Independent thesis (15 ECTS)

Author Program/Course Andreas Vuorma OP SA 18-21 Supervisor Word count Course code Jacob Westberg 12,000 1OP415

A NORDIC SMALL POWER ANOMALY

Finnish strategy from independence to the Moscow Armistice Finland makes an exception to its Nordic neighbors in the Second World War in that it first fought and outlasted great power aggression alone, later fought alongside the Axis, and finally remained under Soviet pressure for the duration of Cold War.

With the ambition of contributing to research regarding small power at large and Finland in par- ticular, this study looks at Finnish military strategy from its independence till its’ final peace with the Soviet Union. It identifies what strategies Finland employed and what factors influenced these strategies. The study conducted a qualitative text analysis in a thematical approach driven by theo- retical perspectives on small powers.

Contrary to preferences of small power strategy suggested by previous authors, the results indi- cate that Finland adhered mostly to a strategy of courting. Partly to the international community through the League of Nations and too by efforts of forming defensive measures with its neighbors. The external environment, including its neighbors’ worries of greater powers and the German con- quests in the west, played a vital part in shaping Finnish strategy. When no other alternative seemed viable, Finland pursued a strategy of bandwagoning for profit.

Keywords: Finland, Second World War, Small Powers, Military strategy, Alignment strategy, Defense strategy

Contents

1. INTRODUCTION ...... 1 1.1. RESEARCH OVERVIEW ...... 1 1.1.1. Finnish Strategy ...... 2 1.1.2. Small Power Strategy ...... 4 1.2. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM ...... 6 1.3. PURPOSE AND RESEARCH QUESTION ...... 7 1.4. SIGNIFICANCE, SCOPE AND DEFINITIONS ...... 7 2. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ...... 9 2.1. THE CHOICE OF STRATEGY ...... 9 2.2. THE CONCEPT OF STRATEGY...... 11 3. METHODOLOGY & RESEARCH DESIGN ...... 13 3.1. RESEARCH DESIGN ...... 13 3.2. DATA COLLECTION ...... 14 3.3. RESEARCH PRACTICE & ETHICS ...... 14 3.4. OPERATIONALIZATION ...... 15 4. ANALYSIS ...... 17 4.1. THE INTERWAR PERIOD ...... 17 4.2. THE WINTER WAR ...... 20 4.3. THE INTERIM PEACE ...... 22 4.4. THE CONTINUATION WAR ...... 24 4.5. ANALYSIS IN SUM ...... 27 5. CONCLUSIONS ...... 28 5.1. DISCUSSION ...... 28 5.1.1. Theoretical Perspectives ...... 29 5.1.2. Research Design ...... 29 5.2. PROPOSALS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH ...... 30 5.3. RELEVANCE TO PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE ...... 30 BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 31

Andreas Vuorma 2021-06-20 The Officers’ Programme 18-21 1. Introduction

The Nordic countries initially remained neutral during the Second World War. When Norway and Denmark were occupied by Germany in 1940, the Norwegian government went into exile and continued the fight on the Allied side. The latter strove to remain neutral in the escalating conflict. Sweden however, largely managed to maintain its military neutrality throughout the war.

This study is based on the belief that Finland constitutes an interesting exception to its Nor- dic neighbors for three reasons. Firstly, it passed the test against Soviet aggression during the Winter War 1939–1940. Secondly, after the Moscow Peace Treaty, as previously stern relations with Germany relaxed and intensified for the better; Finland joined the invasion of the Soviet Union alongside the Axis powers in 1941. Lastly, the country remained under great pressure from the Soviet Union for the duration of the subsequent Cold War, severely restricting its freedom of policy compared to its neighbors. In a grander sense, Finland makes an exception to most small powers that fought in the Second World War, in that it was never occupied.

Denmark and Norway joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949. Swe- den and Finland have remained officially neutral, even though, like Russia, they joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace program in 1994. The two are also pursuing ever closer cooperation with NATO, working together to shape partnership policies, and participating actively in exercises.

Both the debate of NATO-membership and military co-operation between the neighbors is intensifying. As a result, there are often remarks and debate of an alliance in the media of both countries – so far, no such obligation has been acknowledged. The study aims to gain insight into Finnish strategy and remedy a lack of research on the period of the Second World War, evident through the findings in the research overview.

1.1. RESEARCH OVERVIEW

This study revolves around the case of Finland as well as theories regarding small powers. Thus, research is presented on both the formation of Finnish strategy as well as small powers in gen- eral.

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1.1.1. Finnish Strategy To present eventual consistency or variation in results of earlier analyses, this section covers studies published during the Cold War as well as before and after Russians acts of aggression in the 21st century.

According to Maude (1976:26), reviewing Finnish history makes it apparent that the ten- dency to avoid any commitment to greater powers led to its isolation in the Winter War. Its post-war policy, however, was based on acknowledgement of a great power political interest. Maude argued that a fundamental change occurred in Finnish thinking on foreign policy when they decided to join Germany in the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. He suggests that Finland joined as a co-belligerent rather than as an ally, expressing the nation’s limited involve- ment in the war. Some authors have gone so far as to view this as a sort of neutrality. As such, it could be said that Finnish wartime policy retained part of its prewar policy – striving to not be dragged down by involvement with the great powers. Some decisions during the war can be interpreted as attempts to solidify this policy, such as not bombing the Murmansk railway, which was vital for Allied supplies from the west (Maude 1976:27f). Overall, Maude takes a balanced look at the Finnish situation, considering too dilemmas of the Soviet Union. He con- cluded that Finnish foreign policy since 1941 had shown a growing understanding “of the dom- inance of the great powers in the world” and preferred bipolarization of the super powers in ways that would draw attention away from northern Europe (Maude 1976:142).

At the turn of the century, Kari Möttölä looked at Finland and its relations with the European Union (EU) and NATO. He writes that Finnish thinking considers that a possible NATO mem- bership and its obligations to article V would commit the nation to a broader and demanding concept of military crisis management (Möttölä 2001:135). The argument for remaining neutral based on military security calculations is that without any military threats and without tangible benefits to be gained by membership, there is no reason to put continued regional stability at risk by provoking Russian countermoves. It should not be overlooked this analysis was con- ducted in 2001 and that the later conflicts in the Caucasus and Ukraine have radically trans- formed this context, suggesting that acts of aggression in the past two decades have not brought, but perhaps rather strengthened support for such fears. This might indicate that the Finnish policy was not formed through recent developments, but much earlier.

It must therefore be noted that Möttöla (2001:101f, 139) included that “the credibility of potential membership in Finnish eyes will be influenced by perceptions of the future of

2 Andreas Vuorma 2021-06-20 The Officers’ Programme 18-21 geopolitics in general and the future of Russia as a great power in particular”. Interestingly, the author makes several connections to the Second World War in explaining the development of policies in Sweden, but none for the account of Finland.

Writing too before Russian aggression in the 21st century, Henrikki Heikka challenged ap- proaches that searched for evidence solely in post-Cold War strategy. Heikka (2005:91f) traced instead the evolution of Finnish policy in terms of strategic culture over a much broader timespan; setting off at the time when it was still a part of Sweden. He means that there is strong continuity in Finnish strategic thinking, suggesting that it has always been based on defending an anti-hegemonic order in Europe. His main conclusion is accordingly that the Finnish change after the Cold War from neutrality towards Europeanization was not a change of strategic cul- ture, but rather a sign of its continuity. Finnish allegiance with Germany is explained as is often, as a choice of accepting co-belligerency with the rising power, or the option of facing the Soviet Union alone. The latter was viewed by Finnish leaders as futile, especially after losing advan- tageous defensive territory in the Winter War (Heikka 2005:104f). This co-belligerency does not contradict Heikka’s thesis since Finland, according to the author, showed its commitment to republicanism by driving the German forces out of Finland, after stopping a “full-scale Rus- sian invasion attempt”. As such, Finland is described as having temporarily relied on this co- belligerency, when its requests for help to the western powers had failed.

