The Rise of the Austrian Freedom Party in the 1990S: a Culturalist Approach Murphy, Anthony

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The rise of the Austrian Freedom Party in the 1990s: a culturalist approach Murphy, Anthony

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Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation: Murphy, A. (2004). The rise of the Austrian Freedom Party in the 1990s: a culturalist approach. Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft, 33(3), 297-307. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-60686

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Anthony Murphy (Bradford) The Rise of the Austrian Freedom Party in the 1990s: A Culturalist Approach

Der Beitrag gibt einen Überblick über unterschiedliche wissenschaftliche Erklärungsansätze zum bemer- kenswerten Aufstieg der FPÖ Jörg Haiders in den 1990er Jahren. Daran anschließend werden einige kulturelle und historische Aspekte, die von anderen Ansätzen nicht beachtet wurden, welche aber einen wesentlichen politischen Hintergrund für Haiders Erfolg bildeten, beleuchtet. Es wird argumentiert, dass die FPÖ eine ausgesprochen erfolgreiche Strategie verfolgte, indem sie ein auf traditionellen und anti- modernen Werten basierendes österreichisches Identitätskonzept (re-)konstruierte. Besonders deutlich wurde dies im aggressiven „Kulturkampf“, den die FPÖ gegen KünstlerInnen und Personen des kulturel- len Lebens Mitte der neunziger Jahre führte. Haiders Version des rechten Populismus erwies sich deswe- gen als besonders erfolgreich, weil sie einen in der österreichischen Gesellschaft nach 1945 stark veran- kerten Parochialismus politisch zu instrumentalisieren vermochte.

Keywords: Austrian parochialism, Kulturkampf, Haider, (Austrian) identity, anti-modernism Österreichischer Parochialismus, Kulturkampf, Haider, (österreichische) Identität, Anti-Modernismus

The rise of the Austrian Freedom Party has dropped to 10.01%, with a real prospect of (FPÖ) in the last two decades has been a re- dropping even further. markable chapter in European politics. This is The political success of Haider’s FPÖ pro- not just the story of a previously marginal po- duced a prolific amount of scholarship. This litical force gaining a bigger share of the Aus- article describes and critically examines some trian political cake. The rise of the FPÖ also of this literature and then puts forward a differ- resulted in considerable controversy and end- ent perspective on the ‘Haider Phenomenon’. It less theorizing about the party’s democratic cre- will state that a key element of Haider’s politi- dentials and the role of its former party leader cal strategy was to address anti-modernist no- Jörg Haider. After gaining 27% of the vote in tions of ‘tradition’ held by many ordinary peo- the 1999 general election, fevered anxiety en- ple and construct his own version of Austrian sued in the media about a Nazi ‘revival’ in Aus- patriotism. Thus, while Haider was seen by some tria and there was an international outcry about scholars as being at the forefront of ‘moderniz- the decision of the Austrian People’s Party ing’ Austrian politics out of the inertia of (ÖVP) to share power with Haider’s party in a Proporz or by others as ruthlessly exploiting government coalition. Massive demonstrations issues like immigration and crime to gain a took place in Vienna and the fourteen other populist vote – he was also appealing to a deeply European Union countries imposed an unprec- rooted parochialism in Austrian society and edented sanctions regime on a fellow member political culture. Haider recognized that an apa- state. The precipitous fall in the popularity of thetic electorate would respond to his rhetoric the FPÖ has been equally dramatic since they of making the FPÖ vote synonymous with vot- joined a government coalition in 2000. At the ing for an Austrian Heimat (homeland). He drew time of writing this article their national vote on a rich tradition of anti-modernism, political

Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft (ÖZP), 33 Jg. (2004) H. 3, 297–307 298 Anthony Murphy conservatism and ambivalent national identity ugly face of a reactionary Austrian political cul- in Austria in order to forge a new and vigorous ture that should be dealt with through a combi- political force that promised more “order, tradi- nation of resistance and education (Pelinka tion, identity and security” (Diamond/Gunther 2002a, 227). 