of the response to their inquiries. could be damaged. These questions require the in- Most journalists felt that Elections Canada was a put of the Chief Electoral Officer, and should be an- credible, accurate and knowledgeable source of swered the same day or within twenty-four hours. information.

40 2.5 Country Case Study: New Technologies in the U.S. Electoral Process

Commissioner Gineen Beach, US Federal Electoral Commission (FEC)

s. Beach’s case study presented a brief mined at the state level. Some states have intro- background on the US electoral system duced additional modalities to make voting more Mand discussed the role of the media in convenient for voters, such as centers. elections, in addition to how the emergence of Depending on the state, early voting centers can new technologies has impacted elections in the open from three days to three weeks before the United States. election to accommodate voters who cannot make it to the polls on election day. Elections in the United States are decentralized, and each of the 50 states, the District of Colum- For the first time in 2002, the federal govern- bia and U.S. have an election author- ment allocated funds to states to make electoral ity which oversees over 7000 , and a improvements through the Help America Vote total of around 177 million voters. The US federal Act (HAVA). More than $3.1 billion have been dis- government does not administer elections; this is bursed to purchase new voting systems, update done at the state, or local levels. Voters’ voter registration databases, install provisional needs are also determined at the local level and voting centers, increase access for voters with dis- reflected in different voting laws and procedures. abilities, and other improvements. HAVA includes In some areas, mainly the Northwest, people basic requirements for voting systems, but it is prefer to cast their ballots by mail, rather than in ultimately up to each state to determine which person. This is also a growing trend in , systems they want to purchase. HAVA also creat- where in the November 2008 election, nearly 42% ed the US Election Assistance Commission (EAC), of voters cast their votes by mail. In rural areas, which is an independent, evenly split, bi-partisan on the other hand, elections are still a community commission. The EAC offers electoral assistance event where people vote in person. The same is and guidance to states. true in larger , such as New York City. In most cases, electoral laws and regulations are deter-

41 II. The Role of the Media in Electoral Campaigns

technologies as a credible source that enables How has the Growth of New Media faster and cheaper communications. In Los Ange- Affected Electoral Information Reporting? les County, officials have discovered that Twitter is a great way to keep voters informed in real time. Television is the dominant source for campaign It is the largest voting county, with over four mil- coverage during elections. Studies by the PEW Re- lion registered voters, and uses Twitter as a tool search Center show that from 1985 to 2009, 71% for providing updated information to a wide audi- of the population got their information from tele- ence. For example, if there is a flood in one of the vision, 42% from the internet and 33% from news- polling stations or another unforeseen problem on papers. During elections, internet use is on the election day, officials need not wait until the me- rise. In the 2008 elections, 44% of adults got their dia reports it. Voters can receive the information information online, up from 29% in 2004. immediately through Twitter wherever they are.

With the explosion of new forms of digital media Many states experienced a surge in the youth vote and the internet, Americans have come to expect in the last election, mainly among college-age stu- instant online updates from the media. In elec- dents. These voters want to obtain information tions, however, it is impossible to publicize results quickly and in multiple formats. Many rely on up- in this manner because they cannot be released dates delivered by their friends through numerous until the polls close. Although polls open for a set platforms, such as Facebook.8 Alabama’s Secretary amount of time, the time differences throughout of State set up a Facebook page for the last elec- the country do not allow for the simultaneous tion in order to send instantaneous, accurate up- calculation of results. There are also cases where dates about election-related matters. electoral races are extremely close and authorities agree to a vote recount; in many states, the win- Another benefit to technology is that it is a bet- ners are not officially certified until weeks later. ter way to share best practices in training electoral officials and voters. YouTube is a great way to ed- Many news sources update their websites often to ucate the public on voting technologies, and the satisfy the public’s expectations for immediate up- EAC has a YouTube site that currently features a dates. Election officials need to keep up with this video on how they certify voting systems.9 A video information to make sure it is accurate and will not format is more useful for training purposes than impact their ability to host the election. Inaccurate traditional paper or oral training materials be- information, usually on individuals’ personal web- cause they show, rather than describe, the steps sites, can impact . involved. The EAC’s YouTube site also includes training videos for setting up polling stations and videos on contingency planning.

How are New Media Outlets Several challenges remain for electoral officials in Benefiting Electoral Organization? adapting fully to the new information age. Misin-

On the other hand, several benefits have been discovered to these new informational modali- 8 See www.facebook.com ties. Many election officials have embraced new 9 See www.youtube.com

42 II. The Role of the Media in Electoral Campaigns

formation travels as fast as accurate information network shows to provide information to voters. via text messages, blogs and social media outlets, The EAC has also produced several resources for so officials must be prepared to correct this mis- electoral officials, including a chapter on public information with the same technologies. In some communications that is integrated into their train- jurisdictions, there is narrow access to these tech- ing. It also gathers resources and tech solutions nologies due to limited resources. It is also chal- from elections officials around the nation and lenging to compete with such a large number of hosts workshops on contingency planning, voter information sources and still get the public to rely empowerment, cost savings, military and overseas on election officials for the facts. voters, and pre-election testing. All of these semi- nars are webcast and free. The EAC is working with election officials to over- come these challenges. In October 2008, the EAC In conclusion, the more tools electoral authori- held a public meeting for journalists and election ties have to deliver information to the public, the officials that provided a platform for them to dis- more successful elections will be. Keeping up with cuss their needs in preparation for the 2008 elec- technology is a challenge, initially, for electoral of- tions. Also in preparation of the 2008 elections, ficials, but the benefits are insurmountable once the EAC participated in several radio and cable they adapt to them and realize their potential.

43

III. The Relationship between Political Parties and Electoral Authorities

he electoral authority’s role as the referee in from within to exhibit transparency, professional- the electoral process is only plausible when ism, efficiency and impartiality in its administra- Tthe main players, political parties, have a tive tasks leading up to and throughout the elec- tacit agreement to abide by the rules of the game. toral process. Second, many electoral authorities Political parties are often the only conduits for or- are also responsible for oversight of the numerous ganized representation of the public’s collective players involved in an election, including the me- interests. It is in the public’s interest, therefore, to dia as previously discussed, and certainly, political have strong political parties that accurately and ef- parties. For political parties, this usually includes fectively represent it; political parties’ interest in oversight of financial contributions and campaign correctly interpreting public opinion and building expenditures, and public advertising during the effective platforms to win elections and put their campaign. Electoral authorities are in charge of constituents’ agendas into action; and to ensure monitoring the behavior of these actors; in addi- the electoral authorities’ role in creating a level tion to that, they are often responsible for medi- playing field on which to put these platforms to the ating conflicts and sanctioning players who step test of public opinion. A level playing field provides outside the boundaries of the law. incentives for players to act fairly based on the no- tion of opportunity; it must be possible, even if The composition of the electoral authority is large- improbable, for any and all candidates to emerge ly responsible for its ability to carry out these func- victorious at the polls. It puts forth the conditions tions that create a level playing field. Historically, for free and fair elections where public opinion, political parties have largely determined that com- and not political parties or electoral authorities, is position. As democracies have evolved through- primary in electing the winners. out the continent, opening up the spectrum to greater plurality to meet public demand, electoral How does the electoral authority lay the ground- authorities have also evolved. In some countries, work for free and fair elections? First, it must work electoral authorities have been of an independent

