Piotr Eberhardt Piotr Eberhardt

2015 88 1 77 http://dx.doi.org/10.7163/ GPol.0007 April 2014 September 2014

Geographia Polonica 2015, Volume 88, Issue 1, pp. 77-105 http://dx.doi.org/10.7163/GPol.0007

INSTITUTE OF GEOGRAPHY AND SPATIAL ORGANIZATION POLISH ACADEMY OF SCIENCES www.igipz.pan.pl www.geographiapolonica.pl

THE ODER-NEISSE LINE AS POLAND’S WESTERN BORDER: AS POSTULATED AND MADE A REALITY

Piotr Eberhardt Institute of Geography and Spatial Organization Polish Academy of Sciences Twarda 51/55, 00-818 Warsaw: Poland e-mail: [email protected]

Abstract This article presents the historical and political conditioning leading to the establishment of the contemporary Polish-German border along the ‘Oder-Neisse Line’ (formed by the rivers known in Poland as the Odra and Nysa Łużycka). It is recalled how – at the moment a Polish state first came into being in the 10th century – its western border also followed a course more or less coinciding with these same two rivers. In subsequent cen- turies, the political limits of the Polish and German spheres of influence shifted markedly to the east. However, as a result of the drastic reverse suffered by Nazi Germany, the western border of Poland was re-set at the Oder-Neisse Line. Consideration is given to both the causes and consequences of this far-reaching geopolitical decision taken at the Potsdam Conference by the victorious Three Powers of the USSR, UK and USA.

Key words Oder-Neisse Line • western border of Poland • Potsdam Conference • international boundaries

Introduction districts – one for each successor – brought the loss, at first periodically and then irrevo- At the end of the 10th century, the Western cably, of the whole of Silesia and of Western border of Poland coincided approximately Pomerania. with the line of the Oder (Odra) and the Lusa- Thus, when the Kingdom of Poland was tian Neisse (Nysa Łużycka) (Sułowski 1952). re-established in the 15th century, its western The small departures from this were of little border was by then shifted well to the east, significance, since the then political limits having an arc shape and ensuring the inclu- were somewhat labile and fuzzy. However, the sion inside it of Eastern Pomerania, Kuyavia era initiated by the death of Bolesław III the and Małopolska (Lesser Poland), as well as the Wrymouthed (Bolesław Krzywousty) in 1138, Wielkopolska region (Greater Poland) extend- which saw Poland divided up into small ing further to the west (Wojciechowski 1945;

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Waszkiewicz 1954). The configuration of the In contrast, much was written and spoken border existing at this time then went more about Polish civilisational achievements in the or less unmodified through to the fall of the east, and there was no doubt in the minds First Republic in 1795. of most that a whole huge area extending The territories lost in the meantime were to the River Dnieper did represent an inte- subject to a steady process of Germanisation, gral element of the Polish Lands. A similar with the whole area except for some parts approach was taken to the western border, to the east of the Oder near Opole/Oppeln which was to return to the line it followed becoming ethnically German. Likewise, the in 1772 (Wapiński 1994). Baltic coast became home to German settle- As time passed, the highly-entrenched ment everywhere up to the mouth of the River view in Polish society as to the territorial Neman, except on the western shore of Dan- shape of a future Poland reborn had per- zig Bay. Following the fall of the First Republic, force to change radically. This did not happen the political borderland shifted even further under the influence of external geopolitical to the east, such that the German-Russian conditioning, which was very much petrified border ran along the River Prosna, while East and did not favour Polish aspirations. Rath- Prussia ceased to be an exclave separated er it was a different process that enforced from Germany proper1. a review of ways of looking at the re-creation In the awareness of a 19th-century Polish of Poland within its historical boundaries. society partitioned into Russian, Prussian and Across Central and Eastern Europe, peasants Austro-Hungarian parts there was a well- had remained largely indifferent to issues rooted vision of Poland within its borders of nationality up to the mid-19th century, and from 1772. This meant that Volhynia, Podolia in many cases up to the very end thereof. The and Lithuania were regarded as Polish lands carriers of tradition and identity from one to a greater extent than, for example, Silesia generation to the next were thus the nobil- or Western Pomerania. While there was an ity and the intelligentsia. However, as time awareness that large areas of both Silesia and passed national ideas began to trickle down East Prussia featured people using the Polish into the rural populace, along with less-subtle language, this was not of more major politi- slogans that were nationalist in tone. This was cal significance. Only Wielkopolska (Greater by no means a unifying process, as the old Poland), East Pomerania and perhaps Catho- eastern lands from the First Republic began lic Varmia/Ermland were treated as areas to diverge in terms of nationality, to the to which Poland retained some moral right. extent that Ukrainian, Lithuanian, Belarusian Other provinces on the eastern bank of the and Latvian national movements all began Oder and Neisse but now in the Kingdom to emerge. of Prussia were regarded as German land, In an analogous way (if with a more posi- and there was no fuller awareness of their tive result) the Polish-German borderland early Slav origin.2 began to nurture distinct activisms in Silesia, Pomerania, Varmia (Ermland) and Masuria, albeit with a struggle against Germanisation 1 During the previous millennium the western bor- in each case encouraging identification with der of Poland did undergo a geographical shift. This was the Polish-language tradition from history associated with the political situation in Europe, and first (Kętrzyński 1882; Bełza 1902). and foremost the position of the German Power. Never- theless, the ultimate return was to the situation that had The circles formed from Polish pro-inde- existed in the early Middle Ages (Labuda 1974). pendence activists and academics (above 2 Scant awareness of the early-Polish nature of the all geographers) were thus faced with an whole of Silesia had survived. But it had been noted by the exceptionally complex research dilemma that Polish chroniclers (such as Długosz), as well as by Polish travellers spending time in Silesia in the late 18th and had consequences extending far beyond the early 19th centuries (e.g. Niemcewicz and Plater). academic. It was now necessary to square

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up to a new demographic and ethnic reality was a Baltic coast extending from the Vistula that required a rethink of many views existing to the Neman/Niemen, as well as possession hitherto, with arguments appropriate in the of the whole of East Prussia, Greater Poland circumstances needing to be advanced, if the and Silesia. new standpoint on the extent and shape of the Popławski stuck by his conviction that the future Poland was to be presented properly. regaining of Upper Silesia, Opole-Silesia and East Prussia was a relatively feasible option, Precursors of Polish Western since considerable Polish populations had thinking persisted in all three regions. In this regard, he was aware that the postulate was maximal- A significant role in the development of west- ist in tone. Equally, he was prepared to accept ern-orientated Polish thinking was played that formerly Piast-ruled provinces like Lower by the country’s political activist Ludwik Silesia and Western Pomerania had by now Popławski. He was fully aware that new politi- become German lands, to which Poland had cal, ethnic and geographical conditions were permanently lost any rights or claims it might appearing, but was less concerned about sys- once have had. Popławski was thus consist- temic and social issues (which he saw as sec- ent in not writing about any revindication ondary), and more interested in the key mat- in respect of areas along the middle or lower ter of assuring optimal political borders for Oder, and all the more so did he eschew indi- a future Poland, in line with the fact that the cating the Oder-Neisse Line as a potential fate of country and nation alike might well border (Popławski 1910). depend on them. He was not therefore inter- Popławski’s geopolitical works in fact ested in claims of a maximal nature. Indeed, played a key role in shaping views of the well- he demonstrated considerable caution and known Polish politician Roman Dmowski, who wisdom, minded only by the desire to achieve saw him as an ideal instructor. In Dmowski’s cohesion and strength for the re-emerging 1907 book Niemcy, Rosja a kwestia polska state. It was for these reasons that he saw (Germany, Russia and the Polish Question), the issue of the western border as overriding it is easy to make out the creative inspi- all others. ration supplied by his great predecessor. It was clear that Poland’s future would have In turn, looking from the perspective of today to be linked with access to the Baltic Sea, and at Popławski’s territorial concepts, it is easy with the regaining of Silesia, the Wielkopolska to suggest that he was effective in antici- region (Greater Poland), Pomerania and East pating a steady shift westwards for Poland Prussia. This view was then a precursor of the (Dmowski 1908)4. ‘Piast Poland’ idea3, at the heart of which was a recognition of lands in the west that were The Russian concept of Sergei ethnically Polish. At the time, this remained Sazonov and the Polish concept a revolutionary concept. What it did not of Bolesław Jakimiak denote was any support for the so-called ‘eth- nic Poland’, with little or no account being It can be assumed that the first justified ter- taken of the Eastern Lands as a whole. In fact, ritorial programme postulating a shift in the in the latter sphere, Popławski’s views were borders of Poland to the line of the upper more complex, but they certainly did not pos- and lower Oder as far as the Baltic Sea was tulate a return to the historical eastern bor- ders of the old Commonwealth. For him the 4 The activity of first Popławski and then Dmowski sine qua non condition for Poland’s existence encouraged an intellectual ferment. Many activists and publicists began to consider the subject matter of Poland’s western border and the situation of the Polish 3 This was the first of Poland’s royal dynasties reign- population made subject to planned Germanisation ing from the 10th to the 14th centuries. (Zieliński 1964).