2001) in the precarious world of post-commu- The more general scholarship on the recent nism and Austria’s integration into the European rise of the ‘Far-Right’ in Europe (Eismann 2002) Union. serves as a general context for studying Haider’s Evidence of Haider’s use of tradition in his FPÖ. It deals with factors such as voter apathy, political strategy can be traced by analyzing two the disillusionment of ordinary people with poli- areas. Firstly, in the political culture underpin- tics, the failure of mainstream parties to deal ning the Austrian system since 1945 with its with issues such as immigration or the march of unique blend of consensus, an advanced wel- neo-liberalism. All these issues are relevant to fare system and a suppression of identities once the FPÖ’s political progress in the 1990s, how- widespread in Austria before 1938 – especially ever in this article I shall dwell on the more that of pan-Germanism (Pelinka 1994, 169). Austrian-specific circumstances that propelled Secondly, in the FPÖ’s anti-modernist political the FPÖ into the position as Europe’s most suc- rhetoric, with its appeal to conservative values, cessful far-right political party. tradition and the establishment of a new type of The authors included in the first category Austrian Heimat. Haider managed a clever strat- focusing on the structural context – are Kurt egy of adjusting the political message accord- Luther (University of Keele), Melanie Sully ing to his different audiences (Ötsch 2000). (Diplomatic Academy, Vienna) and Lothar Before expanding on these points, I shall set the Höbelt (University of Vienna). scene by reviewing the scholarship on Haider Kurt Richard Luther and Melanie Sully see already available. My contribution should be Haider as representing the ‘normalization’ and treated as an Ergänzung to current academic lit- ‘modernization’ of Austrian politics after dec- erature, not a revision. ades of domination by the two main political parties. Although this system might have brought a necessary stability in the post war Views of Haider period, by the 1980s it was clear that Proporz and the post-war Austrian consensus were be- I have chosen two categories of analysis ginning to crumble and were in need of politi- from the abundant literature that is now avail- cal reform. Haider deftly formulated an opposi- able on the ‘Haider Phenomenon’. Firstly, I will tion that had considerable resonance with the review those authors who explain Haider’s suc- Austrian public. For Luther, this ‘structural op- cess more in a structural context, i.e. stemming position’ lies at the core of the Freedom Party’s from a deep disillusionment among many Aus- ideology rather than its purported ‘right-wing trians with the politics of Proporz and the domi- extremism’: nation of political and civil institutions by the SPÖ and ÖVP. In this context, Haider’s FPÖ the element of continuity (or ‘core’) of the Freedom Party’s ideology may well reside not in right-wing represents the modernization of Austrian poli- extremism but in the party’s structural opposition to tics and the breaking of old political cleavages. Austria’s post-war system (Luther 2000, 23). The other view of Haider comes from writers who, while recognizing the obvious structural He states in the conclusion of his article dynamics of the FPÖ’s political breakthrough, ‘Austrian Democracy Under Threat from the also emphasize Haider as being a symptom of Freedom Party?’ that “the Freedom Party is Austria’s failure to deal with its National So- neither a neo-fascist, neo-Nazi, nor right-wing cialist legacy and the promotion of Austria as extremist party (…) (no) such values govern the the ‘victim’ of Nazi aggression rather than its operation, or political goals of the party” (ibid. willing accomplice. Here, Haider represents the 27). The Rise of the Austrian Freedom Party in the 1990s 299

Luther notes that despite the various asso- Haider’s project to change Austria is built on a ciations with Nazism within the party, the infa- potpourri of ideas from the right and the left, from mous neo-Nazi utterances of Haider or the xeno- neo-liberalism economics, conservative slogans and old socialist rhetoric. It is radical and also phobic rhetoric of other party members, the FPÖ conservative (ibid. 201). have contributed to a ‘normalization’ of Aus- trian politics that represent: The Austrian historian Lothar Höbelt describes Haider in his recent book, ‘Defiant Popu- a shift from a system of party competition characterized by hyper stability and accommodation list: Jörg Haider and the Politics of Austria’, as to one in which uncertainty and competition are the a “harbinger of change against a system of order of the day (…) in some respects (this develop- power-sharing (Proporz) that was all-pervasive” ment) can be regarded as a ‘normalization’ of the (2003, 212). He adds that when Haider turned Second Republic’s party system (Luther 1998, 151). the FPÖ into a populist party, the “old guard” became “increasingly irrelevant”. On the one By focusing on the oppositional aspect of hand these long-standing party members were the FPÖ and placing this in the context of the relieved at the rejuvenation of the FPÖ, but they post-war Austrian political system, Luther cor- were also perturbed about developments and rectly points to a central problem with the events that they had “kick-started but no longer continued success of the party once it achieved controlled” (ibid. 61) after making Haider their executive power in February 2000: party leader in 1986. For Höbelt, a key element the transition (from opposition to government) is of Haider’s political strategy