45 III. The Relationship between Political Parties and Electoral Authorities

nature since their inception; in others, political While it appears that most governments are mov- party representatives in the legislative branch had ing toward an independent model, their institu- the ability to appoint the members of the electoral tional makeup should fit the political and social authority. Today, there are several models in place context of each country. The Mexican case pro- for political party participation in the electoral au- vides an example of a system that is evolving to- thority. greater independence as the electoral au- thority also takes on additional responsibilities. In These models for political party participation have Jamaica, on the other hand, polarization and dis- as much of an impact on the relationship with trust, illustrated by a history of violent elections as electoral authorities as do the roles of the elec- described by Senator Tom Tavares-Finson, require toral authorities themselves. As with the media, political parties to be deeply involved in the work the electoral authority’s oversight functions of of the electoral authority. Mr. Adrian Lopez used political parties can lead to tensions. Dr. Lorenzo the Ecuadorian example to highlight another as- Córdova Vianello described several models for po- pect of the relationship between political parties litical party participation in electoral authorities, and electoral authorities. Namely, when electoral with the implicit tensions underlying each model, authorities become completely independent and which also depend on the functions attributed to removed from political party influence, there is the electoral authority. As Dr. Andreas Schedler little clarity about who oversees their actions. Re- surmised in his presentation, it is imperative for gardless of the model, the presentations highlight- electoral authorities to always uphold transpar- ed the need for governments to draft clear legisla- ency as a valued principle, in order to preclude al- tion on electoral matters that specifies the roles legations by the losing parties of unfair conduct or of each actor in the system. Without clear rules, . These types of allegations can be harm- there is limited space for accountability by political ful not only to the electoral authority, but could parties and electoral authorities alike. impair the legitimacy of the electoral process as a whole.

46 3.1 The Relationship between Political Parties and Electoral Authorities: Lessons from the Mexican Case

Lorenzo Córdova Vianello, Head Researcher at the Institute for Judicial Re- search, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM)

he relationship between political parties and of political parties in decision-making processes. electoral authorities is a deeply complex sub- Each model differs in its level of institutional inde- Tject. It is both an essential component of and pendence and composition.10 determinant factor to the effectiveness of electoral mechanisms and democracy as a whole. Dr. Cór- • The Governmental Model: In this model, the dova divided his presentation into two separate government, through the executive branch, parts. The first part explores different models for is in charge of administering elections among political party participation in decision-making and its other functions. This model is popular in oversight of electoral authorities, their implications several European countries, where often the for the relationship between the two actors, and Ministry of the Interior or other ministries or the areas where the greatest tensions are bound institutions manage the electoral process. to arise between parties and electoral authorities within each model. The second part of his pre- sentation illustrated the relationship and tensions between political parties and electoral authorities through an analysis of the Mexican model.

Models for Political Party 10 International IDEA describes three models of electoral manage- ment: Governmental, Independent and Mixed. These models are Participation in Electoral Authorities differentiated by their independence and autonomy from the ex- ecutive branch, financial autonomy and accountability, composi- tion and membership, and basic functions ranging from electoral Dr. Córdova described four institutional models for administration to oversight. For more information, see Electoral political party participation in electoral authori- Management Design: The International IDEA Handbook. Interna- tional IDEA (2006), available at http://idea.int/publications/emd/ ties, differentiated by the degree of integration index.cfm.

47 III. The Relationship between Political Parties and Electoral Authorities

• The Independent Model: In this model, politi- • The Governmental Model: The electoral au- cal parties are excluded from the electoral au- thority is subjected to external political pres- thority, which is wholly independent. The elec- sures as an extension of the pressures that toral authority is not housed within a ministry, opposition parties typically place on govern- as in the Governmental Model, but exists as a ments. External forms of pressure are part of separate institutional entity. This model is ap- the natural criticisms that stem from any dem- plied in some countries in the form of electoral ocratic system. The ruling party always runs the tribunals. risk of being seen as imbalanced or biased in all of its government functions, including elec- • The Mixed Model: In this model, political par- toral management. External pressure tends to ties have vocal representation in the electoral take the form of accusations of manipulation authority, but they do not always participate of the electoral process. In Italy, for example, in decision-making mechanisms. Mexico is one this case was taken to the extreme when the prime example of this model, and worthy of ruling party accused the government (which study in order to better understand the com- was controlled by the same party) of electoral plexities and tensions that are derived from fraud in its penultimate elections. The success, such a system. therefore, of this model depends upon a great deal of responsibility by government officials • The Ruling Party Model: The fourth model is in carrying out transparent and credible elec- no longer applicable to Latin America. It in- tions, as well as a great deal of public confi- volves an electoral authority whose integra- dence in government institutions. tion is largely determined by political parties, and its composition tends to favor the ruling • The Independent Model: This model is similar party. Prior to the 1990 reform, Mexico’s elec- to the Governmental Model in that external toral authority was designed in this manner. pressures also threaten the electoral author- In 1988, IFE was mostly composed by politi- ity’s legitimacy. However, the Independent cal party representatives, whose participation Model has additional guarantees in place with was proportional to the votes received by each respect to the impartiality of the electoral party in the previous congressional elections. authority because there is no direct political Of its 31 members at the time, 16 belonged to participation in the institution. Since the elec- the ruling party. toral authority does not depend directly on the state, it is more likely to be impartial, and its autonomy helps to diffuse some of the ac- cusations of impartiality that could befall it. Implications for Relations with Political Parties However, the electoral authority must still act responsibly and transparently in order to gain Each of the four models implies a different type society’s trust. of relationship with political parties, and political pressures on the electoral authority that vary in • The Mixed Model: This model, which is IFE’s their nature and intensity. model, is founded on the notion of distrust. The inclusion of political parties in the elec- toral authority was designed to counteract the

48 III. The Relationship between Political Parties and Electoral Authorities

inherent lack of trust in the country’s electoral Mixed Model institutions are the system. The model is incoherent in some ways, because the very actors that the electoral au- most difficult to design, since thority must regulate (political parties) also their internal structure should partake in the institution’s decision-making create an equilibrium that will processes. This is the typical design that al- hinder political parties from lows political parties to oversee, but not de- altering the course of its work. termine, electoral functions as they are able to participate but not to vote. Their presence -Dr. Lorenzo Córdova Vianello is a guarantee that elections are planned and carried out without partisan biases, but rather with transparency and objectivity. It is no coin- with political parties. These functions include elec- cidence, therefore, that the greatest tensions toral management, oversight of political parties, between political parties and the electoral au- and or conflict resolution between po- thority emerge during the creation of voting litical parties. lists, or in the distribution of airtime for cam- paign advertising. Electoral Management

