The Role of Bureaucratic Processes
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FIGHTING OVER WAR: THE BUREAUCRATIC ROLE IN CREATING WAR-TERMINATING BARGAINS A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Government By Thomas J. Nagle, M.A. Washington, DC November 13, 2013 Copyright 2013 by Thomas J. Nagle All Rights Reserved ii FIGHTING OVER WAR: THE BUREAUCRATIC ROLE IN CREATING WAR-TERMINATING BARGAINS Thomas J. Nagle, M.A. Thesis Advisor: Andrew Bennett, Ph.D. ABSTRACT The bargaining model of war assigns a central role to information, which enables belligerents to reduce mutual uncertainty. Although no two wars are identical, ceteris paribus, an enhanced ability to receive and interpret battlefield information should lead to a more rapid termination of the crisis. However, the U.S.’s experience with limited and protracted wars, despite its informational advantages, suggests this is not the case. How does a state determine its offers in the bargaining process to terminate a war once it becomes clear its exogenous ideal point is no longer attainable within an acceptable cost range? The area of war termination within the bargaining model of war has received growing attention, but remains challenged to account for prolonged wars, negotiated settlements, and delays in Bayesian updating. An under-explored factor in this line of inquiry is the role of the national security apparatus that supports the foreign policy executive in decision-making. My central hypothesis is that the bureaucratic advisory process affects state behavior in predictable manners. To explain these conditions, this dissertation develops a typological theory of the bureaucratic processes that create a state’s bargaining position. The principle challenge for the executive is controlling the biases that unavoidably enter into the advisory process; all participants are biased in some manner. The processes used to control them can either help the executive approximate a rational actor, or lead to demands based on outdated or incorrect information. The dependent variable in this dissertation is the iii characterization of a state’s bargaining position described by two elements: the extent of the demands placed on an adversary, and how closely those demands are supported by current battlefield conditions. I will test the above hypothesis through conducting structured, focused comparisons of four cases in a building block approach. This dissertation will contribute to the expanding inquiry into domestic factors in the bargaining model of war by focusing on intra- governmental competition and assessing its relationship to aggregating preferences and updating beliefs. iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to first thank my dissertation committee, Andrew Bennett, Daniel Nexon, and Thomas McNaugher for agreeing to assist me with this endeavor and providing their helpful input. Professor Bennett’s advice helped shape my ideas and drastically improved my early attempt. Special thanks go to Professor Nexon, whose assistance early in my academic adventure was instrumental in getting me to this point. My parents, Tom and Sherry Nagle, have been endlessly supportive and understanding throughout my life, and I get to see them far too infrequently. My children, Alyssa and Tommy, routinely inspire me with their love of life. My biggest thanks go to my wife, Jennifer, who continues to amaze me with her support for my demanding career choices. She has brightened my life immeasurably, and this work is dedicated to her. v Table of Contents Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1 Contributions............................................................................................................................... 4 Argument and Hypotheses .......................................................................................................... 6 Research Strategy and Design .................................................................................................... 9 Key Findings ............................................................................................................................. 12 Dissertation Plan ....................................................................................................................... 14 Chapter 2: Politics and War Termination ..................................................................................... 15 Why Can’t States Settle and Avoid War? ................................................................................. 16 Why Can’t States Settle Quickly, Once War Starts? ................................................................ 22 How does the Bargaining Model Account for Irrational Choices? ........................................... 30 Can Bureaucratic Politics Enhance Understanding of Endogenous Bargaining? ..................... 35 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 46 Chapter 3: Opening the Black Box ............................................................................................... 49 Some Terminology Clarifications: ............................................................................................ 51 War, Strategy, and Information. ............................................................................................... 52 War, Strategy, and Information II: Enter the Bureaucracy ....................................................... 55 Conflicting Interests and Decision-Making. ............................................................................. 62 Theory and Hypotheses............................................................................................................. 65 First Independent Variable: Degree of Plurality ....................................................................... 71 Second Independent Variable: Resolution Strategy ................................................................. 74 Dependent Variable: The Characteristics of a State’s Bargaining Position ............................. 78 Outcome 1: Demands consistent with battlefield information. ................................................ 81 Outcome 2: Excessive demands unsupported by battlefield information. ................................ 84 Outcome 3: Inflexible demands unrelated to battlefield information. ...................................... 87 Outcome 4: Excessive demands unrelated to battlefield information. .................................... 90 Competing Explanations. .......................................................................................................... 92 Conclusion. ............................................................................................................................... 97 Chapter 4: Nixon in Vietnam ........................................................................................................ 98 Context of the War, Key Assessments, and Decisions ........................................................... 102 Bureaucratic Conditions and Rules of the Game .................................................................... 116 Structured Assessment ............................................................................................................ 120 Hypothesis Assessment ........................................................................................................... 128 Alternate Explanation: The Predominant President ................................................................ 133 Alternative Explanation: Psychological Limitations .............................................................. 135 Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 137 Chapter 5: Truman in Korea ....................................................................................................... 142 Context of the War, Key Assessments, and Decisions ........................................................... 145 Bureaucratic Conditions and Rules of the Game .................................................................... 157 Structured Assessment ............................................................................................................ 163 Hypothesis Assessment ........................................................................................................... 174 Alternative Explanation: The Predominant President............................................................. 178 Alternative Explanation: Psychological Limitations .............................................................. 180 Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 182 vi Chapter 6: Johnson in Vietnam ................................................................................................... 187 Context of the War, Key Assessments, and Decisions ........................................................... 189 Bureaucratic Conditions and Rules of the Game .................................................................... 199 Structured Assessment ............................................................................................................ 203 Hypothesis Assessment ..........................................................................................................