was to provoke and likely to prove especially difficult for a party such mobilize an apathetic Austrian electorate into as the FPÖ which for so many years and so registering their disgust with the ‘system’ by successfully pursued a strategy of populist agitation (Luther 2001, 28). voting for the FPÖ. Haider had managed to capture a new phenomenon in Austrian electoral In her book, ‘The Haider Phenomenon’, politics – “the swing vote” (ibid. 154). Melanie Sully also puts Haider at the centre of Referring to the “Nazi question mark” that Austria’s “painful process of modernization” hangs over Haider, Höbelt reckons that Haider (1997, 204). She points to the role of Haider in made a political gamble by being too ‘outspo- playing a “radical anti-establishment card” in ken’ on taboo issues stemming from Austria’s Austrian politics, an establishment dominated, past in order to gain domestic support. It led to according to Sully, by “1968-vintage pseudo- the image of Haider as a neo-Nazi in the heart left Viennese intellectuals” (ibid. 37). Haider’s of European politics, endangering democracy. success is therefore partly due to a failure of the As a result of these ‘gaffes’, it became subse- Austrian Left to reform and modernize the Sec- quently impossible for Haider to take part in ond Republic before 1986. She draws on the government politics after dabbling in such his- work of Menasse (ibid. 199) to show that Haider torical revisionism: “Once he had started in that took up the gauntlet of critique of the Austrian direction, however, it was difficult for him system that the Left had failed to put into prac- (Haider) to turn back” (ibid. 155). tice. The Left’s subsequent ‘hysterical’ anti- For the view of those authors who see Haider Haider stance focused only on the apparent ‘fas- more as a threat to Austrian democracy than cism’ of the FPÖ while ignoring the crucial proc- those in the first category, I have selected from ess of normalization in an “ordinary western books and articles by Wolfgang Neugebauer democracy” (ibid. 200). (Dokumentationsarchiv des österreichischen For Sully, Haider incorporates a “potpourri” Widerstandes), Ruth Wodak (University of Vi- of ideas from all sides of the political spectrum enna) and Anton Pelinka (University of Inns- in his project of change for Austria. The FPÖ is bruck). an important force of modernization, capable Neugebauer presents a convincing case for of breaking the old cleavages of an outdated making Haider firmly responsible for shifting Austrian post-war political system: the FPÖ from the more liberal agenda under the 300 Anthony Murphy leadership of Norbert Steger in the 1980s to- construction of history” (Pelinka 1997, 96). A wards the “racism and right-wing extremism” self-deception that is encapsulated in the ‘vic- that marked out the Haider era (Neugebauer/ tim thesis’ promoted by post-war Austrian elites, Bailer 1996; Neugebauer/Bailer 1998). He who portrayed Austria as the victim of Nazi shows that many components of extreme-right aggression rather than an active participant. wing policies can be directly applied to ‘Haider’s Pelinka locates Haider’s rise as resulting movement’ (Neugebauer/Bailer 1998, 172). from a series of crises in Austrian society since For Neugebauer, Haider’s promotion of him- the 1960s. These included the search for more self as a “statesman” and “Austrian patriot” is democracy in the 1960s, the decline of stability simply a camouflage to deceive the public about in the 1980s and the impact of the international “the consistently pan-Germanic, and in the last and European agenda in the 1990s. As Pelinka instance, anti-Austrian, basic stance of the FPÖ states, “all these crises together changed Aus- (and) to mobilize or utilize xenophobic attitudes trian society; and when the society and economy in the population” (ibid. 169). The extreme-right changed, the political system had to change too” margins of Austrian politics have warmed to the (Pelinka 1998b, 213). FPÖ since Haider became party leader in 1986 Austria has continued a tradition of histori- and were subsequently integrated into the party cal ‘exceptionalism’ (Pelinka 2002b), to the (ibid. 166). Thus, while Haider was busy mobi- point where it is perceived as a country ‘outside lizing mainstream support amongst the wider the European mainstream’ due to having the electorate there was a parallel process of an in- most successful far-right party in Europe. For creasingly active and vocal faction of neo-Nazi Pelinka, in contrast to the general trend of right- elements within the party. wing populism in Europe, the FPÖ has one cru- Ruth Wodak has made a detailed scrutiny of cial difference – their specific roots in, and on- the language and rhetoric of Haider (Wodak et going ambivalence towards, National Socialism. al. 1999). By focusing on the discourse of Haider’s FPÖ is symptomatic of what Pelinka Haider’s FPÖ, she shows the way in which terms as the ‘x-factor’ (ibid. 9) which denotes Haider manipulated language in order to con- Austria’s specific negligence in