A Historical Constructivist Perspective of Japan’s Environmental Diplomacy

Katsuhiko Mori International Christian University

Abstract: Why did Japan attempt to take a leadership role on some occasions, while it became a bystander or even a dragger on other occasions? By examining three cases of environmental diplomacy, i.e., hosting the Kyoto conference on climate change, the Nagoya conference on biodiversity, and the diplomatic conference for the Minamata Convention, this paper will identify the key drivers of effectiveness in Japan’s environmental diplomacy from the perspective of historical constructivism. The study accounts for the historical trajectory and conjunctures of Japan’s environmental diplomacy in the changing global environmental governance with a combination of power, interests, and ideas across time and areas of concern at both international and domestic levels.

Introduction

Why did Japan attempt to take a leadership role on some occasions, while it became a bystander or even a dragger on other occasions? In the 1980s, Japan was accused of being one of the world’s “eco-outlaws,” especially regarding the tropical timber, whaling, and ivory trades.1 Since the 1990s, Japan has become more active in hosting multilateral environmental conferences, such as the 1997 Third Session of the Conference of Parties (COP-3) of the United Nations (UN) Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the 2010 COP-10, the fifth Meeting of the Parties to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (MOP-5) of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), and the 2013 Diplomatic Conference for the Minamata Convention on Mercury. These conferences were concerned with the atmosphere, biosphere, and hydrosphere, which were on the diplomatic agenda in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s, respectively. On the one hand, these conferences appear to be symbolic signals of Japan’s environmental diplomacy, especially by adopting the protocols and conventions using the names of the Japanese host cities: Kyoto, Nagoya, and Minamata.2 However, there is a difference between hosting these conferences and contributing to the conference

1 outcomes. Japan lost credibility and the opportunity to take environmental leadership by deciding not to participate in the second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol, and by having not ratified the Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-sharing (ABS) and the Nagoya–Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. On the other hand, Japan ratified the Minamata Convention relatively early, before it will enter into force. What are the key driving forces of effectiveness in Japan’s environmental diplomacy? This paper will answer this question from the perspective of historical constructivism. The next section will establish a framework of analysis for the historical trajectory of Japan’s environmental diplomacy. The following sections will account for the three cases of environmental diplomacy in deconstructing and reconstructing the changing global environmental governance with a combination of power, interests, and ideas across time and areas of concern.

A Comprehensive Analysis Framework

Historical Trajectory of Japan’s Environmental Diplomacy To what extent was Japan’s environmental diplomacy successful or not successful in which areas of environmental concern? To answer this question, it is first important to identify the historical trajectory and conjunctures of Japan’s symbolic environmental diplomatic actions, such as hosting conferences for multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), inviting international organization headquarters to Japan, hosting summitry meetings, and committing and disbursing environmental official development assistance (ODA). Japan’s environmental diplomatic actions are varied, with different conjunctures in different environmental issues, such as the atmosphere, biosphere, geosphere, and hydrosphere. As shown in Table 1, the history of international environmental governance can be roughly periodized using the UN environmental summits as thresholds, although there were some early attempts, such as the International Whaling Commission (IWC) and the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, before the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE) held in Stockholm. A salient feature of the main issues that the 1972 Stockholm conference dealt with was the “internationalization” of environmental pollution issues or transboundary

2 environmental pollution. At that time, Japan was preoccupied with domestic environmental pollution and there were no transboundary environmental issues. The Diet session held in late 1970 was called the “Pollution Diet,” which discussed a series of environmental pollution-related legislation and established the Environment Agency in 1971. Compared with Sweden and Canada, Japan’s environmental diplomacy was premature. Japan joined the MEAs created in the 1970s many years later. Japan entered the World Heritage Convention (WHC) in 1992, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) in 1980, and the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) in 1983. Currently, Japan is not under the geographical coverage of the Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) Convention, and Japan is not a member of the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (the Bonn Convention). Stockholm was a starting point of Japan’s environmental diplomacy. A Japanese diplomat had the idea of hosting a second UNCHE for further learning. In reality, Deputy Prime Minister Takeo Miki officially expressed such an idea to the UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim, but it was not realized.3 The session of a special character of the Governing Council of the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) was held in Nairobi in 1982. The Nairobi conference was characterized as “worldization” in the sense that the socioeconomic dimension of the North–South problems became the main agenda. Rather than human (social) and environmental pillars, economic development was the main concern for developing countries. In 1982, Japan responded to this demand by proposing the establishment of a World Commission on Environment and Development to UNEP. Japan also hosted the first World Lake Conference in 1984. Japan also increased its ODA rapidly in the middle of the 1980s and became the world’s largest donor in 1989. Japan joined the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer in 1988 and the Montreal Protocol in 1989, although Japan was a dragger in the early phases of the ozone negotiations. Japan was the world’s largest timber importer, and its responsibility for deforestation was seriously criticized by the early 1980s. Japan invited the headquarters of the International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO) to Yokohama in 1986. The negotiations on the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea

3 (UNCLOS) also faced difficulties due to the North–South divide. Japan joined the Basel Convention in 1993 and the UNCLOS in 1996. A dominant idea of the 1992 Rio conference is characterized as the “globalization” of environmental issues, as symbolized by the emphasis on the “common” element of the principle of common but differentiated responsibility, which was applied to all three Rio conventions on climate change, biodiversity, and desertification. Japan played some intermediate roles by hosting the Kyoto conferences on CITES in 1992, and on climate change in 1997, and playing a mediator role in adopting the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety in 2000.4 The UN Commission on Sustainable Development established by the Rio summit became a forum to create the Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions related to hazardous materials. Instead of socioeconomic world trade, toxic chemicals were recognized as a “global” environment issue, in the sense of global distillation, or the “grasshopper” effect, by which persistent organic pollutants (POPs) are vaporized at high temperatures and blow around on winds and travel to cooler places in the Arctic and high-altitude areas in the global climate process. At the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development held in Johannesburg, the three pillars of environment, economy, and society were reconfirmed and public–private partnerships of multiple stakeholders were widely recognized. Japan hosted the third World Water Forum in 2003. Japan’s environmental diplomacy seemed revitalized when the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) swept the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in a landslide in the August 2009 general election. At the UN General Assembly in September 2009, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama pledged a 25% reduction in greenhouse gases below 1990 levels by 2020 leading up to the 2009 Copenhagen conference, and expressed in May 2010 the idea of hosting the diplomatic conference for the Minamata Convention on Mercury. However, after Copenhagen talks failed, Japan decided not to join the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol in 2010. Japan also hosted the COP-10 of CBD, where the Aichi Biodiversity Targets, the Nagoya Protocol, and the Nagoya–Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol were adopted. However, Japan has not yet ratified these Protocols. At the 2012 Rio+20, new diplomacy for sustainable development began. After Japan experienced the triple disaster of earthquakes, tsunami, and nuclear meltdown in 2011, voters gave the LDP a landslide victory in 2012. In October 2013, Japan hosted the Diplomatic Conference on the Minamata Convention on Mercury, and ratified it in

4 February 2016. In 2015, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals were adopted at the UN General Assembly, and the Paris Agreement on climate change at the COP-21 of the UNFCCC.

Table 1: Historical Trajectories of Japan’s Environmental Diplomacy

tmosphere Biosphere/Geosphere Hydrosphere IWC (46) Ramsar (71) 1972 Stockholm World Heritage (72) CITES (73) MARPOL (73) LRTAP (79) Bonn (79)

1982 Nairobi Vienna (85) UNCLOS (82) Montreal (87) ITTO (86) WLC (84) Basel (89) Kyoto COP8 (92) 1992 Rio UNFCCC (92) UNCBD (92) Kushiro COP5 (93) Kyoto (97) UNCCD (94) Watercourses (97) RoSerdam (98) Cartagena (00) Stockholm (01)

2002 Johannesburg Cancun (10) Nagoya (10) WWF3 (03) Nagoya-KL (10) 2012 Rio+20 Minamata (13) Paris (15)

Drivers of Effectiveness How can the driving forces and effectiveness of Japan’s environmental diplomacy be conceptualized? This section will establish an analytical framework (Figure 1) from the historical constructivist perspective.

