A Historical Constructivist Perspective of Japan’s Environmental Diplomacy Katsuhiko Mori International Christian University Abstract: Why did Japan attempt to take a leadership role on some occasions, while it became a bystander or even a dragger on other occasions? By examining three cases of environmental diplomacy, i.e., hosting the Kyoto conference on climate change, the Nagoya conference on biodiversity, and the diplomatic conference for the Minamata Convention, this paper will identify the key drivers of effectiveness in Japan’s environmental diplomacy from the perspective of historical constructivism. The study accounts for the historical trajectory and conjunctures of Japan’s environmental diplomacy in the changing global environmental governance with a combination of power, interests, and ideas across time and areas of concern at both international and domestic levels. Introduction Why did Japan attempt to take a leadership role on some occasions, while it became a bystander or even a dragger on other occasions? In the 1980s, Japan was accused of being one of the world’s “eco-outlaws,” especially regarding the tropical timber, whaling, and ivory trades.1 Since the 1990s, Japan has become more active in hosting multilateral environmental conferences, such as the 1997 Third Session of the Conference of Parties (COP-3) of the United Nations (UN) Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the 2010 COP-10, the fifth Meeting of the Parties to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (MOP-5) of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), and the 2013 Diplomatic Conference for the Minamata Convention on Mercury. These conferences were concerned with the atmosphere, biosphere, and hydrosphere, which were on the diplomatic agenda in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s, respectively. On the one hand, these conferences appear to be symbolic signals of Japan’s environmental diplomacy, especially by adopting the protocols and conventions using the names of the Japanese host cities: Kyoto, Nagoya, and Minamata.2 However, there is a difference between hosting these conferences and contributing to the conference 1 outcomes. Japan lost credibility and the opportunity to take environmental leadership by deciding not to participate in the second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol, and by having not ratified the Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-sharing (ABS) and the Nagoya–Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. On the other hand, Japan ratified the Minamata Convention relatively early, before it will enter into force. What are the key driving forces of effectiveness in Japan’s environmental diplomacy? This paper will answer this question from the perspective of historical constructivism. The next section will establish a framework of analysis for the historical trajectory of Japan’s environmental diplomacy. The following sections will account for the three cases of environmental diplomacy in deconstructing and reconstructing the changing global environmental governance with a combination of power, interests, and ideas across time and areas of concern. A Comprehensive Analysis Framework Historical Trajectory of Japan’s Environmental Diplomacy To what extent was Japan’s environmental diplomacy successful or not successful in which areas of environmental concern? To answer this question, it is first important to identify the historical trajectory and conjunctures of Japan’s symbolic environmental diplomatic actions, such as hosting conferences for multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), inviting international organization headquarters to Japan, hosting summitry meetings, and committing and disbursing environmental official development assistance (ODA). Japan’s environmental diplomatic actions are varied, with different conjunctures in different environmental issues, such as the atmosphere, biosphere, geosphere, and hydrosphere. As shown in Table 1, the history of international environmental governance can be roughly periodized using the UN environmental summits as thresholds, although there were some early attempts, such as the International Whaling Commission (IWC) and the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, before the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE) held in Stockholm. A salient feature of the main issues that the 1972 Stockholm conference dealt with was the “internationalization” of environmental pollution issues or transboundary 2 environmental pollution. At that time, Japan was preoccupied with domestic environmental pollution and there were no transboundary environmental issues. The Diet session held in late 1970 was called the “Pollution Diet,” which discussed a series of environmental pollution-related legislation and established the Environment Agency in 1971. Compared with Sweden and Canada, Japan’s environmental diplomacy was premature. Japan joined the MEAs created in the 1970s many years later. Japan entered the World Heritage Convention (WHC) in 1992, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) in 1980, and the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) in 1983. Currently, Japan is not under the geographical coverage of the Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) Convention, and Japan is not a member of the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (the Bonn Convention). Stockholm was a starting point of Japan’s environmental diplomacy. A Japanese diplomat had the idea of hosting a second UNCHE for further learning. In reality, Deputy Prime Minister Takeo Miki officially expressed such an idea to the UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim, but it was not realized.3 The session of a special character of the Governing Council of the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) was held in Nairobi in 1982. The Nairobi conference was characterized as “worldization” in the sense that the socioeconomic dimension of the North–South problems became the main agenda. Rather than human (social) and environmental pillars, economic development was the main concern for developing countries. In 1982, Japan responded to this demand by proposing the establishment of a World Commission on Environment and Development to UNEP. Japan also hosted the first World Lake Conference in 1984. Japan also increased its ODA rapidly in the middle of the 1980s and became the world’s largest donor in 1989. Japan joined the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer in 1988 and the Montreal Protocol in 1989, although Japan was a dragger in the early phases of the ozone negotiations. Japan was the world’s largest timber importer, and its responsibility for deforestation was seriously criticized by the early 1980s. Japan invited the headquarters of the International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO) to Yokohama in 1986. The negotiations on the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 3 (UNCLOS) also faced difficulties due to the North–South divide. Japan joined the Basel Convention in 1993 and the UNCLOS in 1996. A dominant idea of the 1992 Rio conference is characterized as the “globalization” of environmental issues, as symbolized by the emphasis on the “common” element of the principle of common but differentiated responsibility, which was applied to all three Rio conventions on climate change, biodiversity, and desertification. Japan played some intermediate roles by hosting the Kyoto conferences on CITES in 1992, and on climate change in 1997, and playing a mediator role in adopting the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety in 2000.4 The UN Commission on Sustainable Development established by the Rio summit became a forum to create the Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions related to hazardous materials. Instead of socioeconomic world trade, toxic chemicals were recognized as a “global” environment issue, in the sense of global distillation, or the “grasshopper” effect, by which persistent organic pollutants (POPs) are vaporized at high temperatures and blow around on winds and travel to cooler places in the Arctic and high-altitude areas in the global climate process. At the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development held in Johannesburg, the three pillars of environment, economy, and society were reconfirmed and public–private partnerships of multiple stakeholders were widely recognized. Japan hosted the third World Water Forum in 2003. Japan’s environmental diplomacy seemed revitalized when the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) swept the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in a landslide in the August 2009 general election. At the UN General Assembly in September 2009, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama pledged a 25% reduction in greenhouse gases below 1990 levels by 2020 leading up to the 2009 Copenhagen conference, and expressed in May 2010 the idea of hosting the diplomatic conference for the Minamata Convention on Mercury. However, after Copenhagen talks failed, Japan decided not to join the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol in 2010. Japan also hosted the COP-10 of CBD, where the Aichi Biodiversity Targets, the Nagoya Protocol, and the Nagoya–Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol were adopted. However, Japan has not yet ratified these Protocols. At the 2012 Rio+20, new diplomacy for sustainable development began. After Japan experienced the triple disaster of earthquakes, tsunami, and nuclear meltdown in 2011, voters gave