Mixed Model institutions are the most difficult to The first function of electoral authorities across design, since their internal structure should cre- the board is electoral management. This includes ate an equilibrium that will hinder political parties the creation and maintenance of voter registra- from altering the course of its work. Through their tion lists, recruiting election officials, installation representatives, political parties will always seek of voting centers, and calculating electoral results. to steer the decisions of the electoral authority Political parties accompany rather than intervene in their favor. Electoral authorities should expect in these functions. It is in their best interests that this behavior; their independent, voting members elections are carried out smoothly, transparently should do their best to avoid the influence of po- and legally. That way there is no chance that the litical parties and uphold their independence. elections will be questioned on the basis of tech- nical problems, which could render the results il- • The Ruling Party Model: The last model is usu- legitimate. ally born out of transition periods to democ- racy. It is implicitly biased, and the work of the Political Party Oversight electoral authority is only as good and as im- partial as its members would like it to be. A second function of some electoral authorities is oversight of political parties, in areas such as party registration, adherence to legal requirements such as gender quotas, or campaign financing report- Impact of Electoral Authority ing. When electoral authorities are endowed with Functions on Political Party Relations this responsibility, their relationship with political parties ceases to be collaborative. The authority in The particular functions of the electoral authority charge of oversight within the electoral authority, also influence the type of relationship they have frequently the same one that manages the elec-

49 III. The Relationship between Political Parties and Electoral Authorities

toral process, will have a confrontational relation- The functions of the electoral ship with the political parties that are the subjects of this oversight. authority, therefore, should be compartmentalized to offset these Resolving Conflicts between Political Parties possible negative effects. Ideally, electoral justice, administration and A third common function of electoral authorities oversight should be run by different is conflict resolution between political parties, departments within the institution. with respect to issues such as electoral advertis- ing and illegal conduct, among other things. As the -Dr. Lorenzo Córdova Vianello referee, this relationship is clearly confrontational, because there will almost always be an aggravated party after each dispute. Political parties will likely terms of tensions with political parties, and the accuse the electoral authority of being biased in concentration of its institutional responsibilities or favor of one party or another, irrespective of its functions. decision. Regardless of whether or not sanctions are imposed on the accused party, the electoral Mexico has experimented with several electoral authority will lose favor with either the accuser or models. Prior to the establishment of IFE, the Min- the accused. Oftentimes, accusations are brought istry of the Interior was in charge of electoral mat- forward to protect the accusing party or to debili- ters. Accusations of fraud in the 1988 elections led tate another. to IFE’s establishment in 1990. The electoral au- thority continued to be staffed by political parties If this behavior becomes common currency, it can until a subsequent reform in 1996, which separat- affect the electoral authority’s ability to carry out ed IFE completely from the executive branch and its other functions. The functions of the electoral gave the legislative branch the authority to des- authority, therefore, should be compartmental- ignate IFE’s members. This reform developed the ized to offset these possible negative effects. Ide- institutional structure that is currently in place, ally, different departments within the institution where political parties have a voice but no voting should run electoral justice, administration and abilities within IFE. This reform, however, created oversight. This is not the case in most electoral a two-tiered model that failed to separate IFE’s authorities, however, because of limited economic three main functions. The first tier is in charge of and institutional resources. administering elections, political party oversight and electoral justice. The second tier is the elec- toral , which is capable of overriding IFE’s decisions. The Experience of Mexico’s Federal Electoral Institute IFE’s functions have gradually increased over time, complicating its relationship with political parties. Mexico’s IFE, on the one hand, is a poster child of In the latest reform of 2009, IFE’s role was expand- institutional progress resulting from the need to ed to include conflict resolution between political resolve political controversy. On the other hand, parties. It also introduced new restrictions that its electoral management organizational model limit campaign advertising to public airtime, which currently presents some of the worst scenarios in is now solely distributed by IFE. In addition, IFE is

50 III. The Relationship between Political Parties and Electoral Authorities

now responsible for monitoring political parties, as Although the creation of autonomous institutions well as the media, to make sure they comply with was a positive step towards consolidating democ- the new legislation. These reforms have placed IFE racy, Mexico’s legislation left openings for its po- in a confrontational position with respect to po- litical parties to interfere with the election of their litical parties, as well as some of Mexico’s largest members. Political parties have no incentives to economic powers. resist the temptation to designate their members to these positions for the benefit of their party. In Mexico’s July 2009 legislative elections, IFE fo- IFE’s membership, therefore, continues to have cused most of its attention on disputes regarding politicized elements that can threaten the legiti- campaign advertising, sanctions on one of the macy, impartiality and autonomy of the institu- largest media networks (Televisa), and tensions tion. As a result, IFE’s multiple functions should be with the electoral tribunal. Its administrative role reconsidered or redesigned to better serve demo- in the electoral process was largely ignored until cratic interests. Otherwise, Mexico runs the risk of election day. Its success in carrying out the elec- “institutional deconstruction”. Until the benefits tions while also managing its newly appointed of a neutral and depoliticized electoral author- duties, demonstrates that these reforms are not ity are not accepted or, alternatively, imposed on without their virtue, even though they put IFE in a Mexico’s political parties, the legitimacy of IFE is at delicate position. risk. In Mexico, the sum of “partialities” does not lead to impartiality.

51

3.2 Transparency and Electoral Legitimacy

Dr. Andreas Schedler, Center for Economic Research and Education (CIDE), Mexico

nconsistencies in electoral administration can have contaminating effects on the electoral External Factors for Electoral Legitimacy Iprocess. Dr. Schedler focused his presentation on the effect that these inconsistencies can have Democracy is defined by its procedural legitimacy, on the legitimacy of electoral authorities and the which not only stems from the process itself, but elections in question. Electoral legitimacy, as de- also from the electoral results, which are beyond fined by Dr. Schedler, results from the relationship the control of the electoral authority. Electoral re- between the transparency and consistency of in- sults are measured by the winners and losers: did formation provided by the electoral authority. Its the governing party win, or the opposition party? achievement is the fundamental challenge and ob- In the ideal scenario, from the perspective of the jective of any electoral authority. electoral authority, the opposition would win ev- ery election by a wide margin. In the worst-case Democracy is a system that will always generate scenario, the governing party would win by a nar- losers, and its legitimacy rests on the losers’ ac- row margin, as in Mexico’s 2006 general elections. ceptance of their defeat. As Adam Przeworski has When the opposition wins by a wide margin, it defined it, democracy is a system in which political dispels doubts about the partiality of the electoral parties lose elections.11 In other words, the losers authority and also lowers general expectations for in the democratic process are the protagonists of administrative perfection in the electoral process. long-term democratic consolidation. As such, elec- Electoral results should also be consistent with toral authorities should never provide or justifications to the losing candidates or parties to reject electoral results. Unfortunately, electoral le- gitimacy does not rest solely on the actions of the 11 Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Eco- electoral authority, but also on other external vari- nomic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (New York: ables and actors that lie beyond its control. Cambridge University Press, 1991).

