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-1‘ < ~ 'rQN30‘ ~ P nrzsof _-4 - 2§‘_,*i~;;'§"%= ~’ ,_ _ I 1"'%~‘3 ,5‘ ’ ‘L -2 °'.> " ""': ' . i— » w. . - . , . ( » . >*==>- >“ ’\,1§»>‘§?;J_..f;1‘~ _|_‘:,_§f:_\,§.E-W vwfig '&% .,:§§;- -=-,~_v,,5‘:-ii MEMORANDUM \\,§E§,,; A5 E, DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE \ \ The Sittttttion iii Vietnam _- \ 6-“Q. . 1 I \ 1 9’ C O2 LLuufl£4%4QMw%++5hnnnfi-- 28 February_l968 l \ 3 \ T Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786687 r \ Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786687 \ 4 \ A __ l "H po ii? . £555 Slil to . YBackground Use Only \ __,_,_ ' Information as of 1600 ' 28 February 1968 s.5(¢) HIGHLIGHTS Reports from several rural areas indicate that the Viet Cong have almost complete freedom of move- ment there, even in formerly pacified sections. The relative lull in major Communist ground action activ- ity continues, although there are indications of im- pending large—scale activity in several-areas of the ' ' ' country.‘ -_ - ; _ v_ _ I. .Military.Situation in South Vietnam:_ Com- munist.military activity on 27-28 February was high- lighted by continued shelling of allied strongpoints in northern and western Quang Tri Province, and by at- - tacks.in western Kontum Province, and against provin- cial and district capitals in III and IV Corps. On the allied side, US forces have inflicted.heavy losses on the.Viet Cong in Quang Tin Province and have launched two new spoiling operations against-enemy units threaten- ing Da Nang (Paras. 1-7). -There are unconfirmed re- ports that North Vietnamese forces may be moving addi- tional armored vehicles.and.rocket launchers southward* into the-Laotian infiltration corridor (Paras. 8-l5). Evidence of Communist intentions to conduct.sustained military operations in the western highlands mounts (Paras; 16-22).) \_: .j_i_ 9’ £2 X2) II. Political Developments in.South Vietnam: The- r \ latest.labor leader'arrested.in.Saigon.was released \ a few hours afterlhe had been picked up (Para. 1). Re- ports from several rural areas.indicate that the Viet. Cong have almost complete freedom of movement there, even in formerly pacified sections (Paras..2—6). -De- fections to the Viet Cong are discussed (Paras. 7-12). i ll,_<,o_c,o_.__r___l ) £Background Use Only- _ £591 £19, Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786687 I \ Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786687 3 W 7 _ ‘ “ * '~"”"“'- I04 \._ -9. ‘ma. -3-_?~%Z."i.'°-x ' ' ' - ;' ' ,'\j{r;,‘-L.‘ --1 '_ , _57;lr ,0’ { V, _ Qrélfll/lfl!(X_Ed,Z|>3I'|€ __~ .__‘ ' ~ .~ . ~~=_,'\_r,_>~L_,- _ _ , , D @’ I _ ~ | I ’ V" Q ‘ I Qufiflgér ' V '~ “:3; iiouei Sui I ‘7 Eriém ‘<\ffi§red'Vehi¢|es'Sigh1é'd “K.-Q“ m_,e- ; ggéésagc e. i ff § _ "' -0-I '- ° ‘ », O '_".kTH'L“lI-ghTHl5 . I I f‘>'~=; "J , 1 | ' " ’" 3 *3“ 4/ --i - ;‘,",‘;;<'_;-12»-»€'*,;>=w“: . E .5 _. , ‘\ F k _ , '-1’-7'” <15 ¥- ‘-*na"Nans* 16 _ * ~‘ -Q V -;_=\f‘;_,, I] J - -‘ '.:_;ji'_*l':-;r'1‘~;__»,;..‘\y' D (D _' 'QU‘ANG A .-'\_-_:_ ._ . Sill T-. »- . '. K u __ (__‘V:{»»!"£‘:‘\"..< i.- - - - . .. 8|T[Ky\\' 2- . 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C1"? 1 . >- 5 e ~ ,5 _,~="a P ,-.s_e,,.,.; ..;; _, .=+._ V“-' -'- »‘- -- '-‘~ -* \.-- .~' - . ,,- - I '~ - r -'_:’l~*, . - - -‘*7. ’.- , __. 5 ,_,--, La Q“'1._,§‘_‘?h\>{_;5Z.¢r:\_flg|:_.»:;\§‘,§‘ \,‘.F_,~_/4._.-.'_' J .fv¢;‘_A'.‘,-_ _', . . .\ "}\ :1 -l: Q,‘-,_,-.\=='>.-_._:,» Q)‘.;,-i¥.,_\f >,.‘;;-'4 ,~_.,.\_ _. ‘- V Y _ T’$'»~ -;\@:;»¢__--; :rf~Z"_‘i"/4:‘ 1. \ .\\‘.,-jf ~ 1 V - - ~ ,3-, »-3» -~_-, . -{vi _ “?1_"!-~»*\‘\J‘l'\!(“Z“;’L' » . . ‘_, 1,51.-X ' "1- 3-1;__5 ,_>. 3,» 1";_._ A _. _ 1'» ._*_,_,_.vl._h ___A , _,‘__ _‘ ,:_ _ _ N_ _‘ -: '- = I, _r w _ 7 » - ' L -.1. ~ 5». _;./>‘~ 1.1. ' ‘ 3?-_;;_'-~;;.'