Page 134 The Border Battles of Vietnam The Border Battles of Vietnam By Michael A. Eggleston . The fight at Dak To was the third engagement during the fall of 1967 that collectively became known as the "Border Battles." . Dak To was possibly the greatest portent if it was the opening round in "a con- centrated offensive effort" throughout South Vietnam1. General William C. Westmoreland The Border Battles2 1967 brought major fighting to the border areas of South Vietnam. It was an effort by Hanoi to draw U.S. Forces from the densely populated cities of the coastal region to the border areas. This was in preparation for the Tet offensive planned for January 1968 when the cities would be the target of Hanoi’s offensive. The Border Battles would extend from the Demilitarized Zone in the north to the border region north of Saigon in South Vietnam. This required a major commitment of forces by North Vietnam into the border region while the VC would bear the brunt of the fighting in The Border Battles2 the cities during Tet. The Allies would see a new strategy by the NVA. Rather than guerrilla warfare, a conventional war would emerge. Most of the fighting would occur in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam. Dak To fighting started a year before Tet ’68 and would peak in the fall of 1967 after two previous Border Battles. Fighting in the Central Highlands occurred at over a dozen locations, but the most decisive and costly to both sides was at Hill 1338 and Hill 875. 1 William C. Westmoreland. A Soldier Reports, (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1976), 287 2 Author’s Collection. Michael A. Eggleston Page 135 The Hills of Dak To3 The town of Dak To is located in the Central Highlands thirty miles from the Laotian and Cambodian borders. “It lies on a valley floor with surrounding hills covered by tall, thick trees capped by triple-canopy jungle soaring a hundred feet off the ground. These peaks and ridges slope steeply up to elevations of four thousand feet.”4 Weather and terrain favored the enemy. This was similar to Dien Bien Phu in 1954 but with a different outcome. Dak To had a Special Forces Camp (Detachment A-244) which was also being used as a launch site by MACV Studies and Operations Group (SOG)5 which sent reconnais- sance teams to monitor the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos. Battles occurred nearly every year starting in 1966, but the greatest fight was in 1967. The U. S. 4th Infantry Division (4ID) was commanded by MG W. R. Peers, who launched Operation Sam Houston in the Central High- lands on 1 January 1967. The purpose of the operation was to interdict the movement of NVA troops and equipment into South Vietnam from communist sanctuaries in Cambodia and Laos. The operation did not really get started until mid-February and much of the fighting was in the border areas of Pleiku province and further north in Kontum province where Dak To is located. Since the NVA tactic was to attempt to surround and annihilate small U. S. units. General Peers ordered 3 Author’s Collection. 4 Shelby L. Stanton. The Rise and Fall of an American Army: U. S. Ground Forces in Vietnam, 1965-1973. (New York: Balantine Books, 1985), p. 168. 5 SOG carried out covert operations against the North Vietnamese. Page 136 The Border Battles of Vietnam companies to stay within mutual supporting distance. This meant that one company could quickly move to support another that was under attack. The distance/time factor varied but was usually considered to be one hour.6 Operation Sam Houston resulted in many contacts with the NVA in the border areas and General Peers reported a body count of 733 NVA with friendly losses of 155 when the operation ended on 5 April 1967. He noted that terrain favored the enemy and that friendly firepower could not be used to its full advantage. This would continue in the engagements that followed and the concept of mutual support became increasingly important. NBC News reported fighting in Kontum province. BILL RYAN, anchor: Last week in Kon Tum Province, in the central highlands, ele- ments of the 4th Division took part in Operation Sam Houston. Enemy units, perhaps two regiments thought to have crossed from Cambodia during the Lunar New Year’s Truce, were in the area. The 1st Platoon, C Company, 2nd Battalion, 8th In- fantry Regiment, engaged the enemy in Kontum. Lieutenant Conrad Braun spoke with correspondent Howard Tuckner. HOWARD TUCKNER reporting: What’d you lose? 2nd Lt. CONRAD BRAUN: I had thirty-six when I started. We