Figure 1: Framework of Analysis

5 Key Drivers History • Power • Trajectory • Interest • Conjuncture • Idea/knowledge Process Level of Analysis • Leader • stem • Supporter EffecCveness • tateDomesCc • Mediator • ociety/Individual • Dragger (DiplomaCc) (Environmental) • Bystander

INPUTS DIPLOMACY OUTPUTS OUTCOMES IMPACTS

Short-term Medium-term Long-term • Decision (behavioral change) (environmental (Foreign Policy) (Diplomacy) • Output • PrecontemplaCon impact) • Resultant • ContemplaCon • ProtecCon • PreparaCon • ConservaCon Drivers • AcCon • RestoraCon • Maintenance • TerminaCon

First, foreign policy is defined as a set of ideas and other inputs intended in managing foreign affairs, while diplomacy is conceptualized as the practice and actions taken through which inputs are mobilized in handling foreign affairs to produce specific outputs. Although early works, such as Gabriel Almond’s developmental approach,5 identified some historical tendencies, the systematic input–process–output thinking often becomes ahistorical in the sense that a linear pathway to teleological development is assumed. Environmental diplomacy is a process through which diplomatic actions are taken and inputs are mobilized to produce specific outputs on the environment. This process of actions emerges at the historically constructed conjunctures in global environmental governance trajectories described in the previous section. Japan’s diplomatic position may be as a leader, supporter, mediator, dragger, bystander, or something else.6 When Japan acts as a chair of a multilateral environmental conference, it is also important to explore negotiation management. Elements of negotiation management may include: transparency and inclusiveness, capability and authority of the conference chair, and negotiation modes.7 To understand and explain drivers of effectiveness in Japan’s environmental diplomacy, it is important to reconsider the classical input–process–output model dynamically with reference to John Barkdull and Paul G. Harris’ proposed 3 × 3 matrix for the study of environmental foreign policy.8 “Input” can be conceptualized as a combination of three basic causal variables, power, interests, and ideas,9 which emerge

6 at a specific historical conjuncture and are used or constrained for diplomatic intervention. The orthodox levels of analysis—international system, state, and society—are the location where these causal variables interact dynamically in diplomatic processes, which are contextualized using historical trajectory as a unit of analysis. Some variables embraced by agents may become driving forces to promote intended foreign policy, while others may be constrained as structural variables. Between agents and structures, institutions at both international and domestic levels may be arranged to promote or constrain intended foreign policy. Power can be concentrated or distributed in a unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar world at the international system level. In the changing context of the post-World War II international system, Japan can be considered to have transformed itself from a small power to a middle power. Normative ideas and international institutions are inherent to middle power diplomacy especially in development and environment issues, as shown in Canada and Sweden. Following the scenarios posited by Robert Cox, Japan’s middlepowermanship can be viewed in the following options: a revived US hegemony supported by Japan, an enlarged G7/G8/G20 in which Japan functions as a principal power, a neomercantilist world of rival blocks, in which Japan works as a regional hegemon, and a multilevel, counterhegemonic vision of greater diffusion of power for which Japan is a potential leader.10 At the state level, the position of environmental authority in Japan’s government institutions can work as a catalyst for environmental policy and diplomacy. In 1971, the subcabinet level Environmental Agency was established and it was upgraded to the cabinet level Ministry of the Environment in 2001. After the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster, the Nuclear Regulation Authority was established under the Ministry of the Environment in 2012. In 1999, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs created the Global Environment Division under the International Cooperation Bureau. And in 2008, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs created the ambassadorial position of Director-General for Global Issues. At the society level, Japanese-style neocorporatism with the government, business, and labor unions has been recognized since the 1970s, especially after the oil crises. Considering interests, Sprinz and Vaahtoranta provided an interest-based framework focusing on ecological vulnerability and abatement costs of countries, which are categorized as bystanders, pusher, draggers, and intermediates. 11 However,

7 economic interests of abatement costs in the short term at home can be further elaborated by costs of inaction in the long run and competitive advantages of abatement technologies and practices at the international system level. 12 Environmental vulnerability at home is difficult to analyze because some environmental issues are transboundary, regional, or global. For instance, desertification tends to be regarded as an issue for other countries, although the Tottori sand dunes are an area of desertification in Japan. Different ministries may interpret national interests at the state level differently. For instance, climate policy is closely related to not only environmental policy, but also energy and industrial policies. National interest at the international level may also be interpreted in connection to another environmental or nonenvironmental regime. For instance, it is understood that Russia’s acceptance of the Kyoto Protocol was made in exchange for Russia’s entry into the World Trade Organization. Ideas and scientific knowledge can be key input variables. Public opinion and civil society campaigns based on norms can lead, follow, or have nothing to do with environmental diplomacy. Some normative ideas across time may or may not be spread throughout Japan and the world. The key idea of sustainable development, e.g., is not always referring to environmentally sustainability, but also sustainable social development and sustained economic growth.13 The role of individual moral leaders and media is also important. Not only normative ideas, but also scientific knowledge, another form of intangible ideas in epistemic communities, can be included as a key input.

Effectiveness As the dependent variable, there exists a loose consensus on the three types of effectiveness suggested by Oran Young’s conception on regime effectiveness: outputs, outcomes, and impacts.14 These are equivalents of what Davenport calls “effectiveness in a negotiated outcome,” “effectiveness as enforcement,” and the “effectiveness of agreement,” respectively. 15 In development community practice, planning and implementation are identified in a line of “inputs,” “activities,” direct immediate term “outputs,” medium-term “outcomes,” and long-term “impacts.” 16 In the case of biodiversity, the Drivers–Pressures–States–Impacts–Responses (DPSIR) framework was applied to the new Strategic Plan for Biodiversity. Policy responses can be made to

8 all the levels of drivers, pressures, states, and impacts. In this paper, diplomatic effectiveness refers to short-term outputs and medium-term outcomes, while environmental effectiveness refers to long-term environmental impacts. Inputs will be transformed into outputs, which are agreements or disagreements that resulted from diplomatic interactions at specific conjunctures. Following Allison’s classic model of foreign policy decision-making, outputs are rational “decisions,” “outputs” of organizational processes, or negotiated “outcomes,” which are often unintended “resultants.” 17 The outputs can be outcome documents that describe regulations, mechanisms, and institutions to be created. Outcomes are medium-term changes in the behavior of actors. They include implementation and policy actions by the government, and the behavioral changes of other stakeholders. Following the transtheoretical model of behavioral change, different stages of behavioral change can be posited: precontemplation, contemplation, preparation, action, maintenance, and termination.18 Impacts here are defined as the problem-solving effectiveness of long-term environmental impacts. Environmental impacts can be conceptualized separately from, jointly, or integrated with other dimensions of sustainable development. Environmental impacts can be protection (or preservation), conservation (or sustainable use), or restoration (or redress) of the natural environment.