In 2010, Ulrika Möller and Ulf Bjereld (2010:363, 367, 373f) analyzed the foreign policy of both Sweden and Finland. They view their extended participation in the European and transat- lantic security community as adjustment of their policies of neutrality, referring to the countries as ‘post-neutrals’. They make the distinction that Finnish neutrality evolved during the 1950s, but military non-alignment already a few years after the Second World War. Given its war experience and the following pressure from the Soviet Union, it made it impossible for the Finnish government to ally with the west.

Antti Seppo and Tuomas Forsberg (2013:113f) provide an exception in previous research in that they employ a historical focus in analyzing Finland’s security and defense policy. They mean that its’ experiences in the Second World War have shaped present-day ideas on why Finland needs its armed forces and how they should be employed. The impact of these experi- ences, they mean, manifests itself in small state realism where survival is the key, but note that Finnish strategic culture also includes elements from the Cold War. Finland pursues no ambi- tions of international leadership; the authors mean that the small state identity is deeply

3 Andreas Vuorma 2021-06-20 The Officers’ Programme 18-21 internalized. The irredentist wars during the 1920s, and the idea of Greater Finland, are thus not viewed as attempts of achieving great power status. However, experiences from the Con- tinuation War and its alliance with Germany was fundamental for the post-war country. The inability of the international community and western powers in preventing the Soviet invasion led to the conclusion that the national interest should be about survival. The authors conclude that this strategic culture explains continuity after the Cold War and that participation in inter- national organizations and other cooperative activities has not changed the key doctrine of na- tional defense (Seppo & Forsberg 2013:122). Changes in the international system and the decay of historical memory may however initiate a readjustment in Finnish strategic culture.

The concluding note is an interesting remark when considering the Russian invasion of Cri- mea, the year following the publication of this analysis. It is not unthinkable that Finnish his- torical memory has not decayed but rather reemerged since then. In comparison to Heikka’s idea of a much longer continuity, Seppo and Forsberg place its origin in the experiences of the Second World War, close to the conclusions of Möller and Bjereld.

Juhana Aunesluoma and Johanna Rainio-Niemi (2016:54f, 75) mean that Finland aspired, but failed to remain neutral before and the Second World War. When Finland was moving towards EU membership, foreign minister Paavo Väyrynen claimed that Finland had returned to its neutrality policy it had pursued before the Second World War. This claim could be inter- preted as a break in the idea of continuity presented by Heikka. All in all, the authors describe the partnership with Germany explicitly as an alliance, compared to Maude who suggested a radical change, although through continued neutrality and limited involvement.

1.1.2. Small Power Strategy The study of small powers stands on a backbone of research carried out during the Cold War in the late 60s and early 70s. In this overview, two distinctly different approaches are included.

One of the most influential authors on the subject is Robert L. Rothstein, writing Alliances and Small Powers in 1968. The studies carried out in the book are focused on problems of achieving security via alliance policies (Rothstein 1968:1, 32). According to Rothstein, nona- lignment policies are sensible only when certain conditions prevail: (i) the state must not be as powerful to rub the balance of power by joining one side; (ii) its citizens must be ready to withdraw from world affairs, essentially, the state must be strategically irrelevant and pursue nonprovocative politics; (iii) the powers of neighboring great powers must be balanced.

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The author discusses a few hypothetical considerations regarding reasons for incorporation or remaining unaligned. For one, an unaligned state may pursue more flexibility in its choice of policy and perhaps even assume initiative through such efforts, as allies need not be con- sulted or persuaded. From abstaining alliances, it may also maintain a short list of enemies, as enemies of potential allies might otherwise by definition become enemies of the joining state (Rothstein 1968:48f).

Based on his study on the Little Entente1, Rothstein (1968:168ff) argues that small powers alliances are of limited utility and cannot handle major military threats. Instead, they must turn to other great powers when threatened by such, and when support is denied, they ultimately seek agreement with the aggressor – not other small powers. He states that unless the small powers perform a complete integration of forces and strategy, they are “militarily useless”, admitting that such integration can at least soften this otherwise harsh conclusion. The weak- ness, otherwise, lies in the opportunity for the opponent to pick off one army at a time.

While Rothstein (1968:8) undoubtedly provides valuable insights, some generalizations ap- pear quite broad; but he acknowledges too that the book should serve as target for future inves- tigations. Rothstein’s conclusions regarding small powers might make the pursuit of a Swe- dish–Finnish alliance seem perhaps not necessarily hopeless, but fruitless.

Writing more recently in 2017, Tom Long (2017:186, 194) formulated ideas on how small powers gain influence by incorporating previous analyses of power. He means that arguments that emphasize the lack of power of small powers is underpinned by military oriented, resource- based conception of compulsory power. This approach is according to the author, deeply em- bedded in the study of small states and the many contested definitions of small states. Long means that small states can successfully pursue their interests through three types of power: derivative power, particular-intrinsic power, and collective power. All states can employ these types of powers, but small states, due to their limitations, must rely on them to a greater extent.

In short, these powers entail the use of international organizations, power gained from geo- graphical holdings, international identity through mediation of conflicts or sustainable devel- opment, convincement of greater powers, and groupings of small powers shaping the actions of greater powers to their benefit; for example by vetoes (Long 2017:195ff, 200).

1 The alliance formed by Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia during the interwar period, sup- ported by France.

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Long (2017:198ff) notes Rothstein’s analysis and skepticism of the Little Entente in the mil- itary sense but means that collective power can work in different ways. The author concludes that these concepts are more important today as military force is less acceptable, interdepend- ence is greater, and norms and institutions are more important. These final remarks are inter- esting for two reasons respectively: firstly, Russia approached its goals using military means even in the last decade; secondly, the failure of the League of Nations (LoN) became not clear before it proved incapable of preventing consistent acts of aggression in the 1930s. In sum, the author makes valuable contributions to the theory of small powers, presenting a somewhat more optimistic outlook than that of Rothstein. Regarding the authors several remarks about surviv- ability and integrity of small powers by contemporary institutions, it might be wise to view these as guarantees for the future no more than the LoN once might have done.

Concerning small power strategy, literature tends to emphasize their limited freedom of ac- tion and adaptive behavior is seen as the norm for their choice of strategy (Elgström 2000:27). Rothstein (1968:34) wrote that small powers have tended to adopt the strategy commonly re- ferred to as balance of power. Elgström (2000:6) suggests that balancing is the preferred strat- egy for small, non-aligned states. Annette Baker Fox (1959:187) however, in her study on di- plomacy of small states during World War II, concluded that these states preferred an “anti- balance-of-power” policy. It is thus debatable if small powers can be attributed preferences for strategy, but the general concepts and possible choices are well researched and will be outlined in chapter 2.

1.2. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

As the research overview has shown, most works regarding Finland and its strategies are fo- cused on the Cold War or later. Seppo and Forsberg suggested that Finnish strategy has its origin in the experiences of the Second World War. Möller and Bjereld meant that Finnish neutrality evolved during the 1950s, and military non-alignment a few years after the Second World War. Heikka suggested that it had always been based on defending an anti-hegemonic order in Europe. Maude meant that Finnish wartime policy was not too different from its prewar policy, but also suggested a change in policy after 1941, when it clearly started to prefer the bipolarization of superpowers in efforts to draw attention away from its geographical area.