£1"_,¢';z=1-I§:<¢~=--,'.:ir;4?I,.j¢f \ Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786687 Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786687 ' S‘) 3.5 ) O0 3.5 /\/\ Packground Use Only ) ( \ s I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SQUTH VIETNAM l. The network-of allied strongpoints from Khe Sanh eastward across the Demilitarized Zone again received artillery, rocket, and mortar fire on 27-28 February. No-significant North Vietnamese groundattacks were re- ported._ Reconnaissance elements of two Communist divi- sions in the Khe Sanh area have intensified their de- tailed reporting on allied air strikes and ground activ- ity as well as on the construction and repair of fortifi- cations and fences at Khe Sanh. I 2. The heaviest fighting in I Corps-was in Quang Tin I Province where, on 27 February, a US Army battalion at- tached to Operation WHEELER/WALLOWA killed l48 enemy in a four—hour firefight less than five miles west of the capi- tal city of.Tam Ky. US losses were two killed and l4 wounded. The enemy force encountered was tentatively \ identified the 72nd Viet Cong Main Force Battalion. 1 as 3. In an effort to delay or disrupt renewed Com- munist offensive activity in the Da Nang area,US forces have launched.two spoiling campaigns." Operation HOUSTON, 1 A a fourebattalion US Marine/US Army task force, will try to secure the general area.northwest of Da Nang, which includes strategic coastal Route 1 in the Hai Van Pass and Phu Loc area.- Meanwhile, in Operation TAMPA, a rein- 1 forced US Marine battalion is.tasked-with the destruction R » of-enemy_staging and assembly areas ten miles west¢south— west of Da Nang. No significant brushes with the enemy ' ' have thus far been reported from either operation. . 4. Communist tactical activity in II Corps on 27 .' February was highlighted by attacks against three US - Army.companies attached to Operation MACARTHUR in Kontum Province. The first attack was aimed at two US companies operating westenorthwest of Dak To and resulted in enemy< losses of 50 killed and US losses of 4 killed and 22 . wounded. *The second attack—¥a mortar and sma1l—arms assault-—against one US.company five miles north—north— east of Kontum city inflicted American casualties of . 24 wounded. Enemy losses were not reported. 28 February 1968 I-1 . ‘Background Use Only \_ _ U ) 9>w ifibn 51?? ' ' 2 1 "Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786687 1 Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786687 1 35 \/ l‘T¥}Pf5E€H%E§3 l /\ T fbackground Use Only 35( O0 \ I 4 ' 5.‘ In the coastal provinces of central Vietnam, the Binh Thuan provincial capital of Phan Thiet re- ceived small—scale enemy probes on 27-28 February. US Army airborne units operating just west of the capital reported killing 29 Viet Cong during this ' ' ' 4 1 period. _ 6. Communist forces inII1ICorps continued their attacks—by—fire against provincial and district capitals on 27-28 February, with all eleven provinces reporting some form of Viet Cong activity. The most serious situation appeared to be in Phuoc Long Prov- ince, where the adjoining towns of Song Be and Phuoc Binh were reported under enemy ground attack. The Phuoc Binh airstrip was-closed after Viet Cong ground fire destroyed a US C-130 aircraft on take- off. Elsewhere, rocket-and mortar attacks were re- ported against US infantry base camps_at Tan An, the capital of Long-An Province, at Cu Chi in Hau-Nghia Province,-and against Saigon's Tan-Son Nhut Air Base. i r 7. In the IV Corps area, the provincial capitals \ of Chau Phu, Can Tho, Vinh Long city, and Soc Trang came under Viet Cong mortar and rocket attacks on 27-28 February. ‘_- . New Heavy Enemy Weapons Reported -8. Reports during the past few days indicate that the North-Vietnamese may be moving additional- armored vehicles'and rocket launchers down into the Laotian infiltration corridor. The reports - are not confirmed." 9. 