Case 1: Kyoto

Japan’s Climate Diplomacy Japan was the host country of the COP-3 where the Kyoto Protocol on climate change was adopted, so why did Japan express its opposition to extend the Kyoto Protocol at the COP-16 in Cancun? Japan was still a major economic power and the fifth largest greenhouse gas emitter, so why did Japan lack diplomatic presence at the COP-21 in Paris? Japan’s climate diplomacy in Kyoto, Cancun, and Paris shows Japan’s trajectory from being an attempted mediator to being a less-visible bystander through a dragger. When Sukio Iwatare, the head of the Environment Agency, officially offered to host the COP-3 in 1996 in Geneva, he had mixed feelings. Knowing that CO2 emissions from Japan in 1995 already exceeded the 1990 levels by about 7–8%, he was concerned

9 that this trend would undermine the credibility of Japan’s leadership in Kyoto. At the same time, however, he saw it would be a good opportunity for not only Japan’s environmental diplomacy, but also democratization of Japanese foreign policy-making by involving non-State actors, including businesses, labor unions, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). He was a social democrat in the coalition government led by Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto (LDP). Domestic politics were unstable, and in September 1997, Hashimoto reshuffled his Cabinet and appointed Hiroshi Oki (LDP) as the new head of the Environment Agency. Although Oki served as the COP-3 President, the actual negotiation was managed by experienced Argentine diplomat Raul Estrada-Oyuela as chair of the Committee of the Whole (COW). Many observers questioned and even ridiculed the Japanese presidency, when Oki, during the COP-3 session, almost had to return to Tokyo to prevent a nonconfidence vote against the Hashimoto Cabinet. When Japan became the 74th ratifier of the Kyoto Protocol in 2002, three years before it entered into force, Hiroshi Oki was the Environment Minister of the coalition government led by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi (LDP). At the beginning of the COP-16, Jun Arima, a chief negotiator from the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI, formerly the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI)) said, “Japan will not inscribe its target under the Kyoto Protocol on any conditions or under any circumstances.”19 One year after the failure of climate talks in Copenhagen, his statement was a surprise to the other delegations in Cancun. Japan dishonorably won the first place award as the Climate Action Network’s “Fossil of the Day.” At the COP-21, Japan became less visible. Japan gave only one official press conference for the foreign press, but avoided being awarded the “Fossil of the Day” during the COP-21. In the second week of the negotiation, when the “high ambition coalition” was visible, Japan did not participate until the very end of the conference. A Japanese government source said, “What’s better than not getting a dishonorable award? Environment Minister Tamayo Marukawa has actively participated in negotiations, including 13 bilateral meetings.”20 Some observed that “Japan bashing” had now changed into “Japan passing.”

Drivers of Effectiveness

10 The key drivers and constraints for Japan’s climate diplomacy are explained by interest-driven coalition building both at home and abroad. Japan’s climate diplomacy in the conjunctures of Kyoto, Cancun, and Paris was also bombarded by the shocks of the US, Premier Hatoyama, and the 3.11 disasters, respectively. The source of Japan’s position making in Kyoto was the bureaucratic rivalry between the then MITI representing business interests and the then Environment Agency supported by environmental NGOs. To persuade the opponents within the government, both camps sought for “foreign pressure” or gaiatsu. At the international system level, while the EU was active in forcing other countries to comply with the UNFCCC, non-EU developed countries, or JUSSCANNZ (Japan, US, Switzerland, Canada, Norway, and New Zealand, later called the Umbrella Group) were generally reluctant to strengthen the UNFCCC regime. The US initially avoided using the word “protocol,” but agreed to the Berlin Mandate (named by the US) to begin a process to adopt “a protocol or another legal instrument” at the COP-1, which was presided by Angela Merkel. At the COP-2, for the first time, the US officially supported a legally binding agreement. Following the US position, MITI proposed a “feasible” (or critics called “too little, too late”) emission reduction target for Japan that aimed to be as lower as possible to stabilize the 1990 levels, i.e., 0%. By contrast, the Environment Agency proposed a “challenging” target of 5.7% reduction, in an attempt to mediate between the pusher position of the EU and the dragger position of the US. Prime Minister Hashimoto intervened in the interministerial rivalry to set the reduction rate at 5%, but the Japanese position was overridden by the US at the COP-3. The US shock in Kyoto further traumatized Japan’s climate diplomacy in 2001 when the George Bush administration declared that it had no interest in implementing the Kyoto Protocol and intended to withdraw the US signature from the accord. Japan’s climate diplomacy attracted international attention in September 2009 when Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama (DPJ) announced at the UN General Assembly that Japan would aim to reduce its emissions by 25% by 2020 on the premise that all of the major economies would agree on the ambitious target in Copenhagen. Hatoyama’s initiative was driven by his top-down political leadership, but the Japan Business Federation strongly opposed it. Hatoyama’s diplomatic campaign failed to create momentum for climate talks in Copenhagen, where the US and China collided. Instead, Hatoyama’s campaign had a negative impact on Japanese bureaucracy, which drove

11 Japan’s surprise speech in Cancun. Arima’s speech was expressed as an official statement supported by not only METI, but also the Ministry of the Environment and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.21 The COP-3 and COP-15 meetings were held during very sluggish economic conditions for Japan. The currency and financial crisis in Asia, starting from July 1997, slowed the growth of Japan’s exports to Asia. The collapse of the Hokkaido Takushoku Bank and Yamaichi Securities in November 1997 destabilized the Japanese financial system, which affected financial confidence. Japanese export-led economic growth was hit harder by the world financial crisis of 2008–2009 than the US or the EU, while the appreciation of the yen provided Japan with a permissive cause for cheap import of fossil fuels. The failure of Copenhagen also affected more skepticism in multilateral environmental negotiations, and Japan sought for minilateral (such as G7/G8/G20) and bilateral diplomatic actions. The relative weight of the Foreign Ministry increased after resolving the differences between METI and the Ministry of the Environment. When Japan chaired the G8 Hokkaido Toyako Summit, the Foreign Ministry created and made the best use of the position of Director-General for Global Issues (Ambassador) in charge of global negotiations.

Effectiveness The Kyoto Protocol was a diplomatic resultant rather than an outcome of organizational processes or rational decisions. The figures of emission reduction by 8% for the EU, 7% for the US, and 6% for Japan specified in the Kyoto Protocol were diplomatically created when US Vice President Al Gore met Prime Minister Hashimoto. Neither MITI nor the Environment Agency was involved in this process. It was understood that the seemingly high target of 8% for the EU would be not so difficult to achieve when the former East Germany and other central European countries were taken into account. The relatively modest 6% target for Japan could actually be the most economically challenging among the industrial countries from the perspective of the MITI and Japanese businesses because they felt they have already made their best efforts in improving energy efficiency after the oil shock. The expression, “wringing a dry towel,” was often used to describe this output.

12 Japan’s climate diplomacy at COP-3 walked a tightrope. The negotiations on the issue of forest sinks were confused at the very late stage of the Kyoto conference. Once COW Chair Estrada adopted that forest sinks would not be allowed for the first commitment period. Yet with the request from Japan this issue was re-negotiated and agreed in early morning of the last day of the meeting.22 While Japan achieved its Kyoto Protocol commitments for the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol (2008–2012), its achievement tools were forestry absorption and the Kyoto mechanism, especially through the purchase of emission rights from other developed countries. The amount of emissions in Japan fluctuated with the ups-and-downs of the economy. The relatively low level of emissions during the 2008 world financial crisis was superseded by an increase in fossil fuel consumption after the economic recovery and after the 3.11 tragedy. When the COP-13 of 2007 adopted the Bali Road Map for the two tracks of negotiations, the Convention track and the Kyoto Protocol track, the trauma Japan experienced after Kyoto and the subsequent US shock inhibited Japan’s behavioral change for activism. The COP-16 set a transitional period from 2013 through 2020 with a combination of the Cancun Agreements (the pledge and review approach only for Canada, Japan, New Zealand, and Russia) and the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol (the cap and trade approach for the EU, Australia, and other Annex B countries). For Japan, the Kyoto Protocol was neither fair nor effective any longer: “it is unfair, since only the Parties under the Kyoto Protocol are bound by the Kyoto Protocol, while other major economies such as the US and China have no legally binding commitments. Also, it is ineffective in terms of achieving emissions reduction at global 23 scale.” Japan stressed repeatedly, “the total CO2 emissions from the Parties under the obligation of the Kyoto Protocol account for only 27%.” Japan also noted that “it is very unlikely that the US and China will participate in the new future,” and that “it is groundless to believe that the US and China will follow to accept legally binding commitments once developed countries take a lead in undertaking their obligations.” As such, Japan’s perspective was betrayed again at the COP-21 in Paris, where the US and China took the lead in producing the legally binding Paris Agreement. Japan’s limited inputs to the substance of the Paris Agreement included bureaucratic wording for the ambiguous concept that was difficult to understand, and defining the entry into force conditions. Because the Bolivarian Alliance of the Americas (ALBA) countries