53 III. The Relationship between Political Parties and Electoral Authorities

“extra-electoral” information, such as polls and Elections should not only be surveys and public opinion. When results gener- ally coincide with poll and survey data, there is democratic, but should also less tension and suspicion towards the electoral appear to be democratic. authority. -Dr. Andreas Schedler A second external factor is the degree of demo- cratic consolidation within a country. This consoli- dation is defined by the level of trust or distrust The actors in the political system also have an in- amongst political parties. Democracy is consoli- fluence on electoral legitimacy. Actors should be dated when it is truly “the only game in town”.12 differentiated in accordance with their moral com- Political parties do not resort to armed rebellion, promises, some of which can be extreme. There exclusion of other parties, , military are democratic actors, opportunistic actors, and options, or other solutions that lie outside the pa- non-democratic actors. Strategic intelligence is im- rameters of a democratic system. Consolidation is portant for these actors. In Mexico, for example, also the result of mutual expectations of . analysts were confounded by the actions of Andres In other words, political parties are convinced that Manuel Lopez Obrador after his electoral defeat in opposing parties will follow the rules of the game 2006. By failing to accept his defeat, he managed and desist from engaging in fraudulent activities. to alienate many of his supporters and curtailed his chances for electoral victory in future elections. A third external consideration is the cost-benefit Had he accepted the defeat, he could have main- analysis of the competitors. In other words, what tained more of his political capital for the future. is at stake for each actor? The cost of electoral de- feat depends on several factors. First is the ideo- logical polarization of the political system, which determines the variation between the plat- Electoral Authorities’ Role forms of each party. When parties converge near in Generating Legitimacy the center, their policies are not radically different and the costs of defeat are lower. A second factor Although electoral authorities cannot control the is the limitation of political power. How confident afore-mentioned factors, they are responsible for are the losers that their democratic rights will be many others that have a direct effect on their legiti- respected, and not restricted, after their defeat? macy. Building up credibility is a major challenge for When power is not concentrated in a central enti- electoral authorities. Elections should not only be ty (for instance in the executive branch), the loser democratic, but should also appear to be democratic. does not lose everything and retains certain po- In other words, credibility presents a dual challenge: litical leverage. In these types of systems, defeat one that is fact-based and administrative, and one is less costly and easier to accept. In winner-takes- that is political, public relations and image-related. all systems, it is far more difficult to accept defeat. Lastly, the institutional role of the defeated party is important, and the prospect of future wins is es- 12 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Tran- sition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and sential to its acceptance of defeat. Defeat must be Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University perceived as a temporary condition. Press, 1996).

54 III. The Relationship between Political Parties and Electoral Authorities

Credibility is a complex matter, as it cannot be Consistency is the only way to legislated, demanded or defined. It is a combina- tion of what we see and what we believe; in other confirm reputations, sincerity and words, it is the combination of transparency and honesty, and when consistency trust. Transparency is extremely important and in is breached it is easy to generate high demand when there is a lack of trust in the suspicion and doubt. Regardless system. Transparency does not create trust, but of whether or not these suspicions rather substitutes for it. People can evaluate and have a foundation, inconsistency judge that which they can see, and transparency is their prime generator in provides tangible, empirical for evalu- any electoral process. ation. Trust, on the other hand, requires a leap of faith into believing in something that people -Dr. Andreas Schedler cannot see. Intricate and complex processes like electoral organization, especially in large countries like Mexico, are always a black box in spite of best implemented with any parallel control or monitor- efforts to make them crystal boxes. Effective elec- ing mechanisms to ensure consistency across the tions require the public’s trust, either in the elec- board. IFE’s noble intentions were poorly imple- toral authority or the multiple actors that monitor mented and thus generated uncertainty and dis- or supervise its actions. trust, which were only exacerbated by the narrow margin obtained by the top candidates. How can we create trust? Trust depends largely on consistency: consistency between words, words In the democratic context, credibility and legitima- and actions, and actions themselves. Consistency cy are completely interwoven and interdependent is the only way to confirm reputations, sincerity concepts. In order for a “democracy” to be cred- and honesty, and when consistency is breached it ible, it must be democratic, and in order for it to be is easy to generate suspicion and doubt. Regard- legitimate, it must be credible. These conditions, less of whether or not these suspicions have a as previously noted, are necessary but insufficient foundation, inconsistency is their prime generator for ensuring legitimacy when we take external fac- in any electoral process. tors into account. Transparency and consistency are essential elements in this process, but they In Mexico’s 2006 presidential election, administra- alone do not guarantee credibility and legitimacy. tive inconsistencies made by the electoral author- In fact, transparency and consistency often go un- ity generated a great deal of suspicion. In previ- noticed when electoral authorities behave in this ous years, certified vote tallies were required to manner. Professional and functional electoral au- provide a registry of the number of votes and the thorities are usually seen as administrative, rather number of remaining unused ballots. In 2006, IFE than political, institutions. But when they breach introduced additional requirements in order to transparency and consistency, they come to the make the process more controlled and reliable. For forefront and start to quickly erode an election’s example, certified vote tallies had to also account credibility. Opacity and inconsistency will lead to for the number of ballots received, the number of suspicion, illegitimacy and the potential rejection voters that turned up, and the number of ballots of electoral results. counted. However, these requirements were not

55

3.3 Oversight of Electoral Authorities: The Case of Ecuador

Adrián López A., Researcher, Latin American Schoolof Social Sciences (FLACSO), Ecuador

n his presentation, Mr. Lopez began by claim- making in addition to electing representatives. Yet ing that electoral authorities face five main this process often circumvents political parties. As Ichallenges as they are strengthened over time the governing structure establishes a direct rela- in the process of consolidating representative de- tionship with the citizen, it obviates representative mocracy. These challenges are: oversight of the intermediaries such as political parties. This transi- executive branch, the crisis of political parties, fi- tion implies a shift in the relationship and balance nancial oversight over political parties, equal between electoral authorities and politi- access to the media, and providing civic education cal parties. to the population. As these challenges are ad- dressed, they imply structural and administrative changes that redefine relationships both between political actors and within existing power struc- The Ecuadorian Case tures; in other words, the search for consolidated democracy implies an era of transition. Ecuador’s recent history illustrates well the evolv- ing nature of the relationship between political In Latin America, in several cases this transition parties and the electoral authority after a long pe- has also meant a move towards a more participa- riod of political turmoil. Its 2008 constitutional re- tory and plebiscitary type of democracy. Direct form brought about changes in the nature of polit- democracy provides one possible solution to the ical consultation, from a party-dominated system challenge of representation by providing direct of representation to a more participatory system. linkages between the citizen and the government. Another critical element of the reform included It also implies the need for stronger electoral au- the division between electoral administration and thorities to adjudicate and carry out plebiscitary electoral justice. These changes in the electoral processes, which tend to occur more frequently landscape have reconfigured electoral administra- as citizen participation is invoked for decision- tion and management along both technical and

