Undermining the Global Nuclear Order? Impacts of Unilateral Negotiations Between the U.S. and North-Korea
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Undermining the global nuclear order? Impacts of unilateral negotiations between the U.S. and North-Korea Gordon Friedrichs, M.A. America first – America alone? Evangelische Akademie Hofgeismar Haus der Kirche, Kassel Dienstag, 27. November 2018 Gordon Friedrichs, M.A. Evangelische Akademie Hofgeismar 24.01.2019 Haus der Kirche, Kassel #1 Outline 1. History of U.S.-North Korea relations 2. The Nuclearization of North Korea 3. North Korea and challenges to U.S. global leadership 4. Discussion: Four options for conflict resolution Chanlett-Avery et al. 2018: 3 Gordon Friedrichs, M.A. Evangelische Akademie Hofgeismar 24.01.2019 Haus der Kirche, Kassel #2 History of U.S.-North Korea relations 1949-50: Communist insurrection on Jeju Island, Soviet & Chinese military support for the North; 1910 Japanese 1948/49: Kim Il-Sung Stalin’s support for military 1937: The battle depicted becomes chairman of the invasion. rule over NK 1950-53: Korean War. in the Grand Workers’ Party of Korea; Monument in Samjiyon, Democratic People’s Samjiyon County Republic of Korea (DPRK) 38th parallel established to divide North (SU, Communist) 1949: U.S. troop and South (US) Korea withdrawal; SK instability. 1953: The Korean Armistice 1945: End of World War II; Agreement that declared cease fire but no peace on the 38th parallel; Soviet victory over Japan on 1948: Republic of Korea was Korean Peninsula consolidation of power on both sides: founded under Syngman Rhee Juche ideology paired with Stalinism (authoritarian leader) in the North; autocratic military rule in the South. Gordon Friedrichs, M.A. Evangelische Akademie Hofgeismar 24.01.2019 Haus der Kirche, Kassel #3 Gordon Friedrichs, M.A. Evangelische Akademie Hofgeismar 24.01.2019 Haus der Kirche, Kassel #4 Development of North Korea’s foreign relations after the Korean War • Juche ideology (self-reliance), personal cult – Great Leader (Suryong) – Strong demarcation from Soviet Union under Nikita Krushchev and its de-Stalinization – Critique of China‘s Cultural Revolution under Mao Zedong (1963) – Repeated military clashes with the South and the U.S. • 1966: Korean DMZ Conflict • 1968: Blue House Raid to assassinate South Korean president Park Chung-hee • 1968: Capturing of the USS Pueblo • 1969: North Korean fighter jet shots down EC-121 aircraft (radar aircraft) • Command economy, combining military and economic development – First Three Year Plan (1954-56): Nationalization of industry & Collectivization of agriculture and mass mobilization. – By the 1970s, NK’s GDP per capita was estimated to be equivalent to SK’s; high degrees of urbanization by the 1980s and functioning education system. – Seven Year Plan (1961-67): Due to borrowing of foreign capital to invest in its military to lessen dependence on China and the SU, NK’s economy was in debt. – Development of cultural projects to foster indoctrination (Juche Tower, Nampo Dam, Ryugyong Hotel) increased fiscal tensions in NK. • End of Cold War increased NK’s isolation (China was betraying Communism; end of SU as sign for success of Juche) strengthening self-image Gordon Friedrichs, M.A. Evangelische Akademie Hofgeismar 24.01.2019 Haus der Kirche, Kassel #5 Development of North Korea’s foreign relations after the Korean War Gordon Friedrichs, M.A. Evangelische Akademie Hofgeismar 24.01.2019 Haus der Kirche, Kassel #6 North Korea‘s path to nuclearization: The argument 1. Economic mismanagement by focusing on self-reliance and independence resulted in three unintended consequences for North Korea: i. High dependency on foreign aid, i.e. China, and vulnerability to sanctions. ii. Militarization increased influence of military on policymaking iii. Trauma and feeling of inferiority 2. To counter these inherent weaknesses, North Korea aimed to i. tying economic aid to regional security/stability (revenue-seeking) ii. reducing its dependency on conventional deterrence via the development of nuclear weapons (domestic & international balancing) iii. pride and fear (opposition nationalism) External provocation via nuclear weapons development and missile testing and internal oppression by sustaining the Kim dynasty. Gordon Friedrichs, M.A. Evangelische Akademie Hofgeismar 24.01.2019 Haus der Kirche, Kassel #7 Development of DPRK Plutonium Program Push factors Nuclear dynamics 1. US nuclear threat during 1. Since 1965: Nuclear Korean war, Cuba Missile crisis cooperation with SU, building of research reactor. 2. US withdrawal from Vietnam; South Korea considers nuclear 2. Fall 1975: Acceleratio; Building weapons 5MW reactor on Yongbyon 3. Change in Soviet Union policy 3. 1985 NPT entry 4. End of Cold War: Loss of 4. 