dealing with its struct a new type of national identity that polar- Nazi past, reflected in the FPÖ’s prominence in izes the population, creating a divisive society Austrian politics. Thus, while this aspect of the composed of “good guys” (white, Germanic FPÖ was not necessarily the main factor in the Austrians) and “bad guys” (the rest, particularly success of the FPÖ – it did not prevent 27 per- brown-skinned, Jews etc.) (Wodak 2002, 40). cent of Austrians voting for them in 1999. Haider plays on the prejudices already held by many Austrians and turned them into political capital. He made a new assessment of Austria’s Another Perspective ‘past, present and future’ (Wodak 2000) by pos- tulating in his political rhetoric who he thinks By mostly falling into these two categories are the echt, anständig und ordentlich citizens of analysis, the scholarship on the rise of of Austria. Haider’s FPÖ has not focused enough on some Anton Pelinka has been a prolific writer on cultural-historical factors that have also had Haider’s FPÖ. He accepts that the ‘moderniza- considerable bearing on the success of right- tion’ of Austrian politics opened up a new sort wing populism (or extremism) in Austrian main- of political culture in Austria, however the sig- stream politics. I noticed this when, in the course nificance of this development lies in the fact the of my research, I came across the party’s ag- “thoughts and actions of the underdogs (i.e. the gressive campaign against artists and intellec- underclass) are increasingly right-wing” tuals in the early 1990s, which cumulated in an (Pelinka 1998a, 117). Historically, this right- election poster that appeared in Vienna during wing ascendancy arose out of the “taboos and 1995 stating: “Lieben Sie Scholten, Jelinek, self deception” in the “Second Republic’s re- Häupl, Peymann, Pasterk...oder Kunst und The Rise of the Austrian Freedom Party in the 1990s 301

Kultur? Freiheit der Kunst statt sozialistischer the Kulturkampf of the FPÖ. Many in the ÖVP Staatskünstler” (Tieber 1996, 40). A statement could identify with a political campaign against that has obvious connotations with the National the Austrian avant-garde and their ‘left-wing Socialist drive against ‘entartete Kunst’ in the backers’. In addition, the moralistic stance of 1930s, implying an FPÖ party policy of cen- ‘upholding’ family values and ‘protecting’ sorship and the promotion of a particular decency within Austrian cultural production ‘healthy’ form of art. The ‘official’ intention of could also be supported. Another example of the FPÖ was to attack the ‘wasted’ state subsi- the newly found common ground between the dies on artistic projects that no one likes, how- two parties was Haider’s alliance with the Catho- ever the wider implications of this type of cam- lic church, which included a visit to the Pope in paign show a political party engaged in some December 2000 and a friendly relationship with kind of latter-day Kulturkampf: the bishop of St. Pölten, Kurt Krenn during the 1990s (Hofer 1998, 235). In this context the Vieles, was heute als Kunst ausgegeben, von der marriage of these parties can be seen not only öffentlichen Hand gefördert und von deren Vertre- tern bejubelt wird, erregt Ekel und Ablehnung, die as a neo-conservative political and economic soweit führen kann, daß mancher Bürger gar nichts project but also as a moralistic cultural project mehr von Kunst wissen will (Bleckmann 1996, 386). that aims at supporting a certain type of artistic production at the expense of experimental con- No other right-wing populist party in Eu- temporary art. rope was prioritizing culture and aesthetics in their political strategy to this extent, apart per- Targeting the Left: Haider singled out the haps from some cultural skirmishes stemming ‘linke Kulturmafia’ as a political target. This was from the regional politics of Le-Pen’s Front a loose term for left-wingers, the avant-garde, National. Haider obviously thought he would anti-fascists and the more progressive element gain political capital out of an attack on artists of the SPÖ – basically the most emphatic oppo- and cultural figures, I wished to uncover why nents of Haider. As Haider states in one of his the issue of Kultur seemed to have such a reso- books: nance and importance in mainstream Austrian political culture. Diesen Abschnitt in meinem Buch widme ich mei- nen speziellen Freunden. Den Kulturschaffenden, In this ‘Kulturkampf’ of the 1990s, the FPÖ Kulturjournalisten, Kulturgenießern, Kulturpolitik- attacked a newly constructed enemy – the ‘linke ern, Kulturkämpfern, Kulturlandschaftmalern, Kulturmafia’. They took a moral high ground Kulturgutbewahrern, Kulturrevolutionären, Kultur- on cultural issues of ‘taste’ in an attempt to ap- kritikern, Kulturgutverteidigern und all den ande- peal to a general antipathy towards modern art, ren kultivierten Menschen, die in der Vergangen- the avant-garde and certain aspects of moder- heit einen Kult betrieben, sich als Teil einer Elite im Lande von der Nicht-Elite abzusetzen. Und damit nity in the general population (Menasse 1997, vor allem von den Freiheitlichen (Haider 1997, 67). 