57 III. The Relationship between Political Parties and Electoral Authorities

political lines. Its course could be a useful example Under its new , the electoral branch has to other countries in the region, in particular the taken on additional responsibilities that extend Bolivarian axis (Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia), beyond organizing elections. The electoral author- where governments are contemplating constitu- ity has now taken on an oversight role on electoral tional reforms with their sights set toward greater spending and advertising by political parties. It is use of citizen consultations and direct participa- also endowed with legislative initiative and has tion in political decision-making. the ability to resolve conflicts on electoral matters in addition to imposing sanctions. The electoral branch is divided into two bodies: the National Electoral Council and the Litigious Electoral Tribu- Increasing Direct Democracy Practices nal, thereby separating the administrative tasks from electoral justice. Membership of the elector- Over the last three years, Ecuador has held seven al authority has also changed, and its five council- national elections,13 in addition to several regional ors are chosen on the basis of a merit competition. elections, signifying a clear move towards more Candidates may be nominated directly by citizens participatory methods. In addition to general elec- or political parties, but are chosen by the Council tions, there has been a for of Citizen Participation and Social Control. convening a Constituent Assembly, followed by Constituent Assembly elections, a constitutional New technical divisions between the electoral au- , and municipal elections. This has thority and other branches of government have implied an intense workload, not to mention in- created political divisions as the electoral author- creased responsibility, for the electoral authority, ity has taken on additional responsibilities. Politi- as well as high demand for public participation cal parties, which previously dominated the politi- through the exercise of its democratic right. cal landscape, are less and less the protagonists as the current structure has sought to depoliticize the electoral authority. Evidence of this transfor- mation existed early on in the process. The new Constitutional Reforms to the Electoral Constitution called for the Constituent Assembly’s Management and Government Structure appointment of a transitional National Electoral Council and Litigious Electoral Tribunal to oversee Prior to the 2008 reform, the Ecuadorian system consisted of three main branches of government and an independent electoral authority. This struc- ture was expanded under the newly approved constitution to incorporate five branches of gov- ernment. The electoral authority was elevated to 13 October 2006: Presidential and parliamentary elections first a branch of government, joined by the new Trans- round; November 2006: Presidential elections second round; April parency and Social Control branch. Each is subject 2007: Referendum; September 2007: Constituent Assembly elec- tions; September 2008: Constitutional referendum; April 2009: to the Constitutional Court, as equals to the other Presidential and parliamentary elections; June 2009: Andean Par- three branches (judiciary, executive and legisla- liament and Municipal Council elections. 14 Constitución de la República del Ecuador (2008). http://www. 14 tive). asambleanacional.gov.ec/documentos/constitucion_de_bolsillo. pdf

58 III. The Relationship between Political Parties and Electoral Authorities

presidential elections in April 2009.15 Rather than file appeals or complaints, the recourse of revision limit nominations to the Constituent Assembly, or reconsideration of results, the right to demand nominations were opened to the public “as a dem- clarification or expansion upon the decisions taken onstration of greater transparency and increased by the electoral court, as well as protective actions opportunity for participation by the citizens.”16 Be- and political . In other words, political parties, fore 2008, political parties with the greatest num- candidates and individuals have several tools or ber of votes would submit shortlists of candidates mechanisms of varying importance by which they for the seven-member Supreme Electoral Tribunal. can oversee the actions of the electoral authority. Today, it is the Transparency and Social Control What is lacking, however, is clarity on how to ap- branch that elects members to the Supreme Elec- ply, process, and sanction these measures. There toral Tribunal through merit contests, and chooses is also a great need to provide capacity-building five councilors and five electoral to serve at the national level about the new constitution- on the tribunal. ally established mechanisms, especially to political parties and politicians. At the moment, there are few individuals who possess this capacity and un- derstanding of the new system. Growing Power of the Electoral Authority and the Need for Oversight Mechanisms

With new powers granted to the electoral author- Conclusions ity, there is a parallel need for greater judiciary supervision over the constitutionality of the elec- It is clear that the region’s current political pro- toral authority’s decisions. This is important in the cesses have strengthened the role and importance context of a system that is increasingly distancing of electoral institutionalization, forming part of itself from the influence of political parties. In the a historical juncture that is setting the stage for ongoing quest to depoliticize Ecuador’s electoral new electoral and democratic opportunities. It is bodies, legitimacy of origin has been sacrificed for essential that during this process, guarantees be the legitimacy of processes. The only two branches put in place allowing for democratic channels for that maintain legitimacy of origin are the executive constitutional control over electoral authorities. and legislative branches. The other three branches These channels should systematize, clarify and in- are appointed through merit contests, but retain a stitutionalize the role of electoral authorities, oth- great deal of importance in the national political er government bodies and political parties with agenda. respect to the electoral process.

Within the context of the electoral authority’s growing power, and to further depoliticize the electoral authorities, there is a greater need for clarity with respect to the application and sanc- 15 The Carter Center, “Report on the Appointment of the Tempo- tioning of electoral justice. In Ecuador, there are rary Electoral Authorities of Ecuador,” several constitutional controls in place to balance November 2008. At http://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/ The_Carter_Center_Report_on_the_appointment_of_the_tem- the power of the electoral authority. For example, porary_electoral_authorities_Ecuador_FINAL.pdf there is the right to question electoral results, to 16 Ibid, p.3.

59 III. The Relationship between Political Parties and Electoral Authorities

Moreover, these controls should be extended to cover periods between elections, and the relation- ship between electoral tribunals and the highest instance of constitutional control should be care- fully thought through when countries are consid- ering constitutional reforms. In doing so, the role of political parties should not be marginalized. On the contrary, it should be strengthened with the goal of making democracy more participative and of higher quality.

60 3.4 The Case of Jamaica: The Role of Political Parties in Overseeing the Electoral Authority

Senator Tom Tavares-Finson, Jamaican Electoral Commission

enator Tavares-Finson began his presenta- tion by explaining how political parties play Political Party Participation in the Sa fundamentally important role in defining Jamaican Electoral Commission and promoting democracy in Jamaica. Their con- tinued existence and contributions over time have The composition of Jamaica’s Electoral Commis- ensured the continuation of political pluralism and sion and the role of political parties within it are the creation of democratic institutions. largely a reflection of the country’s political land- scape. In Jamaica’s 1980 general elections, there While several political parties are active in Jamaica, were over 800 casualties from politically related it is considered a two-party state. The two main po- violence.18 In the aftermath of this election, and litical parties, the People’s National Party and the within the context of a highly politicized society Jamaica Labour Party, emerged in the late 1930’s, like Jamaica’s, the presence of politicians in the as in many other countries in the Caribbean. These electoral authority was essential to provide le- two parties have shaped Jamaica’s political culture and dominated the political landscape in spite of new parties that have emerged,17 which have been unable to garner a significant amount of support. Both parties have demonstrated a long-term com- mitment to democracy, both by their participation 17 In Jamaica’s 2002 general elections, other contenders included the United Peoples Party, the National Democratic Movement and in parliamentary and national elections and their the National Jamaica Alliance. For more information see Interna- promotion of peaceful transitions to democratic tional Foundation for Electoral Systems, “2002 Elections in the Commonwealth Caribbean: The Electoral Experience of Jamaica norms and values. and the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago,” 2003, at http://www. ifes.org/publication/e4d842afaed3b154a08abf4a075668e4/Elec- tions_in_the_Commonwealth_Caribbean_2002.pdf. 18 The Carter Center, Activities by Country: Jamaica, at http:// www.cartercenter.org/countries/jamaica.html.