Thus, a recurring idea seems to be that Finnish strategy and neutrality can be explained through its historical experiences during the Second World War, also implicitly suggesting that future alliances might be far-fetched without understanding of the underpinnings of such an

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identity. Furthermore, the pact with Germany, of which the importance varies among authors, makes one possible exception to Finnish neutrality. This constitutes a problem since most works regarding Finland during the Second World War are historical descriptions, and without ambi- tions of analyzing its strategy.

However, the ambition of understanding the future of Finnish strategy by examining the past might seem far-fetched. Heikka (2005:109), although writing before more recent Russian acts of aggression, however showed support for such ambitions; stating that at least Scandinavians “might want to study more closely the case of Finnish strategic culture in order to understand what is happening to them”. Dan Reiter’s arguments concerning how experiences in the World Wars have constituted a significant factor in subsequent policies of small powers, supports this viewpoint as well (Reiter 1994:521ff). Aside from geography, climate and resources; historical experiences are too considered important elements in the evolution of strategic culture, which is a commonly used concept to understand strategy (Lantis & Howlett 2016:88f). Thus, it is believed that the approach this study will undertake is substantiated by previous research.

1.3. PURPOSE AND RESEARCH QUESTION

The purpose of this study is to gain insight in Finnish strategy, by examining it from a historical standpoint, before and during the Second World War. Based on this purpose two interpretative questions are formulated:

i. What security strategies did Finland employ in the period before and during the Second World War?

ii. What factors have influenced these strategies?

As these questions form a basis of knowledge for the case, a final inquiry with the ambition of contributing to small power theory is as follows: iii. How do the Finnish experiences correlate with theories regarding small power strategies?

1.4. SIGNIFICANCE, SCOPE AND DEFINITIONS

By analyzing stages of Finnish policy through theoretical frameworks, contributions can be made to their plausibility in evaluating historical cases and to the topic of military strategy in general. The results could also provide insight to the thesis of continuity presented by Heikka. A subordinate ambition is to add knowledge to the discussion of cooperation between Sweden

7 Andreas Vuorma 2021-06-20 The Officers’ Programme 18-21 and Finland. In a broader sense, the study may also be of relevance in the context of a small power navigating its way through a world conflict and retaining its independence.

On the basis that studying the Cold War is not wholly sufficient in understanding Finnish strategy and that it has been passionately researched by previous authors, the scope of study is instead limited to the period before and during the Second World War. This decision is also partly supported by contemporary Russian ambitions of reasserting its status as a great power, bearing resemblance to the chosen period. The study does not go into great lengths concerning the Finnish Civil War, nor the specifics of battles or tactics during the later wars due to the focus on strategy on a much grander scale. Regarding strategy as a concept, the interpretation used in this study is based on what Håkan Edström, Dennis Gyllensporre and Jacob Westberg (2019:34) chose to call defense strategy. Thus, strategy is defined as how politically defined military-strategic goals should be achieved.

International relations literature tends to categorize countries to small-, medium-, and great powers or other similar definitions. However, such definitions vary and there is a lack of con- sensus of what factors should be taken into regard when defining these levels.2 Since the sole case of Finland is central to this study, which is uniformly defined as a small power; this study will not advocate a precise definition. Likewise, it will regard Germany and the Soviet Union as great powers and the Nordic countries as small powers, consistent with definitions at large.

2 See Rothstein (1968:29) and Edström et al. (2019:8–13) for different definitions, which both catego- rize Finland as a small power.

8 Andreas Vuorma 2021-06-20 The Officers’ Programme 18-21 2. Theoretical Perspectives

Based on the purpose of this study and its research questions, this chapter will firstly present theories on strategy for small powers and secondly their formation, through which the analysis will be guided.

2.1. THE CHOICE OF STRATEGY

In analyzing Swedish neutrality in the 19th century, Elgström (2000:23, 30f) developed a theo- retical model for strategic choices in non-aligned small powers, incorporating and developing many concepts from previous theories. His model combines two dimensions: the degree of great power adaption and the level of activism or passivism by the small power.

PROACTIVE

Distancing

PROPER

BANDWAGONING

POWER - Courting Balancing Appeasement FOR PROFIT

OF -

BALANCE

Hiding

REACTIVE

Figure 1. Elgström’s (2000:31) model for small state security strategies, recreated and expanded with variations of bandwagoning. In this framework, the outliers on the horizontal spectrum refer to strategies which involve entering an alliance, as such these policies can be seen as endpoints of the inner dimension. The balance-of-power strategy entails joining an alliance with the weaker or less threatening power bloc in order to pose a counter-weight (Elgström 2000:5). On the other side of the spectrum, in bandwagoning proper, otherwise known simply as bandwagoning, the state seeks alliance with the rising, threatening power. Another variation of bandwagoning is bandwagoning for profit

9 Andreas Vuorma 2021-06-20 The Officers’ Programme 18-21 which is when the small state instead joins a stronger party with the aim of sharing in the spoils of victory, rather than appeasing a threatening state (Elgström 2000:33, 58).

In balancing strategies the small power aims to avoid taking sides by keeping a balanced distance to the great powers, either by staying equally close to, or far away from them (Elgström 2000:5f, 30ff, 36). These strategies are supposedly sprung from goals of maintaining a large degree of autonomy and avoiding great power entanglement. Acts of maintaining good relations with several great powers by giving reassurances or concessions, is a variant of this strategy. In doing so, balancing can be understood as a pendulum policy; approaches towards one side might occur, but only for short periods of time. States that pursue this strategy must uphold sufficient capacity and internal resources to withstand external threats, since the risk of aban- donment by other powers is high.

Like the strategy of balancing, distancing is chosen by states motivated to retain its freedom of action and political autonomy by avoiding to not take sides, here too with the risk of aban- donment (Elgström 2000:5, 30ff, 37). This strategy indicates a proactive behavior, while still pursuing an independent posture. The strategy involves the act of keeping a political distance to all relevant great powers. However, offensive ambitions are given some priority in combina- tion with intentions of producing counterweights to stall political and military demands of other countries.

Characterized by states relying on passivism and quiescence, states embarking on the strat- egy of hiding attempt to avoid the international political arena (Elgström 2000:31ff, 36f). Its autonomy is protected by passivity and hopefully, by staying unobserved. In employing this behavior, the small power attempts to remain outside the conflicts of great powers.

The strategy of courting can take the form of efforts to woe or side with a friendly great power or coalition, but without seeking an outright alliance (Elgström 2000:31ff, 64, 142). In- formal alliances may, however, be formed. The strategy is thus concerned with finding a po- tential protector or credible allies to diminish the risk of abandonment. Such efforts are aimed at creating counterweights against overwhelming threats. Since Elgström analyzed the 19th cen- tury, a time in which international organizations did not exist as their present-day shapes, these will however be included in this 20th century context of courting. As Westberg (2021:45) notes, courting can take the form of engagements in institutional collaborations, naming contemporary examples such as EU, the Nordic Defence Cooperation and NATO.

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Finally, in the strategy of appeasement, the state makes unilateral concessions to a threaten- ing greater power (Elgström 2000:5, 31, 33, 35). Such strategies are of interest in situations when military confrontations are not ruled out and the state lacks offensive power but still wants to keep, or gain, some capabilities in international influence.