'A Laotian-Army company commander who had been_statiofied just west of Khe Sanh at Ban Houei San before that outpost was overrun in late.January claims_that.he saw-and counted l74 pieces of heavy equipment including tanks, mobile assault guns, and artillery rocket launchers moving south in Laos the night of 11-12 February. The Laotian-officer reportedly made the observations on Route 92 about l8 miles southwest of Khe Sanh as he was retreating overland toward government—held Laotian territory 28 February 1968 I-2 . _ '\ Tackground Use Only 35“; a we) . . -{ _ H _ Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786687 Z A X _ A PP r0Ved f0 r Re E aSe 2O 1 9lO4l 1 7 C O6786687 ‘\) \) _ _ tm ‘m _m N GW m fi H F 3t H RO U t QS t O KO H t U m P rO V C Q _ _ _ ‘ Q h _ I‘ __ V _/ v_ ' _ _>_: _ _ J_.‘,“"' _ y__>_4_A“ _‘__“) J‘ \ I _»_ ’_ VJ __ ‘ _ ‘ U; f H ‘ K2 fir V ‘ 4*‘ *___ _.G _ A_V ' is!“ ‘Q ___|__ _ \ V I _ A “__ kl N 1 ~ H__§_, _ ‘FA h I\_ “W U? V _ __ '\\“_‘m_u\| TH _ 1‘ _'__ _“__‘ [_ \ _ “F _ ¢§%g ” _ _ 1 L‘ > HQ mm I __" ‘ J _ ‘ w/kg I '_ / > ()5 __ _ _ ‘I _ E d *1 _v|\‘__"‘U? 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Qdlj I’, ‘J _ l J __)' r___J_m > I, \ __‘_v .4 3} F-..\I AM 9 ‘ \_ __ _ _’__ _ _’, ’ ’ __1 __ l _,__£__"\,__\J'_ Q ‘_ __"_ ‘ _\W.‘/_ I _h _ ‘__ }§n__i_ 3 ___H"__‘ J; _ v fix _ “L _' iv _ /_‘__1 \__ _ __) 3 N“ I __ _ ‘nun "_w%\€_,u“_? in ‘_ Jrqk _ if__&"wH_‘ A 8 _f%_;V8 '33 l _ ‘V _ _ (F J _‘__ _ N J Iq >_ I I _ _‘_’_‘ I;_‘_ _ ‘I! _‘v_ _v _ _ v _ __k|‘______‘Sh Y _ __fi_‘_U“_4\q_H_ V _ _ U _ V 9 A A; ‘%\Yv_>_;__ _ I‘ Y _ _ ,5 am? __ _ _ 1 J‘ ___“ \ y I _ __, V_//W __’w__‘ _ I ‘ / __ .______A _ _ __ ‘ _ I 1 _ v_ __ ‘ __ _ _ lJ,\\ “J”//V ‘ any /I _ _ I _ _"_J_ _G_ _ _ ‘ P E I K U I I _ Lvfid _ I IY L_' _ /_l_ ‘F_ n E B R U A_ R P3 I ‘__ Q V__-\__V§_ _ _ '_ I > ____ ‘ 5 I, O _ ‘ O _ _ %_ I//I; __ I B‘_“_ ‘ xnrowwvfl __ %¢/ H ‘_ //M S T AT UT E M L E S J ‘; _ E _ ___ 1 _ _ 6 97 42 Z& C M 3 'C\ 5_ ) A PP rOVGd fO r RH G% EM 20 1 9/M/ 1 7 C O6786687 Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786687 6‘) —"F6-P—S-E-GR-E51’ “iv 8-5< O 3 > Packground Use Only 35()O \ - / . 15., A number of low—level agent reports have " stated that the enemy intends to use tanks in the central highlands and northwest of Saigon. Allied troops reportedly engaged a force which was sup~- ported by tanks near the Cambodian border in Tay Ninh Province on 26 February. In addition; enemy tanks were sighted in Binh Long Province on 27 Feb- ruary1.accordingYto a preliminary report from an aerial observer. In general, however,.the evidence of enemy tanks in the southern part of South Vietnam is rather tenuous at this time. The possibility 1 exists that captured allied vehicles or even Cam- 1 " bodian vehicles might be involved. A The Western_Highlands- ' 1 - 16. Evidence_of Communist intentions to conduct- sustained_military operations in the western high- - lands mounts. V " 17. Analysis of aerial photography of early February has revealed the further extension of a new ‘road from the Communist-controlled road network in- Laos through the Cambodian salient and into South Vietnam's Kontum Province in-the vicinity of Dak To. Aerial photography of-December 1967 provided the first indication of-the extension of Laotian Route ll0 to a point near the South Vietnamese border. Byl9 February, this road had been extended across 1 the Kontum Province-border and joined with South Vietnamese Route 512. New occupied enemy defen- sive positions—-personnel trenches. foxholes, auto- matic weapons/antiaircraft artillery sites-—were. r also revealed in the 9 February photography at the junction of this new road and Route 512. ;l8.“The-completion of this road provides the Communists with a_motorable logistical transport com—. plex capable of supporting operations against a netr work of at least four US military installations in_ ' ' the Dak To area. ‘ 28 February 1968 1 I-4 iBackground Use Only 35U3 \ ' - —"F6-P—S-E6-R-E=P s 35(6) \ 1 1 r "Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786687 Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786687 F :3-5< O l > Background Use Only 35 O /\ \ H _ 19. Moreover, the-photography revealed enemy road—clearing operations extending a branch of this_ samerunvroute southward along the Cambodian - South Vietnamese border and into Kontum Province some 32 miles northwest of Kontum city." ’ the pattern of deployment and 20.