Challenges of Democratic Inclusion: Investigating the Politics of Difference

Introduction

Challenges of democratic inclusion: Investigating the politics of difference

Astrid Mattes1, Jeremias Stadlmair1, *

1 Department of Political Science, University of Vienna, Austria * E-Mail: [email protected]

Abstract Contemporary European societies are shaped by ongoing disputes about how to draw boundaries of membership and about the proper means of democratic inclusion. Who – which groups and individuals – should have a voice in the political system and access to resources? How can these actors achieve an equal standing in democratic societies? Sieglinde Rosenberger has contributed important points to these questions and continues to do so: With an emphasis on the Austrian political system in the context of European Integration, she combined research on gender, migration, religion and political participation into a common framework of “Politics of Inclusion and Exclusion”. On the occasion of her 60th birthday, this special issue aims to review the Politics of Inclusion and Exclusion, providing both normative and empirical perspectives.

Keywords Participation; inclusion/exclusion; democratic inclusion; politics of difference; Austrian Politics

Demokratische Inklusion: Herausforderungen einer Politik der Vielfalt

Zusammenfassung Welche Individuen und Gruppen sollen an demokratischen Institutionen und Verfahren teilhaben? Welche Formen von Teil- habe ermöglichen eine adäquate Berücksichtigung divergierender Interessen? Zur wissenschaftlichen Aufarbeitung dieser Fragen politischer Grenzziehungsprozesse trägt Sieglinde Rosenberger maßgeblich bei: Fokussierend auf das politische System Österreichs im Kontext europäischer Integration vereint Sieglinde Rosenberger Forschung zu Gender, Migration, Religion und politischer Partizipation zum konzeptionellen Rahmen der „Politik der Inklusion und Exklusion“. Anlässlich ihres sechzigsten Geburtstags befasst sich dieses Schwerpunktheft mit normativen wie empirischen Fragen politischer Grenzziehung in den Bereichen Migration, Religion, und Geschlecht und bietet damit eine Zusammenschau des Konzepts Inklusion/Exklusion.

Schlüsselwörter Partizipation, Politische Teilhabe, Politik der Differenz, Inklusion/Exklusion, Österreich

The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.

March 31, 2017 I innsbruck university press, Innsbruck OZP – Austrian Journal of Political Science I ISSN 2313-5433 I http://oezp.at/ Vol. 46, issue 1 I DOI 10.15203/ozp.1672.vol46iss1 OPEN ACCESS 2 A. Mattes, J. Stadlmair: Challenges of democratic inclusion I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1

1. Introduction such as the politics of difference covering gender, religion and ethnicity. All the same, she also worked In 1989 Sieglinde Rosenberger wrote: on more ‘conventional’ political science, dealing with social policy and distributional justice (2003 with Differences of life realities, domination and oppression, are Emmerich Talós), voting (2008 with Gilg Seeber), par- based on interests, some aiming to remain the status quo, others ticipation (2014 with Jeremias Stadlmair), represen- pushing for change – this however, from different positions of tation (2016 with Iris Stöckl) and political attitudes power. (1989, 343) (2011 with Gilg Seeber). She also advanced the discipline in Austria with her textbook on Austrian politics These lines from Sieglinde Rosenberger’s dissertation the- (one of the very few), which she wrote together with sis on gender politics could not be more topical today. As we Anton Pelinka, published first in 2000. write the introduction for this special issue, the European Although her rich publication record includes Union and its member states are challenged by turbulent several cross-national studies, the Austrian politi- processes: large numbers of persons seek shelter and a cal system is Rosenberger’s core empirical subject, prospect for their lives in Europe, triggering both support which she has academically observed in its develop- and backlash in migration-related discourses and policies. ment over recent decades. One such development Debates about immigration and its imputed consequences which she investigated are war memorials as an ex- assume an unprecedented significance and polarization pression of Austria’s struggles of coming to terms (Bauman 2016). In this context, questions of democratic with its role as an aggressor in the Second World War inclusion attract increasing attention: Who – which groups (1991 with Reinhold Gärtner). This links into her more and individuals – should be regarded as legitimate mem- recent research on nationalism and right-wing par- bers of the political community and therefore have a voice ties (2008 with Nora Gresch and Leila Hadj Abdou). in the political system? How can these voices receive an Another line of research deals with the changing role equal standing in society? of religion and its institutions in Austrian politics In contrast to many current sentiments on immigra- (2007; 2014 with Astrid Mattes). Always informed by tion, democracies normatively ought to be inclusive and a desire to facilitate democratic inclusion, Sieglinde accommodate conviviality in difference (Dahl 1989; Young Rosenberger’s research focus increasingly shifted to- 1990). As the reality in which such principles are to be im- wards migration research (2010). Here she combined plemented in is complex and diversified, democratic prin- her fields of expertise to address both normative is- ciples are never uncontested and do not follow the simple sues, such as collective identity and common values black and white logic we tend to find in public discourse. (2013 with Birgit Sauer), and pragmatic issues of im- Social scientific research, by contrast, aims to understand migrant integration (2014 with Florian Trauner). Her and process this complexity by investigating such develop- strong empirical focus made her sensitive to evolving ments both normatively and empirically. Social sciences issues and up-to-date research, a strength she always play a significant role in developing an understanding of brings to her work with colleagues in the field. The processes of inclusion and exclusion by identifying prob- conceptual framework of politics of inclusion and lematic political concepts and policies that lack inclusion- exclusion spans across Rosenberger’s theoretical and ary effects, and by outlining possibilities to overcome ex- empirical research (2013b with Ilker Ataç). clusion qua difference. Sieglinde Rosenberger’s research did not only evolve in terms of concepts and topics, but also in the way how research is conducted. In the last decade, 2 An attempt to grasp Sieglinde Rosenberger’s she has initiated numerous third-party funded re- academic contribution search projects (for an overview on recent projects by Sieglinde Rosenberger and her team, see: http://inex. The multiple challenges of democratic inclusion are the univie.ac.at/research/), enabling many promising connecting elements of Sieglinde Rosenberger’s wide- students to become professional academics. In this ranging research activities. Starting from women’s inclu- sense, directing research is to her no end in itself but sion in the labour market in her early career in Innsbruck always intended to make a social impact, to address (1994 with Brigitte Haller and Karin Liebhart), Rosenberger the broader public, to guide younger colleagues or to soon connected gender-relations to the general politics of motivate students (aims that overlap somewhat). difference in democratic societies (1996). When Rosenberg- In this spirit of cooperation, she has conducted er was appointed to a full professorship at the University research on processes of inclusion and exclusion in of Vienna in 1998, she was not only one of the first female democratic states, covering all main categories of professors of political science in Austria, but also brought difference (Young 1990; Benhabib 1996; Brubaker new perspectives and issues to Austrian political science, 2013): The VEIL project (Values, Equality and Differences A. Mattes, J. Stadlmair: Challenges of democratic inclusion I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1 3

in Liberal Democracies) focused on issues of gender and ible in terms of attitudes and political discourses, which religious diversity, GIVING VOICE (Inclusion through Po- may be very different to legal categories (Rosenberger/ litical Parties) investigated political representation along Seeber 2011; Ruedin and Hadj-Abdou in this issue). ethnic categories. Projects like LIVING ROOMS (The Art An investigation of intersections of different forms of Mobilizing Belongings) included a class perspective and of legal, participatory and discursive boundary-drawing applied an innovative approach to conviviality in multi- requires a common conceptual framework. Originating ethnic and multi-national societies that combined from research on social inequality and welfare systems, perspectives of social sciences and modern art. Rosen- the concept of inclusion/exclusion addresses the simul- berger’s research focuses on discursive, as well as on in- taneity of inclusion and exclusion in different social stitutional, civic and legal, mechanisms of inclusion and sub-systems (Ataç/Rosenberger 2013b; Kronauer 2010), exclusion. The SOM (Support and Opposition to Migration) such as employment, education, welfare systems, etc. In project investigated the politicization of migration on a this framework, inclusion and exclusion are argued to be discursive level, while GOVERNING INTEGRATION (A partial, not absolute. In other words, there are not mem- State Secretariat for Integration) monitored the institution- bers and non-members in a political system, but there is alization of Austrian immigrant integration politics. a sliding scale of inclusion and exclusion as well as partial TAKING SIDES (Protest Against the Deportation of Asylum memberships. This, however, implies that the demos or Seekers) documents protest movements against depor- the boundary problem outlined above is not only about tations and INSIDE (Inside the Deportation Gap – Social inclusion, but also about equality: While having a voice Membership for Non-Deported Persons) addresses the situ- or no voice in politics could be understood as a binary ation of people without secure legal status. Conducted question, the perspective of inclusion/exclusion is sensi- with the research group ‘INEX – politics of inclusion and tive to inequalities of political voices, where some politi- exclusion’, headed by Sieglinde Rosenberger, these and cal actors are more and some less able to make their in- many other projects investigate the manifold challenges terests heard (Verba et al. 1995). Accepting a simultaneity of democratic inclusion. of inclusion and exclusion in stratified social systems is a central assumption of the concept of inclusion/exclusion. However, despite this simultaneity, social systems 3 Conceptualizing inclusion, exclusion and are not considered to be independent from one another. democracy Their intersections are at the core of a research interest using the approach of inclusion/exclusion. Applied to As Dahl’s (1989) principle of inclusion poses a so-called issues of migration and diversity, this concept helps to boundary problem to liberal democracies, questions of investigate legal stratifications of access to citizenship, who is, should, and is not or should not be, a member unequal voices in political participation and representa- of a democratic society are highly contentious. In nor- tion, as well as the study of discursive boundaries. mative terms, concrete operationalizations of inclusion – such as including all affected interests, all subjected to coercion, and all stakeholders – lead to incongruent 4 Four questions of democratic inclusion and outcomes and need to be reconciled (Bauböck in this is- exclusion sue). More generally speaking, questions arise as to how nation states are able to maintain agency and legitimacy This special issue takes Sieglinde Rosenberger’s rich in times of transnationally mobile goods and persons work on different forms, categories, levels and mecha- (Pelinka in this issue). nisms of inclusion and exclusion as its point of depar- Looking at membership in democratic societies from ture. It is an attempt, on the occasion of her 60th birth- a broader perspective than formal citizenship and ac- day, by scholars who worked with her at different stages cess to electoral rights, empirical research on the ac- of her impressive career to pay tribute to her achieve- commodation, participation and representation of di- ments. To this end we follow her example in addressing verse social groups and interests shows that boundaries pressing issues of democratic inclusion by analysing of democratic membership are contested in several di- contemporary developments in the politics of differ- mensions (Anderson/Hughes 2015; Ataç/Rosenberger ence. Providing both empirical and normative perspec- 2013b; Rosenberger/Mourão Permoser 2012; Yuval- tives, the papers in this special issue reassess questions Davis 2006). In this sense, boundaries involve different of inclusion and exclusion in the light of new data and legal formats, ranging from humanitarian protection recent political developments, but also develop new per- to national citizenship. Boundaries, however, also im- spectives on long-standing controversies of democratic ply practices which cut across legal distinctions, such as inclusion. The collection of articles is guided by four political participation beyond voting, in favour of or op- questions: posed to marginalized groups. Boundaries are also vis- 4 A. Mattes, J. Stadlmair: Challenges of democratic inclusion I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1

1. How is access to social, political and civic rights ne- both new discursive elements and older ones, apparent- gotiated in democratic polities? ly inherent to nationalist ideologies, and concludes by 2. Which legal and discursive categories shape the con- pointing at the intersectional mechanisms of exclusion struction of boundaries in mobile societies? at play. 3. How are different actors involved in the politics of Drawing on the data of the SOM project, Didier Rue- inclusion and exclusion? din investigates the salience and framing of different 4. How do policies regulating difference impact on groups of immigrant minorities in the media in seven democratic inclusion? European countries. He shows that not only the actors in the debate, but also citizenship regimes (Koopmans et al. Below we provide a brief outline of the contributions 2005) shape the way in which immigrant minorities are in this special issue, discussing how they relate to ques- portrayed in the media, in particular when it comes to tions of democratic inclusion and how they might com- vulnerable or voiceless groups. While the mere size of an plement Sieglinde Rosenberger’s academic work. immigrant group does not correspond to its politicization, it is often the case that voiceless groups are politicized in a particular type of ethnic regime. Ruedin’s text 5 Article overview points out the relevance of institutional settings, such as citizenship regimes, for the discursive formation of Dealing with the question of how social and political democratic inclusion and exclusion. rights were extended to foreign residents in Austria, Il- Questions of how immigration-related diversity is ker Ataç’s paper goes to the very core of Rosenberger’s debated are also addressed in the contribution of Flo- research, following a rights-based approach of inclu- rian Trauner and Jocelyn Turton: They investigate the sion (Ataç/Rosenberger 2013a; Marshall 1950). This ar- phenomenon of a ‘welcome culture’. Comparing Austria ticle builds on empirical cases from Austria which dem- and Germany, two states that were severely affected by onstrate how rights of third-country nationals to social recent inflows of refugees, the authors sketch the course assistance and electoral rights in works councils were of the debates and the change in meaning of that ‘wel- secured through litigation. In a thick case description, come culture’ over time. The article demonstrates how Ataç demonstrates the necessity of providing support this debate reflected the struggles of both societies to structures for legal action as well as the reluctance of income to terms with the challenge of refugee reception. stitutions to implement court decisions. This article thus Trauner and Turton contribute to a growing literature refers to questions no. 1 and 3, centring on the role of dif- on the public contestation of asylum seekers as a so- ferent actors in negotiating citizenship rights. cial group and of asylum as a human right, which is a Also looking at actors involved in processes of inclu- core theme of Sieglinde Rosenberger’s recent research sion and exclusion, Astrid Mattes investigates the role of (Rosenberger 2010; Rosenberger/Trauner 2014; Rosen- faith-based organizations in immigrant integration pol- berger/Winkler 2014). icy. Case studies from Austria, Germany and Switzer- In contrast to the discourse- and actor-centred land reveal that these groups fulfil multiple roles as civil perspectives in this special issue, Jeremias Stadlmair society actors, as religious representatives or as migrant investigates the social impact of policies regulating associations. Differences occur mainly in relation to democratic inclusion (question no. 4). In a comparison Muslim associations: While Austria’s legally recognized of nine European countries over two decades, he shows Islamic Religious Community is involved mainly as a to which extent citizenship policies can account for dif- religious representative, German Islamic associations ferences in citizenship acquisition via naturalisation. fulfil multiple roles, while Swiss Islamic associations are While changes in some naturalisation requirements, hardly involved at all. To understand these differences, such as residence requirements, cannot be directly re- she applies the perspective of governmentality, which lated to changes in naturalisation rates, it is specifically allows her to identify trust and suspicion as central dis- economic resource requirements which constitute a cursive techniques of government. barrier to democratic inclusion. This article again builds The use of categories in the construction of bound- on a rights-based understanding of inclusion/exclusion aries in discourses on immigration (question no. 2) is (Ataç/Rosenberger 2013a). central to the contributions of Leila Hadj-Abdou and As normative contributions, the discussion articles Didier Ruedin. In Leila Hadj-Abdou’s discussion article by Anton Pelinka and Rainer Bauböck take a broader on gender debates by nationalist actors, the category ‘re- perspective on challenges of democratic inclusion. ligion’ is frequently utilized. Hadj-Abdou discusses how Pelinka addresses the normative challenges of democ- nationalist narratives draw on gender roles to push no- racy in a globalized world. The “collision of two mega- tions of self versus the other and sketches the develop- trends”, as he describes the concurrent phenomena of ment of this ‘gender nationalism’. Hadj-Abdou identifies democratization and globalization, results in a drifting A. Mattes, J. 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apart of ideas and interests and a lack of congruence Gresch, Nora/Leila Hadj-Abdou/Sieglinde Rosenberger/ between those represented and those affected by demo- Birgit Sauer (2008). Tu felix Austria? The Headscarf cratic politics. In drawing two future scenarios – an op- and the Politics of „Non-issues“, in: Social Politics: timistic and a pessimistic one – the article demonstrates International Studies in Gender, State & Society, Vol. the necessity of structures of global government to pre- 15(4), 411–432. vent violent confrontations and continue the success Haller, Brigitte/Karin Liebhart/Sieglinde Rosenberger story of democratic politics. (1994). Feminism and multiculturalism, in: Öster- Similarly, Rainer Bauböck’s discussion article is reichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft, Vol. a theoretical contribution to the normative question 23(2), 205–211. whose interests should be involved in democratic pro- Koopmans, Ruud/Paul Statham/Marco Giugni/Florence cesses, and how. Bauböck shows that the demos problem Passy (2005). Contested Citizenship: Immigration of democratic inclusion can be resolved when combin- and Cultural Diversity in Europe, Minneapolis. ing the principles of ‘all affected interests’, ‘all subjected Kronauer, Martin (2010). Exklusion. Die Gefährdung des to coercion’, and the ‘stakeholder principle’. In contrast Sozialen im hoch entwickelten Kapitalismus, Frank- to common assumptions, which take these approaches furt am Main/New York. as competing principles, Bauböck proposes a multi-level Marshall, Thomas H. (1950). Citizenship and Social Class: model of democratic inclusion to reconcile them. He ar- And Other Essays, Cambridge. gues that one has to draw on the different objectives of Mattes, Astrid/Sieglinde Rosenberger (2015). Islam and these principles to resolve the demos problem. Muslims in Austria, in: Ines Michalowski/Marian Taken together, the articles of this special issue cover Burchardt (eds.): After Integration: Islam, Convivial- a broad spectrum of comparative perspectives across ity and Contentious Politics in Europe, Wiesbaden, European countries and different aspects of the politi- 129–152. cal sphere, enriched by theoretical debates of norma- Pelinka, Anton/Sieglinde Rosenberger (2000). Öster- tive foundations of democratic inclusion. In doing so, reichische Politik. Grundlagen. Strukturen. Trends, we hope to contribute to the social scientific debate on Vienna. inclusion and exclusion in democratic societies that face Rosenberger, Sieglinde (1989). Frauenfragen oder Ge- multiple challenges, from the micro-level of individual schlechterfragen. Institutionelle Frauenpolitik in struggles for equal rights to macro-level developments Österreich, Innsbruck. such as globalization. Rosenberger, Sieglinde (2007). Individuelle Freiheit oder institutionelle Säkularität? Religionen in der liberalen Demokratie, in: Helga Peskoller/Michaela Literature Ralser/Maria Wolf (eds.): Texturen von Freiheit: Bei- träge für Bernhard Rathmayr, Innsbruck, 167–182. Anderson, Bridget/Vanessa Hughes (eds.) (2015). Citizen- Rosenberger, Sieglinde (ed.) (2010). Asylpolitik in Öster- ship and its Others, London. reich: Unterbringung im Fokus, Vienna. Ataç, Ilker/Sieglinde Rosenberger (2013a). Inklusion/ Rosenberger, Sieglinde (1996). Geschlechter – Gleichhei- Exklusion – ein relationales Konzept der Migrations- ten – Differenzen. Eine Denk- und Politikbeziehung, forschung, in: Ilker Ataç/Sieglinde Rosenberger (eds.): Vienna. Politik der Inklusion und Exklusion, Vienna, 35–52. Rosenberger, Sieglinde/Julia Mourão Permoser (2012). Zuge- Ataç, Ilker/Sieglinde Rosenberger (eds.) (2013b). Politik der hörigkeit mobilisieren, politisieren, de-politisieren. Inklusion und Exklusion, Vienna. Analysen aus dem Wiener Gemeindebau, in: Florian Bauman, Zygmunt (2016). Die Angst vor den anderen: ein Bettel/Julia Mourão Permoser/Sieglinde Rosenberger Essay über Migration und Panikmache, Berlin. (eds.): living rooms – Politik der Zugehörigkeiten im Benhabib, Seyla (1996). The Democratic Movement and Wiener Gemeindebau, Vienna/New York, 19–74. the Problem of Difference, in: Seyla Benhabib (ed.): Rosenberger, Sieglinde/Birgit Sauer (2013). Politics, Reli- Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundar- gion and Gender: Framing and Regulating the Veil, ies of the Political, Princeton, 3–18. Oxford. Brubaker, Rogers (2013). Language, religion and the poli- Rosenberger, Sieglinde/Gilg Seeber (2011). Kritische Ein- tics of difference, in: Nations and Nationalism, Vol. stellungen: BürgerInnen zu Demokratie, Politik, 19(1), 1–20. Migration, in: Regina Polak (ed.): Zukunft. Werte. Dahl, Robert (1989). Democracy and Its Critics, New Ha- Europa. Die Europäische Wertestudie 1990–2010: ven. Österreich im Vergleich, Vienna, 165–189. Gärtner, Reinhold/Sieglinde Rosenberger (1991). Krieg- Rosenberger, Sieglinde/Gilg Seeber (2008). Wählen, Vienna. erdenkmäler: Vergangenheit in der Gegenwart, Rosenberger, Sieglinde/Jeremias Stadlmair (2014). Par- Innsbruck. tizipation in Österreich, in: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 6 A. Mattes, J. Stadlmair: Challenges of democratic inclusion I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1

Staatsministerium Baden – Wüttemberg (ed.): Parti- Vol. 45(1), 2016, 65–79 (together with Oliver Gruber and zipation im Wandel – Unsere Demokratie zwischen Astrid Mattes); „Petitionen und Parlamentarische Bür- Wählen, Mitmachen und Entscheiden. Gütersloh, gerinitiativen: Zivilgesellschaft im Parlament?“, in: 454–488. TransForm – Journal für Zivilgesellschaftliche Innovati- Rosenberger, Sieglinde/Iris Stöckl (2016). The politics of on, Vol. 1, 2016, 68–100 (together with Sieglinde Rosen- categorization – political representatives with immi- berger). grant background between “the other” and “standing for”, in: Politics, Groups, and Identities, DOI: 10.1080/21565503.2016.1194764, 1–20. Rosenberger, Sieglinde/Emmerich Talos (eds.) (2003). Sozialstaat: Probleme, Herausforderungen, Perspek- tiven, Vienna. Rosenberger, Sieglinde/Florian Trauner (eds.) (2014). Themenschwerpunkt Asylpolitik (Special Issue), in: Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft, Vol. 43(2) Rosenberger, Sieglinde/Jakob Winkler (2014). Com/ passionate Protests: Fighting the Deportation of Asylum Seekers, in: Mobilization: An International Quarterly, Vol. 19(2), 165–184. Verba, Sidney/Kay L. Schlozman/Henry E. Brady (1995). Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics, Cambridge. Young, Iris Marion (1990). Justice and the politics of difference, Princeton. Yuval-Davis, Nira (2006). Belonging and the politics of belonging, in: Patterns of Prejudice, Vol. 40(3), 197– 214.

Authors

Astrid Mattes (1988) is PhD researcher at the Department of Political Science at University of Vienna. She studied Political Science and Comparative Religious Studies in Vienna (Austria) and Limerick (Ireland) and spent research visits at the Universities of Lucerne (Switzerland) and Toronto (Canada). Her research interests include the fields of immigrant integration politics, challenges of pluralism, religious diversity, Islam in Europe and religion-state relations. Latest publication: Special Issue “Institutional Responses to Religious Diversity”, Inter- disciplinary Journal for Religion and Transformation in Contemporary Society, 2016 (1) (with Kristina Stoeckl and Julia Mourao Permoser).

Citizenship Regimes and the Politicization of Immigrant Groups

Didier Ruedin1, *

1 University of Neuchâtel, Switzerland; University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa * E-Mail: [email protected]

Abstract Previous research has examined the various ways individuals and organizations react to immigration. This article explores how immigrants and their integration are debated across citizenship regimes, with a focus on ‘voiceless’ groups without formal franchise and a precarious residence status: asylum seekers, refugees, and irregular immigrants. A yearly measure of citizenship regimes is used together with a large-scale claims analysis of newspapers from seven Western European countries between 1995 and 2009 to systematically describe the relative frequency of and frames in different claims by political actors. The debate on immigration and integration varies by citizenship regime, including the way immigrant groups are referred to. Having an ethnic citizenship regime is associated with more claims about voiceless immigrant groups. At the same time, the association between immigrant group size and the extent to which immigrant groups are politicized is moderated by the citizenship regime. Debates on immigrants and their integration vary across citizenship regimes.

Keywords Immigration, ethnicity, politicization, citizenship regime, framing, salience, claims analysis

Staatsangehörigkeitsregime und die Politisierung von Immigranten

Zusammenfassung Dieser Artikel untersucht, wie Migranten und deren Integration in verschiedenen Staatsangehörigkeitsregimes diskutiert werden, wobei der Fokus auf „stimmlosen“ Gruppen ohne formalem Wahlrecht und einem prekären Aufenthaltsstatus liegt: Asylbewerber, Flüchtlinge und illegale Einwanderer. Jährliche Werte von Staatsangehörigkeitsregimes werden zusammen mit einer groß angelegten Claims-Analyse verwendet, um systematisch die Frames verschiedener politischer Akteure zu beschreiben. Debatten über Einwanderung und Integration variieren je nach Staatsangehörigkeitsregime. In ethnischen Staatsangehörigkeitsregimes werden mehr Claims über stimmlose Einwanderergruppen beobachtet. Gleichzeitig wird der Zusammenhang zwischen der Größe von Migrantengruppen und dem Ausmaß, in dem diese Migrantengruppen politisiert werden, vom Staatsangehörigkeitsregime moderiert.

Schlüsselwörter Einwanderung, Ethnizität, Politisierung, Staatsangehörigkeitsregime, Framing, Salienz, Claims-Analyse

Acknowledgements I would like to thank Sieglinde Rosenberger for her contributions to an earlier version of this article including the notion of voiceless groups, and the anonymous reviewer, Jeremias Stadlmair, Astrid Mattes, Irene Bloemraad, Erik Bleich, Sa- rah Meyer, Teresa Peintinger, Jean-Thomas Arrighi de Casanova, Marco Guigni, Oliver Strijbis, and William Doehler for comments and suggestions. This work was supported by the European Commission’s Seventh Framework Programme

The author has declared that no competing interests exist.

March 31, 2017 I innsbruck university press, Innsbruck OZP – Austrian Journal of Political Science I ISSN 2313-5433 I http://oezp.at/ Vol. 46, issue 1 I DOI 10.15203/ozp.1591.vol46iss1 OPEN ACCESS

(FP7/

2007-2013) [grant number 225522], and by the Swiss National Science Foundation [grant number 141551]. 8 D. Ruedin: Citizenship Regimes and the Politicization of Immigrant Groups I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1

1. Introduction voices – including those of immigrants. As such, media coverage includes different tones and arguments, In most Western societies, immigration and immigrant and differences across countries and time should be integration figure prominently in political debates. Politi- expected (Bleich et al. 2015; Van der Brug et al. 2015). cians and public narratives alike have linked the growing It is through these different ways of how immigrant number and diversity of immigrants in Western societies groups are mentioned in the media that they are con- with topics as far-ranging as pressure on the welfare state, structed (Caviedes 2015; Lawlor 2015): Immigrant growing competition in the labour market, challenges to groups are actively constituted in claims-making. For key social values and national identities, or a decline in so- example, when a claim refers to immigrants by na- cial capital (Vasta 2010; Goldin et al. 2011; Kymlicka 2011). tionality, this often reflects an implicit choice: The -ac Within this context of contestation, immigrant groups are tor could have identified the same person in terms of referred to in different ways, reflecting legal status, na- legal status, or religion, for instance. Claims-making tional communities, and religious affiliation. In the realm is understood as in Koopmans et al. (2005) and re- of politics, however, the presence, citizenship rights, eco- fers to individual instances of public claims that are nomic achievements, culture and identities of only some reported in national newspapers. A claim is the pur- immigrant groups are controversial, while other groups are posive “articulation of political demands, calls to ac- hardly mentioned in debates (Korkut et al. 2013). There are tion, proposals, criticisms, or physical attacks, which, striking differences across time and countries with regard actually or potentially, affect the interest or integrity” to which groups are politicized, and how they are referred of immigrant groups (ebd., 252). to in political debates (Koopmans et al. 2005; Van der Brug This article examines the politicization of immi- et al. 2015). For example, the application of racial categories grant groups in seven European countries – Austria, is almost exclusive to Anglo-Saxon countries, while moral Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzer- categorization and the politicization of Muslims have in- land, and the United Kingdom. The choice of coun- creased across most Western countries in recent years tries provides variation in the number of immigrants, (Brubaker 2013; Berkhout/Ruedin 2016). and historical differences in when large numbers of These dynamics in politicization reflect a contestation immigrants started to arrive. Throughout the article, of immigration, which entails both legal frameworks and attention is paid to different citizenship regimes in the discursive construction and maintenance of in- and a detailed manner to explore their role in the politi- out-groups. This construction not only concerns boundar- cization of immigration. It is shown that the politi- ies between immigrants and non-immigrants but also be- cization of immigrant groups varies by citizenship tween different immigrant categories (Brubaker 2013). This regime. This is done with regard to so-called voice- legal, ethnic, racial, national and religious boundary-mak- less groups, an analytical category introduced to bet- ing is reflected in political claims about the distribution ter capture the role of citizenship regimes. Voiceless of rights and goods. In-groups enjoy undisputed access to groups are defined in administrative terms that limit rights and goods, while out-groups must justify such ac- their means to directly participate in political debates, cess. These claims, in turn, follow competing definitions of and they have to rely on other actors to give them a citizenship, membership and belonging within culturally voice in debates. There is more frequent politiciza- diversified but territorially bounded societies. Hence, in tion of voiceless groups in ethnic contexts. Irrespec- political debates immigrant groups are discussed not only tive of the citizenship regime, normative principles with reference to their (legal/administrative) residence are mentioned more often when it comes to voiceless status but also their national or ethnic origin, or race and groups, but the citizenship regime is associated with religion (Van der Brug et al. 2015). Groups do not simply ex- how group size in the population is translated into ist in legal terms but they are constructed, questioned and politicization. maintained within political debates in general, and claims- making processes in particular. The immigrant groups that can be observed are the temporary outcomes of these pro- 2 Differences in the Politicization of Immigrant cesses of boundary-making. Groups: Theory and Expectations The media play an important role in shaping the politicization of immigrant groups and how they are construct- In this article, politicization describes the fact that in ed in debates. They inform both the public and political ac- political debates actors make references to and claims tors, and influence which issues are regarded as pressing. about certain groups and policies regulating these Even as major print media are read less, they remain domi- groups. De Wilde (2007) highlights that first a topic nant in setting the debate (Bleich et al. 2015; Lawlor 2015). is put on the public agenda, and then polarized to be- It is important to bear in mind, however, that the media come relevant in political debate, leading to policies are not a monolithic construct, but reflect many different being formulated and discussed publicly. A topic or D. Ruedin: : Citizenship Regimes and the Politicization of Immigrant Groups I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1 9

group is therefore more politicized when there are more trast, immigrants with stable residence rights typically claims about the topic or group: They are on the political have resources, organizations, and access to participate agenda and appear in debates. Of interest is in particu- directly. As vulnerable groups, voiceless groups are also lar the extent to which different immigrant groups are less likely to participate in protests themselves, and for politicized in relation to each other. By focusing on rela- that reason it can be assumed that political actors are less tive frequency, the importance of immigration as a topic constrained in the way they can address these groups in overall is largely controlled away by design. The litera- political claims (see further discussion in Cağlar/Meh- ture offers different theoretical perspectives with com- ling 2013; Beckman 2013). peting expectations on why and how the politicization Of the voiceless groups, asylum seekers play an im- of immigrant groups varies across countries and over portant role, both numerically and because the policies time: (1) the size and visibility of immigrant groups, (2) in place usually ensure they remain in a precarious situ- the possibility of immigrant groups to participate in de- ation. For instance, asylum seekers are often denied the bates themselves (e.g. Finotelli/Michalowski 2012), and possibility to engage in paid work or are placed in spe- (3) immigration policy and citizenship regimes. cial centres (Schuster 2003; Squire 2009). These policies To begin with group size and visibility, a basic prem- have the effect that asylum seekers are less likely than ise is that there is a direct relationship between the de- other immigrant groups to be organized in any form. mographic composition of the immigrant population By contrast, ‘voiceful’ groups like EU-citizens enjoy and the debate on immigration (see discussions in Van limited political rights but full economic and residency der Brug et al. 2015). In particular immigrants perceived rights. This restricts the manner in which these groups as culturally different are regarded as a greater- eco can be addressed in public debate. The focus on voiceless nomic, political, or symbolic threat than immigrants groups allows a clearer analysis of the role of citizenship who belong to groups perceived as ‘nears’ and ‘dears’ regimes in politicization by reducing or excluding the (Tholen 2009), especially when there are many of them. influence of the other factors outlined. Voiceless groups To counter such threats, they tend to be opposed and po- are an analytical category to ensure that the groups un- liticized in a negative way: Political actors make claims der consideration have equivalent rights: in this case about these groups. Purportedly, more visible groups none to formal politics. are politicized more frequently and in more negative or With a focus on being voiceless, particular actor-ob- polarized terms. While this article will examine the reject constellations may influence politicization. Specific lationship between politicization and group size, there to voiceless groups is that these groups are in positions in is empirical work questioning a direct relationship which they are unlikely to have the same kind of access between group size and politicization. For instance, to public claims-making than other groups in society. immigrants from other Western European countries Characterized by an absence of rights and franchise, as are rarely politicized across Europe, while there are well as having low status, they are thus less able to fend many claims about Muslim immigrants who consti- for their own interests, leaving them vulnerable to nega- tute a much smaller immigrant group (Van der Brug et tive claims by other actors – particularly actors seeking al. 2015). Similar to Bloemraad, Graauw, and Hamlin to further their own agenda by ‘othering’ another group. (2015), the contributions in Van der Brug et al. find no It is the lack of political means to counter negative po- evidence that immigrant group size is directly related to liticization directly that renders these groups voiceless. politicization (see also Klingeren et al. 2015; Berkhout/ Indeed, attitudes to these groups tend to be more nega- Ruedin 2016). tive than to other groups (Constant et al. 2009). It fol- The second explanation concerns the possibility of lows that claims about voiceless groups are more likely to be immigrant groups to participate in debates themselves. negative in tone. The analytical category of voiceless groups is introduced to At the same time, because of their marginalized po- better understand how the politicization of immigration sition, voiceless groups are likely to be supported by varies by citizenship regime. These are namely asylum certain actors – namely actors from the political left as seekers, refugees, and irregular immigrants: immigrant well as religious and civil-society organizations as tra- groups not only characterized by their lack of access to ditional champions of minorities and the weak (Giugni/ formal politics, but also by a precarious residence and Passy 2001; Rosenberger/Ruedin 2017). Voiceless groups social status (Gibney 2009). They are ‘voiceless’ in the might get sympathy because of their vulnerable position sense that they are usually unable to speak for them- (Coenders et al. 2013). With the support of these actors, selves in political debates (Bleich et al. 2015). With few be they left-wing parties or civil-society organizations, resources and a reluctance to appear in public (Ruedin voiceless groups appear in public claims-making in a et al. 2017), they typically rely on others to ‘defend’ their positive way. Put differently, claims about voiceless groups interests in debates, notably NGO and civil society ac- by civil-society actors are more likely to be positive. Combined tors (Rosenberger/Ruedin 2017) or neighbours. By con- with the more negative claims by other actors, this 10 D. Ruedin: Citizenship Regimes and the Politicization of Immigrant Groups I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1

probably leads to an increased polarization of positions (see Appendix A1 for mean citizenship scores and their when it comes to voiceless groups. Given their vulner- range). able position, voiceless groups can be perceived as (po- Given the way citizenship regimes reflect different tential) burdens to the welfare state and thus are likely conceptions of national belonging, it can be expected to be confronted with negative reactions. Such groups that they not only account for differences in politiciza- tend to be ‘othered’ and singled out in public debates, tion across countries, but also for differences between and it can be expected that the kind of justification in groups and how they are referred to in claims. The citi- claims is affected (Helbling 2014). As is common in the zenship regime can be regarded as bounds to the way literature, we can draw on a distinction between instru- specific immigrant groups are politicized by actors and mental, normative, and identity frames. Claims drawing how claims are justified with particular frames: Depend- on normative principles justify policy change with ref- ing on the context, some claims will find resonance, or erence to principles like equality or human rights; ref- almost be taboo – like the use of racial categories in erences to identity span national identities, cultural and many European countries. In particular, it is assumed institutional traditions, as well as values. These frames that both the ethnic-civic and the monistic-pluralistic are contrasted with instrumental frames that involve dimension reflect which groups are politicized, or how some kind of cost-benefit calculation, like references immigrants are referred to. to economic benefits (Van der Brug et al. 2015). We can Helbling (2014) looked at frames used by political expect that claims about voiceless groups are more likely to parties in five Western European countries and- con use frames drawing on normative principles and identities than cluded that citizenship regimes are largely unrelated to claims about other groups. the frames used in the debate on immigration, that is, A third explanation for the politicization of immi- the way claims about different immigrant groups are grant groups concerns immigration policy and citizen- justified by parties. Taking a broader view and consider- ship regimes. Faced with the challenges brought about ing all kinds of political actors, we can still expect that by increasing levels of immigration and an increasingly the frames used in claims are likely to vary according to diverse immigrant population there are different poli- the citizenship regime in place, especially if citizenship cy responses (Zincone et al. 2011). In broad lines, these regimes are considered as tendencies rather than fixed differences can be captured in citizenship regimes: the categories. Depending on the citizenship regime – where jurisdiction and legal practices in place. Citizenship re- on the two scales introduced by Koopmans et al. (2005) gimes also reflect how citizenship and national belong- the policies are situated –, some justifications might be ing are perceived in a country in general, and to some ex- more successful in debates than others, and actors are tent the immigration and immigrant integration policies more likely to turn to them. Specifically, because in eth- in place reflect conceptions of citizenship. Following nic contexts the notion of ethnicity is more salient, one Koopmans et al. (2005) citizenship regimes can be de- might expect that instrumental justifications are more com- fined along two axes: On the one hand, ethnic and civic mon in civic contexts, while in ethnic contexts identity arguments citizenship regimes, and on the other cultural monism are more common. and pluralism are contrasted (see Vink/Bauböck 2013 for Koopmans et al. (2005) highlight that different con- a discussion of alternative conceptualizations). ceptions of citizenship affect the way immigrant groups The ethnic-civic dimension looks at access to citizen- are politicized. The different actors involved in claims- ship, distinguishing between an ethnic and civic-territo- making are embedded in the same national context that rial understanding of citizenship. This legal dimension reflects a particular citizenship concept, and this article looks at how immigrants acquire rights and nationality argues that this constrains them with regard to the man- to become full members of society. The cultural monism- ner and extent to which different immigrant groups pluralism dimension captures the regulation of cultural can be politicized. The intuition is that immigration is difference and group rights. This cultural dimension generally used to demarcate the boundary between in- looks at the support of cultural and religious minority groups (‘us’) and out-groups (‘them’). We can expect the groups of immigrant origin, irrespective of nationality. ethnic-civic dimension to be associated with which spe- While there are strong traditions in the way citizenship cific immigrant groups are more likely to be politicized – policies are implemented in different countries, this ar- or how they are constructed in public claims. The intu- ticle takes into consideration that citizenship regimes ition is that in ethnic contexts highlighting the legal sit- are dynamic to some degree, and there are changes over uation as a non-citizen suffices to emphasize difference time (Ersanilli/Koopmans 2011; Ruedin 2015; Koop- from an immigrant group. In a civic context, by contrast, mans/Michalowski 2017). By considering changes over the legal status of why an immigrant is present has less time, this article provides variance to differentiate the currency to identify outsiders, and non-administrative influence of citizenship regimes from that of- differ categories like the country of origin or religion are more ent immigrant populations, which also vary by country likely to be evoked. Given that voiceless groups are de- D. Ruedin: : Citizenship Regimes and the Politicization of Immigrant Groups I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1 11

fined by their legal-administrative status, it can be ex- grant group, using 5 response categories. Claims with a pected that in ethnic contexts there are relatively more claims positive tone are open towards immigrants, progressive, about voiceless groups. Similarly, in pluralistic contexts di- or multi-cultural; negative claims are restrictive to im- versity is accepted and valued, meaning that immigrants migrants, conservative, indicate preference for national can be referred to in many different ways to distinguish citizens, or are mono-cultural (Van der Brug et al. 2015). them from the majority population. References to reli- The combination of how groups are debated in claims, gion or country of origin therefore are just as likely as the tone of the message, and the frame used leads to an references to administrative categories. In monistic con- active constitution of immigrant groups by political ac- texts, by contrast, emphasizing difference other than in tors (Krzyżanowski/Wodak 2009). terms of administrative categories has less currency As predictor variables, the kind of political actor, in public debates, and we can expect more references and citizenship regimes are considered. Actors were to generic signifiers like ‘immigrant’ or administrative classified according to their function during coding. Of categories more generally. It can therefore be expected interest in this article are civil-society organizations, that in monistic contexts the share of claims about voiceless im- left-wing parties, and anti-immigrant organizations migrant groups is higher. (including anti-immigrant parties because there are too few claims by anti-immigrant parties to treat them separately – see Meyer and Rosenberger (2015) on the 3 Data and Methods misconception that anti-immigrant parties make most claims on immigrants; see appendix A4 for party clas- This article draws on a large-scale media analysis, cov- sifications), while all other actors are combined in a re- ering newspapers in seven European countries from sidual category. Civil-society organizations comprise 1995 to 2009. For a random selection of 700 days, and for different kinds of organizations, including non-gov- each country’s dominant linguistic groups, all articles ernmental organizations (NGO) and religious organiza- on immigration and integration in two national news- tions, but exclude anti-immigrant organizations. In the papers were sampled by manually checking all articles basic operationalization immigrant organizations are in the newspapers. This led to over 7,000 articles from counted separately, in a separate one they are included both broadsheet and tabloid newspapers coded manu- as civil-society organizations, leading to the same sub- ally according to a common codebook (Van der Brug et stantive results. al. 2015, see appendix A2 for a list of newspapers). The Citizenship regimes are conceived as outlined in analysis counts instances where the groups, claimants Koopmans et al. (2005), and operationalized by recom- and frames are within the realm of politics. The unit of posing extended MIPEX data to capture year-on-year analysis is a particular claim about immigration. Spe- changes in policy (Ruedin 2013; see Huddleston/Nies- cifically, a claim exists when a political actor – defined sen 2011 for a description of the MIPEX data). Ruedin in the broadest sense – makes a statement that suggests (2015) demonstrates that this approach closely matches some aspect of policy is to be changed. Each claim can be data presented by Koopmans, Michalowski, and Waibel positive or negative – its tone –, and uses a certain justifi- (2012). The MIPEX data contain indicators that – when cation – its frame. Different dimensions of politicization re-assembled – capture the two dimensions well (see are captured using the share of claims about specific im- Ruedin 2015 for an extended discussion).1 There is sub- migrant groups, and by the frames and the tone of the stantive variation across countries and time (compare claims. These aspects of politicization constitute the Appendix A1). As a result, citizenship scores are avail- outcome variables, so to speak. able for every year and country, and the article refers to Frames describe how a claim is presented or jus- contexts because tendencies rather than fixed regimes are tified in newspapers, differentiating instrumental captured. frames, identity frames, and frames drawing on moral Bivariate analysis and an OLS regression model are principles. An anti-immigrant group may oppose im- used to describe the relationship between citizenship migrants from Eastern Europe as they are regarded regimes and the politicization of immigration. In some as unwelcome competition in the labour market. This justification is economic and refers to an instrumen- 1 For the ethnic–civic dimension, the following MIPEX items were tal frame. A civil-society organization, by contrast, used: eligibility for long-term residence, formal rights regarding may emphasize human rights when discussing asylum political participation, informal rights regarding political participation, eligibility for nationality, security of nationality status, dual seekers from a politically unstable country. In this case nationality, and anti-discrimination. The monism–pluralism di- normative principles are invoked (see appendix A3 for mension includes the following MIPEX items: integration measures details, and Helbling (2014) for an equivalent classifica- for labour-market access, consultative bodies as political participation, implementation policies regarding political participation, tion). The tone of the claim captures whether the claim cultural requirements for family reunion, cultural requirements for would have a positive or negative impact on an immi- long-term residence, and cultural requirements for naturalization. 12 D. 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of the tables, citizenship regimes are dichotomized by At the same time, in contexts with a larger proportion of dividing scores at 50, the mid-point. At this aggregat- Muslim immigrants, there are fewer claims about voice- ed level, too, there is variance within countries. In the less groups, among which asylum seekers are an impor- regression model, the outcome variable is the propor- tant part (r=−0.26, p<0.01). This suggests that voiceless tion of claims about voiceless groups in a given coun- groups are politically marginalized and singled out for try-year, and predictor variables are the proportion of being different – as assumed –, but in contexts with a asylum seekers, and the citizenship regime (monistic– larger Muslim population, another immigrant group – pluralistic). Muslims – seems to play this role. By contrast, immigrants from EU-15 countries are hardly politicized, despite their large share in the population. Indeed, EU/ Results EFTA citizens, immigrants from former colonies, family reunifications, or religious immigrant groups other than Politicization of Voiceless Groups Muslims tend to be rarely politicized (Van der Brug et al. 2015). In a first step, it is established that larger groups are For a better understanding of the politicization of not more politicized than smaller groups. The most immigrant groups, it is constructive to look at the tone common way to refer to immigrants in claims is in the of claims, not just the volume. Because the tone of claims generic sense, simply as immigrants, foreigners or foreign is measured on a categorical rating scale (5-points), in- citizens without further qualification. This can be inter- terpolated median values are used as central tendencies preted as the politicization of immigrants as non-citi- (Revelle 2015). There is no statistically significant differ- zens. Table 1 shows the proportion of claims about a se- ence in tone between claims about voiceless groups and lection of immigrant groups alongside their size in the those about other immigrant groups (p>0.1). The expec- general population. It is apparent that the size of im- tation that voiceless groups are generally politicized in migrant groups is not directly associated with their po- more negative terms cannot be supported. liticization, both when comparing within countries and This analysis, however, may hide differences due to across countries. Consider for instance the fact that the particular actor-object constellations. To this end Fig- majority of claims recorded in Ireland concern asylum ure 1 presents the tone of claims about voiceless groups seekers, despite their small share in the population, or and other immigrant groups by actor type. The figure claims in Austria where asylum applications decreased gives kernel densities to show the distribution of tones from nearly 40,000 in 2002 to fewer than 13,000 in for each constellation of interest. In each case the thick 2009, while the proportion of claims about asylum black line gives the interpolated median as a measure seekers increased. There are no statistically significant of central tendency, and the zero line (dashed) for ref- correlations between group size and claims in the news erence. The first row in the figure highlights that the across countries (p>0.1 for all three groups considered tone of claims about voiceless groups tends to be simi- in Table 1). lar to other immigrant groups, perhaps slightly less positive. By contrast, irrespective of immigrant group, Table 1: Claims and Immigrant Group Size civil-society actors and left-wing parties tend to make more positive claims about immigrants. In particular for civil-society organizations it is rare to make nega- Muslims EU-15 Asylum Seekers tive claims, visible by the thin tail on the left. This near Popu- Popu- Popu- absence of negative claims is particularly pronounced lation Claims lation Claims lation Claims when it comes to voiceless groups (p<0.01) – and can- Austria 4% 9% 3% 1% 0.5% 31% not be found for corresponding claims by left-wing par- Belgium 3% 12% 6% 1% 0.9% 12% ties. Taken together, the figure provides clear evidence Ireland 1% 1% 7% 0.3% 0.1% 58% against the expectation that voiceless groups are gen- Netherlands 4% 12% 2% 0.4% 0.1% 20% erally politicized in more negative terms. At the same Spain 2% 3% 2% 0.2% 0.01% 1% time, civil-society organizations and left-wing parties Switzerland 2% 14% 9% 5% 0.6% 26% are more likely to make positive claims about voiceless United 2% 13% 2% 2% 0.1% 20% Kingdom groups than other actors, but this is a reflection of their more positive stance on immigrants more generally. Notes: all years are combined for the claims data, 100% refers to all claims on immigration and integration in a country; population as of 2005, foreign- born (Morales et al. 2012) D. Ruedin: : Citizenship Regimes and the Politicization of Immigrant Groups I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1 13

Figure 1: Tone of Claim by Immigrant Group and Actor Table 2: Justification (Frames) in Claims about Voiceless Groups

Group Instrumental Identity Moral Principles Voiceless 62% 2% 36% Other 55% 16% 28%

The Role of Citizenship Regimes

A central claim of this article is that the politicization of immigration varies by citizenship regime. Focusing on the nature of claims, we can expect more use of instrumental frames in contexts characterized by a civic regime, and more use of identity frames in ethnic contexts. Table 3 illustrates that these intuitions bear out empirically. As in the table that follows, the citizenship regime of a country and year is reduced to a binary contrast, considering the difference between contexts below the theoretical midpoint and those above. In line with the expectation and as an extension to Table 2, we observe that claims in civic contexts are considerably more likely to draw on instrumental justifications (p<0.01). By Notes: This figure gives the kernel distributions of the tone of claims, di- contrast, in more ethnic contexts, identity arguments vided by the actor making the claim (vertical) and whether the claim was are evoked more often. made about voiceless groups (horizontal). In each instance, negative claims are on the left; the number in each case indicates the number of claims recorded. The black lines give the interpolated median as a measure of central Table 3: Frames by Citizenship Regime tendency, the dashed lines indicate zero (neutral tone).