13 strongly opposed using the expression, “market mechanisms” for mitigation actions, the Japan-proposed phrase “cooperative approaches that involve the use of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes” was adopted in Article 6. Japanese bureaucracies often intentionally use this kind of opaque expression. In this case, the real intention of Japanese negotiators was to ensure that Japan’s proposed bilateral Joint Crediting Mechanism could be used under this concept. Another input was Article 21, which determined that the agreement would enter into force after 55 parties ratified the Convention accounting for at least 55% of total greenhouse gas emissions. These conditions are the same as the Kyoto Protocol, and Japan strongly adhered to these numbers. This is because China and the US could not be allowed to run away again. These examples indicate that Japan had not yet recovered from the trauma of the Kyoto Protocol. To evaluate the environmental impact of Japan’s climate diplomacy, a scientific assessment by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was used as a reference. The IPCC was established by the World Meteorological Organization and the UN UNEP in 1988, and issued a series of assessment reports for important conjunctures of climate negotiations. The IPCC’s first assessment report issued in 1990 served as a scientific basis for creating the UNFCCC regime, and its second assessment report issued in 1995 provided a momentum for the Berlin Mandate process to adopt the Kyoto Protocol. However, the emission reduction target of the Kyoto Protocol was far behind the IPCC’s second scientific assessment, which noted that “to keep the concentration at the present level, emissions would have to be reduced drastically to 30% of present immediately and to less than 20% by 2050.”24 As compared to the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement’s objective to limit global warming to well below 2 degrees and to pursue efforts for 1.5 degrees above preindustrial levels is much more consistent with evidence-based recent assessment. However, the aggregated Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) submitted to the UNFCCC Secretariat was not enough to meet these objectives, and could bring 2.7 degrees of warming. Japan’s INDC submitted in July 2015 includes an emission reduction target of 26% below 2013 levels by 2030, which is equivalent to 18% below 1990 levels by 2030. This target was regarded as being both infeasible and inadequate. It is not feasible because the nuclear generation target between 20–22% is unrealistic economically and not supported socially after Fukushima. It is inadequate

14 because if all countries adopted this level of less-ambitious emission reduction targets, global warming would likely exceed 3–4% in this century.25

Case 2: Nagoya

Japan’s Biodiversity Diplomacy Japan hosted the Nagoya conference in 2010, so why did not Japan ratify the Nagoya Protocol on ABS and the Nagoya–Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol? Aichi Target 16 says, “by 2015, the Nagoya Protocol … is in force and operational, consistent with national legislation.” The Nagoya Protocol entered into force in 2014; therefore, this target was achieved internationally, but Japan has not yet ratified it. Japan was a mediator for the Cartagena Protocol, but Japan has not yet ratified the Supplementary Protocol. Therefore, it appears that Japan’s position for CBD diplomacy shifted from being a mediator to being a laggard. Nagoya was another candidate city for the COP-3 of the UNFCCC. However, at the meeting of the Bureau International des Expositions (BIE) in 1997, Japan won against Canada’s Calgary to host the 2005 World Exposition in Aichi, with the theme of “Nature’s Wisdom.” Toyota Motor Corporation, which is based in Aichi, helped to form a majority of the BIE member voters by playing the card of Toyota’s second manufacturing plant in Europe. The Japanese government made the best use of the venue of this international specialized exposition by using forest and conservation sites and the nearby city of Toyota as a high-technology base in appealing to the CBD’s COP-10 participants. In the historical trajectory of Japan’s biodiversity diplomacy, however, Japan often acted as a dragger or a laggard while being a supporter of selected issues. Japan adhered to the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling and joined the IWC in 1951. So far, Japan has hosted six IWC meetings. With the US proposal, the 1972 Stockholm Conference recommended a 10-year moratorium on commercial whaling, although the IWC rejected the proposed moratorium. When the IWC passed a moratorium on commercial whaling in 1982, Japan filed a formal objection. Japan withdrew its objection in 1986 and ended commercial whaling in the Antarctic by March 1987. However, Japan has issued special scientific permits in the Antarctic and in the western North Pacific every year since 1987–1988.

15 Local communities and environmental NGOs have extended Japan’s commitment and support of the conservation of wetlands and the implementation of the Ramsar Convention widely. Kushiro became Japan’s first Ramsar site, where COP-5 was held in 1993. This contributed to raise awareness of Ramsar and wetland conservation, and since then engagement has increased to 46 sites in 2016. The Stockholm Conference sparked a series of multilateral environmental regimes. Japan’s acceptance of the WHC, which was adopted in 1972, was long delayed until June 1992 when Japan became the 125th member. In 1992, the concept of “cultural landscape” was introduced. Among the 18 Japanese world heritage sites, only four are natural (Ogasawara Island, Shirakami-Sanchi, Shiretoko, and Yakushima), and others are cultural. In 1980, Japan accepted the CITES, which was adopted in 1973. Initially Japan had reservations about nine listings, although it removed these reservations by the early 1990s. Japan hosted the CITES COP-8 in Kyoto in 1992, when the new Conservation Act was enacted. However, Japan currently has reservations on seven species of whales listed in Appendix I and nine species of sharks listed in Appendix II. The Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS), also known as the Bonn Convention, which was adopted in 1979, has 120 members. However, Japan has not yet joined the Bonn Convention because whales and sharks are included in the CMS species list. The negotiation for the UNCLOS, which includes the protection and preservation of the marine environment, was a marathon that started in 1974 and ended in 1982. Japan signed the UNCLOS in 1983 and ratified it in 1996. In 1999, New Zealand and Australia requested the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) to prescribe provisional measures in their disputes with Japan over southern bluefin tuna. The ITLOS did so, although the arbitral tribunal later found that it did not have jurisdiction to rule on the merits of the case. Two Japanese judges, Soji Yamamoto and Shunji Yanai, were elected to the ITLOS chamber, and Yanai has served as President of the ITLOS. The Rio conference did not produce a global forest treaty; however, the International Tropical Timber Agreement of 1983 was revised in 1994 and again in 2006. Japan was one of the largest tropical timber importers (China has now become the largest tropical log importer; however, Japan’s tropical plywood imports increased in

16 the 1990s), and the ITTO was headquartered in Yokohama in 1986. The ITTO issued guidelines on the conservation of biological diversity in tropical production forests in 1993, and updated it as the Guidelines for the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biodiversity in Tropical Timber Production Forests, in collaboration with the International Union for Conservation of Nature in 2009. The ITTO with the CBD Secretariat also launched a collaborative initiative for tropical forest diversity in the Year of Biodiversity 2010 and the International Year of Forests 2011. Unlike the previously mentioned treaties in the field of biodiversity, Japan signed the CBD immediately after the treaty was open for signatures at the June 1992 Rio Conference on the assumption that other countries would also do so. However, the US did not ratify the CBD, which was like déjà vu of Kyoto for Japan.