- Meanwhile, _ \of major B-3 Front combat \ _ 35g»' units in the highlandsrefle¢tS preparations for early, coordinated attacks in the Dak To sector, in the Kon- tum city - Pleiku city region, in the-Le Thanh area of western Pleiku, and in the Ban Me Thuot area of Darlac Province. _ 1 available\ 35 21. Recently \ _ /\/'\ O0 some B-3 \_/\/ 1 Q;:::::::::]there has been a southerly move by 35' Front elements which normally operate in the western Kontum—Cambodian_border area,_ For example, between 12 and 24 February, the lst North Vietnamese Army Division's 32nd Regiment moved nearly lOQ miles south- southeast from a.spot west of Dak T0 t0 the Pleiku- Darlac province border area. The present communica- tions of this regiment indicate that it may have been re- subordinatedtx>a headquarters element of the B-3 Front which appears to be controlling military ogerations in the area. Elements of the 174th Infantry egiment and the 40th Artillery Regiment have also shifted from the > Dak To area to positions threatening the provincial 1 capitals of Kontum and Pleiku. 22.» While the repositioning of these units has probably temporarily weakened the enemyYs over—all of- fensive posture in the Dak To area, at least one regi- Y ment——the 66th of the lst Division--along with artil- 5 lery and.other combat support units still pose a | threat in western Kontum Province. horeover, the com- pleted-construction of the previouslj mentioned road- way into western Kontum will facilitate the introduc- tion of reinforcements and war materiel into the Dak To sector. - J 28 February 1968 I-5 I \ A iBackground Use Only 35kn \ s.5(¢) Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786687 \ Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786687 \ \ | . Y ii‘) i - 8-5< t Background-Use_Only- 35( O0 \ Y ) I Enemy_Communications‘Standdown'Along.the Northern Coast ‘ 23. "Dnrincj the - X _ ' 3_3(h)(2) past few weeks there have been numerous indications that the_enemy plans to launch additional attacks this 1 in region, possibly_in coordination with a move in the i Khe Sanh area 5 i \ 1 i I \ 1 i I A I ) \ I 28 February 1968 6 . ' TBack round Use Only 35“? \ = 8-'5 ' ' \ ‘ Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786687 Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786687 ) R 3-5 /\ O0 \/\_/ Background Use Only 35( II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM l. Labor leader To Thanh Tuyen_was released from po- lice custody a few hours after_he was picked up on 27 Feb- gruary. Tuyen, president of the Vietnamese Confederation of Labor's Saigon Council, had been detained for undeter- mined reasons, but was allowed to go after Saigon Mayor Van Van Cua intervened on his behalf. Cua told a union official that the police had overreacted to Hanoi radio appeals urging workers in Saigon to rise up against the ' government. - Grim Situation in Rural Areas - 2. Reports beginning to come in on the situation in the rural areas of Vietnam indicate that, in several areas, the movement of allied military forces to the cities has left the countryside almost completely unde- fended. Pacified hamlets are no longer safe for travel in these areas, and authorities there cannot get out to the rural areas to assess the situation. The Viet- namese Army, in many cases, is locked in static defen- sive postures around the cities. ‘ 3. Local officials in Da Lat, capital of Tuyen Duc Province,say they have not yet been in contact with the rural areas. Although some commercial traffic has been moving along Routes 20 and ll, Vietnamese and