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Politicizing Europe: Patterns of Party-Based Opposition to European Integration

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Politicizing Europe: Patterns of Party-Based Opposition to European Integration S T OCKHOLM STUDIES IN POL I TICS 1 5 1 Politicizing Europe: Patterns of party-based opposition to European integration Göran von Sydow 2 Politicizing Europe Patterns of party-based opposition to European integration Göran von Sydow 3 © Göran von Sydow, Stockholm 2013 ISSN 0346-6620 ISBN 978-91-7447-666-8 Printed in Sweden by Universitetsservice US-AB, Stockholm 2013 Distributor: Department of political science, Stockholm University The photos on the cover page show campaign posters during referenda in Ireland 2009 (photo: William Murphy) and France 2005 (photo: Philipp Hertzog and Justin Cormack). All photos available through Creative commons licenses. 4 To Estrid, Ines and Lisa 5 6 Contents Figures and tables…………………………………………………………………………………………………...............10 Acknowledgments .................................................................................................................... 12 1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 14 1.1 Politics and European integration ............................................................................ 18 1.2 Aim and research question ....................................................................................... 21 1.3 Contributions ............................................................................................................ 24 1.4 Outline ...................................................................................................................... 28 2 Europe, parties, politicization and opposition: concepts and previous research ............ 30 2.1 Political parties and party systems ........................................................................... 30 2.1.1 Functions of political parties .............................................................................. 30 2.1.2 Party systems: stability and change ................................................................... 33 2.1.3 Political parties and cleavages ........................................................................... 35 2.2 Europeanization and political parties ....................................................................... 38 2.2.1 Europeanization of political parties and party systems ..................................... 39 2.3 Politicization and European integration ................................................................... 43 2.4 Euroscepticism ......................................................................................................... 49 2.4.1 Defining Euroscepticism ..................................................................................... 50 3 Analytical framework and methods .................................................................................. 57 3.1 Politicization as party-based opposition ................................................................... 57 3.1.1 The number of Eurosceptic parties .................................................................... 57 3.1.2 The vote share obtained by Eurosceptic parties ................................................ 58 3.1.3 The formation and success of single-issue Eurosceptic parties ......................... 60 3.2 Explaining variation: the role of institutions ............................................................ 60 3.2.1 Voter availability................................................................................................. 66 3.2.2 Institutional incentives ....................................................................................... 68 3.2.3 Political opportunity structures ......................................................................... 71 3.2.4 Summarizing the analytical framework ............................................................. 77 3.3 The comparative method .......................................................................................... 79 3.3.1 Causes, conditions and factors ........................................................................... 82 3.3.2 On comparisons across time and space ............................................................. 85 7 3.4 Classifications, cases, elections and data ................................................................. 86 3.4.1 Identifying Eurosceptic parties ........................................................................... 86 3.4.2 Observations and limitations ............................................................................. 90 4 Patterns of opposition: describing variation .................................................................... 94 4.1 Euroscepticism in fourteen member states ............................................................... 95 4.1.1 Austria ................................................................................................................ 95 4.1.2 Belgium ............................................................................................................... 98 4.1.3 Denmark ........................................................................................................... 101 4.1.4 Finland .............................................................................................................. 105 4.1.5 France ............................................................................................................... 107 4.1.6 Germany ........................................................................................................... 111 4.1.7 Greece .............................................................................................................. 113 4.1.8 Ireland .............................................................................................................. 115 4.1.9 Italy ................................................................................................................... 116 4.1.10 The Netherlands ............................................................................................... 118 4.1.11 Portugal ............................................................................................................ 121 4.1.12 Spain ................................................................................................................. 122 4.1.13 Sweden ............................................................................................................. 123 4.1.14 United Kingdom ................................................................................................ 125 4.2 Descriptive comparison .......................................................................................... 128 4.2.1 The number of parties ...................................................................................... 129 4.2.2 Vote support for Eurosceptic parties over time............................................... 133 4.2.3 Evolution of single-issue parties....................................................................... 136 4.2.4 National and European elections ..................................................................... 142 4.2.5 Specifying the degree of mismatch .................................................................. 144 5 Conditions for politicization ............................................................................................ 148 5.1 Voter availability .................................................................................................... 150 5.1.1 Public opinion ................................................................................................... 152 5.1.2 Electoral volatility ............................................................................................. 156 5.2 Institutional incentives ........................................................................................... 160 5.2.1 Referendum ...................................................................................................... 161 5.2.2 Referendum and the creation of Single-issue Eurosceptic parties .................. 167 8 5.2.3 Electoral system ............................................................................................... 169 5.3 Political opportunity structures .............................................................................. 173 5.3.1 Number of parties ............................................................................................ 174 5.3.2 Factions on the EU-dimension ......................................................................... 175 5.3.3 Salience of European integration ..................................................................... 178 5.3.4 Party system mechanics: the openness of the government arena.................. 183 5.3.5 Left-right polarization and establishment collusion ........................................ 192 5.4 Summing up variation: conditional configurations ................................................ 200 5.4.1 Dynamic synthesis – trends of increasing opposition ...................................... 210 5.4.2 The electoral response during the economic crisis .......................................... 215 6 Conclusion and implications ........................................................................................... 227 6.1 Main findings, alternative models and future research .......................................... 228 6.1.1 Locating politicization ...................................................................................... 229 6.1.2 Conditions for politicization ............................................................................
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