Drivers of Effectiveness At the international system level, the relative weight of the G77+China presence was higher for the Nagoya negotiations without the presence of the US as a formal member of the CBD. With the firm negotiation stance of G77+China, a fear of another failure like Copenhagen was widely shared by the COP-10 delegations. Japan expected to adopt a new nonbinding strategic plan after its poorly performed 2010 Biodiversity Target without serious diplomatic difficulties, but the prolonged negotiations on legally binding protocols on ABS and biosafety unexpectedly posed great challenges for the Japanese presidency. The presidency for the COP/MOP-5 meeting on biosafety was represented by Michihiko Kano, Japanese Minister of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries. Two outstanding issues that remained unresolved before Nagoya were the issues of “living modified organisms (LMOs) and products thereof” and financial security in the draft text.26 While Article 27 of the Cartagena Protocol addresses the issue of liability and damage resulting from transboundary movements of “LMOs,” the Protocol’s Annex III on risk assessment contains the words “living modified organisms or product thereof,” i.e., processed materials that are of LMO origin. LMO-exporting countries and Japan wanted to limit the scope of the liability regime within the LMOs only, whereas Malaysia and the African group (except South Africa) as well as environmental NGOs argued that the narrow definition of LMOs was not enough, and proposed alternative wording, such as LMOs “including products containing LMOs” and “replicating” or

17 “naturally reproducing” in the environment. Japan proposed to replace “products thereof” with an alternative expression, “including LMOs contained in products.” Financial security, such as insurance or another financial safeguard, is required in case that compensation for damage from LMOs exceeds the financial capacity of an operator. Malaysia and other proponents preferred the inclusion of a provision of financial security, while Brazil and other exporters opposed it by worrying that such a provision would become a trade barrier. As for the Strategic Plan debated in the COP-10, the most contentious issue was the strategic goal on implementation, especially resource mobilization.27 The Plan was further refined as the Strategy for Resource Mobilization. Developed countries wanted to have an innovative financing mechanism including the idea of the Green Development Mechanism, which was modeled after the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). For developed countries, mainstreaming of the valuation of ecosystem services is effective for biodiversity conservation, as demonstrated by The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB) study. On the contrary, many developing countries opposed the market-based approach, partly because it would shift the responsibility of the government to the private sector, and partly because most developing countries had negative experiences on the CDM scheme. The ALBA group strongly opposed the “commodification” of nature, which would result in further environmental destruction and human rights violations. Instead, they demanded to include measurable targets and indicators to monitor aggregated financial flows. The concept of innovative financing mechanism can refer to different things for different countries, and the ABS protocol itself can be regarded as an innovative financing mechanism for developing countries with generic resources. The COP-10 negotiations on the ABS protocol managed by Environment Minister Ryu Matsumoto were the most challenging in Nagoya. The excluded negotiating groups heavily criticized the Japanese presidency’s risky arrangement of a secret meeting of selected countries.28 The key conflicting point in the ABS protocol was that developed countries with competitive biological industry wanted to guarantee “access” to genetic resources, while developing countries with diversified genetic resources wanted “benefit-sharing.” Concrete conflicts included derivatives, retroactive application, compliance, and traditional knowledge. While developed countries argued that the utilization of derivatives of genetic resources should be judged on a case-by-case basis,

18 developing countries wanted derivatives of genetic resources to be covered by the protocol. Developed countries argued that a retroactive application of the protocol was against the principle of international law, whereas developing countries lobbied for retroactive application. Developed countries were worried about burdensome disclosure requirements for compliance of businesses, while developing countries requested that one or more checkpoints for compliance should be established in each country. Developed countries argued that the regulation of publicly available traditional knowledge could be suggested, while developing countries, especially the Like-Minded Asia-Pacific Group, preferred that it is required. What were key drivers for the successful conclusion of the Nagoya conference? Many delegates from both developed and developing countries felt that a further prolonged stalemate on key issues would not be in their interests. Unlike Copenhagen, the number of top-level leader participants was limited in Nagoya, which helped to minimize face-losing diplomacy for hardliners. As for the supplementary protocol, Japan shifted position on the definition of “product” in previous negotiations to a flexible position, which was perhaps because of the regime shift from a business-supported LDP-led government to a union-supported DPJ government. Alternatively, this shift was because Japan’s presidency wanted to prevent Nagoya from becoming another Copenhagen. Japan’s checkbook diplomacy worked as another possible driver. In the middle of the COP-10, Japan pledged to establish the Japan Biodiversity Fund with $5 billion over 5 years to support the implementation of the outcomes of the Nagoya conference. Two days later, Prime Minister Naoto Kan (DPJ) pledged another $2 billion to preserve biodiversity in developing countries. In addition, on the last day of the Nagoya conference, Japan made an additional pledge of $1 billion if the ABS protocol would be adopted in Nagoya. Parties also discussed the establishment of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) and the launch of TEEB. These were realized later as the epistemic communities of natural and social sciences on biodiversity respectively. In Nagoya, international perceptions on key issues were also changed in the historical conjuncture. For instance, it was observed that unnecessary confusion in the definitions of LMOs was a reflection of the rapid changes in life science. The changing food economy after the 2008 world food crisis reflected the

19 more-flexible attitudes about LMOs of importing countries. Ambiguity in many aspects of the ABS protocol was also reflected in the complexity and uncertainty of various situations of member countries and different uses of genetic resources on a case-by-case basis. COP-10 President Ryu Matsumoto felt that the success in Nagoya held “a razor-thin margin.29”

Effectiveness The outputs of Nagoya were the package of the Nagoya Protocol, the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020, the Strategy for Resource Mobilization, and the Nagoya– Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol. The vision of the Strategic Plan was written using general wording, “by 2050 biodiversity is valued, conserved, restored and wisely used, maintaining ecosystem services, sustaining a healthy planet.” Following the DPSIR framework, the Strategic Plan included five goals and twenty Aichi Biodiversity Targets. As for the Strategy for Resource Mobilization, the compromise on financial resources included deleting the concept of TEEB, mentioning innovative financial mechanisms, and adopting targets at the COP-11. The text of the Nagoya Protocol on ABS was filled with “creative ambiguity” by deleting contentious words and phrases or by providing a broader definition. The terms “retroactive application” and “benefit-sharing of publically available traditional knowledge” disappeared from the text of the ABS protocol. On the one hand, the utilization of derivatives can be assessed on a case-by-case basis as requested by developed countries. On the other hand, one or more checkpoints are to be established as requested by developing countries (although with some flexibility). The two outstanding issues of the Supplementary Protocol were also resolved with ambiguity. After long negotiations, the delegates agreed to remove reference to all the “product” definitions from the Supplementary Protocol. This left the ambiguity in the definitions of these terms, which the Cartagena Protocol contains, and importers can be liable if a causal link is found between LMOs and the damage caused by a LMO product. As for the provision of financial security, a diluted compromise was expressed in the Supplementary Protocol to allow the parties to retain the right to provide for financial security in their domestic law in a manner consistent to international law. An elaboration of financial security mechanisms was postponed.

20 In implementing the CBD, the Japanese government formulated the first Biodiversity Action Plan in 1995, the second Plan in 2003, and the third Plan in 2007. The Basic Act on Biodiversity bill was sponsored by a cross-party group of lawmakers and passed by the Diet in June 2008. The Cabinet decided the fourth national biodiversity strategy based on the Basic Act in March 2010. With the great East Japan earthquake disaster of March 11, 2011, the national biodiversity strategy 2012–2020 was updated in response to the Nagoya outcomes. Japan’s delayed ratification of the Nagoya Protocol and the Nagoya–Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol is a shameful symptom of the fading activism in Japan’s environmental diplomacy. The revived LDP-led government, supported by business interests, did not give priority to the ratification of these protocols, which were adopted by the DPJ-led government. When the CBD was adopted in Rio, the Japanese bureaucracy did not always assume that reasonable assurance by the legislation and regulation regarding necessary domestic action would be needed. However, the Ministry of the Environment has been struggling to obtain interministerial consensus on the domestic legislation necessary for implementing the ABS protocol. In addition, the Japanese government thought that another legislation would not be needed in addition to the Cartagena Act promulgated in 2003 and entered into force in 2004. However, Japanese consumers and environmental NGOs are lobbying for a revision of the Cartagena Act by inserting a precautionary principle and compensation to ratify the Supplementary Protocol. The long-term environmental impacts of the Nagoya outcomes are to be evaluated in relation to the three main objectives of the CBD regime: conservation of biodiversity, sustainable use of its elements, and fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from genetic resources. Conservation, rather than protection, by the ecosystem approach to biodiversity should be monitored and evaluated with the emphasis of the environmental aspect of biodiversity with other environmental issues. The biosafety concept is a combination of biological (environmental) and safety (social), which tends to de-emphasize economic benefits, whereas the concept of ABS, in which economic access and social benefit-sharing are combined, tends to de-emphasize the environmental aspect of the use of genetic resources.