Instrumental Identity Moral Principles Claims can be positive or negative about immigrants, but they also tend to use a particular frame, that is a Civic 63% 8% 29% justification as to why the claimant believes things Ethnic 55% 16% 29% should change, presenting the claim in a particular Notes: citizenship scores were cut at the theoretical midpoint; given are the light. Frames may invoke normative principles like percentages of all claims by frame ideas of equality, human rights or solidarity; frames may be instrumental in that they underline pragmatic and utilitarian considerations, and there are identity As Table 4 illustrates, the citizenship regime is also as- frames. In all countries instrumental frames are domi- sociated with the politicization of voiceless immigrant nant – both for voiceless and other groups. Identity groups in particular. In line with the expectations, there frames are far less common for voiceless groups than are relatively more claims about voiceless groups in eth- for other immigrant groups, and normative principles nic and monistic contexts (p<0.01). This is visible by the are invoked more often in claims about voiceless groups percentage points in the table: The first two rows con- than in claims about other immigrant groups (Table 2, trast ethnic and civic contexts (36% > 29%); the last two p<0.001). The fact that claims about voiceless groups are rows contrast monistic and pluralistic contexts (34% > more likely to invoke normative principles may be a re- 31%). This association between citizenship regime and flection of the sympathies that asylum seekers and in the politicization of voiceless groups can also be ob- particular refugees may get because they are often seen served when the scores are not reduced to the binary as vulnerable groups in need of protection (Coenders et contrast as is done in Table 4: There is a positive cor- al. 2013).2 relation between scores indicating citizenship regimes being more ethnic and the proportion of claims about 2 Using the data at hand, I find no support for Park’s (2014) suggestion voiceless groups (r=0.34, p<0.001), as well as a some- that human rights frames, included in the table under the heading what weaker association between scores indicating citi- moral principles, would be more common in countries that were widely regarded as emigration countries until recently – in the present zenship regimes being more monistic and the propor- case Ireland and Spain. tion of claims about voiceless groups (r=0.18, p<0.1). Put 14 D. Ruedin: Citizenship Regimes and the Politicization of Immigrant Groups I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1

differently, differences in the conception of citizenship Figure 2: Claims about Voiceless Groups and Citizenship are not only associated with the way immigrant groups Regime are addressed in political claims, but also with the extent to which different groups are politicized, or how immigrants are referred to in claims.

Table 4: Claims about Voiceless Immigrant Groups by Citizenship Regime

Other Voiceless Ethnic 64% 36% Civic 71% 29% Monism 66% 34% Pluralism 69% 31%

Notes: citizenship scores were cut at the theoretical midpoint; given are the percentages of all claims by citizenship regime

In a final analysis I examine whether the citizenship regime is associated with the way group size in the population is translated into politicization. The share of asylum seekers in the population is used as a proxy of the share of voiceless groups. While there are no more claims Notes: outcome variable: proportion of claims that are about voiceless about voiceless groups in contexts where the share of groups; predictor variables: share of asylum seekers in the population, citizenship regime (monistic–pluralistic). The dark stripe indicates the relative asylum seekers is larger – see Table 1 above –, Figure 2 level of pluralism: lowest in the bottom-left panel, and highest in the top- indicates that this relationship is shaped by the citizen- right panel. Only shares of asylum seekers < 1% of the population are shown ship regime. Here a simple OLS regression model is used to avoid misleading extrapolations due to a small number of observations. with the proportion of claims about voiceless groups – measured per country and year – as the outcome variable, and the proportion of asylum seekers in the popu- Discussion lation, and the citizenship regime (monistic-pluralistic) as predictor variables. The figure presents the statistical While countries across Western Europe are all affected interaction between the two predictor variables graphi- by immigration, the political debate on immigration and cally. In monistic contexts, a higher share of asylum the civic integration of immigrants varies across coun- seekers is associated with fewer claims about voiceless tries. In this article, I argue that the way the debate on groups (bottom-left of Figure 2). In this case, we seem to immigration is carried out depends on specific actor- observe a situation as the share of voiceless groups in- object constellations and in particular the citizenship creases, it becomes more difficult to single them out: -Ad regime. The politicization of different immigrant groups ministrative categories are likely to be considered more is not merely a reflection of group size in the popula- adequate or natural to refer to these immigrants. By con- tion. Immigrant groups unlikely to fend for themselves trast, in pluralistic contexts, there are more claims about are likely to be politicized, irrespective of the fact that voiceless groups where the share of asylum seekers is other groups like European immigrants are much more larger (top-right of Figure 2). In this case, we seem to ob- numerous. Contrary to the expectation, claims about serve a situation where voiceless groups are increasingly voiceless groups are not generally more negative than singled out as their share in the population increases: In claims about other immigrant groups. Civil-society or- contexts where many ways to refer to immigrant groups ganizations and left-wing parties tend to make positive have currency, there are reasons not to politicize asylum claims about voiceless groups, but this is a reflection of seekers. In sum, it appears that the character of citizen- their generally more positive stance on immigration. ship regimes and their influence on politicization come Voiceless groups are thus present in the debate on immi- to the fore especially when the share of voiceless groups gration and integration mostly as objects: talked about, increases. debated, but shaped by others (see Berkhout/Ruedin 2016 for a similar observation on Muslim immigrants). While this does not seem to affect the tone of the debate as such, this article shows that the justifications used in D. Ruedin: : Citizenship Regimes and the Politicization of Immigrant Groups I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1 15

claims about voiceless groups are different: Normative tiated in this article. These interaction effects are impor- arguments such as human rights are more common, as tant for understanding how citizenship regimes reflect are claims that invoke identity, compared to claims with the bounds of the political debate on immigration and instrumental justifications. This indicates that voiceless integration. groups as objects of the debate are used for symbolic More research and theory is also needed to explore politics more often than immigrants in general, perhaps whether the two dimensions outlined by Koopmans et with the exception of Muslims. Put differently, while al. (2005) are the most suited for understanding differ- immigration may generally play an important role in ences in politicization. With seven countries included, identity politics and boundary making, it is in particular it is impossible to rule out that case selection affects the voiceless groups that are referred to. results in this article. For instance, the politicization of This article highlights that citizenship regimes re- asylum seekers is common in Ireland while it is almost flect the bounds in which the debate on immigration absent in the other ‘new’ immigration country in the takes place. With the data at hand it is impossible to dis- sample: Spain (Van der Brug et al. 2015). To some extent entangle causality in a definitive manner: whether citi- these concerns are alleviated by regarding citizenship zenship regimes set the bounds, or whether both the de- regimes as tendencies rather than fixed properties of bate and citizenship regimes are influenced by common countries. underlying factors. What the article could show, however, is that the kind of debate that takes place in different contexts varies: Depending on the citizenship regime, Conclusion different arguments are put forward, like the relatively more frequent use of instrumental frames in more civic This article has examined the politicization of immigrant contexts. Depending on the citizenship regime in place, groups in seven Western European countries, drawing the politicization of voiceless groups is also affected – in on data from a large-scale claims analysis. Using the contexts with more ethnic and monistic citizenship re- analytical category of voiceless groups – asylum seekers, gimes, voiceless groups are politicized more frequently refugees, irregular immigrants, groups with consider- than in more civic and pluralistic contexts. The citizen- able residence insecurity and without access to formal ship regime thus crystallizes as a covariate for differenc- franchise – the article demonstrated that claims about es in the politicization of immigration across time and immigrants vary according to actor-object constella- countries. Put differently, because of differences in the tions and that the citizenship regime plays and impor- citizenship regime – being more ethnic or civic, being tant role in understanding differences in politicization more pluralistic or monistic –, different reactions and across time and countries. Put differently, patterns of different forms of politicization can be expected even politicization are not entirely idiosyncratic or country- when the situation on the ground otherwise seems alike. specific. The politicization of immigrant groups is not a Future research should pay attention to the potential simple reaction to groups that may be rejected for being politicization of (recent) refugees as Muslims (compare (perceived) threats to the majority population (compare Berkhout/Ruedin 2016). Pecoraro/Ruedin 2016). It seems reasonable to assume The differences in frames and in the number of that a certain number of immigrants from a particular claims about voiceless immigrant groups reported here group need to be present for them to be politicized, but may point to wider differences in the style of the debate. beyond a very low threshold numbers are clearly not When a political actor makes a claim about an immi- decisive for politicization. There does not appear to be a grant group, he or she has a choice how individuals are direct relationship between group size and the extent to identified, be this in terms of legal status, religion, or a which immigrant groups are politicized, yet the citizen- different criteria. While in some contexts claimants may ship regime shapes how this relationship is borne out. be more likely to choose an ethnic label, in different con- The findings on patterns of politicization contribute texts they may focus on legal status to refer to the very to critical reflections on the prospects of basic rights same group. The analysis in this article suggests that and democratic inclusion in societies with a significant the choice of how immigrants are referred to in claims number of immigrants in precarious situations (Beck- in the news – and how they are ultimately constituted man 2013); they can provide the necessary foundations and boundaries are constructed – correlates with the for theory-building. With regard to actor-object con- citizenship regime in place, just as it does with actor- stellations, this article identified clear differences as object constellations. It is in this sense that it is possible to how different political actors politicize immigrant to speak of the citizenship regime shaping the debate. groups. While governments and centre-right parties More research is needed to understand how the citizen- are the source of positive and negative claims about im- ship shapes the association between population size and migrants – including voiceless groups, left-wing parties politicization of immigrant groups – in the manner ini- and civil-society organizations are the source of almost 16 D. Ruedin: Citizenship Regimes and the Politicization of Immigrant Groups I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1

exclusively positive claims about immigrants. In this Cağlar, Ayse/Sebastian Mehling (2013). Sites and the sense the immigrant groups referred to as voiceless are scales of the law: third-country nationals and EU not completely voiceless – they have civil-society orga- Roma citizens, in: Engin F. Isin/Michael Saward (eds.): nizations to make claims on their behalf (Giugni/Passy Enacting European Citizenship, 155–77. 2001; Rosenberger/Ruedin 2017). Caviedes, Alexander (2015). An Emerging ‘European’ Using a fine-grained approach drawing on -Koop News Portrayal of Immigration?, in: Journal of Eth- mans et al. (2005), it was possible to show that the po- nic and Migration Studies, Vol. 41(6), 897–917. liticization of immigration varies by citizenship regime. Coenders, Marcel/Marcel Lubbers/Peer Scheepers (2013). Further research is needed to strengthen the associations Resistance to immigrants and asylum seekers in the sketched here, reflect them in theory, and test them on European Union: Cross-national comparisons of fresh data. There are more claims about voiceless groups public opinion, in: Gary P. Freeman/Randall Hansen/ in ethnic (rather than civic) contexts, and in these ethnic David L. Leal (eds.): Immigration and Public Opinion contexts claims about voiceless groups are more likely in Liberal Democracies. to draw on normative principles as justifications. This Constant, Amelie F./Martin Kahanec/Klaus F. Zimmermann article thus refines the argument by Helbling (2014) (2009). Attitudes towards immigrants, other inte- who found no association between citizenship regimes gration barriers, and their veracity, in: International and frames used by political parties for specific immi- Journal of Manpower, Vol. 30(1/2), 5–14. grant groups. Not only are citizenship regimes related to Ersanilli, Evelyn/Ruud Koopmans (2011). Do Immigrant which immigrant groups are more politicized, but also Integration Policies Matter? A Three-Country Com- they are associated with how voiceless groups are re- parison among Turkish Immigrants, in: West Euro- ferred to in political claims. In other words, citizenship pean Politics, Vol. 34(2), 208–234. regimes reflect the bounds within which debates on im- Finotelli, Claudia/Ines Michalowski (2012). The Heuristic migration and immigrant groups are held. In all constel- Potential of Models of Citizenship and Immigrant lations of citizenship regimes covered in this article, im- Integration Reviewed, in: Journal of Immigrant & migrant groups are politicized, but there are differences Refugee Studies, Vol. 10(3), 231–240. as to which groups are politicized more often and how Gibney, Matthew J. (2009). Precarious Residents: Migra- these groups are referred to in political claims. Future tion Control, Membership and the Rights of Non- research should address in more detail how citizenship Citizens, in: UNDP Human Development Reports regimes affect and are reflected in the political debate on Research Paper, Vol. 10. immigration – and how that debate affects presumably Giugni, Marco/Florence Passy (eds.) (2001). Political also other minority groups in society. Altruism? Solidarity Movements in International Perspective, Lanham. Goldin, I./G. Cameron/M. Balarajan (2011). Exceptional Literature People: How Migration Shaped Our World and Will Define Our Future, Oxford. Beckman, Ludvig (2013). Irregular migration and democ- Helbling, Marc (2014). Framing Immigration in Western racy: the case for inclusion, in: Citizenship Studies, Europe, in: Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 17(1), 48–60. Vol. 40(1), 21–41. Berkhout, Joost/Didier Ruedin (2016). Why Religion? Im- Huddleston, Thomas/J. Niessen (2011). Migrant Integration migrant Groups as Objects of Political Claims on Im- Policy Index, Brussels: British Council and Migration migration and Civic Integration in Western Europe, Policy Group. 1995–2009, in: Acta Politica, Early View. Klingeren, Marijn van/Hajo G. Boomgaarden/Rens Vlieg- Bleich, Erik/Irene Bloemraad/Els de Graauw (2015). Mi- enthart/Claes H. de Vreese (2015). Real World is Not grants, Minorities and the Media: Information, Rep- Enough: The Media as an Additional Source of Nega- resentations and Participation in the Public Sphere, tive Attitudes Toward Immigration, Comparing Den- in: Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. mark and the Netherlands, in: European Sociological 41(6), 857–873. Review, Vol. 31(3), 268–283. Bloemraad, Irene/Els de Graauw/Rebecca Hamlin (2015). Koopmans, Ruud/Ines Michalowski (2017). Why Do States Immigrants in the Media: Civic Visibility in the USA Extend Rights to Immigrants? Institutional Set- and Canada, in: Journal of Ethnic and Migration tings and Historical Legacies Across 44 Countries Studies, Vol. 41(6), 874–896. Worldwide, in: Comparative Political Studies, Vol. Brubaker, Rogers (2013). Categories of analysis and cat- 50(1), 41–74. egories of practice: a note on the study of Muslims in Koopmans, Ruud/Ines Michalowski/Stine Waibel (2012). European countries of immigration, in: Ethnic and Citizenship rights for immigrants: National political Racial Studies, Vol. 36(1), 1–8. processes and cross-national convergence in West- D. Ruedin: : Citizenship Regimes and the Politicization of Immigrant Groups I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1 17

ern Europe, 1980–2008, in: American Journal of So- Ruedin, Didier/Sieglinde Rosenberger/Nina Merhaut (2017 ciology, Vol. 117(4), 1202–1245. forthcoming). Tracing Anti-Deportation Protests: A Koopmans, Ruud/Paul Statham/Marco Giugni/Florence Longitudinal Comparison of Austria, Germany, and Passy (2005). Contested Citizenship: Immigration Switzerland, in: Sieglinde Rosenberger (ed.): Compara- and Cultural Diversity in Europe, Minneapolis. tive Analysis of Protest Movements in Refugee, Asy- Korkut, Umut/Gregg Bucken-Knapp/Aidan McGarry/Jonas lum and Deportation Policies, New York. Hinnfors/et al. (2013). The Discourses and Politics of Schuster, Liza (2003). The Use and Abuse of Political Asy- Migration in Europe, New York. lum in Britain and Germany, London. Krzyżanowski, Michał/Ruth Wodak (2009). The politics Squire, Vicki (2009). The Exclusionary Politics of Asylum, of exclusion: debating migration in Austria, New Basingstoke. Brunswick. Tholen, Berry (2009). Privileging the near and dear? Kymlicka, Will (2011). New directions and issues for the Evaluating special ties considerations in EU migra- study of ethnicity, nationalism and multicultural- tion policy, in: Ethnicities, Vol. 9(1), 32–52. ism, in: Ethnicities, Vol. 11(1), 5–11. Van der Brug, Wouter/Gianni D’Amato/Joost Berkhout/ Lawlor, Andrea (2015). Local and National Accounts of Didier Ruedin, (eds.) (2015). The Politicisation of Mi- Immigration Framing in a Cross-national Perspec- gration, Abingdon. tive, in: Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. Vasta, E. (2010). The controllability of difference: Social 41(6), 918–941. cohesion and the new politics of solidarity, in: Eth- Meyer, Sarah/Sieglinde Rosenberger (2015). Just a Shadow? nicities, Vol. 10(4), 503–521. The Role of Radical Right Parties in the Politicization Vink, Maarten Peter/Rainer Bauböck (2013). Citizenship of Immigration, 1995–2009, in: Politics and Gover- configurations: Analysing the multiple purposes of nance, Vol. 3(2), 1–17. citizenship regimes in Europe, in: Comparative Eu- Morales, Laura/Virgina Ros/Laura Sudulich/Joost Berkhout/ ropean Politics, Vol. 11(5), 621–648. et al. (2012). Comparative Data Set of Immigration- de Wilde, Pieter (2007). Politicisation of European Inte- Related Statistics 1995-2009 [Data File], IQSS Data- gration: Bringing the Process into Focus, in: Univer- verse, available at: http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/17963 sity of Oslo ARENA Working Paper, Vol. 18, 1–34. (accessed 02.09.2016). Zincone, G./R. Penninx/M. Borkert (eds.) (2011). Migratory Park, K. (2014). Foreigners or multicultural citizens?: Policymaking in Europe: The Dynamics of Actors Press media’s construction of immigrants in South and Contexts in Past and Present, Amsterdam. Korea, in: Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 37(9), 1565–1586. Pecoraro, Marco/Didier Ruedin (2016). A Foreigner Who Author Does not Steal My Job: The Role of Unemployment Risk and Values in Attitudes toward Equal Opportu- Didier Ruedin (DPhil, Oxford; born 1979) is a project of- nities, in: International Migration Review, Vol. 50(3), ficer and lecturer at the Swiss Forum for Migration and 628–666. Population Studies at the University of Neuchâtel, Swit- Revelle, William (2015). psych: Procedures for Psychologi- zerland, and a Visiting Research Fellow at the African cal, Psychometric, and Personality Research, Evan- Centre for Migration & Society at the University of the ston, Illinois: Northwestern University, available at: Witwatersrand, South Africa. His research focuses on re- http://CRAN.R-project.org/package=psych (accessed actions to immigration and diversity: attitudes towards 02.09.2016). immigrants and the politicization of immigration. Re- Rosenberger, Sieglinde/Didier Ruedin (2017 forthcoming). cent publications include: Zschirnt, Eva and Didier Rue- The Politicization of Asylum Seekers and Other Im- din. 2016. “Ethnic discrimination in hiring decisions: A migrant Groups in a Comparative Perspective, in: meta-analysis of correspondence tests 1990–2015”, Jour- Merli, Franz/Pöschl, Magdalena (eds.): Asylrecht als nal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 42(7):1115–34. Experimentierfeld, Vienna. Ruedin, Didier (2015). Increasing Validity by Recombin- ing Existing Indices: MIPEX as a Measure of Citizen- ship Models, in: Social Science Quarterly, Vol. 96(2), 629–638. Ruedin, Didier (2013). MIPEX Over Time Data: Detailed [Data File], IQSS Dataverse, available at: http://hdl. handle.net/1902.1/20529 (accessed 02.09.2016). 18 D. Ruedin: Citizenship Regimes and the Politicization of Immigrant Groups I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1

Appendix

Appendix A1: Citizenship Regimes

Citizenship regime on the ethnic-civic and monistic-pluralistic dimensions following Ruedin (2015), with the mean and range of values between 1995 and 2009 to highlight the dynamic nature of citizenship regimes.

Country Ethnic—Civic Monistic—Pluralistic mean min max mean min max Austria 34 29 41 36 19 51 Belgium 61 51 77 63 55 75 Ireland 59 40 76 43 33 60 Netherlands 73 72 76 80 61 85 Spain 41 26 52 66 57 72 Switzerland 43 40 47 46 37 49 United Kingdom 62 56 75 50 41 52

Appendix A2: Newspaper Coverage

Country Newspapers Austria Der Standard, Neue Kronen Zeitung Belgium De Standaard, Le Soir; Het Laatste Nieuws, La Dernière Heure Ireland The Irish Times, Irish Daily Star Netherlands Volkskrant, Telegraaf Spain El País, La Vanguardia Switzerland Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Blick; Le Temps/Tribune de Genève, Le Matin United Kingdom The Guardian, Daily Mail

Appendix A3: Frames

Basic coding scheme for frames, for the full codebook including sub-frames, refer to Van der Brug et al. (2015).

Frame Definition No argument Instrumental Instrumental, pragmatic, utilitarian or goal-oriented arguments

Identity Arguments about collective identity (i.e. nationality), ethics, values, community, culture and appropriateness Moral principles Arguments about universal moral principles and rights (including legal arguments) D. Ruedin: : Citizenship Regimes and the Politicization of Immigrant Groups I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1 19

Appendix A4: Actor Classifications

Country Anti-Immigrant Parties Left-Wing Parties Party Party ID Party Party ID Austria FPÖ 42420 Grüne 42110 BZÖ 42710 SPÖ 42320 Belgium VB 21914 Ecolo 21111 FN 21710 Groen (Agalev) 21112

SP/ SP.A 21221 PS 21322 Ireland n/a Green Party 53110 Democratic Left 53221 Labour Party 53320 Sinn Fein 53951 Socialist Party 53999 Netherlands PVV 22722 GL 22110 LPF 22720 SP 22220 PvdA 22320 PvdD 22951 Spain n/a IU 33220 PSOE 33320 BNG 33908 Switzerland SVP 43810 Grüne 43110 SD 43710 SP 43320 FP/AP 43951 FDP 43420 United Kingdom UKIP 51951 Labour Party 51320 BNP 51701

Research Article

Gaygusuz v. Austria: Advancing the rights of non-citizens through litigation1

Ilker Ataç 1, *

1 Department of Political Science, University of Vienna, Austria * E-Mail: [email protected]

Abstract Focusing on migrant rights in Austria, this article illustrates how local actors use courts and litigation as avenues to claim rights for non-citizens. Adding to studies that have stressed the role of the international court in this process, I analyze such changes as a result of the interplay between international human rights frameworks and the capacities of local actors to mobilize resources, knowledge and expertise. This article presents two case studies in Austria, in which the entitlement to unemployment assistance (Notstandshilfe), and the right to stand as a candidate for works councils (Betriebsrat) and for the Chamber of Labour (Arbeiterkammer) were expanded to non-citizens.

Keywords Litigation, social and political rights, Austria, Human Rights, Migrant rights

Gaygusuz gegen Österreich: Rechtsstreit als Mittel zur Ausweitung der Rechte von Nicht-StaatsbürgerInnen

Zusammenfassung Mit Fokus auf die Rechte von MigrantInnen in Österreich beschreibt dieser Artikel, wie lokale AkteurInnen Gerichte und Rechtsstreit als Plattform nutzen um Rechte für Nicht-StaaatsbürgerInnen zu fordern. Aufbauend auf Studien, die die Rol- le der internationalen Gerichte in diesem Prozess betonen, analysiere ich diese Veränderungen als Ergebnis des Zusam- menspiels von internationalen Menschenrechtsrichtlinien einerseits, und andererseits den Kapazitäten von lokalen Ak- teurInnen, die relevante Ressourcen, Wissen und Expertise zum Einsatz bringen. Der Artikel schildert zwei Fallstudien in Österreich: die Ausweitung des Anspruchs auf Notstandshilfe sowie des passiven Wahlrechts zu Betriebsräten und Arbei- terkammer.

Schlüsselwörter Rechtsstreit, soziale und politische Rechte, Österreich, Menschenrechte, MigrantInnenrechte

Acknowledgement I conducted the research for this article during my time as research fellow to Sieglinde Rosenberger. Her continued support and the professional freedom she granted me allowed me to combine academia with the arts and turn the knowledge gath- ered in this project into an interactive theater experience. I would like to thank Sieglinde Rosenberger for these opportunities and for inspiring discussions.

The author has declared that no competing interests exist.

1 This paper discusses two cases. The title only mentions one case because of the symbolic significance of the first case for the second case.

March 31, 2017 I innsbruck university press, Innsbruck OZP – Austrian Journal of Political Science I ISSN 2313-5433 I http://oezp.at/ Vol. 46, issue 1 I DOI 10.15203/ozp.1588.vol46iss1 OPEN ACCESS 22 I. Ataς: Gaygusuz vs. Austria I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1

1. Introduction2 nationals, were particularly relevant in the extension of social and residence-related rights in Aus- Improvements to the social and political rights of non-citi- tria (Bauböck/Perchinig 2006; Kraler 2011). These zens in European countries are a result of disputed process- processes of improvement of rights of non-citizens es involving different actors on multiple levels. Concerning in Austria have not been investigated, especially not access to welfare services, Yasemin Soysal (1994) argues with a focus on the role of local actors and on how that social, civic, and some political rights are extended to a these processes are embedded in political debates. country’s foreign population. This leads to a decreasing rel- Instead, analyses have focused on protest movements evance of national citizenship and towards a more inclu- against the expulsion of asylum seekers (Rosenberg- sive model of membership, in which notions of universal er/Winkler 2014). human rights play a decisive role, accompanied by dena- This article discusses two cases in the Austrian tionalization of rights (Sassen 1996). In her elaborations on context, in which rights were extended to non-citi- this transition from national to post-national citizenship, zens through litigation procedures: unemployment Soysal stresses the role of the international courts, which assistance (Notstandshilfe) in 1999, and the right to implement human rights norms so that they effectively stand as a candidate for works council (Betriebsrat) protect the rights of non-citizens. I build on this argument, and Chamber of Labour (Arbeiterkammer, AK) elec- adding that it is not only courts and governments who ef- tions in 2005. I reconstructed detailed chronolo- fectuate such extensions of rights, but our analysis has gies of these two cases, triangulating information to include the diverse actors behind these processes, who through the use of a wide range of data sources. These push individual cases and thereby activate the courts. This included interviews with the key actors who were in- leads me to a processual understanding of rights, and a fo- volved in the campaigns and litigation procedures, cus on how rights of non-citizens are claimed and negoti- court and legal documents, as well as campaign ma- ated with reference to international human rights and reg- terial of activist groups, counseling centers and trade ulations. My analysis centers on the role of local actors in unions. These case chronologies were complemented these processes. As Basok and Carasco (2010) emphasize, by a systematization and content analysis of relevant the role of transnational human rights activists in forc- newspaper articles from the early 1970s until the late ing governments to adopt international norms for disad- 1990s, taken from the media archive of the Austrian vantaged groups has been explored (Muñoz 2009; Risse et Press Agency and the newspaper archive of the AK. al. 2009). Similarly to their analysis, I underscore the role Together, these data sources enabled thick case de- of litigation, focusing on how local actors use litigation to scriptions, as well as the reconstruction and analysis translate international law into domestic laws and prac- of the roles, stakes and arguments of the actors in- tices in improving the rights of non-citizens. volved in these cases. In Austrian migration policy, higher courts have played In analyzing the rich data, I focused on three rel- a decisive role in the improvement of some social, resi- evant research questions: First, which actors were dence- and family-related rights of non-citizens, which led involved in these processes? In addition to courts to a paradigm change towards the extension of rights for and governments, we can also identify actors such as this group (Perchinig 2009). The implementation of these counselors in advisory centers, lawyers, translators, rights was introduced on the national level by the Austrian and trade unionists as key actors who pushed the le- Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof, VfGH) and gal disputes towards extending non-citizens’ rights. the Higher Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof, Second, I am particularly interested in the knowledge VwGH), and on the European level by the European Court and skills that actors needed in order to contribute of Human Rights (ECtHR), building on the European Con- to these processes, as well as their motivations, for vention of Human Rights (ECHR), as well as the European example, moral opposition to injustice. Third, which Court of Justice (ECJ)3. In addition, European regulations, networks were activated in the collaboration and especially those concerning the rights of third country knowledge exchange between these actors? Overall, this article highlights the transformative 2 The research for this project was financed by the - role of litigation in struggles for rights. By emphasiz- ternational Dialogue and Cooperation (VIDC) and Wienwoche. The first result of this research was presented as a performance on 13 September ing the importance of litigation, I focus on agency 2014 under the title „Gaygusuz gegen Österreich“ in the Schauspielhaus and the relevance of networks. I also discuss the role Wien. Many people have contributed to the realisation of this event. of governments and their use of tactical concessions Most of all, I want to thank Katharina Kronhuber who worked as a research assistant for this project. aimed at decelerating processes of extending non-cit- 3 The decision of the higher courts in Austria did not only lead to an ex- izens’ rights. My research shows that the implemen- pansion of the rights of non-citizens. In addition, there were cases which tation of these rights is a contested process. A focus aimed at halting such expansions. For example, in one case the VfGH abolished a regulation through which the City of Vienna attempted to only on the verdicts of higher courts is insufficient introduce voting rights for persons with permanent residence rights. to explain how the extension of rights comes about. Vienna Institute for In I. Ataς : Gaygusuz vs. Austria I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1 23

Instead, this process is made up of several steps, initi- basis on which European courts can apply human rights ated by diverse actors, and slowed down by deceleration to protect non-citizens and finds that “they did rule on tactics of the government. certain specific areas, such as family life and protection In the next chapter I outline my theoretical approach, against inhuman treatment, that are directly relevant to followed by the description of the two case studies. The state discretion in expelling foreigners” (114). main themes that arise are summarized in a concluding International human rights instruments have be- analysis. come effective in improving human rights practices and gaining greater authority over states’ domestic affairs (Kaleck 2012: 377). However, these instruments alone are 2. Theoretical Considerations not sufficient to bring about change. Rather, the increasing relevance of human rights instruments is part of a Human rights have been discussed as a value system, as process initiated by actors such as activists, lawyers, and international law, and as a decisive framework that mo- migrant advocacy organizations. Consequently, litiga- tivates human rights activism (Barber 2012; Jacobson/ tion activities reflect the growing agency of these actors, Ruffer 2002; Kaleck 2012). Additionally, international understood here as the extent to which these actors can human rights law has altered political dynamics, “as intervene in political and legal affairs by using legal in- states unwittingly presented openings for civil society stitutions. This is also discussed as ‘strategic litigation’ actors and civil society actors in turn adroitly used these (Barber 2012). Kawar (2015) analyzes political mobiliza- opportunities to advance human right goals” (Tsutsui et tions and legal activism in France and the United States al. 2012: 375f.). In this way, international human rights around litigation campaigns and shows the ability of le- law has increasingly become a platform of political ac- gal rights activism and how legal contestation reshapes tivism towards implementing human rights. Activists the law and policymaking. Litigation activities reveal and social movements use legal norms and mechanisms the extent of agency and thereby can be seen as an indi- for implementing social justice and rights through liti- cator for “a growing legal and social readiness and ‘rec- gation strategies, thereby translating political principles ognition’ of rights” (Jacobson/Ruffer2002: 82). into a legal language of human rights. The proliferation of legal forms and mechanisms al- Human rights norms and institutions have proven a tered the nature and location of political engagement. useful tool for extending rights and protection to non- In a self-reinforcing process, this growing legal density citizens across Europe. However, as Morris shows, states promotes and facilitates agency. When migrant orga- construct forms of civic stratification in which specific nizations and lawyers use legal institutions as a tool to migrant categories have different access to rights, and gain rights, and thereby exercise agency, they simul- thereby create limits for the ability of human rights taneously reinforce the conditions that enabled these norms to protect the rights of non-citizens (Morris forms of agency in the first place. Indeed, as Jacobson 2002). By contrast, scholars emphasizing “post-nation- observes, there are parallels between the idea of agency al” rights discuss how migrants’ rights are derived from and the concept of human rights, in that both presume transnational rights located outside of the nation state universal and individualistic values (Jacobson/Ruffer (Soysal 1994) and show that government decisions on 2002: 81). Consequently, it is not only previous success migration policies are constrained by international hu- experiences of litigation procedures that promote and man rights and constitutional norms (Hollifield 1992; encourage actors’ capacity to intervene in political and Joppke 2005; Sassen 1996). The role of the courts in legal processes, but also the universalistic and individu- the creation of non-citizen’s rights has been discussed alistic notions of the subject matter of human rights. as “torn between two opposite imperatives” (Joppke/ The following pages give an overview of the two Marzal 2004: 827) to protect non-citizens on the basis cases that stand at the center of this article: the struggle of human rights provisions, and to draw a distinction for the extension of unemployment assistance, and the between aliens and citizens. right to stand as a candidate for works council elections In the European context, the legal density and in- for non-citizens. These case studies highlight the role of fluence of the ECtHR, its scope and caseload, as well actors and networks in litigation procedures aimed at as the influence of the ECJ have increased significantly implementing the rights of non-citizens. since the 1990s (Jacobson 2002: 82). At the same time, the density and relevance of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) has grown. The ECHR and the growing 3. The case of unemployment assistance legislative body of European Union (EU) have been important sources for the expansion of rights of non-citi- Long-term unemployed persons are entitled to unem- zens beyond national states in European countries. Nev- ployment assistance (Notstandshilfe) after the expiry of ertheless, Guiraudon (2000) highlights the limited legal their unemployment benefits (Arbeitslosengeld) if they 24 I. Ataς: Gaygusuz vs. Austria I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1

are financially destitute. Church organizations were the that supported this argument were published from the first to demand the extension of unemployment assis- mid-1970s until the end of the 1990s. They advocated tance to foreigners in the mid-1970s (Neues Volksblatt the right to unemployment assistance for foreigners 1975). This demand made an increased appearance in based on data, thus following the logic of “those who pay the media and in parliamentary debates during the mid- should also receive” (APA 1989a; Der Standard 1991, 21). 1980s. The Green Party and the Social Democratic Party Trade unions, pro-migrant associations and counsel- also raised this issue. In 1987, the Green Party put for- ing centers referred to this line of argumentation to ward the demand for unemployment assistance for for- strengthen their claim for non-citizens’ access to unem- eigners, combined with other demands, such as the right ployment assistance. Simultaneously, they reached be- to stand as a candidate for elections in works councils, as yond the economic cost argument and framed the right well as the introduction of the right to vote in munici- to social benefits as a matter of political representation pal elections (APA 1987a; APA 1987b). Also in 1987, Al- and rights of non-citizens as denizens (APA 1989b). In fred Dallinger, Minister of Social Affairs from the ruling 1994, members of the Green Party called for the intro- Social Democratic Party, together with Sepp Rieder, ju- duction of a resident citizenship, which was supposed to dicial spokesperson of the Social Democratic Party, an- include the right to stand as a candidate for elections and nounced their aim to extend unemployment assistance full access to social benefits, such as unemployment as- to foreigners (APA 1987c; Arbeiterzeitung, 1987). sistance (APA 1994). Until 1989, Austrian citizenship was the precon- The second position opposed non-citizens’ access dition for access to unemployment assistance. The to social benefits, and especially since 1992, promoted a amendment of the Unemployment Insurance Act “welfare scrounger” discourse. This discourse was used (Arbeitslosenversicherungsgesetz) from 1 August in the right-wing Freedom Party’s (FPÖ) demands for a 1989 made it possible for the first time for unem- stop on immigration and in its initiative on a referen- ployed foreign workers, who were entitled to an ex- dum regarding foreigners (AusländerInnenvolksbegeh- emption certificate and had worked in Austria for ren) (APA 1992). Issues like “misuse of income support,” eight years, to receive unemployment assistance for as well as discussions about undocumented employment 39 weeks (APA 1989a). However, despite the amend- partly shaped the debate on “welfare scrounging,” which ment, access remained limited, and about two-thirds gained relevance after 1995. of foreigners remained excluded from unemployment assistance (OTS 1991). The situation did not 3.1 A Migrant Worker Goes to Court for Unemployment improve until 1992, when the Austrian government Assistance adapted regulations to European Union standards (Stern 2010, 243). The possibility to receive special Cevat Gaygusuz,5 a Turkish worker born in 1950, lived unemployment assistance was extended from 39 to and worked in Upper Austria since 1973. Some years 52 months. Additionally, it was extended to other later, his wife and children moved to Austria as well. He target groups such as refugees and stateless persons, intended to work and live in Austria until his retirement and the required duration of employment in Austria (Interview 1). He started his first job in Austria in the tex- was reduced from eight to five years (Kurier 1992, tile industry. Because of his very low wage, he switched 6). However, Austrian citizenship remained the cat- to the construction sector, where he worked in a com- egorical requirement (Stern 2010, 243). pany until it went bankrupt. Finally, he worked in the The debates on unemployment assistance consisted metal industry in the assembly line of one of Austria’s of two major opposing positions, which also accompa- biggest factories. One day at work he fell from a height nied the debates on non-citizens’ access to social ben- of four meters and, as a result, broke both of his feet and efits. The first position advocated a “net-contributor” crushed his heel. After this accident in October 1984, discourse and was brought into the public debate by aca- he had to undergo several surgeries and walked with demic studies from the Austrian Institute of Economic crutches for 19 months (Interview 1). Research (WIFO) and the AK. It mainly argued that foreigners pay more taxes and other contributions than have increased less without guest workers. It stresses the fact that the state too profits from guest workers: foreign workers turned out they receive in social benefits, which counters the image to bring relief to the retirement insurance. In 1984, die Furche head- of migrants as a cost factor and therefore supports argu- lined: “No parasites. Guest workers are more often supporters than ments in favor of their access to social benefits.4 Studies beneficiaries of our social systems”. The article cites a study by the Vienna Chamber of Labor from the same year which concludes: “For the fact that foreign workers and their families are excluded from 4 There are several contributions showing that foreign workers paid many social benefits financed by tax and social security contribu- more into state funds than they received. One title in the newspaper tions, there is a considerable income surplus in favor of the guest Kurier from the year 1975 reads, “Guest workers helped everyone workers.” earn more.” Referring to experts from the social partners the article 5 The real name of Gaygusuz is Kaygusuz. It was misspelled in official emphasizes that the salaries and wages of Austrian citizens would documents. I. Ataς : Gaygusuz vs. Austria I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1 25