2.2. THE CONCEPT OF STRATEGY

Regarding the foundations and concept of strategy, a well-established outlook is the rational- istic view proposed by Lykke (1989:3f). Lykke describes how General Maxwell D. Taylor ex- plained strategy as consisting of objectives, ways, and means. Lykke presents this concept as an equation: 푠푡푟푎푡푒푔푦 = ends + ways + means: ends being the objectives toward which one strives; ways the courses of action; means the instruments by which the end can be achieved. In his interpretation of the concept, the means refers to purely military resources such as man- power, material, economic means and logistics (Lykke 1989:4), as it will in this study.

To bring clarity to concept for the analysis in this study, the definition used by Westberg et al. will be employed as a base, but with a stricter military focus. Building on previous authors such as Elgström and Lykke, Westberg (2021) used primarily four components in analyzing and explaining Swedish strategies in the 19th and 20th centuries, presented below.

Ends

Ways

Environment Means

Figure 2. Elements of the strategy concept according to Westberg (2021:27). The environment covers external, international, influencing and internal factors associated with characteristics of the state (Westberg 2021:28, 57). External factors can include relations to other states and organizations, presence, and absence of common institutions for security coop- eration as well as distributions of power and levels of tensions between the great powers.

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Internal factors include, geographic position and size, experience from armed conflicts in the past, political identity, culture, and the political system.

Regarding ends, Westberg (2021:27) writes that strategy is not purely about coordination and the presence or absence of documents as a presenter and overall strategy. Rather, the basic factor of success for different forms of strategy are that they achieve set goals.

Means, as the term suggests, constitute the paths and resources to reach set ends. If national means are insufficient to achieve political ends, states may try to compensate for such deficien- cies by cooperating with alliances and other states (Westberg 2021:36). In this study, means are focused around military resources, independent or gained from cooperation and support from other states (Westberg 2021:102, 130, 181).

Constituting the core of strategy, the ways binds together goals, means and environmental factors (Westberg 2021:29, 93, 206). Ways can include formation of alliances, military strate- gies, concepts and solutions for defense, and related policies.

12 Andreas Vuorma 2021-06-20 The Officers’ Programme 18-21 3. Methodology & Research Design

This chapter will begin by explaining the research design, followed by collection of data, and considerations regarding research practice and ethics. Finally, the operationalization of theories is presented.

3.1. RESEARCH DESIGN

As the case of Finland is central to the study, it has undertaken a theory-consuming perspective (Esaiasson et al. 2017:42). To provide structure and enable identification of variations within the period, the case was divided into distinct time periods, presented in Figure 1 (George & Bennett 2005:67). When factors overlap these periods, they are assigned the one in which they are most prominent.

Since the understanding of Finnish strategic choice is of central importance and little such data exists in meaningful quantitative formats, the study employed a qualitative interpretive case study methodology (Esaiasson et al. 2017:211). When studying historical experiences in ambition to draw its explanations into a broader theory, case studies are considered a good fit (George & Bennett 2005:67). This was carried out by text analysis where thematic analysis was applied to the operationalization of given theories regarding small states and military strategy.

In answering the first question regarding security strategies, distinct strategies laid out by Elgström constitute the framework in finding the most similar. In finding motives for these strategies for which the result will be descriptive, the second question will be answered using factors previously used by Westberg. Finally, for the third question, comparisons can be made between the findings of this study and previous research regarding small powers.

Case Sub-cases Methodology Theoretical perspectives

The Interwar Period Choice of Strategy 1918–1939 Question i The Winter War 1939–1940 Finnish Qualitative text Thematic Findings military strategy analysis analysis The Interim Peace 1940–1941 Question iii Question ii The Continuation War Concept of Strategy 1941–1944

Figure 3. Research design and process visualized.

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The study may be regarded as a disciplined configurative case study, in its use of established theories to identify Finnish strategy through its two initial research questions, as a within-case method (George & Bennett 2005:75, 181ff). Likewise, it has similarities as theory testing, in its comparison of results with previous statements in the final question. This choice is motivated through the fact that Finnish strategy throughout the period has not been systematically identi- fied through one single framework before, and that it increases the independency of the study.

3.2. DATA COLLECTION

The purpose of the data collection was to find information regarding Finnish strategies in the chosen periods. Sources consist of historical material, primarily history books consisting of secondary sources focused on Finland, Sweden, and the Second World War published by rec- ognized researchers and authors. To conduct an independent analysis, works striving to analyze Finnish strategy have not been included, focusing instead on objective descriptions of the course of events. The sources have been treated from perspectives of authenticity, independ- ence, simultaneity, and tendency. There is an inherent risk of tendency of many works that Finnish primary sources, whose writers may have had interests in elevating efforts made by the nation during the wars and additionally exaggerate the abilities of its enemies to further boost their own success (Esaiasson et al. 2017:293). At the same time, the opposite might be true for works published in the Cold War period, due to constrained Finnish relations to the Soviet Union. An obstacle in researching the wars between Finland and the Soviet Union is that Rus- sian historiography, especially during the time of the Soviet Union, downplayed conflicts with Finland in the shadow of the much larger conflict with Germany (Tuunainen 2011:242f).

A varied collection of works concerning time and origin was included to avoid errors of simultaneity and tendency (Esaiasson et al. 2017:294ff).

3.3. RESEARCH PRACTICE & ETHICS

Since the study does not revolve around living individuals explicitly neither can be assumed to have affected people, no major emphasis has been placed on the criteria related to the harm of persons (Esaiasson et al. 2017:74ff).

However, several considerations have been made to conduct the study in accordance with good research practice. First, the collection of data has avoided material with similar purpose of those of this study, as not to base the results on, or steal the results of, previous research (Vetenskapsrådet 2017:8). To increase transparency, materials have been chosen which are

14 Andreas Vuorma 2021-06-20 The Officers’ Programme 18-21 easily available to the public. When analyzing the material, references or citations are made to identified and relevant factors, as to provide transparency and honesty and not to distort or manipulate the results (Esaiasson et al. 2017:228). Furthermore, the study strives to describe its methodology in detail, so that it may be reproduced, and to openly and objectively present all its results regardless of their implications (Vetenskapsrådet 2017:8, 16). Finally, the theories, similar operationalizations and concepts employed in the study are referenced to their respec- tive inventors (Vetenskapsrådet 2017:64f). As such, this study does not lay claim to any of the original concepts or theories used throughout the paper.

It should also be noted that it is not the ambition of the study to explore ethical dilemmas concerned with the Finnish cooperation with Germany during the Continuation War (1941– 1944), which it will strive to analyze objectively in terms of strategy.

3.4. OPERATIONALIZATION

The operationalization of the theoretical perspectives has been guided by definitions previously employed by other authors; which has inherent benefit of working cumulatively (Esaiasson et al. 2017:61). The first part aims to understand the reasoning behind Finnish strategy by outlin- ing the most relevant findings of each factor. In determining relevance, the material and its implications will be guiding.

Component Implications External − Relations to other states and organizations, Environment − international distributions of power and affecting factors. − Experience from armed conflicts, Internal − political identity and system, Environment − culture, − geographical situation. Ends − Explicit or implicit strategic goals of the state. − Independent military resources, Means − military resources gained from cooperation with alliances and other states. − Military alliances, strategies, and defense solutions, Ways − related methods and policies employed by the state to achieve its goals. Table 1. Analytical tool for the Concept of Strategy.

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The second part, corresponding to the first question, is based on a most-similar approach, in which it will define which strategy Finland can be said to have employed in the period. While similarities to many of the strategies certainly can be found, the analysis strives to find the most recurring and pronounced.