177). The venture into cultural politics by the FPÖ was part of the overall populist strategy of Among the many artists, politicians and cul- appealing to various constituencies in Austria tural figures targeted in the 1990s were: in order to increase electoral support. Haider Hermann Nitsch, who was an example of managed to package this critique of Kultur in ‘ugly’ and ‘disgusting’ contemporary art, which the Second Republic as part of his overall at- has a sacrilegious content and ‘celebrates’ cru- tack on the ‘fossilized’ system of Proporz in elty. Elfriede Jelinek is seen as ‘un-patriotic’, Austria. Apart from its populist appeal, I have obsessed with Austria’s national socialist past uncovered four other factors that underpin the and feminism. Claus Peymann was portrayed FPÖ’s inclusion of culture as an intrinsic part as a typical ‘leftie’ intent on using his role as of their populist political strategy in the 1990s. director of the Burgtheater in order to promote Political Marriage: Reactionary conserva- leftist propaganda or obscure avant-garde pro- tive elements in the ÖVP found a natural ally in duction for selected elitist audiences. And 302 Anthony Murphy

Rudolf Scholten was singled out as a corrupt By appropriating Kultur as a political issue, SPÖ politician who supported and subsidized Haider was able to mobilize a historic tradition experimental art during his tenure as Minister of cultural parochialism more accentuated in for the Arts in the early nineties. Austria than in other European countries – a tra- A War of Ideas: Underpinning the FPÖ dition that survived world wars, Nazism and cultural rhetoric was a political theory seeking decades of liberal-democracy (Wimmer 1996). to justify and explain the party’s Kulturkampf It should be noted that Haider’s methods of po- in the 1990s. FPÖ Kulturkämpfer such as Walter litical mobilization, in contrast to the content of Marinovic and Andreas Mölzer borrowed and his rhetoric, were innovative and showed a dis- adapted concepts from the writings of Antonio tinct ability to exploit modern methods of po- Gramsci and transformed them into a rightist litical marketing. The term ‘parochialism’ has critique of the apparent left-wing ‘hegemony’ no direct German translation, the nearest inter- that was dominating many Austrian institutions pretation being provinziell. Its basic meaning is (Zogholy 2001). A prime example of this left- to have opinions, views or attitudes that are ‘re- wing ‘takeover’ was the support and financial stricted or confined within narrow limits’. While assistance given by the Left to experimental this phenomenon is obviously not restricted to modern art in Austria. Haider introduced Austria, cultural parochialism has penetrated Gramsci’s vocabulary of ‘hegemony’ into his mainstream politics to quite a significant degree political writings and it became a staple part of in Austria, enabling a fertile soil for the growth his oppositional discourse in the 1990s. As of reactionary movements like Haider’s Free- Zöchling comments: dom Party. This is reflected in the long-standing distaste for modern art amongst the Aus- Kunst und Kultur sind für Haider der Angelpunkt, trian political establishment: die politische Hegemonie zu erlangen. Als Kärnt- ner Landeshauptmann hat er sich als erstes das (…) Wobei ein Phänomen auftrat, das leider zu ei- Kunst- und Kulturressort geschnappt (Zöchling nem bestimmenden Element österreichischer Kul- 1999, 156). turgeschichte geworden ist: Borniert gegen moder- ne Kunst gerichteter Aggression gelang es und ge- The Right-Wing Core: In its transforma- lingt es durchaus immer wieder, die Welt der Krea- tion into a populist political force, the FPÖ dis- tivität und des Geistigen zu beschädigen, Künstler pensed with certain items of ideological bag- in ihrer Arbeit zu behindern und sie in ihrer materi- gage. These included German nationalism i.e. ellen – und im Extremfall auch physischen – Existenz zu gefährden und zu bedrohen (Denscher 1999, 5). pan-Germanism, anti-clericalism and any overt connections to National Socialism. New career The tenacity of parochial attitudes in the politicians emerged to prominence in the party Austrian establishment can be attributed to the such as Susanne Riess-Passer and Karl-Heinz historical, political and social forces that com- Grasser, hungry for the status and privileges of bined during the twentieth century to shape political power. Haider had to perform the deli- Austrian political culture in a different way from cate balancing act of appealing to a wider elec- other European countries. In Germany, the torate and maneuvering for executive power trauma of Nazism was dealt with more rigor- while placating an ideological right-wing core ously than in Austria, it was reflected by Ger- of the party to prove that he had not given up man writers such as Böll or Grass who thema- FPÖ ‘principles’. Haider became a chameleon, tized Nazism directly in their works (Konzett