Consequently, he remained on sick leave for more The lawyer had the idea to take the case before the than one year until he found himself unemployed. Ini- VfGH and to plead for a violation of the equality prin- tially, he received unemployment benefits for nine ciple (Interview 2). The VfGH refused the treatment of months. After his claim for benefits ran out, he applied the complaint in February 1988, arguing that the “alleged for an advancement of his pension in the form of un- violation of rights” was “so unlikely,” that its assertion employment assistance (Interview 2). The employment had “no sufficient prospect of success” (Netzer 1996, 6). agency in Linz and the employment agency of the state According to Andreas Netzer, there is a system behind of Upper Austria both rejected his request on the basis of the VfGH’s refusal of the motion: Especially with re- his Turkish citizenship. When filing the application for gards to legal cases relating to non-citizens, he observes unemployment benefits and unemployment assistance, that politically controversial cases are increasingly re- he was counseled by Şenol Şentürk and Barış Yalçın,6 fused approval for entering the legal system of com- who also helped him with translation (Interview 1). plaints (Netzer 1996). The VfGH instead referred the case Şenol Şentürk moved from Turkey to Austria in to the VwGH, which, however, found the complaint to be the late 1960s and worked to advocate for the rights of of constitutional matter and decided that the complaint non-citizens and overcome discriminatory regulations. fell outside its jurisdiction (Stern 2010). During the time he helped Mr. Gaygusuz with interpre- The decision of the VfGH came as a surprise to the at- tation, he worked for the AK and the Trade Union Fed- torney (Interview 2). After the negative decision, the at- eration and provided counseling and translation for torney and the counselor decided in agreement with Mr. migrants in the field of residence permits, social and Gaygusuz to bring the case before the ECtHR in Stras- economic rights (Interview 4). In 1985, when he was still bourg. At this time, the attorney already had experience counseling Mr. Gaygusuz, he co-founded the association with the ECtHR (Interview 2). Furthermore, the Austri- “Migrare”, initiated by migrants and supported by the an Trade Union Federation covered the procedural costs. Upper Austrian Trade Union Federation. In his vision, The complaint referred to Articles 6 (1) (right to fair trial) the association should not only offer charitable counsel- and 8 (right to respect for family life) of the ECHR and to ing, “but also in relative political independence take up a Article 14 of the ECHR taken in conjunction with Article self-confident and critical stance in matters concerning 1 of the Protocol No. 1 (principle of non-discrimination migration in the interest of migrants” (Migrare 2010, 2). taken in conjunction with the right to property). At a later point, he worked for the Upper Austrian Trade Union Federation, where he was assigned the task to fur- 3.2 The Decision of the European Court ther involve migrants in the Trade Union’s work (Inter- of Human Rights view 4). Şenol Şentürk played a key role in the legal case of Mr. Gaygusuz. He was the one who contacted Herbert On 20 April 1995, the Gaygusuz case was assigned to the Blum, a dedicated lawyer from Linz, who represented ECtHR. On 22 May 1996, the hearing took place in Stras- Mr. Gaygusuz in court (Interview 2). Shortly after giving bourg. A lawyer delegated by the Turkish government Mr. Blum full power of attorney, Mr. Gaygusuz returned as a member state of the Council of Europe also partici- to Turkey, because the government’s refusal to grant him pated in the trial to lobby for the rights of Turkish citi- unemployment assistance deprived him of his financial zens and to argue in favor of an association agreement basis in Austria (Interview 1). His attorney never met between Turkey and the EEC (Interview 2). The trial took Mr. Gaygusuz in person, since all communication went place shortly after Austria joined the EU. On 16 Septem- through Mr. Şentürk. “I had known this counselor and ber 1996, the ECtHR decided in favor of Mr. Gaygusuz: translator already for a while, since he repeatedly acts as Refusing unemployment assistance to Mr. Gaygusuz an interpreter and campaigns strongly for the rights of because of his foreign citizenship violated Article 14 of his Turkish colleagues” (Interview 2). the ECHR taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Proto- Herbert Blum is a committed lawyer, who has been col No.1. The unequal treatment between Austrian and involved in various cases relating to foreigners, asy- non-Austrian citizens “that Mr. Gaygusuz fell victim to” lum and migration, as well as in cases of expulsion and was “not objectively and reasonably justifiable” and the prohibition of residency. He explained his reasons for regulation, according to which only Austrian citizens accepting the case: “Due to the legal situation, Mr. Gay- were entitled to unemployment assistance,7 violated gusuz had no entitlement to unemployment assistance, the ECHR (ECtHR 1996). As a third-country national, because he did not meet the criteria. I am always inter- Mr. Gaygusuz paid unemployment insurance contribu- ested in investigating whether legal norms are really in tions, which were dedicated to a specific purpose, but for accordance with the constitutional order, the European which he had never been compensated. This illegitimate Convention on Human Rights and EU law” (Interview 2). 7 The terminology used in the ruling of the ECtHR refers to unemplo- 6 The names of the counsellors are anonymized. yment assistance as “emergency assistance”. 26 I. Ataς: Gaygusuz vs. Austria I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1

discrimination in comparison to Austrian citizens rep- (Betriebsrat) members in Germany. In Austria, individ- resented a violation of the principle of non-discrimi- ual groups started demanding that all employees have nation regarding the right to property8. The Republic of the right to stand for elections to the Chamber of La- Austria was sentenced to a monetary compensation for bor, as well as to works councils. In the beginning, these pecuniary damage of 200,000 Schilling, as well as cost demands were raised by charity organizations and mi- and expense reimbursements of 100,000 Schilling. grant groups (Salzburger Nachrichten 1972; Kurier 1973). This verdict initiated a tug-of-war between the Aus- In 1974, migrant workers in Austria received the right to trian government and the VfGH, accompanied by ac- vote for their works councils; however, they could not tivities of counseling centers. According to the court’s themselves stand for election as members of the works decision, unemployment assistance had to be granted council (Pühretmeyer 1999: 18).9 independently from the applicant’s citizenship. The According to Pühretmeyer (1999: 3), it was only in government consequently revised the regulations re- the 1980s that demands for the right of all employees to garding unemployment assistance, introducing a new stand for election were raised publicly by several actors, criterion: Applicants had to either be born in Austria or including the Viennese Chamber of Labor, political par- have spent half of their life or school time in Austria. For ties, and migrant organizations (Profil 1984; Die Presse Stern, these conditions presented a “classic example of 1985; Tiroler Tageszeitung 1988). In the 1990s, initia- indirect discrimination that excluded naturalized Aus- tives advocating for implementing the right to stand for trians” (Stern 2010, 243). Through the change, the re- election gained traction. The trade union HGPD (Hotel, striction stayed intact in a different form. However, the Gastgewerbe, Persönlicher Dienst), the women’s and amendment of the Unemployment Insurance Act was to youth organizations of the Trade Union Confederation come into effect no earlier than the year 2000. The VfGH ÖGB, self-organized migrant groups, as well as individ- continued to promote the decision of the ECtHR, argu- ual persons in all trade unions supported this demand. ing that discrimination against foreigners regarding un- The year 1991 marked a turning point in the approach of employment assistance was a violation of the ECHR. The the ÖGB. At the 12th Federal Congress, delegates unani- federal government reacted to the court’s decision by mously voted in favor of the right to stand for election. putting the new discriminatory regulations into effect However, the implementation of this right was not high early. At this time, counseling centers for migrants in on the ÖGB’s list of priorities (Pühretmeyer 1999: 21). Vienna and Linz organized 25 complaints and brought them before the VfGH. 4.1. Political Campaign In July 1999, the VfGH declared for the second time that the regulations in the Unemployment Insurance In this context, several initiatives emerged on the lo- Act, according to which entitlement to unemployment cal level in order to push this demand forward. In 1992, assistance was subject to the applicant’s place of birth or five members of the Trade Union for Private Employees school attendance in Austria, were unconstitutional. In (GPA) founded the project group “Open Sesame!” (SÖD). their verdict, the VfGH argued that unemployment as- This group aimed at implementing trade union decisions sistance did not represent a welfare benefit, but rather concerning the introduction of the right to stand for was to be considered as a right worthy of protection. election. The foundation of this group can be traced back Since 1 August 1999, the entitlement to unemployment to efforts towards founding a works council in a language assistance in Austria is subject to the applicant’s resi- school, initiated by Caroline Grandperret (Grandperret/ dent status. Nagel 2000, 33ff; Griesser/Sauer 2014, 60). Being a non- citizen employee at the time, she could not stand for election to the works council. Over the course of seven 4. The right to stand for election in Chamber of years, SÖD took action within GPA towards implement- Labor and Work Councils ing trade union decisions concerning the right to stand for election. This work included a petition on the right to The debate on voting rights for migrant employees stand for election, which was submitted to the Viennese started in 1972 with internal discussions in the Social Chamber of Labor in 1993. Democratic Party (APA 1972). In the same year, migrants The first campaign which took the form of strategic gained the right to stand for election as works council litigation was coordinated by individuals working for

9 On 17 December 1970, the Austrian Trade Union Confederation and 8 Gaygusuz v. Austria is widely considered to be a leading case of the the Federal Chamber of Commerce signed a “Collective Agreement European Court of Human Rights. Dembour (2012) discusses why on Regulations of Employment Conditions for Foreign Workers.” this case did not lead to the development of a significant case law. This agreement allowed migrants to elect their own “Gastarbeiter” While the judgment merely targeted the exclusion of legally resi- representatives. These persons, however, could only act based on dent migrant workers from social security benefits, it did extend the specific permission of the works council, and were protected neither principle of equality between regular and irregular migrants. from dismissal nor from discrimination. I. Ataς : Gaygusuz vs. Austria I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1 27

the Association for Support to Foreigners in Linz, Upper violated a human right in 2002. Excluding non-EEA Austria. In the early 1990s, this was a small organization citizens from the right to stand for election to the works with ten employees who supported non-citizens in le- council in Austria was categorized a violation of Article gal and social matters. They also supported demands for 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political migrants’ right to stand for election to works councils, Rights. In their statement, the Human Rights Commit- taking actions such as a signature collection at the trade tee of the United Nations demanded that the Austrian union congress, which led to 10,000 signatures (Inter- government revise the respective laws so that no un- view 3). Despite several campaigns and initial euphoria justified distinction be made between non-citizens and in the early 1990s, they had to acknowledge that there Austrian citizens. Additionally, Austria was obligated to was a lack of political will to implement these rights. publish the verdict on a webpage. Therefore, the association decided to enter a legal dispute Although this decision did not lead to immediate over migrant workers’ right to stand for election and use legal change, it did have political effects. Following the this as the basis for a political campaign (Interview 3). verdict of the UN Human Rights Committee, political They planned a strategy involving several steps in order pressure increased. The chairperson of the GPA, Hans to bring the case to the European Court of Human Rights. Sallmutter, advocated for the right to stand for election The first step was that two employees founded a (APA 2002). The Green Party submitted an inquiry titled works council within the association. The candidates “Breach of Law by the Republic of Austria” in the par- were Mümtaz Karakurt, who had Turkish citizenship, liament asking why migrant workers’ right to stand for and Vladimir Polak, who had Croatian origins and Aus- election was still not implemented despite several re- trian citizenship. Karakurt won the election by a narrow quests by the EU and the UN Human Rights Committee margin (Interview 3). As part of the overall strategy, Po- (Der Standard 2002). lak reacted to Karakurt’s victory with the legal claim to It took another campaign and another conviction disallow the latter’s election, which he submitted to the until the respective laws were revised. This happened Regional Court in Linz on 21 June 1994. In September in the context of Austria’s admission to the EU. Already, 1994, the Court ruled that foreign workers did not have in 1997 and in 1998, the EU Commission criticized Aus- the right to stand for election, and therefore could not tria on this matter, pointing to the fact that EEA citizens be elected as members of the works council. Karakurt’s were not granted the right to stand for election to works mandate in the works council was denied. Karakurt sub- councils in Austria despite contradictory EU and EEA sequently, and as part of their strategy, went through all regulations (Pühretmeyer 1999: 3). The election to the legal levels: He appealed to the Higher Regional Court, Chamber of Labor in 1999 was the first election after which in turn refused the appeal based on the same ar- Austria’s entry to the EU. gument (Interview 3). As a next step Karakurt submitted The exclusion of third country nationals from the a revision in April 1995 to the VfGH, making an applica- election to the Chamber of Labor was challenged by tion to revise Article 53 (1) 1 of the Austrian Labor Con- candidate lists which included migrants from Turkey stitution Act based on Article 11 of the ECHR, which has in 1999. In Vorarlberg, the list “Joint Zajedno/Birlik- constitutional status in Austria. This appeal was again te Alternative and Green Trade Unionists” (Wähler- refused. In its justification, the VfGH argued that the gruppe Gemeinsam) stood for election, and it included works council, as designed in the Austrian Labor Consti- five Turkish citizens (Die Presse 2009). The association tution Act, was not an association in the sense of Article „Wählergruppe Gemeinsam“ was founded in 1993 as a 11 ECHR. In this process, Karakurt received legal and fi- common platform of migrants and “green” activists and nancial support from the GPA in Upper Austria (Inter- stood for election in AK for the first time in 1994. One view 3). of the founders, Mario Lechner, explained that for the On 24 July 1996, Mümtaz Karakurt submitted a com- election of 1999, since EU law was effective, including plaint to the ECtHR, claiming a violation of Article 11 (1) the association agreement between the EU and Turkey, ECHR on the freedom of association (Interview 3). The Turkish citizens had the right to stand for election to the case was struck out of the list since a staff association Chamber of Labor (Lechner 2009). However, the FPÖ such as the works’ council in the respective case could submitted a formal objection against the list. The princi- not be considered an ‘association’ within the meaning pal election committee decided to delete the five Turkish of Article 11 (1) ECHR (Buchinger et al. 2009). They did nationals from the list of candidates submitted by „Wäh- not give up, and submitted an individual complaint to lergruppe Gemeinsam“ on the ground that they did not the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations, have Austrian citizenship. building on Article 26 of the International Covenant on The responsible Federal Minister rejected the com- Civil and Political Rights, which guarantees the right plaint of the Wählergruppe Gemeinsam in November of equality before the law. Accordingly, the UN Human 1999. Although the Minister acknowledged that Turkish Rights Committee came to the conclusion that Austria workers were eligible for election to the general assem- 28 I. Ataς: Gaygusuz vs. Austria I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1

bly of the AK, he argued that the deletion of the names demands by several actors, but also by prominent cam- of the Turkish nationals from the list was not expected paigns and activities of powerful trade unions. to influence the results of the election, since in a non- Third, the detailed chronologies of the two cases personalised list voting system, the individual candidate highlight the broad range of different actors that shaped is of little importance to voters (ECJ 2003). the processes, as well as the extent of their agency. In The Wählergruppe Gemeinsam then took the dispute the unemployment assistance case, one migrant advi- to the VfGH. It claimed that the principal election com- sor who worked as translator and consultant for trade mittee’s decision of 8 February 1999 should be declared unions, and who brought the case to the lawyer, played unlawful and annulled, since the five Turkish candidates an important role. He had the local knowledge and he were deleted. It also claimed that the electoral procedure had been active in different forums for improving the as a whole should be declared unlawful and annulled, and rights of the migrants. A second very important actor that fresh elections should be held (ECJ 2003). The VfGH in this case was a dedicated lawyer who had acquired turned to the ECJ in order to determine how to interpret the relevant skills and experiences through his earlier the Association Agreement between Turkey and the EU. involvement. After this case, he successfully brought This led to a decision by the ECJ in 2003, in which the other cases to the European courts. The case on the right exclusion of Turkish employees from the right to stand to stand for election was shaped by a broader number of for election to works councils and the Chamber of Labor advisors, who were fiercely determined to fight for this was deemed illegal (ECJ 2003). This verdict opened the right, and identified litigation as a strategic opportunity path for a lawsuit of the European Commission against to effectuate political change. These actors were part of Austria, categorizing this form of exclusion as a viola- political campaigns aiming to achieve political change tion of the EU treaty. Subsequently, the law regulating on different levels, and used litigation as a strategic tool the Chamber of Labor, as well as the Labor Constitution because other intervention strategies failed. Simultane- Act were changed so that all third country nationals have ously, they continued to exert other forms of political the right to stand for election. pressure, such as collecting signatures, mobilization and raising public attention. Building on the analysis of actors and their agency, a 5. Analysis fourth theme becomes obvious: the specific knowledge that actors could mobilize, which constituted one of A joint overview of the two cases highlights a number the key resources that enabled them to exercise agency of themes that shaped the conditions and outcomes of in the form of litigation procedures. In both cases the these processes. First, it is clear that policy changes and core actors were connected to the counseling center improvements of rights were realized through decisions in Linz, which was established in order to improve the made by international higher courts: the ECtHR and legal situation of migrant workers and their access to the ECJ. In the case about the right to stand for election, social services. The specific work of counseling centers the litigation strategy also moved beyond the European equips their members with insight into the Austrian le- level and an individual complaint was submitted to the gal system and into the relevant legal cases, as well as Human Rights Committee of the United Nations, which with connections to the dedicated lawyers. Addition- convicted the Austrian government of human rights ally, they knew the specific problems that migrants were violations in 2002. This did not lead to immediate legal faced with, and they were motivated by the idea of social change. It took another campaign and another convic- justice and the aim to challenge injustice. Their knowl- tion by the ECJ until the respective laws were revised. edge and expertise enabled them to turn this case into A second important theme is the interplay between a litigation procedure. It also proved to be an important political campaigning activities and litigation strate- resource in later collaborations with other counseling gies. In the unemployment assistance case, NGOs and centers, which aimed at finding further cases and bring- migrant associations made some claims in the public ing them to the ECJ and VfGH. sphere before the case entered the legal path. However, For litigation activities, technical expertise in human these demands and campaigns were not as prominent rights law was critical to draft legal documents and to as in the second case. The right to unemployment as- issue formal complaints. The legal expertise needed for sistance was not as universally approved as the right to human rights work was transmitted through networks stand for election. Rather, the discussion was shaped by connecting individuals and organizations, which were strong arguments in favor and against unemployment created by the translators, activists and further individ- assistance for non-citizens, the latter being based on uals at the local level. The case studies show how access populist claims and economic reasoning. By contrast, to these networks and to the relevant knowledge enabled litigation activities in the case on the right to stand for these actors to incorporate international human rights election were preceded not only by political claims and law on the local level. Mümtaz Karakurt stresses that the I. Ataς : Gaygusuz vs. Austria I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1 29

case of unemployment assistance was a milestone for agreements on nation states. Rather, a movement “from subsequent legal struggles, since this was the first time below” is needed in order to implement these rights. that someone came up with the idea of bringing such a However, my analysis has also shown that decisions case before the ECtHR. He therefore highlights the at- and verdicts of international courts alone do not lead to torney’s decision to take this step as highly significant in immediate implementation of rights. As illustrated by the fight for migrant rights (Interview 3). the two case studies, especially by the case on unemploy- Finally, the case studies also show strategies of the ment assistance, implementation of issues that are sub- governments, aiming at deceleration of the procedures ject to contested debates is delayed and has to be pushed and delays in putting into effect the decisions of high- forward through additional legal channels such as the er and international courts. In both cases, the Austrian VfGH. We can also observe delay strategies by the gov- government used tactics to evade immediate imple- ernment in the second case, in which the right to stand mentation of the required changes. One strategy was to for election was widely supported. The implementation reformulate discriminatory regulations so that specific of rights takes a lot of time and energy, and even the criteria were modified but exclusionary effects -essen road to successful rights extensions is marked by failures tially stayed the same, as done in the case on unemploy- and dead ends. This was not the main focus of this study; ment assistance. A second strategy, which the govern- however, further research in this area is warranted. The ment applied in both cases, was to keep the laws which current restrictive approach to migration policy, as well were judged to be violations of international agree- as the increasing relevance of human rights frameworks ments intact and unchanged as long as legally possible, and instruments provide a context in which the research and partly even longer, although it was clear that higher approach advanced in this article can provide a useful courts would repeatedly demand change. Although in lens for studying human rights. This research approach both cases the litigation procedures finally led to the takes into account the contested and dynamic nature of implementation of rights of non-citizens, these decel- the processes leading to the implementation of rights. In eration and delay tactics prolonged the procedures, re- doing so, it promises an improved understanding of the quiring even higher levels of expertise and resilience on mechanisms through which international rights frame- the part of human rights advocates. works can come to life on the local and national level.

6. Conclusions Literature

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Politics of Labor Migration in the Department of So- Lechner, Mario (2009): Der Kampf um das allgemeine cial Sciences at the University Kassel. From August 2015 passive Wahlrecht. AK-Wahl 4, available at: https:// until April 2016 he worked as a post-doctoral research mariolechner.wordpress.com/2009/01/07/ak- fellow in the section “Migration & Society” at the Insti- wahl%C2%A04/ (Access: 10.05.2014) tute for Migration Research and Intercultural Studies Migrare (2010): Migrare fragt. Wie alles begann…, in: Di- (IMIS), University of Osnabrück. His research interests rekt, Sonderausgabe, 2. are in the area of citizenship studies and migration poli- Morris, Lydia (2002). Managing Migration: Civic Stratifi- cies, social movement studies and civil society, Turkish cation and Migrants’ Rights. London. politics. Recent publications are: ‘Refugee Protest Camp Muñoz, Alejandro Anaya (2009). Transnational and Do- Vienna’: making citizens through locations of the pro- mestic Processes in the Definition of Human Rights test movement, in: Citizenship Studies, 20 (5), 2016, Policies in Mexico, in: Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 629-646. Human Rights Discourses in the Context of the 31(1), 35–58. Regionalisation of Border Regimes: Comparing Mexico I. Ataς : Gaygusuz vs. Austria I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1 31

and Turkey, in: Journal für Entwicklungspolitik, 22 (1/2), OTS (1991): OTS0019 5 II 0209 NPK001, ci/Arbeitsmarkt- 2016, 187–212. verwaltung/ÖPK-Nr.2550, Arbeitslose Ausländer, 07. Mai 1991. Profil (1984) Studie über die „Probleme ausländischer Appendix 1: List of Interviews Arbeitnehmer am Beispiel Wien“, 30.04.1984. Salzburger Nachrichten (1972): Auch Gastarbeiter Interview 1 Cevat Gaygusuz, April 25, 2014, Izmir, müssten für den Betriebsrat wählbar sein. 29. März Turkey. 1972. Interview 2 Helmut Blum, May 27, 2014, Vienna, Austria. Tiroler Tageszeitung (1988): Die Grünen bringen Änder- Interview 3 Mümtaz Karakurt, June, 03, 2014, Vienna, ungsantrag bezüglich der Novelle des Ausländerbe- Austria. schäftigungsgesetzes ein, 20.04.1988. Interview 4 Şenol Şentürk, April, 03, 2014, Vienna, Austria.

Appendix 2: Newspaper List

Austria Presse Agentur (APA) (1972): Den „Abgeordneten Kolaric“ soll es nicht geben (APA, 31.03.1972). APA (1987a): APA0214 5 II, Parlament/Budgetdebatte/ Soziales, 25.03.1987. APA (1987b): APA0189 5 II, Grüne fordern gesetzliche Gleichstellung für Ausländer, 23. 10.1987. APA (1987c): APA0104 5 II, Parlament/Fragestunde/So- ziales, 07.04.1987. APA (1988): APA0183 5 II, Parlament/Nationalrat/ Vorschau, 18.04.1988. APA (1989a): APA0197 5 WI, Arbeitsmarkt/Arbeitslosen- versicherung, Kein “Mindeststandard” beim Arbeit- slosengeld, 25.01.1989. APA (1989b): APA0047 5 II, Wahlrecht/Ausländer, 25.11.1989. APA (1992): APA0185 5 WI 0394, Arbeitsmarkt/Auslän- der/Haider, Arbeitsmarkt: Haider für Einwander- ungsstopp, 22.01.1992. APA (1994): APA0220 5 II 0468, Soziales/Ausländer/ Grüne/Stoitsits, Grüne fordern Einführung einer Wohnbürgerschaft, 24.02.1994. APA (2002): GPA-Vorsitzende Sallmutter macht sich für das passive Wahlrecht stark, APA0253, 16.07.2002. Arbeiterzeitung (1987), 11.04.87. Der Standard (1991): Ausländer sponserten Sozialnetz mit sechs Milliarden Schilling, 19.10.1991:21. Der Standard (2002): Rechtsbruch durch die Republik Österreich, 28.08.2002. Die Presse (1985): Studie “Ausländische Arbeitskräfte in Österreich”, 19.03.1985. Die Presse (2009): Vorarlberg-Wahl: Migranten haben einen schweren Stand, 10.08.2009. Kurier (1973): Kolaric als Betriebsrat, 20.03.1973. Kurier (1992): Arbeitslosengeld, 21.12.1992:6. Neues Volksblatt (1975): Notstandshilfe für Gastarbeiter fehlt, 25.09.1975.

Research Article

“Welcome culture”: the emergence and transformation of a public debate on migration

Florian Trauner1, *, Jocelyn Turton 2

1 Institute for European Studies, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium 2 College of Europe, Bruges, Belgium * E-Mail: [email protected]

Abstract This article investigates the emergence and transformation of a debate on “welcome culture”. This concept has developed as part of a wider effort by the German government since 2005 to improve perceptions of immigration. In autumn 2015, the term entered mainstream public discourse when it became a point of reference for political, societal and media actors. These groups sought to promote a pro-refugee policy for humanitarian or economic reasons, or simply out of pragmatism. Even- tually, right-wing actors began to dominate the discourse in order to undermine the pro-refugee camp and approach. The discussion therefore reflects the struggles to define whether Germany and Austria are countries of immigration, or should even aspire to this title.

Keywords Germany; Austria; welcome culture; discourse analysis; refugee crisis

„Willkommenskultur“: das Entstehen und die Veränderung einer öffentlichen Debatte zu Migration

Zusammenfassung Dieser Artikel untersucht die Veränderung und die Geschichte der öffentlichen Auseinandersetzung zur „Willkommens- kultur“. In den Jahren nach 2005 wurde dieses Konzept im Rahmen eines Plans der deutschen Regierung entwickelt, der darauf abzielte, die Akzeptanz von Einwanderung zu erhöhen. Im Herbst 2015 wurde „Willkommenskultur“ Teil einer brei- teren Debatte, als politische, gesellschaftliche und journalistische AkteurInnen sich für eine migrationsfreundliche Politik aufgrund von humanitären, wirtschaftlichen oder pragmatischen Gründen einsetzten. Der Diskurs zu Willkommenskultur wurde zusehends von rechtsgerichteten AkteurInnen dominiert. Sie benützten ihn, um dem Pro-Refugee Camp und einer liberalen Politik die Legitimation abzusprechen. Die Debatte zur Willkommenskultur spiegelt daher die gesellschaftlichen Spannungslinien wider, inwieweit Deutschland und Österreich Einwanderungsländer sind bzw. sein sollen.

Schlüsselwörter Deutschland; Österreich; Willkommenskultur; Diskursanalyse; Flüchtlingskrise

Acknowledgement by Florian Trauner: The Special Issue including this article is dedicated to the 60th anniversary of Sieg- linde Rosenberger. Sieglinde has been a colleague, mentor and research collaborator of mine. Her work and her way of dealing with students and colleagues have been an important source of inspiration for me. Happy birthday and I wish you many more years of joy and fun in research.

Acknowledgement by both authors: We would like to thank Astrid Mattes, Jeremias Stadlmair, and the referee for constructive and useful comments on earlier versions of the article.

The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.

March 31, 2017 I innsbruck university press, Innsbruck OZP – Austrian Journal of Political Science I ISSN 2313-5433 I http://oezp.at/ Vol. 46, issue 1 I DOI 10.15203/ozp.1587.vol46iss1 OPEN ACCESS 34 F. Trauner, J. Turton: Welcome culture (Willkommenskultur) I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1

1. Introduction guage (e.g. Fairclough 2013; Gee 2014). Given the focus on a migration-related subject, the article is particu- The year 2015 has been marked by a series of migrant boat larly reliant on the “Vienna school of discourse anal- tragedies in the Mediterranean Sea and unusually high ysis”. This sociological approach developed out of an numbers of migrants departing from Turkey to Greece investigation of the complex and multilayered reac- and moving further North. The situation rapidly devel- tions to immigration and multiculturalism in Austria oped into a full-blown crisis for the European Union (see at the beginning of the 1990s. Spearheaded by Ruth detailed Trauner 2016). Germany and Austria have been Wodak, it sought to identify certain linguistic pat- particularly scrutinised in terms of their policy decisions terns and trends within a multiplicity of documents and public sentiment towards migration (e.g. Rosenberger and sources related to the topic of migration, in an 2016; Schneider 2016). By the end of 2015, Germany had effort to extrapolate certain basic features underpin- the highest number of first time asylum applications ever ning general attitudes towards this phenomenon (e.g. registered (441,800 or 35 percent of all applications in the Wodak/Köhler 2010; Wodak/Matouschek 1993). EU). In Austria around 85,000 migrants submitted their The Vienna School’s theoretical approach to dis- asylum application (Eurostat 2016). Central to both Ger- course analysis involves two principal strands of many and Austria’s response has been the phenomenon of argument: the identification of particular macro- “welcome culture” (“Willkommenskultur”). It has become a strategies at work in these documents, and the more salient subject of public discourse and a symbol of the civil micro linguistic features underlying their composi- society initiatives launched in the country at various stages tion and transmission. Through a scientific dissec- throughout the crisis. While similar initiatives were pres- tion of certain documents at the time, Wodak and her ent in other EU member states, the two countries became colleagues seek to explain the relative power of com- standard bearers for this outpouring of popular support peting influences upon the public mindset – ranging towards accepting the waves of migrants making their way from elements of political discourse, to everyday con- up through Europe’s southern corridor. versations relating to issues of migration and race, Public discourse is the backbone of any negotiation on overheard by her colleagues on the streets of Vienna. membership, participation and belonging, the common theme of this Special Issue. This article aims at decon- Through discourse, social actors constitute structing the competing influences behind the emergence knowledge, situations, social roles as well as iden- of the discourse on welcome culture in the autumn of 2015. tities and interpersonal relations between various The research will explore the concepts and definitions used interacting social groups. In addition, discursive in the context of this debate. It will discuss whether this acts are socially constitutive in a number of ways: discourse amounts merely to a social media bubble or rath- first, they play a decisive role in the genesis, pro- er to a more profound shift in the German and Austrian na- duction and construction of certain social conditional perspectives towards migration. tions (van Leeuwen/Wodak 1999, 92). In terms of timeframe, the focus of the analysis is on the public debate in the context of the 2015 refugee crisis. A key distinction between Wodak’s school and our ar- Notwithstanding this, the article will also investigate the ticle is that the Vienna School chooses to focus exclu- emergence of this discourse (post-2005) and its transfor- sively on the growth of negative perceptions – princi- mation in 2016. In terms of structure, the article starts by pally on the issue of what she terms “neo-racism”. By adapting the “Vienna school of discourse analysis” to the contrast, this article seeks to understand how a posi- present research interest. It then shifts attention to how the tive discourse on migration could gain momentum discourse has become popularised in the cases of Germany in the context of the 2015 refugee crisis. It identifies and Austria. The research also looks at the extent to which the factors that have allowed a pre-existing concept the concept of “welcome culture” has been of relevance to gain prominence and dominate the public debate, outside these two countries. It ends by investigating how albeit only for a limited period of time. the discourse has changed since the public attitude became Our argument is that welcome culture as a con- more hostile towards the arrival of new migrants. In terms cept gained such a relevance in the public debate as of methodology, it scrutinises primary and secondary it allowed different societal, media and political ac- sources relating to the concept of welcome culture. tors to promote a certain perception of migrants. Hu- man rights-oriented and pro-refugee actors used it to gain societal support for their cause. It also became 2. Adapting the Vienna school of discourse analysis a handy concept for actors with more economic and pragmatic motives that primarily sought to make a This work is informed by discourse analysis, which seeks to virtue out of necessity. In fact, there seems to be quite study in a critical fashion the meaning and usage of lan- some overlap in the discourse dynamics of the 1990s F. Trauner, J. Turton: Welcome culture (Willkommenskultur) I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1 35

and 2015, regardless of their distinct objectives. The use would therefore appear to inspire extreme arguments of welcome culture with a positive connotation was also on both sides, and the same core rhetorical features thus meant to bolster national identity, much in the same way seem to recur. that right-wing propaganda has consistently sought to do on the topic of migration. The Vienna school identifies the following hallmarks 3. Welcome culture – the emergence of a concept of prejudiced debate surrounding the issue of migration: The term “welcome culture” has become inextricably – Emphasis on unifying common features/shared sor- linked to Germany’s and Austria’s idiosyncratic ap- row or worries (for example, at a subnational or na- proach towards the refugee crisis. Yet the concept and tional level) the use of the term pre-dated the 2015/2016 events. – Emphasis on the will to unify/co-operate/feel and show solidarity 3.1. Germany and the emergence of welcome culture – Emphasis on national model character of subnational units (Wodak et al. 2008, 38). While the article refrains from claiming to identify the exact date of entry of this neologism into common us- These features of xenophobic discourse could be applied age, its origins appear to coincide with the Chancellor- to welcome culture, most obviously to the emphasis on a ship of Angela Merkel. In 2005, a reformed immigration need for solidarity and a national model character. Thus law entered into force, which merged the previously if Wodak’s theories are scrupulously applied, it would distinct concepts of “migration policy” and “integra- appear that newspapers and politicians alike were us- tion policy”. This was a milestone in the German ap- ing the refugee crisis in part as a pretext for promoting proach on migration. “For the first time in the federal national unity – potentially in the face of imminent na- German history of labour migration, permanent migra- tional fragmentation. tion was explicitly presented to the public as a politi- These discursive strategies have been open to chal- cal aim” (Sachverständigenrat deutscher Stiftungen für lenges and alternative frames. The article shows that Integration und Migration 2011, 66, own translation). the concepts and models promoted with the discourse In this context the term “welcome culture” started to of welcome culture have become increasingly contested be used more often by leading German politicians. In and a different sort of “othering” been proposed – one in 2010, for instance, Annette Schavan, then secretary of which the migrants are not included. Eventually, the dis- state for education, maintained in an interview with a course on “welcome culture” was dominated by migra- German daily that “we need a welcome culture” in un- tion-hostile actors to emphasize the “negative” aspects certain times (Berliner Morgenpost, 2010). A reluctant of migration and the “naïveté” of societal support to- public should be persuaded that large-scale migration wards migrants. A discourse more in line with what Wo- was a necessity rather than a temporary phenomenon dak observed in the 1990s took over, with a prominent to be tolerated. Put differently, the term “welcome cul- “warning against the loss of national autonomy and ture” became instrumental to pursue a specific political uniqueness (with its accompanying ‘topos of threat’)” agenda, namely, to enhance the acceptance of German (Wodak et al. 2008, 38). society to being a country of immigration. This raises further questions about the nature and As is often the case with a broad, politically-inspired function of “culture” as a sociological phenomenon. The nomenclature, the term is open to different interpreta- counterintuitive match between the xenophobic dis- tions and usages. Even the assumption that it bears posi- course in early 1990s in Austria and, at least initially, tive connotations, as the word “welcome” and its associ- the debate on the welcome culture in 2015 would imply ations of human empathy suggests, should not be taken that a culture can be created and harnessed as a unifying for granted. According to Roland Roth, there is a need phenomenon. For whatever ultimate aim, the primary for caution to align the term with “general hospitality actors responsible for pro-refugee discourse during the […] or a welcome for all and sundry” (Roth 2014, 20, own era of welcome culture therefore utilised a number of translation). Even when the term emerged, there was core macro strategies in order to generate a groundswell thus a separation between the atmosphere of tolerance of public opinion in favour of enhanced reception con- and permissiveness that it implied and the selective ap- ditions. The fact that, historically, the same methods had proach which many viewed as underpinning its practical been employed by those wishing to propagate contrast- manifestation. Some politicians even used the term ear- ing views on the topic is perhaps best explained by the ly on to differentiate between those who were and others need for absolutes in arguing for or against the loosen- who were not “welcome” in Germany. The German mi- ing of immigration policy. The profoundly controversial gration expert Klaus Bade, for instance, states that “wel- and divisive nature of immigration in the public arena come culture refers chiefly to qualified immigrants, who 36 F. Trauner, J. Turton: Welcome culture (Willkommenskultur) I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1

are welcome today as a result of demographic and eco- In overall terms, however, the Austrian grand coali- nomic needs. It decidedly does not refer to those who are tion did not develop the concept of welcome culture into unwelcome, yet we are obliged to accept for reasons of a general concept to enhance the acceptance of Austria EU law” (Bade 2014, 8, own translation). From this per- as a country of immigration. The term “welcome cul- spective, welcome culture may serve more as a means of ture” was used in a narrow sense, mostly in relation to exclusion than as a form of admissibility. tourists or highly skilled migrants. A case in point has Following the increasing usage of the term in politi- been the education ministry’s call to develop the red- cal rhetoric and media discourse, the concept of “wel- white-red card with a view to attracting more top-level come culture” was gradually incorporated into a series researchers. There are expected to be particular con- of concrete measures and official declarations. For in- cepts for Austrian universities, IST Austria and the Aus- stance, the German Federal Office for Migration and trian Academy of Sciences to “anchor welcome culture” Refugees (BAMF) developed a government-endorsed (“Willkommenskultur verankern”) (Bundesministerium definition on “welcome culture”. It suggests that “new für Wissenschaft 2015, 49). migrants are welcomed with an appealing framework and thus recognised in society. Welcome culture extends to all new legal immigrants” (Bundesamt für Migration 4. The impact of the 2015 refugee crisis und Flüchtlinge 2013, 20, own translation). The two crucial insertions are the words “new” and “legal”, which set The 2015 refugee crisis altered the way in which the pre- clear parameters for the target of the new policy. It thus viously technical term “welcome culture” started to be emphasises the importance of adhering to legal norms used in the German and Austrian public debate. and the fact that such a policy constitutes a new chapter in German migration policy targeting future waves 4.1. Germany: transforming the meaning of welcome of migrants. The German migration institute situated culture “welcome culture” within a broader policy framework that aimed at integrating legal migrants in a structured In 2015, the EU witnessed the steepest increase in asylum and uniform fashion. The three-step model consisted of applications thus far – it doubled to over 1.2 million first “pre-integration”, “initial orientation” and “settling in time asylum seekers in the EU-28 (Eurostat 2016). The Germany” (ibid). “Welcome culture” applies solely to the German government under Angela Merkel quickly be- first two phases and thus deals exclusively with the early came a key actor in seeking to define Europe-wide solu- stages of integration into German society. Once these are tions and approaches towards the reception of migrants. complete, a new policy system comes into force, which According to Holmes and Castañeda (2016, 2), “Germany goes under the label of “recognition culture” (“Anerken- played an especially important role in responding to the nungskultur”). This implied that by welcoming migrants crisis in the summer and autumn of 2015, occupying an into the country, there was not an automatic official rec- important political and rhetorical position within media ognition of their status as equivalent to that of other narratives”. Welcome culture, a domestic migration-re- German citizens (ibid). lated concept that just started to take off pre-2015, sud- denly became an internationally recognised reference 3.2. Austria’s more narrow use of the concept point as the refugee crisis dominated headlines. A turning point was the German government’s de- Similar to Germany, the concept of “welcome culture” cision, in the face of an increasing fragmentation of was already in use in Austria before the 2015 refugee cri- member states and the risk of a humanitarian tragedy in sis. In the 2013-2018 “work programme” (“Arbeitspro- Hungary, to suspend the Dublin-III-regulation for Syri- gramm”) of the Austrian coalition government between an migrants on 24th August 2015 (Der Spiegel 2015a). An- the Social Democrats (SPÖ) and the Christian Democrats gela Merkel’s famous statement – “We can do this” (“Wir (ÖVP), the term was used four times in relation to inte- schaffen das”) – signalled that the German government gration measures for migrants in Austria. Most notably, was willing to take a lead and to make domestic efforts in the Austrian government underlined that certain ad- order to compensate for the non-cooperative approach ministrative branches would still exhibit “deficits in the of other EU states. Yet, at this stage, the concept of wel- welcome culture for highly qualified migrants” (Öster- come culture was no longer only fed by the input of po- reichische Bundesregierung 2013, 13, own translation). litical actor, but it also became a popular concept used by This suggests that the Austrian government initially civil society actors and the media. used the concept – like the German one – to make the The role of societal actors: In the autumn of 2015, there country more attractive for highly desirable migrants. was an alignment between what became known as There was no reference to a need for a welcome culture Merkel’s open-door policy and different societal actors. for lower skilled migrants and asylum seekers. Major German entrepreneurs backed a liberal migration F. Trauner, J. Turton: Welcome culture (Willkommenskultur) I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1 37

policy. For instance, the CEO of the German car produc- its rivals in terms of popularity and influence. Its sup- er Daimler Benz, Dieter Zetsche, publically maintained port for Merkel’s open-door policy was therefore of cen- that ‘refugees … [may be the] basis for the next German tral importance in the evolution of the debate surround- economic miracle’ (Euronews 2015). ing migration at the time. Its most emphatic statement Civil society actors – often local volunteers – started of intent came with the headline “We will help” (“Wir to engage to ease the transition of migrants into Ger- helfen”) on August 29th 2015, just as the full scale and many. The principal manifestations of this were found in implications of the refugee crisis for Europe were be- the central train stations of various major transport hubs coming apparent. It then started a campaign under the in the South of the country (most notably in Munich), slogan “We help #refugees welcome”. Such an approach where images of volunteers warmly welcoming scores of came as a surprise for many commentators since the migrants on platforms were taken and diffused around Bild-newspaper had until this stage built itself a repu- the world. They became an international symbol of Ger- tation as a right-wing, anti-immigration media outlet. many’s migration approach at that time (e.g. Connolly Critical voices, however, suggested that the Bild-news- 2015). This was coupled with the founding of various in- paper primarily sought to exploit the popular support dependent local help organisations and action groups, for migrants for its own PR reasons (Jahn/Maus 2015). teamed by volunteers, who sought to ensure that mi- In addition, this stood in contrast to headlines fol- grants were adequately cared for after the arrival. Their lowing the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1989-91 and activities were often referred to as a reflection ofGer- the resultant flow of migrants from Yugoslavia and the man “welcome culture”. This action included the hosting Eastern Bloc into West Germany. At the time, the news- of so-called “solidarity parties” and the re-publication of paper was famed for its militant opposition towards ac- local newspapers in Arabic so as to mitigate some of the cepting this mass movement of people into the country. sense of alienation experienced by the new arrivals. Quinkert and Jäger went so far as to say that, following The concept of welcome culture became part of the fall of the iron curtain, “Bild-newspaper was the a Gramscian “war of position” (Holmes/Castañeda, spark… that set the smouldering fires of xenophobia 2016: 2), through which symbols are used as weapons to ablaze’ (1991, 4, own translation). The newspaper’s editor achieve a desired socio-political goal. This ranged from and publisher, Kai Diekmann, explained this change in the lexical shift from “migrant” to “refugee” in media tack during the next major wave of migration by claim- and political discourse (to illicit greater degrees of coming that the Bild-newspaper only acts as a barometer for passion) to the symbolic mock burial of migrants out- public opinion: “No medium is strong enough to create a side the German Reichstag, staged by protestors wanting culture that is not actually there” (quoted in Crair 2015). to highlight the consequences of inaction by state ac- According to this view, welcome culture has therefore tors in Germany and other EU member states (ibid). The not been a product of a concerted media campaign to power of symbols has been harnessed in depicting both shape public opinion, but rather takes its cue from popu- the crisis itself and the response of the German public lar sentiment on particular issues. By this logic, the me- at home. Images of applause in Munich central station dia can thus not be deemed to be a driving force behind have thus been absorbed into a broader tapestry of sym- the propagation of positive attitudes in this respect. This bols, including those of saturated boats in the Mediter- is in line to what Ruth Wodak and her colleagues suggest. ranean and razor-wire fences being erected across the “Newspapers, after all, write only those kinds of reports EU’s Eastern border. and appeal only to those prejudices which they expect The role of the German media: The German print media, will find a resonance among their readership” (Wodak/ in particular the tabloid press, contributed to promot- Matouschek 1993, 226). ing the concept of welcome culture. In the early autumn months of 2015, many German newspapers expressed 4.2. A comparative view on Austria messages of solidarity and kinship towards those ar- riving in their thousands from the southern neighbour- Austria was deeply involved in the handling of the ref- hood. Compared to equivalent tabloid titles in other EU ugee crises. In September 2015 alone, approximately member states, most notably the United Kingdom, this 200,000 migrants crossed Austria on their way to Ger- represented a divergence from usual patterns of associ- many, with 10,000 staying to apply for asylum (Springer ating migrants with more negative attributes. It there- 2015). During this time, chancellor Werner Faymann fore raises the question of whether such media outlets aligned the approach of the Austrian government to were simply reflecting a groundswell in public opinion Germany. He was outspoken in his criticism of Hun- or aiming to set the agenda themselves in a more active gary and compared Victor Orbán’s approach with the fashion. holocaust (Der Spiegel 2015b). The chancellor sought to With an average circulation of 2.46 million copies position Austria between Germany (associated with an (Kleinsteuber/Thomass n.d.), the tabloid “Bild” eclipses open-door policy) and Hungary (the symbol for a closed- 38 F. Trauner, J. Turton: Welcome culture (Willkommenskultur) I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1

door policy) (see, e.g., interview in Die Krone 2015). In Orbán was particularly vociferous in his condemnation the official discourse of the Social Democrats, solidarity of Merkel’s approach. According to his close associate, and dignity for refugees featured heavily. From the very János Lázár, beginning of the crisis, the Christian democrats, the coalition partner in the government, were more reserved It is the policies of the past 10 years which have led to vis-à-vis the high number of migrants. The two parties, this situation. The leftist approach of the European however, converged in their priority to ease the trans- commission, according to which anybody should be port of the migrants further on to Germany. However, allowed into the territory of the European Union. it rapidly became clear that Austria would not simply The EU has failed to manage the situation and the remain a country of transit. With around 85,000 new problem is the EU itself, which is incapable of pro- asylum applications in 2015, Austria has taken in more tecting its own borders (quoted in Traynor 2015). people than “18 other member states combined”, according to the then Austrian Ministry of the Interior Johan- While not having a similar degree of open opposi- na Mikl-Leitner (quoted in Österreichisches Parlament tion such as the “Visegrad four”, the political rhetoric 2016a). of key Western European leaders differed from Angela Similar to Germany, Austrian civil society actors Merkel’s. For instance, the French president François used the concept of welcome culture in a positively con- Hollande emphasized the need to ensure European har- noted way. “Refugees welcome!” was a slogan widely mony rather than openly advocating more humanitar- used to receive and host transit migrants at the station ian engagement: “Westbahnhof” in Vienna, a main hub for the journey to Munich, and elswehere in Austria. “Welcome culture” The debate is not between the less or more Europe. was voted as the Austrian word of the year 2015. It is between the strengthening of Europe or the end While civil society activities were comparable in of Europe. Yes, the end of Europe, the return to na- Germany and Austria, the Austrian tabloid press has tional borders, the abandonment of the euro (quoted embraced a less pronounced pro-refugee approach at in Karnitschnig 2015) the peak of the crisis. The Austrian Broadcasting Coop- eration ORF launched a support campaign for refugees – Yet, the concept of “welcome culture” has featured out- “Help. Like We Are” (“Helfen. Wie Wir”). No other media side Germany and Austria given that it has been widely outlet adopted such a marked stance. According to Fritz discussed and promoted in social and conventional me- Hausjell, a media specialist, the “Kronen-Zeitung”, Aus- dia. When the migration flows across different parts of tria’s highest circulation newspaper, had an “ambivalent the Mediterranean reached a tipping point in Septem- approach” during the peak of the refugee crisis, oscillat- ber 2015, polls revealed that French public opinion had ing between “alarmist resentments and tolerant empa- swung in favour of increased intakes of newly arrived thy” (quoted in Der Standard 2015, own translation). As migrants, with polling support jumping from 44 per- of October 2015, the Krone reported with more nega- cent to 55 percent in just a week (L’express 2015). This tive undertones on the situation of migrants, verging followed the heated debate in the wake of publishing a on open hostility. A publically salient case was an op-ed picture of a drowned Syrian child on a Turkish beach. of Christoph Biró, editor-in-chief of a regional branch According to Bernard Sananes, head of the Elabe polling of the Kronen-Zeitung, who drew an apocalyptic pic- agency, “there is also the guilty conscience. The images ture of masses of migrants storming local supermarkets coming from Germany have undoubtedly surprised and and committing “aggressive sexual assaults” (Die Presse shaken up French mindsets” (quoted in Love 2015). 2015, own translation). The op-ed caused 40 complaints In the United Kingdom, a wave of different initiatives with the Austrian Press Council and an investigation of inspired by the German approach aimed at promoting the Austrian public prosecution office for incitement the idea of “Refugees are Welcome”. This reached its (ibid). pinnacle at an organised march in Central London on 12th September, in which an estimated 10,000 protes- 4.3. Welcome culture beyond Germany and Austria tors took to the streets in order to demand that the UK government take on a greater share of the burden for When the refugee crisis reached its zenith in September accepting Syrian migrants. A similar event took place in 2015, the political rhetoric across the European Union Copenhagen, with an estimated 30,000 protestors gath- differed sharply. In response to the German chancellor’s ering outside the Danish parliament demanding a more repeated call for a European-wide approach to the refu- pro-active and humanitarian-oriented approach of the gee crisis, the Visegrad group (Poland, Czech Republic, Danish government. In Spain, popular protests contrib- Slovakia and Hungary) united to oppose the concept uted towards ending Prime Minister Rajoy’s initial re- of obligatory quotas. Hungarian Prime Minister Victor sistance to the European Commission’s proposed quota. F. Trauner, J. Turton: Welcome culture (Willkommenskultur) I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1 39