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of non-Polish authorship. This reflected the subsequent steady erosion of the Kingdom fact that a major shift in the western border of Poland put a stop to all of the great stud- lay in the imperial interests of Tsarist Rus- ies on ways in which further lands belonging sia. Possibly attesting to this was the ”Map to Germany might be annexed. of the future Europe” published in Moscow The first Polish visionary to propose a Pol- in 1914 (Alekseev 1914). It probably emerged ish border that not only followed the Oder but at the inspiration of Minister of Foreign also had its southern extremity along the line Affairs of Russia Sergei Dmitrievich Sazonov of the Lusatian Neisse was Bolesław Jakimiak, (1860-1927). On the map published there who wrote under the pseudonym ‘Mściwój was a precise delineation of the border of the Łohoda’ (Łohoda 1918). It is hard to say if future Poland forming an integral part of Rus- he was inspired by the Russian map. In any sia. Evidence of this affiliation lies in the fact case, his concept was still more ambitious, that the lands of an autonomous Poland are since it anticipated the incorporation into the in the same colour as the remaining Russian independent Poland of the whole area to the parts. The shape of the province dubbed east of the Oder-Neisse line. A vision of Jakim- ‘Polska’ recalls today’s Poland. However, due iak’s that proved a precursor was presented to the scale of the map, the borders of the in a brochure published, first in Moscow and future Poland follow only a very generalised then in Warsaw in 1918. The territorial pro- course. Nevertheless, along all sections they gramme then proposed was far from any have been thought-through and are unequiv- reality, indeed on the verge of utopian. And ocal. The western border of the planned prov- yet it emerged as prophetic, given that just ince runs along the Oder channel from the 27 years later it had proved fully capable Sudety Mountains to the Gulf of Stettin, albeit of being accomplished. with Szczecin/Stettin itself beyond the west- In his introductory chapter, Jakimiak ern border. Similar annotations relating to the describes the history of Poland’s Western strongholds of Wrocław/Breslau and Głogów/ Lands, as well as the eastward political and Glogau are made on the German side. The demographical/ethnic expansion of Germa- autonomous Poland has the Baltic coast from ny, postulating that it would only be a matter the Gulf of Stettin as far as Gdańsk/Danzig, of historical justice if the whole of Pomerania, which has been excised from the autonomous East Prussia, Nadodrze (East Brandenburg) Poland and incorporated directly into Russia. and the whole of Lower and Upper Silesia Close to Gdańsk/Danzig, the border assumes became integral parts of the Polish state. a southward course and reaches Bydgoszcz/ The text offers a detailed description of each Bromberg. The lower course of the River Vis- of the provinces in turn, which would await tula now belongs to Russia on both sides, rapid repolonisation. The consequence of the with the border crossing the river close establishment of the Polish-German border to Toruń/Thorn, whose strategic significance along the Oder and Neisse would be the auto- and location ensure its allocation to Russia. matic inclusion of East Prussia within Poland. Between Toruń and Osowiec, the border runs This reference to the western limits more or less west-east along the line of lati- of Poland during the times of its first Piast- tude. The whole of East Prussia together with dynasty rulers was in line with the histori- the province of Suwałki form an integral part cal truth. Attesting to this is a comparison of Russia. The concept whereby the western between the territory of the post-1945 Polish border of Poland was to be the Oder has rap- state and its western borders during the reign idly gone out of date and been forgotten. of Bolesław III the Wrymouthed (Krzywousty) However, real-life warfare did not proceed in 1136. as an optimistic elite in Tsarist Russia had At the time Jakimiak was formulating the fondly imagined. Actions at the Front proved border concepts cited above, the main atten- to have catastrophic consequences, and the tion of the then Polish society was turned

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by French Ambassador in Berlin, Jules Cam- bon. Poland had to prepare its proposals as regards the borders for this Commission. In the name of the Polish Government, Roman Dmowski made a 28 February 1919 submis- sion of a note that defined more precisely the Polish desiderata where matters such as the country’s future western border were con- cerned (Dmowski 1947). The note in question proceeded on the assumption that the start- ing point for any determination of the said western border would need to be the borders as of 1772. This condition represented an act of historical justice and was the premise behind the re-emergence of a strong state. Figure 1. Boundaries of Poland as of 1136 and However, that border required verification – 1945 mainly to the benefit of Poland – since there were known to be areas to its west uniformly towards the east. It was considered that deci- inhabited by Polish populations. Thus it was sions as regards the western border would to begin running from Raciborz/Ratibor, be taken at a peace conference in which the then east of Głubczyce/Leobschutz, Prudnik/ Western Powers would be playing a decisive Neustadt, Niemodlin/Falkenberg, Brzeg/ role. It was also assumed that a more opti- Brieg, Oleśnica/Oels and Milicz/Militsch. mal solution than a return to the Repub- The whole of Upper Silesia, together with lic’s western borders of 1772 – plus limited a large part of the Opole region located along access to the sea along with Gdańsk – would the upper Odra but not belonging to the First be unlikely to emerge. The bold vision postu- Republic was also supposed to come within lated by Jakimiak seemed like pure fantasy the new Poland. The Wielkopolska region in the circumstances of the political situation (the so-called Greater Poland or once Polo- at the time (Kochanowski & Kosmala 2013). nia Maior) was also to be included in Poland, in this way restoring the pre-Partition border The Versailles Conference here. Dmowski also postulated the incorpo- ration of Gdańsk/Danzig into Poland, as well Following the defeat in the First World War as Warmia (Varmia or Ermland) and the of all three of the powers partitioning Poland, whole southern belt of East Prussia. the Western Powers were to determine the The above proposals constituted a basis western limits of the reborn Republic. The for the Cambon Commission’s drawing up Paris Peace Conference began its delib- of a report on the western and southern erations on 18 January 1919 at Versailles. borders of Poland. In essence, the postulates The victorious countries called into being put forward by the Polish delegation gained the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers acceptance, though they did meet with a clear formed from representatives of France, the protest on the part of the United Kingdom United Kingdom, Italy, Japan and the United representative David Lloyd George (1863- States. It was to make final determinations 1945). Indeed, his opposition did lead to cer- as regards the defeated Central Powers, this tain border changes that benefited Germany process also entailing the establishing of the (Pajewski 1963; Bierzanek & Kukułka 1965; future Polish-German border. Karski 1998). After lengthy deliberations the The Supreme Council in turn designated Supreme Council chose 14 June 1919 to make a Commission on Polish Affairs headed known to the Polish delegation its verdict

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as regards the border, as well as a decision of a markedly offensive, rather than defen- concerning the necessity of plebiscites being sive, posture. To these ends, 1921 saw the run. It was at a later time that the assigning establishment at Poznań University of a West- of Upper Silesia took place, as well as the ern-Slav Institute which commenced with both basic retention of the old borderline between academic and publishing activity. Research East Prussia and the Mazowsze region (the on geographical subject matter relating former Masovia).5 to the western lands began to be carried out Ultimately, the Polish-German border as then, under leading Polish geographer Stani- agreed upon was not accepted with a great sław Pawłowski. Toponomastic studies relat- sense of satisfaction by either Poland or Ger- ing to the ­Polish-German borderland played many. Extending for nearly 2000 km, it was a key role, with work being done to under- irregular, and only reached the Oder along mine hypotheses as to the German origins the section west of Rybnik. Lower Silesia, of these. A similar academic centre came into Western Pomerania and the Lubusz Land being in Toruń, and yet another in Katowice. (East Brandenburg) all remained integral Likewise, geographers and historians parts of the German State. Nevertheless, in Warsaw and Krakow that had previously Poland had gained access to the sea, while dealt mainly with eastern subject matter the western border did recall in general out- were now more and more inclined to turn line the limits that had been present in 1772. their attention to the political and geopoliti- cal consequences of the new Polish-German Polish western thinking in the border (Mroczko 1986). Many books and inter-war period articles appeared at this time, pointing to the existence of a potential threat posed The decisions taken at Versailles simultane- by the neighbour to the west. There was a full ously brought an end to – and gave a start awareness that the borders agreed at Ver- to – periods of intellectual work by Polish activ- sailles were of a provisional nature and might ists and researchers as regards the future be shifted eastwards in the future (or indeed of Poland’s western border and its perma- westwards). From the strategic point of view, nence. It was seen as desirable to fix in Polish the border that had been delineated was society an awareness of the need to defend hard to defend. against German revisionism and to ensure One of the first researchers to justify the full integration of the new acquisitions with thesis that only a shift in the border to the the remaining parts of the country. Germany Oder-Neisse Line would protect Poland was at the time engaged in anti-Polish propa- from the German threat was Roman Umia- ganda activity that was both political and stowski. He foresaw a future Polish-German economic in character. Books published at the conflict in which Poland’s natural ally would time sought to advance a thesis regarding the be France. Furthermore, he realised that harm and hurt that had been inflicted upon Poland’s strategic goals should not be con- Germany at Versailles, and hence the need fined to defence of the status quo, but should for the Pomeranian corridor to be erased and rather be set at achieving a border that the lands lost in the east regained. brought within Poland the area between the All German centres of higher learning Sudety Mountains and the Baltic Sea, as well engaged in information-related activity con- as extending to the Oder-Neisse Line (Umia- cerning ‘the east’ (Ostforschung), ensuring stowski 1921). the need for the Polish side to take aca- A similar train of thought was represented demic counter-measures within the context by Włodzimierz Wakar, whose book written under the pseudonym ‘Consulibus’ referred 5 With the exception of the poviat of Działdowo/ to the armed defeat of Germany and verifica- Soldau, which joined Poland. tion of the western border. And were France