attempting to appeal to all types of voters from 2000, 10). Avant-garde culture was specifically poor working-class families to entrepreneurs. Of allocated space in public broadcasting, particu- the various issues, certain ones like Kulturpolitik larly through initiatives like DCTP (Develop- had more of an appeal to these right-wing fun- ment Company for Television Programme). In damentalists in the party – those who wished Great Britain, political discourse has steered for ‘healthy’ values to be re-established in a clear of cultural matters and the flourishing society degenerated by the ’68 generation. multiculturalism in the British art scene is in The Rise of the Austrian Freedom Party in the 1990s 303 marked contrast to the narrow confines of Aus- with conservatism – it is clear from the party’s trian public art. Haider managed to use these stance on Kultur that it retained a deep suspi- specific cultural factors in order to capture the cion of any form of progressive cultural tenden- imagination of the Austrian electorate with a cies. Cornelia Klinger highlights this tension in new type of political program – based on ‘iden- her article titled ‘Fascism – a German Funda- tity’ politics – and promising something ‘new’ mentalism?’ and ‘radical’ while appealing to deeply conservative traditions and attitudes in Austrian Die Problematik des Faschismus hat weniger mit dem Prozeß ‘sozialer’ Modernisierung zu tun als mit society. The next sub-section gives a deeper indem Prozess ‘kultureller’ Modernisierung bzw. ih- sight into this specific Austrian political and rer Verhinderung und Verfehlung (Klinger 1992). social climate that Haider inherited and ex- ploited. In this context Ernst Hanisch (1994) has sketched some illuminating aspects of the parochial nature of post-war Austrian society. Dur- Austrian Identity ing the 1950s, the previous decades of instabil- ity, war and dictatorship were overcome in the There is a deep tension in modernity between cultural arena not by some kind of confronta- those embracing the dynamic, liberal, techno- tion or Vergangenheitsbewältigung – instead logical, and cosmopolitan version of modernity there was the widely popular Heimatfilm – a and the conservative reaction of those regret- distinct manifestation of Austrian cultural pa- ting the ‘loss’ of cultural identity, religious be- rochialism: lief and hierarchical societal order. This anti- modernist ideology crystallized itself in the fas- Im Trivialfilm (Heimatfilm) (…) kristallisieren sich die kollektiven Träume, das Imaginäre einer auf cist movements of the 1930s. Austria has been Ruhe und Ordnung bedachten Gesellschaft aus. no exception to this conflict. In fact, as outlined Gegen die brutalen Zivilisationsbrüche der vorher- in Schorske’s (1980) classic work on Fin-de- gehenden Jahre, gegen die Technikeuphorie der Siècle Vienna – Vienna became a hotbed of both Gegenwart setzte der Heimatfilm auf eine ungestörte avant-garde radicalism and deeply reactionary Natur als Ort der Zuflucht, auf eine intakte konser- populism at the beginning of the 20th century. vative Werthierarchie, wo die gesellschaftlichen Ränge klar bestimmt, die Rolle von Mann und Frau The subsequent effects of two world wars, the ‘naturwüchsig’ ausformuliert werden (Hanisch disintegration of the empire, the civil war in 1994, 433). 1934 and Nazi occupation has had deep social consequences. Amid all this political and social Parallel to this ‘trivial’ culture, ‘high’ cul- turmoil, a deeply engrained parochialism in ture was dominated by the looming figure of Austrian elites, probably arising out of the trau- Herbert von Karajan. An undoubted master of mas of the first half of the 20th century, has re- his art, but also a perfectionist who “mit einer mained a constant feature of Austrian politics – herrisch ungeduldigen Geste schob seine NS- right up to the present-day. These political elites Verwicklung beiseite” (ibid. 434). The back- – whether black or red – set up a progressive ground to this conservative ‘Kulturparadigma’ social welfare system and practiced a remark- was a nation putting the bulk of its energy into able level of co-operation in government. How- economic reconstruction, in which there was ever, at the same time, they were resistant to the little effort made to bring back exiled Jewish or progressive social and cultural manifestations communist artists and intellectuals. As Michael of modernity and distinctly failed to ‘modern- Wimmer states in his article, the cultural poli- ize’ Austria in the cultural sense of the word. cies of the post-war era primarily involved a Haider’s political project incorporated an “cultural policy of exclusion” (1996, 42). ideological undercurrent of cultural anti-mod- The main political parties established a sys- ernism. While embracing neo-liberalism, com- tem of ‘Consociationalism’ (Pelinka 1998b, 15), petitive party politics and eventually a coalition giving Austria decades of stable coalition gov- 304 Anthony Murphy ernments and compliant trade unions. The po- has been altered so often