Spanish civil society actors and even football teams such sible for the very attacks on them” (Wodak/Matouschek as Real Madrid engaged and provided financial support 1993: 239). to help newly arrived migrants. Post-Cologne attacks, the public discourse in Ger- The relatively warm reception of migrants at the many – and also in Austria – became considerably more train stations in Munich, Vienna and elsewhere during hostile towards new migrants. This development was early autumn 2015 was therefore not an isolated phe- further accentuated by the 2016 terrorist attacks in Nice, nomenon. Inspired by the German approach and the Ansback, Reutlingen and Berlin, which were partly com- concept of welcome culture, civil society actors were mitted by migrants who had claimed for international active in different parts of (mostly Western) Europe in protection in Europe. Various arson attacks on shelters their reception of new migrants. However, only few gov- of asylum seekers and the rise of the protest movement ernments have taken a similarly pro-refugee approach Pegida and the right-wing party “Alternative for Ger- as the German and, to a lesser degree, the Austrian gov- many” (AfD) reflect the growing, and partly even violent ernments did during these months in late 2015. opposition towards migration. The Austrian government made a complete reversal of its early pro-refugee approach and adopted some “emergency laws” and an 5. The contestation of welcome culture upper ceiling for the number of asylum seekers that may enter the country. If the government perceives an “emer- The pro-refugee approaches of the German and the gency”, i.e. a situation that threatens the maintenance of Austrian governments peaked in September and Octo- law and order and public security, asylum seekers may ber 2015. These policies found support with the German be refused entry after an accelerated procedure directly and Austrian electorates at that time and were mirrored at the border (Österreichisches Parlament 2016b). by a wave of civil society activities. The approach, how- Furthermore, Germany has adopted more restrictive ever, has never been devoid of contestation. Right-wing policies vis-à-vis newly arrived migrants. Two asylum politicians tended to have a critical look at the influx packages adopted on 1 August 2015 and in early 2016 de- of migrants and took up the term “welcome culture” as clared the Western Balkan states, Algeria, Morocco and a means to highlight that they disassociate themselves Tunisia as “Safe Third Countries”. Asylum seekers from from a pro-refugee approach. A case in point has been a these newly defined “Safe Third Countries” are brought parliamentary inquiry (“Dringliche Anfrage”) submitted to special reception facilities and their application pro- by the Freedom Party (FPÖ) in October 2015. Under the cessed in an accelerated manner. The chances of receiv- heading “Austria abolishes itself” (“Österreich schafft ing asylum if the applicant’s country is deemed “safe” sich ab”), they criticise welcome culture as a “vogue term”. are low (Der Spiegel 2016). Germany has also had a lead According to them, anyone daring to express criticism in negotiating the EU-Turkey deal of March 2016 that on it would be stigmatised as a “fascist” (Österreichisch- allows for the return of all migrants irrespective their es Parlament 2015). Whereas this kind of criticism was legal claims if they enter Greece illegally by sea. In re- still the exception rather than the norm in autumn 2015, sponse to two terror attacks in Bavaria in July 2016, the this changed over time. The public attitude eventually German government further toughened its approach became more hostile towards the reception and integra- towards refugees, providing for instance facilitated de- tion of new migrants. A reflection of this development portation opportunities for newly arrived individuals was how the media started to depict migrants. suspected of having militant sympathies (Chazan 2016). According to critical discourse analysts (e.g. Wodak/ In this context, migration-opposing actors have in- Matouschek 1993), the principal tool of the media in creasingly used the term “welcome culture” to denounce choosing to present either a positive or a negative de- the pro-refugee camp and to push for restrictive poli- piction of migration is the exploitation of a so-called cies. “Welcome culture” became a wording central for “victim complex”. At its most rudimentary, this involves the discourse of right-wing populists, comparable to a basic choice as to whether to cast local populations or the earlier use of “do-gooder” (“Gutmensch”). Austria’s migrants as the victims of displacement. In the case of Freedom Party repeatedly used the term in the context welcome culture, the clearest pivot for this was the cov- of the presidential elections of spring 2016. Alexander erage afforded to the Cologne attacks of 31st December van der Bellen, the presidential candidate of the Green 2015, where media focus began gradually to shift from Party, was presented as a “darling” of the welcome com- migrants/refugees as victims to migrants/refugees as munity (“Darling der Willkommensklatscher”) (FPÖ perpetrators, with some elements of German society 2016a). The Freedom Party advocated an end to the moving in the other direction (Steinmetz 2016). When “welcome culture” and for a start of a “return culture” employed negatively therefore, “the ‘victim-victimizer’ (FPÖ 2016b). For its new party platform (“Grundsatz- reversal represents an extreme case of the scapegoat programme”) adopted on 1 May 2016, the German Al- strategy, since the victims of prejudice are held respon- ternative for Germany (AfD) explicitly used the term 40 F. Trauner, J. Turton: Welcome culture (Willkommenskultur) I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1

“welcome culture” in relation to unborn and newborn Germany, the concept influenced public debates and was children (Alternative für Deutschland 2016, 31). In their used by pro-refugee actors in a number of other mem- view, if there were a more welcoming attitude towards ber states, most notably in Austria. these groups, less migration would be needed. Accord- The German and Austrian governments – and the ing to the AfD’s logic, a lower number of abortions public at large – have become more hostile towards would lead to more Germans and, as a consequence, to the arrival of new migrants as of late 2015/early 2016. fewer demographic pressures. In this changing environment, the notion of “welcome The discourse has also shifted in the mainstream culture” has been increasingly captured by actors op- parties. Thomas de Maizière, the German minister posing further migration, notably from the (far-)right. of interior, has popularised the term “arrival culture” They have framed a liberal migration policy as a failure (“Ankommenskultur”). De Maziére called for a stron- and have used the concept to denounce the pro-refugee ger “arrival culture” of migrants given that they would camp. Similarly, politicians from mainstream parties “go on strike when they dislike their accommodation” have gone on to distance themselves from the concept of and “cause trouble, when they don’t like the food” (see welcome culture. Thomas de Maizière, the German min- e.g. interview in the ZDF 2015). With this discourse, the ister of interior, has been a case in point by increasingly minister contributes to an “othering” of the migrants focusing on the need for an “arrival culture”. According and presents them as undermining public order and se- to this perspective, the success of integration depends curity (Neef 2016). By highlighting that migrants have again first and foremost on the migrant and less so on to respect German values and norms, the main respon- the receiving society. sibility for a successful integration is again shifted to What are the implications of these findings? The dis- the migrants. Thomas de Mazière is not the only one course on welcome culture reflects the struggle of both embarking on this discourse. The lack of an “arrival German and Austrian society to define community and culture” has become a frequent complaint in national belonging in a rapidly changing geopolitical context. The and right-wing populist media outlets (ibid). In a more question as to what extent – or, even, whether – Germa- moderate variant, the concepts of “welcome culture” ny and Austria are and should be countries of immigra- and “arrival culture” are presented as complementary tion has implicitly informed the debate on welcome cul- (Hartnigk 2016). ture. It explains the ferocity with which the arguments have clashed. These findings speak and inform scholarly research on the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion in 6. Conclusions European societies (e.g. Ataç/Rosenberger 2012; Rosen- berger/Stadlmair 2014) – a debate that is not likely to This article has investigated the emergence and evolu- lose any of its relevance in the years to come. tion of the discourse on welcome culture. This discourse did not come out of the blue. The German political elite has been aware of the urgent demographic pressures, Literature as a result of a rapidly ageing population. The concept of “welcome culture” was an element of a wider effort Alternative für Deutschland (2016). Grundsatzprogramm to advance integration and assimilation policies under der Alternative für Deutschland. Leitantrag der the Chancellorship of Angela Merkel and to enhance Bundesprogrammkommission und des Bundes- the acceptance of Germany as a country of immigration vorstandes. Vorlage zum Bundesparteitag am post-2005. The Austrian government did not develop 30.4.2016 und 01.05.2016. the concept in such a pronounced way but the “refugees Ataç, Ilker/Sieglinde Rosenberger (eds.) (2012). Politik der welcome”-movement worked transnationally and used Inklusion und Exklusion, Vienna. the same symbols and strategies as in Germany. Bade, Klaus (2014). Kulturrassismus und Willkommens- From its origins as a reference point in some official kultur, Heinrich Böll Stiftung, available at: http:// government documents, welcome culture has gradu- kjbade.de/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/2014-12-12_ ally come to constitute a central pillar of Germany’s re- Potsdam-Kurzfassung.pdf (last accessed 12 January sponse to the refugee crisis. This reached its pinnacle in 2017). September 2015, when the symbolically-loaded imagery Berliner Morgenpost (2010). „Wir brauchen eine Willkom- of cheering crowds at German train stations was cou- menskultur“, in: morgenpost.de, 8 August 2010. pled with Angela Merkel’s statement “We can do this” Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (2013). Willkom- (“Wir schaffen das”). At that time, the notion of welcome mens- und Anerkennungskultur. Handlungsemp- culture entered mainstream public and media discourse, fehlungen und Praxisbeispiele. Abschlussbericht including the German tabloid press. While the most sa- Runder Tisch „Aufnahmegesellschaft“, Nürnberg. lient manifestations of welcome culture took place in F. Trauner, J. Turton: Welcome culture (Willkommenskultur) I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1 41

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Authors

Florian Trauner (1978) is a Research Professor for Euro- pean studies at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel and a Visit- ing Professor at the College of Europe, Natolin Campus. His research interests include EU justice and home affairs (internal and external dimension), dynamics of EU decision-making, and EU-Western Balkans relations. Among his recent publications are ‘Policy Change in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: how EU institutions matter’ (Routledge 2015, with Ariadna Ripoll Servent) and ‘Asylum Policy: the EU’s “crises” and the looming policy regime failure’ (Journal of European In- tegration, 2016).

Jocelyn Turton (1991) has recently completed an MA in European Interdisciplinary Studies at the College of Eu- rope, Natolin. Whilst studying there, he majored in ‘The EU as an external actor’, with a focus on issues of Migra- tion, Transatlantic Relations and EU-Russia relations. Before this, he graduated with First Class Honours in Modern Languages (French and German) from the Uni- versity of Oxford. Research Article

Part of the problem or of the solution? The involvement of religious associations in immigrant integration policy

Astrid Mattes1, *

1 Department of Political Science, University of Vienna, Austria * E-Mail: [email protected]

Abstract Across Europe we see faith-based organizations (FBOs) getting involved in the policy field of immigrant integration. The interweaving of the policy fields of religion politics and immigrant integration is particularly delicate in systems of religion- state cooperation. Here, FBOs and state actors build on each other to fulfil certain tasks. This paper explores how FBOs are involved in the field of immigrant integration and which techniques of government are being used. Drawing on empirical case studies from Austria, Germany and Switzerland, the paper shows that religious communities fulfil multiple roles as civil society actors, as religious representatives or as migrant associations. While similarities occur due to comparable structures and institutions, observed differences are the consequence of different constellations of suspicion and trust between FBOs and state actors.

Keywords Immigrant integration politics, religious diversity, governance, governmentality, Islam in Europe

Teil des Problems oder Teil der Lösung? Die Einbindung von Religionsgemeinschaften in Integrationspolitiken

Zusammenfassung In vielen Staaten Europas lässt sich eine zunehmende Einbindung religiöser Verbände in das Feld der Integrationspolitik beobachten. Diese Einbindung ist insbesondere in so genannten Systemen hinkender Trennung relevant, in denen Staaten eng mit Religionsgemeinschaften zusammenarbeiten. Dieser Beitrag geht der Frage nach, wie religiöse Verbände in Integ- rationspolitiken eingebunden sind und welche Techniken des Regierens dabei zum Tragen kommen. Empirische Fallstudien zu österreichischen, deutschen und schweizerischen Integrationspolitiken zeigen, dass religiöse Verbände multiple Rollen erfüllen: Sie agieren als zivilgesellschaftliche Akteure, als religiöse Repräsentanten und als MigrantInnenorganisationen. Während sich Ähnlichkeiten aus den vergleichbaren institutionellen Settings ergeben, können Unterschiede als Konsequenz unterschiedlicher Konstellationen von Misstrauen und Vertrauen zwischen religiösen und staatlichen Akteuren verstanden werden.

Schlüsselwörter Integrationspolitik, religiöse Diversität, Governance, Gouvermentalität, Islam in Europa

Acknowledgement I want to thank Sieglinde Rosenberger for her helpful comments on a previous version of this article. Her analytical way of thinking, her ability to be critical beyond the sake of criticism and her fine sense for the issues of our time are always inspiring.

The author has declared that no competing interests exist.

March 31, 2017 I innsbruck university press, Innsbruck OZP – Austrian Journal of Political Science I ISSN 2313-5433 I http://oezp.at/ Vol. 46, issue 1 I DOI 10.15203/ozp.1589.vol46iss1 OPEN ACCESS 44 A. Mattes: Part of the problem or of the solution? I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1

1 Introduction The paper proceeds as follows: First, the scholarly debate on immigrant integration and religious plural- Migration inflows are one of the main reasons for reli- ism will be reviewed to name areas of involvement of gious diversification in contemporary European societies. FBOs identified in the literature. Second, the theoret- At the same time, the relatively young policy field of im- ical framework of this paper will be presented, draw- migrant integration became a central stage for political ing on the governance of diversity literature (2), the debates on religion, especially minority religions (Brunn notion of governmentality and the benefits of com- 2012). Reasons for this focus on religion are manifold and bining those concepts (3). This is followed by a brief issues range from identity politics (Mattes 2015) and secu- case description (4) and an overview of material and rity debates (Rodatz/Scheuring 2011) to practical aspects methods (5) for the empirical study presented in sec- of state-religion relations (Klinge 2012). As a result, these tion 6, which discusses the empirical results against policies address faith-based organizations (FBOs)1 as part the backdrop of the theoretical framework. of the policy problem and at the same time involve them in attempts at solutions. While FBOs are often the subject of political debate, they then become actors in the field of im- 2. Governing diversity: linkages of immigrant migrant integration. Considering the “return of religion” integration and religion to the political sphere (Casanova 2013; Foret/Itçaina 2012), immigrant integration is a fruitful area to understand how Immigrant integration and religious diversity are and why religious associations become increasingly in- two policy fields that have been subject to intensive volved in the politics of secular states. research for about two decades and the body of liter- This paper is guided by the question how faith-based ature keeps growing. Immigrant integration is a rela- organizations are involved in immigrant integration poli- tively young policy field, with often changing struc- cy. To understand differences between the studied cases, I tures (Rosenberger/Gruber 2016). The involvement ask which discursive governing techniques can be identi- of religion in this policy field is even younger (Allievi fied within the roles religious associations fulfill. Drawing 2005), but became a central aspect of many European on document analysis and semi-structured interviews with immigrant integration policies. Other immigrant in- religious and bureaucratic actors, the empirical basis of tegration issues, such as the inclusion into the labour this study allows a thick description of the involvement of market or questions of language proficiency and FBOs in Austrian, German and Swiss immigrant integra- education, target the individual level and primarily tion policies. The paper analyses processes of governance concern newcomers. Religion, by contrast, is a cat- of religion in immigrant integration policies, followed by a egory of “deep diversity” (Galston 1995) which liberal critical reflection on the findings through the lens of gov- states tolerate per definition. Therefore, as Rogers ernmentality. Brubaker argues, religious diversity has strongest Findings reveal that faith-based organizations fulfil implications for the political accommodation of dif- multiple roles in the field of immigrant integration policy. ference (2013, 1). Depending on the specific religion and a country’s gover- Within the massive literature on these implica- nance of diversity, they are involved as civil society actors, tions, we can identify three different areas where as religious representatives or as migrant associations. The FBOs become involved in immigrant integration comparative perspective identifies clear differences in -im policy. I subsume these three areas under the terms migrant integration policy between Germany, Austria and accommodation and establishment, adjustment and Switzerland, particularly with regards to Islam. Austria in- improvement, and implementation and enforcement. volves its recognized Islamic religious community mainly By establishment and accommodation I refer to multi- as a religious representative, German Islamic associations level processes, comprised of “constitutional, legal, are most broadly involved and fulfil multiple roles, while political, cultural, administrative” aspects (Bader Swiss Islamic associations are hardly involved at all. This 2007a, 202). Although religion politics is a separate can be understood by looking at the governmentality of re- policy field in most states, equipped with its own in- ligion in the context of immigrant integration: The notion stitutions and bureaucratic specialists, the broader of government through suspicion and trust (see Ragazzi establishment of minority religions has become cen- 2016), which is linked to discourses on Islam and migration, tral to many immigrant integration policies. As Brunn enables to understand different outcomes in three similar has shown, this is the case in laicist republican France cases. as well as in multicultural Britain and ethnic Germa- ny (2012). Studies on the establishment of religions 1 Religious associations and faith based organizations are used syno- focus on the ways of accommodation (Fetzer/Soper nymously to refer to religious organizations independent from their legal status. Religious communities is used to refer to religious groups 2004; Mattes et al. 2016), the processes of negotiation recognized in law. for establishment (Klinge 2012; Maussen 2009) and A. Mattes: Part of the problem or of the solution? I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1 45

normative questions of extent and limits for minority (2007a, 228f.), whereby FBOs aiming at official recogni- religious claims (Tatari 2009; Mookherjee 2010). tion and broader establishment face a trade-off between I use the terms adjustment and improvement to refer to privileges and political influences. Negotiation for es- state attempts to influence religious practices, beliefs or tablishment further requires a certain organizational structures. Turner wrote in this context about a “strategy structure and forces FBOs to develop effective represen- of upgrading religion” that states apply to make certain tation and leadership. religions compatible with liberal democratic regimes State actors have several interests in influencing re- (2007, 124). Political influences on faith-based organiza- ligious associations. First, systems of religion-state co- tions may take the form of legal regulations (e.g. laws on operation build on privileged partnerships with at least religious symbols and unwanted practices), soft policy church-like structured FBOs. And while all liberal states measures (e.g. campaigns and various forms of dialogue) have “to ‘recognize’ religion administratively and/or in or of laying down conditions for cooperation with the legal or jurisprudential practice” (ibid., 226), these states respective FBOs. Recent research about adjustment and are confronted with demands for considerable adapta- improvement of FBOs focuses on controversial practices tion. Second, state actors aim at guaranteeing security and beliefs discursively related to Islam, such as forced and the functioning of public order and use their influ- marriage and honour killing (Korteweg/Triadafilopoulos ence on FBOs for policing and control (Haverig 2012). 2013), or more general questions of values (Mattes 2015) Third, and inherently related to immigrant integration, and security (Haverig 2012). The structures of FBOs are is the need for agencies to implement policy measures. another central aspect of adjustment and improvement, As discussed before in reference to implementation and as policies often aim at steering community formation enforcement, FBOs are suitable structures to provide among minorities (Lange/Schimank 2004). services, to spread information and to enforce non-le- The third area of involvement, the participation of gally binding directives by means of social control. FBOs in immigrant integration policy projects, is re- Long-established FBOs are relevant actors in the ferred to as implementation and enforcement. Levent Tez- field that are neither in need of approval nor subject to can describes how FBOs become “integration agencies” intense political influence. The still growing focus on re- when policy measures build on “pastoral” elements ligion within the field of immigrant integration poten- (2007, 65). Religious authorities as role models and the tially widens their scope of action and legitimizes their training of multipliers within FBOs make use of the political influence. Both minority religious associations perceived moral authority of religious leaders (Aslan/ and state actors rely on their support in pursuing their Windisch 2012). Authors observe “governing through goals (Baldas 2012). communities” especially in terms of security politics (Ragazzi 2016). Religious infrastructures are also frequently involved in general integration policy imple- 3. Governance and governmentality: How to under- mentation. This is primarily the case with long-estab- stand religion in immigrant integration policy lished religious welfare organizations, which have a long history in providing services to guest workers and The description of actors and their activities follows the refugees, both independently and on behalf of public logic of governance analysis, an approach central to the authorities (Klee 1972). In contrast, the involvement scholarly debate on religious diversity (Bader 2007b; of minority FBOs in policy implementation and in the Bramadat/Koenig 2009; Griera 2016). While governance provision of general services to migrants is often rather has become a fashionable and widely applied term, its symbolical (Thränhardt 2009). meanings differ from one research area to another. For The areas in which the involvement of FBOs in in- the field of religious diversity, governance usually refers tegration policies has been observed – accommodation to internal and external implications of various forms of and establishment, adjustment and improvement, im- regulating religion. Much broader than the concept of plementation and enforcement – are highly interrelated. government, governance includes “those mechanisms A rough differentiation between state actors, minority of action coordination that provide active intentional religious associations and established FBOs should help capacities to regulate, including co-regulation and self- to understand these relations. regulation” (Bader 2007b, 30). Typical research questions Accommodation and establishment is clearly a goal ask how state authorities, other political actors and gov- for many minority FBOs. Especially in systems of reli- ernmental/legal regimes influence organized religion gion-state cooperation, legal establishment brings eco- and vice versa. Thus, governance perspectives in the field nomic, political and legal benefits. The involvement in of religious diversity are not limited to governmental ac- public policies also legitimizes associations (internally tion. Analytically though, it implies the perspective of and externally) and allows to widen their scope of ac- a “governor” addressing a policy problem, although not tion. Here Bader describes an “autonomy dilemma” necessarily impersonated by the government. 46 A. Mattes: Part of the problem or of the solution? I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1

This perspective leads to one of the strongest points 4. Three similar cases: Religion and immigrant of criticism of governance approaches. As Renate integration in Austria, Germany and Switzerland Mayntz argues, all governance approaches start from the (implicit) idea, that actors are interested in solving In terms of immigration history, post-war Germany, a (real or perceived) policy problem and set actions ac- Austria and Switzerland share many similarities. Guest cordingly (2005). Other motives are largely ignored, worker regimes were established and workers from so governance approaches often suffer from a - “rela Eastern and Southern Europe came on a rotation prin- tive blindness towards phenomena of power and rule” ciple. None of the countries anticipated the significant (Höppner/Nagl 2009, 9). An approach that explicitly number of people who decided to stay permanently, aims at understanding non-direct forms of power and as neither Austria nor Germany and Switzerland saw underlying mechanisms is the concept of governmen- themselves as countries of immigration. Restrictive mi- tality. Introduced by Michel Foucault (1977/2000), gov- gration and integration policies were a consequence of ernmentality is a system of thinking of “how to conduct the denied acceptance of the permanence of migration conduct” (Gordon 1991, 48). Nikolas Rose, who pursued inflows. The three countries are classified as restrictive the thought of governmentality, emphasizes that “the migration regimes and “ethno-cultural” models of citi- activity of government is inextricably bound up with zenship (Bertossi/Duyvendak 2012). Migration inflows the activity of thought”, that the analysis of processes also originated mainly in the same countries, namely of governing requires “attention to the conditions un- Turkey and former Yugoslavia (in addition to inflows der which it becomes possible to consider certain things from EU member states). to be true” (Rose 1999, 7ff). Similarly to Carol Bacchi’s Immigrant integration politics in the countries under practical “What’s the problem – Approach” (2009), a observation developed in similar manners, despite cer- governmentality perspective is interested in the ques- tain decisive differences, mostly stemming from varying tion how a situation is identified and becomes perceived degrees of federalism or centralization respectively. In as a policy problem in need of a solution. While gover- all three countries policy makers at national level did not nance aims at a realist analysis of relations and regula- make any efforts for long-term integration up until the tions between political actors in a field, governmentality 1990s (Ruedin et al. 2015; Bommes/Kolb 2012; Mourão aims to understand the emergence of certain “regimes Permoser/Rosenberger 2012). When immigrant integra- of truth” (Rose 1999, 19) and the resulting ways of exer- tion evolved as a policy field, policy responsibility was cising power. spread across different governmental actors and offices. While mapping actors and their roles within a field In the 2000s, claims for a re-location of the cross-sec- follows the logic of governance analysis, it is the per- tional policy agenda to a discrete governmental office spective of governmentality that allows critically ques- for integration were frequently heard: Germany shifted tioning the terms of their involvement. As Rose puts it, policy responsibility for immigrant integration to a State governmentality is “diagnostic rather than descriptive” Minister in the Federal Chancellery in 2005. In Austria, (ibid.). Here lies the strength of combining governance the State Secretariat for Integration, founded in 2011 and and governmentality perspectives: scholars can apply located in the Ministry of interior, was the first institu- diagnostic practices in addition to thick descriptions of tionalization of immigrant integration at governmental their cases. This paper aims to do so by applying a two- level. In 2013 this responsibility shifted to the Ministry step approach: First, processes of governance of religion of Foreign Affairs, Integration and Europe. In Switzer- in immigrant integration policies are analysed. This is land the Federal Office for Migration became a State followed by a critical reflection on the findings through Secretariat for Migration in 2014. The changing institu- the lens of governmentality, taking into account dis- tional setting was accompanied (and partially preceded) cursive techniques of governing. As many authors have by the development of coordinated policy programmes shown (Flynn 2002; Corbridge 2005; Shore 2011), the at national level. Germany started this process in 2005 combination of governance and governmentality – two with an Integration Summit that resulted in the publi- approaches to analytically capture the activity of gov- cation of a National Integration Plan (NIP). Austria con- erning – can be fruitfully combined. sulted experts and stakeholders in an Integration Plat- This combination of theoretical approaches is ap- form in 2007, and introduced both the Expert’s Council plied in a study on three similar cases. The following sec- for Integration and the National Action Plan for Integra- tion introduces and contextualizes the cases of Austrian, tion (NAP) in 2010. Swiss immigrant integration policy German and Swiss immigrant integration policies. at federal level started in 2001 with so-called Focus Pro- grammes for integration projects. The legal basis for current policies is the Foreigners Act of 2005. Following a 2010 governmental report, immigrant integration policy was modified into a new federal coordination strategy. A. Mattes: Part of the problem or of the solution? I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1 47

In terms of religion-state regimes, the countries The collection of policy documents comprises na- are classified as “systems of cooperation” (Minkenberg tional integration policy plans, major documents re- 2003), allowing for special treatment of selected, of- leased by integration advisory councils, the policy ficially recognized religious communities. In Austria output of platforms specifically dealing with the inte- official recognition is regulated by federal law (RGBl. gration of Islam and lists of publicly funded integration Nr. 68/1874 1867), while in Germany and Switzerland policy projects issued between 2005 and 2015, a period Länder and Kantone (with the exception of laic Geneva that covers most major developments in the policy field. and Neuchâtel, see Winzeler 2009, 77 ff.) grant recogni- A detailed listing of documents can be found in the Ap- tion to religious associations in accordance with their pendix 1. Interviews were conducted with high-level respective constitutional settings. Austria, which has a bureaucrats from governmental offices concerned with long history of being inclusive towards religion, has the immigrant integration, members of integration councils broadest establishment of religious communities (17 na- and representatives of Muslim associations and Chris- tionwide, see BKA 2016). For example, recognition of Is- tian churches (see Appendix 2). lam was granted as early as 1912 during the Austro-Hun- The empirical results presented in the following sec- garian monarchy (Mattes/Rosenberger 2014). Official tion stem from the qualitative analysis of documents recognition of religious communities in Switzerland and interview contents, coded in a two-stage coding and Germany varies between their federal states, reach- procedure. First, actors, their relations and positions ing from more inclusive settings (such as Hamburg and within the policy field, as well as their occurrence in Bremen in Germany or Basel in Switzerland) to states different immigrant integration policy contexts, were that only grant that recognition to Christian churches coded based on a codebook derived from literature on (such as Schwyz or Wallis in Switzerland). With the governance of religious diversity (Bader 2007a). In a German Islam Conference (Deutsche Islam Konferenz, second step, subject constructions and discursive strate- DIK), the Ministry of the Interior created a federal body gies were captured by a codebook following Carol Bac- for the coordination, negotiation and collaboration with chi’s What’s the problem-Approach (Bacchi 2009) (see Islamic associations in 2006. This platform had two de- Appendix 3). clared goals, the broad establishment of Islam in Ger- many and the integration of Muslim immigrants and their descendants. While Austrian and Swiss govern- 6. Integrating religion, religions that integrate? ments also installed dialogue platforms for the interac- Empirical results from immigrant integration tion with Muslim representatives, neither the Dialogue politics Forum Islam, initiated by the Austrian State Secretariat for Integration, nor the Swiss governmental initative a) Mapping the field: Structures of involvement Muslim-Dialogue became a lasting element of integration or religion politics. The document analysis focused on the involvement of To sum up, in a long list of similarities we can iden- FBOs and allowed identifying structures of policy in- tify two major differences: First, Austria has – unlike volvement: religions as stakeholders (members of inte- Germany and Switzerland – granted official recognition gration boards and councils), integration fora specific to to Islam and also most other minority religions. Second, religion, religions in policy development and religions Swiss federalism is most pronounced, which results in in policy measures; (see Fig. 1) a smaller scope of both immigrant integration policies In Austria structural involvement is limited. Boards and politics of religious diversity on the national level. and councils rarely involve religious representatives. In the Integration Council the established Christian welfare organizations Caritas (Catholic) and Diakonie (Protestant) 5. Methods and material for the analysis of religion are listed as NGOs with other large non-religious initia- in immigrant integration policies tives. As described above, in 2012/13 Austria had a forum for dialogue with Islam. This was however transformed The empirical study builds on immigrant integration into a broader religious dialogue that included all recog- policy documents at national level and qualitative semi- nized religions, established in the Federal Chancellery structured interviews with policy-makers and religious (BKA), no longer concerned with immigrant integration representatives. These materials are used to a) map the (see DOC AT10). Caritas and Diakonie were also involved in structures of involvement of FBOs in immigrant inte- the Steering Group for the development of the NAP. So gration policy, b) describe the multiple roles of FBOs in called “expert talks” also involved religious actors from immigrant integration policy, and c) critically reflect on recognized Christian-Orthodox, Jewish and Islamic the discursive techniques and subject constructions im- communities in this policy process, even though their plied in the involvement of FBOs. involvement was limited to the field of inter-cultural 48 A. Mattes: Part of the problem or of the solution? I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1

Figure 1: Structures of policy involvement

Stakeholder: AT: Integration Council DE: Integration Council FBOs as members in councils, boards, etc. CH: Confederate Commission for Questions of Migration (EKM) Target group Muslims: AT: Islam Dialogue

Integration fora specific to religion Dialogue of Religions at Federal Chancellery DE: German Islam Conference

CH: Muslim-Dialogue

Policy development: AT: Steering group on NAP

FBOs involved in policy formulation Expert groups on NAP DE: Integration summits CH: no involvement at national level (aside from EKM) Policy projects: AT: State funded integration projects (BMI/SSI/BMEIA)

FBOs carry out integration projects NAP measures DE: State funded integration projects (BAMF)

NIP self-commitments CH: Programmes of national relevance (EKM)

Cantonal integration programs (EJPD/SEM) dialogue (see DOC AT4). The listed examples of policy welfare organizations carry a large proportion of immi- measures within the National Action Plan for Integra- grant integration projects (around 15 percent). Around tion include some implemented by Catholic, Protes- two percent of immigrant integration projects are car- tant and Islamic associations (see DOC AT7). Still, the ried out by Islamic associations (see DOC DE12). big Christian welfare organizations are most involved In Switzerland an advisory board at national level, in policy measures. In 2015, for example, Caritas and the so-called Eidgenössische Kommission für Migra- Diakonie carried out about 20 percent of all integration tionsfragen (EKM), includes representatives from the projects funded by the Ministry for Integration (see DOC Catholic and Protestant churches as well as an Imam. AT14). The recognized Jewish and Islamic communities A forum for Islam-specific dialogue with state authori- received occasional funding for carrying out immigrant ties (Muslim-Dialog) was initiated in 2010, but did not integration projects. last very long. In 2011 the federal government decided In Germany stakeholder involvement varied. Be- to end this platform and limit dialogue activities to the tween 2009 and 2014, an integration council included level of cantons. This is a typical feature of Swiss im- representatives of Christian-Orthodox, Jewish, Islamic migrant integration policy: National immigrant inte- and other FBOs (see Doc DE2). A central way of involv- gration policy activities are limited by a strong sense of ing religion in German immigrant integration politics subsidiarity. Also, immigrant integration policy devel- is the German Islam Conference (DIK). Established in opment is mostly left to cantonal structures. At national 2006, its mandate was renewed for the 3rd time in 2014. level no deliberative policy development processes take During the three periods (analogous to the governmen- place, therefore there is also no direct involvement of tal terms), the DIK changed its structure, its participant religions in national policy formulation. Of the projects composition and its priorities. Some of the Islamic asso- (co-)financed by national agencies a small proportion is ciations involved in the DIK were also part of immigrant carried out by Christian associations, most prominent integration policy development. The so-called integra- among them the Catholic Caritas (see DOC CH14). Un- tions summits that prepare the work on the National like in Austria and Germany, many integration projects Integration Plan (2007) and its succeeding documents are carried out by private foundations, universities or included Islamic, Christian-Orthodox, Catholic as well companies focused on social work. Faith-based organi- as Protestant and Jewish representatives. Regarding the zations play a smaller role overall. However, this is only involvement of FBOs in policy measures, the structure true of the national level. Cantonal immigrant integra- resembles the Austrian setting: Established Christian tion funding was not analysed systematically. A. Mattes: Part of the problem or of the solution? I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1 49

To sum up: Established Christian welfare organiza- velopment of new structures for Muslims in Germany, tions are most strongly involved in all three countries’ more comparable to those of the established Christian immigrant integration policies. Also, Islam has a specif- churches (INT DE6). Religious practices and beliefs are ic role, as the three states have established fora to debate subject to adjustment and improvement, when Muslim the integration of Islam. Other FBOs are only occasion- associations are required to commit to common values ally involved in the structures of immigrant integration. (e.g. DOC DE21), confirm their loyalty to the constitu- These observations can be further specified when we in- tion (e.g. DOC DE7) and condemn practices like forced clude the areas of immigrant integration that FBOs are marriage (e.g. DOC DE4). Swiss immigrant integration involved in. policies hardly refer to religious structures and contents. Unwanted practices like forced marriage are ad- b) FBOs’ multiple roles: areas of involvement dressed extensively, but not in relation to religion. The Swiss Muslim-Dialogue report, however, begins with Within these structures of involvement, FBOs are as- the dissociation of Muslim participants from terror, cribed and fulfil multiple roles. From the literature we radical thoughts, ghettoization and human rights viola- know the previously discussed three different areas of tions (see DOC CH17). Structures were influenced only at religious involvement: accommodation and establish- cantonal level, and often indirectly, as an example from ment, adjustment and improvement, implementation Kanton Zürich shows: Here an association wanted an Is- and enforcement. lamic cemetery. When the cantonal government refused Accommodation and establishment is not so much of to negotiate with a single association, the VIOZ, a can- an issue in Austria, where official recognition is granted tonal umbrella organization for Zurich Islamic associa- to all major religious communities, including Islam. tions evolved (INT CH3, INT CH5). Clearly this is also the reason for the quick end of the Implementation and enforcement of immigrant in- Austrian Islam-specific forum. When issues of estab- tegration policy via FBOs is the third area of involve- lishment and accommodation are discussed, then rarely ment identified from the literature. In Austria general in the context of immigrant integration. The negotiation integration projects (not related to religion) are only of Islam law in 2015 states an exception: Here, the Min- implemented by Christian FBOs. The rare projects car- ister for Integration, Sebastian Kurz, publicly appeared ried out by Jewish and Islamic FBOs are for the most part as governmental actor in charge (OTS 2015). Policy re- either about their respective religion or about inter-reli- sponsibility for religion-state relations, however, lies gious dialogue and tolerance. In Germany non-Christian with the Kultusamt, located in the Federal Chancellery. FBOs are also implementing general integration policy In Germany establishment and accommodation, espe- measures. The Turkish Islamic Union for Religious Af- cially of Islam, are at the centre of integration politics. fairs (DITIB) for example, is one of the organizations The DIK also structurally combines immigrant integra- that offers the obligatory integration courses for- new tion and accommodation of Islam. Although a respon- comers (see DOC DE12). Islamic associations were also sibility of the Länder, this platform of the national level involved in the sample measures listed in the NIP, refer- debates preconditions for establishment, often in rela- ring among others to projects against forced marriage tion to issues of immigrant integration. In Switzerland, and domestic violence. Projects aimed at the integration where legal establishment and most aspects of accom- of Muslims and Jews are even declared funding priori- modation are cantonal responsibilities, accommodation ties (DOC DE17). In Switzerland the role of religions in is hardly negotiated at federal level. In the few instances the implementation and enforcement of immigrant in- where this is the case, accommodation is clearly inter- tegration policies is generally limited. Of the projects woven with immigrant integration, as in the case of the that involve religion, most are carried by established Muslim-Dialogue. Christian associations and have a general focus. We find instances of adjustment and improvement The combination of structures of involvement and of religious structures and contents in all three coun- areas of involvement allows differentiating between the tries, almost exclusively in reference to Islam. In Austria various roles of FBOs in immigrant integration policies. this is not a dominant pattern of immigrant integration policy, but it occurred in the context of the Dialogue Fo- • Civil society actors: FBOs are responsible for the rum Islam, where common values were briefly debated implementation of general integration policy goals – (see DOC AT16), and in the above mentioned Islam Law, such as language proficiency or social work. As civil negotiated by the Minister for Integration. The Islam society actors they might also become involved in Law significantly changes existing structures and- ex integration councils as stakeholders alongside other plicitly states that “There must be a positive basic at- NGOs. titude towards society and state” (Islam Law 2015, § 4. • Religious representatives: FBOs are involved as reli- (3)). In Germany the DIK aimed at contributing to the de- gious representatives where they serve as represen- 50 A. Mattes: Part of the problem or of the solution? I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1

tatives of the religious needs of believers alongside ating partners. Our interviews, however, did not confirm other FBOs. Here FBOs might also negotiate accom- this. Swiss (INT CH1, INT CH2) and German (INT DE5) modation and establishment. As religious represen- bureaucrats stated that these attempts are reactions to tatives they are asked to implement integration proj- public and political discourses. All Muslim interviewees ects on religion specific issues (e.g. inter-religious emphasized their frustration about repeated demands to dialogue). publicly declare themselves as not illiberal. The thoughts • Migrant organizations: FBOs are involved as rep- behind these demands, namely the questionable loyalty resentatives of an immigrated community, respon- of Muslims to rule of law and liberal norms, serves as a sible for the integration of their members. Projects discursively produced “regime of truth” (Rose 1999). that involve FBOs in this role aim at the integration Following the logic of this regime of truth, trust and of their group members, often through practices of suspicion become central techniques of governing that adjustment and improvement. allow understanding the differences observed between Austria, Germany and Switzerland. Here the concept of These roles can’t be sharply differentiated and overlap a suspect category (also suspect community) is crucial. in practice. It is possible, though, to identify tendencies The notion of suspect community was originally devel- to summarize the findings of this governance analysis: oped by Hillary in reference to anti-terror strategies re- The role of civil society actors is primarily fulfilled garding Northern Ireland. Pentazis and Pemberton, who by established Christian welfare organizations. Only in applied the concept to British Muslims, define it as “a Germany, other FBOs occasionally also take on this role. sub-group of the population that is singled out for state While the involvement of established Christian church- attention as being ‘problematic’” (2009, 649). Ragazzi es is limited to this field in all three cases, minority FBOs suggests that in this context “[…] the main techniques seem to have multiple other roles in immigrant integra- of government are those of ‘empowerment’, ‘partner- tion. Typically, Austrian recognized Jewish and Islamic ship’ and ‘community policing’, which take their roots communities are involved as religious representatives. in the pro-active and self-management imperatives of Islamic FBOs in Switzerland and Germany fulfil this neo-liberal governmentality” (2016, 734). Governing role when establishment and accommodation are nego- through (suspect) community is therefore not a simple tiated. In Austria FBOs are hardly involved as migrant discriminatory practice vis-à-vis Muslims, it only works associations. This role is primarily fulfilled by Islamic if it is supported by (parts of) those to be governed. Here FBOs in Germany and partly so in Switzerland. Ragazzi speaks of “trusted” Muslims (ibid.). This interplay between suspicion and trust is equally c) Understanding differences: Looking at the govern- found in the involvement of Islamic FBOs in immigrant mentality of religion integration policies. FBOs are interested in being trusted when they aim for establishment and accommodation. To better understand differences in the governance of This makes them willing to trade off autonomy (e.g. tol- religion in immigrant integration, it is useful to widen erate adjustment and improvement) for the perspective the view and discuss immigrant integration policy from of establishment (as described in Bader’s notion of the the perspective of governmentality. Therefore we need “autonomy dilemma”). State actors, on the other hand, to identify “lines of thought”, of “acts and counter-acts” depend on the cooperation and trustworthiness of agen- (Rose 1999, 21). In terms of the involvement of FBOs in cies to implement integration policy measures. The wid- immigrant integration politics, this perspective is most est involvement then occurs where suspicion and trust fruitfully applied to the issue of Muslim integration, as are most balanced. the involvement of Islamic FBOs has to be seen against In Austria legal establishment is granted to Islam, so the backdrop of a polarized, politicized and mostly ex- the perspective of „being trusted” does not serve as an clusionary discourse. incentive. The recent restrictive changes to the Islam Islam has become discursively connected with se- Law might be viewed as an expression of suspicion by curity threats, patriarchy and anti-democratic regimes the current government and the result of a discourse (Korteweg/Triadafilopoulos 2013). Muslim interview that had come to a head. Another way to understand partners and interviewed policy-makers alike explicitly the restrictive outcome of this law are internal conflicts confirmed that these discourses influence their - activi among different groups within the Islamic Religious ties and scope of action. The observed ‘adjustment and Community in Austria that was involved in all steps of improvement’ of Islamic FBOs is a good example of the the legislation. However, the Austrian Islamic commu- complementarity of governance and governmentality: nities are not depended on the label “trusted”. The legal The commitment to rule of law and human rights de- setting guarantees them the comfortable role as estab- manded from Islamic FBOs in all countries can be under- lished religious representatives and is in a figurative stood as the attempt to secure their suitability as negoti- sense the legal expression of trust. Therefore Austrian A. Mattes: Part of the problem or of the solution? I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1 51