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not to accept a military solution, there would What was not appreciated fully, however, anyway be a need to eliminate East Prussia was the disparity in strength, and the degree (Consulibus 1926). to which an unavoidable political calamity Numerous works sought to attest to the was fast approaching. geographical, historical and economic unity and homogeneity of the lands between the The concept of the Oder-Neisse Oder and the Vistula. The crowning academic border in the early phase and popularising achievement in this respect of the war was a convention-like gathering of histori- ans and others running in Poznań between Following their aggressive onslaught against 6 and 8 December 1925 and called Powszech- Poland on 1 September 1939, and the rapid ny Zjazd Historyków Polskich (the General takeover of western and central parts of the Convention of Polish Historians). The event country, the Nazi authorities decided – by vir- marked the 900th anniversary of the corona- tue of a Decree dated 8 October 1939 – tion of Bolesław I the Brave (Chrobry), but went to incorporate ‘German Pomerania’ into the far beyond the purely symbolic. Rather it was Reich, along with Greater Poland, Silesia, intended to make Polish society fully aware Kuyavia, northern Mazowsze, the Dąbrowa of its sworn duty to guard the western border, Industrial District, the greater part of the and to remember the provinces that consti- voivodship of Łódź, the western poviats of the tuted the cradle of Polish statehood (Mrocz- voivodships of Kielce and Krakow and the povi- ko 1986: 184). It was recalled that the lands at of Suwałki. By further Decree (dated 12 Octo- belonging to Bolesław’s Poland had included ber 1939, the German authorities established West Pomerania and the whole of Silesia. Ref- the so-called ‘Generalgouvernement’ (Gen- erence was thus being made to the concept eral Governorate) between the near eastern of ‘Piast Poland’, whose later standard-bearer border of the Reich and a frontier established would be Zygmunt Wojciechowski. A ‘Jagiel- by means of the Soviet-German Pact that lonian’6 ideology was already rooted deeply Molotov and von Ribbentrop had concluded in the Polish consciousness, but this was now on 28 September 1939. being augmented by efforts to regenerate the For the Polish Government-in-Exile, oper- ‘Piast’ ideology invoking Poland’s return to the ating first in France and then after the lat- Oder and the Baltic Sea. ter’s capitulation in the United Kingdom, There was a degree of normalisation to the Polish state remained constituted within Polish-German relations following the signa- the borders existing as of 31 August 1939. ture on 26 January 1934 (at Berlin) of the However, there was from early on an aware- Non-Aggression Pact offering a formal ness that a return to the pre-War situation guarantee that Poland would not be subject was always going to be hard to achieve, to German aggression for at least a ten-year since it effectively required the simultane- period. This was obviously just a form of tem- ous defeat of both Hitler’s Germany and porary camouflage which lost all significance Stalin’s USSR. Work was therefore begun as German power grew steadily. Following to study other variants. A quite surprising Austria’s incorporation via the Anschluss initial outcome was the development of cer- and then Munich 1938 it was clear that the tain maximalist plans that saw the eastern Versailles order had come to an end. Facing border taken yet further eastwards, and the a direct threat, Poland mobilised its society western still further to the west! It was only and adopted a unified attitude to the military with Red Army victories on the Eastern Front aggression that was now fully anticipated. that accommodations with the real state of affairs began, and a determination arose 6 Jagiellonian monarchs ruled in Poland in the 15th to defend the eastern border established and 16th centuries. following the Polish-Bolshevik­ War at the

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1920 Riga Conference. The assumption here Its head became the known geographer was of a definitive military defeat for Nazi Stanisław Srokowski, the former Polish Con- Germany, as well as victory for the West- sul in Olsztyn. Commencing with its activity ern Powers, who would then be in a posi- at the same time was the so-called ‘Western tion to delineate the new borders in Europe. Office’ organised by Witold Grott, and then It was further assumed that this kind of situ- under the leadership of Stanisław Tabaczyń- ation would allow for modification of the ski. This also began its studies on a concept ­Polish-German border. The projects actually for Poland’s future western border. The West- devised in this regard were in fact quite dis- ern Office became the Office for the West- parate, with rather minimalist postulates ern Lands, at which the post of Director was assuming nothing more than the regaining taken up by Władysław Czajkowski. A branch of Gdańsk and the rejoining of the divided of the Office was in turn the Western Section Upper Silesia being augmented by oth- at the Department for Information and the ers demanding the inclusion within Poland Press of the Government Delegature found- of the whole of eastern Germany up to the ed in Poznań. It was under the leadership edges of Berlin and Dresden. Within the of Edmund Męclewski, an activist and journal- framework of these various territorial pro- ist popularising knowledge on Poland’s West- jects there was also a return of the old con- ern Lands. It cooperated with the Western cept that the Polish-German border should Study Centre whose work was led by Zygmunt be set by the Oder-Neisse Line (Orzechowski Wojciechowski. 1969). The approach was arrived at in both Views expressed at the Western Office occupied Poland and in London, under the nevertheless differed. There was a minimalist auspices of the Government-in-Exile. And approach at the outset, but later demands for from the outset, the idea began to be asso- Poland to even encompass the island of Rugia/ ciated with considerations regarding future Rügen and the Lusatia region emerged. The territorial vindications. prevailing concept was nevertheless one Late 1939 and early 1940 saw the estab- intending to include within Poland the whole lishment (still in France) of an Office of Policy of East Prussia, the Free City of Danzig, Szcze- Studies headed by Minister Marian Seyda. cin/Stettin in the west and all of the land to the Later, in London, this took on the form of the east of the Oder and Neisse. The fact that Ministry of Preparatory Work for the Peace this view was in the ascendant led its being Conference. Its task was to work on the stance dubbed ‘Variant A’ at the Western Office. All as regards Poland’s future borders for the work and studies were concerned with this purposes of the anticipated post-War Peace basic variant, though a ‘Variant B’ was also Conference. At the same time, an animated in fact developed, with preference for it shown discussion began back in Poland on the scope by the Government-in-Exile. It assumed that and means of implementation of Polish postu- the post-War western border would run along lates regarding territory. The western borders a line of longitude linking Kołobrzeg/Kolberg in fact became the main subject of interest for with Gorzów/Landsberg, and then along the the conspiratorial groups associated with the Oder and Neisse down to the Czech border rightist movement of ‘Szaniec’, ‘Walka’ and (Gluck 1971: 39). ‘Pobudka’. These prepared a number of vari- There is no purpose in invoking all of the ants, but most sought to delineate Poland’s studies carried out abroad or at home future border along a line approximating in regard to possible variants for the coun- to the courses of the Oder and Neisse. try’s future western border. Alongside collec- The issue of the border was also taken up tive works, there were also projects under at Biuro Studiów dla Ziem Nowych (the Office individual authorship, and their content was of Studies for the New Lands) to the Head- influenced by political and military events quarters of the Union for Armed Struggle. in Europe, as well as the situation within the

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resistance movement, whose ideological ori- As distinct from the prevailing view repeat- entations were of course diverse. In the early edly voiced in Occupied Poland, the stance days it was possible to assume both a fail- taken by the Polish Government began ure for Nazi Germany and the neutralisa- to undergo adjustment. This was not espe- tion, or even the active emasculation, of the cially under the influence of political condi- Soviet Union. It would emerge that the latter tioning, but rather reflected a more precise assumption was entirely unrealistic, and had assessment of the demographic and ethnic perhaps not been plausible at any stage. situation in eastern Germany, which would Indeed, a tendency to play down the USSR’s need to be taken within the future Poland political and military strength was a visible as recompense for land lost. The calculations feature of all the then programmes relating done by Government experts suggested that to the nearer or more distant future. a shifting of the border to the Oder-Neisse Line The first comprehensive document to be would leave almost 9 million Germans within drawn up by émigrés in Paris (of Detach- Poland. At this point there was no anticipation ment III of the Supreme Commander’s Staff), of a mass resettlement (eviction or expulsion) and to be signed on 2 April 1940, was the of Germans, and it was clear that their remain- Studium przyszłej granicy polsko-niemieckiej ing within the country’s borders would inevi- z punktu widzenia wojskowego (Study of the tably precipitate a crisis of Polish statehood. future Polish-German border from the military It was for this reason that claims on Wrocław point of view), in which it was stated clearly and Szczecin were resigned from, along with that the optimal western border for Poland those to the Baltic coast west of Kołobrzeg. would be the line of the Oder and Neisse In contrast, it was accepted that Poland’s (Dynarski & Derwiński 1990: 15-16). wish-list should include (only) East Prussia, Being aware of the degree to which the Gdańsk coast and Opole-Silesia/Upper their project was maximalist, the authors Silesia. There were more precisely-defined also worked on more limited variants, inter variants within the framework of this overall alia resigning from Wrocław and the whole concept limited in its territorial ambitions. of Lower Silesia, or else from Szczecin, In each Not unnaturally, the views to be found case, they continued to stick to the stance among conspiratorial groups back at home that mastery of the whole Baltic Coast as far were more extreme in tone and ambition. The as the Szczecin Lagoon should be achieved. principal advocates of border changes were The Government-in-Exile resembled forces activists holding nationalist views, along with back home in Poland in believing unswerving- many Polish academics like the geographers ly in the strength of France and in the disaster Jan Dylik, Maria Czekańska and Antoni Wrzo- for Germany that was just a matter of time sek. In fact becoming ever more firmly fixed (Dynarski 1997: 87). in the minds of these people was a convic- The radical change in the political situation tion that the Oder-Neisse Line should indeed arising out of the liquidation of the Western serve as the border for post-War Poland. This Front and Germany’s complete dominance view gained still-wider acceptance with time, over almost the whole of Europe did rather lit- and was thus propounded widely in the circles tle to limit territorial maximalism. The ultimate associated with the nationalist and peasant fall of Nazi Germany was still believed in, and movements alike. the postulate regarding a border along the It was down to Lech Neyman, Leszek Pro- Oder and Neisse continued to be advanced rok and Zygmunt Wojciechowski to develop and justified. At this stage, it is hard to assess a cohesive concept, the first of these doing the extent to which those persisting with this so in his Szaniec Bolesławów, which begins were far-sighted, and to what extent merely by stating that the delineation of borders for stubborn and dogmatic (Dynarski & Derwiński Poland need not be driven by ethnic consid- 1990: 18). erations, but should rather be conditioned

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by political and economic need, as well as the territory of enclaves of German ethnic and strategic situation. It was these assumptions cultural affiliation seeking German state- that led Neyman to draw a future western hood. In Neyman’s view, the meeting of these border of Poland that is seen to run in the three criteria would be dependent upon the immediate vicinity of Berlin. There was thus establishment of a western border at the a large area to the west of the Oder – and Oder-Neisse Line (Neyman 1941: 129). up to and including Rügen Island in the It is interesting that a further postulate Baltic – that was intended for incorpora- concerned the establishment of a sover- tion into Poland. In his next work Polska po eign Serbo-Lusation state with its capital wojnie (Poland after the War), the author in Budziszyn/Bautzen. At the same time, the offered a detailed presentation of his terri- author makes it clear that the establishment torial intentions for Poland. In his view, the of an Oder-Neisse border would be further country’s post-War security was dependent associated with the whole of East Prussia upon: 1) The shortest possible and most being irrevocably assigned to Poland (Fig. 2) readily defensible borderline with Germany, (Neyman 1941: 130). 2) direct and extensive access to the sea, Another courageous visionary was Leszek 3) a compact and cohesive area that would Prorok (who went by the pseudonym ‘Modrzew’, preclude the future emergence within the meaning ‘The Larch’). Prorok offered an incisive

Figure 2. The future border of Poland after Lech Neyman Source: Neyman 1941.