and so significantly since litical turmoil, economic difficulties and civil 1800 (Pelinka 1998, 9). unrest prevalent in other European countries, Austrian identity after 1945 was a crucial particularly in the 1960s, were notably absent issue for political elites who had the task of post- in Austria. Pope Paul VI famously called the war re-construction and the formation of an country “the land of the blessed” during a visit Austrian liberal-democracy. In a sense, the claim to the Vatican by the Austrian President, Franz on ‘Austrianness’ was up for grabs – and the Jonas, in 1971. The extent of the Austrian es- post-war Austrian establishment spared little tablishment’s ‘Kompromissbereitschaft’ after time in constructing a new national identity. the war was the ‘pragmatic’ policy of integrat- Peter Thaler (2001) notes in his book that the ing numerous ex-Nazis into the SPÖ and ÖVP Austrian case of “nation-building” after 1945 as well as allowing the embryonic version of was a highly successful project resulting from the FPÖ – the VdU (Verband der Unabhängigen) the “conscious efforts of elites” to build an Aus- to become a political party. The VdU explicitly trian “nation” (2001, 1). This process from aimed to serve (as stated in 1949), amongst other above involved not only the formation of a dis- constituencies, the “respected and unin- tinctive political culture, it also entailed the de- criminated representatives of the interests of velopment of an explicitly ‘Austrianist’ registered National Socialists” (Riedlsperger historiography after 1945, which aimed at the 1978, 40). eradication of pan-German ideology and the Right up to the 1980s, Austria managed to reinforcement of a new Austrian national iden- sustain political and economic ‘stability’. In the tity. History books were re-written, based on a cultural arena, an image of wonderful land- highly selective interpretation of the past – with scapes, Mozart and of being the ‘first victim’ of the specific intention of giving historical cre- Nazi aggression in Europe was successfully ex- dence to the notion of an independent Austrian ported. The only significant response to this be- nationhood. nign construction of Austrian identity came from However, as Thaler notes, the flipside of this a few writers and artists. Amongst others, Tho- successful political process was that Austrian mas Bernhard, Peter Handke, and Elfriede nation-building had its “foremost impact on Jelinek wrote polemics, plays and novels that consciousness, but did not significantly affect tore down the hypocritical facade of the Second the general economic and cultural environment” Republic (Konzett 2000). In the plastic arts, Vi- (ibid. 175). In other words, while the populace ennese Actionism exposed the fault line of moral identified with the Austrian state, this identifi- hypocrisy and repression in Austrian society with cation came as a result of a process ‘from above’ outrageous artistic ‘happenings’ (Fellner 1997). – dependent on economic success and political However, the Kulturrevolution of the 1960s ac- consensus. Deep-rooted changes in social and tually changed very little in Austrian political cultural identity did not take place. The fate of culture. If anything, the conservative Right could Austria’s Jewish population, the complicity of characterize this artistic challenge to the politi- Austrians in Nazi war crimes and the legacy of cal order as the outpourings of ‘Nest- Austro-fascism were pertinently avoided by beschmutzer’ – whose intent it was to de-stabi- politicians, the media and academics for well lizing the hard won moral, political and eco- over a generation, right up to the Waldheim cri- nomic foundations of the post-war Austrian state. sis of 1986. Underlying and contributing to the conservative Kulturparadigma that affected post-war Austria was the vexed question of Austrian iden- Enter Haider tity. As Pelinka states: No other European country at the end of the 20th Coinciding with the election of the contro- century whose identity has changed so many times, versial Austrian president, Kurt Waldheim, Jörg whose objective, as well as subjective, substance Haider entered the Austrian political stage by The Rise of the Austrian Freedom Party in the 1990s 305 his dramatic and successful bid for party lead- of identity by focusing on economics and wel- ership in 1986. He then embarked on his politi- fare. Haider’s success lay in as Isolde Charim cal strategy of capturing the mood and imagi- states, ‘redefining the passions that move a re- nation of the Austrian electorate by an empha- gime’: sis on ‘identity’ politics and an appeal to ‘traditional values’ (Haider 1995; 1997). In this im- Darin besteht ihr größter Erfolg: Sie (die extreme Rechte) hat – und sie ist weiterhin dabei –, das sym- portant respect, the main political parties were bolische Dispositiv der Zweiten Republik, jene „Lei- unable to adapt to the new political landscape denschaften, die ein Regime bewegen“, neu be- of late-modernity. They were left behind by the stimmt (Charim 2001, emphasis