Islamic communities do not need to prove themselves as gration, documented in the governance analysis, depend possible civil society actors, nor can state actors expect on a specific “regime of truth”. This helps to understand them to willingly accept the role of a migrant organiza- why Austrian Islamic FBOs are less involved, despite tion. Involvement in immigrant integration is therefore official recognition (mostly fulfilling the role ofreli- limited to the role as religious representative. gious representatives), why German Islamic FBOs are In Switzerland regulations for legal establishment strongly involved as migrant associations, as religious vary from canton to canton. What is more, as empha- representatives and partly as civil society actors, and sized by Swiss interview partners, official recognition why Swiss Muslim associations are least involved. The is hardly a realistic perspective for Islamic FBOs. Even techniques of government using suspicion and trust can if there was the political will to grant recognition, the be found across the borders of the studied countries. The perspective of a public referendum against it seems to outcomes of these techniques of government, however, scare all parties off (INT CH1, INT CH6). In immigrant vary as a result of different structures. integration policies, Swiss Muslims are not treated as In the field of immigrant integration politics, both “trusted” partners and suspicion clearly dominates. established and newer minority FBOs play a decisive Suspicion by state actors in Switzerland is then further role. While especially Islamic associations seek to be heightened by right-wing actors: They reply to any sign involved like established Christian FBOs, their involve- of trust towards Muslims with the threat of a referen- ment is hardly ever that of a civil society actor (unlike dum. Interviews have shown that Swiss Islamic FBOs the role of Catholic and Protestant associations). It aim for the role as religious representatives rather than mostly remains limited and often tied to their percep- that of civil society actors (INT CH3, INT CH5). This, tion as alien. The critique of involvement of minority however, is only a limited option as there is hardly any religion in immigrant integration politics therefore is involvement of non-Christian FBOs in this role in Swiss reminiscent of that of multiculturalism. When Muslims immigrant integration policies. Christian interview are addressed in immigrant integration politics, it might partners even saw a more general suspicion against re- as well be seen as a strategy of “divide and rule” and a ligion that also influenced their inclusion (INT CH4, INT way to keep “them off serious policy agendas” (Vertovec CH6). Therefore Islamic FBOs are – if at all involved – 2010, 85). Despite the fact that established Christian limited to the role of migrant organizations, responsible Churches and Muslim associations are all involved in for the integration of their religiously defined members. the same field, their roles are very different. And while Especially in Germany, all interviewed Muslim rep- inclusion is a declared goal of all countries’ immigrant resentatives indicated that they hope for the role of civil integration policies, it is questionable if the involvement society actors. Here the prospect of legal establishment of religions contributes to it. is especially strong and according to all German interview partners, including bureaucrats, also a realistic perspective. German Muslims therefore have a strong Literature need to be “trusted”. This explains why German Islamic FBOs accept and embrace their role as migrant organi- Allievi, Stefano (2005). 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religion.orf.at (2014). Bundeskanzler Faymann lädt zu Author Religionsdialog, Internet: http://religion.orf.at/sto- ries/2659733/ (Zugriff: 18.8.2016) Astrid Mattes (1988) is PhD researcher at the Department RGBl. Nr. 68/1874 (1867). Gesamte Rechtsvorschrift für of Political Science at University of Vienna. She studied Gesetzliche Anerkennung von Religionsgesell- Political Science and Comparative Religious Studies in schaften. Internet: http://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Gelten- Vienna (Austria) and Limerick (Ireland) and spent re- deFassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzes search visits at the Universities of Lucerne (Switzerland) nummer=10000006 (Zugriff: 2.9.2013) and Toronto (Canada). Her research interests include Rodatz, Mathias/Jana Scheuring (2011). ›Integration als the fields of immigrant integration politics, challenges Extremismusprävention‹, in: Forum für kritische of pluralism, religious diversity, Islam in Europe and Rechtsextremismusforschung (Hrsg.): Ordnung. religion-state relations. Latest publication: Special Issue Macht. Extremismus, 163–190. “Institutional Responses to Religious Diversity”, Inter- Rose, Nikolas S. (1999). Powers of freedom: reframing disciplinary Journal for Religion and Transformation political thought, Cambridge, United Kingdom, New in Contemporary Society, 2016 (1) (with Kristina Stoeckl York. and Julia Mourao Permoser). Rosenberger, Sieglinde/Oliver Gruber (2016). Politikwan- del durch Institutionalisierung? Die österreichische Integrationspolitik und das Staatssekretariat für In- tegration (2011-2013), in: IPW Working Papers, Vol. 2016(1), 1-27. Rosenberger, Sieglinde/Birgit Sauer (2013). Politics, Reli- gion and Gender: Framing and Regulating the Veil, New York. Ruedin, Didier/Camilla Alberti/Gianni D’Amato (2015). Immigration and Integration Policy in Switzerland, 1848 to 2014, in: Swiss Political Science Review, Vol. 21(1), 5–22. Shore, Cris (2011). ‘European Governance’ or Govern- mentality? The European Commission and the Fu- ture of Democratic Government, in: European Law Journal, Vol. 17(3), 287–303. Tatari, Eren (2009). Theories of the State Accommoda- tion of Islamic Religious Practices in Western Eu- rope, in: Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 35(2), 271–288. Tezcan, Levent (2007). Kultur, Gouvernementalität der Religion und Integrationsdiskurs, in: Levent Tezcan/ Monika Wohlrab-Sahr (Hrsg.): Konfliktfeld Islam in Europa, Soziale Welt. Baden-Baden, 51–76. Thränhardt, Dietrich (2009). Migrations- und Inte- grationspolitik: Vom Korporatismus zur inszeni- erten Verstaatlichung, in: Britta Rehder/Thomas von Winter/Ulrich Willems (Hrsg.): Interessenvermittlung in Politikfeldern, Wiesbaden, 156–172. Turner, Bryan S. (2007). Managing religions: state responses to religious diversity, in: Contemporary Is- lam, Vol. 1(2), 123–137. Vertovec, Steven (2010). Towards post-multiculturalism? Changing communities, conditions and contexts of diversity, in: International Social Science Journal, Vol. 61(199), 83–95 Winzeler, Christoph (2009). Einführung in das Religions- verfassungsrecht der Schweiz, 2. Auflage, Zürich. 54 A. Mattes: Part of the problem or of the solution? I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1

Appendix

Appendix 1

Documents Title Author/Date

DOC AT1 Gemeinsam kommen wir zusammen Bundesministerium für Inneres, 2007

DOC AT2 Integration in Österreich. Einstellungen Bundesministerium für Inneres, 2009 Orientierungen und Erfahrungen

DOC AT3 Arbeitsprogramm Expertenrat Bundesministerium für Inneres, 2010

DOC AT4 Expertengespräche Nationaler Aktionsplan Bundesministerium für Inneres 2010 Integration – Interkultureller Dialog I und II

DOC AT5 Nationaler Aktionsplan Integration - Bericht Bundesministerium für Inneres, 2010

DOC AT6 Nationaler Aktionsplan Integration - Indikatoren Bundesministerium für Inneres, 2010

DOC AT7 Nationaler Aktionsplan Integration - Bundesministerium für Inneres, 2010 Maßnahmenkatalog

DOC AT8 Integrationsbericht 2011 Staatssekretariat für Integration, 2011

DOC AT9 Integrationsbericht 2012 Staatssekretariat für Integration, 2012

DOC AT10 Integrationsbericht 2013 Staatssekretariat für Integration, 2013

DOC AT11 Integrationsbericht 2014 Bundesministerium für Europa, Integration und Äußeres, 2014

DOC AT12 Integrationsbericht 2015 Bundesministerium für Europa, Integration und Äußeres, 2015

DOC AT18 Zusammen Österreich Staatssekretariat für Integration, 2013

DOC AT13 50 Punkte – Plan zur Integration von Asylberechtigten Bundesministerium für Europa, Integration und Äußeres, und subsidiär Schutzberechtigten in Österreich 2015

DOC AT14 Gesamtübersicht Förderungen 2015 Bundesministerium für Europa, Integration und Äußeres, 2015

DOC AT15 Datenbank „Integrationsprojekte in Österreich“ Staatssekretariat für Integration bzw. Bundesministerium für Europa, Integration und Äußeres, 2011-2016

DOC AT16 Dialogforum Islam - Ergebnisse aus dem ersten Jahr Bundesministerium für Inneres, 2013

DOC AT17 Dialogforum Islam – Grundlagentexte Bundesministerium für Inneres, 2013

DOC AT18 Dialogforum Islam - Bericht Bundesministerium für Inneres, 2013

DOC DE1 Erklärung der Bundesregierung: Gutes Bundesregierung 2006 Zusammenleben – klare Regeln

DOC DE3 Teilnehmerinnen/Teilnehmer am Integrationsgipfel Bundeskanzleramt, 2006 2006

DOC DE2 Mitglieder des Beirates der Beauftragten der Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Migration, Bundesregierung für Migration, Flüchtlinge und Flüchtlinge und Integration, 2006 Integration

DOC DE4 Nationaler Integrationsplan – Neue Wege, neue Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Migration, Chancen Flüchtlinge und Integration, 2007

DOC DE5 Teilnehmerinnen/Teilnehmer am Integrationsgipfel Bundeskanzleramt, 2007 2007 A. Mattes: Part of the problem or of the solution? I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1 55

DOC DE6 Teilnehmerinnen/Teilnehmer am Integrationsgipfel Bundeskanzleramt 2008 2008

DOC DE7 1. Fortschrittsbericht zum Nationalen Integrationsplan Die Bundesregierung, 2008

DOC DE8 Der Nationale Integrationsplan – Neue Wege, neue Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Migration, Chancen –Beispiele des Erfolgs Flüchtlinge und Integration, 2008

DOC DE9 Teilnehmerinnen/Teilnehmer am Integrationsgipfel Bundesregierung 2010 2010

DOC DE10 Nationaler Aktionsplan Integration Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration, 2011

DOC DE11 Teilnehmerinnen/Teilnehmeram Integrationsgipfel Bundesregierung 2012 2012

DOC DE12 Datenbank: Auskunftssystems des Bundesamtes für Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2016 Migration und Flüchtlinge

DOC DE13 Projektjahrbuch 2009 Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2009

DOC DE14 Projektjahrbuch 2010 Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2010

DOC DE15 Projektjahrbuch 2011 Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2011

DOC DE16 Projektjahrbuch 2012 Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2012

DOC DE17 Projektjahrbuch 2013 Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2013

DOC DE18 Projektjahrbuch 2014 Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2014

DOC DE19 Deutsche Islamkonferenz –Ergebnisse 3. Plenum 2008 Deutsche Islam Konferenz 2008

DOC DE20 Deutsche Islamkonferenz –Ergebnisse 4. Plenum 2009 Deutsche Islam Konferenz 2009

DOC DE21 Drei Jahre Deutsche Islam Konferenz 2009 Deutsche Islam Konferenz 2009

DOC DE22 Arbeitsprogramm der DIK in ihrer zweiten Phase Deutsche Islam Konferenz 2010

DOC DE23 Arbeitsprogramm Deutsche Islam Konferenz 2014

DOC DE24 Teilnehmerliste Lenkungsausschuss 1 Deutsche Islam Konferenz 2015

DOC DE25 Tagesordnung Lenkungsausschuss 1 Deutsche Islam Konferenz 2015

DOC DE26 Tagesordnung Lenkungsausschuss 2 Deutsche Islam Konferenz 2015

DOC DE27 Teilnehmerliste Lenkungsausschuss 2 Deutsche Islam Konferenz 2015

DOC CH1 Integrationsförderung des Bundes: Evaluation des Eidgenössische Kommission für Migrationsfragen, 2008 Schwerpunkteprogramms 2004 -2007

DOC CH2 Umsetzung Massnahmenpaket Integration 2008 Interdepartementalen Arbeitsgruppe Migration IAM, 2008

DOC CH3 Umsetzung Massnahmenpaket Integration 2009 Interdepartementalen Arbeitsgruppe Migration IAM, 2009

DOC CH4 Umsetzung Massnahmenpaket Integration 2010 Interdepartementalen Arbeitsgruppe Migration IAM, 2010

DOC CH5 Integrationsförderung des Bundesund ihre Eidgenössisches Justiz- und Polizeidepartment/ Auswirkungen in den Kantonen – Jahresbericht 2008 Bundesamt für Migration 2008

DOC CH6 Integrationsförderung des Bundesund ihre Eidgenössisches Justiz- und Polizeidepartment/ Auswirkungen in den Kantonen – Jahresbericht 2009 Bundesamt für Migration 2009

DOC CH7 Integrationsförderung des Bundesund ihre Eidgenössisches Justiz- und Polizeidepartment/ Auswirkungen in den Kantonen – Jahresbericht 2010 Bundesamt für Migration 2010 56 A. Mattes: Part of the problem or of the solution? I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1

DOC CH8 Integrationsförderung des Bundesund ihre Eidgenössisches Justiz- und Polizeidepartment/ Auswirkungen in den Kantonen – Jahresbericht 2011 Bundesamt für Migration 2011

DOC CH9 Integrationsförderung des Bundesund ihre Eidgenössisches Justiz- und Polizeidepartment/ Auswirkungen in den Kantonen – Jahresbericht 2012 Bundesamt für Migration 2012

DOC CH10 Anhang zum Jahresbericht 2012 Eidgenössisches Justiz- und Polizeidepartment/ Bundesamt für Migration 2013

DOC CH11 Integrationsförderung des Bundesund ihre Eidgenössisches Justiz- und Polizeidepartment/ Auswirkungen in den Kantonen – Jahresbericht 2013 Bundesamt für Migration 2013

DOC CH12 Anhang zum Jahresbericht 2013 Eidgenössisches Justiz- und Polizeidepartment/ Bundesamt für Migration 2013

DOC CH13 Liste der Programme und Projekte von nationaler Staatssekretariat für Migration 2014 Bedeutung des Bundes

DOC CH14 Bericht KIP 2014 Staatssekretariat für Migration 2014

DOC CH15 Citoyennité auf den Punkt gebracht Eidgenössische Kommission für Migrationsfragen, 2015

DOC CH16 Bericht des Bundesrates über die Situation der Der Bundesrat, 2010 Muslime in der Schweiz

DOC CH17 Muslime in der Schweiz Eidgenössische Kommission für Migrationsfragen, 2010

DOC CH18 Muslim-Dialog 2010: Austausch zwischen den Eidgenössisches Justiz- und Polizeidepartment 2011 Bundesbehörden und Musliminnen und Muslimen in der Schweiz

Appendix 2

Structure Codebook

Analysing governance key figures document/speaker (following Bader 2007a) when/where

who

measure/idea

target (subjects) at whom

via

for/against whom

means

Analysing governmentality (following concern Bacchi 2009) cause

underlying assumptions

emergence of this problem representations

techniques of problem solving

alternative problem formulation/ what is left unsaid

effects direct

subjectification

discursive

perspectives that emerge A. Mattes: Part of the problem or of the solution? I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1 57

Appendix 3

Interview Name Function Date/place

INT AT1 Martin Kienl Bundesministerium für Europa, Integration und Äußeres 02/15/15, Vienna

INT AT2 Carla A. Baghajati Islamische Glaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich 08/31/16, Vienna

INT AT3 Rainald Tippow Erzdiözese Wien 26/09/16 Vienna

INT DE1 Zekeriya Altuğ DITIB/Koordinationsrat der Muslime in Deutschland 08/05/16, Cologne

INT DE2 Murat Gümüs Islamrat für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland 08/04/16, Cologne

INT DE3 N.N. (Muslim association preferring anonymity) 08/05/16 Cologne

INT DE4 Aiman A. Mazyek Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland 08/03/16, Telephone

INT DE5 Honey Deihimi Arbeitsstab der Beauftragten der Bundesregierung für 08/08/16, Berlin Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration

INT DE6 Reinhard Busch Bundesministerium des Inneren 08/09/16, Berlin

INT DE7 Kerstin Düsch Katholisches Büro in Berlin 08/09/16, written

INT DE8 Martin Dutzmann Beauftragter der Evangelischen Kirche 08/17/16, Telephone

INT CH1 Regula Zürcher Borlat Staatssekretariat für Migration 08/11/16, Bern

INT CH2 Lilo Roost Vischer Religionsbeauftragte Kanton Basel 08/10/16, Basel

INT CH3 Montassar BenMrad Föderation islamischer Dachorganisationen der Schweiz 08/10/16, Zürich

INT CH4 Samuel Behloul Migratio – Katholische Bischofskonferenz 08/11/16, Freiburg

INT CH5 Laila Oulouda Presidentin Iman-Zentrum 08/12/16, Volketswil

INT CH6 Simon Röthlisberger Schweizerischer Evangelischer Kirchenbund 08/30/16, Telephone

Research Article

Which policies matter? Explaining naturalisation rates using disaggregated policy data

Jeremias Stadlmair1, *

1 Department of Political Science, University of Vienna, Austria * E-Mail: [email protected]

Abstract Despite similar experiences of immigration, the proportion of immigrants taking up the citizenship of their country of residence varies substantially in Western European countries. While previous research concluded that citizenship policies in general are relevant for explaining these differences, this paper provides a fine-grained analysis of which policy dimensions bear greater or lesser importance for naturalisation outcomes. Drawing on citizenship policy data from nine EU countries for the period 1995 to 2014 and using time-series cross-section regression models, the study identifies economic requirements, ius soli, and dual citizenship provisions as main drivers for differences in naturalisation rates.

Keywords Citizenship, immigration, naturalisation, policy analysis, boundary making

Welche Kriterien machen den Unterschied? Einbürgerungsraten und Einbürgerungsbestimmungen im europäischen Vergleich

Zusammenfassung Trotz ähnlicher Migrationsbewegungen unterscheiden sich westeuropäische Staaten im Anteil jener MigrantInnen, die die Staatsbürgerschaft ihres Aufenthaltslandes annehmen. Während bestehende Forschung damit schließt, dass heterogene Staatsbürgerschaftspolitiken einen zentralen Erklärungsfaktor für Divergenz darstellen, bietet dieser Beitrag eine detaillierte Analyse, welche Aspekte von Einbürgerungspolitiken größeren und welche geringeren Einfluss auf Einbürgerungsraten auf- weisen. Basierend auf einer Regressionsanalyse von Einbürgerungsraten und -policies in neun EU-Staaten über den Zeitraum von 1995 bis 2014, zeigt der Beitrag, dass vor allem ökonomische Einbürgerungsvoraussetzungen, Ius Soli und Bestimmungen zu Doppelstaatsbürgerschaft Ursachen für diese Varianz darstellen.

Schlüsselwörter Staatsbürgerschaft, Einbürgerung, Immigration, Policyanalyse, Grenzziehungsprozesse

Acknowledgements I would like to thank Sieglinde Rosenberger for her supervision and support in the overall PhD project, of which this paper is part, and for her comments strengthening an earlier draft of the paper. Thanks also go to Didier Ruedin, Markus Wagner, and the anonymous reviewer of the OEZP for their comments and suggestions.

The author has declared that no competing interests exist.

March 31, 2017 I innsbruck university press, Innsbruck OZP – Austrian Journal of Political Science I ISSN 2313-5433 I http://oezp.at/ Vol. 46, issue 1 I DOI 10.15203/ozp.1585.vol46iss1 OPEN ACCESS 60 J. Stadlmair: Which policies matter? I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1

1. Introduction from naturalising, do higher naturalisation fees lead to fewer naturalisations? Questions like these go be- As international migration blurs the congruence of citi- yond a general finding that policies matter, but are of zens with residents of a(ny) state, the politics of naturalisa- crucial importance given the increasing complexity tion – in the sense of acquiring citizenship other than by and number of conditions for naturalisation. birth – attract considerable public and scholarly attention. The next section reviews recent literature on fac- Questions of who should be able to become a citizen and tors shaping naturalisation, with a distinct focus on who should not are politically contested and citizenship policy-level factors, leading to hypotheses guiding policies differ widely across European countries (Goodman the analysis, which are operationalised in section 3; 2014; Howard 2009; Koopmans et al. 2005). This variation in section 4, the findings of the multivariate regres- includes different residence requirements, naturalisation sion analysis are presented; section 5 discusses the conditions, procedural structures and positions on dual main findings, followed by a concluding summary citizenship (Huddleston et al. 2011; Koopmans et al. 2012). and potential perspectives for future research in Although some aspects may have a mostly symbolic func- section 6. tion – displaying the characteristics of an ideal citizen (van Houdt et al. 2011) – the core function of citizenship policies is to regulate outcomes, i.e. the acquisition or loss of citi- 2. State of the art zenship. These outcomes are important for an individual’s opportunities in society (OECD 2011) as well as for demo- Apart from individual-level factors and factors re- cratic societies as a whole, by defining the legitimising lated to the country of origin, the institutional con- basis of democratic government (Bauböck 2010). There- text of the destination country shapes an individual’s fore, the outcomes of citizenship policies have attracted propensity to naturalise (Peters et al. 2016; Vink et substantial academic interest in recent decades (Brubaker al. 2013; Yang 1994). While studies focusing on indi- 1992; Hagedorn 2001; Janoski 2010; Reichel 2011, 2012; vidual-level determinants of citizenship acquisition Vink et al. 2013). rely on survey or register data (Bevelander/DeVoretz This paper examines how citizenship policies relate to 2008; Reichel/Perchinig 2015; Vink et al. 2013), an naturalisation rates, investigating which naturalisation analysis of macro-level determinants of naturalisa- policy dimensions can explain the variation in naturalisation outcomes requires multi-level models (Vink et al. tion rates across nine western European countries (Austria, 2013) or aggregate data (Janoski 2010; Reichel 2011). Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Nether- For an analysis of (macro-level) destination-country lands, Sweden and the United Kingdom) for the period 1995 determinants of naturalisation, aggregate data con- to 2014. It assesses whether (a) ius soli, (b) residence require- stitute a straightforward approach, as they allow in- ments, (c) naturalisation conditions, (d) procedural securi- cluding a larger number of countries and may also ty, and (e) dual citizenship provisions can account for dif- cover a longer period of time. This approach comes ferent levels of naturalisation rates. Within the dimension at the expense of not allowing to draw conclusions on of naturalisation conditions, specific attention is given to individual-level naturalisation determinants. Studies civic integration requirements (Goodman 2014), economic investigating cross-national differences in immigrant resource requirements (Stadlmair 2014), and naturalisa- naturalisation associate four main destination coun- tion fees as potential sources of variation. try factors influencing naturalisation rates: immi- As comparable data on immigration and citizenship grant inflows, economic development, government acquisitions remains relatively scarce, most research on composition and citizenship policy configurations consequences of citizenship policies draws on case stud- (Janoski 2010; Reichel 2011); ies of single or few countries (Brubaker 1992; Hagedorn First, naturalisations are a consequence of im- 2001; Koopmans et al. 2005), which by design can only migration, where higher immigrant inflows could be provide indicative findings. With increasing quality of assumed to lead to higher naturalisation rates. Janos- comparable data provided by EUROSTAT and the OECD, ki (2010) shows empirically that this effect is not as some recent studies use quantitative macro-comparisons straightforward as one might think, as the transition on the effect of citizenship policies on naturalisation out- from immigration to acquiring the citizenship of the comes (Janoski 2010; Reichel 2011, 2012; Vink et al. 2013). country of residence is mediated by economic devel- As these approaches build on comprehensive citizenship opment, citizenship policies and the wider political policy indices, they primarily show that policies matter climate. Factors stemming from the country of origin overall, but do not provide insights on which dimensions may have an additional macro-level impact. In par- of naturalisation policies are more (and which are less) ticular, EU citizens are less likely to naturalise in an- relevant for naturalisation outcomes: Does the length of other EU country, as the benefits of naturalisation are residence requirements encourage or prevent immigrants smaller for them than for non-EU citizens (Dronkers/ J. Stadlmair: Which policies matter? I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1 61

Vink 2012). Thus immigrant inflows from EU countries ropean countries in the years 2007/2008 and concludes may have different consequences than inflows of third that dual citizenship regulations matter particularly for countries. Overall, immigration can be considered as a naturalisation. As acknowledged by Reichel, this model sine-qua-non for naturalisation, but this effect may not does not include control variables: Most importantly, be a direct one. independently from policy change, immigrant inflows, Second, naturalisation rates tend to be higher in which cannot be expected to be constant or homoge- countries with greater economic development and neous across countries, may lead to changes in naturali- tend to increase with economic development. In par- sation rates. Other factors, in particular economic devel- ticular, the temporal and cross-national variation in the opment and party politics, may have a mediating effect Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita corresponds on the correlation between policies and naturalisation to levels and changes in naturalisation rates (Janoski rates (Janoski 2010). Lastly, not only differences across 2010, 239–240). countries may be of interest here, but also changes with- Third, the strength of different political parties rein countries may be used to make inferences on the im- lates to immigrant naturalisation, with left-wing parties pact of citizenship policies on naturalisation rates. accounting for higher naturalisation rates: As agents of de-ethnicisation (Joppke 2003), left-wing parties Hypotheses contribute to immigrant naturalisation on a discursive level, by enabling naturalisation in terms of policy and As the MIPEX index does not only focus on naturalisa- via inclusive policy implementation (Janoski 2010). Im- tion but also on citizenship acquisition based on birth- portantly, such an effect is not confined to policy devel- place (ius soli), this aspect should be kept separate in any opment alone, as Janoski finds an independent effect of model on immigrant naturalisation: If citizenship is left politics on naturalisation rates. Thus, left-wing par- also available via ius soli, there should be fewer naturali- ty strength needs to be included as a separate factor in sations than in cases where citizenship at birth can only macro-level models on immigrant nationalisation. be acquired via ius sanguinis (Janoski 2013; Reichel 2012). On the other hand, if ius soli is not available, naturalisa- Citizenship policy configurations and their impact tion rates may also be deflated, as the number of foreign on naturalisation outcomes residents (the denominator of naturalisation rates) will increase not only due to inflows, but also due to births of Apart from immigration, economic development and foreign citizens on a country’s soil (Vink 2010). Anyway, relative strength of parties of the left, naturalisation ius soli provisions may play a role for assessing naturali- rates are influenced by policy configurations: More -in sation rates independently from naturalisation policies clusive policies correspond to higher naturalisation per se, leading to a first hypothesis: rates, more exclusive policies to lower rates (Dronkers/ Vink 2012; Janoski 2010; Reichel 2011, 2012).1 However, (A) If citizenship is available for second and third gen- taking other factors in comprehensive models on immi- eration immigrants via ius soli, naturalisation rates grant naturalisation into account, the effect of policies is are lower, because these persons do not need to un- often very weak and calls for further attention: As such, dergo a naturalisation procedure in order to acquire studies find that policies matter more for immigrants the citizenship of their country of residence. from less developed countries than for those from more developed ones (Peters et al. 2016; Vink et al. 2013). Fur- Residence requirements regulate for how long a foreign thermore, not all aspects of citizenship policies seem to person must have resided in a country in order to natu- be equally important. This, however, calls for disaggre- ralise and which legal formats qualify as residence. As gating policy data into separate dimensions of citizen- Floris et al. (2016, 371) find that the propensity to natu- ship policies: ralise decreases with longer individual residence, natu- Using MIPEX data, but no – arguably necessary – ralisation rates as macro-level measure may not only be control variables, Reichel (2011) compares naturalisation delayed, but also lower when residence requirements are rates and the MIPEX dimensions (Eligibility, Conditions for long or selective in terms of their legal format. Reichel Acquisition, Security of Status, and Dual Nationality) in 29 Eu- (2011) does not find such an effect, but as the measure- ment of residence requirements in the original MIPEX 1 Which criteria of a policy configuration should be considered in- structure underlying his analysis also includes ius soli, clusive or exclusive is subject to various operationalisations and normative discussions. The probably most prominent approach is this does not refute the following hypothesis: taken by the MIPEX project, for which inclusiveness is defined as citizenship policies corresponding to recommendations of the Coun- (B) More inclusive and shorter residence requirements cil of Europe (Huddleston et al. 2011). Currently the index includes 31 indicators on citizenship policy, representing a one-dimensional lead to higher naturalisation rates, because immi- continuum of exclusion – inclusion. 62 J. Stadlmair: Which policies matter? I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1

grants are more likely to naturalise in earlier stages processes can also provide opportunities for inclusion, of their residence. not only for exclusion, e.g. by selectively exempting some applicants from certain requirements in order to Once a foreign citizen qualifies for naturalisation in avoid hardship (Dornis 2001). However, the operation- terms of residence, there are several requirements to be alisation of procedural security applied here focuses met, which vary across countries and over time. Sum- on aspects, where large discretionary capacities clearly marising requirements on language and civic skills, indicate a potential for exclusion, not for inclusion.2 The economic resources, good conduct, good character and countries covered in this study vary in terms of proce- the payment of a naturalisation fee to an index, inclu- dural security, and it is thus possible to test a hypothesis sive conditions – meaning no or easy-to-meet require- on procedural security: ments – should correspond to higher naturalisation rates (Reichel 2011). The underlying mechanism here is (D) Higher procedural security leads to higher naturali- that the costs for meeting the requirements – literally as sation rates, because the risk of investing time and fees or in terms of time and effort – decrease with fewer resources for naturalisation is lower. or easier requirements and consequently the number of persons fulfilling these requirements may be higher. That the availability of dual citizenship matters for Looking at specific requirements, especially naturalisa- naturalisation is underlined by several studies and con- tion fees and economic resource requirements are high- cerns both the policy of the country ‘of origin’ and of lighted in the literature as potential barriers to natu- residence (Reichel 2011; Vink et al. 2013). While country ralisation (de Groot 1989, 263–270; Reichel 2011, 2–3). of origin differences are beyond the scope of this study, Civic integration requirements – such as language and an effect of dual citizenship policies of the country of cultural knowledge courses and exams – may be under- residence is expected as follows: stood primarily as symbolic politics (Mourão Permoser 2012), but, at least in Denmark, citizenship testing can (E) A possibility to obtain dual citizenship leads to higher be attributed to changes in naturalisation rates (Ersbøll/ naturalisation rates, because it provides easier oppor- Gravesen 2010): tunities to maintain ties with the country of origin.

(C) Liberal naturalisation conditions lead to higher naturalisation rates, because less demanding or fewer 3. Operationalisation, data requirements lower the effort required for naturali- and descriptive statistics sation and increase the proportion of eligible immigrants. This paper builds on multivariate regression analysis (C1) Civic integration requirements in particular of macro-level data, with naturalisation rates as depen- lead to lower naturalisation rates, as these are dent variable and naturalisation policy, economic devel- demanding in terms of time and resources. opment, government composition and immigrant in- (C2) Economic requirements for naturalisation limit flows as independent variables. The model includes nine the proportion of immigrants eligible for natu- countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ger- ralisation and thus lead to lower naturalisation many, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United rates. Kingdom) for a period of 20 years (1995 to 2014). As EU (C3) Naturalisation fees increase the costs of natu- member states which experienced major immigrant in- ralisation and thus lead to lower naturalisation flows in recent decades, these countries are suitable for rates, specifically in a policy context which al- comparing naturalisation outcomes. Given that many lows an otherwise easy access to naturalisation. studies highlight substantial differences in citizenship policies in these countries, they constitute an adequate When Joppke (2007, 39) claims that naturalisation be- sample for investigating the effect of policies on natu- came a “rule-based routine”, he correctly implies that ralisation (Huddleston et al. 2011; Koopmans et al. 2012). naturalisation used to (and still might) be a risky process An inclusion of other EU countries in the sample is lim- with no clear outcome. Waiting a long time, complet- ited by data constraints, in particular for the early years ing courses or taking tests, and paying substantial fees of the analysed period. Immigration and naturalisation without certainty of obtaining citizenship may dampen 2 The indicator on procedural security covers (a) whether there is a le- the attraction of naturalisation. Especially in southern gal time frame within which applications for naturalisation need to European countries, low naturalisation rates may be less be processed; (b) whether there is an entitlement to naturalisation a consequence of demanding requirements than of pro- (if all criteria are met), or an application can be rejected nonethe- less; (c) whether applications can be rejected due to fraud or a pos- cedural uncertainty (Christopoulos 2009; Waldrauch sible threat to public security; (d) whether there are legal remedies 2006). Generally speaking, discretion in naturalisation against negative decisions. J. Stadlmair: Which policies matter? I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1 63

data for southern EU member states are not available, Ius soli regulations describe whether second and third and citizenship policies often remain fairly vague so far. generation immigrants acquire citizenship at birth (two Naturalisation rates are derived from EUROSTAT, indicators). They range from an entire absence of ius soli, taking the ratio of naturalisations and the resident for- such as in Austria, to an automatic ius soli for the second eign population per country/year. Given the purpose and third generation, such as in Ireland. Most countries of assessing effects of naturalisation policies, these fall somewhere in between, where persons born in the naturalisation rates do not include ius soli acquisitions country may acquire citizenship via declaration or sim- and thus constitute what Janoski (2013) refers to as nar- ple application. row naturalisation rates. In the sample of nine EU coun- Residence requirements refer to the length of the stan- tries for the period 1995 to 2014, naturalisation rates dard residence requirement, whether it is necessary to vary greatly, both across and within countries, ranging have a permanent residence title, whether periods of from the Netherlands in 1996, where 11.4% of all for- absence are permissible and whether there are preferen- eign residents took up Dutch citizenship, to Denmark tial conditions for spouses of citizens (four indicators). in 2013, where just under 0.5% of all foreign residents The most exclusive residence requirements are found did so. Overall, the mean naturalisation rate is 3.7% of in Austria and Denmark, where immigrants need to be all foreign residents naturalising per year. The variable resident for up to ten years (ordinary naturalisation in is distributed fairly normally around the mean, with the Austria), a certain period thereof must be based on a notable exception of some particularly high naturalisa- permanent residence permit and periods of absence are tion rates in the Netherlands in the 1990s and in Sweden handled in an exclusive way. The most inclusive regula- in 2007/08. tions on residence are again found in Ireland. Naturalisation conditions cover all main naturalisa- Figure 1: Naturalisation rates in nine EU countries, tion requirements other than residence: language skills, 1995-2014 citizenship testing, economic resources, absence of a criminal record, or good character requirements; in line with the framework of MIPEX, naturalisation fees are also taken as conditions for acquisition (ten indicators). Within the dimension of naturalisation conditions, three requirements receive further attention: First, a separate variable of civic integration requirements includes six indicators of MIPEX on language and citizenship testing. These requirements have at times been particularly strong in Denmark, with required Danish language skill level of B2 and a citizenship test with low pass rates (Ersbøll/Gravesen 2010). In contrast, such requirements have been absent in several countries, e.g. in Belgium from 2000 to 2012. Second, a separate variable covers economic requirements for naturalisation and distinguishes between (a) applicants who must only provide evidence of economic means, without an explicit threshold, (b) Measuring naturalisation policies explicit income, employment or welfare benefit requirements which include an exemption on social grounds, (c) The policy variables for this analysis are mostly con- such requirements without social exemption and a short structed in line with the Access to Nationality dimension reference period, and (d) such requirements with a ref- of the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX). As recent- erence period of more than one year (Stadlmair 2014). ly proposed by Ruedin (2015), MIPEX data were disag- Economic resource requirements were most strongly de- gregated and recomposed in line with the theoretical veloped in Austria and Denmark from 2006 to 2013, but approach described above. The MIPEX indicators were other countries, such as Germany, Finland, or Ireland, recomposed into five main policy dimensions, ranging also impose weaker forms of economic requirements. from 0 to 100, with the value of 100 indicating maxi- Third, naturalisation fees are covered as a separatevari- mum inclusion.3 50=medium, 100=inclusive), each policy dimension has a theoretical 3 MIPEX indicators used to construct the policy dimensions described range from 0 (exclusive) to 100 (inclusive). Depending on the number below: ius soli: 102-103; residence requirements: 98-100, 101a; natu- of indicators covered, the number of theoretically possible scores ralisation conditions: 104a-c, 105a-c, 106-109; procedural security: varies for the different policy dimensions. Although some varia- 110-113; dual citizenship: 115a-b. By taking the mean of the included bles were regrouped with this approach, the main strategy of index indicators, which each include three coding options (0=exclusive, construction is the same as in the original MIPEX structure (ibid.). 64 J. Stadlmair: Which policies matter? I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1

Table 1: Descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables

Variable Min. Max. Mean Standard deviation na Overall Between Within Naturalisation rate 0.5 11.4 3.7 2.3 1.8 1.5 178 Ius soli 0 100 58.6 35.2 32.8 16.7 180 Residence requirement 38 100 68.4 18.5 17.7 7.8 180 Naturalisation conditions 19.5 83.3 52.3 16.9 14.5 9.9 180 Civic integration 10 100 71.6 24.0 19.1 15.7 180 Economic requirements 0 100 70.8 33.8 29.2 19.4 180 Naturalisation fees 0 1123 433.3 324.6 310.2 137.4 173 Procedural security 0 87.5 27.4 21.9 19.6 11.6 180 Dual citizenship 50 100 84.7 16.8 12.2 12.2 180 Lagged immigrant inflow rates 1.3 27.5 6.0 3.6 2.7 2.6 176 Share of EU citizens in % of inflows 0.03 0.84 0.37 0.19 0.16 0.12 178 Government composition 1 5 2.7 1.4 0.6 1.2 180 GDP per capita 18100 33300 24980 3036 2412 1991 177

Notes: a: Number of observations (country-year combinations) able, based on formal naturalisation fees controlled for covered which do not offer any exemptions from re- inflation and purchasing power inequalities.4 Acquiring quirements to renounce the former citizenship. In order citizenship via naturalisation is fairly expensive in Ire- to account for this limited empirical variation, the in- land (a fee of 1125€ for non-privileged applicants), Aus- dicator is recoded as a dummy variable, distinguishing tria, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. Belgium only between an unrestricted possibility of dual citizen- is the only country in this sample where naturalisation ship (89 observations) and the presence of any restric- was free (from 2000 to 2012). tions on dual citizenship (91 observations). Procedural security describes discretion and transpar- For the period of 2007 to 2014, the data are avail- ency in the naturalisation process and the availability able on the MIPEX website (http://www.mipex.eu/). For of judicial review (four indicators). The most uncertain earlier years and for the variables on economic require- naturalisation procedures are found in Ireland and the ments and naturalisation fees, data were collected from United Kingdom, where decisions are made highly dis- secondary literature, in particular the NATAC and EUDO cretionary, do not need to be made within a certain time- reports (http://eudo-citizenship.eu/), and from policy frame and include only limited possibilities for judicial documents.5 review. The most transparent or secure procedures can be found in the Netherlands and in Belgium from 2013. Controls: GDP per capita, government composition, Dual citizenship covers the availability of dual citi- TCN and EU inflows zenship in cases of naturalisation and – if not generally permitted – of categories of applicants exempt from a The control variables include a basic measure for Gross requirement to renounce the former citizenship (two Domestic Product per capita, which is recommended by indicators). Just as the other variables, the indicator for Janoski (2010) as a suitable and influential measure for dual citizenship theoretically ranges from 0 (no possi- the economic context shaping naturalisation rates. To ac- bility for dual citizenship in naturalisation procedures) count for changes of GDP values due to inflation, a speci- to 100 (dual citizenship always possible); Empirically, fication as chain-linked volumes is offered byEURO- it ranges only from 50 to 100, as there are no countries STAT, which eliminates inflation effectshttp://ec.europa. ( eu/eurostat/en/web/products-datasets/-/TEINA011). 4 In order to avoid a bias of differences in purchasing power over time, actual fees were controlled for annual average inflation rates 5 I would like to thank Hilkka Becker, Sampo Brander, Dimitris Chri- within the EU-15; to avoid bias due to differences in purchasing po- stopoulos, Betty de Hart, Eva Ersbøll, Anuscheh Farahat, Alberto wer across countries, inflation-controlled fees were then multiplied Matrtín-Pérez, Patrick Wautelet, and Helena Wray from the EUDO with purchasing power parities (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/ Citizenship Observatory for contributing their country expertise to purchasing-power-parities/). the data of this study. J. Stadlmair: Which policies matter? I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1 65

