UCLA UCLA Historical Journal Title Birth of the Cold War Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5n76j21d Journal UCLA Historical Journal, 25(1) ISSN 0276-864X Author Kuhelj Bugaric, Max Publication Date 2014 Peer reviewed eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California The Birth of the Cold War Max Kuhelj Bugaric Independent Scholar Introduction The alliance that came to exist during the Second World War between the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union emerged because they had a common interest in defeating Hitler and the Axis Powers. However, even before the end of the war, these three countries and their leaders, President Franklin D. Roosevelt of the United States, Prime Minister of Great Britain Winston S. Churchill, and General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Iosif V. Stalin, began to reassert their security interests and adopted policies to influence the postwar system. In the end, these steps to further their own security interests led directly to several conflicts between the wartime allies in the late-war and imme- diate postwar period. Thus, the Cold War emerged. The Cold War is often interpreted in terms of a confrontation between good and evil, with the Soviet Union being portrayed as an “evil empire” that chal- lenged the United States, the leader of the Western world. As John Lukacs explained, “Stalin, not Roosevelt, was the principal architect of the iron curtain of the cold war.”1 Others point to the major ideological-political differences as the central question, and in the end, as the main cause of Cold War confronta- tion. In a recent study, Jussi Hanhimäki asserted that, “given the ideological differences, material capabilities, security interests and contrasting personalities of those in power, it was no wonder that any possibility of cooperation between Moscow and Washington vanished after the common objective of defeating the Axis powers had been achieved.”2 Most of these interpretations of the Cold War fail to take into account the United States’ and the Soviet Union’s misperception of each other’s intentions. © 2014 Max Kuhelj Bugaric. All rights reserved. 39 40 UCLA HISTORICAL JOURNAL Vol. 25 No. 1 While they attempted to build massive defense systems for their own security, they unintentionally generated suspicion and fear in the eyes of their former allies. A major factor that contributed to the tensions was decisions made by both sides that were guided by misperceptions themselves. These confusions created a security dilemma that set the stage for the emerging bipolar system of the Cold War.3 Much of the literature about the Cold War victimizes one side and puts most of the blame for the emergence of tensions on the other; thus, it is no wonder that the general public remains misinformed about the whole affair. Hence, this paper presents an analysis of the events that were crucial to the rise of the Cold War, including the question of control over Poland, the British intervention in Greece, and the incidents that increased tensions between the Allies. It examines why missteps from both sides generated further missteps and, finally, a dangerous confrontation. Finally, this paper concludes with an analysis of the combined impact of these factors. The timeframe for these events is the period from the end of World War II in 1944 to 1945 until the Berlin Blockade, which began on 24 June 1948 (and ended on 12 May 1949). The latter is commonly acknowledged as the “real” manifestation of the Cold War but will not be described in detail here, as it is not my intention to describe the Cold War itself, but rather the events and interactions that caused the conflict. The Sovietization of Poland The question that emerged among the Allies toward the end of World War II was how to set up a balanced system that would endure and provide for greater security after the end of the War. Both the Soviet Union and the Anglo-American coalition believed that such security could be achieved by strengthening its own position. While Roosevelt believed that the key to international security was American- Russian cooperation, he also put his trust in American economic and military might. Roosevelt wanted to retain amicable relations with the Soviets to guar- antee their assistance in the war against Japan, but also to achieve postwar stabilization and to ensure that they would not “block an agreement on his pet project, the United Nations.”4 He did not have as great an interest as Churchill in creating a system based on balanced spheres of influence.5 Stalin, partially because of the enormous losses the Soviet Union had suf- fered during the War, also wanted to retain an alliance with the United States. Nevertheless, he also wanted to construct a security buffer zone along the Soviet Union’s western borders. This approach derived from old Russian