American of- ficials regard security as_inadequate on these major roads. Until the Tet offensive, the two roads had been secure for more than two years. The Revolutionary Development chief for the province has been forbidden to leave Da Lat, and the province chief has made only helicopter visits and one heav- ily armed convoy trip to the districts,' , 4. Of the ll Regional Force companies normally as- ‘ signed to Tuyen Duc, three were brought in to defend Da Lat Q and are still there. Only six of the province's l6 Revolu- tionary Development teams are in place in their appointed hamlets, and many of the remainder are unaccounted for. No significant attacks occurred in rural Tuyen Duc until the Viet Cong had withdrawn from Da Lat, at which time Revolu- tionary Development hamlets in each district were hit. Small groups of Communist troops have now returned to the outskirts of the city, but the Vietnamese Army has made no moves to oust them, even thoughiis forces outnumber the enemy's and have been assured of adequate air and-artillery support. II—l 28 February 1968 ”_ ‘ {Background Use Only \ Fpw Em £13 Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786687 Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786687 ll) 4 3.5 T) ) O0 [Background Use Only 3.5 /\/\ \ ) - 5. In Binh Long Province, reports from resi- dents of An Loc and Loc Ninh districts indicate that é the Viet.Cong are gaining a firm foothold. They have been expanding their administrative control and mobiliz- ing the population in many hamlets. Residents report that the Viet Cong are firmly entrenched in many ham- lets. Destruction of government identity cards by the enemy has reportedly become so standard that the people automatically produce their cards when the Viet Cong appear. ' _ _ 6, In Phu Yen Province, government forces, which had been deployed inand around Tuy Hoa to defend the city against the Viet Cong attacks/have now been moved back out to the rural areas.' They have been reluctant however, to patrol at night or to set-ambushes. They move instead in company strength from one strongpoint to another, and operations even during daylight hours have been largely confined to Revolutionary Development "hamlets instead of being extended to more insecure areas. Revolutionary Development teams, almost all of which have been back in their assigned hamlets since l5 Feb- ruary, feel so unprotected that many will not spend rel-, ,the-night in the hamlets. The Viet Cong have been J atively “free to operate at night in platoon strength and \ reportedly havebeen taxing villagers, confiscating rice, ‘ ‘ 1 and - recruiting. . ' Defections to the Viet Cong -. = 7. Although no major government military unit is believedTto have defected to the Viet Cong since 30 January, numbers of South Vietnamese Government per- sonnel are believed to have individually joined them. Evidence of this is most readily available in Hue. 8. South Vietnamese Government authorities have discovered that at'least"25 individuals—-company grade military officers, noncommissioned officers, civil servants, and policemen-—defected to the Communists in Hue. This may be an extreme case, since Hue has long been a hotbed of antigovernment dissension and was the center of the abortive "struggle" movement in ‘the spring ofIl9€€§' Moreover, the Communists con— trolled parts of Hue far longer than was the case in any other city attacked at Tet. 28 February 1968 ___%_ II—2 ' _____‘ Q) fBack round Use Only ) \ iflifl SLY? K-Q) Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786687 f Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786687 9,-i__ 7 3 £1 °‘£E [Background Use Only Q \ ( ) _,w 9." ac-~ Most of the civilian defectors in Hue, v cording to the Vietnamese_information, were associe | t ated with "extremist struggle elements" in the past. Some of these people apparently were recently released from government prisons, 1 l0. Most