The variable on government composition is taken 1995; Wenzelburger et al. 2014, 119–160). In Stata, this from the Comparative Political Data (CPDS) set of Armin- specification is implemented in the xtpcse command, geon et al. (2015), which reflects the share of left-wing which is used as the main approach for this paper (la- government members in five categories (ranging from belled PCSE-LDV model henceforth). 1 to 5): The first category includes governments without Plümper and Tröger (2009, 265–267) argue that the any members affiliated to left parties, the last category lagged dependent variable may have smaller standard includes governments composed only of left party mem- errors than the variables of interest, which may lead to bers, the middle categories falling in-between. As CPDS underestimating their long-term effects. They propose a data are only available until 2013, the values for the year different model (Prais-Winsten transformation), which 2014 were added by the author’s own research. accounts for this problem and may thus show more sub- Immigrant inflow rates are calculated using OECD stantial effects of the independent variables. This- ap data on the total population of a country/year divided proach is applied as robustness check for the findings of by inflows of foreign citizens (inflow rate=population/ the PSCE-LDV model. inflows*1000). As immigrant inflows cannot be expect- Often time-series cross-section analyses include lags ed to lead to an immediate increase of naturalisation for independent variables, as their effect might theo- rates, they are lagged by approximate residence require- retically be not immediate, but take some time to unfold ments.6 To account for variation within immigrant in- (Janoski 2010; Wenzelburger et al. 2014). For an analysis flows, the proportion of EU citizens among immigrant of naturalisation rates, lagging the independent vari- inflows is included as separate variable. As data on im- ables may not be appropriate, as there are many cases in migrant inflows dating back to the 1980s are scarce, the which policy changes have an immediate effect on natu- coverage of this analysis is limited to nine countries and ralisation outcomes.7 some missing observations were interpolated. In Table 1, immigrant inflows are displayed including lags and as the ratio of immigrant inflows per 1000 inhabitants of a 4. Empirical results country/year. Typically, this ratio ranges from 2.4 to 9.6 (mean of 6.0, standard deviation of 3.6), however, there In a model containing only the lagged dependent vari- are some observations of much higher values to a maxi- able and the policy dimensions outlined above, the only mum of 27.5. These observations stem from Ireland in significant policy dimension is that of naturalisation con- the late 2000s, which experienced a strong inflow from ditions (model 1). More inclusive conditions for naturali- citizens of Eastern European countries, which also led to sation can account for higher naturalisation rates – and an increase in naturalisations (see Figure 1). The share of vice versa. Figure 2a displays this result in a marginal EU citizens among foreign inflows ranges from 3% (Fin- effects plot: For instance, a decrease from the value of land in the 1990s) to 84% (Ireland in late 2000s). 61 to the value of 28 – which reflects the policy changes in Denmark in 2006, where economic requirements and Model specifications citizenship tests were introduced – corresponds to an estimated change in naturalisation rates of 1 (de facto With the exception of dual citizenship, all variables are Danish naturalisation rates decreased from 3.8 in 2005 interval-scaled and show considerable variation both to 2.9 in 2006). within and between countries, suitable for a times-se- Once GDP per capita, government composition, and ries cross-section analysis on the effect of policies on immigrant inflows are included as controls (model 2), naturalisation outcomes. For this purpose, a standard dual citizenship and ius soli also have a significant ef- OLS regression is insufficient and may lead to biased and fect on naturalisation rates: As expected, ius soli has a overconfident results as it does not control for poten- negative effect, with a change from no ius soli (value 0) tial time- and panel-specific errors. The most common to full ius soli (value 100) leading to an estimated change and appropriate response to these problems is to use a in naturalisation rates of 0.87. With a value of 0.74, the model with panel-corrected standard errors to account estimated positive effect of permitting unrestricted dual for differences across countries and a lagged dependent citizenship (as opposed to exceptional dual citizenship) variable to account for differences over time (Beck/Katz is slightly weaker. Residence requirements remain insignificant in model 2. However, naturalisation conditions 6 For Austria and Germany, inflow rates were lagged by 10 years, for again have the greatest predicted effect on naturalisa- Denmark by 8 years, for all remaining countries inflow rates were lagged by 5 years. Lags for residence requirements cannot be calcu- tion rates, where a theoretical shift from full exclusion lated exactly, as requirements differ for various categories of applicant and underwent some amendments during the period of analy- 7 For instance, naturalisations dropped quite immediately after re- sis, so this approach can only be an approximation. Using shorter or strictive policy amendments in Austria and Denmark in the mid- longer lags does not substantially alter the results in terms of model 2000s, or increased strongly after a liberalising reform in Belgium fit and statistical effects of the variables of interest. in 2000 (Ersbøll 2006; Foblets/Loones 2006; Stern/Valchars 2013). 66 J. Stadlmair: Which policies matter? 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Table 2: PCSE-LDV regression results

Model (1) (2) (3) (4) Policy dimensions Ius soli -0.00472 -0.00865* -0.0109*** -0.00556* (0.00327) (0.00337) (0.00268) (0.00282) Residence requirements 0.00196 0.00944 (0.00556) (0.00649) Naturalisation conditions 0.0305*** 0.0291*** (0.00691) (0.00692) Procedural security 0.00617 0.00549 (0.00558) (0.00512) Dual citizenship (dummy variable) 0.488 0.739** (0.296) (0.248) Naturalisation conditions Civic integration requirements 0.00515 (0.00387) Economic requirements 0.0155*** (0.00341) Naturalisation fees -0.0000691 -0.00147 (0.000222) (0.002) Policy index (excluding civ. int., ec. 0.0287*** req., nat. fees) (0.00732) Policy index (excluding nat. fees) 0.0311 (0.0194) Interaction term of fees and policy 0.0000235 index (0.0000338) Control variables Lagged immigrant inflows 0.0523* 0.0316 0.0264 (0.0208 (0.0236) (0.0248) EU-share of inflows -1.129* -0.707 -0.501 (0.547) (0.569 (0.515) Government composition 0.133* 0.164** 0.149* (0.0672) (0.0591) (0.0644) GDP per capita -0.00000251 -0.000033 -0.0000335 (0.0000345) (0.0000324) (0.0000306) Lagged naturalisation rate (dependent variable) 0.684*** 0.665*** 0.648*** 0.760*** (0.0573) (0.0528) (0.053) (0.0492) Intercept -0.693 -1.13 -0.586 -0.139 (0.401) (1.027) (0.946) (1.347) Observations 176 175 168 168 Adjusted R-squared 0.7875 0.7996 0.7958 0.7751 Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 J. Stadlmair: Which policies matter? I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1 67

Figure 2a/b: marginal effects of naturalisation conditions and economic requirements

to full inclusion would lead to an estimated change of Robustness checks naturalisation rates of 2.9. Based on these findings, it may however be interesting which conditions matter: The models discussed above already include a lagged de- Are differences in naturalisation related to trends of civ- pendent variable to account for serial autocorrelation, ic integration requirements, do economic requirements as otherwise the errors would be serially correlated.8 matter, or are the often substantial fees possible reasons To check for problems due to a heterogeneity of units, for this effect? a fixed-effects regression with the same independent Model 3 investigates different components of natu- variables as in model 3 is applied and confirms that het- ralisation conditions, namely civic integration require- erogeneity across units is already sufficiently covered by ments (language and citizenship tests), economic re- the independent variables in the model (insignificant F- quirements for naturalisation and naturalisation fees. value of fixed-effects model). The remaining indicators on naturalisation policy are Tests for potential heteroscedasticity are also lim- summarised to one index (residence requirements, good ited, as the model already includes a measure for pan- conduct, good character, procedural security, and dual el-corrected standard errors. Checking the raw residu- citizenship). It shows that economic requirements drive als of model 3, Figure 3a shows their even distribution the effect of naturalisation conditions on naturalisation over time; Figure 3b shows that strong outliers typically rates, while civic integration requirements and naturalisation are observations with very high naturalisation rates.9 fees are not significant. The marginal effects are displayed In other words, the model can explain low and average in Figure 2b, which shows that the difference between naturalisation rates fairly well, but exceptional circum- the most elaborate economic requirements (value 0) and stances with more naturalisations than usual call for the absence of such requirements (value 100) is about further attention: 1.16 on estimated naturalisation rates. Dutch naturalisation rates in the mid-1990s were Fees are not significant in model 3. As outlined theo- unusually high, according to van Oers et al. (2006, 417) retically, fees might have a conditional effect depending a consequence of a phase in which dual citizenship was on general policy inclusiveness. Following this argument, we may expect an interaction effect between fees 8 Including the same variables as in the models of Table 2 without a lagged DV, a Woolridge test for autocorrelation confirms the ex- and an overall index of naturalisation policy, where fees pected serial correlation of errors, which is eliminated by including should be significant only if the index has high values. a lagged DV. Model 4 includes this interaction effect and shows that 9 Running a separate model excluding observations with unusually high naturalisation rates (>8, n=161) confirms the findings of the the (insignificant) effect of fees does not vary by differ- fuller model. Observations with high naturalisation rates thus do ent levels of policy inclusiveness. not substantially influence the empirical results. 68 J. Stadlmair: Which policies matter? I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1

Figure 3a/b: Raw residuals by year and by levels of naturalisation rates

available unconditionally. In Belgium a sudden increase rected standard errors, faces criticism for being overly of naturalisations in 2000 can also be attributed to policy restrictive: In particular the lagged DV may account for reform, which is unfortunately not adequately covered so much variation that other factors underlying natu- in the MIPEX coding scheme (Foblets/Loones 2006). The ralisation outcomes may be falsely considered insig- outliers for Sweden (2006/2007) are more puzzling. One nificant because they cannot fully explain year-by-year possible explanation might be backlogs in the processing differences (Plümper/Troeger 2009). The alternative of naturalisation applications, which were remedied by proposed by Plümper and Tröger is a Prais-Winsten institutional reforms and a possibility to appeal against specification, which does not include a lagged DV. Com- negative decisions in 2006 (Lokrantz Bernitz/Bernitz paring the models described in Table 2 with a Prais-Win- 2006, 537–544). Denmark in 2003 is the only observa- sten model (see ANNEX), including the same variables tion in which naturalisations were severely overestimat- except from the lagged dependent variable, confirm the ed. This large residual likely stems from the mid-year findings of the PCSE-LDV model, but – as expected – re- introduction of formal Danish language assessments in veals stronger effects of the variables of interest. Pro- 2002, which is estimated to have had an immediate effect cedural security and civic integration requirements also on the 2002 rates, but according to Ersbøll (2006, 133) show a significant effect on naturalisation rates in the is only visible in the 2003 naturalisation rates, as there Prais-Winsten model. Fees for naturalisation remain were many naturalisations granted in the first half of insignificant, with a more pronounced interaction- ef the year 2002. Overall, most outliers may be attributed fect but large confidence intervals for fees higher than to policy changes and their timing and underline the dif- approximately 600€. ficulty of adequately measuring policy development.10 As mentioned above, the model specification, -in cluding a lagged dependent variable and panel-cor- 5. Discussion

10 Outlier cases due to a delayed effect of policy changes may be The empirical results provide robust evidence that citi- addressed by lagging the relevant independent variables (Janoski zenship policies have an independent and substantial 2010). Lagging all variables by one year, I find the same effects as in effect on naturalisation rates in full models including the unlagged approach (Table 2), but a slightly worse model fit and larger residuals. This approach thus creates more problems than it relevant control variables, confirming the findings of actually solves. If the outlying observations discussed above are ex- Janoski (2010) and Reichel (2011). Moving beyond a gen- cluded from the model altogether, the same variables of interest are eral effect of policies on naturalisation outcomes, they significant as in models including all observations, except for dual citizenship and ius soli, which then have no significant effect on -na show that some dimensions of naturalisation policies turalisation rates. are more relevant for explaining naturalisation rates J. Stadlmair: Which policies matter? I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1 69

than others. It remains however to contextualise these countries make access to citizenship conditional upon findings and its constraints in terms of methods and economic resources (van Houdt et al. 2011; Stadlmair data used. As the analysis draws on aggregate data, 2014). One country with particularly complex eco- taking country/years as units of analysis instead of in- nomic requirements for naturalisation is Austria, for dividual persons, the effects of policies on individual which Joachim Stern (2012) estimated for the year 2010 decisions concerning naturalisation fall out of sight. that for a single person a net income of under 1000€ Therefore, the findings may deepen an understanding per month was very likely insufficient for naturalisa- of which aspects of policies shape overall naturalisation tion. Reichel and Perchinig (2015) confirm this estimate outcomes, but cannot explain naturalisation as such, with census data, showing that income is an important since many important factors cannot accounted for in individual-level indicator for naturalisation in Austria, this model. with only few low-income immigrants actually obtain- Confirming hypothesis (A), the availability of ius soli ing Austrian citizenship. Confirming hypothesis (C2), indeed corresponds to lower naturalisation rates, al- this paper shows that a focus on economic resources though such an effect is only significant in a full model can be associated with fewer naturalisations on an ag- with control variables. As ius soli constitutes an addition- gregate level. al possibility to obtain citizenship and does not regu- Naturalisation fees do not seem to play a role for natu- late naturalisation per se, this evidence is not surpris- ralisation in a comparison of cross-national differences ing (Reichel 2012). Even so, it refutes a ‘deflation effect’, in naturalisation rates. There is neither an independent where the absence of ius soli leads to higher proportions nor a clear conditional effect, leading to the rejection of of foreign residents, which in turn would deflate natu- hypothesis (C3). The very weak interaction of naturali- ralisation rates (Vink 2010). Turning to naturalisation sation fees and policy inclusiveness implies that natu- policy dimensions in a narrow sense, residence require- ralisation fees might have a stronger effect in a context ments cannot independently explain levels of naturali- in which naturalisation is otherwise easily accessible. sation rates. Assuming that potential naturalisations However, given that both naturalisation fees and natu- are delayed depending on the length of legally required ralisation policy inclusiveness are not correlated and residence, there is no evidence that naturalisation rates vary quite substantially in the sample of countries are lower if potential applicants have to wait longer to studied as well as within countries over the period of naturalise. This is not in line with what one might expect analysis, it is rather surprising that this effect is not sig- based on research using survey or register data, which nificant. Interpreting this finding it seems that, unlike shows that the propensity to naturalise decreases with public services, citizenship acquisition cannot be effec- the length of individual residence (Peters et al. 2016). tively regulated via fees (Grohs et al. 2013). Also when applying shorter or longer lags for immigrant Differences in procedural security have no clear effect inflows, there is no statistically significant effect of on naturalisation rates when using the PCSE-LDV ap- residence requirements on naturalisation rates. Conse- proach, but they do when using Prais-Winsten approach. quently, hypothesis (B) is rejected. The most solid effect Therefore hypothesis (D) cannot be confirmed with of policies on naturalisation is the effect of naturalisation solid evidence, calling for further research on discre- conditions: More demanding requirements correspond to tion in naturalisation processes. An availability of dual fewer naturalisations, leading to a confirmation of hy- citizenship corresponds to higher naturalisation rates, at pothesis (C). Within the set of possible conditions for least when including all control variables, confirming naturalisation, civic integration requirements only have an hypothesis (E) and the findings of Reichel (2011) with a effect on naturalisation in the Prais-Winsten model but larger data set. not in the more restrictive PCSE-LDV model. This evi- In line with the findings of Janoski (2010), immigrant dence supports arguments which question the purpose inflow rates have no clear and direct effect on naturali- of such requirements, rendering them primarily sym- sation rates, even when using appropriate lags based on bolic politics (Mourão Permoser 2012). However, there is the duration of residence requirements and controlling no solid evidence for confirming hypothesis (C1). for the share of EU-citizens among inflows. In the PC- Of the naturalisation conditions, the findings sup- SE-LDV model, the variable on government composition port the view that in particular economic requirements confirms the expected effect of left-wing party power on supress naturalisation. If access to citizenship is tied naturalisation rates (ibid.). Economic development does to some form of economic independence – be it not re- not seem to have an impact on naturalisation rates, as ceiving welfare benefits, having stable employment, or the variable on GDP per capita is always insignificant. meeting an income threshold – there are fewer natural- However, this finding may be attributed to the relatively isations compared to countries in which such require- homogeneous economic development of the countries ments are not in place or more lenient. This finding is covered in the sample. of particular relevance, as an increasing number of 70 J. Stadlmair: Which policies matter? I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1

6. Conclusion Literature

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Author

Jeremias Stadlmair (1987) is a PhD student at the Depart- ment of Political Science of the University of Vienna and member of the research group IN:EX Politics of Inclu- sion and Exclusion. His research interests comprise citizenship and migration policies in Europe, political participation, and direct democracy. Recent publications include: “Die meritokratische Neugestaltung der öster- reichischen Integrationspolitik zwischen Rhetorik und Policy”, in: Austrian Journal of Political Science (ÖZP), Vol. 45(1), 2016, 65–79 (together with Oliver Gruber and Astrid Mattes); “Petitionen und Parlamentarische Bürgerinitiativen: Zivilgesellschaft im Parlament?”, in: TransForm – Journal für Zivilgesellschaftliche In- novation, Vol. 1, 2016, 68–100 (together with Sieglinde Rosenberger). J. Stadlmair: Which policies matter? I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1 73

Appendix: Prais-Winsten regression results

Model (1) (2) (3) (4) Policy dimensions Ius soli -0.0183* -0.0190* -0.0215** -0.0240** (0.0072) (0.00743) (0.00715 (0.00809) Residence requirements 0.0224 0.0302 (0.0147) (0.0159) Naturalisation conditions 0.0872*** 0.0840*** (0.0127) (0.0137) Procedural security 0.0333*** 0.0301** (0.00888) (0.00921) Dual citizenship (dummy variable) 1.307** 1.405** (0.434) (0.442) Naturalisation conditions Civic integration requirements 0.0235** (0.00809) Economic requirements 0.0261*** (0.00619) Naturalisation fees -0.000181 0.00434 (0.00078) (0.00531) Policy index (excluding civ. int., ec. req., 0.103*** nat. fees) (0.0213) Policy index (excluding nat. fees) 0.203*** (0.0446) Interaction term of fees and policy -0.0000898 index (0.0000927) Control variables Lagged immigrant inflows 0.0698 0.0548 0.0422 (0.0494) (0.0509) (0.0543) EU-share of inflows -1.411 -2.001 -1.232 (1.641) (1.459) (1.707) Government composition 0.115 0.12 0.126 (0.117) (0.116) (0.118) GDP per capita 0.0000516 0.0000201 -0.0000151 (0.0000857) (0.0000858) (0.000101) Intercept -3.036* -4.774 -4.581 -6.634 (1.258) (2.54) (2.51) (3.492) Observations 178 176 169 169

Adjusted R-squared 0.271 0.273 0.285 0.222 Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Discussion

Drei demokratische Inklusionsprinzipien1

Rainer Bauböck1, *

1 Department of Political and Social Sciences, European University Institute, Florence, Italy * E-Mail: [email protected]

Zusammenfassung Wessen Interessen sollten in demokratischen Entscheidungen repräsentiert werden? Wessen Rechte sollten von demokratischen Regierungen geschützt werden? Wer hat Anspruch auf Bürgerschaft und Wahlrecht? Gegen die vorherrschenden normativen Demokratietheorien argumentiert dieser Diskussionsbeitrag, dass diese drei Fragen unterschiedliche Antwor- ten verlangen. Demokratische Legitimität erfordert die Berücksichtigung der von einer Entscheidung negativ betroffenen Interessen, die Gewährleistung von gleichen Rechten und Einspruchsoptionen für alle Rechtsunterworfenen und Zugang zur Bürgerschaft für all jene, die genuine Bindungen zu einem bestimmten demokratischen Gemeinwesen haben.

Schlüsselwörter Demokratische Theorie, Inklusion, Bürgerschaft, Betroffene Interessen, Legitimität

Three Principles of Democratic Inclusion

Abstract Whose interests should be represented in democratic decisions? Whose rights ought to be protected by democratic governments? Who has a claim to citizenship and voting rights? Against most current normative theories of democracy, this contribution argues that these three questions call for different responses. Democratic legitimacy requires taking into account the interests negatively affected by a decision, the provision of equal rights and contestation options for all subjected to the law, and citizenship status for all those with genuine ties to a particular democratic polity.

Keywords Democratic Theory, Inclusion, Citizenship, Affected Interests, Democratic Legitimacy

Acknowledgment Sieglinde Rosenberger hat durch ihre empirischen Forschungen wesentlich zum besseren Verständnis von Inklusion und Exklusion in Österreich beigetragen und immer wieder wichtige Impulse für öffentliche Debatten gesetzt. Ich bedanke mich bei ihr für die Einladung, zum Thema dieses Beitrags einen Vortrag am Institut für Politikwissenschaft in Wien zu halten. Schließlich danke ich ihr auch für viele Jahre einer nicht nur kollegialen, sondern auch freundschaftlichen Beziehung.

The author has declared that no competing interests exist.

1 Dieser Beitrag ist eine Kurzfassung einiger Thesen aus Bauböck (2017 im Erscheinen). Einige dieser Argumente wurden bereits in Bauböck (2015) vorgestellt.

March 31, 2017 I innsbruck university press, Innsbruck OZP – Austrian Journal of Political Science I ISSN 2313-5433 I http://oezp.at/ Vol. 46, issue 1 I DOI 10.15203/ozp.1590.vol46iss1 OPEN ACCESS 76 R. Bauböck: Drei demokratische Inklusionsprinzipien I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1

Im folgenden Beitrag skizziere ich aus der Sicht der nor- Prinzips der Inklusion aller betroffenen Interessen mativen politischen Theorie eine kurze Grammatik demo- variable politische Grenzen für das Wahlrecht vor: kratischer Inklusion in der Hoffnung, dass eine analytische “The appropriate demos should be settled decision by Klärung von Inklusionsprinzipien letztlich auch für die decision, not people by people” (Shapiro 2002, 244). empirische Forschung fruchtbar ist. Diese Hoffnung speist Arash Abizadeh vertritt im Unterschied zu Goodin sich aus der Annahme, dass demokratische Legitimität ein und Shapiro ein Prinzip der Inklusion aller, die der Begriff mit sowohl normativem als auch empirischem Ge- Zwangsgewalt von Gesetzen unterworfen sind. Sei- halt ist und dass Inklusion eine wesentliche Bedingung dene Schlussfolgerungen sind jedoch ähnlich: Der De- mokratischer Legitimität in beiderlei Hinsicht ist. mos muss grundsätzlich unbegrenzt sein, weil jeder Unter demokratischer Inklusion verstehe ich hier die Staat Einwanderung gesetzlich reguliert und dadurch Berücksichtigung betroffener Interessen in politischen den Rest der Menschheit seiner Zwangsgewalt un- Entscheidungen, die Einbeziehung von Gesetzesunter- terwirft. Zumindest Einwanderungsgesetze müssen worfenen in Systeme ziviler und sozialer Rechte, und die daher in demokratischen Foren beschlossen werden, Zuerkennung von Mitgliedschaft und politischen Betei- in denen die potenziell ausgeschlossenen Fremden an ligungsrechten in einem demokratischen Gemeinwesen. der Entscheidung beteiligt sind (Abizadeh 2008, 26). Ich versuche zu zeigen, dass diese drei Modi der Inklusion Andere AutorInnen, wie etwa Seyla Benhabib (2004) durch spezifische normative Prinzipien geregelt werden und Sofia Näsström (2007) sind vorsichtiger, was sol- sollten, die unterschiedliche personale Reichweiten haben. che institutionellen Implikationen betrifft, benutzen aber demokratische Inklusionsprinzipien ebenfalls in erster Linie dazu, die Legitimität bestehender Aus- 1. Welche Fragen sollen Inklusionstheorien schlüsse in Frage zu stellen. beantworten? Obwohl dieses Anliegen wichtig ist, so kann es doch nicht der Sinn demokratischer Inklusionsprin- Normative Theorien verfolgen in der Regel kritische Ab- zipien sein, alle Grenzen grundsätzlich in Frage zu sichten, welche ihre Suche nach Prinzipien leiten. Das gilt stellen. Inklusion setzt ja eine Grenze voraus, die auch für Theorien demokratischer Inklusion. Oft ist die kri- überschritten wird. Wenn die Grenze selbst illegi- tische Absicht jene, den existierenden Grenzen von Staaten tim ist, dann erübrigen sich Fragen der Inklusion. So die demokratische Legitimation zu entziehen. Zu diesem macht etwa die Frage, wer in demokratischen Wahlen Zweck genügt es nicht zu zeigen, dass die heutigen Grenzen inkludiert werden soll, keinen Sinn, wenn das Terri- und die heutige Zusammensetzung der Bevölkerung fast torium, in dem die Wahlen stattfinden, zuvor wider- aller Staaten aus einer Geschichte von Krieg, Eroberung, rechtlich annektiert wurde. Umgekehrt formuliert, Kolonisierung und ethnischen und religiösen Säuberungen muss demokratische Inklusionstheorie zumindest hervorgegangen sind. Demokratisch illegitim sind Gren- die Möglichkeit legitimer territorialer Grenzen und zen nicht aufgrund ihrer Genese, sondern dann, wenn sie Unterscheidungen zwischen Mitgliedern und Nicht- in gegenwärtigen Kontexten jene ausschließen, die gut be- mitgliedern des Demos zulassen, um die folgende Lis- gründete Ansprüche auf Inklusion haben oder umgekehrt, te praktischer Inklusionsfragen positiv beantworten wenn sie jene einschließen, die Ansprüche auf kollektive zu können: Selbstbestimmung und Unabhängigkeit haben. Viele zeit- genössischen politischen Theorien behaupten dagegen, • Wer hat Anspruch auf Mitgliedschaft und po- dass es prinzipiell keine demokratische Rechtfertigung litische Beteiligung in einem demokratischen für Grenzschließungen gibt. In dieser Sicht sind politische Gemeinwesen? Grenzen nicht nur historisch kontingent, sondern auch • Wer hat Anspruch auf Schutz von Rechten durch moralisch grundsätzlich arbiträr und können jederzeit in politische Institutionen? Frage gestellt werden. • Wer hat Anspruch auf Anhörung und Berücksich- Robert Goodin (2007) vertritt zum Beispiel die Auf- tigung seiner/ihrer Interessen in einer bestimm- fassung, dass alle von politischen Entscheidungen wahr- ten politischen Entscheidung? scheinlich Betroffenen in den Demos inkludiert werden • Unter welchen Voraussetzungen ist es demokra- müssen, der diese Entscheidungen trifft. Da es aber- un tisch legitim, territoriale Grenzen durch Abspal- möglich ist, bei der Entscheidung über die Zusammen- tung oder Vereinigung zu verändern? setzung eines Demos im Voraus zu wissen, wer von allen möglichen Entscheidung auf der Grundlage aller mögli- Ich werde versuchen, in diesem kurzen Artikel die chen politischen Agenden eines Gesetzgebers betroffen ersten drei dieser Fragen zumindest grundsätzlich zu sein wird, folgt schlüssig, dass es nur einen globalen De- beantworten. Diese Fragen setzen stabile und legiti- mos geben kann, der die gesamte Menschheit umfasst. Ian me territoriale Grenzen voraus. Die vierte Frage nach Shapiro schlägt im Gegensatz dazu auf der Basis desselben der demokratischen Legitimität der Veränderung R. Bauböck: Drei demokratische Inklusionsprinzipien I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1 77

dieser Grenzen muss hier ausgeklammert bleiben, um ven Identität der gemeinsamen Herkunft, Geschichte, Komplexität zu reduzieren. Sprache, Kultur oder Werte sehen, die diese Nation von anderen unterscheidet. Der Zweck der Erhaltung dieser Differenz rechtfertigt dann entsprechende Kriterienka- 2. Korrespondenz zwischen legitimer Inklusion taloge für die Einbürgerung von ImmigrantInnen. und Zwecken der Assoziation Die notwendige Korrespondenz zwischen legiti- men Inklusionsansprüchen und assoziativen Zwecken Mein Ziel ist also nicht nur die Kritik von Ausschluss, bedeutet, dass es immer zwei mögliche Normverlet- sondern auch die Schließung einer Lücke in der De- zungen gibt: ungerechtfertigten Ausschluss und unge- mokratietheorie, die schon in den 1980er Jahren von rechtfertigten Einschluss. Unter letzterem verstehe ich Fredrick Whelan (1983) und Robert Dahl (1989) beklagt nicht den zwangsweisen Einschluss von Individuen oder wurde. Das von Dahl und Whelan formulierte und in Gruppen, sondern Über-Inklusion. Der Begriff der - In letzter Zeit vieldiskutierte „democratic boundary pro- klusion suggeriert explizite Zustimmung oder implizi- blem“, besteht darin, dass ein Demos über seine eigene tes Einverständnis der Inkludierten. Die Insassen eines Zusammensetzung oder sein Territorium nicht selbst Gefängnisses oder die einer Kolonialmacht Unterwor- auf demokratische Weise bestimmen kann, weil solche fenen werden nicht „inkludiert“. Über-Inklusion erfolgt Entscheidungen nur von einem Demos getroffen werden dann, wenn konsensuelle Aufnahme den assoziativen könnten, der selbst bereits demokratisch legitim zusam- Zwecken widerspricht. Als Beispiel kann die Vergabe mengesetzt ist und legitime Herrschaft innerhalb eines von Staatsbürgerschaften und damit auch Wahlrechten Territoriums ausübt. Im Folgenden sollen zunächst ei- an Großinvestoren dienen (Shachar/Bauböck 2014). Ist nige Bedingungen erörtert werden, unter denen dieses beim Zugang zur Staatsbürgerschaft ein pekuniäres In- logische Paradox praktisch lösbar werden könnte. teresse des Staates ausreichend oder verletzt es ein De- Als erste Regel für eine normative Grammatik der In- mokratieprinzip, wenn Wahlrechte von jenen erkauft klusion schlage ich ein Prinzip der Korrespondenz zwi- werden, die keine genuinen Bindungen an die jeweilige schen assoziativen Zwecken und Inklusionsansprüchen politische Gemeinschaft haben? vor. Politische Gemeinwesen sind eine Form der Asso- ziation von Menschen. Alle solchen Assoziationen sind partikular und unterscheiden zwischen Mitgliedern und 3. Hintergrundannahmen einer Inklusionstheorie Nichtmitgliedern. Die Menschheit insgesamt ist eine für territoriale Gemeinwesen natürliche Spezies und keine Assoziation. Assoziatio- nen sind zweckorientierte Zusammenschlüsse. Das gilt Jede normative Theorie muss bestimmte Hintergrund- auch für politische Gemeinwesen. Aristoteles definiert annahmen über die menschliche Natur oder allgemei- die Polis als eine Vereinigung zum Zweck eines autarken ne Eigenschaften von Gesellschaften treffen, die in der und guten Lebens der Bürger. Hobbes sieht den Staat als weiteren Analyse nicht mehr in Frage gestellt werden. Zusammenschluss zur Gewährleistung der Sicherheit So postulierte etwa John Rawls für seine einflussreiche der Untertanen, Locke dagegen als die Bedingung für die Theorie „circumstances of justice“, worunter er die nor- Sicherung der natürlichen Freiheiten im gesellschaftli- malen Bedingungen verstand, unter denen menschli- chen Zusammenleben. Für Rousseau ist der Zweck der che Kooperation sowohl möglich als auch notwendig Unterwerfung unter politische Herrschaft die kollektive ist (Rawls 1999, 109). Dazu zählt Rawls eine moderate Freiheit durch Selbstgesetzgebung. Der Legitimitäts- Knappheit an Ressourcen (weil sowohl bei Überfluss anspruch demokratischer Herrschaft (im Gegensatz zu als auch bei absoluter Knappheit Prinzipien der Vertei- dynastischer oder religiöser) wird immer mit solchen lungsgerechtigkeit ins Leere laufen) und einen „Sinn für Zwecken begründet. Gerechtigkeit“ als bei Menschen grundsätzlich vorhan- Aus der Binnensicht einer Vereinigung ist Inklusion dene psychologische Disposition, ohne die der normati- dann legitim, wenn die Ansprüche von Außenstehenden ve Appell keine Resonanz fände. auf Aufnahme mit den Zwecken der Assoziation korres- Können wir in vergleichbarer Weise Umstände be- pondieren. Ein leidenschaftlicher Schachspieler hat kei- nennen, unter denen demokratische Inklusion sowohl nen Anspruch auf Aufnahme in einen Tennisklub. Bei empirisch möglich als auch normativ notwendig für demokratischen Gemeinwesen ist die Antwort, worin die Legitimation politischer Herrschaft ist? Ich möchte die Korrespondenz zwischen individuellem Anspruch in dieser Hinsicht ahistorisch universelle Rahmenbe- und assoziativem Zweck besteht, weniger eindeutig, weil dingungen von historisch variablen unterscheiden. Zu sie von unserer Auffassung der Demokratie abhängt. den ersteren gehören m.E. interne Diversität innerhalb Wer etwa das demokratische Volk als Nation begreift, politisch verfasster Gesellschaften und externe Vielfalt wird die Korrespondenz in einer Übereinstimmung von abgegrenzten Gemeinwesen. Gäbe es in einer Ge- individueller Identitätsmerkmale mit einer kollekti- sellschaft keine Vielfalt von Interessen, Identitäten und 78 R. Bauböck: Drei demokratische Inklusionsprinzipien I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1

Ideologien (wobei ich mit letzteren primär Ideen über daraus, dass weder kurzfristige Migrationsbewegungen das Gemeinwohl meine), so wäre Demokratie nicht not- zwischen Staaten noch Binnenmigration innerhalb von wendig, weil jeder und jede EinzelneR alle Entscheidun- diesen einbezogen werden. Nach dem Zerfall der Sow- gen im Namen aller treffen könnte. Die Existenz von jetunion und Jugoslawiens ist die Zahl der internatio- Außengrenzen zwischen politischen Gemeinwesen ist nalen MigrantInnen alleine dadurch angestiegen, dass zwar keine strikte Voraussetzung für Demokratie; wir Binnenmigration sich in zwischenstaatliche verwan- können uns eine solche auch auf einer Inselgesellschaft delt hat. Diese Einsicht ist wesentlich für ein Mehrebe- vorstellen, die niemals Kontakt zu anderen Gesellschaf- nenmodell demokratischer Inklusion, das ich am Ende ten hatte.2 Aber quer durch die Menschheitsgeschichte dieses Aufsatzes skizzieren werde. Die Bedingungen haben sich politische Gemeinwesen immer in einer Um- für demokratische Inklusion auf der Ebene von Staaten welt konstituiert, in der sie Beziehungen zu anderen, von unterscheiden sich von jenen auf der Ebene von lokalen ihnen unabhängigen Gemeinwesen unterhielten. Jeden- Gemeinden, nicht zuletzt deshalb, weil letztere in viel falls taucht, wie oben ausgeführt, die Frage nach demo- höherem Grad mobile Gesellschaften beherbergen als kratischer Inklusion nur in Kontexten auf, in denen es erstere. Grenzen zwischen politischen Gemeinwesen und Unter- scheidungen zwischen Mitgliedern und Fremden gibt. Zu den historisch variablen Umständen demokra- 4. Vordemokratische, prozedurale und tischer Inklusion rechne ich jeweils eine politische und substanziell demokratische Inklusionsprinzipien eine gesellschaftliche Rahmenbedingung: die Territori- alität politischer Herrschaft und die relative Sesshaftig- Das „demokratische Grenzproblem“ verleitet dazu, In- keit von Bevölkerungen. klusionsprinzipien jenseits der Demokratie zu suchen. Mit relativer Sesshaftigkeit meine ich den Umstand, Eine solche Lösung wurde bereits angedeutet. Die Gren- dass die meisten Menschen den Großteil ihres Lebens zen aller politischen Gemeinwesen sind historisch kon- innerhalb der politischen Grenzen eines bestimmten tingent, aber jene der modernen Staaten orientieren sich Gemeinwesens verbringen. Relativ sesshafte Gesell- am Ideal der Übereinstimmung von Staat und Nation. schaften unterscheiden sich von nomadischen, die sich Die Grenzen des Staates können nicht demokratisch als Kollektive durch den Raum bewegen, von territorial legitimiert werden, sondern nur durch die kollektive statischen, in denen fast alle Menschen ihr gesamtes Le- Identität seiner BürgerInnen als Angehörige einer Nati- ben im selben Territorium verbringen und grenzüber- on, deren Existenz als historisches Kollektiv unabhängig schreitende Migration die seltene Ausnahme ist, und von der demokratischen Verfassung des Staates ist. Ob von hypermobilen, in denen die meisten Menschen in- ein Staat offen ist für die politische Integration von Ein- dividuell migrieren und sich dabei die meiste Zeit ihres wanderern, ist in dieser Sicht nicht eine Frage der De- Lebens in Territorien aufhalten, in denen sie sich nicht mokratie, sondern des nationalen Selbstverständnisses. dauerhaft niederlassen. Relative Sesshaftigkeit ist eine Einwanderungsnationen, die aus kolonialer Landnahme relevante Rahmenbedingung für demokratische Inklu- hervorgegangen sind, unterscheiden sich in dieser Hin- sion, weil sie bedeutet, dass MigrantInnen in territorial sicht von Auswanderungsländern und Nationalstaaten, verfasste Gemeinschaften mit dauerhaft niedergelas- die aus dem Zerfall multinationaler Imperien hervorge- senen Mehrheiten inkludiert werden. In nomadischen gangen sind. und statischen Gesellschaften taucht die Frage nach Solche vordemokratischen Lösungen bleiben die demokratischer Inklusion jener, die territoriale Gren- Antwort schuldig, wie liberal demokratische Staaten zen überschreiten, überhaupt nicht auf und in hyper- den Ausschluss niedergelassener Einwanderer von mobilen wäre sie auf den Kopf gestellt, weil es hier um Staatsbürgerschaft und Wahlrecht auf Dauer rechtfer- die Inklusion einer Minderheit von Sesshaften in eine tigen können. Auch empirisch gesehen gibt es in diesen Gesellschaft ginge, die keine dauerhafte Bindung an ein Staaten trotz erheblicher Unterschiede eine gemeinsa- Territorium hat. me Dynamik der Inklusion sowohl der ImmigrantInnen Mobilität und Sesshaftigkeit hängen aber nicht nur als auch der EmigrantInnen in den Demos, welche durch vom Verhalten der Menschen ab, sondern auch von der Bezug auf die unterschiedliche Geschichte und Identität Größe und den Grenzen des politischen Territoriums. von Nationen nicht erklärt werden kann. Wenn wir heute etwas mehr als 3% der Weltbevölke- Demokratische Inklusionsprinzipien können ent- rung als internationale MigrantInnen zählen, die sich weder prozedural oder substanziell sein, je nachdem ob länger als ein Jahr außerhalb ihres Geburtslandes auf- Demokratie primär als Verfahren für kollektiv binden- halten3, so ergibt sich dieser überraschend niedrige Wert de Entscheidungen verstanden wird oder als ein Bündel von Normen und Institutionen, welche insgesamt ge- 2 Ich danke Joseph Carens für diesen Hinweis. 3 Das ist die Definition und Schätzung der United Nations Population währleisten, dass politische Herrschaft durch freie und Division. gleichberechtigte BürgerInnen autorisiert wird. Joseph R. Bauböck: Drei demokratische Inklusionsprinzipien I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1 79

Schumpeters Lösung des demokratischen Grenzprob- rung, die mit allgemeiner Gesetzgebungskompetenz in- lems war rein prozedural: „Democracy is a political me- nerhalb eines politischen Territoriums ausgestattet sind thod .... incapable of being an end in itself.“ (Schumpeter und Gesetze beschließen und implementieren, welche 1950, 242). Daraus folgt, dass wir es jedem Demos über- die Interessen von Personen innerhalb und außerhalb lassen müssen, seine Zusammensetzung selbst zu be- dieses Territoriums in unterschiedlicher Weise betreffen. stimmen (ebenda, 245). Wie Robert Dahl ausgeführt hat, Der Demos kann erstens nicht dadurch bestimmt wäre in dieser Sicht nicht nur das Apartheidregime in werden, welche Interessen von Regierungsentschei- Südafrika demokratisch legitim gewesen, sondern auch dungen betroffen sind, weil dann sowohl die Zusam- die Herrschaft eines kommunistischen Zentralkomitees, mensetzung des Volks als auch der von ihm gewählten sofern innerhalb dieses Gremiums demokratische Me- Regierung von zukünftigen Entscheidungen ebendieser thoden zur Entscheidungsfindung angewendet werden Regierung abhängen würden. Das zweite Inklusions- (Dahl 1989, 121). Die Paradoxien prozeduraler Lösun- prinzip des Einschlusses aller Gesetzesunterworfenen gen lassen sich gut am Beispiel des Frauenwahlrechts führt zu einem ähnlichen Zirkelschluss. Das demokrati- demonstrieren. Dieses wurde von verfassungsgebenden sche Volk ermächtigt eine Regierung und die Reichweite Versammlungen, Parlamenten oder in Volksabstimmun- der Gesetzgebungsgewalt dieser Regierung bestimmt gen beschlossen, bei denen nur Männer wahlberechtigt wiederum, wer zum demokratischen Volk gehört. Die- waren. War die Einführung des Frauenwahlrechts le- se Rückkoppelung eines demokratischen Outputs (die gitim, weil sie in einem demokratischen Verfahren von Etablierung einer Regierungsgewalt) an einen Input (die einem existierenden Demos beschlossen wurden, oder Autorisierung dieser Gewalt durch einen Demos) ist nur war sie illegitim, weil Frauen an diesem Verfahren nicht dann widerspruchsfrei, wenn wir ein territoriales Ge- beteiligt waren? Wäre eine Entscheidung gegen das waltmonopol als vordemokratisch legitim annehmen Frauenwahlrecht legitim, wenn Frauen gleichberechtigt und lediglich die Frage stellen, ob Zugewanderte in den an dieser Entscheidung beteiligt sind und mehrheitlich Demos inkludiert werden sollen. Grenzüberschreitende gegen ihr eigenes Wahlrecht stimmen? Migration wirft dann allerdings die Frage auf, wie unter Für substanzielle Inklusionsprinzipien hängt da- einem Prinzip der Inklusion aller Gesetzesunterworfe- gegen die Legitimität der Anwendung demokratischer nen die Abweisung von Einwanderungswilligen und der Verfahren zur Entscheidungsfindung davon ab, ob die Einschluss von Ausgewanderten als Staatsbürger und von den Entscheidungen betroffenen Interessen in an- Wahlberechtigte gerechtfertigt werden kann. gemessener Weise berücksichtigt wurden, ob die einer Solche Widersprüche sind m.E. lösbar, wenn wir die Regierungsgewalt Unterworfenen von dieser als Gleich- beiden Prinzipien so modifizieren, dass sie die Frage le- berechtigte respektiert und geschützt werden, und ob gitimer Inklusion für jeweils eine Phase des demokrati- das diese Regierungsgewalt ermächtigende Volk alle schen Prozesses beantworten: einschließt, die demokratische Ansprüche auf Mitglied- schaft und Wahlrecht haben. In der gegenwärtigen De- (1) Demokratische Entscheidungen sind nur dann legitim, wenn batte wurde von allen AutorInnen jeweils eine dieser drei die von ihnen tatsächlich oder wahrscheinlich betroffenen In- Bedingungen zu einem generellen Inklusionsprinzip teressen bei der Entscheidung berücksichtigt wurden. verallgemeinert. Ich versuche dagegen zu zeigen, dass diese drei Bedingungen sich auf jeweils unterschiedliche Die Berücksichtigung betroffener Interessen erfordert, Aspekte der Demokratie beziehen. dass deren Vertreter von einer bevorstehenden Ent- scheidung informiert werden, ein Recht auf Anhörung genießen und gegebenenfalls auch in die Beratung über 5. Anwendungsbereiche demokratischer die Entscheidung eingebunden werden. Dieser Prozess Inklusionsprinzipien der Berücksichtigung von Interessen ist ein unverzicht- barer und allgemein anerkannter Aspekt innerstaatli- Die meisten AutorInnen vertreten entweder ein Prinzip cher Demokratie. Er setzt eine politische Öffentlichkeit des Einschlusses aller betroffenen Interessen oder aller mit unabhängigen Medien sowie die Einbeziehung von dem Gesetz Unterworfenen. Wird eines dieser Prinzipi- Interessenvertretungen in Beratungen über den Be- en verallgemeinert, dann dient es dazu, auch die Frage schluss und den Vollzug von Gesetzen voraus. Das be- zu beantworten, wer Ansprüche auf Mitgliedschaft und deutet jedoch nicht, dass die Besitzer privater Medien Wahlrechte hat. Dies ist jedoch deshalb nicht möglich, oder die Vertreter von Interessenverbänden Ansprüche weil der demokratische Prozess aus unterschiedlichen auf Staatsbürgerschaft, auf besondere Stimmrechte bei Phasen besteht, deren logische Abfolge nicht durch Rück- Wahlen oder Sitze in Parlamenten haben. Es bedeutet koppelung in einen Kreislauf verwandelt werden kann: auch nicht, dass möglicherweise betroffene Interessen Ein demokratisches Volk ermächtigt durch Wahlen die berechtigt sind, die politische Tagesordnung demokra- legislativen und exekutiven Institutionen einer Regie- tischer Regierungen mitzubestimmen, weil damit das 80 R. Bauböck: Drei demokratische Inklusionsprinzipien I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1