61 III. The Relationship between Political Parties and Electoral Authorities

gitimacy and credibility to the system to put the Only then could consensus be reached in the elec- country on a more peaceful, democratic path. The toral authority. country has successfully transitioned from violent elections to predominantly peaceful elections. Once the Commission makes a decision, it is dis- cussed in Parliament, where political parties no Jamaica’s Electoral Commission is composed of longer have the ability to interfere in the decision- eight individuals, four of whom are independent making process. Once Parliament approves the members (including a judge, a , and two ac- change, the decision is final. In a highly politicized ademics) and four who are appointed by political society like Jamaica’s, political party members of parties. The electoral authority operates on a con- the electoral authority call for restraint and under- sensus basis for all decision-making. This practice standing at the party level, presenting the electoral has not been written into law, but political parties authority as a serious institution to be respected. have agreed to it for the sake of preserving the legitimacy of the institution. Political parties each have one vote, independents have four votes, and the Chairman has a final vote. Independent mem- Political Party Roles at the Polls bers of the electoral authority lose their right to vote in national elections for seven years. In most existing and emerging democracies, politi- cal parties are usually permitted to be present at The participation of political parties in the deci- the polling stations on election day. The primary sion-making body of the electoral authority has objective of their presence is to provide candi- had several ripple effects, both within the institu- dates and parties the ability to monitor and partic- tion as well as within political parties themselves. ipate in the implementation of the election. Their At the individual level, political party representa- presence ensures transparency and legitimacy, tives are frequently in the position of having to even though their first and foremost role is to pro- sell an opinion (the electoral authority’s) to their mote their own interests. It is precisely their self- parties. As a result, these representatives of the interest, however, which is the main guarantor of electoral authority are frequently accused by their legitimacy because each party watches the others own parties of selling out the interests of the party very closely. Their participation ensures that elec- to the electoral authority. tions are more free and fair.

For example, several years ago, the Commission Jamaica has a peculiar system for recruiting party was discussing the introduction of a system of workers on election day to work at polling sta- electronic voter identification through fingerprint- tions. The electoral authority provides a stipend recognition machines. Its introduction would have to workers and pays for their training prior to the a fundamental effect on voting patterns because election. As a result of their training and role on it would help prevent electoral fraud. When this election day, party workers have a vested interest idea was presented to political parties, there was in the operation of the election. a great deal of resistance because the parties be- lieved they would lose some control over the elec- Additionally, electoral legislation in Jamaica al- toral process. The system was finally introduced, lows for parties to have both indoor and outdoor but not before political parties agreed to it first. agents at polling stations. Political Liaison Officers,

62 III. The Relationship between Political Parties and Electoral Authorities

who are at a special administrative level, were in- gree of politicization in the country, political par- troduced in 2002’s parliamentary elections to pro- ties are often suspicious. Returning to the finger- vide general political supervision of party workers. print recognition example, many people thought They are allowed to visit polling stations and may that it would be used for other purposes, such as visit each table for up to three minutes. These of- tracking criminal records. By training the agents ficers monitor voter turnout, and the law allows of political parties on how to use the machines, them to inspect electoral materials, observe all this information was transmitted to their parties movements except the actual act of filling out the and was critical in convincing the leaders of their , and, more critically, to participate in the proper functioning and purpose. initial counting of the ballots. Not only do they observe the counting of the ballots, but they also Another innovation in Jamaica’s system came sign off on the final results that are submitted to into place in the last five years. Once an election the electoral authority. is announced, an organizational body called the Election Center is created. It operates 24 hours On the other hand, Political Liaison Officers are a day, and is comprised of two members of the subject to some restrictions; they are not allowed Commission representing each party, represen- to interfere with or intimidate voters, nor are they tatives of civil society, the head of the military, allowed to wear party colors indoors. Misconduct the head of the , the and the may result in their removal from the polling sta- director of elections. Any infractions, violence, al- tion. Because they are now part of the administra- legations of misconduct, or other issues are taken tion of the electoral process, the presence of Polit- directly to the Center for resolution. This system ical Liaison Officers greatly reduces the possibility has managed to diffuse many tensions in Jamaica, of allegations about unfair elections. where political “over-enthusiasm” often results in violence. The Electoral Commission plays an integral role in ensuring that political party agents act within their In a country like Jamaica, the question of trans- mandated roles. Since the 1990s, the electoral parency and legitimacy is very important and un- authority has trained these agents with its own questioned faith in the benefits of democracy has funds. The electoral authority uses party agents yet to fully develop. Until it does, authorities will as avenues for communication with political par- have to keep reinventing themselves in an effort ties, particularly to disseminate knowledge about to maintain a well-functioning electoral system. In electoral procedures. Yet because of the high de- doing so, political parties must be close allies.

63

3.5 The Case of the Dominican Republic: Legislative Regulation over Political Parties

John Giuliani, Judge of the of the Dominican Republic

n his remarks about the evolving nature of the processes. In most countries in Latin America, in- Dominican Republic’s electoral code, Mr. Giu- cluding the Dominican Republic, there are merely Iliani sought to provide more clarity on the re- mentions of political party regulation in their legis- lationship between political parties and electoral lation. Although political parties are rarely in favor authorities from the standpoint of the oversight of being regulated, the frequency of crises they and implementation of elections. As the Domini- experienced in the Dominican Republic led them can Republic’s highest authority in electoral mat- to bring this issue to the forefront. Political parties ters, the Central Electoral Board (Junta Central demanded the adoption of legislation that would Electoral) has several responsibilities relative to spell out their roles and recourse for dealing with electoral administration and justice. These roles different scenarios for conflict, within parties and and responsibilities have influenced the behavior also in relation to the electoral authority. On the of political parties over time, and have been ex- other hand, the electoral authority is also in favor ecuted but not properly reflected in the country’s of a new law for political parties, as it will provide electoral legislation, which is now in the process a legal backdrop for its actions, grounded in the of discussion as part of the Dominican Republic’s electoral code and allowing for fewer instances of new constitution. interpretation and conflict.

The oversight function of electoral authorities in Among the most controversial is the electoral au- the matters of public financing, access to the me- thority’s role as mediator of political parties’ af- dia, and restrictions on campaign financing, tends fairs. Aside from resolving any issues stemming to be the greatest factor of contention between from the creation or dissolution of political par- it and political parties. While these practices have ties, the electoral authority is also responsible for been put into place over time to make the electoral resolving matters relating to coalitions or mergers system more fair and credible, there has been an between them. This is in addition to the elector- absence of electoral legislation to streamline these al authorities’ jurisdiction to distribute all public

65 III. The Relationship between Political Parties and Electoral Authorities

funds for political campaigns, and to provide fi- The new political party legislation under discussion nancial oversight of parties at any time. Although is of benefit to political parties in many ways. For political parties are not required by law to submit example, opposition parties see potential benefits periodic financial statements to the electoral au- in a law that strictly prohibits the incumbent from thority, they must submit to financial audits by the using public funds (other than those allocated by institution at its behest. During elections, politi- the electoral authority) for political campaigns. It cal parties must submit complete financial state- also includes regulations for primaries within par- ments detailing all campaign contributions and ties, quotas for the inclusion of female candidates expenditures. Also during the electoral processes, by political parties (33 percent), and discusses the the electoral authority may interfere with internal issue of sanctions. Specifically, the draft law calls party politics if they involve the removal from the for different levels of sanctions on political parties party of a potential candidate, for example. As a depending on the infraction committed, which in result of the far-reaching abilities of the electoral the harshest instances, allows the electoral au- authority, political parties have resorted to chang- thority to withhold public campaign funds from ing their membership during non-electoral peri- the guilty party. The draft political party legislation ods, at which point the electoral authority may is seen by most as a positive political tool that will not intercede in their decisions. In spite of these strengthen political parties and improve their rela- attributes, there is no legislation that explicitly lays tionship amongst themselves, and with the elec- out a sanctions regimen for political parties found toral authority. to be acting in violation of their legal parameters, particularly with respect to campaign financing.