Strategy Indicators − Alliance with the weaker or less threatening power bloc to pose a counter- Balance-of-Power weight. Bandwagoning − Alliance with a rising, threatening power. Proper Bandwagoning − Alliance with a stronger party with aims of sharing in the spoils of victory. for Profit − Balanced distance to great powers, − reassurances or concessions to maintain good relations with several great Balancing powers, − approaches to one side or another for short periods of time. − Proactive behavior, Distancing − offensive ambitions intended at producing counterweights, − distance kept to relevant great powers. − Passivity, Hiding − attempts to avoid the international arena. − Attempts to woe friendly great powers or alliances, − engagements in institutional collaborations, Courting − formation of informal alliances as counterweights against overwhelming threats. Appeasement − Uniliteral concessions to a threatening great power. Table 2. Analytical tool for the Choice of Strategy. Finally, for each period, a short summarization of the outcome of the period is included.

16 Andreas Vuorma 2021-06-20 The Officers’ Programme 18-21 4. Analysis

The analysis is presented for each of time periods chronologically. For each one, findings iden- tified through the analytical tool are presented. Lastly, the results of the whole analysis are presented.

4.1. THE INTERWAR PERIOD

The interwar period covers the time since Finland became independent during the Russian Civil War, until the Winter War.

External Environment Externally, Finland came to be affected by a complex relation with Sweden. Even though the latter was quick to recognize Finnish independence, relations were strained due to the Åland question (Nevakivi 2001:24; Koivisto 2008:66ff). The debacle, which took place in a time when Finland was weak, was sensitive and created a deep mistrust of Sweden and its intentions. The Ålanders expressed wishes to unite with Sweden in the summer of 1917 and in the following year Sweden sent a small fleet to the islands. German troops landed in March 1918 to ensure that the islands would not be occupied by Sweden. Sweden continued to push for Åland during the peace negotiations in Paris and the question was forwarded to the LoN. Finland joined the League in December 1920, and the final convention was signed in October 1921; the isles would belong to Finland but demilitarized and with increased autonomy.

Furthermore, Sweden had declined Finnish requests of training Jäger units before the war, which in turn were instead trained in Germany (Westberg 2012:96). On the other hand, a Swe- dish volunteer brigade had fought for the Whites during the war and Swedish officers fought in Finnish units; altogether more than a thousand Swedes joined the war (Koivisto 2008:66).

Military cooperation with Germany, which had assisted in ensuring Finnish independence, continued throughout the period. Partly, through the shape of a secret cooperation regarding submarine construction, testing and training (Forsén & Forsén 1999:56, 271). During the period about a hundred German experts visited Finland, many would later occupy prominent positions in the construction of the new German submarine fleet. Germany too assisted in reorganizing the army into a model of peacetime conscription (Ahlbäck 2014:277).

Internal Environment

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Concerning internal factors, the Civil War came to be remembered, politicized, and radicalized throughout the interwar period, reaching its height during a memory boom in the 1930s (Ahlbäck 2014:277; Roselius 2014b:320, 329f). The post-war society of Finland was as a result, conflict-torn and deeply divided. Additionally, anti-Soviet and nationalistic propaganda was integral in teaching and literature, creating strong enemy images throughout the Finnish society (Tuunainen 2012:178).

Ends

Based on the military campaigns abroad in 1918−1922, an implicit goal of the early interwar period was to conquer territory in Russia and expand the national borders of the new state.

During the subsequent period of tension with Russia, and the later Soviet Union, Finland searched for support abroad (Nevakivi 1976:23; Kirby 1995:287). In March 1922, the foreign ministers of Finland, Poland, Estonia, and Latvia signed the Warsaw Accord; little more than a mutual agreement to observe neutrality in the event of unprovoked aggression, yet perhaps with grander ambitions.3 Following dissent between the Social Democrats and the Conservatives however, the Finnish parliament refused to ratify it and thus it never entered into force. In No- vember, the Conservatives suggested that Finland should conclude a defense treaty with the United Kingdom, however, the idea was never followed through.

Means The victorious White Army was soon reorganized into a peacetime conscription army after the Civil War, inspired by German models and initially too under the supervision of German mili- tary advisors (Ahlbäck 2014:277). Many of the Jäger officers, who had been trained in Germany years before, came to play a vital role in this process.

Ways Sprung from an aggressive Finnish irredentist policy, several semi-official military campaigns were carried out between 1918 and 1922, involving some 10,000 volunteers (Roselius 2014a:139ff). There were also plans of a campaign on Petrograd4, but which came to nothing as sufficient backing could not be secured from the Allied countries or the White Russian coa- lition. In the Treaty of Tartu signed in October 1920, Finland agreed to end occupation of Re- pola and Porajärvi, two East Karelian regions which had joined Finland, and refuted their claims

3 See the Polish statesman Józef Piłsudski’s initiatives for the Intermarium (Polish: Międzymorze) fed- eration. 4 Later known as Leningrad and Saint Petersburg.

18 Andreas Vuorma 2021-06-20 The Officers’ Programme 18-21 in the region and the Kola Peninsula (Roselius 2014a:147ff). In the north however, Petsamo with its ice-free harbor was seceded to Finland. Further violence sparked in Karelia in the sum- mer of 1921 as a local uprising opposed the introduction of Soviet rule. The Finnish government now took a reserved approach but did not stop volunteers, some 500, from joining the locals. The conflict was finally settled in 1922 and thousands of Karelian refuges crossed the border to Finland.

Regarding Finland’s search for support abroad, the initially strained relations with Sweden seem to have relaxed by the mid-1930s as the armed forces of the two nations formulated joint defense planning (Westberg 2016:427f). These plans entailed military cooperation in the case that the Soviet Union attacked Finland. In this event, the Swedes advocated that most of their army be transferred to Finland for a joint war effort, which indirectly too would protect Sweden. Such efforts were assumed to take place in the context of a council decision on military inter- vention from the LoN. As the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact5 was signed in August 1939, the Swe- dish foreign minister soon pointed out that the situation was significantly different than at the time of formulation, since the plans had been constructed for the context of a war between Germany and the Soviet Union in the Baltic Sea. Thus, following the pact, the Swedish gov- ernment was wary of German reactions to Swedish assistance against the Soviet Union; and the plans ultimately came to nothing. The following Finnish requests of assistance in the remilita- rization of Åland were too, denied.

Strategy Finnish strategy in the period resembles mostly that of courting. Firstly, through its entrance into the LoN and the following diplomacy via the organization regarding Åland. Later, the for- mation of what resembles an informal alliance with Sweden, is in line with the strategy. Some offensive ambitions are however evident early in the period, reminiscent to the strategy of dis- tancing. Distancing would however imply that Finland had kept an equal distance to great pow- ers, which it did not; partly through its continued, albeit limited alignment towards Germany, and more so by its hostile relations with the Soviet Union.

Outcome Finland gained the Petsamo region with its important cold harbor port in the Treaty of Tartu, 1921. As the Germans invaded Poland, essentially sparking the World War, Finland had signed

5 The non-aggression pact between Germany and the Soviet Union, which included a secret protocol defining their respective spheres of influence across Eastern Europe.

19 Andreas Vuorma 2021-06-20 The Officers’ Programme 18-21 no formal alliances and there were signs of Swedish abandonment following the Molotov-Rib- bentrop Pact.