got twenty-one killed, fourteen wounded, and one man not a scratch on him. TUCKNER: Did they try to overrun you at any time? BRAUN: First two assaults they made, they made two assaults in the platoon perimeter just coming at us screaming and yell- ing. We knocked them down with small arms fire and M79 fire. Then they stopped assault and we could hear their officers down there. We were trying to get them to come out again and come at us. Then they didn’t assault us anymore. They just tried this sneaky stuff. They crawled out one, two men at a time, threw grenades inside the perimeter, then crawled back. We killed quite a few of them doing this. One time, one dink crawled up on the platoon perimeter and Owen Mapes shot him, shot him in the leg and just left him out there. And dink’s two buddies came up to help him out and Mapes just emptied a magazine automatic fire and killed all three of them. 6 4ID Combat Operations After Action Report, 16 May 1967, 1. Michael A. Eggleston Page 137 TUCKNER: What were you thinking about? BRAUN: I was thinking of getting support in there, and I was thinking of the company that was coming to help us, and I was thinking of-- Like, I was talking on the radio trying to get help, but I was thinking of my wife, and my baby that I haven’t seen, I guess. I got a baby coming in June and that was on my mind. I was-- I just knew we were going to get overrun. I didn’t think the company-- the company was so far away, I didn’t think we could hold long enough to be relieved in time, and I knew we were getting hit with a couple companies, of course the mortars were all over us, and well, when we did get relieved, Sergeant Brown had six rounds left and I had a hand grenade.7 As soon as Operation Sam Houston ended, a new operation called Francis Marion commenced on 6 April 1967. For all intents and purposes it was basically a continuation of Sam Houston and consisted of search and destroy operations in the border areas. The NVA purpose was to draw U. S. forces from the populated regions to the border areas. As many as six NVA regiments were ready to fight and had replaced losses incurred during Sam Houston. Battalions of the 8th and 12nd Infantry Regiments as well as tanks from the 10th Cavalry of the 4ID became involved in the operation. Much of the action centered on the Duc Co Special Forces Camp in Pleiku Province near the border. Initial contacts occurred in late April. The 8th Infantry reinforced with tanks struck an NVA battalion that had moved into an area near Duc Co and had constructed bunkers. In a two-day fight these were destroyed and the NVA lost 133 people while U. S. losses included wounded and one KIA. Fighting continued along the border for weeks with a pattern of NVA moves into South Vietnam followed by contacts with the 4ID, withdrawal into the Cambodian sanctuary, and return. This was carried out during the southwest monsoon season (May-October) which limited mobility and air support. This became known as the NVA monsoon offensive. It was also during this period that the 4ID base camp, Camp Enari, was completed south of Pleiku.8 This appeared to demonstrate that the U. S. had taken the bait and was moving its forces from the populated areas to the border regions, but the 4ID had been laagered 7 "Army Officer Describes Fierce Gunfight in Vietnam" NBC News, New York, NY: NBC Universal, 02/28/1967. 8 Headquarters, 4th Infantry Division. Combat Operations After Action Report - Operation Francis Marion. (Office of the Commanding General: 25 November 1967), 1-3. Page 138 The Border Battles of Vietnam (set up in a defensive camp site) there for nearly a year and could quickly move to the populated areas when required. With NVA incursions across the border near Dak To increasing, Op- eration Greeley was launched in June 1967 and General Peers was reinforced with the 173d Airborne Brigade commanded by General John R. Deane. Operation Greeley continued for months in the Dak To area while Operation Francis Marion further south ended on 12 October 1967 as fighting at Dak To reached its peak. Both Francis Marion and Greeley were consolidated and became Operation MacArthur. The 173d Airborne Brigade that would fight at Dak To had three battalions (the 1st, 2nd and 4th) and was under the control of the 4ID. Each battalion had 750 men and was composed of four companies with about 150 troops each. Each company had three or four platoons of thirty each, a weapons platoon and staff. The squad is the building block of the infantry and consists of five to ten soldiers.