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and multi-stranded justification of the need for be Poland-Germany. Ten centuries of strug- Poland to gain Germany’s eastern lands up gle (Wojciechowski 1945). The first of the to the Oder-Neisse Line (Fig. 3). A total of 15 geo- theses that would fill the book had emerged political, demographic, ethnic and economic/ by 1933, but the write-up only came in 1942, social justifications were in fact advanced, with rapid dissemination among conspirato- though these can be seen to be of disparate rial groupings. Proper publication had to wait value from the substantive point of view. While until 1945. A no-nonsense postulate presented many sound rational enough, some at least by Wojciechowski held that ”the eradication are loaded with exaltation and naive optimism of all things German is a basic precondition (Modrzew 1944: 6-7). for the restoration of a natural and peaceful existence in a post-War Poland”. In turn, the book closed with this telling appeal, “In place of the German ‘Drang nach Osten’ (‘Thrust towards the East’), the approaching era will be one of a renewed Slavic march to the west. He who fails to appreciate this phenomenon is not conceiving of the new era in the cor- rect way, and does not correctly perceive Poland’s place in the reality that surrounds it. As the second millennium approaches, it will again be Poland that mounts guard along the Odra” (Wojciechowski 1945: 262). Initially, the German-Soviet war did not influence perceptions of the future (post-War) western border of Poland. No account was taken of the Soviet stance and its influence on Polish-German relations. At the outset, a victory for Hitler over the USSR was counted on, with this denoting a repeat of the geo- political conditions present at the end of the First World War, i.e. with Poland’s two major neighbours simultaneously suffering a major military reverse – to the extent that the decid- Figure 3. Heritage of the Piast dynasty (book ing vote in a post-War Europe would be left cover picture) with the Western Powers. It was only with the Source: Modrzew 1944. Battle of Kursk and the clear statement of the Soviet authorities that only the Curzon Line would suffice as an eastern border for Poland It can nevertheless be conceded that the that the matter began to look less clear-cut. creative activity of greatest cognitive impor- In such conditions, a Polish Government-in-Exile tance was that of Zygmunt Wojciechowski, defending the idea of the Riga border in the with his concept regarding the so-called east began to see the question of the western ‘Polish native lands’ or ‘Polish homelands’, border in less categorical terms. It was feared located in the basins of the Oder and Vistula. the incorporation of the Eastern Lands would In the view of the author, it had been the be facilitated if the USSR could deploy the argu- steady loss of these to Germany that had led ment regarding a so-called ‘compensatory to political catastrophe for Poland. A major equivalent’ (Kowalski & Lippóczy 1971: 16-17). popularising role for the concept came For this reason, the concept of the Oder-Neisse with a book whose translated title would Line was abandoned, not only for logistical

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and ethnic reasons, but also because it might final drawing of the boundary line requires work towards Poland’s loss of the Eastern thorough study and possible resettlement Lands to the USSR. in some points” (Cieślak et al. 1965: 429). However, the political position of the Polish Stalin’s response was as follows, ”The Rus- Government-in-Exile weakened steadily as the sians have no ice-free ports on the Baltic. That War went on. To a greater and greater extent, is why the Russians would need the ice-free Poland was coming to be regarded as an entity ports of Königsberg [Kaliningrad] and Memel that ‘had policy done to it’, rather than being [Klaipėda] and the corresponding part of the an active participant. What was worse, while territory of East Prussia, particularly since the Three Great Powers were theoretically these are age-old Slav lands7. If the British going to be deciding on the fate of Poland, the agree to the transfer of the said territory role of Stalin was clearly coming to dominate to us, we shall agree to the formula proposed as time passed. In the light of this, stances by Churchill” (Cieślak et al. 1965: 429). taken by the Polish Government in London, The decisions as regards Poland’s eastern and postulates advanced by the authorities border were unambiguous, but the wording of the Home Army active in Occupied Poland, vis-à-vis the western border was still such both came to seem more symbolic in nature. as to encourage quite free interpretation. All All the more so, when it began to look as if the that was known was that Poland would gain Soviet authorities were actually starting work the southern part of East Prussia, as well on the future Polish satellite-state in at least as the province of Opole. There were, how- embryonic form. ever, no indications as to how the concept of a border on the Oder was to be interpret- The Teheran Conference ed, since it might equally well have related to the whole of the river, or just a small stretch A milestone event that brought decisions thereof. regarding Poland’s new eastern border and Information on the decisions taken reached the possibility of a degree of compensation the Polish Government in London with some in the west was the Conference of the Three delay, since they were initially concealed. Great Powers taking place between 28 Sep- However, this was not of greater significance, tember and 1 October 1943 in Tehran, Iran. since that Government was by then in a mar- Full documentation with stenograms of the ginalised condition in any case. The loss of the deliberations and behind-the-scenes discus- Eastern Lands gained its final confirmation sions was published long ago and there at the Conference in Yalta8. In contrast, set- is no need to comment on the course they tlements as regards the course of the western assumed (Zabiegło 1958; Cieślak et al. 1965). border were still formulated in a less-precise The decisions taken as regards the eastern way, allowing for various interpretations border were unambiguous. The Soviet party and quite disparate decisions regarding the obtained full approval for the delineation extent of what was to be incorporated. But of Poland’s eastern border along the so-called Curzon Line. There was no final determina- 7 It is hard to decide if Stalin, in referring to East tion of the future affiliations of Lvov, but it was Prussia as ‘eternally Slavic lands’, made an unintended already clear that the verdict would in the end mistake, or used it as a political argument in an aware- be unfavourable for Poland. The final wording ness of Churchill’s lack of knowledge of geography. 8 proposed by Churchill was as follows, “It was The Soviet side came to accept the fact that the German-Soviet Demarcation Line from the years agreed in principle that the heart of the Polish 1939-1941 would not be restored. Furthermore, many state and people must be situated between historians do not perceive the geographical difference the so-called Curzon Line and the line of the between the border from 28 September 1939 and that following the Curzon Line (notwithstanding the fact that Oder River, including East Prussia and the that difference equates to around 23,000 km2 of terri- Oppeln Province as part of Poland. But the tory – in Poland’s favour).

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by this stage the future of Poland was not was a different matter, which offered a safety being decided by the Western Powers, let valve for patriotic rhetoric to be employed alone by the Government-in-Exile, but by Sta- without much risk, at the same time, depriv- lin in person. It was he who devised his own ing political opponents of their sole occupa- concept regarding Germany and Poland, with tion of the moral high ground. Communist ever greater certainty that his Western Allies activists rapidly determined that the USSR would give their seal of approval to it. was interested in a weakened Germany, and hence in Poland being compensated gen- Poland’s western border in the erously in the west. Thus, with some kind assumptions of Polish communists of plenipotentiary power and acceptance and the government in London being present in this area at least, maximum advantage was taken. While it was none- In the wake of what was agreed at Tehran, theless in a somewhat ad hoc way that the Stalin effectively had full consent to his communists in question embarked upon their geopolitical concepts, and might therefore task in support of the Polish national interest, proceed to the implementation of his vision they rather rapidly found themselves adopt- for the future borders of Poland. An appro- ing a strident rhetoric that had hitherto been priate moment had also arrived for Polish the preserve of the Polish right. communists in the USSR to have the plans As the Red Army came ever closer to ter- made known to them. In line with Stalin’s ritory that was ethnically Polish, at the same assumptions, these people were to be grant- time strengthening the USSR’s international ed full authority in Poland, and that meant position steadily, it became an ever-more a necessity for agreements to be reached topical matter to set up the new authori- and consultations run. All was obviously ties, and to define more precisely what the subordinated in full to the authorities in the stance as regards the western border was Kremlin, but the people in question neverthe- going to be. In line with Stalin’s plan, interim less had a standpoint regarding what was authorities would come into being, not only feasible vis-à-vis the borders, and they were by deploying the membership of such Mos- also fully aware of wider hopes nurtured cow-based organisations as Związek Patrio- in Polish society. What is more, they fully tów Polskich (the Union of Polish Patriots), but anticipated – and had no illusions – that their also – for the sake of appearances at least return to Poland, and their taking up of the – by co-opting delegates who had remained reins of power, would see them regarded in the Occupied Poland. Following the arrival (and reviled) at home as pawns of a foreign of representatives in the so-called Krajowa power pursuing its policy. In fact, the group- Rada Narodowa (State National Council), ings of Polish communists, whether active there was – between 22 and 27 July 1944 in Poland or organising under the care of the – a session of official talks at the Kremlin. Soviet Services in Moscow, did not start The delegation of the so-called Polski Komitet off with any principled or decisive stance Wyzwolenia Narodowego (Polish Committee as regards the independence or post-War of National Liberation) was presided over borders of their country, rather being from by Edward Osóbka-Morawski (1909-1997), the outset subordinate to Soviet diktats, and while the Soviet side was led by Stalin himself. hence accepting of an eastern border follow- Making only small amendments, the Polish ing the Curzon Line. A communist stance delegates accepted the course of the Curzon swallowing the Soviet decision regarding the Line as Poland’s eastern border. The division eastern border without a word of objection of East Prussia into Soviet and Polish parts was needless to say very unpopular in Poland was also agreed upon. The east-west border and made propaganda activity more difficult. was to extend from the meeting point of the However, the struggle for the Western border borders of Poland and the Lithuanian SSR,