fundamentale Prinzip der Ermächtigung von Regie- Aus dem zweiten Prinzip folgt wiederum nicht, dass rungsgewalt durch gleichberechtigte BürgerInnen aus- der Anspruch auf Mitgliedschaft und Wahlrechte allen gehöhlt würde. Gesetzesunterworfenen und nur diesen zukommt. Der Ein Prinzip des Einschlusses betroffener Interessen 14. Zusatz zur U.S. amerikanischen Verfassung unter- bildet jedoch nicht nur die Situation in liberalen Demo- scheidet in dieser Hinsicht sehr genau zwischen dem kratien ab, wie wir sie kennen. Es birgt auch erhebliche citizenship clause („all persons born or naturalized in the Sprengkraft für das internationale Staatensystem, in United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, dem die Nichtberücksichtigung extern betroffener Inte- are citizens of the United States and of the state wher- ressen die Regel ist. Aus dieser Sicht ist es nicht nur eine ein they reside”) und dem equal protection clause (“no sta- Frage der ökologischen Vernunft, sondern der demokra- te shall … deny to any person within its jurisdiction the tischen Legitimität, dass staatliche Energiepolitik die equal protection of the laws”). Interessen der gesamten Menschheit an der Verlangsa- mung des Klimawandels berücksichtigen muss. Für die- (3) Anspruch auf Bürgerschaft und Wahlrechte haben all jene, se und zahlreiche andere Politiken mit transnationalen deren Freiheit und Wohlergehen mit der Selbstregierung und und globalen Effekten braucht es Institutionen, in denen dem Gemeinwohl eines bestimmten politischen Gemeinwe- staatliche und nichtstaatliche Akteure als Vertretungen sens verknüpft sind. betroffener Interessen an Beratungen beteiligt werden, bevor einzelne Regierungen und internationale Orga- Dieses Inklusionsprinzip bezieht sich auf die erste Pha- nisationen in legitimer Weise Entscheidungen treffen se des demokratischen Prozesses. Statt Mitgliedschaft können. an bestimmte Ergebnisse dieses Prozesses (Regierungs- gewalt oder spezifische Politiken) zu knüpfen, wird hier (2) Demokratische Regierungsgewalt ist nur dann legitim, wenn das allgemeine Kriterium der Korrespondenz zwischen sie allen, die ihr unterworfen sind, den gleichen Schutz ge- individuellen Inklusionsansprüchen und assoziativen währt und wenn sie von diesen auch angefochten werden Zwecken auf demokratische Gemeinwesen angewandt. kann. Der normative Zweck der Demokratie ist es, die kollektive Freiheit und das Gemeinwohl der BürgerInnen zu Dieses zweite Inklusionsprinzip begründet Rechtsstaat- sichern. Daher sind alle jene einzuschließen, deren in- lichkeit als ein demokratisches Prinzip. Es bezieht sich dividuelle Freiheit und Wohlergehen nur durch diesen im Gegensatz zum ersten nicht auf spezifische Politiken, Einschluss gesichert werden kann. deren Effekte unterschiedliche Reichweiten haben, son- Dieser allgemeine Grundsatz muss in zweierlei Hin- dern auf das elementare Verhältnis zwischen Regierun- sicht konkretisiert werden, um praktisch anwendbar zu gen und jenen, die deren Zwang unterworfen sind. Die werden. Erstens muss die Stärke individueller Bindun- Legitimität dieses Zwangs erfordert nicht nur demokra- gen an ein bestimmtes Gemeinwesen beurteilt werden. tische Autorisierung, sondern auch den gleichen Schutz Langfristiger Aufenthalt im Territorium ist dafür sicher- der Rechte all jener, die ihm ausgesetzt sind. Eine demo- lich eine hinreichende, aber nicht immer eine notwendi- kratische Regierung kann deshalb nicht von Mehrheiten ge Bedingung. Auch der vergangene Aufenthalt oder die autorisiert werden, Minderheiten zu unterdrücken. Die in einer zukünftigen Lebensplanung vorgesehene Rück- im dritten Abschnitt besprochene Territorialität politi- kehr können begründen, warum Auswanderer der ers- scher Herrschaft identifiziert die Wohnbevölkerung als ten Generation ihre Staatsbürgerschaft und Wahlrechte primär Anspruchsberechtigte unter diesem zweiten In- beibehalten, obwohl sie der laufenden Gesetzgebung des klusionsprinzip. Herkunftsstaates nur marginal unterworfen oder von Die Gesetzesunterworfenen haben nicht nur An- dieser betroffen sind. Sogar Ansprüche von Flüchtlingen spruch auf gleichen Schutz ihrer Rechte, sondern auch auf raschen Zugang zur Staatsbürgerschaft können sich das Recht zur Anfechtung der ihnen gegenüber ausge- darauf stützen, dass der Aufnahmestaat in besonderer übten Gewalt. Niedergelassene Fremde, auch wenn sie Weise für ihre Freiheit und ihr Wohlergehen verant- kein Wahlrecht besitzen, genießen dennoch die Frei- wortlich geworden ist, weil der Herkunftsstaat in dieser heitsrechte der politischen Rede, Versammlung und Hinsicht versagt hat. Vereinigung und können sich gegen staatliche Behörden Zweitens folgt aus dem Grundsatz der Korrespon- an unabhängige Gerichte oder Ombudsinstanzen wen- denz, dass die Bedingungen für die Selbstregierung den. Jene, die nicht umfassend einer politischen Gewalt eines Gemeinwesens ausschlaggebend dafür sind, wie unterworfen sind, aber in ihren Freiheiten von dieser Inklusion praktisch geregelt wird. Für unabhängige erheblich beschränkt werden, haben in gleicher Weise Staaten sind die Integrität ihres Territoriums und die Anspruch auf Rechtfertigung und Berufungsmöglich- Kontinuität ihres Staatsvolks Bedingungen für Selbstre- keiten. Diese Schlussfolgerung trifft auch für abgewiese- gierung innerhalb des internationalen Staatensystems. ne ImmigrantInnen zu. Das erklärt und rechtfertigt, warum das Wahlrecht in R. Bauböck: Drei demokratische Inklusionsprinzipien I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1 81

nationalen Wahlen in fast allen Staaten an die Staats- Bauböck, Rainer (2017 im Erscheinen). Democratic Inclu- bürgerschaft geknüpft ist und diese wiederum automa- sion. Rainer Bauböck in Dialogue. Manchester. tisch per Geburt erworben wird und nur per Antrag auf Benhabib, Seyla (2004). The Rights of Others: Aliens, Re- Einbürgerung oder Ausbürgerung gewechselt werden sidents, and Citizens, Cambridge. kann. Kommunen sind im Gegensatz dazu politische Dahl, Robert (1989). Democracy and Its Critics, New Gemeinwesen, die in das Territorium eines Staates ein- Haven. gebettet sind und deren Grenzen offen für Einwande- Goodin, Robert E. (2007). Enfranchising All Affected In- rung sind. Es entspricht diesen Bedingungen kommu- terests, and Its Alternatives, in: Philosophy & Public naler Autonomie, die jeweilige Wohnbevölkerung in Affairs, Vol. 35(1), 40–68. den Demos der lokal Wahlberechtigten zu inkludieren. Näsström, Sofia (2007). The Legitimacy of the People, in: Auch diese normative These wird durch einen demo- Political Theory, Vol. 35(5), 624–658. kratischen Trend gestützt: In den meisten europäischen Rawls, John (1999). A Theory of Justice. Revised Edition, und südamerikanischen Staaten sind kommunale Wahl- Oxford. rechte von der Staatsbürgerschaft teilweise oder ganz Schumpeter, Joseph A. (1950). Capitalism, Socialism, and abgekoppelt (Arrighi/Bauböck 2016). In einer föderalen Democracy, New York. Mehrebenenstruktur bilden substaatliche und supra- Shachar, Ayelet/Rainer Bauböck (Hrsg.) (2014). Should staatliche Regionen einen dritten Typus demokratischer Citizenship be for Sale?, Florence: Robert Schuman Gemeinwesen, in denen Bürgerschaft und Wahlrechte Centre for Advanced Studies, European University weder per Geburt noch per Wohnsitz erworben werden, Institute. sondern von der Staatsbürgerschaft abgeleitet werden. Shapiro, Ian (2002). The State of Democratic Theory, in: Dies trifft sowohl auf die europäische Unionsbürger- Ira Katznelson/Helen V. Milner (Hrsg.): Political Sci- schaft zu, als auch auf Wahlrechte in den konstitutiven ence. State of the Discipline, New York, 235–265. Regionen demokratischer Bundesstaaten. Whelan, Frederick G. (1983). Prologue: Democratic Theo- ry and the Boundary Problem, in: J. Roland Pennock/ John W. Chapman (Hrsg.): Liberal Democracy, Nomos 6. Schlussbemerkung 25, New York, 13-47.

Diese sehr kurze Grammatik demokratischer Inklu- sion lässt viele Fragen offen. Sieglinde Rosenbergers Autor Forschung hilft einige davon in konkreten Migrations- kontexten zu beantworten (Ataç/Rosenberger 2013). Ich Rainer Bauböck ist seit 2007 Professor für soziale und habe hier lediglich versucht zu zeigen, dass bei bestimm- politische Theorie am Europäischen Hochschulinstitut ten Hintergrundannahmen und einer Ausdifferenzie- in Florenz. Zuvor war er Mitarbeiter am Institut für Hö- rung von Inklusionsprinzipien für drei Aspekte und here Studien in Wien und am Institut für europäische Phasen des demokratischen Prozesses das sogenannte Integrationsforschung der Österreichischen Akademie demokratische Grenzproblem sowohl theoretisch wie der Wissenschaften, Lehrbeauftragter an den Univer- praktisch lösbar ist. sitäten Innsbruck und Wien und Vorsitzender der Ös- terreichischen Gesellschaft für Politikwissenschaft. Er hatte Gastprofessuren und Forschungstipendien un- Literaturverzeichnis ter anderen an den Universitäten Innsbruck, Warwick, Princeton, Yale, CEU Budapest, Pompeu Fabra und Bris- Abizadeh, Arash (2008). Democratic Theory and Border tol. Gemeinsam mit Jo Shaw und Maarten Vink leitet Coercion: No Right to Unilaterally Control Your Own Rainer Bauböck ein Beobachtungszentrum für Staats- Borders, in: Political Theory, Vol. 36(1), 37–65. bürgerschaftsfragen http://eudo-citizenship.eu. Arrighi, Jean-Thomas/Rainer Bauböck (2016). A multilevel puzzle. Migrants’ voting rights in national and local elections, in: European Journal of Political Research, online first, DOI: 10.1111/1475-6765.12176. Ataç, Ilker/Sieglinde Rosenberger (Hrsg.) (2013). Politik der Inklusion und Exklusion, Wien. Bauböck, Rainer (2015). Morphing the Demos into the right shape. Normative principles for enfranchising resident aliens and expatriate citizens, in: Democra- tization, Vol. 22(5), 820–839.

Discussion

‘Gender nationalism’: The new (old) politics of belonging

Leila Hadj Abdou1, *

1 Department of Political Science, University of Vienna, Austria * E-Mail: [email protected]

Abstract This contribution takes a look at the phenomenon of ‘gender-nationalismʼ. It argues that references about gender equality and women’s rights play an important role in contemporary politics of belonging: these references are used as boundary markers in nationalist narratives, constructing the self versus the immigrant other. The contribution traces the emergence of this phenomenon in Europe, and focuses on its occurrence in recent debates. It concludes that whilst gender equality is a crucial claim that needs to be upheld in the public sphere, we also need to pay attention to intersectional mechanisms of exclusion and oppression which are at play in contemporary versions of gender nationalism.

Keywords Nationalism, Gender Equality, Women’s Rights, Immigration, Populist Radical Right, Muslims

„Gender Nationalismus“: Neue (alte) Politik der Zugehörigkeit

Zusammenfassung Dieser Beitrag setzt sich mit dem Phänomen des „Gender-Nationalismus“ auseinander. Das Hauptargument, das der Beitrag verfolgt, ist, dass in gegenwärtigen Politiken der Zugehörigkeit Referenzen auf Geschlechtergleichheit und Frauenrechte eine zentrale Rolle einnehmen, wobei diese Referenzen als Demarkationslinien zwischen „uns“ und den „anderen“ funktion- ieren. Die Entwicklung dieses Phänomens seit den späteren 1980ern wird in dem Beitrag rekonstruiert und dessen Manifes- tation in aktuellen Debatten aufgezeigt. Der Artikel versteht sich als Kritik am Gender-Nationalismus und plädiert für eine Perspektive, die Ausgrenzung und Unterdrückung in ihrer Intersektionalität erfasst.

Schlüsselwörter Nationalismus, Geschlechtergleichheit, Frauenrechte, Migration, Populistische Rechtsparteien, Muslime

Acknowledgement The ideas presented in this contribution were developed in the framework of cooperation and continuous exchange with Sieglinde Rosenberger. From 2006-2009 we have worked together in the research project “VEIL” on debates about Muslim headscarves. But it was long before that project, that Sieglinde’s extraordinary capacity to think analytically and her passion for research has started to inspire me. I owe her a lot for that, and consider her as a wonderful academic colleague and friend.

The author has declared that no competing interests exist.

March 31, 2017 I innsbruck university press, Innsbruck OZP – Austrian Journal of Political Science I ISSN 2313-5433 I http://oezp.at/ Vol. 46, issue 1 I DOI 10.15203/ozp.1592.vol46iss1 OPEN ACCESS 84 L. H. Abdou: ʻGender nationalismʼ I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1

Introduction: marcating the political community and establishing the potent revival of nationalisms in Europe „who is in and who is out“. It can be summarized as the dirty work of boundary maintenance (Yuval Davis In August 2016 local bans of the Muslim swim-cloth, the 2006, 204) separating the world into ‘usʼ and ‘themʼ. so called burkini, in several French coastal towns have Some projects of the politics of belonging are more sparked a heated controversy across Europe. While some open, whereas others are more exclusive, but they are have been outraged by the punishment and forced undress- always directed at promoting power, either through ing of Muslim women by armed police forces, others such reproducing existent power relations or by chal- as the French prime-minister Emanuel Valls have unveiled lenging them. Nationalism is based on the idea of a their discontent with the Muslim swimwear: ‘It is the ex- national community that is bound together by com- pression of a political project, a counter-society, based no- mon imagined features. Other, competing projects tably on the enslavement of womenʼ, Valls underlined (The have emerged in addition to nationalism, and are e.g. Independent August 24, 2016). Controversies, such as the constructed around the notion of religion or cosmo- ‘Burkini affairʼ are closely tied to the revival of nationalism politanism (Yuval Davis 2011). It is finally important in Europe. to note, that the politics of belonging does not only This revival of nationalism is characterized by two involve the construction of boundaries but also the major, interrelated components: First, current versions inclusion and exclusion of certain people based on of nationalism in Europe are paradoxically embracing social categories (Yuval Davis 2011, 19), it is thus not ‘Europeannessʼ. The revival of nationalism is closely relat- merely a symbolic act, but can have substantive con- ed to particular forms of othering, which do not exclusively sequences in terms of rights and opportunities. refer to the national ‘otherʼ, but to Europe’s ‘otherʼ. Second- Although, as noted before, alternative, competing ly, contemporary versions of nationalism are deeply gen- projects of the politics of belonging have emerged, dered. Nationalist projects always have exhibited a gender nationalism is undoubtedly still highly relevant to- component, but the specific ways of gendering nationalist day. But there are certain shifts as regards how- na discourses and politics have changed, as will be discussed tional narratives construct the ideal image of the na- in this contribution. References to gender equality and tion. The question is, thus, not whether nationalism is women’s rights have become a core element of boundary still important, but how the idea of the nation is con- making, in establishing ‘Europeanizedʼ nationalist nar- structed today. Gender is a core element in the process ratives of the ‘selfʼ and the ‘otherʼ. It is this phenomenon of reimagining the nation. Women have been used which I call ‘gender-nationalismʼ, its role in contemporary throughout history as the symbolic border guards of politics of belonging, and it’s manifestations in recent de- the nation (see Yuval Davis 1993). It is often the purity bates in Europe this contribution is interested in and will and the modesty of female citizens, which morally discuss in the following. The contribution shows that gen- represent the nation, whereas men are imagined as der nationalism is a central instrument in the nationalist the protectors of the nation. Through protecting the repertoire to legitimize the exclusion of the ‘otherʼ. nations’ women, they are ‘savingʼ the nation. As we The contribution first introduces the concept of the will see in the following these classical imaginations politics of belonging, which provides a useful tool to un- are still at play in nationalist narratives today. What derstand the dynamics of nationalism. It then looks at the differentiates gender nationalism from previous vari- emergence of gender nationalism post-1989. Afterwards ants, though, is the focus on those living in Europe, it illustrates the phenomenon of gender-nationalism with but who are considered not to be of Europe, namely examples from the current “refugee crisis” debate; a de- Muslims immigrants. bate which starting from summer 2015 has further raised concerns with immigration and gave nationalism a new boost. It then discusses the nexus between Europeaniza- Post-1989: tion and gender nationalism. The conclusion is eventually From Economic Concerns to Cultural Values highlighting some implications of gender nationalism for gender equality. New variants of gender nationalism emerged at the end of the 1980s, as became particularly evident in growing debates about Muslim headscarves across Nationalism and the politics of belonging Europe. An analysis of headscarf controversies across Europe by a project led by Sieglinde Rosen- Nationalism and it’s reproduction is strongly related to berger and Birgit Sauer (Rosenberger/Sauer 2012) the ‘politics of belongingʼ, or to be more precise national- showed, that the oppression of Muslim women, took ism is the expression of a specific project of the politics of a central role in establishing new “tales about what belonging. The politics of belonging is concerned with de- differentiates ‘usʼ from ‘themʼ (Kilic et al. 2008, 403). L. H. Abdou: ʻGender nationalismʼ I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1 85

The practice of Muslim veiling was widely interpreted and ‘progressive nativesʼ (cf. Yilmaz 2015), whereas ref- as a practice that is (re)importing gender inequality and erences to gender relations were at the core of these de- the oppression of women to European nation states, marcation processes. whereby Muslim women were often constructed as victims in an essentialist, and oversimplified manner. Voices of Muslim women themselves relating the wear- The populist right and gender-nationalism ing of the headscarf to self-determination were widely ignored in these debates or explicitly rejected as misled. These developments supported the rise of the popu- It is revealing that the first headscarf controversy, list right, who have been the agenda setters as regards concerning two French school girls Alma and Lila, took anti-Muslim mobilization in Europe (see Rosenberger / place in 1989. The end of the cold war stimulated the Hadj-Abdou 2013). Previous dominant issues within prioritization of questions of culture and identity over political party competition, that structured Europe’s economic questions and the distribution of material re- political systems along a left-right spectrum, have been sources (cf. Fraser 1995) and therefore triggered this kind complemented by a non-economic, cultural dimension of debates. of societal conflicts, which particularly new populist From 1989 onwards in particularly migrant women parties were able to exploit. have become objects of the politics of belonging in na- The discourses of the new populist radical right tionalist narratives. These narratives exhibit continu- movement in Western Europe, such as the French Front ities to the previous colonialist gaze on the “female oth- National, or the Austrian Freedom Party are a paradig- er”, but they also exhibit differences. Colonial ideology matic example of the use of gender-nationalism. As part often defined the colonized people as a whole as “weak, of their anti-Islam agenda these parties have empha- submissive and irrational” (Hunt 2002, 2). The colonial sized a commitment to gender-equality, women’s rights rule was consequently a reflection of male superiority, and freedom of choice (Akkermann 2015). which was at the time seen as the legitimate, “natural” This endorsement of self-determination and gen- order in colonizing societies (ibid.). Today it is “gender der-equality is somewhat puzzling given that the pop- equality” rather than “male superiority” which is por- ulist radical right continues to embrace a conservative trayed in nationalist discourses as defining European ideology as regards family values and gender roles, nation states. and is usually opposing feminism. The commitment A central element of this post-1989 gender nation- to gender equality has hence been rightly identified as alism is that the integration of immigrants has become a Janus quality of this kind of parties. Their commit- a contested arena. Integration politics, as Uitermark ment is predominantly instrumental to an anti-Islam (2010, 6) has put it, have burst out of their specific policy and anti-immigration agenda as Akkermann (2015, 56) domain and entered the civic sphere, where the condi- noted. Rhetorical references to equality are only rarely tions and nature of belonging are negotiated. This dy- accompanied by more concrete proposals to improve the namic became especially evident in the introduction of position of immigrant women, instead restrictive policy so called civic integration and citizenship tests in several proposals, such as restricting immigration or prohibit- European countries, which did not only require new- ing Muslim practices, leads the agenda of the populist comers to demonstrate linguistic proficiency, but often radical right (ibid, 53). asked immigrants to demonstrate a commitment to val- The strong calls for immigration control in the ues such as gender equality. Probably one of the most ‘liberalʼ rhetoric of the populist right shows that the telling examples is the citizenship test, which was in- main goal is to legitimize immigration control. At the troduced by the Netherlands in 2006. It included a com- same time it can be also understood as a strategy target- pulsory viewing of a film showing a topless sunbathing ing the female segment of the electorate. The populist, woman, as well as homosexual men kissing each other radical right is predominantly popular among a male (Kilic et al. 2008, 404). Although not explicitly targeted electorate, in order to increase their electoral basis they at Muslims these tests were clearly part of a narrative hence have to adapt their electoral mobilization strate- about the cultural alterity of Muslims, their alleged ir- gies to a female audience. Adapting a gender equality reconcilable cultural differences and backwardness. In rhetoric, while keeping a conservative gender ideology sum, from 1989 onwards debates about immigrants in can be interpreted as an effort to attract new voters, Europe have been turned into debates about Muslims, while keeping old ones. Nonna Mayer’s research (2013), and ‘Muslimnessʼ was constructed in these debates as which has shown an increase of female voters in the case incompatible with belonging to the nation. Pre-1989 tra- of the Front National (FN), suggests that this strategy ditional left-right distinctions had been thus widely re- seems to play out in favour for at least some of the radi- placed by the mid of the 2000s with a culturally loaded cal right parties. distinction between ‘traditional (Muslim) immigrantsʼ 86 L. H. Abdou: ʻGender nationalismʼ I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1

The refugee crisis: Gender-nationalism, though, is not limited to cer- a new peak of gender nationalism tain political parties and Eurosceptic actors, as the above mentioned statements might suggest. Gender national- In the wake of the 2015 ‘refugee crisisʼ, the degree of ist narratives have actually become a dominant perspec- gender nationalism reached unprecedented levels. A tive to ‘understandʼ the ‘immigrant otherʼ across Eu- particular case in point is the debate following the hor- rope. This has become not at least clear in media debates rid sexual attacks by groups of men of North-African in the aftermath of the Cologne attacks in January 2016. descent during the 2015/16 new years’ eve celebration The German daily ‘Süddeutsche Zeitungʼ as well as the in the German city of Cologne (see also e.g. Goetz 2016). news magazine ‘Focusʼ produced media covers of female The point I am making here is not that these attacks are white bodies that were penetrated and/or invaded by not worth of condemnation, they absolutely are, but black male (migrant) hands. my claim is that the way these attacks were discussed in The discursive images employed in all these debates public debate have irrevocably perpetuated the idea of a indicate that gender-nationalism has anew transformed male ‘Muslimʼ threat based on a monolithic understand- itself. The previous focus on migrant women has to some ing of ‘Muslimnessʼ, and by doing so have legitimized extent shifted again to a focus on ‘our womenʼ that are restrictive policies towards refugees in Europe. threatened by the alien ‘otherʼ. This signifies that gen- The use of gender-nationalism and its objective in the der-nationalism has partly abandoned the arena of in- wake of the refugee crisis is again particularly well illus- tegration politics. Within the domain of integration pol- trated in statements of the populist radical right in West- itics gender nationalist narratives have left some space ern Europe. At the beginning of 2016 FN leader Marine for inclusion. The ‘otherʼ could transform into a citizen, Le Pen made the following appeal to the ‘French peopleʼ: by adapting to ‘ourʼ liberal values. In this new old variant of gender-nationalism the only option left, however, is It is as a political leader, but also as a woman, that I the exclusion of the ‘otherʼ. The issue is no more incom- address the French people today. It is as a free French patibility, but the existential threat of the nation (sym- woman, who has been able to enjoy, her whole life, bolized by its women) itself. This is not to say, that the the very precious freedoms fought for long and hard old focus on migrant women has completely vanished. by our mothers and grandmothers, that I want to As the in the beginning mentioned burkini controversy warn about a new form of social, human and moral suggests, debates about migrant/Muslim women are still regression imposed on us by the migrant crisis […] relevant today, the discursive focus though has certainly The right to preserve the integrity of one’s own body, shifted from assimilation/integration to exclusion. whatever sex one may be, is one of the most essential rights. Today, for many women, this right is under at- tack. That barbarity can once again be used against Gender-nationalism and Europeanization women fills me with horror. I remember these words of Simone de Beauvoir: ‘never forget that all it would The above described strong deployment of gender-na- take is a political, economic or religious crisis for tionalism by the Eurosceptic, populist-radical right sug- women‘s rights to be called into questionʼ, and I fear gests that the revival of nationalism is strongly linked that the migratory crisis signals the beginning of the to an anti-EU agenda. Things are however slightly more end of women’s rights. […] I do not for one minute complex than that. While these parties indeed reject the believe in the European Union to reverse this trend. EU, the trope of the Muslim ‘otherʼ also reflects that na- I do think, very strongly, that France, should she re- tional identities and consequently nationalisms in Eu- cover her sovereignty […] can completely choke off rope now include a strong European component. this migratory submersion and its diverse conse- As Bunzl (2005) highlights, modern anti-Semitism quences. I am persuaded that it is the will of the Na- as a product of the 19th century was closely related to tion. (Le Pen, cit. after Galliawatch 2016). nationalism and the emergence of the nation state, whereby the Jewish ‘otherʼ served primarily as a marker Similarly Nigel Farage, the then leader of the popu- of who did or did not belong to the national community. list right United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) The construction of ‘Muslim otherʼ, on the other hand, claimed at the height of the Brexit referendum cam- determines who belongs or does not belong to Europe. paign in June 2016, that women would be at risk of mass As Bunzl (ibid.) remarks, those that mobilize against the sex attacks carried out by gangs of migrant men if Brit- ‘Muslim otherʼ are not worried whether Muslims can be ain stays in the European Union: ‘It depends if we vote good Germans, Italians or Danes; rather they question for Brexit or not. It is an issueʼ (Metro News, 5 of June whether Muslims can be good Europeans (ibid., 502). 2016), Farage claimed. Gender nationalism hence functions less in the interest of national, ethnic purification than as an instrument to L. H. Abdou: ʻGender nationalismʼ I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1 87

fortify Europe in face of international (to a great extent The construction of monolithic, single collectivities Muslim) migration. through nationalist narratives, moreover, is problemat- The existence of gender-nationalism in current poli- ic not only for those who are constructed as ‘outsidersʼ. It tics of belongings is moreover, also related to the fact, is potentially also a problem for those who are imagined that family migration has replaced labour migration as as being within the political community. To put it dif- the dominant type of migration to Europe (cf. Akkerman ferently, the construction of difference equally homog- 2015). The strong focus on the role of migrant women in enizes those within the community, and is oppressing the past decades, hence, is also related to this changing differences such as class, gender, age, and political inter- pattern of immigration. ests. These processes in turn maintain existing inequali- Gender nationalism and the Muslim trope eventu- ties within the “national” community through omitting ally also mirror the fact that the majority of Europeans these inequalities, including gender inequalities. In today indeed express some kind of identification with other words, nationalist narratives are a-politicizing Europe. National and European identities often co-exist inequalities within the political community and his- as research has shown (Wodak/Boukala 2015, 90). This toric struggles to overcome them, by claiming that it is is a fact that also actors such as the populist, radical the supposedly ‘common achievementsʼ (such as gender right cannot and does not ignore. These parties success- equality), that are threatened by the alien Muslim ‘otherʼ. fully albeit in a paradox manner integrate and combine This tale also oppresses that ‘the history of secular de- gender-nationalism with their Eurosceptic, and anti- mocracy was profoundly gender-unequal, in which both immigration agenda. Gender nationalism, thus, has also women and religion were pushed to the private sphere in “modernized”, and to some extent Europeanized the order to make way for masculine rationality. It was only rhetoric of the radical right. in the 20th century that women’s challenge to patriarchal In sum, current politics of belonging, which (re)con- secularism succeeded in winning for them suffrage and stitute the nation through demarcating ‘usʼ from the eventual entry into political institutionsʼ, as the histo- ‘women oppressing Muslim immigrantsʼ is to be under- rian Joan Scott (cit. after Aune 2015) reminds us. stood as a deeply European phenomenon. It is linked to What is needed is not gender-nationalism, but an ac- the emergence of ‘Europeanizedʼ national identities as tive thinking through intersectional dynamics which are well as changing patterns of immigration to Europe. constitutive of inequality. A critique of gender-nationalism that guided this contribution, thus, is not implying that a struggle for gender-equality (in an increasingly Implications of gender-nationalism nationalist but also increasingly religious fundamental- for gender-equality ist world) is obsolete, on the contrary. Instead what this contribution has tried to empha- Gender-nationalism often harms those it claims to ‘saveʼ. size is that references to gender-equality are part of For instance, it is particularly refugee women who suffer a nationalist repertoire of exclusion. As such they are from restricted immigration and asylum regulations, in not primarily about gender-equality or about women’s particular restrictive family reunification rules, which rights, but they are used instrumentally, reifying exist- are legitimized by gender-nationalism. Consequently, ing power-relations. while initially it was mostly men, women are increasingly crossing the Mediterranean too. Women are more at risk to be sexually exploited on their way to Europe, References but also to die during the travel, given that in contrast to men they are more often placed in areas below deck Aune, Kristin (2015). Is secularism bad for women? In- where exposure to fumes, leaking water, and other haz- ternet: https://www.opendemocracy.net/transfor- ards is likely (Pickering/Cochrane 2012, 33). mation/kristin-aune/is-secularism-bad-for-women Gender-nationalism establishes a ‘hierarchy of (Access: 1.8.2016) oppressionʼ, which puts oppression of women before Akkermann, Tijtske (2015). Gender and the radical right other forms of oppression. This hierarchy of oppression in Western Europe: a comparative analysis of policy blends out intersectional dynamics and its consequenc- agendas, in: Patterns of Prejudice, Vol. 49(1-2), 37–60. es, such as in the example above, of being a woman and Bunzl, Matti (2005). Between Anti-Semitism and Is- simultaneously a refugee. lamophobia: some Thoughts on the New Europe, in: It also ignores what scholars of interculturalism and American Ethnologist, Vol. 32(4), 499-508. multiculturalism have emphasized for some time now, Galliawatch (2016): Marine Le Pen in Cologne and wom- namely that cultures are negotiated and transformed en’s rights. Internet: http://galliawatch.blogspot through encounters and interactions with others (Siim/ .co.at/2016/01/marinelepenoncologneandwomens. Stolz 2015, 7). Html (Access: 29.7.2016) 88 L. H. Abdou: ʻGender nationalismʼ I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1

Fraser, Nancy (1995). From Redistribution to Recogni- Wodak, Ruth/Salomi Boukala (2015). European identi- tion? Dilemmas of Justice in a ‘Postsocialist’ Age, in: ties and the revival of nationalism in the European New Left Review 212, 68–93. Union, in: Journal of Language and Politics, Vol. 14(1), Goetz, Anja (2016). Feminismus von rechts. Eine unbeha- 87–109. gliche Frage, in: Femina Politica, Vol. 25(2), 129–137. Yuval-Davis, Nira (2011). The Politics of Belonging: Inter- Hooghe, Gary/Liesbet Marks (2016). Europe’s Crises and sectional Contestations, London. Political Contestation. Paper presented at the Con- Yuval-Davis, Nira (2006). Belonging and the politics ference “Theory Meets Crisis,” Robert Schuman Cen- of belonging, in: Patterns of Prejudice, Vol. 40(3), tre, EUI, June 30-July 1, 2016 197–214. Hunt, Tamara (2002). Introduction, in: Tamara Hunt/ Yuval-Davis, Nira (1993). Gender and Nation, in: Ethnic Micheline Lessard (Hg.): Women and the Colonial and Racial Studies, Vol. 16(4), 621–632. Gaze, New York, 1–16. Kilic, Sevgi/Sawitri Saharso/Birgit Sauer (2008). Heads- carf Regimes in Europe. Comparative Perspectives, Author in: Social Politics. International Studies in Gender, State and Society, Vol. 16(4), 397–410. Dr. Leila Hadj Abdou is an Associate Lecturer at the Mayer, Nonna (2013). From JeanMarie to Marine Le Pen: Department of Political Sciences of the University of Electoral Change on the Far Right, in: Parliamentary Vienna. She is specialized in international migration Affairs, Vol. 66(1), 160–178. governance, immigrant integration and immigration Metro News (2016). Nigel Farage slated for saying wom- policies, and the populist right. From 2014–15 Dr. Hadj en more likely to be raped if we stay in EU. June 5, Abdou was a Research Fellow at the University of Shef- 2016. Internet: http://metro.co.uk/2016/06/05/farag- field (UK); and in 2013/14 she was a Research Fellow at eslatedforsayingwomenaremorelikelytoberapedif- the Centre for Transatlantic Relations in Washington westayintheeu5925625/ (Access: 29.7.2016) D.C.. From 2003-2009 she held a position as a research Pickering, Sharon/Brandy Cochrane (2012). Irregular bor- associate at the Department of Politics of the University der-crossing deaths and gender: where, how and why of Vienna. Dr. Hadj-Abdou holds a PhD in Social and women die crossing borders, in: Theoretical Crimi- Political Sciences from the European University Insti- nology, Vol. 17(1), 27–48. tute (2013). Latest publications include: Migration and Rosenberger, Sieglinde/Birgit Sauer (Hg.) (2012). Politics, Refugees in the Mediterranean. In: Volpi, Frederic and Religion and Gender, London. Gillespie, Richard (eds.). Routledge Handbook on Medi- Rosenberger, Sieglinde/Leila Hadj-Abdou (2013). Islam terranean Politics. Routledge 2017 (with Sarah Wolff); at Issue: Anti-Islamic Mobilization of the Extreme The religious conversion of the Austrian populist right. Right in Austria, in: Brian Jenkins/Andrea Mammone In: Roy, O., McDonnell D. and Mazouki N. (eds.): Saving (Hg.): Varieties of Right Wing Extremism, London the People: How Populists Hijack Religion. Hurst 2016; and New York, 149-163. An unstable equilibrium: Freedom of movement and the Siim, Birte/Pauline Stoltz (2015). Reframing nationalism, welfare state in the European Union. In: Freeman, G. and citizenship and gender: Reflections on contempo- Mirilovic, N. (eds.): Handbook of Migration and Social rary European nationalisms. Paper presented at Policy. Edward Elgar 2016 (with Andrew Geddes); The Being a citizen in Europe, Zagreb, Croatia. Internet: Europeanization of immigration policies. In: Amelina, http://vbn.aau.dk/files/219159089/Reframing_Natio A., Horvath, K. And B. Meeus (eds.): International Hand- nalism_Zagreb_final_2015.pdf (Access: 15.4.2016) book of Migration and Social Transformation in Europe. The Independent (2016). Brexit: Wave of hate crime Springer 2016. and racial abuse reported following EU Referen- dum. 26 of June 2016. Internet: http://www.inde pendent.co.uk/news/uk/homenews/brexit-eu-refer endum-racial-racism-abuse-hate-crime-reported- latest-leave-immigration a7104191.html (Access: 29.7.2016) Uitermark, Jan (2010). Dynamics of Power in Dutch Inte- gration Politics. Doctoral thesis. University of Am- sterdam. Yilmaz, Ferruh (2015). From immigrant worker to Muslim immigrant: Challenges for feminism, in: Journal of Women’s Studies, Vol. 22(1), 37–52. Discussion

Demokratie im Zeitalter der Globalisierung. Ein Essay

Anton Pelinka1, *

1 Nationalism Studies Program and Department of Political Science, Central European University, Budapest * E-Mail: [email protected]

Zusammenfassung Der Diskussionsbeitrag beschreibt den Megatrend Demokratisierung in Verbindung mit einer permanenten Ausweitung des „demos“ in Form der Inklusion von gesellschaftlichen Teilen, die davor aus Gründen des Geschlechts, der Ethnizität („Rasse“) und/oder der religiösen oder auch politischen Überzeugung exkludiert waren. Demokratien – definiert nach den konzeptionellen Kriterien Schumpeters und Dahls – werden aber nunmehr durch die Implikationen des wachsenden Ungleichgewichts zwischen einer globalisierten Ökonomie und der abnehmenden Fähigkeiten einer staatlich limitierten Demokratien her- ausgefordert. Die Folge ist eine abnehmende Politikfähigkeit der Nationalstaaten und damit einer ausschließlich staatlich definierten Demokratie.

Schlüsselwörter Demokratietheorie, Demos: Inklusion und Exklusion, Globalisierung, Gleichgewicht zwischen Freiheit und Gleichheit, nationale und/oder globale Gerechtigkeit

Democracy in Times of Globalization

Abstract The discussion article argues that the process of democratization has been based on an ongoing enlargement of the “demos” by including segments of the society which had been excluded in the past, justified by gender, ethnicity (“race”) and/or religious or political beliefs. In the established democracies – democracies according to the concepts of Schumpeter and Dahl – this process has come almost to an end. But as globalization reduces more and more the political ability of the traditional nation state to define and implement efficient policies, democracy faces a new challenge: How to deal with the growing- im balance between a globalized economy and democratic political systems, restricted in their ability to act by the limitations of nation states?

Keywords Democratic Theory, Demos: Inclusion and Exclusion, Globalization, Balance between Liberty and Equality, national and/or global Justice

The author has declared that no competing interests exist.

March 31, 2017 I innsbruck university press, Innsbruck OZP – Austrian Journal of Political Science I ISSN 2313-5433 I http://oezp.at/ Vol. 46, issue 1 I DOI 10.15203/ozp.1829.vol46iss1 OPEN ACCESS 90 A. Pelinka: Demokratie im Zeitalter der Globalisierung I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1

1. Die Frage nach dem Demos nis breitest möglicher Inklusion ersetzt worden. Prinzipiell ist im Gefolge internationaler Kon- Der Diskussionsbeitrag geht von einem die Neuzeit we- ventionen ein Verständnis von universellen Men- sentlich bestimmenden Trend aus: Die wachsende Selbst- schenrechten akzeptiert, die eine auf Differenzen verständlichkeit von Demokratie als pluralistischer Pro- des Geschlechts, der Religion, der politischen zess – und von einer zunehmenden Inklusion, die in der Überzeugung und der sexuellen Orientierung ge- Ausweitung der politischen Mitbestimmungsrechte auf gründete Exklusion vom „Demos“ als nicht akzep- davor ausgeschlossene Gruppen besteht.: Die letzten zwei table Diskriminierung wertet. Jahrhunderte waren durch die permanente Ausweitung des „Demos“ in Richtung auf eine Deckungsgleichheit Ob diese Trends eher als Auflösung von Widersprü- zwischen den an der Legitimierung politischer Macht Be- chen gesehen werden – wozu Francis Fukuyama neigt teiligten und den dieser Macht Unterworfenen geprägt. (Fukuyama 1992); oder ob sie ursächlich mit dem Dieser Trend stößt aber deshalb auf Grenzen, weil die Er- Entstehen neuer Widersprüche einher gehen – was fahrungen neuzeitlicher Demokratie auf der territorialen die Sichtweise Samuel Huntingtons ist (Huntington Begrenztheit von als souverän fingierter Staaten aufbauen. 1996): Generell ist zu akzeptieren, dass Demokratie Da aber die (vor allem ökonomische, aber auch kulturel- im zweiten Jahrzehnt des 21. Jahrhunderts weltweit le) Globalisierung die staatliche Souveränität und damit in einem signifikanten Maß breiter akzeptiert und auch Territorialität zunehmend obsolet macht, verliert die umfassender verwirklicht ist als je zuvor, insbeson- demokratisch legitimierte Autorität der Staaten – und da- dere auch in der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts, mit die Demokratie – immer mehr die Fähigkeit, Politik zu als Joseph Schumpeter Demokratie in einem die De- gestalten und insbesondere der globalisierten Ökonomie mokratietheorie prägenden Sinn prozessual definiert kontrollierend entgegen treten zu können. (Schumpeter 1950) und, in der zweiten Hälfte des Es geht dabei nicht um den Entwurf eines globalen Jahrhunderts, als Robert Dahl einen rechtlich breit Demokratiemodells, es geht – zunächst – um die Sensibi- garantierten egalitären Zugang vieler zu den demo- lisierung für ein Problem, das in der anachronistischen Be- kratischen Entscheidungen entwickelt hat. (Dahl schränktheit der Demokratie besteht. Eine solche Sensibi- 1989) Dahl hat so das auf den politischen Prozess lisierung reibt sich aber an der Ideologisierung des Volkes, abgestellte, in diesem Sinne formale Demokratiever- des „Demos“. Dem Interesse einer demokratisch legitimier- ständnis Schumpeters durch ein inhaltliches, norma- ten Kontrolle von (vor allem auch) ökonomischer Macht tives, egalitäres Konzept erweitert, das eine Beteili- steht die Idee von der Selbstverständlichkeit des „Demos“ gung aller einer politischen Macht Unterworfenen entgegen. Diese tradierte Selbstverständlichkeit im Dis- zwingend vorsieht. kurs aufzubrechen, das ist die Aufgabe der Demokratiethe- Der von Schumpeter und Dahl repräsentierte orie im 21. Jahrundert. Doppelschritt dominiert das Demokratieverständ- Die neuzeitliche Entwicklung der Demokratie ist durch nis der Gegenwart: Schumpeters am ökonomischen zwei Trends gekennzeichnet, die den demokratietheoreti- Marktmechanismus orientierte Definition von De- schen Diskurs herausfordern und bestimmen: (Alonso et mokratie als Wettbewerb um Wählerstimmen ist al. 2011; Müller 2011; Salzborn 2012; Grande 2015) durch das Scheitern der marxistisch-leninistischen Antithese, Demokratie durch eine elitäre, aber einer • Aus den ethisch-normativen Entwürfen der Demokra- generellen Gleichheit (Gerechtigkeit) verpflichteten tie ist, mit vielen Rückschlägen, eine demokratische Avantgarde herstellen zu lassen, im 21. Jahrhundert Realität entstanden, die zunehmend eine universelle nicht mehr umstritten. Demokratie setzt Pluralis- Geltung beanspruchen kann. Die Entwicklung der po- mus und politischen Wettbewerb voraus. Und Dahls litischen Ordnung der Neuzeit muss als Siegeszug der kritische Ergänzung, dass der auf dem Prinzip indi- Demokratie gesehen werden. Das „We, The People of vidueller Freiheit aufbauende politische Markt der the United States“ – zunächst eine Kampfansage ei- Demokratie durch einen garantierten und egalitären ner durch ökonomische Privilegien ausgezeichneten Zugang zu eben diesem Markt ergänzt werden muss bürgerlichen Elite an eine feudal-aristokratische Ord- (Dahls Konzept von „Citizenship“), ist ebenfalls nicht nung – hat sich in einem Systemtypus konkretisiert, der umstritten – mit einer freilich in ihrer Deutlichkeit weltweit nahezu hegemonial ist. immer klarer erkennbaren Ausnahme: Die Beschrän- • Der elitäre Charakter des Anspruchs auf Demokratie – kung des Zuganges zu „Citizenship“ als Vorausset- ausgedrückt in der Realität, dass 1776 eine kleine Grup- zung des Zuganges zur Demokratie. (Bauböck 1994) pe weißer Männer, darunter „Besitzer“ von Sklaven, in Anspruch nehmen konnten, „das Volk“ zu sein, ist von einem grundsätzlich universell akzeptierten Verständ-