military doc- trine (in particular, during the time of Imperial Russia under Napoleon and during World War I), since the main threat to Russia emanated from the West. Churchill, on the other hand, preferred a division of the world into spheres of influence. He also wanted to reestablish the great power position of Britain, including its 2014 THE Birth OF THE COLD WAR 41 Mediterranean dominance, and deny the Soviet Union the chance to subjugate Eastern Europe. Naturally, such diverse interests were bound to conflict. Such variance first emerged in the Allies’ disagreement regarding the control over Poland. On 1 August 1944, 46,000 men from the Polish Home Army, under General Bor- Komorowski, rose up against German occupiers in Warsaw.6 They proceeded with the uprising without first informing Stalin. Stalin’s disgruntlement regarding the Poles’ trying to force his hand was clearly exhibited by the fact that even though Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky’s 1st Belorussian Front covered an extraordinary 360 miles in the six weeks after Operation Bagration, it stopped six miles short of Warsaw. Alleviation of the Poles’ dire situation through aerial resupply ceased to be a viable option when Stalin denied the Anglo-American air forces the use of Soviet airfields, which they would have sorely needed for refueling after dropping supplies over Warsaw. Stalin’s answer to why the British and the Americans could not use the airfields was that the Soviet Command “must dissociate itself from the Warsaw adventure, as it cannot take direct or indirect responsibility for the Warsaw action.”7 Stalin’s decision derived from the fact that, had Rokossovsky intervened, the Germans would have likely been forced to withdraw and the Home Army would have emerged triumphant. Since the Home Army was under the control of the Polish government-in-exile, Stalin would have had difficulty establishing a government that would be friendly to the Soviet Union and, in effect, under its control. The Soviet Union suddenly changed tactics on September 9, when it implied in a message to the British government that, if London thought that the parachute drops would make any difference, it was welcome to lend its aid. This altered strategy emerged from the fact that Rokossovsky had renewed his offensive on August 31, and the actions of the rebels usefully complemented his own. Although an airdrop was made to the rebels on September 18, it was too late. After the city had been reduced to rubble and the city had suffered 300,000 casu- alties, General Bor-Komorowski surrendered to the Germans on October 2. On October 13, Stanislaw Mikołajczyk, the head of the Polish government-in- exile, pushed by Roosevelt and Churchill, met with Stalin. He was told that the Curzon Line had been accepted at Tehran, even though Stalin had assured him two months earlier that decisions regarding the frontier could be put off until later.8 As Mikołajczyk refused to accept the Curzon line, which would have made Poland give up Lvov to the Soviets, the frustrated Churchill said to him, “You are not a government, you are an unreasonable people that wants to shipwreck Europe and scuttle agreements among Allies.”9 Stalin also demanded that the members of the Lublin Committee, established and dominated by his Polish com- munist comrades, have a majority in the new government.10 Churchill told Stalin that “unless Mikołajczyk had fifty-fifty plus himself the Western World would not be convinced that the transaction was bona fide and would not believe that an independent government had been set up.” Churchill, in his cable to Roosevelt, 42 UCLA HISTORICAL JOURNAL Vol. 25 No. 1 stated, “Stalin at first replied he would consent with fifty-fifty, but rapidly -cor rected himself to a worse figure.”11 At the Tehran Conference in 1943, Roosevelt and Churchill accepted the Curzon Line in principal, but they insisted that the city of Lvov remain under Polish control. By the time they met at the Yalta Conference in February 1945, they were prepared to sacrifice Lvov, but they hoped that Stalin would concede it as a benevolent gesture toward the West. However, Stalin wanted the post-World War II Polish-German border to be based on the more westerly of the Neisse Rivers and on the River Oder. In Churchill’s opinion, this was too much. He declared, “It would be a great pity to stuff the Polish goose so full of German food that it died of indigestion.”12 Stalin’s opinion on the Lublin Committee was that it was “as democratic as de Gaulle” and that “it was vital for the Red Army to have safe rear areas, and as a military man he would only support the government which could guarantee to provide them.”13 Roosevelt wrote to Stalin and suggested that various eminent Poles be invited to Yalta so they could work out an agreement with the Allies and two members of the Lublin Committee.