Case 3: Minamata

21

Japan’s Diplomacy on Mercury Japan experienced large-scale mercury pollution and poisoning in the 1950s, so why was Japan’s diplomacy on mercury inactive and delayed? While Japan attempted to focus on environmental pollution as a main topic for the Stockholm conference, the national report submitted by the Japanese government to the Stockholm conference secretariat in March 1971 contained a one-sentence reference to heavy metal poisoning as a part of the water pollution paragraph.30 It did not mention Minamata disease at all, while even the national report submitted by Indonesia mentioned it. An angered civil society group prepared an alternative report describing Minamata disease and other pollution diseases in Japan, and sent the Minamata victims to Stockholm to share their experience at parallel events.31 These actions drew worldwide attention to Minamata disease victims and corporate and government attitudes on this issue. Minamata disease victims went to the Nairobi conference to report on the situation during the ten years since Stockholm, and warned about a spread of methylmercury poisoning in other Asian countries.32 According to a Minamata disease patient who stopped over Asia on his way back from Nairobi, “… Japan’s rapid economic growth had been achieved not only at the cost of environment, but also at the expense of natural resources from other Asian countries.”33 Saburo Okita, former Foreign Minister, was actively involved in the Brundtland Commission, and its report Our Common Future mentioned that the problems of chemical poisoning “have also be found in many parts of the world, as industrial growth, urbanization, and the use of automobiles spread.” These concerns were reflected in the Basel Convention, which covers transboundary movement of mercury wastes. It became effective in 1992, and Japan’s accession on the Basel Convention was in 1993. However, Japan has not yet agreed to the Basel ban amendment and the Basel Protocol on Liability and Compensation. The UN Commission on Sustainable Development, which was created after the Rio conference, became a functional forum for chemical-related MEAs and the Stockholm and Rotterdam Conventions. Japan became a party to these two conventions when they became effective in 2004. According to Table 2, Japan’s diplomacy on mercury looks more active than these conventions of UNEP chemical and waste cluster. Japan was not a signatory for the Basel and Stockholm Conventions. Japan became a signatory for Rotterdam one year after its adoption, but ratified it six

22 years after its adoption. By contrast, Japan hosted and became a signatory when the Minamata Convention was adopted in 2013, and accepted it three years later before its entry into force.

Table 2: Japan’s Diplomacy for the UNEP Chemical Cluster

MEAs Adopted Effective Japan’s Ratification

Basel Convention 1989 1992 1993

Japan did not sign (accession)

Rotterdam Convention 1998 2004 2004

Japan signed 1999

Stockholm Convention 2001 2004 2004

Japan did not sign (accession)

Minamata Convention 2013 still-pending 2016

Japan signed 2013

The Minamata Convention on Mercury was adopted in October 2013 in Kumamoto, where Minamata disease was officially identified in 1956. The cause of this disease was a long-term discharge of methylmercury from the Chisso Company’s Minamata factory into Minamata Bay. Thus, Japan’s diplomatic actions on mercury became active more than fifty years after child patients with Minamata disease were recognized. However, Japan’s diplomatic stance in a mercury treaty was as a laggard, rather than as a leader, even during the prenegotiation stages in the early 2000s. In 2002, when the Johannesburg summit was held, the Global Mercury Assessment was submitted to the UNEP Governing Council. When the council started discussion in 2005 on what type of instrument should be developed, there were two approaches: a voluntary or legally binding instrument. Japan supported the US-proposed idea of a voluntary instrument, which was also supported by Australia and Canada, while Norway, Switzerland, and the EU proposed a legally binding instrument. There were two options for the legally binding approach: a new stand-alone mercury treaty or using one or more existing binding treaties of the UNEP chemical cluster.34 In February 2009, Japan shifted position to agree to a new legally binding treaty on mercury at the UNEP Governing Council meeting. In May 2010, when Prime Minister

23 Yukio Hatoyama (DPJ) attended the memorial service for the victims of Minamata disease, he expressed the idea of inviting the UNEP-proposed conference on a mercury treaty and wished to name it the Minamata treaty.35 It was the first time Japan’s Prime Minister had attended the service. The outcome document of the Rio+20 conference, The Future We Want, called for a successful outcome of the negotiations on a global legally binding instrument on mercury.

Drivers of Effectiveness Although the Umbrella Group countries were split on the type of instrument to use to regulate mercury, Japan was a supporter of the US position, which was also backed by the increased weight of the emerging countries, such as China and India, who also favored a voluntary approach. Japan’s position shift, as well as that of Australia and Canada, to support for a legal-binding treaty, can be explained by the unilateral position change of the US due to the transition from the ideological Bush administration’s position for a voluntary approach to the legalism of the Barack Obama administration inaugurated in January 2009. 36 Controlling mercury was also Obama’s personal concern, as seen in his introduction of a bill to minimize the mercury market to the Senate in 2007. Another picture can be drawn on power-based leadership in Japanese domestic politics of the administrative, legislative, and judiciary branches over the relief programs for Minamata disease victims. As shown in Figure 2, the increased number of pending applications for Minamata disease patient certification decreased in 1995 and 2010, when two “political settlements” were made. The legislative branch and political parties drove these changes in the compensation issues. The LDP–Socialist–Sakigake coalition government led by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama (Japan Socialist Party) made the first “political settlement” of 1995. This settlement was made partly because of the increased number of lawsuits from the victims who were rejected as “patients” by the certification criteria issued by the then Environment Agency following the 1973 Act Concerning Compensation and Prevention of Pollution-Related Health Damage, and partly because Chisso Company faced financial difficulties meeting its compensation requirements based on its business profits. Bipartisan politicians from the LDP, New Komeito, and the DPJ also supported the second political settlement and the Special

24 Relief Act of 2009. Thus, the issue of political initiative for compensation was an important driver in Japan.

Figure 2: Pending Applications for Minamata Disease Patient Certification37

at the end of the fiscal year The number of pending applica7ons

Japanese fiscal year

Another important domestic power was the judiciary. In October 2004, the Supreme Court ruling for the Kansai lawsuit decided that both the national and local governments were jointly liable for one-quarter of the payment of the compensation in view of their failure to prevent the outbreak and spread of Minamata disease. The Supreme Court ruling also applied looser criteria than the 1977 criteria set by the government for Minamata disease patients. After this ruling, the number of applicants for certified patients sharply increased, but the government retained strict criteria for Minamata disease patients and a second political settlement was demanded in 2009. Thus, leadership in domestic politics can explain Prime Minister Hatoyama’s 2010 speech inviting a diplomatic conference for a mercury treaty, although the liability and compensation issues remain unresolved.