1989-1991: Withdrawing traditional allies: SU and PRC burned nuclear fuel for => normalization of ROK reprocessing => possible relations nuclear weaponization 5. Reprocessing of burned nuclear 5. Change in US DPRK policy fuel rods, Re-Commissioning after 9/11 PU program Gordon Friedrichs, M.A. Evangelische Akademie Hofgeismar 24.01.2019 Haus der Kirche, Kassel #8 Nuclear Weapons: Uranium + PU production Uran Uranium Uranium 238/235 Uranium 235 conversion Enrichment > 80% enriched yellow cake feed UF-6 feed material 25kg for N bomb material Uranium mining/ milling Reactor active PU 239 PU 239 burned up U-fuel reprocessing 4 kg for N bomb Plutonium U 239 material Weaponization Nuclear Test Purchase or Design Design + Production Weapons High Explosive device High Explosive device war head production Gordon Friedrichs, M.A. Evangelische Akademie Hofgeismar 24.01.2019 Haus der Kirche, Kassel #9 https://fas.org/irp/threat/prolif97/meafrica.html Gordon Friedrichs, M.A. Evangelische Akademie Hofgeismar 24.01.2019 Haus der Kirche, Kassel #10 Gordon Friedrichs, M.A. Evangelische Akademie Hofgeismar 24.01.2019 Haus der Kirche, Kassel #11 DPRK nuclear testing behaviour 2006-2018: Assessment 1. DPRK has weaponsgrade material for 10-20 warheads and could possibly produce up to 100 until 2020. 2. DPRK probably has already 10-20 PU- based warheads and has the capacity to produce an untdetermined number of Uranium based systems. 3. DPRK nuclear tests increase in frewquency, technical sophistication and yield over time. 4. The majority of tests happneded during the reign of Kim Jong Un. 5. There remain considerable doubts whether DPRK has mastered to develop a light- enough warhead and a re-entry vehicle for a warhead that could be launched with an IRBM or ICBM. Gordon Friedrichs, M.A. Evangelische Akademie Hofgeismar 24.01.2019 Haus der Kirche, Kassel #12 DPRK Ballistic Missile capability development Gordon Friedrichs, M.A. Evangelische Akademie Hofgeismar 24.01.2019 Haus der Kirche, Kassel #13 A DPRK centered Proliferation network? Pakistan: A.Q Khan Syria Iran Uran technology ? North Korea 1987-1995 Ballistic Missile 1993-2015 technology/SCUD Traded goods: Blueprints, components, nucl. material; specilized machinery; centrifuges; war Libya head designs. 1997-2003 Gordon Friedrichs, M.A. Evangelische Akademie Hofgeismar 24.01.2019 Haus der Kirche, Kassel #14 https://piie.com/blogs/north-korea-witness-transformation/north-korean-illicit-activities Gordon Friedrichs, M.A. Evangelische Akademie Hofgeismar 24.01.2019 Haus der Kirche, Kassel #15 North Korea and challenges to U.S. global leadership 1. The U.S. and the international state community have tried to solve the nuclearization of North Korea via multilateral negotiations and dialogue. While different U.S. strategies since the end of the Cold War had different effects on North Korea’s behavior, no strategy has, so far, achieved a desired outcome. 2. Central to the U.S. approach is the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) – core of the Nuclear Nonproliferation regime. The NPT can be described as an unequal treaty, creating two groups: Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) and Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS). The inequality is balanced off by distinct benefits of the NPT for both groups. 3. Recent diplomatic summit initiatives have prevented further DPRK missile/nuclear testing but not reduced the existing/growing weapons capability. Most likely Kim Jong Un pursues diplomatic talks to prevent preemptive strikes by the United States in autumn 2017 and probe the chances for an economic opening with „North Korean characteristics“. Gordon Friedrichs, M.A. Evangelische Akademie Hofgeismar 24.01.2019 Haus der Kirche, Kassel #16 The international nonproliferation regimes for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Nuclear Weapons Biological/Chemical Ballistic Missile- Regime weapons Regime Regime Nuclear Nonproliferation Genfer Protokoll (1925) Missile Technology Treaty (1970) B-Waffen-Konvention (1972) Control Regime International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (1957) C-Waffen-Konvention (1997) (1987) Limited Test Ban Treaty Organization for the International Code of (1963) Prohibition of Chemical Conduct Against Export Control Mechanisms Weapons (1997) Ballistic Missile (Zangger Group; Exportkontrollmechanismen Proliferation (2002) Nuclear Suppliers Australia Group (1984) Group; COCOM/ Unilaterale und bilaterale Wassenaar Group) US-Maßnahmen Nuclear Weapons Free (ab 1990) Zones (since 1967) United Nations: Security Council, Conference on Disarmament (CD); regional disarmament agreem Gordon Friedrichs, M.A. Evangelische Akademie Hofgeismar 24.01.2019 Haus der Kirche, Kassel #17 Norms of the Nonproliferation Treaty Renunciation (Art. 2): Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the treaty undertakes not to re- ceive the transfer from any transfer or whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explo- sive devices or of control