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2. Inklusion – trotz Widerstandes eine solche politische Lösung nicht zu erwarten. Denn die Migrationsbewegungen sind Teil der Globalisie- Die Inklusion von Ausgeschlossenen folgte einem be- rung – und diese rüttelt an der Essenz des Modells nati- stimmten Muster: Die zunächst durch ihre Inklusion onalstaatlicher Souveränität. Privilegierten setzten sich gegen die Ausweitung der Inklusion zu Wehr: gegen das Wahlrecht der armen wei- ßen Männer am Beginn der Demokratieentwicklung in 3. Der Verlust staatlicher Politikfähigkeit den USA; gegen das Wahlrecht der „freien“ (oder erst gerade von der Sklaverei befreiten) Afro-Amerikane- Der Ausschluss von Menschen aus dem Kreis der poli- rInnen in den USA; gegen das Wahlrecht und gegen die tisch Berechtigten aus dem Grund mangelnder Staats- politische Gleichberechtigung von Frauen in der Verfas- bürgerschaft zeigt das Grundproblem einer Demokratie, sung der USA; gegen die bundesstaatliche Garantie des die auf einem territorial begrenzten „Demos“ aufbaut. verfassungsrechtlich zugestandenen, aber in den Süd- Das war zu Zeiten der Anfänge neuzeitlicher Demokra- staaten der USA faktisch blockierten Wahlrechts der Af- tieentwicklung in den Schweizer Kantonen oder auch ro-AmerikanerInnen – in Form der Bürgerrechtsgesetz- in den britischen Kolonien Nordamerikas weniger eine gebung 1964, 1965. Die Strategie der Ausgeschlossenen grundsätzliche Herausforderung als dies im 21. Jahr- war immer eine doppelte: auf der ethisch-normativen hundert der Fall ist: Die Frage der Legitimation und Ebene auf die grundsätzlich akzeptierten, de facto aber der Kontrolle von Macht im ausgehenden 18. Jahrhun- ignorierten Werte der Demokratie zu verweisen – auf dert betraf in Boston oder im Kanton Schwyz die vor das „We, The People“ oder die Menschenrechtsdeklarati- allem von regionaler, von lokaler Macht Betroffenen. on; und faktisch, durch politischen Druck, die Interessen Die Globalisierung hat die territoriale Begrenzung der derer zu treffen, die vom Status quo profitierten. Es war Macht – vor allem in ihrer ökonomischen Dimension – das Bündnis von Idee und Interesse, das – bisher – die gesprengt: BürgerInnen von Boston oder von Schwyz Demokratie weiter entwickelte: von ihren Anfängen als sind im 21. Jahrhundert massiv von Ereignissen und ein Luxusgut einer kleinen privilegierten Minderheit Entscheidungen betroffen, die – wenn sie sich überhaupt zu einem grundsätzlich alle Menschen inkludierenden lokalisieren lassen – in Schanghai oder Sao Paulo oder System der Verteilung und der Kontrolle von Macht. Frankfurt am Main zu verorten sind. Und damit ist das, Lipset hat noch 1997 die Nation der USA („das Volk“) was in Boston oder Schwyz – aber auch das, was in Wien zweigeteilt gesehen. (Lipset 1997) Die Afro-Amerikane- oder Berlin entschieden wird – für die Frage nach der Le- rInnen waren auch nach der Bürgerrechtsbewegung und gitimation und Kontrolle von Macht von abnehmender deren gesetzlichen Erfolgen in den 1960er Jahren eine Bedeutung. gesellschaftlich weitgehend segregierte Sub-Nation. Das Die Nationalstaaten erfahren immer mehr, dass ist in der Zwischenzeit nicht generell anders geworden. ihnen die Fähigkeit zur Politikgestaltung abhanden Aber der Graben, der diese Subnation trennt, ist in- kommt. Die Ökonomie ist immer weniger von Wien oder zwischen weniger tief. Die Wahl Barack Obamas 2008 Stockholm, aber auch immer weniger von London oder bedeutete kein Ende des Rassismus, kein Ende der all- Paris zu steuern – wie auch die Fragen von Sicherheit täglichen Diskriminierung der „schwarzen“ Minderheit. immer weniger national zu beantworten sind. Die Po- Aber dass Obama von einer Regenbogenkoalition ge- litik ist dabei ihre Fähigkeit zu verlieren, der Macht der wählt wurde, von einer Mehrheit aller politisch relevan- Ökonomie eine balancierende Gegenmacht entgegen ter Gruppen der Gesellschaft, einschließlich der Mehr- stellen zu können. Und auch Kriege und Wanderungs- heit der Frauen – nur nicht von einer Mehrheit „weißer“ bewegungen entziehen sich einer politischen Steuerung Männer, das zeigt, dass der Prozess der Inklusion Fort- durch politische Macht, wenn diese staatlich und damit schritte gemacht hat. (Hochschild/Weaver 2010) staatlich begrenzt verstanden wird. Die formelle Ausschließung von Personen wegen ih- Auf dieses Phänomen des staatlichen Politikver- res Geschlechts, ihrer Herkunft, ihrer Überzeugungen lustes gibt es eine rationale Antwort – das traditionel- und Präferenzen kann überwunden werden, ist weitge- le Verständnis von Staatlichkeit aufzugeben; und das hend überwunden – mit Ausnahme eines Ausschlusses, nicht aus primär normativen, sondern aus empirisch der die Grenzen der Demokratieentwicklung vor Augen nachvollziehbaren Gründen. Der Staat als ein durch ein führt: Der Ausschluss aus dem Grund der fehlenden klar abgegrenztes Territorium und ein ebenso klar abge- Staatsbürgerschaft. Dieser Ausschluss könnte, technisch grenztes (Staats-) Volk definiertes souveränes Gebilde, gesehen, leicht überwunden werden: durch eine Garan- als Alpha und Omega der Politik, ist dabei, diese zentrale tie des Zuganges zur Staatsbürgerschaft nach transpa- Rolle einzubüßen. Soll die Politik ihre Handlungsfähig- renten Kriterien, die diesen Zugang nicht für eine länge- keit nicht mehr und mehr verlieren, müssen der Staat re Zeitspanne hinausschieben. Doch angesichts der mit und seine Definitionsmerkmale überdacht werden: die dieser Frage verbundenen Migrationsbewegungen ist territoriale Begrenztheit und die fiktive Eindeutigkeit 92 A. Pelinka: Demokratie im Zeitalter der Globalisierung I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1

des Volkes. Rainer Bauböck hat, im Anschluss an Robert Das analoge Phänomen im 21. Jahrhundert ist die Dahl, auf die Schere zwischen dem staatlichen Territo- versuchte Abschottung gegen die Globalisierung. Die rialitätsprinzip und der abnehmenden Politikfähigkeit rechtspopulistischen Parteien Westeuropas unterschei- verwiesen und auch die in Europa vorherrschende Ab- den sich von den rechtsextremen (faschistischen, na- lehnung der Doppelstaatsbürgerschaft kritisiert – als zistischen) Parteien des 20. Jahrhunderts durch eine Widerspruch zu den Ansprüchen der Demokratie und weitgehend faktische Akzeptanz des demokratischen dem Phänomen globaler Migration. (Bauböck 1994, 3–22, Prozesses und durch den auffallend ausgeprägten „pro- 197–205) Im Gefolge einer auch und wesentlich mit dem letarischen“ Charakter ihrer aus den sozial schwachen Phänomen „Globalisierung“ verbundenen Relativierung Schichten kommenden Wählerschaft. (Wodak, Khosra- der Bindungen an eine territorial definierte Staatlichkeit viNik, Mral 2013) Deren politische Artikulation richtet verliert der Staat zunehmend sein Monopol, politische sich gegen die, die sie als „fremd“ wahrnehmen – und Loyalitäten zu binden. Im 21. Jahrhundert ist Staat nicht deren Integration in die Gesellschaft sie als Bedrohung dasselbe wie im 19. Jahrhundert. Menschen sind immer empfinden: eine Bedrohung, die real ist – etwa auf dem weniger BürgerInnen, deren politisches Bewusstsein Arbeitsmarkt; eine Bedrohung, die irreal ist – dann, durch das Leben in einem einzigen Staat bestimmt ist. wenn das „Anderssein“ der Fremden als objektive Ge- Diese Option, die Politikfähigkeit zurückzugewinnen gebenheit konstruiert wird. In den USA ist der Aufstieg oder, besser, sie in einer transstaatlichen und transnati- des Donald Trump die aktuelle Version dieser Entwick- onalen Form neu zu gewinnen, stößt auf einen derzeit lung – zumeist ohne den um die Mitte des 20. Jahrhun- und in absehbarer Zeit wohl nicht übersteigbaren Wi- derts noch offen artikulierten Rassismus, aber mit der derstand. Das sich nationalstaatlich definierende Volk gleichen Ausschließungstendenz gegenüber den als ist nicht bereit, die Differenz zwischen Volk und Volk Bedrohung empfundenen und als „fremd“, als „anders“ und damit zwischen Staat und Staat einfach am Altar ei- konstruierten Minderheiten. Diese Ausschließungsnei- ner rational konzipierten Transnationalität aufzugeben. gung ist funktional deckungsgleich mit dem Rassismus Die Europäische Union als Versuchslabor von Transna- und seiner Rolle als Hindernis im Prozess der Demokra- tionalität stößt in ihrer geplanten Vertiefung („An ever tisierung. (Rosenberger, Mourao Permoser 2013) closer Union“ – Dinan 1999) auf einen massiven Euro- Die Globalisierung macht staatliche Grenzen durch- skeptizismus, der sich auf alt-neue Nationalismen lässig und relativiert nationalstaatliche Souveränität. stützt und in den Erfolgen von anti-EU-Parteien äußert. Macht verliert ihre nationale Zuordnung. Denn Macht (Leconte 2010) Dieser Widerstand kommt oft von Partei- findet statt, wenn Kapital grenzüberschreitend - inves gruppierungen, die (als „rechtspopulistisch“) traditionell tiert wird; wenn Produktionsstätten von einem Staat in als politisch „rechts“ eingestuft werden. Er kommt aber den anderen verlegt werden; und wenn Millionen Men- auch von Gruppierungen, die sich als „links“ verstehen schen wandern – und in Staaten wohnen, von deren und Transnationalität als Angriff auf den Sozialstaat politischer Macht sie abhängig sind, ohne dass sie die verstehen – dessen Leistungsfähigkeit freilich nicht Politik dieser Staaten mit gestalten können. Demokra- durch den Aufbau transnationaler politischer Struktu- tie als ein System der Legitimierung und Kontrolle von ren sondern durch eine wachsende politische Hilflosig- Macht bleibt hinter diesen Entwicklungen zurück. Die keit des Nationalstaates bedroht ist. (Pelinka 2015) Herrschaft des durch staatliche Grenzziehungen einge- Der sich im Wahlverhalten niederschlagende Anti- grenzten „Volkes“ entspricht immer weniger der Realität Globalisierungs-Affekt ist eine Erscheinung, die der von einer die Grenzen zwischen den Staaten aufhebenden Theodor Adorno und anderen um die Mitte des 20. Jahr- Weltordnung. hunderts in den USA beobachtbaren Entwicklung einer Die Geschichte der universellen Demokratieent- „Autoritären Persönlichkeit“ entspricht: In den USA wa- wicklung ist die Geschichte einer ständigen Erweiterung ren es die ärmeren Schichten innerhalb der insgesamt des „Demos“ – und damit eine Geschichte der ständigen privilegierten („weißen“) Mehrheitsbevölkerung, die um Neudefinition von Volk. Die Effekte der Globalisierung den Verlust ihres gesellschaftlichen Startvorteils fürch- machen deutlich, dass die Geschichte der Demokratie teten. Weil sie nichts zu verlieren hatten als das Privileg als permanenter Erweiterung nicht an einem logischen ihrer Hautfarbe, reagierten die ärmeren „weißen“ Män- Endpunkt angelangt ist. Die Definition des „Demos“ ist ner („rednecks“) auf die sich abzeichnende Inklusion der mehr denn je die Aufgabe der Demokratietheorie. „schwarzen“ Männer in einem signifikant überpropor- tionalen Maße mit aggressiver Ablehnung. Aus einem Gefühl der Bedrohung heraus schotteten sich die ärme- 4. Piketty? Ja, aber ren „Weißen“ gegen die afroamerikanische Minderheit ab. Als ideologischer Überbau diente ein Rassismus, der Demokratie baut auf Freiheit, und sie baut auf Gleich- auf der behaupteten prinzipiellen Differenz zwischen heit. Gleichheit hat aber mit Gerechtigkeit zu tun. „weiß“ und „schwarz“ baute. (Adorno et al. 1993) (Rawls 1971) Das Freiheitspostulat der Demokratie be- A. Pelinka: Demokratie im Zeitalter der Globalisierung I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1 93

trifft den Input Bereich des politischen Systems: Jeder die ebenso rasante Steigerung der Lebenserwartung ge- und jedem muss die Freiheit garantiert werden, sich am rade auch in den ärmeren Regionen der Welt; die begin- politischen System zu beteiligen. Das Gleichheits- und nende Problematisierung der prinzipiellen Ungleich- Gerechtigkeitspostulat der Demokratie betrifft den Out- behandlung, der Diskriminierung von Frauen in den put Bereich des politischen Systems: Die Qualität einer „Schwellenländern“ – das alles droht von einer Über- Demokratie wird auch daran gemessen, wie groß das empfindlichkeit der relativ Privilegierten in den privi- Ausmaß der durch Politik ermöglichten Reduzierung legierten Regionen Europa und Nordamerika zugedeckt der (sozialen und ökonomischen) Ungleichheit ist. zu werden. Dass die Globalisierung auch und wesentlich Das größte Defizit an Gerechtigkeit ist – jedenfalls eine Umverteilung von Wohlstand ist – zugunsten der im 21. Jahrhundert – die Schere zwischen den verschie- Ärmeren – wird von der Fixierung auf die Befindlichkeit denen globalen Regionen. Die Indikatoren der mensch- der sozial Schwächeren in den Reichtumsregionen ver- lichen Entwicklung (Human Development Indicators) drängt. unterscheiden signifikant zwischen den ökonomisch In der schrittweise erfolgten Inklusion der Afro- entwickelten und den ökonomisch weniger entwickelten AmerikanerInnen in den „Demos“ der USA ist das Zu- Regionen der Welt. Die Globalisierung beginnt jedoch sammenspiel von struktureller Ungleichheit, Idee und diese Differenz zu verschieben: Sie führt zu wachsen- Interesse zu beobachten. Gunnar Myrdals Studie „An der Ungleichheit (oder: abnehmender Gerechtigkeit) in American Dilemma“ fasste eine Fülle von Daten zusam- den entwickelten Regionen der Welt (Piketty 2014) und men, die rund um das Jahr 1940 erhoben waren. (Myrdal inspiriert bzw. provoziert so die Affekte, die sich poli- 1942) Die umfangreiche Studie belegte, dass die US-Ge- tisch gegen die Globalisierung richten. Pikettys kritische sellschaft insgesamt – trotz signifikanter Unterschiede Analyse der wachsenden Differenz zwischen Arbeits- zwischen dem Norden und Westen auf der einen, dem einkommen und Vermögen betrifft die Entwicklung in Süden der USA auf der anderen Seite – eine segregier- den reicheren Regionen der Welt insbesondere in Euro- te Gesellschaft war, in der die (im wesentlichen in den pa und Nordamerika. Aber gleichzeitig vermindert die Südstaaten existierende) legale und die (überall zu beob- Globalisierung das Entwicklungsgefälle zwischen den achtende) faktische Diskriminierung der Afro-Amerika- Regionen: Nach den Indikatoren ökonomischer und hu- nerInnen mit einem Vorurteil einherging: Die Vorstel- maner Entwicklung sind die Nutznießer der Globalisie- lung von der „natürlichen“ Überlegenheit der „Weißen“ rung die Gesellschaften in den ärmeren Regionen. gegenüber den „Schwarzen“. In Myrdals Studie wird die In seiner Studie über die Schwierigkeiten, die tradi- „The Racial Beliefs of the Unsophisticated“ genannt. tionell auf innerstaatliche Entwicklungen beschränkten (Myrdal 1962, 97–101) und so der empirisch belegte Zu- Messungen von Ungleichheit (und Ungerechtigkeit) mit sammenhang zwischen Bildung („sophistication“) und der abnehmenden Relevanz von staatlichen Grenzen in Rassismus unterstrichen. Es waren vor allem die in der Einklang zu bringen, zeigt Steven Weisman das Ungenü- gesellschaftlichen Pyramide weiter unten platzierte, gen einer nur auf die innerstaatlichen Effekte gerichte- durch einen geringeren Bildungsstand und – damit zu- ten Debatte auf. (Weisman 2016) Dass das rasante Wirt- sammenhängend – geringeren sozialen Status charakte- schaftswachstum in China die Ungleichheit in China risierten „Weißen“, die um 1940, die von der Überlegen- selbst verstärkt hat – in Form der sich auseinander entwi- heit der eigenen „Rasse“ überzeugt waren. ckelnden Einkommen, das ist die eine Seite der Realität; Als 1962 Myrdals Studie neu aufgelegt wurde, dia- dass aber, erstens, die durch die generelle ökonomische gnostizierte Arnold Rose in einem „Postscript“ die in Entwicklung Chinas die Lebensverhältnisse (gemessen zwei Jahrzehnten eingetretenen Veränderungen: „There etwa an der Gesundheitsversorgung, der durchschnittli- could be no doubt that the races were moving rapidly… chen Lebenserwartung, der Alphabetisierung) auch der (towards) desegregation by 1962.“ (Myrdal 1962, xliii) armen Bevölkerungsschichten sich signifikant verbes- Das Parallelogramm der politisch und ökonomisch be- sert haben; und dass, zweitens, in einem globalen Ver- stimmenden Interessen hatte sich verschoben – vor al- gleich „China’s middle class“ zu den großen Gewinnern lem durch den Bedarf an qualifizierten Arbeitskräften. der Globalisierung zählt, die „US lower middle class“ zu Die Idee einer Demokratie, die auf Freiheit und Gleich- den großen Verlierern, das lässt eine Verallgemeinerung heit aller BürgerInnen beruhte, stand nun nicht mehr in der Aussage einer primär Ungleichheit produzieren- dem 1940 beobachteten Ausmaß in Opposition zu den den Globalisierung ganz bestimmt nicht zu. (Weisman Interessen einer weißen Dominanzkultur, die vorhan- 2016, 49-65) Die Globalisierung hat eine wachsende Mit- dene Startvorteile ideologisch absichern konnte. Durch telschicht in den ärmeren Regionen der Welt zu den gro- die Bürgerrechtsgesetze der 1960er Jahre verschoben ßen Gewinnern der Entwicklung gemacht. sich überdies Interessen, die den politischen Wettbe- Die pauschale Denunzierung der Globalisierung werb bestimmten: Das Gewicht „weißer“ Stimmen, die nimmt diesen Effekt nicht zur Kenntnis: Der rasante nicht mehr von dem traditionellen Vorurteil eigener (na- Rückgang des Analphabetismus in Asien und in Afrika; tur- oder gottgegebenen) Überlegenheit ausgingen, in 94 A. Pelinka: Demokratie im Zeitalter der Globalisierung I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1

Verbindung mit dem wachsenden Stimmgewicht nicht- Volk definiert, besteht wenig Aussicht, dass die - Demo „weißer“ Minderheiten reduzierte das politisch messba- kratie andere Antworten als die Ab- und Ausgrenzung re Gewicht des US-amerikanischen Rassismus. derer findet, die nicht zum (eigenen) „Demos“ gehören. Eine analoge Konfliktsituation lässt sich im gegen- Solange sich das eine Volk vor allem durch konstruiertes wärtigen Konflikt zwischen einem „Demos“, der die Anderssein und institutionelle Ein- und Ausschließung Durchlässigkeit und Aufhebung staatlicher Grenzen als durch den Ausschluss des anderen Volkes definiert, ver- Bedrohung wahrnimmt, und den Folgen der Globalisie- hindert die Demokratie in ihrer national verengten, be- rung beobachten. Aber im Gegensatz zu der Entwick- und eingegrenzten Form eine politische Globalisierung lung in den USA fehlt eine verbindende normative Idee als Antwort auf die bereits bestehende ökonomische. von der Zusammensetzung des „Demos“ – eine Idee, an Die bestehende Demokratie in den (zum Beispiel der sich eine abweichende Realität reibt. Das herrschen- europäischen) Nationalstaaten wird als Endpunkt der de Verständnis von dem, was Volk ist und sein soll, be- Demokratieentwicklung gesehen. Diese Wahrnehmung ruht nicht nur auf Inklusion, es beruht vor allem auch ignoriert, dass die Machverhältnisse, die zu legitimieren auf Exklusion. Das begründet die nationalstaatliche Be- und zu kontrollieren die Kernaufgabe der Demokratie schränktheit der real existierenden Demokratie. Diese sind, sich nicht mehr auf die Etikette „französisch“ oder ist, solange sie nationalstaatlich verengt bleibt, struktu- „polnisch“ reduzieren lassen. Ebenso ist die Differenzie- rell gar nicht in der Lage, auf die globale Ungerechtigkeit rung zwischen Innen- und Außenpolitik immer weniger und die globalen Verschiebungen zu reagieren. Die De- realistisch: Die Wahl eines (einer) US-Präsidenten (Prä- mokratie in den reichen Regionen der Welt reagiert, als sidentin) betrifft BürgerInnen Japans oder Brasiliens, Folge der territorialen Begrenzung des „Demos“ und der ohne dass diese in irgendeiner Form die für sie relevante demokratischen Prozesse in den als „souverän“ fingier- Entscheidung mit beeinflussen könnten. Die Weltpolitik ten Staaten, auf die Umschichtung von Ungerechtigkeit wird zur Weltinnenpolitik – ohne dass die bestehenden aus der Sicht der Betroffenen in den reichen Staaten. Die politischen, die bestehenden demokratischen Struktu- Antworten auf einen Entwicklungsprozess, der durch ren dies reflektieren würden. (Büchele/Pelinka 2013) die Eigendynamik der Globalisierung bewirkt wird, sind bestimmt von der Rücksichtnahme auf die Ängste Globalisierungs- und Modernisierungsverlierer in der 5. Die Schwierigkeiten mit dem „Volk“ reichen („ersten“) Welt. Diese Verlierer flüchten sich zunehmend in eine nationalistisch und rassistisch unter- Daher wäre es – unter Berücksichtigung der Inklusions- fütterte Defensivaggressivität, in eine zumindest latent geschichte der Demokratie – notwendig, die Begrifflich- militante Exklusion von „anderen“, von „Fremden“ – ver- keit „Volk“ zu überdenken. Das Resultat eines solchen bunden mit der Illusion, so die Globalisierung und ihre Überdenkens kann nicht eine fertige Ordnung eines negativen Effekte verhindern zu können. globalen politischen Systems sein, das alle Weltbürge- Diese im Rahmen der Nationalstaaten demokratisch rInnen zum globalen „Demos“ erklärt – das wäre noch legitimierte Abwehrhaltung entspricht der Abwehrhal- naiver als die Vorstellung, dass Thomas Jefferson bei tung der Maschinenstürmer, die im 19. Jahrhundert als der Verfassung der US-amerikanischen Unabhängig- Teil einer „radikalen Tradition“ Industrialisierung und keitserklärung die Frauen, die „Native Americans“, die Kapitalismus abwehren wollten (Hobsbawm 1999): Aus Afro-AmerikanerInnen in sein „We, The People“ hätte einem nachvollziehbaren Interesse stellten sie sich ge- mit einschließen können. Aber die Inklusion der 1776 gen Veränderungen, die ihren sozialen Status bedrohten. Ausgeschlossenen ist innerhalb von zwei Jahrhunderten Anders als diese Maschinenstürmer der Vergangenheit grundsätzlich anerkannt und auch in konkrete Rechts- sind die Maschinenstürmer der Gegenwart aber darüber ansprüche transferiert worden informiert – oder könnten und sollten informiert sein – Die Infragestellung des herrschenden Verständnis- welche Entwicklungen außerhalb ihrer sich potentiell ses (besser: der unterschiedlichen Formen des Verständ- zu Festungen entwickelnden nationalstaatlichen Demo- nisses vom Volk) dient der Wahrnehmung des Wider- kratien vor sich gehen: etwa der Aufstieg von „Schwel- spruchs zwischen Anspruch und Realität: zwischen dem lenländern“ zu Großmächten oder das Massenmorden Anspruch, dass in der Demokratie alle von Machtver- in globalen gesellschaftlichen Erdbebenzonen wie dem hältnissen Betroffenen bei der Regelung dieser Verhält- Nahen Osten. nisse mitwirken können; und der Realität einer Globa- Solange aber die Demokratie gefesselt ist an die – lisierung, die alles zur Innenpolitik macht, ohne dafür scheinbar – Schutz bietende Territorialität des Natio- Instrumente zur Mitbestimmung bereit zu stellen. nalstaates findet sie darauf keine andere Antwort als die Jede Erweiterung der Inklusion reibt sich mit dem Umsetzung von Formeln wie „das Boot ist voll“. Solange konkreten Verständnis von Volk. Die Geschichte der die Demokratie auf einem Begriff von „Demos“ baut, Definition von Volk ist die Geschichte der Spannung der sich vor allem in der Abgrenzung zwischen Volk und zwischen Inklusion und Exklusion, zwischen „‘us‘ and A. Pelinka: Demokratie im Zeitalter der Globalisierung I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1 95

‚them‘“. Diese Geschichte ist durch eine Kontinuität von ation eine wesentlich andere: „Weltpolitik“ wird – etwa Aggression und Gewalt gekennzeichnet, die von „uns“ im Rahmen der Vereinten Nationen – von staatlichen gegen „die anderen“ geübt wurde und mit dem Begriff Regierungen gemacht, die alles daran setzen, unter dem von Volk und Nation gerechtfertigt wurde. Die Diktatu- Stichwort „Nicht-Einmischung“ die nationale Souve- ren des 20. Jahrhunderts haben sich auf das Volk beru- ränität zu verteidigen; ein Prinzip, das zwar durch die fen, auf eine mystische Volksgemeinschaft – und dabei ablaufenden vor allem ökonomischen Globalisierungs- eine den Demokratien analoge Begrifflichkeit verwendet. prozesse mehr und mehr ausgehöhlt wird, das offiziell Der zweite Satz des Bundes-Verfassungsgesetzes der aufzugeben aber schwer, ja unzumutbar erscheint: Las- Republik Österreich stellt fest, dass das Recht der Repu- sen sich doch mit dem Anspruch, dieses Prinzip vertei- blik „vom Volk“ ausgeht. Was dieses Volk aber ist – die digen zu müssen, Wahlen gewinnen – Wahlen in den Summe aller im Staatsgebiet lebenden Menschen, oder abgeschotteten Bereichen der einzelnen Staaten. die Summe der formell als BürgerInnen der Repub- Deshalb ist „global governance“ nicht ausreichend, lik Anerkannten, war von Anfang an umstritten: Einer um den Widerspruch zwischen globalisierter Ökono- nüchtern-rationalen Definition stand eine ethnisch- mie und nationalstaatlich eingeengter Politik aufzulö- rassistische entgegen. 1921 entschied der deutschnati- sen: Denn „global governance“ als zwischenstaatliche onale Innenminister der Republik Österreich, Leopold Kooperationsmuster bleibt im Rahmen einer die staat- Waber, dass „altösterreichische“ BürgerInnen aus dem liche Souveränitätsdoktrin respektierenden Ordnung. nunmehr zu Polen gehörenden Galizien keinen An- Erst die Herstellung supranationaler Strukturen – eben spruch auf die Staatsbürgerschaft der Republik hätten, von „global government“ – würde diesen Widerspruch weil sie – obwohl deutschsprechend – als Jüdinnen und vom Ansatz her aufheben. Doch solange das „Volk“ aus- Juden keine Deutschen wären. (Judson 2016, 445, 542) schließlich mit Bezug auf sich voneinander abgrenzen- Diese Entscheidung war eine Vorwegnahme der Nürn- den Staaten verstanden wird, und solange die interna- berger „Rassen“-Gesetze und zeigte die Willkürlichkeit tional relevanten Akteure die Interessen eines national von Inklusion in das und Exklusion aus dem Volk. und damit abgegrenzt definierten Volkes vertreten, ist Albert F. Reiterer hat die ethnische, die „völkische“ „global government“ nicht in Sicht. Konnotation des Nationsbegriffes kritisch dekonstru- „Global government“ bedeutet den prinzipiellen iert. (Reiterer 1988) Um ein „Wir“-Gefühl im Einklang Abschied von der Vorstellung nationaler Souveränität. mit dem Verständnis universeller Menschenrechte zu Eben das sind die bisher beobachteten Versuche von begründen, braucht es die Akzeptanz des individuellen „global governance“ – vor allem der Völkerbund und Ein- in und auch Austritts aus dem Volk. Und diese Ak- die Vereinten Nationen – eindeutig nicht. Was „global zeptanz ist von Wahrnehmungen und Interpretationen government“ bedeuten müsste, lässt sich bei dem zen- beeinflusst, die Inklusion und Exklusion mit demAn- tralen Diskurs über das Wesen der Europäischen Union schein von Konsistenz versehen: Zu „uns“ gehört, von erkennen: Es ist die Interpretationsschule des „Neo- dem (der) wir annehmen, dass er (sie) „unsere“ Kultur Funktionalismus“, die in der Union ein Laboratorium akzeptiert, oder „unsere“ Sprache spricht, oder die glei- von „transnational government“ sieht – insbesondere chen genetischen Wurzeln („roots“) aufweist, oder die im Europäischen Parlament, der Europäischen Kom- gleiche Hautfarbe hat. Ein „Wir“-Gefühl ist immer auch mission, dem Europäischen Gerichtshof, aber auch im von mehr oder weniger bewussten Rationalisierungen Rat, wenn er nicht mehr an das Einstimmigkeitsprinzip und Ideologisierungen von vorweg (als Vor-Urteil) be- gebunden ist. Die Debatte über den Demokratiecharak- stehenden Ein- und Ausschließungen begleitet. ter der EU und über deren Bundesstaatlichkeit zeigt die Hinter der Ideologisierung des Volkes und des damit Grenzen der politischen Durchsetzbarkeit von „transna- verbundenen „Wir“-Gefühls war und ist immer der Ge- tional government“ auf europäischer Ebene. (Schmitter gensatz von Interessen erkennbar: Die „Haves“, die sich 2000, Morgan 2005) Eben deshalb kann „global govern- aus mehr oder weniger gut nachvollziehbaren Grün- ment“ zwar als schlüssige Antwort auf den Politikver- den von einem signifikanten Inklusionsschritt bedroht lust der Nationalstaaten konzipiert werden – etwa der fühlen, stehen den „Have Nots“ gegenüber, die aus den institutionellen Ausgestaltung der EU folgend, aber auf analogen Gründen von einer Inklusion zu profitieren absehbare Zeit sind die Chancen auf politische Umset- hoffen. Innerhalb eines grundsätzlich der Demokratie zung nicht gegeben. verpflichteten Systems führt das zu den Spannungen und Konflikten, von denen die Geschichte der US-amerikanischen Bürgerrechtsbewegung im 19. und vor allem 6. Die Kollision zweier Megatrends im 20. Jahrhundert ebenso bestimmt war wie die Ge- schichte der Frauenbewegung. Innerhalb eines Systems, Demokratisierung war ein die letzten zwei Jahrhunderte das – wie die Welt in ihrer Gesamtheit – aber keinerlei dominierender Megatrend – methodisch und substanti- demokratische Strukturen aufweist, ist die Konfliktsitu- ell. Demokratie setzte sich immer mehr durch – metho- 96 A. Pelinka: Demokratie im Zeitalter der Globalisierung I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1

disch verstanden als Wettbewerb um Zustimmung von Die Idee einer die nationale Begrenztheit sprengenden Betroffenen und Berechtigten; und inhaltlich verstan- Demokratie trifft sich mit dem Interesse einer von der den als ständig fortschreitende Inklusion von Betroffe- Globalisierung profitierenden Gesellschaft. nen, aber (noch) nicht Berechtigten. Im 21. Jahrhundert Das optimistische Szenario setzt eine Akzeptanz von ist die Demokratisierung mit einem anderen Megatrend Strukturen eines „global government“ voraus, die der konfrontiert – mit der Globalisierung. Die beiden Mega- Vorstellung nationalstaatlicher Souveränität widerspre- trends sind keineswegs inkompatibel. Aber die Weiter- chen und diese in letzter Konsequenz aufheben. Das pes- führung der Demokratisierung setzt voraus, dass das simistische Szenario schließt eine solche Entwicklung nationalstaatliche Axiom, das bisher die Demokratisie- mit dem Hinweis auf eine Ablehnungsspirale aus: Die rung bestimmt hat, zunächst überdacht, dann weiter- unvermeidlichen VerliererInnen einer Entwicklung hin entwickelt und schließlich relativiert wird. Wenn das zu „global government“ sind – solange „global govern- nicht gelingt, wäre die Zukunft der Demokratie gefähr- ment“ nicht existiert – mit einer Vetomacht ausgestat- det: Denn dann würden Nationalstaaten, in eine prinzi- tet. Die demokratisch legitimierten Regierungen der pielle Oppositionshaltung zur Globalisierung getrieben, Nationalstaaten können ihren BürgerInnen, die ja ihre zunehmend autoritäre Tendenzen entwickeln müssen – WählerInnen sind, nicht einfach Lösungen aufzwingen, beginnend mit der Infragestellung und partiellen Auf- die zwar als eine rationale und vor allem auch als eine kündigung universeller Grundrechte. substanziell demokratische Antwort auf die Globali- Wie das Ergebnis der erkennbaren und wohl weiter sierung zu begründen sind, aber kurz- bis mittelfristig zunehmenden Reibungskonflikte zwischen Demokratie den BürgerInnen der privilegierten Zonen der Welt vor und Globalisierung sein wird, muss natürlich offen blei- allem auch Nachteile bringen. Die als „Flüchtlingskri- ben. Aber es zeichnen sich zwei mögliche Szenarien ab: se“ stilisierte weltweite Migrationsbewegung und die (Büchele/Pelinka 2013, 45–76) Reaktionen in Nordamerika und Europa, Japan und Das pessimistische Szenario: Der Widerstand der Australien zeigen, wie schwierig eine rationale Politik Interessen, die eine weitere Ent-Ethnisierung und eine auf nationaler Ebene zu legitimieren ist. Das sich in der Ent-Territorialisierung des „Demos“ als Bedrohung ih- herrschenden Form der Demokratie vor allem, ja fast rer relativ privilegierten Situation sehen, kann nicht auf ausschließlich national artikulierende Interesse steht dem Wege traditioneller nationalstaatlicher Demokra- der Idee transnationaler Demokratie effektiv im Wege. tie aufgehoben werden. Der Widerstand führt zu einer Die Vorstellung von einer globalen demokratischen Verschärfung einer „Das Boot ist voll“-Stimmung und Struktur als in sich logischen Umgang mit der ökono- einer Renaissance nationalstaatlicher Souveränitäts- mischen Globalisierung und die von Defensivinteressen ansprüche als Folge neo-nationalistischer Bewegungen beherrschten demokratischen Strukturen der Staaten in und bei Wahlen erfolgreicher neo-nationalistischer Par- den privilegierten Regionen der Welt sind nur schwer teien. Ökonomisch führt dies zu mehr Protektionismus, in Einklang zu bringen. Die Demokratietheorie, die mit politisch zu einem Rückzug in abgeschottete, eng um- der permanenten Aufhebung von Exklusion beschäftigt grenzten Festungen. Da die Umverteilungswünsche der hat, ist gefordert, Konzepte zur Überwindung der im von diesen relativen Privilegierungen Ausgeschlossenen 21. Jahrhundert dringlichsten Form der Verengung des wachsen und auch an Aggressivität zunehmen werden, „Demos“ zu beschäftigen: Mit der territorialen Dimen- ist eine Zunahme von systematischer Gewalt die Folge: sion von Demokratie. Diese Beschäftigung kann sich auf in Form traditioneller und nicht-traditioneller Kriege. ein Interesse stützen – auf das Interesse, Politikfähigkeit Das optimistische Szenario: Die in der gegebenen jenseits des Staates zu entwickeln. Und sie kann sich auf globalen Ordnung ökonomisch und kulturell relativ Pri- eine Idee stützen: Allen von konkreten Machtverhält- vilegierten akzeptieren allmählich, dass die Sicherung nissen Betroffenen die Möglichkeit zur Mitsprache bei ihrer gesellschaftlichen Position eine Öffnung nicht nur der Legitimierung, der Kontrolle, und der Veränderung der ökonomischen sondern auch der politischen Systeme solcher Machtverhältnisse einzuräumen. erfordert. Die von Inglehart schon Ende des 20. Jahrhun- derts beobachteten Entwicklungstrends – der Zunahme von Bildung und Zunahme von Wohlstand – verstärken Literaturverzeichnis die Einsicht, dass auf die nicht mehr aufzuhaltende öko- nomische Globalisierung eine politische Globalisierung Adorno, Theodor et al. (1993). The Authoritarian folgen kann und soll: aus dem Eigeninteresse der rela- Personality. New York. tiv Privilegierten heraus. Es entstehen mehr und mehr Alonso, Sonia/John Keane/Wolfgang Merkel (eds.) (2011). transnationale Formen von Staatlichkeit. Die Europäi- The Future of Representative Democracy. Cambridge. sche Union wird als Muster, als Instrument für die Rück- Anderson, Benedict (2006). Imagined Communities. Re- gewinnung von Politikfähigkeit im Zeitalter der Globali- flections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism, sierung gesehen – als ein Schritt zu „global government“. London. A. Pelinka: Demokratie im Zeitalter der Globalisierung I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1 97

Bauböck, Rainer (1994). Transnational Citizenship and Rosenberger, Sieglinde/Julia Mourao Permoser (2013). Zu- Rights in International Migration, Cheltenham. gehörigkeitspolitik – schmutziges Geschäft der - po Benhabib, Seyla (ed.) (1996). Democracy and Difference. litischen Grenzziehung? In: SWS-Rundschau 53(4), Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, Princeton. 431–453. Büchele, Herwig/Anton Pelinka (2013). Weltinnenpolitik, Salzborn, Samuel (2012). Demokratie. Theorien, Formen, Innsbruck. Entwicklungen, Baden-Baden. Cannadine, Daviod (2013). The Undivided Past. Humanity Schmitter, Philippe C. (2000). How to Democratize the beyond Differences. New York. European Union…and Why Bother? Lanham (MD). Dahl, Robert A. (1989). Democracy and Its Critics, New Schumpeter, Joseph A. (1950). Capitalism, Socialism and Haven. Democracy, New York. Dinan, Desmond (1999). Ever Closer Union. An Introduc- Weisman, Steven R. (2016). The Great Tradeoff. Confron- tion to European Integration. 2nd edition, London ging Moral Conflicts in the Era of Globalization, Wa- Fukuyama, Francis (1992). The End of History and the shington, DC. Last Man, New York. Wodak, Ruth/Majid KhosraviNik/Brigitte Mral (eds), Grande, Edgar (2015). Transformations of Democracy in (2013). Right-Wing Populism in Europe. Politics and a Globalized World, in: Volker Schneider/Burkhard Discourse, London. Eberlein (eds.): Complex Democracy. Varieties, Crises, Transformations. Cham, 219-230. Hobsbawm, Eric (1999). Uncommon People. Resistance, Author Rebellion and Jazz, London. Hochschild, Jennifer/Vesla Mae Weaver (2010). There’s Anton Pelinka is Professor of Nationalism Studies and No One as Irish as Barack O’Bama: The Policy of Political Science at the Central European University, American Multiculturalism, in: Perspective on Poli- Budapest. From 1975 – 2006 he was full professor at the tics. American Political Science Association, Vol 8(3), University of Innsbruck, Austria and visiting professor 737–759. at Harvard University (Schumpeter Fellow), Stanford Huntington, Samuel P. (1996). The Clash of Civilizations University (Austrian Chair), University of Michigan, and the Remaking of World Order, New York. Ann Arbor, the University of New Orleans, and the Uni- Inglehart, Ronald (1997). Modernization and Postmoden- versité Libre de Bruxelles (Institute for European Stu- ization. Cultural, Economic, and Political Changes in dies). His research fields include Comparative Politics 43 Societies. Princeton. and Democratic Theory. His immediate research focus Judson, Pieter M (2016). The Habsburg Empire. A New will be on democracy and transnational politics. His History. Cambridge, MA. research fields include Comparative Politics and- De Leconte, Cécile (2010). Understanding Euroscepticism, mocratic Theory and transnational politics. Among his Houndsmill. publications: Die unheilige Allianz. Rechte und linke Ex- Lipset, Seymour Martin (1979). American Exceptionalism. tremisten gegen Europa, Böhlau: Wien (2015) A Double-Edged Sword, New York. Morgan, Glyn (2005). The Idea of a European Superstate. Public Justification and European Integration, London. Müller, Jan-Werner (2011). Contesting Democracy. Politi- cal Ides in Twentieth-Century Europe, New Haven. Myrdal, Gunnar (1962). An American Dilemma. The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy. 2nd edition. 2 volumes, New York. Pelinka, Anton (2015). Die Unheilige Allianz. Die rechten und die linken Extremisten gegen Europa, Wien. Piketty, Thomas (2014). Capital in the Twenty-First Cen- tury, Cambridge, MA. Rawls, John (1971). A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, MA. Reiterer, Albert F. (1988). Die unvermeidbare Nation. Ethnizität, Nation und nachnationale Gesellschaft, Frankfurt am Main. Rosenberger, Sieglinde (1996). Geschlechter – Gleichhei- ten – Differenzen. Eine Denk- und Politikbeziehung, Wien

Book Review

What kind of democracy? Participation, Inclusiveness and Contestation Kateřina Vráblíková New York – London 2016: Routledge, 230 pages.

Miriam Haselbacher

Institut für Politikwissenschaft, Universität Wien, Österreich E-Mail: [email protected]

The manifestations of interactions between citizens and dicting traditional inclusive consensus traditions. In their representatives are a decisive element in shaping the following chapters (3 to 6) the model is tested amid and characterising political systems. How do citizens the empirical evidence, with chapter 3 focusing on mi- get involved in political processes and how does this crolevel and chapter 4, 5, and 6 on macrolevel explana- civic engagement influence democracies? What ways tions of political participation. The latter refers to insti- of participation do exist besides the act of voting? And tutional structures (chapter 4), mobilization (chapter 5) what factors may have an influence on a more or less en- and the political culture (chapter 6). Chapter 7 summa- gaged citizenry? In ‘What kind of Democracy’ Kateřina rizes the empirical part and concludes that it is classical Vráblíková adopts a comparative perspective to address microlevel theories that explain who participates and those questions and asks how political inclusiveness/ that it is the contextual theory of inclusive contestation exclusiveness and public contestation/consensus influ- that explains where this participation takes place. The ence participation. She investigates how “individuals’ final and conclusive chapter (Chapter 8) is divided into national political contexts affect their engagement in two parts: it starts by going back to initial reflections nonelectoral political activism” (xiii). Comparing 30 on democratic theory and proceeds by pointing out the contemporary democracies the book asks “how and why practical implications this work may have for policy- people in some countries tend (…) to participate more making. The formerly developed inclusive contestation in nonelectoral politics than people in other countries” model is contrasted with more traditional normative amid the “generally shared aspiration to have a more models of democracy since confrontation between con- active citizenry” (3). Vráblíková develops a democratic flicting interests is considered to be an essential element model of ‘inclusive contestation’ that is said to facilitate of inclusive democratic systems. This theory-driven nonelectoral participation, linking the three dimen- discussion is enriched by practical conclusions and rec- sions of the book’s subtitle to each other. Based on those ommendations that are based on the principles of inclu- considerations it is argued that political rivalry, contes- sive contestation. Linking individual, institutional and tation and competition motivate people to take action. cultural factors, the book determines specific systemic Methodologically, Vrablikova worked with the 2004 arrangements to be decisive for the enhancement of ISSP (International Social Survey Programme) and sup- public engagement. Vráblíková ends the book with the plemented it with macrolevel factors and other nation- formulation of five general rules that should be followed ally representative surveys. in participatory policymaking. The book is divided into eight subchapters and starts As Vráblíková lays out, participatory channels have with an introductory chapter that describes what is been booming, but the concrete form, variations and called the ‘landscape puzzle’ and provides an overview the extent of nonelectoral instruments remain a politi- to the reader about the volume. Chapter two presents the cally contested issue. In times of growing electoral suc- main arguments and develops an inclusive-contestation cess of right-wing populist parties more than ever. The theory drawing on Robert Dahl’s approach and contra- book therefore contributes highly to current discussions

March 31, 2017 I innsbruck university press, Innsbruck OZP – Austrian Journal of Political Science I ISSN 2313-5433 I http://oezp.at/ OPEN ACCESS Vol. 46, issue 1 I DOI 10.15203/ozp.1830.vol46iss1I ORCID: 0000-000x-xxxx-xxxx 100 M. Haselbacher: Book Review I OZP Vol. 46, Issue 1

about democracy as such, as well as the proper institutional environment to encourage the inclusion of citizens and enhancing public participation. Its strength derives from the thoughtful and elaborate combination of empirical research on political participation and the author’s observations on democratic theory. The strong theoretical approach is related to the empirical data and concludes in a discussion about the implications of those findings for normative democratic theories. This fresh and ingenious approach makes it stimulating to readers who are interested in democratic theory as well as for those, who wish to gain a greater understanding of nonelectoral political participation or who wish to have a practical guide for policymaking based on the model of inclusive contestation. It provides new notions on discussions about conceptions of democracy and practical considerations about possible enforcement of nonelectoral political participation.