66 IV. Next Steps

he Second Inter-American Training Seminar In addition, based on the positive response from was a successful follow-up in a now ongo- member-states to the Inter-American Electoral Ting series of professionalization activities Training Seminars, the OAS has begun to tailor for electoral authorities in the region. Like its National Training Seminars for individual elector- predecessor, it sought to enrich the participants’ al authorities throughout the hemisphere. These knowledge by stimulating theoretical and practical trainings present electoral authority staff with discussions and using country case studies to il- information from both experts and from other lustrate the region’s experiences in electoral man- EMBs throughout the region on their experiences agement. Horizontal cooperation was encouraged in election administration and organization. amongst the seminar’s participants to not only share experiences, but also to find areas of com- This report is but one of the takeaways from the mon interest for future sessions. Second Inter-American Electoral Training Seminar. It captures the ideas, challenges and possible solu- As an additional step to consolidate its commit- tions that were shared by experts and participants ment to the professionalization of the region’s alike. As such, it provides participants with the electoral authorities, the OAS has commenced theoretical discussions that took place, in addition the development of a certificate program in elec- to practical case studies from around the hemi- toral studies in collaboration with FLACSO, which sphere. All seminar-related materials, including will be aimed at officials from electoral manage- this report, are knowledge resources for all par- ment bodies. This academically certified program ticipants as well as other interested parties. It is will provide both further theoretical and applied hoped that the exchanges and exercises that took knowledge on the state of electoral systems and place over the course of the Second Training Semi- practices throughout the Americas. nar will continue to evoke thoughtful discussion and pave the way for a Third Training Seminar.

67 IV. Next Steps

Analysis of the Second Training Seminar’s discus- far more complex. Electoral management bod- sions demonstrates the need for additional col- ies share many characteristics, but the context in laboration within the region as electoral authori- which they operate, including the electoral model, ties balance delicate relationships with actors like number and strength of political parties, and con- political parties and the media in their respective centration of media control, is a determining fac- countries. Their increased visibility as guarantors tor in choosing the most effective and appropriate of fairness in the electoral process also raises the solutions for each country. Electoral authorities demand for transparency and accountability. As must respond to societal pressures and trends seen throughout this report, their internal admin- that are constantly in flux. They should not be stat- istration and operations are as important as their ic entities, and their roles should adapt over time public image, which is largely determined by their to ensure that under the current circumstances, relationship with the media and political parties. they can guarantee free and fair elections to their citizens. By strengthening these institutions, the The discussions held during the Second Training Inter-American Training Seminar series seeks to Seminar made clear that one size does not fit all contribute to the improvement of their legitimacy in electoral administration. The challenges and di- so they will successfully face these challenges and lemmas are common to all, but the solutions are continue to uphold democracy in the region.

68 Speaker Biographies

COMMISSIONER GINEEN BRESSO BEACH U.S. Election Assistance Commission Ms. Gineen Bresso Beach holds 5 years of experience as a Commissioner and formerly served as for the United States . She provides assistance to states on election administra- tion matters under the Help America Vote Act. She is also the primary spokesperson for the Election Assis- tance Commission, conducting interviews and liaising with several media outlets to educate and provide voters with information during elections.

John Enright Manager, Media Relations, Elections Canada Mr. John Enright has served for 25 years at Elections Canada and is currently Manager of Media Relations, acting as principle spokesperson for Elections Canada and the Office of the Commissioner of Canada Elec- tions. He regularly responds to news media requests directly, and provides media interviews for both broadcast and print media. Within Elections Canada, Mr. Enright provides strategic media relations advice and guidance on sensitive and complex issues.

Wesley Gibbings President of the Association of Caribbean Media Workers Wesley Gibbings is a freelance journalist, media trainer and communications consultant. He currently heads the Association of Caribbean Media Workers (ACM), a network of journalists spanning the Carib- bean Basin. He has contributed to and edited publications on the Caribbean media and climate change and the coverage of elections by Caribbean journalists. He has also written extensively on the subject of freedom of the press and is on the Advisory Committee of the Global Forum for Media Development.

69 Speaker Biographies

DR. JOHN GIULIANI Judge of the Central Electoral Board of the Dominican Republic Dr. John Guiliani is a Principal Judge of the Litigious Chamber of the Central Electoral Council of the Domin- ican Republic. He holds a PhD in Law from the Universidad Autónoma de Santo Domingo. He is a member of the College of Attorneys and Notaries of the Dominican Republic. His law practice currently is based in the city of Santo Domingo.

ADRIÁN LÓPEZ Researcher, Latin American School of Social Sciences (FLACSO), Ecuador Adrián López graduated from Hampshire College in Massachusetts, majoring in and His- tory. He also holds a Master’s Degree in Latin American studies from theUniversidad Andina Simón Bolívar and another in Political Science from the Latin American School of Social Sciences (FLACSO). His main areas of research include electoral matters and South American integration. He currently works for the Ministry of Planning and in Ecuador.

DR. BETILDE V. MUÑOZ-POGOSSIAN Head of the Electoral Studies and Projects Section, OAS Department for Electoral Cooperation and Obser- vation Dr. Muñoz-Pogossian is Head of the Electoral Studies and Projects Section at the OAS Department for Elector- al Cooperation and Observation. She has a doctorate in Political Science from Florida International University in Miami, with a concentration in , and Latin American Politics. Her doctoral thesis explored the impact of Bolivia’s electoral system on the relationship between the presi- dent and congress, and social conflicts from 1995 to the present. She received several research scholarships for her Master’s thesis on the role of women in national political processes and transitions to democracy in Venezuela. She has participated as an electoral observer and Deputy Chief for several OAS Electoral Observa- tion Missions, and has worked on democracy and conflict resolution topics for the last ten years.

DR. RAFAEL RONCAGLIOLO Director, International IDEA Peru Dr. Roncagliolo has been the Director of International IDEA’s (Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assis- tance) Peru Program since January 2003. Both a sociologist and journalist, he has worked as a journalist in print, radio and television. He teaches at the University of Lima, Catholic University of Peru and Nacional de San Marcos. He has also been a visiting professor at the University of , Iberoamericana de México and Pontificia de Ecuador. He has served as a consultant for UNESCO, UNDP, OAS, IDB, the In- ternational Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), the National Democratic Institute (NDI), and bilateral aid agencies of the United States (USAID), Italy and .