25 Economic interests also worked as drivers for the Minamata Convention. According to the UNEP, fossil fuel combustion for power and heating is the largest sector of the global anthropogenic emission to air. The largest mercury-emitting region is Asia, where China and India are the two largest emitters.38 It is estimated that increased Asian emissions are transported to and concentrated in the US and Europe. With the turnover of the US preference for a legally binding approach, the Chinese and Indian economic interests would be hit hard by a binding approach. Switzerland persuaded the emerging economies by explaining that a new treaty on mercury would de-link mercury from other heavy metals, and mandatory financial mechanisms are only found in legally binding, but not voluntary, instruments.39 Japan’s position shift to a legally binding approach can also be explained by potential interest for possible financial mechanisms, through which Japan can enjoy the competitive edge of its technological development on mercury control and management. The abatement cost for mercury reduction in Japan was not reduced rapidly, but was reduced significantly by the end of the 20th century. For instance, mercury-based chlor-alkali production was replaced by a high-cost, low-quality asbestos diaphragm process in 1973, and then by the ion-exchange membrane process in 1979. With intensive research and development (R&D) and cost reduction, the previous method was completely replaced by the best-available techniques (BAT) in 1999.40 Industries and central and local governments learned the cost of inaction, including financial compensation and relief, and socioeconomic losses. More importantly, the timing of Japan’s diplomacy on mercury can be explained by the competitive edge of its technological development of mercury control and management. The UNEP Global Mercury Partnership includes some BAT and best-environmental practices (BEP) areas where Japan has a competitive edge, which include mercury control of coal combustion using Japan’s “clean coal” technology and mercury waste management.41 The Japanese government promoted its competitive advantage in abatement technology by budgeting. In 2013, the Ministry of the Environment budgeted support for the Minamata Treaty initiatives by promoting the international deployment of Japan’s technologies and measures for mercury management, creating international and national mercury management strategies, such as the BAT/BEP guidelines, promotion of monitoring and prediction of mercury emissions and concentrations in Asia, and financial contributions to the UNEP.

26 Knowledge-based leadership for the Minamata Convention was undertaken by the UNEP. Arctic Council members and the executive body of the LRTAP Convention asked the UNEP to perform a global mercury assessment. The UNEP chemical cluster shared some dimensions of scientific knowledge. The Basel Convention can cover mercury wastes, but not other stages of mercury circulation. The Stockholm Convention can cover methylmercury as an organic substance, but not other forms of mercury. The Rotterdam Convention can cover mercury compounds for the required prior informed consent procedure in international trade, but cannot cover nontrade transboundary movements of mercury. In 1998, the LRTAP Convention adopted the Aarhus Protocol on Heavy Metals, including mercury, which became the basis for the Minamata Convention. Japan took leadership in launching the Acid Deposition Monitoring Network in East Asia (EANET), but this network deals with acid rain, not mercury and other heavy metals. Civil society organizations abroad, such as the Zero Mercury Working Group and the International POPs Elimination Network (IPEN), and in Japan joined the global campaign on mercury. The main items of the joint statement include the polluter’s responsibility for contaminated sites and victims, and the government and polluter’s responsibility for transparent investigation and information disclosure.42 Civil society also requested the Japanese government to enact a mercury export ban act, to place all surplus mercury produced in Japan in long-term storage safely, to take the leadership for a mercury treaty, to build mercury storage capacity in Asia, and join the Global Mercury Partnership.43

Effectiveness An outline of the Minamata Convention is summarized in Table 3. While it is a legally binding instrument, many elements of the Convention contain voluntary or discretionary actions. Japan’s early acceptance of the Convention can be understood because of its watered-down substance. The fact that the US quickly became the world’s first nation to use the instrument of acceptance may also be unexpected for Japan. This section highlights some of the items closely related to key drivers for Japan’s diplomacy on mercury. First, while the Rio principles in general, including the common, but differentiated responsibility principle, are reaffirmed in the Preamble, there is a precautionary

27 approach and no explicit mention of the polluter-pays principle. This contrasts with the Stockholm Convention, which mentions precautions in both its Preamble and Articles and reaffirms that the polluter should bear the cost of pollution in its Preamble. It is also insufficient in terms of Japan’s Compensation Act, which recognizes the polluter’s responsibility and requires compensation expenses to be provided by a government subsidy and pollution load levy for polluters. Critics argue that Japan should have made better efforts to insert these principles in the Convention, especially on “health-care services for prevention, treatment and care for populations affected by the exposure to mercury” (Article 16).

Table 3: Outline of the Minamata Convention Preamble No mention of precautions or polluter-pays principle 1. Objective To protect the human health and the environment 3. Supply sources and trade Primary mining not allowed after 15 years of entry; mercury export not allowed with some exceptions 4. Mercury-added products A positive list approach 5. Manufacturing processes Not allowed for Part I with some exceptions; restricted use for Part II 6. Exemptions Maximum 10 years after the phase-out date 7. Artisanal small-scale gold Reduce and “where feasible eliminate”; Party mining (ASGM) determines ASGM is “more than insignificant” 8. Emissions Control and “where feasible reduce”; use BAT and BEP “where feasible” for new sources; emission limit from a point of source 9. Releases Control and “where feasible reduce”; use BAT and BEP for relevant sources; release limit from a point of source 11. Mercury wastes Take appropriate measures 12. Contaminated sites “Endeavor” to develop appropriate strategies; incorporate, where appropriate, an assessment of the risks to human health and the environment Others Finance, technology, implementation, health aspects,

28 education, R&D, effectiveness evaluation, etc.

Second, while the Minamata Convention controls the international trade in mercury, there are exceptions. Virtually, mercury trade is possible for “use allowed” or “interim storage.” As shown in Figure 3, Japan still exports mercury and increased its exports even after the adoption of the Minamata Convention, while the US and the EU enacted laws banning metallic mercury exports in 2008 and in 2011, respectively. Civil society organizations heavily criticized Japan for continuing to be a major mercury exporter and requested the Ministry of the Environment to enact a mercury export ban act.

Japan’s Mercury TradeFigure 3: Japan’s Mercury Trade 1988-201544 t

Export

Import

Article 8 on emissions to the atmosphere concerns “controlling and, where feasible, reducing emissions of mercury and mercury compound.” “Total mercury” and its mission limit value are based on a point of source, rather than aggregated sources. Therefore, the total “total mercury” can increase if the number of relevant sources increases. In addition, the source categories listed in Annex D do not cover oil and gas power plants or iron and steelmaking facilities. Coal power plants are included, and BAT and BEP are required to use new sources where feasible. The Party has the discretion to assess whether it is “feasible” or not, which is reflected in the interest of these countries who rely greatly on coal power plants, including emerging economies, such as China and India. It is also in the interest of some Japanese companies with BAT/BEP for “clean coal” power plants.

29 Article 12 on contaminated sites was also watered down to “endeavor to develop appropriate strategies for identifying and assessing sites contaminated by mercury or mercury compounds.” Japan has the world’s largest mercury-contaminated sites in Minamata and Niigata. Even when releases of methylmercury stopped, the residual presence of mercury still contaminated water and marine lives. Rather than remove the contaminated sediment, “the Kumamoto Prefectural Government dredged some 1.5 million m3 of bottom sediment showing a mercury concentration above the provisional reference value for removal (25 ppm) and reclaimed 58 ha of land using this sediment (sealed filling).”45 The cost of removal and reclamation was paid by Chisso Company, the Kumamoto Prefectural Government, and the national Government. The Japanese experience was not reflected in this Article. Rather, Japan removed the provision of financial and technological support for strategy development for contaminated sites, for which Japan does not have effective techniques and practices.