of the military defectors in Hue were assigned the mission of propagandizing other SOldi€tS and civil servants to surrender and coop+- erate with the Viet Cong. One group was charged with writing letters to members of the-Vietnamese \ lst Division,.urging them to leave their unit. ll. The number of defections elsewhere in the country, especially among government forces located- 1 outside of cities and towns, cannot be accurately- assessed. The large number of rural outposts over- run or abandoned——including at least a few through treachery—-suggests that this kind of thing may- have occurred elsewhere. l2. Recent Communist propaganda claiming de- fections from the government forces hassprovided ex- plicit unit designations and the number of personnel—— in many cases no more than four or five alleged de- V fectors. For_example, a Liberation Radio broad? - cast of 24 February claimed that_ a majority of. the officers and troops'from the Vietnamese 45th Regiment (23rd Division) joined with the "libera- tion forces" to attack and take over Ban Me Thuot. Although this-is known to be an exaggeration "since the unit as a whole fought the enemy attack, reports from US and Vietnamese officials did_suggest that at least some members of the 45th Regiment assisted- the Communists. Since "troop proselyting" has alt. ways received heavy emphasis from the Communists, l it is not possible to determine at present whether the apparent defections were spontaneous or were ' in fact enemy "agents in-placeL" - 1 28 February 1968 II—3 ' l gBackground Use \ Only s.5(¢ 35(0)) ’ Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786687 _ I Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786687 I I "W é.5( 3 e ) O0 0nly- 3.5 /\ W ‘Background Use \ I III_. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM l. The evidence clearly indicates that the infiltration of personnel from North to South Viet-- nam-has continued at a high rate since the first of the.year, Infiltration has probably been above the 1967 monthly average of 4,000 to 6,000 men. - 2.__ The bulk of the infiltrators appears to have been replacements or-reinforcements for exist- ing units. Reports from prisoners and agents sugj gest that significant replacement-and augmentation groups arrived in January. 3.3(h)(2) \ \ K:::::::::::::]also reflect the influx of replace-- 3.3(h)(2) ment.personnel." For example,\ L 3.3(h)(2) mid-February referred to replacements for the 27th Independent Battalion and 803rd North Vietnamese Army Regiment in Quang Tri Province. \ l 3._ It is possible that new organic North v Vietnamese units have infiltrated, althouqh there is no firm evidence of this - (hX2) \ l 99W o>w kthe-316th Division probably has (hX2) deployed out-of North Vietnam, but its destination is at unclear this time. Captives recently taken 1 in the Demilitarized Zone area have-stated that new divisions;.including the 308th, have moved into this area. This information-has not been corrobor— ated. g 3.3(h)\(2) P f \ 28 February 1968 III-1 . YBackground=Use-0nly_ ) _p ifiifl A-(JQ_0Ol SLY? i ' Approved for Release: 2019/'04/17 C06786687 __- Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786687 4‘; W “?15‘*?35‘4“‘4“4 W ()° @ackground Use Only £5 £1 ‘ 5. The Communists, in planning the Tet offen- sive, are likely to have made provisions for re- placing large numbers of troops they probably-ex- i pected to lose or for exploiting any advantage \ gained from-the-offensive." ' '6. As in the past, it will be some months before a firm assessment can be made of the pace of infiltration during the past eight weeks. There is normally a time lag of three to six months. \ v 1 28 February l968 - III-2 [Background Use Only _9,6itr \ ifiifl SLY? ’ Approved. for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786687 Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786687 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786687