Dr. Roncagliolo was Secretary General and a founding member of the Peruvian Transparency Civil Associa- tion from its creation in 1994 until December 2002. His memberships include the Global Council for Radio

70 Speaker Biographies

and Television, sponsored by UNESCO (1994- 1997); the Institute for Latin America, headquartered in Lima; and the Federation of Communications Faculty of Latin America (FELAFACS). He was Vice President of the International Association for Mass Communication Research, IAMCR / AIERI (1982-1986) and Presi- dent of the Global Association of Community Radios (AMARC) from 1995 to1998.

DR. ANDREAS SCHEDLER Researcher, Center for Economic Research and Education (CIDE), Mexico Dr. Schedler is a researcher and professor at the Center for Economic Research and Education (CIDE) in Mexico, in the Department of Political Studies. He holds a PhD from the University of Vienna in political science. Dr. Schedler has published widely on the topics of democratic transition and consolidation, citi- zen disenchantment, accountability, electoral manipulation and the process of democratization in Mex- ico. His current areas of focus are: institutional design and analysis; democratization; fraud and elec- toral reform; comparative public institutions; political parties and elections; and research processes and methodologies.

SENATOR THOMAS TAVARES FINSON Senator and Member of Jamaica’s Electoral Commission Senator Thomas Tavares-Finson is a member of Jamaica’s Electoral Commission. He is a lawyer, with de- grees from the University of Jamaica and McMaster University in Canada. He is a member of the Jamaica Labour Party and has held a seat in the since 2007. Between 2005 and 2006, he was a member of the Committee of Electoral Advisors.

DR. Raúl Trejo Delabre Head Researcher at the Institute for Social Research, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM) Raúl Trejo Delabre holds a PhD in Sociology from the Department of Political and Social Sciences of the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM); a Master’s degree in Latin American Studies and a Bachelor’s Degree in Journalism, also from UNAM. He is the head researcher for the UNAM Institute for Social Research and a professor in the Department of Political and Social Sciences. He teaches in the De- partment of Communications at UNAM, and has taught in the Department of Economics as well.

Dr. Trejo has been a member of the Academic Post-Graduate Council in Political and Social Sciences as a representative of the Institute for Social Research. He has authored fifteen books and coordinated another ten collective publications. His writing has contributed to another 90 publications. Among his most recent work are included: “Poderes salvajes. Mediocracia sin contrapesos” (Cal y Arena, 2005) and “Viviendo en El Aleph. La Sociedad de la Información y sus laberintos” (Gedisa, Barcelona, 2006).

71 Speaker Biographies

DR. FRANCISCO VALDÉS UGALDE President of the Superior Council, Latin American School of Social Sciences (FLACSO) Dr. Valdés Ugalde is President of the Superior Council of FLACSO. He holds a PhD in Political Science from the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM), is Head Researcher for the Institute of Social Re- search at the same university and a doctoral professor at FLACSO’s Mexican campus.

Dr. Valdés Ugalde is a member of the Mexican Academy of Sciences and other professional international associations. He is part of the National System of Researchers and the editorial councils of the Mexican Sociology Magazine, the Journal of American History, Latin American Profiles and Fractal, and is a weekly contributor to Mexico’s newspaper El Universal.

Dr. Valdéz Ugalde is also the director of the Mexican Sociology Magazine of the Institute for Social Re- search of the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM). He was General Director of the National Institute of Historical Studies of the Mexican Revolution within Mexico’s Secretaría de Gobernación. He has taught and researched at Harvard University, Brown University, University of Connecticut, University of California-San Diego, University of Salamanca and the Instituto Universitario de Investigación José Orte- ga y Gasset. He has authored numerous articles on political science, and is currently working on a piece on state reform in Mexico.

DR. LEONARDO VALDÉS ZURITA President Councilor of the Federal Electoral Institute of Mexico (IFE) Dr. Valdés Zurita holds a degree in Economics from Universidad Anáhuac and a PhD in Social Sciences, with a specialization in Sociology, from the Center for Sociological Studies at El Colegio de México. His list of publications includes eight co-authored books on political and electoral matters, as well as several re- search articles. Some of his work has been published in the United States, Brazil, Uruguay and the .

Dr. Valdés Zurita was IFE’s Executive Director from 1996 until 1998. He was also a member of the Commis- sion of Specialists that was appointed by IFE’s General Council in 1998 to study voting models for Mexicans residing abroad. From 1999 to 2005, he was appointed Proprietary Electoral Councilor for the ’s Electoral Institute, where he presided over the Electoral Organization Commission.

72 Recommended Reading List

ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, “Media and Electoral Management.” http://aceproject.org/ace-en/ topics/media-and-elections

ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, “Political Parties and Candidates.” http://aceproject.org/ace-en/top- ics/lf/lfb/lfb05?set_language=en

Alcántara Sáez, Manuel, Gobernabilidad, Crisis y Cambio, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1994.

Association of Caribbean Media Networks (ACM), United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Or- ganization (UNESCO) and International Freedom of Expression Exchange (IFEX), “An Election Handbook for Caribbean Journalists,” 2009.

Bobbio, Norberto, The Future of Democracy, University of Minnesota Press, Great Britain, 1987.

Catón, Matthias, Effective Party Assistance: Stronger Parties for Better Democracy, International IDEA, Stockholm, Sweden, 2007.

Davis, D.K. and S.J. Baron, “A History of Our Understanding of Mass Communication. ” Mass Communica- tion and Everyday Life:A Perspective on Theory and Effects, Wadsworth Publishing, Belmont, 1981. (19-52)

Griner, Steven and Daniel Zovatto (eds.), From Grassroots to the Airwaves: Paying for Political Parties and Campaigns in the Caribbean, OAS- International IDEA, Washington DC, 2005.

Griner, Steven and Daniel Zovatto, Funding of Political Parties and Elections Campaigns in the Americas, OAS- International IDEA, San Jose, Costa Rica, 2005.

73 Recommended Reading List

International IDEA,Code of Conduct for Political Parties: Campaigning in Democratic Elections, Stockholm, Sweden, 1999.

International IDEA, Electoral Management Design:The International IDEA Handbook, Stockholm, Sweden, 2006.

International IDEA, Electoral System Design: the New International IDEA Handbook, Stockholm, Sweden, 2005.

Latinobarómetro, Latinobarómetro Report 2008, Santiago, Chile, 2008.

Linz, Juan J. and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1996.

Merloe, Patrick, Promoting Legal Frameworks for Democratic Elections, National Democratic Institute, Washington DC, 2008.

Merloe, Patrick and Robert Norris, Media Monitoring to Promote Democratic Elections, National Demo- cratic Institute, Washington DC, 2002.

Przeworski, Adam, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1991.

Sartori, Giovanni, El Homo Videns: La Sociedad Teledirigida, Taurus, Mexico, 1999.

The Carter Center, “Financing Democracy: Political Parties, Campaigns, and Elections; Statement of the Council of Presidents and Prime Ministers of the Americas,” 19, 2003. http://www.cartercenter. org/documents/nondatabase/Final%20statement%20Financing%20Democracy.pdf

United Nations Development Program, Democracy in Latin America: Towards a Citizens’ Democracy, Agui- lar, Altea, Taurus, Alfaguara, S.A., Buenos Aires, 2004.

74