4.2. THE WINTER WAR

Concerned primarily about Leningrad’s proximity to the Finnish border which lay some thirty- two kilometers to the north, the Soviet Union initiated negotiations with Finland on October 5 1939 (Trotter 2000:3ff; Lunde 2011:13). After two months of ultimately failed negotiations and mistrust between the two, the Soviet Union invaded Finland on November 30. Peace was finally settled through the Moscow Peace Treaty, signed on March 13, 1940.

External Environment Germany respected their pact with the Soviets and prevented arms intended for Finland from passing through its borders after a Swedish newspaper revealed the fact (Krosby 1968:11; Trot- ter 2000:196). Furthermore, on December 2, a German telegram instructed all its diplomatic missions abroad to avoid any anti-Russian note regarding the war in Finland. Thus, Finland could not expect any help from the great power which had helped them achieve independence two decades earlier.

The political turmoil on the continent would cause much of the aid, external means, destined for Finland to arrive too late or not at all (Trotter 2000:198). The most ambitious plan of foreign aid, the British-French expeditionary force, which entailed some 100,000 troops and 11,000 vehicles, was stopped by Norway and Sweden as they refused its passage (Butler 1957:107, 109, 112f; Lunde 2011:17). Admittedly, one objective of the expeditionary force was to secure the Swedish iron ore fields, which the Nordic countries too, suspected. Thus, mainly concerned about reactions from Germany and their own neutrality, the passage of the force was denied. The plan was ultimately scuttled as Finland accepted the Soviet terms in March 1940 and the pretext of assistance to Finland was no longer available. It seems quite likely however, that plans played an important role in persuading the Soviets to end the conflict, before the Allies could intervene (Krosby 1968:10; Lunde 2011:19).

Internal Environment The Winter War played an important part in unifying the Finnish nation. Much of the internal dispute that had followed the Civil War faded away in favor of closing ranks against the imme- diate external threat (Tuunainen 2012:178). Instead, a sort of war spirit developed which epit- omized the national determination to defend itself. The war essentially marginalized the

20 Andreas Vuorma 2021-06-20 The Officers’ Programme 18-21 divisive experience of the Civil War through this new unifying and shared experience; and the one-sided public memory of the White victors came to an end (Roselius 2014b:329f).

Ends Naturally, since Finland had been the target of aggression, its primary ends was reasonably that of maintaining its independence. The sources have failed to indicate any other goals for the Finnish state explicitly. Judged by the methods employed by Finland during the conflict, no other implicit ends have been identified.

Means In early October 1939, the Finns had conducted a full mobilization in the disguise of “special maneuvers”, finalizing deployment and reaching full wartime readiness by the end of the same month (Tuunainen 2012:141). The Red Army on the other hand had delayed its concentrations for the offensive until November, giving Finnish units time to train, replenish and fortify. The Finnish Defense Forces were however lacking in most aspects but manpower; from its 3.7 mil- lion population it managed to muster an impressive 250,000-men army and even reinforce it later to 340,000.

Means were also attained through significant shipments from abroad. At the beginning of the conflict, the Finnish air force possessed around a hundred planes in total, many obsolete. Shipments of British, French, Italian, Swedish and American aircraft had doubled the amount by the end of the war (Trotter 2000:189). Other forms of material aid came from Italy, Hungary, Denmark, Norway, Belgium, France and the Union of South Africa, and perhaps most im- portantly from Sweden (Trotter 2000:198). Sweden lent much valuable support in volunteers, weapons, equipment and other necessities (Carlgren 1981:8f).

The war inspired volunteers in many western countries, including the United States, Italy, Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Hungary (Trotter 2000:194ff). Although some of these were considered directly unfit for duty and many never arrived in time; it strengthened the morale. For example, Hungary intended to send an entire corps numbering some 25,000 men but only a fraction was permitted to leave, and about 450 finally arrived in the last hour. In total, about 11,500 volunteers had made it to Finland before the break of peace, 8,275 of these from Scan- dinavia – mostly from Sweden (Lunde 2011:16).

Ways After three days of hostilities, the Finnish government appealed to the LoN (Beck 1981:59f, 66, 69). On December 14, the Soviet Union was expelled from the League. The League served

21 Andreas Vuorma 2021-06-20 The Officers’ Programme 18-21 as a platform to publicize Finland’s struggle and to secure world sympathy; yet little practical support came to materialize, as the government admittedly neither had expected from the or- ganization whose decline was increasingly evident.

Instead, Finland held out the best it could, and sought to use the possible Franco-British intervention as a trump card in peace negotiations with the Soviets (Meinander 2012:62f).

Strategy During the Winter War, the Finnish strategy resembles mostly that of courting; to the interna- tional community and namely the LoN.

Outcome Although Finland maintained its independence, the terms of the peace were harsh. The Karelian Isthmus, Ladoga Karelia, Salla and the islands in the Gulf of Finland were seceded along with the lease of a naval base in Hanko, west of Helsinki (Tuunainen 2012:151). Due to external factors, its Nordic neighbors were anxious of repercussions from Germany, preventing the Franco-British intervention. Other aid rallied abroad often arrived too late due to turmoil on the continent.

4.3. THE INTERIM PEACE

This period entails the short peace between the Moscow Peace Treaty in March 1940 until the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941.

External Environment Following the German conquests of Norway, Denmark and France, Finland was effectively isolated from the west and no more assistance could be expected from the Allies (Lunde 2011:20f). Thus, Finland put its hopes of assistance from abroad primarily in Germany (Carlgren 1981:50).

Internal Environment A rapid shift in Finnish governmental policy and public opinion in favor of Germany occurred in the period, explained by external factors such as Finland’s further isolation from the world and the fact that Germany, which by then must have seemed unstoppable, was the only country that could offer some protection against the Soviet Union (Lunde 2011:26f).

The fact that the Karelian Isthmus, with its defensive depth, had been lost in the Winter War, further motivated Finland to seek a strong ally against the Soviets (Heikka 2005:104).

Ends

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As in the Winter War analysis, explicit goals have not been identified for the interim peace period. However, the attempted ways, means, and the outcome in the period, strongly suggest that Finland was primarily concerned with securing a better position against the Soviet Union. Such actions include strengthening of the army and not wholly demobilizing it (means) and attempts of reaching defensive military solutions with its neighbors (ways).

Means After the Winter War, Finland took measures to strengthen and reorganize its army (Tuunainen 2012:152). The number of divisions was raised from nine to sixteen. The duration of conscrip- tion was doubled from one year to two, increasing the size of the peacetime standing army. Even though the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was still in place, Germany now assisted in rearming the Finnish forces. Furthermore, laws and special orders for war were not annulled, and the army was kept in a semi-mobilized state until the Continuation War, indicating that a new war seemed certain (Junila 2012:192).

Ways Politically, Finland proposed a defensive alliance between itself, Norway and Sweden, this was however opposed by the Soviet Union and failed to materialize (Lunde 2011:2f). Another so- lution was proposed by Sweden, entailing a military political union between the two countries. As a defense union was being discussed in Stockholm on March 16, Molotov let the Swedish Moscow minister Assarsson know the same day, that any such union could only be directed solely at the Soviet Union (Carlgren 1981:15f). Similar warnings were given to the ministers of Finland and Norway in Moscow, whose attempts to emphasize the defensive character of the union failed to convince the Soviet regime. The question faded from agenda already before the invasion of Denmark and Norway on April 9, through which it was decisively buried. It seems like deliberations about the defense union had acted primarily as a way of facilitating the Finn- ish domestic policy towards peace with the Soviet Union; and when this was accomplished, the idea of the union was not in itself so viable (Carlgren 1981:23ff).