added). political dynamic of a brand of right-wing populism that was particularly suited to the During the first few years of his leadership, Austrian conditions of cultural parochialism and Haider led a successful grassroots campaign in political stalemate. Haider managed to fill a psy- which many new party members were recruited chological vacuum in an Austrian society that and political support was mobilized. He chose had failed to grasp the nettles of dealing with unconventional channels of political mobiliza- the legacies of the past, reforming the Proporz tion such as targeting young people in discos or political system and the retention and promo- the older generation in ‘beer-tent’ gatherings tion of parochial cultural values, at the expense (Gingrich 2002, 69). Therefore, while Haider’s of cosmopolitanism and inclusion. The FPÖ did FPÖ became increasingly identified with Nazi not offer Austrian people any real political al- revisionism and xenophobia in the international ternative – it merely carried on the established context, within the domestic setting many saw political traditions that had remained unchal- his party as representing the preservation and lenged by Austria’s political establishment since promotion of traditional values and beliefs – an 1945 (Bauböck 2002, 249). Austrian Heimat. The way in which Haider managed to ‘cap- A cultural rhetoric was expounded by the ture the imagination’ of many Austrians can be party in which a ‘Kulturdeutsch’ identity was seen in three areas of Freedom Party policy: specified as opposed to the ‘political’ German Heimat, anti-modernism and traditional values. identity: Heimat translates into ‘homeland’ in Eng- lish – an insufficient translation of a word with Die Freiheitliche Bewegung betont die Zugehörig- keit der Österreicher zu der durch ihre jeweilige significant cultural connotations in German. In Muttersprache vorgegebenen Kulturgemeinschaft; the regional elections of Carinthia (March für die überwiegende Mehrheit der Österreicher also 7, 2004), the FPÖ gained 42.4% of the vote and die deutsche (FPÖ Parteiprogramm 1997, 32) Haider remained governor. In his election campaign he has included the slogan: “Jörg Haider Haider propagated the notion that Austria heißt für mich: Heimat”, which continues: was in the throes of a rampant cosmopolitanism, “Volkskultur und Tradition haben mehr an Überfremdung that was eroding the ‘Aus- Stellenwert als je zuvor”. This is a direct and trian’ way of life. He made the preservation and emotional appeal towards people’s cultural iden- support of a healthy ‘Volkskultur’ a central tity, used so effectively by Haider throughout plank of his political strategy during the 1990s the 1990s. The FPÖ has constantly re-iterated (Gratzer 1998). that this special identity was in danger of being The political journey embarked on by the eroded – whether by immigrants, asylum seek- FPÖ under Haider was understood as a ers, left-wing politicians, cultural figures, art- hegemonic project in which Austrian politics ists or the European Union. Haider also appealed would come under the domination of the FPÖ to the deep-seated desire for belonging and iden- by appealing to people not only on the basis of tity that had been absent from the bureaucratic policies or sound bites but by affecting ordinary and distant politics of the Second Republic – a people’s emotional world and instilling a sense political culture that pertinently avoided issues of fear that something was being ‘lost’ in the 306 Anthony Murphy chaotic society of the late 20th century. In this What used to be the domain of the Left – to respect the FPÖ ventured further than any other capture the imagination of the working class to European far-right party, with the exception of achieve equality and wealth re-distribution – has France’s Front National, into positioning itself been taken over by the Right and transformed as being the ‘true’ representatives of a national into an unpleasant mix of xenophobia and anti- identity. cosmopolitanism. The Right has become more By 1999, the FPÖ represented a formidable adept at moving the passions of ordinary peo- force in Austrian politics. A charismatic leader ple, with Haider being an effective and danger- had convinced his party and a third of the coun- ous example. It would be useful for the Left to try’s electorate that the Freedom Party was the recognize this and incorporate it into a political only true alternative to the bankrupt politics of strategy for the 21st century – a strategy that the old political camps. Jörg Haider had indeed recognizes cultural identity and tradition as po- captured a nation’s imagination – and almost tent political forces and not merely part of some became chancellor in the process. This political kind of Marxian ‘sub-structural’ element in achievement would not have been possible with- modern capitalist human society. out the appropriation and transformation of Austrian ‘identity’ and ‘tradition’ into burning political issues.

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