A NORDIC SMALL POWER ANOMALY Finnish Strategy From
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Independent thesis (15 ECTS) Author Program/Course Andreas Vuorma OP SA 18-21 Supervisor Word count Course code Jacob Westberg 12,000 1OP415 A NORDIC SMALL POWER ANOMALY Finnish strategy from independence to the Moscow Armistice Finland makes an exception to its Nordic neighbors in the Second World War in that it first fought and outlasted great power aggression alone, later fought alongside the Axis, and finally remained under Soviet pressure for the duration of Cold War. With the ambition of contributing to research regarding small power at large and Finland in par- ticular, this study looks at Finnish military strategy from its independence till its’ final peace with the Soviet Union. It identifies what strategies Finland employed and what factors influenced these strategies. The study conducted a qualitative text analysis in a thematical approach driven by theo- retical perspectives on small powers. Contrary to preferences of small power strategy suggested by previous authors, the results indi- cate that Finland adhered mostly to a strategy of courting. Partly to the international community through the League of Nations and too by efforts of forming defensive measures with its neighbors. The external environment, including its neighbors’ worries of greater powers and the German con- quests in the west, played a vital part in shaping Finnish strategy. When no other alternative seemed viable, Finland pursued a strategy of bandwagoning for profit. Keywords: Finland, Second World War, Small Powers, Military strategy, Alignment strategy, Defense strategy Contents 1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1 1.1. RESEARCH OVERVIEW ................................................................................................................. 1 1.1.1. Finnish Strategy .................................................................................................................... 2 1.1.2. Small Power Strategy ........................................................................................................... 4 1.2. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM ..................................................................................................... 6 1.3. PURPOSE AND RESEARCH QUESTION ........................................................................................... 7 1.4. SIGNIFICANCE, SCOPE AND DEFINITIONS ...................................................................................... 7 2. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES .............................................................. 9 2.1. THE CHOICE OF STRATEGY .......................................................................................................... 9 2.2. THE CONCEPT OF STRATEGY...................................................................................................... 11 3. METHODOLOGY & RESEARCH DESIGN ............................................ 13 3.1. RESEARCH DESIGN ..................................................................................................................... 13 3.2. DATA COLLECTION .................................................................................................................... 14 3.3. RESEARCH PRACTICE & ETHICS ................................................................................................. 14 3.4. OPERATIONALIZATION ............................................................................................................... 15 4. ANALYSIS ..................................................................................................... 17 4.1. THE INTERWAR PERIOD .............................................................................................................. 17 4.2. THE WINTER WAR ...................................................................................................................... 20 4.3. THE INTERIM PEACE ................................................................................................................... 22 4.4. THE CONTINUATION WAR .......................................................................................................... 24 4.5. ANALYSIS IN SUM ....................................................................................................................... 27 5. CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................ 28 5.1. DISCUSSION ................................................................................................................................ 28 5.1.1. Theoretical Perspectives ..................................................................................................... 29 5.1.2. Research Design ................................................................................................................. 29 5.2. PROPOSALS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH ........................................................................................ 30 5.3. RELEVANCE TO PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE ................................................................................. 30 BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................. 31 Andreas Vuorma 2021-06-20 The Officers’ Programme 18-21 1. Introduction The Nordic countries initially remained neutral during the Second World War. When Norway and Denmark were occupied by Germany in 1940, the Norwegian government went into exile and continued the fight on the Allied side. The latter strove to remain neutral in the escalating conflict. Sweden however, largely managed to maintain its military neutrality throughout the war. This study is based on the belief that Finland constitutes an interesting exception to its Nor- dic neighbors for three reasons. Firstly, it passed the test against Soviet aggression during the Winter War 1939–1940. Secondly, after the Moscow Peace Treaty, as previously stern relations with Germany relaxed and intensified for the better; Finland joined the invasion of the Soviet Union alongside the Axis powers in 1941. Lastly, the country remained under great pressure from the Soviet Union for the duration of the subsequent Cold War, severely restricting its freedom of policy compared to its neighbors. In a grander sense, Finland makes an exception to most small powers that fought in the Second World War, in that it was never occupied. Denmark and Norway joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949. Swe- den and Finland have remained officially neutral, even though, like Russia, they joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace program in 1994. The two are also pursuing ever closer cooperation with NATO, working together to shape partnership policies, and participating actively in exercises. Both the debate of NATO-membership and military co-operation between the neighbors is intensifying. As a result, there are often remarks and debate of an alliance in the media of both countries – so far, no such obligation has been acknowledged. The study aims to gain insight into Finnish strategy and remedy a lack of research on the period of the Second World War, evident through the findings in the research overview. 1.1. RESEARCH OVERVIEW This study revolves around the case of Finland as well as theories regarding small powers. Thus, research is presented on both the formation of Finnish strategy as well as small powers in gen- eral. 1 Andreas Vuorma 2021-06-20 The Officers’ Programme 18-21 1.1.1. Finnish Strategy To present eventual consistency or variation in results of earlier analyses, this section covers studies published during the Cold War as well as before and after Russians acts of aggression in the 21st century. According to Maude (1976:26), reviewing Finnish history makes it apparent that the ten- dency to avoid any commitment to greater powers led to its isolation in the Winter War. Its post-war policy, however, was based on acknowledgement of a great power political interest. Maude argued that a fundamental change occurred in Finnish thinking on foreign policy when they decided to join Germany in the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. He suggests that Finland joined as a co-belligerent rather than as an ally, expressing the nation’s limited involve- ment in the war. Some authors have gone so far as to view this as a sort of neutrality. As such, it could be said that Finnish wartime policy retained part of its prewar policy – striving to not be dragged down by involvement with the great powers. Some decisions during the war can be interpreted as attempts to solidify this policy, such as not bombing the Murmansk railway, which was vital for Allied supplies from the west (Maude 1976:27f). Overall, Maude takes a balanced look at the Finnish situation, considering too dilemmas of the Soviet Union. He con- cluded that Finnish foreign policy since 1941 had shown a growing understanding “of the dom- inance of the great powers in the world” and preferred bipolarization of the super powers in ways that would draw attention away from northern Europe (Maude 1976:142). At the turn of the century, Kari Möttölä looked at Finland and its relations with the European Union (EU) and NATO. He writes that Finnish thinking considers that a possible NATO mem- bership and its obligations to article V would commit the nation to a broader and demanding concept of military crisis management (Möttölä 2001:135). The argument for remaining neutral based on military security calculations is that without any military threats and without tangible benefits to be gained by membership,