Although it remains unclear exactly when plans for a combined war-effort with the Germans were initiated, at least joint discussion regarding Operation Barbarossa took place during the spring of 1941 (Trotter 2000:266). Sometime earlier, in Christmas 1940, Mannerheim had sent General Paavo Talvela to Berlin, who carefully presented wishes of common preparations in their respective General Staffs for later military cooperation against the Soviet Union (Carlgren 1981:50ff). By this time, Talvela also outlined a Swedish-Finnish union in which Sweden

23 Andreas Vuorma 2021-06-20 The Officers’ Programme 18-21 would assist with at least five divisions. This is most rationally explained by Finnish efforts to look at all possible opportunities of help from abroad, in line with previous endeavors.

Strategy Finnish strategy in the interim peace, with its efforts to form defensive measures with its Nordic neighbors, correlates mostly to the strategy of courting.

Outcome All in all, Finland had strengthened its forces and conducted a German rapprochement, moti- vated by the fact that it remained the only power that could guarantee help against Soviet ag- gression.

4.4. THE CONTINUATION WAR

This period begins with the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 and continues until the Mos- cow Armistice in 1944.

External Environment Externally, the balance of power shifted as the Soviet Union effectively joined the Western power bloc as Germany invaded. Initially, the progress made by Germany was substantial (Lunde 2011:183f; Tuunainen 2012:157f). While Finland reached its war goals by 1942, the German forces in Finland had failed to capture Murmansk or disrupt its railroad route carrying vital Lend-Lease supplies from the western powers. Neither had the conquest of Leningrad nor the linkup with Finnish forces on the Svir river been accomplished. Despite impressive German victories in the first months of the invasion, doubts began to arise; it was becoming increasingly evident that the war would not be as short and successful as hoped.

Internal Environment Internally, the period has some resemblance to the interwar period with nationalistic and ex- pansionist tendencies. These circulated even on some governing levels, evident through Man- nerheim’s orders of the day on June 28 and July 7, 1941 (Lunde 2011:58f). Parts of the latter, which was carried out by Finnish radio, read:

The freedom of Karelia and the Greater Finland is the goal that beckons us in this mighty whirl of historical events. For us this is a holy war against the enemy of our nation and at the side of mighty Germany we are firmly determined to bring this crusade against our common foe to a victorious end in order that Finland’s future may be assured.

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Ends Finnish ends were concerned with regaining territories lost in the Winter War. Militarily, Finn- ish war goals were to advance to a preferable line of defense between Lake Onega and the Gulf of Finland along the Svir river and Karelian Isthmus (Lunde 2011:183f; Tuunainen 2012:157f). This would create a buffer zone in Eastern Karelia, securing the Finnish heartland, and was accomplished by 1942.

Means This time, Finland was better militarily prepared than in 1939. Regarding its national means, the officer and noncommissioned officer corps carried with them experiences from the Winter War (Lunde 2011:153f). Furthermore, since the Moscow Peace Treaty, much had been done to replenish stocks of supplies and equipment. By the time of the invasion, Finland mustered about half a million men.

Externally, whereas the defense of the northern front had been partially relieved by Swedish volunteers in the later stages of the Winter War, there stood now German units intended for offensive operations. In total, some 200,000 German soldiers would come to fight in northern Finland, whose transit had been granted in September 1940 (Kivimäki 2012:6; Tuunainen 2012:152). The Germans too assisted in replenishing stocks.

In the final battles on the Karelian Isthmus in 1944, German units along with large quantities of weapons were sent to reinforce the Finns thanks to deceptive Finnish diplomacy described further in the following section (Lunde 2011:290f).

Ways The Finns had approached the coming conflict with care and requested on June 16 that their main attack be delayed a few days after the German invasion, to create the impression of being draw into the war by the course of events, rather than initiating it (Trotter 2000:266f; Lunde 2011:77f; Tuunainen 2012:153). Thus, it is of little surprise that Finland initially declared itself neutral when Germany launched Operation Barbarossa, invading the Soviet Union on June 22. As the Soviets retaliated with air attacks on Finnish cities following German air operations from Finnish airfields, Finland declared a state of war on June 25 since the country had now been attacked. Mobilization of the army had been carried out shortly before, in mid-June.

Finnish planning for further offensives was halted in the autumn of 1942. It had not yet been convinced to participate in the attack on Leningrad and its participation in cutting the Mur- mansk Railroad came into question.

25 Andreas Vuorma 2021-06-20 The Officers’ Programme 18-21

After a period of stationary war between 1942 and 1944, the Soviets launched a bombing campaign against Finnish cities in February (Lunde 2011:290f; Tuunainen 2012:159ff). A mas- sive, initially successful land offensive followed on the Karelian Isthmus in June. By this point, the Germans had become concerned about Finnish allegiance as Soviet peace offers had been forwarded to Finland, although rejected. The Germans reduced the flow of weapons to Finland and informed Mannerheim in April 1944 that no further shipments would be provided until it could be guaranteed that they would not fall into Soviet hands (Lunde 2011:257ff, 263f). Grain shipments were stopped and an embargo on war material was established the same month.

The Finnish president sent personal letter to Hitler on June 26, assuring him that Finland would not sign a separate peace treaty, this materialized to what came to be known as the Ryti- Ribbentrop Pact (Lunde 2011:314ff). When the threat had been averted, Ryti submitted his resignation to parliament on July 31, invalidating it. The next month, the Soviets sent their conditions for accepting a peace delegation, demanding a reply before September 2. The Finns promptly accepted it after a special session of parliament. A ceasefire took place on September 4 and the armistice was finally signed on September 19, 1944.

Strategy During the Continuation War, it can be said that Finland pursued a strategy of bandwagoning for profit, by effectively allying itself with Germany; essentially joining the believed stronger, and to them less threatening, side rather than appeasing the previous aggressor. Vital in this analysis are the Finnish expansionist pursuits, lacking these its strategy could otherwise be con- sidered balance-of-power.

Outcome The terms for the Soviet-Finnish peace included a restoration of the 1940 borders along with Petsamo, a 50-year lease of Porkkala, and war reparations. Soviet demands also included the right to use Finnish ports, airfields, and merchant shipping in its continued war against Ger- many. Furthermore, the peace resulted in hostilities between Finland and Germany. What came to be known as the Lapland War essentially ended in November 1944, when most German troops had withdrawn to Norway.

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4.5. ANALYSIS IN SUM

The Interwar Period The Winter War The Interim Peace The Continuation War

• Initially strained relations • Molotov-Ribbentrop • Isolated from the west • The Soviet Union joins

with Sweden. Pact: German assistance following German con- the Allies. • Continued military coop- not possible. quests; assistance from • German victory less eration with Germany: • Political turmoil on the Allied powers unlikely. likely after 1941.

External submarine development, continent, delaying and Environment army reorganization. preventing foreign aid.

• Nationalistic and anti-So- • The populace unifies and • Public opinion shifts in • Expansionist pursuits viet sentiment. exerts strong defensive favor of Germany. fueled by German victo- • Divided and conflict-torn will. • Defensive depth lost in ries.

Internal society. the Winter War: need of

Environment allies.

• Conquest of territory in • Retaining independence. • Securing a better position • Reconquer territory lost Russia. against the Soviet Union. in the Winter War. Ends • Securing the independ- • Advance to preferable ence: finding allies. lines of defense.

• White Army reorganized • Relatively large conscrip- • Conscription duration • German units (up to

into peacetime conscrip- tion army although lack- doubled. 200,000 soldiers) and

tion army. ing in equipment. • Amount of army divi- equipment.