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taking a straight line to the north of Gołdap Germans know as the Nysa Kłodzka/Glatzer and Braniewo, and continuing until it reached Neisse and the Nysa Łużycka/Lausitzer Neis- Gdańsk Bay. se was thus to remain part of Germany. In the course of the meeting, Stalin with Overall, it can be presumed that the west- his own hand drew in the western border for ern border as drawn in by Stalin was first and Poland on a base map9, the result then being foremost supposed to offer a general orien- presented to the Polish delegates. In the west, tation. For at that point the leader was not post-War Poland would be extending as far fully cognisant with the views of the Western as the Oder, and it would be along that river Powers, and did not know how far west the that the course of the border would proceed. Red Army would be able to penetrate. At this The only distinct correction was one Stalin time, then, his principal assumption was that made – to the benefit of Poland – along the the western border of Poland would indeed upper course of the Oder. He assigned the reach as far as the River Oder. greater part of the Opole region to Poland and initially ran the border from the Neisse Between the Tehran and Yalta to Brzeg/Brieg. He then blurred this and shift- Conferences ed it between 10 and 20 km further to the west. Moreover, he incorporated into Czecho- The intended shift of Poland to the west was slovakia the Kłodzko/Glatz Basin and a small not a matter that Stalin concealed from his area near Raciborz/Ratibor and Głubczyce/ Western allies. Furthermore, the line of the Leobschutz. The Polish-German border was Oder essentially won the full official accept- to run along the Oder as far as the Szczecin ance of the British party. This is made clear Lagoon. In the lower part of the Oder two in correspondence dated 2 November 1944 parallel lines were to be seen, and it may between Under Secretary-of-State at the For- be supposed that Stalin intended this to indi- eign Office Alexander Codogan and Polish cate that Szczecin – to the west of the Oder Minister of Foreign Affairs Tadeusz Romer. – would also be included into Poland. Similarly In response to an inquiry concerning border ambiguous is the drawing of an indistinct line guarantees where Poland was concerned, close to Wrocław, but on the right bank of the he responded, ”(…) you enquired whether Oder. This allows us to wonder if Stalin at that His Majesty’s Government were definitely point had a fully-formed opinion as to whom in favour of advancing the Polish frontier up Wrocław – situated on both sides of the Oder to the line of the Oder, to include the port – was to belong to. of Stettin. The answer is that His Majesty’s Nevertheless, Stalin’s border proposal was Government do consider that Poland should overall a favourable one for Poland, since have the right to extend her territory to this it gave the country very broad access to the extent” (Rhode & Wagner 1956: 115). sea, as well as the whole of Western Pomera- Nonetheless, in the period between the nia, presumably also with Szczecin, as well Tehran and Yalta Conferences, the Polish as the Lubusz Region otherwise known as East Government-in-Exile engaged in a determined Brandenburg. However, finding itself beyond defence of non-modification of the territorial the border of Poland was the whole of left- configuration of Poland’s eastern border. This bank Lower Silesia. Thus a border following was a hopeless task, doomed to failure from the line of the Lusatian Neisse was not being the outset. Churchill was quite open about taken into consideration by Stalin at this time, the fact that he shared Stalin’s point of view. and the whole area between what Poles and Roosevelt’s stance was the same, though he in fact sought to mislead representatives 9 Polish historian Bogdan Musiał did manage of the Polish authorities in the course of talks to find the map in question – hitherto unknown to re- searchers – at the Russian State Archives in Moscow he had with them, giving them false hope that (Musiał 2008). Polish wishes might nevertheless be granted,

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Figure 4. A plan for the division of Germany, published in the Time Magazine of 21 February 1944 Source: Kokot 1957: 96.

while at the same time disavowing this when of disparate and inconsistent views on the speaking to the British and Soviets. The Pol- course of the western border that stood ish Government’s persistent struggle over the in contrast to the emotionally-motivated and eastern border had no influence on the fait unequivocal stance where the eastern limits accompli decision that the Curzon Line would of the country had been concerned. The Polish be followed, though it did have repercussions Government did not approve of the idea that where the scale of the recompense that would extra recompense in the east might be made be offered in the west was concerned. In order available. This was not merely because it was to undermine Polish resistance, both the West- linked irrevocably with the loss of land to the ern Allies and Stalin in person were ever-more east of the Cuzon Line, but also because there ready to reward Poland at the expense of Ger- were fears as regards a large German minor- many. Information on this reached both the ity that would severely limit the cohesion public and the Western mass media. While of any new Poland. particulars remained unknown, journalists The scale of territorial gains in the west were beginning to speculate in this matter. became an extremely controversial matter Taken as a good example here is the map that divided opinion-formers both in Poland published in Time on 2 February 1944, which and in emigration abroad. Poland’s obtain- makes clear that the ‘compensation’ for ment of the whole of East Prussia, of Gdańsk/ Poland might entail territory extending as far Danzig and of the Opole region did not evoke as the Oder-Neisse Line (Fig. 4)10. reservations, with the result that the stance With the exception of a few commu- was unified in this matter. There was also nists, Poland’s political elite had a range an inclination to accept the granting of the whole of Pomerania, or even the whole coast 10 This was one of the many proposals to make up to the Szczecin Lagoon (though excluding an appearance in the wartime United States. Some – Szczecin itself). On the other hand, the idea like those of Kaufmann (1941), Welles (1949) or Mor- genthau (1945) provided for the total elimination of the of a border along the Oder-Neisse Line, with German state (Kokot 1957: 20-21). the whole of the Oder mouth also included

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in Poland, had both its fervent supporters and were considered obligatory and unambigu- a large number of opponents. ous. The text formulated as regards the future A minimalist stance was taken by Tadeusz Polish-German border was in fact exception- Katelbach as the representative of the Ger- ally opaque and imprecise, offering a great man Section at the Ministry of Information deal of room for manoeuvre when it came and Documentation of the Republic of Poland, to interpretation. A line following the Oder who only wanted East Prussia, Gdańsk and was not in fact mentioned, or any other more Opole-Silesia. At the same time, an ever-wider precise delineation of the border for that mat- political circle (not only associated with the ter. In fact the idea of the Oder Line did arise Polish right) began to demand a border fol- in the course of plenary discussions, as well lowing the Oder-Neisse Line. as in the corridors, but no precisely-defined Polish opinions – and most especially those obligations were linked with it. There was an voiced outside the country – had ceased even a proposal from Molotov that the pro- to have any political significance. However, visions relating to Poland’s borders should what remained was the symbolic dimension, be augmented by an insert worded as follows: which served as testimony to the indefatiga- “(...) with a restoring to Poland of its old bor- ble nature of the struggle for the country’s ders in East Prussia and on the Oder”. integrity. It was by then known that the deci- Roosevelt did not consent to this, though sion would be taken by the three Great Pow- there was a conviction among the West- ers, and in essence arbitrarily by Stalin, who ern Allies that Stalin was a clear advocate would agree on it and consult with Churchill of Poland’s shift to the west, and that the and Roosevelt. border would reach the Oder. This could not be kept out of the public domain. The Yalta Conference In the immediate aftermath of the Yalta Conference, Churchill told the House of Com- The next conference participated in by the mons on 27 February 1945 that “(…) the three leaders of the three Great Powers took place Powers have now agreed that Poland shall between 4 and 11 February at Yalta on the receive substantial accessions of territory both Crimean Peninsula. There is no need to dis- in the North and in the West. In the North cuss this here, as it is very widely known (Plokhy she will certainly receive, in the place of a pre- 2010; Kersten 2011). However, it is worth citing carious Corridor, the great city of Danzig, the the verdict as regards Poland’s borders that greater part of East Prussia west and south was arrived at. This read as follows, “The three of Königsberg and a long, wide sea front Heads of Government consider that the east- on the Baltic. In the West she will receive the ern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon important industrial province of Upper Silesia Line with digressions from it in some regions and, in addition, such other territories to the of five to eight kilometres in favour of Poland. East of the Oder as is may be decided at the They recognize that Poland must receive sub- place settlement to detach from Germany stantial accessions in territory in the north and after the views of a broadly based Polish Gov- west. They feel that the opinion of the new Pol- ernment have been ascertained” (Kowalski ish Provisional Government of National Unity & Lippóczy 1971: 75). should be sought in due course on the extent A couple of days later, on 1 March 1945, of these accessions, and that the final delimi- Roosevelt addressed a Joint Sitting of Con- tation of the western frontier of Poland should gress, declaring that “The limits of the west- thereafter await the peace conference”. ern border [i.e. of Poland] will be permanently The decision of the leaders of the Three fixed in the final peace conference. We know Great Powers as regards the eastern and roughly that it will include in the new strong western borders of the post-War Poland dif- Poland quite a large slice of what is now fered markedly in the degree to which they called Germany. And it was agreed also that