Conclusion

In response to the “Japan bashing,” Japan began contemplating environmental diplomacy in the 1980s by ratifying the CITES, the Ramsar Convention, the London Convention, and by proposing to establish the World Commission on Environment and Development. Japan’s active environmental diplomacy started in the 1990s by hosting the CITES COP-8 in Kyoto, the Ramsar COP-5 in Kushiro, and the UNFCCC COP-3 in Kyoto. Japan’s diplomatic activism during this period was supported by domestic institutionalization, including the establishment of the Environment Agency’s Global Environment Department and the enactment of the Basic Environmental Law. Symbolic activism was also supported by providing environmental ODA. Since the Rio conference, however, the rivalry between the MITI and the Environmental Agency became salient. The Ministry of Foreign Policy had to play the role of mediator both at home and abroad, where proxy battles were seen between the MITI’s and the Environmental Agency’s allies, respectively. Japan’s economic decline continued experiencing “the lost 20 years” in the 2000s and symbolic activism began to fade out. The DPJ-led government, especially Prime Minister Hatoyama, attempted to revitalize environmental diplomacy in 2009, when Hatoyama expressed willingness to reduce greenhouse gas sharply and hosted the

30 Minamata conference. While the Japanese presidency for CBD COP-10 in 2010 in Nagoya successfully led to the adoption of the Aichi Targets, the Nagoya Protocol, and the Nagoya–Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol, Japan has not yet ratified both protocols. The successful conclusion of the CBD COP-10 was luck, if anything, due to the international fears of a repeat of the Copenhagen failure. The ghosts of Copenhagen’s failure also led to the Cancun Agreements on climate change, although Japan’s chilling attitude further undermined the credibility of Japan’s environmental diplomacy. The 2011 triple disaster of earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear meltdown affected further Japan’s environmental diplomacy in the 2010s. Japan’s climate diplomacy has been deeply influenced by pre-existing “business as usual” energy and industrial policies, rather than transformational policies for renewable energy and social inclusiveness. Japan’s actions in hosting the diplomatic conference for controlling mercury and its seemingly relatively early acceptance of the Minamata Convention still looks like symbolism, rather than substantial social compensation and environmental leadership without reflecting fully the Japanese experience on mercury pollution and poisoning. The key driver for Japan’s diplomacy on mercury was market-driven and diplomatic effectiveness was still limited. The constraining factors for Japan’s laggardness include domestic as well as international institutions in the changing historical trajectory and conjunctures. Without transforming from business-as-usual economic, social, environmental, and foreign policies, “Japan passing” in global environmental governance can result in further failure or “Japan nothing.”

1 Sharon Begley, Hideko Takayama, and Mary Hager, “The World Eco-outlaws?” Newsweek (May 1, 1989), p. 68, and Hidefumi Imura and Mirand A. Schreurs, “Learning from Japanese environmental management experiences,” in Imura and Schreurs, eds., Environmental Policy in Japan (Edward Elgar, 2005), p. 123. 2 Loren R. Cass, “The symbolism of environmental policy: foreign policy commitments as signaling tools,” in p. 41-56. 3 Kumao Kaneko, “For only one Earth,” Jurist, 496 (1972), 110, and Letter from Kurt Waldheim to Takeo Miki, (22 February 1972), UNARMS, S-0971-0004015 Env-2nd UN conference – Japan. 4 Japan’s position was expressed as an importer and potential exporter of LMOs. Kiyo Akasaka, “Compromise Group: Japan,” in Christoph Bali, Robert Falkner & Helen Marquard, The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2002), pp. 200-206. Akasaka also observed that the successful

31 conclusion of the Cartagena Protocol was due to Juan Mayr who iutroduced the “Vienna setting,” an innovative way to secure inclusive and transparent negotiation, following his experience of negotiating with indigenous peoples in Colombia. Kyototaka Akasaka, Sakai no eriito wa hitomae de hanasu chikara wo doo mi ni tsukeru ka (Tokyo: Kawadeshobo Shinsha, 2015), p. 168. 5 Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966). 6 Modified from Sprints and Vaahtranta (1994). 7 Kai Monheim, How Effective Negotiation Management Promotes Multilateral Cooperation (London: Routledge, 2015). 8 Michael Brecher, Blema Steinberg, and Janice Stein, “A framework for research on foreign policy behavior,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 13:1 (1969), 75-94, and John Barkdull and Paul G. Harris, “Theories of environmental foreign policy: power, interests, and ideas,” in Paul G. Harris, ed., Environmental Change and Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (Routledge, 2009), pp. 19-40. 9 Not only normative ideas, but also scientific knowledge, which is another form of intangible ideas in epistemic communities, are included. 10 Robert Cox, “Middlepowermanship, Japan, and future world order,” International Journal, 44 (Autumn 1989), 823-869. 11 Detlef Sprinz and Tapani Vaahtoranta, “The interest-based explanation of international environmental policy,” International Organization 48:1 (1994), 77-105. 12 Deborah Saunders Davenport, Global Environmental Negotiations and US Interests (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp. 20-21. 13 The sustainable development concept can also be regarded as a “failure to launch.” Jennifer Hadden and Lucia A. Seybert, “What’s in a norm? Mapping the norm definition process in the debate on sustainable development,” Global Governance, 22:2 (2016), 249-268. 14 Oran R. Young, “Effectiveness of international environmental regimes: existing knowledge, cutting-edge themes, and research strategies,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 108:50 (2011), 19853-19860. 15 Davenport (2006), pp. 17-26. 16 UNDP Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation for Development Results (2009), p. 55. 17 Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Little Brown, 1971). 18 J.O. Prochaska and W.F. Velicer, “The transtheoretical model of health behavioral change,” American Journal of Health Promotion (1997), 12(1) 38-48. 19 The Guardian (December 1, 2010) “Cancun climate change summit: Japan refuses to extend Kyoto protocol.” 20 Mainichi Shimbun, (December 12, 2015). 21 This statement was not pre-determined to announce on the first day of COP-16. After some hesitation, however, Jun Arima decided to make an explicit statement on Japan’s position, when Norway, another member of the Umbrella Group expressed its own position which was much closer to the EU, rather than the Umbrella Group. Jun Arima, Chikyu Ondanka Kosho no Shinjitsu, (Tokyo: Chuokoron Shinsha, 2015), pp. 118-124.

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22 Kiyotaka Akasaka, Kokusai kikan de mita sekai eriito no syotai (Tokyo: Chuokoron Shinsha, 2014), pp. 83-86. 23 Japan’s position regarding the Kyoto Protocol, December 20, 2010. http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/environment/warm/cop/kp_pos_1012.html 24 IPCC, Climate Change: The IPCC Scientific Assessment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 15. 25 Climate Action Tracker. http://climateactiontracker.org/countries/japan 26 International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 9: 533, (October 18, 2010), pp. 14-16. 27 International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 9: 544, (November 1, 2010), p. 27. 28 International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 9: 544, (November 1, 2010), p. 26. 29 Ryu Matsumoto, Kankyo gaiko no butai ura, (Tokyo: Nikkei BP, 2011). 30 Government of Japan, Problems of the Human Environment in Japan (1971). 31 Jun Ui, ed., Industrial Pollution in Japan (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1992). p. 225. 32 Ui, Industrial Pollution in Japan, p. 231. 33 Tom Gill and Kazuko Tsurumi, “New lives: Some case studies of Minamata,” The Asia-Pacific Journal, 12:34 (2014), 2. 34 UNEP Chemicals, Global Mercury Assessment (Geneva: UNEP Chemicals, December 2002), pp. 237-238. 35 Asahi Shimbun, (May 2, 2010) 36 Steinar Anderesen, Kristin Rosenthal, and Jon Birger Skjoerseth, “Why negotiate a legally binding mercury convention?” International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law, and Economics (2012). 37 Ministry of the Environment, Lessons from Minamata Disease and Mercury Management in Japan (2013), p. 12. 38 UNEP, The Global Atmospheric Mercury Assessment: Sources, Emissions, and Transport (Geneva: UNEP Chemical Branch, 2008). 39 Steinar Anderesen et al., pp. 11-12. 40 Ministry of the Environment, Lessons from Minamata Disease and Mercury Management in Japan (2013), pp. 29-31. 41 Mitsubishi Heavy Industry developed a low-cost technology to remove mercury emissions for thermal coal plants. Nihon Keizai Shimbun (October 8, 2013). Masaru Tanaka, a Japanese expert from the Ministry of Environment was appointed as a leader in mercury waste management by the UNEP Global Mercury Partnership. http://www.unep.org/chemicalsandwaste/Mercury/GlobalMercuryPartnership/tabid/125 3/Default.aspx 42 Civil Society Organizations Joint Statement, January 23, 2012. 43 Civil Society Organizations Joint Statement, February 29, 2012. 44 Mainichi Shimbun, (February 3, 2016), based on the Ministry of Finance data. 45 Ministry of the Environment, Lessons from Minamata Disease and Mercury Management in Japan (2013), p. 15.

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