• Foreign volunteers and sions nearly doubled. • Experienced officer Means material aid. • Forces rearmed with Ger- corps. man assistance.

• 1918−1921: Cautious at- • Appeal to the LoN. • Proposal of Finnish-Nor- • Careful treading regard- tempts of expansion • Use of possible Franco- wegian-Swedish defense ing extent of advance into through semi-official mil- British intervention in ne- alliance: opposed by the Soviet territory: refusals itary campaigns. gotiations. Soviet Union; Norway in- to advance on Leningrad • 1930s: Finnish-Swedish vaded by Germany. and Murmansk.

Ways defense planning. • Military political union • Ensuring continued Ger- proposed by Sweden: man aid through the Ryti- failed. Ribbentrop Pact. • Joint military planning with Germany.

• Courting: Diplomacy • Courting: Attempts of • Courting: Efforts to • Bandwagoning for

through the LoN concern- courting to the interna- form defensive measures profit: Joining the inva- ing Åland. Informal alli- tional community through with its Nordic neighbors. sion of the Soviet Union.

Strategy ance with Sweden. the LoN.

• Petsamo gained in the • Moscow Peace Treaty: • German rapprochement: • Moscow Armistice: res- Treaty of Tartu, 1921. loss of territory. Germany remained the toration of 1940 borders,

• No formal alliances • Foreign aid arrived too only power that could Petsamo ceded, lease of signed. late or stopped. possibly match Soviet Porkkala, war reparations • Signs of Swedish aban- strength. and expulsion of German Outcome donment following the troops, leading to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Lapland War. Pact. Table 3. Results of the analysis summarized.

27 Andreas Vuorma 2021-06-20 The Officers’ Programme 18-21 5. Conclusions

The purpose of this study was to contribute to the understanding of Finnish strategy and small powers in general.

As to what strategies were employed, the results show that Finland mostly adhered to a strategy of courting. It did this in courting to the international community through the LoN, and by attempts of forming defensive measures with its neighboring small powers. When no other alternative than Germany was viable for its protection, Finland treaded down this path carefully – and is considered to have pursued a strategy of bandwagoning for profit.

Regarding motives, the study has found that external factors played an important role in the choice of strategy. While the Finnish main concern was consistently that of securing its inde- pendence against its great neighbor, expansionist tendencies arose following the successful war of independence and were fueled again during initial advances in the Continuation War. The government strode however carefully in both cases. Likewise, assistance from abroad was se- verely limited by its neighbors and later by conquests of great powers. Would it not have been for these factors; it is not impossible that Finland might have joined the Allied powers, should their expeditionary force in 1940 have materialized. As such, resulting Finnish strategy was to a great extent guided by external course of events over which it had little power.

The results run contrary to Rothstein’s and Elgström’s suggestions of balance-of-power and balancing respectively being preferred strategies for small powers. While generalizations can- not be made from a single case, Finnish experience constitutes an exception to this idea. Fur- thermore, the results support previous authors ideas of continuity in Finnish strategy, if one considers that the temporary break in joining with the Axis was forced upon it by external factors.

5.1. DISCUSSION

Finland played a substantial role in encouraging the invasion of the Soviet Union, as Germany observed the latter’s hard-fought and relatively limited progress in the Winter War (Tuunainen 2012:151). Westerners too expected that the Soviet Union would fall only after two or three months after the German invasion, due to their poor performance in the Winter War (Trotter 2000:265). In the Continuation War, Finland affected the course of events by refusing German requests of advancing on Leningrad, which otherwise might have freed up German forces

28 Andreas Vuorma 2021-06-20 The Officers’ Programme 18-21 needed elsewhere. These considerations, yet speculative, speak for the impact that small powers can have in world-conflicts.

Regarding the hypothetical alliance between Finland and Sweden mentioned in the intro- duction, the study has highlighted several attempts of cooperation between the two countries. In each case, Sweden was persuaded or threatened by great powers not to pursue such efforts to their end. For similar reasons, the allied expeditionary force was halted in its tracks by Nor- way and Sweden. As to Germany, the sole great power which had come to Finland’s help be- fore, halted supplies passing through its borders in the Winter War due to greater geopolitical motivations and concerns. Given these experiences in Finland, it seems unlikely that it would come to adapt its strategy based on foreign guarantees or wishes; but finds strong reason in its historical experience to plan on the basis that it will stand alone.

5.1.1. Theoretical Perspectives The theoretical perspectives employed, yet broad, were found useful to categorize and analyze the Finnish strategy in a structured way. However, defining the goals of a state is not a straight- forward task; concerned with the number of independent actors involved in a democracy, it is hard to define consistent strategies. Likewise, a state's goals are seldom explicitly stated, and different diary entries of involved actors, as mentioned by authors of the material, state different things. Thus, for some of the periods analyzed, assumptions based on the surrounding factors have been made to determine the ends, which weakens the analysis somewhat.

While the whole spectrum of Elgström’s defined strategies have not been found, this is be- lieved to be due to the nature of the single case study that this study has undertaken, and the seemingly consistency of Finnish strategy. Like ends, determining a strategy is not straightfor- ward. If the Franco-British intervention planned during the Winter War materialized, it could have been considered that Finnish strategy resembled, or at least effectively transformed to balance-of-power. The analysis was thus guided by the more concrete course of events and its results rather than the intentions, of which there are many, obscure and of great variation.

5.1.2. Research Design Regarding the methodological approach taken in this study, it should be acknowledged that a qualitative text analysis always risks tendency, be it by the material that has been analyzed, or the authors previous knowledge, or even personal allegiance (Esaiasson et al. 2017:227ff). Re- gardless such limitations, the design was found suitable for the subject and questions at hand.

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5.2. PROPOSALS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

One weakness in researching Finland is the lack of translated, and released Russian material, by whose history it is as closely linked to as the Swedish. Even though notions sometimes seep through in some sources, it is often based on speculation by westerners. Thus, to reflect upon the potential of defensive solutions contemplated between the Nordic countries in the period, Russian primary material would be helpful. For example, in the secret recording of Hitler’s and Mannerheim’s conversation in 1942, Hitler reveals how a lack of intelligence misguided their interpretations of Soviet military capabilities (Haldin 2018). Lunde (2011:2f), whose work has been vital in this study, argues that it was a serious mistake by the Soviets to oppose the creation of Nordic defensive alliances, since it could have ruled out a Finnish war of revenge. Without primary sources on Soviet contemporary thinking, one cannot conclude the validity of such proposals. Thus, to conclude the weight and capabilities of small power alliances, research into these historical efforts with archived Russian material would be of interest.

5.3. RELEVANCE TO PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE

As Sweden is pursuing increased cooperation with Finland, it is of relevance for its officer corps to understand Finnish historical experiences. Should its colleagues east of the Baltic Sea not seem equally enthusiastic about these efforts, answers might be found in this understanding. Reasonably, the knowledge of factors which have caused previous collaborations to fall short is warranted for the success of future endeavors. If strategic culture plays a role in strategy, as suggested by many authors, one cannot look to the future without looking at the past.

For any small power officer, the important role of foreign assistance should not be forgotten. Understanding how these have formed and performed in the past might help in shaping the environment for which they can exist in the future. Few officers have a say in matters of strategy but will collectively shape how that strategy unfolds through organizational knowledge. The outcome of wars, this author believes, is seldom based on only how well armies fight, but rather where, why and whether they fight.

30 Andreas Vuorma 2021-06-20 The Officers’ Programme 18-21 Bibliography

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