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the new Poland will have a large and long as to what was motivating Stalin when he opt- coastline and many a new harbor. Also that ed for a delineation of the western border East Prussia, most of it, will go to Poland”. of Poland along that very same Oder-Neisse Line. After all, Stalin was no friend of Poland Between the Yalta and Potsdam and Poles, to say the least of it. Indeed, his Conferences instincts towards the country were decidedly hostile in this respect as always. While that After Yalta, the future political and territo- hatred of Poles reached its zenith with the rial position became ever-clearer. In line with Katyn Massacre, after 22 June 1941 Stalin what had been adopted, the area of post- also commenced with his aforementioned War Poland was to extend between the hatred of Germany, and Germans likewise. Curzon Line in the east and an approxima- From that time forward, inflicting military tion of the Oder Line in the west. The future defeat on Germany became one of the ob- allegiance of Szczecin and Lower Silesia with jectives of the War designated by Stalin, Wrocław had not yet been determinedly. along with the division of that country once It can be assumed that Stalin was also work- defeated, the destruction of its industry, and ing to achieve a transfer to Poland of areas a westward ‘shove’ for the zone of German on the left bank of the Oder, just as the West- settlement in Europe (...). It is also impossible ern Allies supported the idea that these lands to ignore a further example of the clearly- should remain German. This was in line with expressed will of Stalin, which is to say the the known opinion of Churchill made clear circumstance that Poland’s westward shift to Stalin on 7 February 1945 in the course ensured decades of dependence on the Sovi- of the 4th Plenary Sitting of the Yalta Con- et Union, this being at the time (and likewise ference, “It would be a pity to stuff the Pol- decades later) the sole guarantor of Poland’s ish goose so full of German food that it got western border”. indigestion”. In the view of the above author, the idea It was also Churchill’s intention that the of Poland being shifted to the west was voiced size of the post-War expulsion/resettlement by Stalin for the first time in September 1941, of the German people should be minimised, in a conversation with Georgi Dimitrov. It was and it was in the light of this that Churchill, then put to General Władysław Sikorski as supported by Roosevelt, found the estab- in December 1941, in the course of his stay lishment of a border along the Oder-Neisse in Moscow. As time passed, the idea only Line a rather problematic solution, and one became more precisely defined, but after whose outcome following the anticipated the Potsdam Conference it was a geopolitical surrender of Germany would be very much reality. dependent on political conditions11. The political position of the Soviet Union In turn, the premises that had guided Sta- was being reinforced steadily, partly thanks lin as he supported the concept of Poland’s to the military success of the Red Army, which being shifted as far as possible westwards was rapidly advancing westwards. It was were described very effectively by Musiał these forces that took Berlin and Vienna and (2008: 154-156) – as a Polish historian deal- reached the middle Elbe, along which the ing with Soviet policy towards Poland and Ger- Allies met. At the same time, events of sig- many. He expressed his point of view on this nificance were taking place in eastern Ger- with words (of course in Polish) to the follow- many. Fearful or the approaching Red Army, ing effect, “A fundamental question arises millions of Germans began to flee westwards in disorder. It is estimated that the final phase of the War coincided with the depar- 11 Much information on Churchill’s position as re- gards Poland’s borders is to be found in his multi-vol- ture of some 5-6 million Germans from areas ume memoirs (Churchill 1950, 1954ab). located to the east of the Oder-Neisse Line.

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Operatives of the Polish field administration and IV – Warmia (Ermland) and Mazury began to move in at the same time, enjoying (Masuria). Then established on 11 April 1945 consent to do this from the Soviet military to ensure efficient governance was a post authorities. While there were frequent Polish- of General Plenipotentiary for the Regained -Soviet conflicts, the authorities of the latter Lands, and subsequently a State Repatriation went beyond mere toleration, regarding these Office whose remit was to coordinate actions people as the body shaping Polish adminis- leading to the settlement by a Polish popula- tration that enjoyed full legal entitlements. tion of lands incorporated into Poland (Gluck A start was also made – rather spontaneously 1971: 94-95). – to the resettlement/eviction of elements Also involved in the undertaking was the of the German population that had not left Polish People’s Army, and – by virtue of an of their own accord, as well as the bringing order from its Supreme Commander dated in of Poles in line with the plans. Units of the 3 June 1945 – work began on the organisa- Polish People’s Army also began to man the tion of military settlement in the 15 poviats Oder-Neisse Line as border, notwithstand- adjacent to the Oder and Neisse). 140 opera- ing the lack of any international consent for tional groups were in turn delegated for this this. This type of intentional action designed purpose, while a further task for the army to indicate that things were already done was to see to the expulsion of the remaining deals had as its overriding aim the de-Ger- German populations to areas beyond the manisation of lands along the Oder, and their Oder-Neisse Line (Gluck 1971: 93). repopulation with people who were ethnically The action referred to was always anticipa- Polish. It was anticipated that this would exert tory in nature, since there was no legal sanc- an influence on the decision taken by the tioning for it from the international communi- Three Powers, making it more likely that a ver- ty. It was known that Poland would be gaining dict favourable to Poland would be arrived territory in the west, but exactly how much at. This was in fact to be the crowning argu- remained uncertain at the time. The upcom- ment in favour of a handover of these lands ing Peace Conference for the three victorious to Poland. powers was the only one enjoying the right First preparatory work was engaged to arrive at a final decision in this matter. The in as early as in 1944 in Lublin. The afore- Soviet authorities allowed the Polish adminis- mentioned Office for the Western Lands tration to take up a wide variety of undertak- was established, along with the first opera- ings, but in doing so they were acting in their tional groups that were to follow on behind own interest. However, they were then merely as the Front advanced. Once the Red Army’s proponents of lands along the Oder (includ- January Offensive had begun, the Council ing Szczecin and Wrocław being incorporated of Ministers of the Provisional Government into Poland (Heitmann 2002; Debra 2003; on 2 March 1945 called into being a Com- Thun 2011). mission whose task it would be to deter- mine the organisational principles under- The Potsdam Conference pinning the administration of the western and northern lands. The concept developed In the wake of the tripartite agreement was for the establishment of district and reached between the authorities of the Soviet county-level Government Plenipotentiaries Union, the United States and the United King- enjoying a wide range of powers. A resolu- dom, a decision was taken to hold a third tion adopted would see the Regained Lands meeting of the leaders of the Three Pow- divided into the four districts of: I – Śląsk ers, i.e. Stalin, Churchill and – following the Opolski (Upper Silesia as then identified with death of Roosevelt – new US President, Harry Opole-Silesia), II – Dolny Śląsk (Lower Silesia), S. Truman. The victors were to determine the III – Pomorze Zachodnie (Western Pomerania) fate of Germany, as well as establishing

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the post-War European order where the the Polish-German border to be set along the continent’s new borders were concerned12. Oder-Neisse Line, with the city of Szczecin It was determined that the venue for the also being assigned to Poland. On the follow- meeting would be Potsdam, just outside Ber- ing day, Truman extended an invitation to the lin. It was also known that the western bor- Polish delegation for 24 July 1945, in his own ders of Poland would be determined at this name and that of both Churchill and Stalin. point, and there was likewise an awareness Making up the Polish delegation, along- that Stalin was positively disposed towards side official representatives in the shape the process, and that it would be mainly of Bolesław Bierut, Edward Osóbka-Morawski, for him that relevant documentation and Stanisław Mikołajczyk, Władysław Gomółka, arguments would need to be made ready, ­Stanisław Grabski and Wincenty Rzymowski, since he would be the one presenting these was a group of experts comprising Andrzej on to Churchill and Truman. The editing was Bolewski, Walery Goetel and Stanisław Lesz- to be such as to ensure ready understanding, czycki. These experts were extremely well- as well as an appropriate level of synthesis, -prepared for the role that had been assigned all with a view to the Western Allies being to them, and they had left over – from the readily convinced. It was further known that time of the Occupation – a ready-made Churchill’s attitude would be less than fully substantive justification for a western Polish supportive of Polish postulates. Thus teams border following the Oder-Neisse Line. There of Polish academics, principally in Poznań were several annexes offering a synthesis and Krakow (since the Warsaw centre had of the arguments in favour of this decision. been annihilated during the Uprising) worked These considered the political and moral to prepare relevant substantive arguments arguments, territorial and demographic in line with history, geography, demogra- matters, historical truths regarding Poland, phy, statistics and the economy. Noteworthy geographical location and geopolitical and among a number of proposals for the bor- economic linkages between the Western ders was an in-depth one advocating a shift Lands with Poland. The work ended with the to the western banks of the Lusatian Neisse following appeal to the effect that strategic and the Oder, in line with justifications issues needed to be brought into sharp relief, of both a strategic and an economic nature. “The border along the Odra and Nysa [‘Nisa’ This concept was prepared by a team com- in the original] and the destruction of East prising Maria Kiełczewska, Leopold Gluck Prussia as a cradle of German Junkerism and Zdzisław Kaczmarczyk (1946). All the will eliminate a place d’armes convenient for studies were then submitted to the commu- the Germans, making it impossible for them nist authorities of Poland, and in this sphere to enjoy the most favourable and suitable con- at least there was found to be a common set ditions should they mount an attack on the of national interests. Thus the government’s Polish lands. The liquidation of East Prussia territorial programme even won the support and the marked reduction in the length of the of academics with anti-communist views. 1912 border (to about 350 km) will allow for As the Potsdam Conference deliberations more effective defence of the frontier. A bor- began (on 17 July 1945), Bierut and Osóbka- der formed by the Odra and Nysa is the natu- -Morawski – as respectively the President and ral one most conducive to effective defence. Prime Minister of the so-called Provisional It will remove the wedge of territory existing Government of National Unity – made an in 1939 between Poland and Czechoslovakia, appeal to Stalin, Churchill and Truman for and will represent for the Soviet Union and all of the Slav lands, as much as for Poland, 12 Like that concerning the Tehran and Yalta Con- the best barrier to ever-possible aggres- ferences, the documentation arising out of the Potsdam Conference is very extensive (RIIA 1946; USDS 1955; sion on the part of Germany” (Rysiak 1970; Butler et al. 1984; BDGG 1985). Bolewski 1977).

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A key substantive argument was the way between the Sudety and Carpathian Moun- it had been demonstrated that the pre-War tains and the Baltic, as well as between Polish border with Germany – established the Odra and the Western Nysa, and the at Versailles – was irrational, and was one Bug and Niemen. The international politi- of the causes of yet another World War. It had cal situation in Europe requires that an end been thanks to the configuration of the bor- should at last be put to the German wedge der that the Germans had been provoked into between Poland and Czechoslovakia, which hostile activity against Poland. These truths proved a threat to peace. Poland must have were set out in a couple of points justifying a border that hinders German aggression, the ‘artificial’ status of the provisions from and that would be the line formed by the Versailles, which it was considered should Odra and the Western Nysa, which short- not be repeated, from the point of view of the ens the Polish-German border. (...) ­Moral security of Europe as a whole, and not merely considerations also speak for the incorpora- Poland. These entailed: tion of areas beyond the Western Nysa and • the assigning to Poland of excessively lim- Odra into Poland. Through the whole War ited access to a sea continually threatened Poland was unwaveringly on the side of the by German aggression, Allies, acting in line with its strength and • the establishment by the mouth of the capabilities in the interests of the joint vic- Vistula of a Free City of Danzig, whose tory. Poland has borne the heaviest losses artificial structure resulted in an artificial in both people and cultural and material cutting-off of the Vistula basin from the goods. In the name of overall human justice, Baltic Sea, Poland is deserving of redress” (Bolewski • the use of East Prussia as a political barrier 1977: 203-205). barricading off Poland from the Baltic Sea, The statement also offered a discussion • the separation of Poland and Germany of demographic issues, and most especially by a border of excessive (1912 km) length, the need to make room for 4.2 million repat- that was hard to defend, riated incomers from the east and 2 million • depriving Poland of its lands along the re-emigrants from the west (Eberhardt 2011). Oder that formed – together with the area It was also noted that, notwithstanding pro- of the Vistula basin – a single geographi- cesses of Germanisation, the lands in eastern cal whole aligned towards the Baltic Sea, Germany retained an autochthonous Polish • depriving Poland of a great part of the population of some 2 million people. natural resources of Silesia, and of Baltic A further document setting out the Polish ports, as well as disrupting the economic case was a letter from Stanisław Grabski sent integrity of the western Polish lands (Sile- to the Soviet, British and American Delega- sia, Greater Poland and Pomerania) to the tions. This drew attention to the fact that, extent that resources that would have even following the establishment of a border allowed for the development of industry along the Oder-Neisse Line: “Poland emerges were lacking. from this War with a much reduced popula- According to the Polish delegation, avoid- tion size, since it cedes 180,000 km2 to the ance of the mistakes that had been made Soviet Union, along with the entire Ukrainian in 1918 and that had resulted in the Second and Belarusian population inhabiting it up World War would require a Polish-German to 1939. Should it gain in exchange East border established along the Oder-Neisse Prussia, to the south and west of Konigsberg, Line, as well as the liquidation of East Prussia, as well as a western border along the Odra, as a bastion of German imperialism. It was with Szczecin, plus the Western Nysa, then apparently the uniform opinion of the Polish Poland will lose around 80,000 km2 of its ter- nation that: “The new Poland should consti- ritory hitherto, with around 7 million of its tute a geopolitically homogeneous territory people”.

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At the end of his letter, Grabski stressed Polish delegation began on July 25 to con- that it would not be just if Poland lost more sider a number of variant options. There was than Germany as a result of the War, noting the least favourable of these, which Churchill that: “If the ally of Poland, in accordance with had insisted on – i.e. the border at the Nysa the Crimea Resolution, repositions its eastern Kłodzka/Glatzer Neisse, then further indirect border to the line along which it ran at the variants involving the border along the River end of the 14th century, it would probably Bóbr/Bober and Kwisa/Queis, or else along not be unjust to push back the eastern border the divides between them. It was consid- of the enemy-state, which is at the same time ered that Churchill would ultimately agree the western border of Poland, to a line that to a border at the Kwisa, with there then was likewise the border in that same 14th cen- being a possibility of a small shift west to the tury. And that line was formed by the Oder divide between the Kwisa and the Lusatian with Szczecin and with the Lustian Neisse” Neisse. ­Polish experts calculated that the (Bolewski 1977: 190-192). variant with the border at the Nysa Kłodzka Immediately after its arrival in Potsdam, would see the country’s acquisitions reduced the Polish Delegation engaged in several ses- by 18,780 km2, as compared with 3908 km2 sions of talks of a fundamental nature with were the border to be along the Kwisa. Stalin, Churchill, Truman and their co-workers. It should be stated here that, in the course The role of Head of Government Delega- of this argument, the Soviet delegation – up tion was taken by Bierut, who referred back to and including Stalin himself – was entirely to Stalin and Molotov at regular intervals, on the side of Poland and did what they could presenting Poland’s arguments to them. Both to prevail upon Churchill, and especially Tru- were then able to make use of them in subse- man, who regarded the whole issue with quent discussions with Truman and Churchill a degree of indifference (Kowalski & Lippóczy (Musiał 2008: 128-158). A very important day 1971: 191). was 24 July 1945, when the Polish delegation Directly before the final decision on the presented its postulates at the seventh sitting border was taken, Churchill left the delibera- of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Three tions in Poznań in order to return to London Great Powers. On the same day, the Polish so that he might be present as the results delegates were hosted by Churchill and Tru- of the British General Election were made man, while next day, Bierut sought to convince known. To the surprise of world opinion, and Churchill to express consent for the Oder- perhaps also to his own, Churchill’s Con- -Neisse line to be used. This did not yield very servatives did not prevail and he ceased positive effects, since Churchill was clearly opt- to be Prime Minister. This of course meant ing for the Nysa Kłodzka. Hence at the outset that he did not return to Potsdam, with his Churchill was confusing what are known in Pol- place being taken by head of the Labour Party ish as the two Nysa rivers. Later on he came Clement Attlee. Needless to say, Attlee was to appreciate the mistake he had made and almost entirely unprepared for the role that made an official declaration to the effect that had unexpectedly come his way. He was not he had not given consent for the use of the aware of the issues that had dominated previ- Lusatian Neisse (or Western Neisse). The line ous discussions and could not therefore pull of the Oder itself did not evoke any reserva- his full weight in negotiations involving Stalin tions among either the British or the Ameri- and Molotov. Thus, despite the emergence can delegations. All that was required there- of minor controversies, both the American fore was a more precise defining of where and British Delegations offered their consent Szczecin/Stettin and Świnoujście/Swinemünde to the Neisse Line (i.e. that following the Lusa- would be vis-à-vis the Polish-German border. tian Neisse). Appreciating the breakthrough nature It is hard to imagine if the situation would of the situation following Churchill’s veto, the have looked different had Churchill won the

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election and returned to Potsdam. In his with the understanding reached at this Con- memoirs, however, he did write that he would ference and including the area of the former not have consented to the Oder-Neisse Line free city of Danzig, shall be under the admin- (Cieślak et al. 1965: 535-536). istration of the Polish State and for such pur- Lesser controversies were raised by mat- poses should not be considered as part of the ters of the future affiliation of the city of Szcze- Soviet Zone of Occupation in Germany” (RIIA cin, which is on the west bank of the Oder 1946: 203). (Heitmann 2002). There was a need for Every sentence, and even every word, agreement to be reached on the line of the of this vitally important wording that decided border and to which country the Szczecin on the course of the Polish-German border Lagoon was going to be assigned, as well was studied and commented upon in various as the water route linking Szczecin with the ways by Polish and German lawyers, as well sea. The issue was considered by the last sit- as those in the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ world. There ting of the Big Three on 1 August 1945. The is an extensive subject literature on this, which version prepared for acceptance including the is now of nothing more than historical signifi- wording: “(...) the line of the border shall run cance (Goguel & Pohl 1956; Rhode & Wagner to the Baltic Sea through Świnoujście”. 1959; Klafkowski 1970; Skubiszewski 1975; Molotov proposed exchanging the word Domke & Domke 2008). The irrevocable “through” with “to the west of”, while Stalin nature of what was agreed at Potsdam was went further and advocated the wording next attested to by the transfer of the Ger- “directly to the west of”. Both Prime Minister man population out of the newly-Polish areas. Attlee and President Truman gave their con- Chapter 13 of the Potsdam Agreement con- sent to this amendment. tained the following provisions: “The Three A further question addressed concerned Governments, having considered the question the delimitation of the Polish and Soviet parts in all its aspects, recognize that the transfer of the old East Prussia. The Soviet version was to Germany of German populations, or ele- adopted, whereby the border would be run ments thereof, remaining in Poland, Czecho- to the north of Braniewo/Braumsberg and slovakia and Hungary, will have to be under- Gołdap/Goldap, by both the Polish and Soviet taken. They agree that any transfers that take parties. place should be effected in an orderly and The final communique winding up the Pots- humane manner”. dam Conference was drawn up on 2 August To ensure the implementation of this deci- 1945 and ended with complete success sion at a later date, since it was only on for Poland. The Polish-German border was 20 November 1945 that it was adopted established along the Oder-Neisse Line, by the Allied Control Council, a programme though Poland would also be granted the by which expulsions might be achieved in line city of Szczecin, notwithstanding its location with established guidelines was to commence on the left bank of the Oder. The wording was in December 1945 and to end in July 1946. as follows: “The Three Heads of Government In fact, however, they began earlier and per- agree that, pending the final determination sisted for much longer. of Poland’s western frontier, the former Ger- man territories east of a line running from the Issues of delimitation Baltic Sea immediately west of Swinemünde, and thence along the Oder River to the conflu- The delineation of the Polish-German border ence of the Western Neisse River and along along the Neisse and Oder did not present the Western Neisse to the Czechoslovak fron- too many difficulties. The right bank was tier, including that portion of East Prussia not to belong to Poland, the left to the then Soviet placed under the administration of the Union Zone of Occupation within Germany. The bor- of Soviet Socialist Republics in accordance der was supposed to follow the middle of the

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river channel, so this did not pose a problem. Subsequent minor modifications only Things were different with the identifica- involved short sections of border. Once tion of the border passing west of Szczecin the border had been confirmed in 1945, – from the Oder via the Szczecin Lagoon Świnoujście lost its access to drinking water or Gulf of Stettin, up as far as the shoreline – a circumstance that required exchanges of the Baltic Sea. A Polish-Soviet Commission of borderland areas by the two sides. A prob- was founded to set the course of the border lem proving harder to resolve concerned the in the field. On the Polish side, the first Pol- delimitation of territorial waters of Poland ish President of Szczecin, Piotr Zaremba, was on the one hand and the GDR on the other among those who participated, and he made – all the more so since the navigable route persistent efforts to ensure that the line fol- passed via a shelf belonging to East Germany. lowed by the border would be more suitable The controversy surrounding this issue in fact for Poland (Fig. 5). persisted for several decades. But these were

Figure 5. Concepts for change in the course of Poland’s western border in the vicinity of Szczecin in 1945 Source: Zaremba 1986: 230.

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in fact secondary matters of local significance Germany had to wait fifty years following compared to what was agreed at the Potsdam the end of the War (and indeed for two years Conference, to establish a new border along after the Berlin Wall came down). A this point the Oder-Neisse Line. This imposed verdict was there came the long-awaited and definitive in fact very hard to accept for German society. recognition by Germany (during the sitting Provinces like Silesia, Pomerania or East Prus- of the Bundestag of 16 December 1991) sia were not deemed somehow marginal, but that the Polish-German border ran along the were in fact viewed by Germans as core Ger- Oder-Neisse Line. The German Parliament man areas, whose loss would prove hard to get would go on to confer force of law upon its over. Indeed, for many years, the post-War decision a month later, on 16 January 1992. borders were regarded by most Germans as of a temporary nature, and so punitive Summary that eventually they would need to be modi- fied (Sułek 1969; Dobrzycki 1975; Marczak The establishing of Poland’s western border 1995). A return to the pre-War situation was along the Oder-Neisse Line was a milestone thought about and hoped for, or at least some event in the thousand-year history of the Pol- kind of compromise solutions that would allow ish state and nation, since it was associated some of the lost lands to go back to Germany. with the incorporation into Poland of Lower However, as time passed, it became more and and Upper Silesia, East Brandenburg, West- more obvious that such ideas were illusions. ern Pomerania, the city of Gdańsk and the Indeed, amongst the elite of Germany there southern part of East Prussia. This was there- was an ever more fixed and widespread con- fore a return to the lands that were the cra- viction regarding the irrevocable loss of what dle of the Polish nation just as statehood had once been Germany’s eastern provinces. was beginning to develop. Notwithstanding The first formal legal interstate act confirm- the major net loss of territory this entailed, ing the existing course of the border along the the overall balance between what had been Oder and Neisse was the Zgorzelec Agree- lost and what gained was a favourable one ment of 6 July 1950 concluded between the for Poland, since the provinces added to the People’s Republic of Poland and the German country were well-managed, furnished with Democratic Republic. However, further steps a technical infrastructure that was both rich towards international recognition encountered and dense, and characterised by the pres- numerous difficulties in the Federal Republic ence of both a werll-developed network of Germany, on account of this country’s deter- of towns and cities and relatively up-to-date mination to maintain the constitutional posi- agriculture. tion regarding the existence of Germany within After the War, neither the Polish nation nor its pre-War borders. In contrast, these were all its patriotic elite were fully aware of the revolu- matters of little import for the Western states, tionary and overwhelmingly positive transfor- given the magnitude of the Cold War, and mation of the border situation that had taken the way in which that absolutely disfavoured place thanks to what was decided at Potsdam. any kind of treatymaking. Indeed, even the The then political situation was seen in terms Peace Conference that had been foreseen for of limitations on sovereignty, satellite status, the near future at Potsdam never actually saw the loss of the Eastern Lands and the devasta- the light of day. tion of Warsaw. These were all indisputable The real geopolitical border at this point facts, but they had little to say about the more was anyway the one at the Elbe, which distant future. Indeed, both geopolitical/terri- divided two German states now belonging torial and economic and social matters were to opposing political, military and economic very much overlooked. No note was taken camps. Ultimately, the ratification of a border of the fact that Poland within its 1939 borders agreement between Poland and the reunified was and would forever have been condemned

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to instability and short-termism in outlook. civilisational and spiritual progress, and Longer-term chances of persistence were regarded the associated events as amongst always going to be in doubt where Upper Sile- the most important in the whole history of the sia was divided, East Prussia and the Free City Polish nation, opening up a new millennium of Danzig remained in existence and the ques- in Poland’s history (Romer 1945). tion of Ukraine remained unresolved. The Potsdam decision sanctioning and in- It is not correct to extend equivalent treat- deed requiring the resettlement of the Ger- ment to the consequences of Yalta and Pots- man population had major consequences dam. The verdict from both was an acceptance for demography and ethnicity alike. Once of the fact that Poland would come within the the Germans had moved out, the formerly Soviet orbit, but there was quite different con- German areas received an influx of people sideration given to the territorial issues. Yalta of Polish nationality but disparate territorial brought an irrevocable decision that Poland’s origin. While only 70% of the people in pre- Eastern Lands would be lost to the USSR, War Poland had actually been Poles (with but the provisions as regards compensation Ukrainian or Belarusian nationality prevail- in the west were only couched in the most ing over extensive areas in the east), the general terms, with nothing binding agreed border changes and effective westward shift upon. The Oder was indeed indicated, but of the new Poland combined with resettle- in a general way (and prior to World War II ment en masse to generate a state that was the Polish border had also reached the Oder uniform in terms of nationality and religious near Raciborz (Ratibor). The most realistic sce- affiliation, and thus unthreatened by any ten- nario was one in which Poland would regain dencies towards disintegration or centrifugal the southern part of East Prussia, the Free change (­Eberhardt 2003). City of Danzig and part of the Opole region. If one leaves aside their unbending and In total this would be an area reaching around at times inhumane face, the Potsdam deci- 30,000 km2. In contrast, the provisions aris- sions regarding the expulsion of Germans ing out of the Potsdam Conference would did bring about increased homogene- assign more than 100,000 km2 to Poland, ity as regards nationality (Eberhardt 2011). with the package including such great cities An effective stop was also put to any possible as Wrocław, and Szczecin plus Świnoujście. inclinations towards revisionism or revenge. Thanks to the setting of the border at the The borderland in fact became safe and not Lusatian Neisse and not the Nysa Kłodzka prone to either ethnic conflict or nationalistic (Eastern Neisse), Poland also gained Legnica/ propaganda. Liegnitz, Wałbrzych/Waldenburg, The Kłodz- The establishment of the border along ko/Glatz and Jelenia Góra/Hirschberg Basins, the Oder-Neisse line actually had serious and Zielona Góra/Grünberg plus Żary/Sorau geopolitical consequences for Central and and Żagań/Sagan. Eastern Europe as a whole. Poland’s re- What had thus appeared on the map gaining of a Baltic shore running between of Europe was a Polish state with entirely Krynica Morska/Neukrug and Świnoujście/ changed political boundaries. This was Swinemünde changed the country’s position documented in a 1946 map by Maria Kieł- vis-à-vis Germany, at a stroke reconfigur- czewska memorably entitled Polska wczoraj ing the geostrategic system of the southern i dziś (Poland yesterday and today) (Fig. 6) Baltic basin. Up until the outbreak of World (Kiełczewska­‍Zaleska 1946). War I, the whole southern shore of the Baltic Leading Polish geographer Eugeniusz Romer as far as Klaipėda/Memel had been German. used the circumstances of a 1945 study to point Post-1919 Poland gained limited access to the out the weighty if positive consequences sea, but was still very much cut off from it, of Poland’s shift from ‘the East’ to ‘the West’. with the Pomeranian ‘Corridor’ itself repre- He felt that Poland would thus be afforded senting a source of Polish-German conflict.

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There was a similar change of configuration north. This was also annihilated. In all these in the foothills region of the Sudety Moun- ways Poland had achieved a kind of suc- tains. German Lower Silesia with the Opole cess. However, while the border was shifted region and the western part of Upper Silesia 100 km to the north, there remained Kalin- separated Poland from the Czech Lands. But ingrad District, belonging to the Soviet (and this further territorial wedge extending far Russian) Empires and representing a poten- to the east and inhabited by Germans was tial geopolitical threat. polonised and hence removed entirely. And The facts presented here attest to the major not far from Warsaw there had been East consequences of the Potsdam Conference, Prussia, limiting the Polish lands from the which led to the emergence of a compact

Figure 6. “Poland yesterday and today” Source: Kiełczewska-Zaleska 1946.

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Polish state in the basins of the Vistula and Editors‘ note: Odra, occupying a large part of the Central Unless otherwise stated, the sources of tables and European Lowland between the Carpathians fugures are the authors‘ on the basis of their own and the Baltic Sea. research.

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