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Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019

Template Case # – Region Name (Target ; Year): ...... 6 1 – Hawai’i (Target: USA; Year: 1994) ...... 6 10 – Lokatah (Target: USA; Year: 2007) ...... 7 11 – Quebec (Target: ; Year: 1962) ...... 8 13 – Nevis (Target: St. Kitts and Nevis; Year: 1996)...... 12 105 – Northern (Target: ; Year: 1968) ...... 13 106 – (Target: United Kingdom; Year: 1992) ...... 16 152 – Basques (Target: ; Year: 1975) ...... 19 153 – (Target: France; Year: 1970) ...... 22 154 – Corsica (Target: France; Year: 1978) ...... 24 155 – Savoy (Target: France; Year: 1997) ...... 26 174 – Basques II (Target: ; Year: 1968) ...... 27 175 – Basques III (Target: Spain; Year: 2000) ...... 29 178 – Catalans III (Target: Spain; Year: 1974) ...... 31 201 – Giulians (Target: Italy; Year: 1947) ...... 35 204 – Padania (Target: Italy; Year: 1996) ...... 36 205 – Sardinia I (Target: Italy; Year: 1965) ...... 37 206 – South Tyrol (Target: Italy; Year: 1965) ...... 41 207 – Serbs (Target: Croatia; Year: 1992) ...... 43 208 – Montenegro (Target: Yugoslavia; Year: 2006) ...... 45 209 – Macedonia (Target: Yugoslavia; Year: 1991)...... 47 210 – Croatia (Target: Yugoslavia; Year: 1991) ...... 49 211 – Bosnia (Target: Yugoslavia; Year: 1992) ...... 50 212 – Kosovo (Target: Yugoslavia; Year: 2008) ...... 51 213 –Slovenia (Target: Yugoslavia; Year: 1990) ...... 52 214 – Serbs (Target: Bosnia; Year: 1992) ...... 54 215 – Croats (Target: Bosnia; Year: 1992) ...... 55 217 – North (Target: Cyprus; Year: 1983) ...... 58 218 – (Target: ; Year: 1991) ...... 59 219 – Gagauz (Target: Moldova; Year: 1991) ...... 60 221 – Moldova (Target: USSR; Year: 1991) ...... 62 223 – Estonians II (Target: USSR; Year: 1991) ...... 64

1 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019

225 – Latvians II (Target: USSR; Year: 1991) ...... 66 228 – Lithuanians III (Target: USSR; Year: 1991) ...... 68 230 – Ukrainians II (Target: USSR; Year: 1991) ...... 70 231 – Belarus (Target: USSR; Year: 1991) ...... 72 232 – Armenia (Target: USSR; Year: 1991) ...... 73 233 – Georgia (Target: USSR; Year: 1991) ...... 74 234 – Azeris (Target: USSR; Year: 1991) ...... 76 236 – Turkomen (Target: USSR; Year: 1991) ...... 78 237 – (Target: USSR; Year: 1991) ...... 78 238 – Khyrgiz (Target: USSR; Year: 1991)...... 79 239 – (Target: USSR; Year: 1991) ...... 80 240 – Kazakhs (Target: USSR; Year: 1991) ...... 81 243 – Dagestan (Target: ; Year: 1999) ...... 81 248 – South (Target: USSR; Year: 1990) ...... 83 251 – Ajars (Target: USSR; Year: 1988) ...... 85 256 – Chechnya I (Target: Russia; Year: 1991) ...... 85 257 – Chechnya II (Target: Russia; Year: 1999) ...... 87 270 – Tatars (Target: Russia; Year: 1992) ...... 88 273 – (Target: Ukraine; Year: 1992) ...... 90 274 – (Target: Georgia; Year: 1994) ...... 91 275 – (Target: Georgia; Year: 1992) ...... 92 276 – Nagorno Karabakh (Target: ; Year: 1991)...... 94 277 – Talysh (Target: Azerbaijan; Year: 1993) ...... 95 279 – Faroe Islands (Target: Denmark; Year: 1946) ...... 97 281 – Casamance (Target: Senegal; Year: 1982) ...... 98 282 – Anyi (Target: Ivory Coast; Year: 1961) ...... 101 283 – Southern Cameroons (Target: Cameroon; Year: 1999) ...... 102 284 – Edos (Target: Nigeria; Year: 1967) ...... 104 285 – Ibos [Igbo] (Target: Nigeria; Year: 1967) ...... 105 286 – South Katanga (Target: Dem Rep Congo; Year: 1960) ...... 106 287 – South Kasai (Target: Dem Rep Congo; Year: 1960) ...... 109 288 – Stanleyville (Target: Dem Rep Congo; Year: 1960) ...... 111

2 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019

289 – Bankonjo I (Target: ; Year: 1963) ...... 113 290 – Bankonjo II (Target: Uganda; Year: 1986) ...... 114 291 – (Target: ; Year: 1991) ...... 116 292 – Eritrea (Target: Ethiopia; Year: 1993) ...... 120 294 – Tigray II (Target: Ethiopia; Year: 1991) ...... 121 295 – Somali I (Target: Ethiopia; Year: 1963) ...... 123 296 – Somali II (Target: Ethiopia; Year: 1994) ...... 125 297 – Cabinda (Target: Angola; Year: 1975) ...... 128 299 – Inkatha [KwaZulu] (Target: South Africa; Year: 1994) ...... 130 300 – Basters [Rehoboth] (Target: Namibia; Year: 1990) ...... 131 301 – Lozi [Caprivi Strip] (Target: Namibia; Year: 1998) ...... 133 302 – Anjouan I (Target: Comoros; Year: 1997) ...... 135 303 – Anjouan 2 (Target: Comoros; Year: 2007) ...... 137 304 – Mohéli (Target: Comoros; Year: 1997) ...... 138 305 – Saharawis (Target: ; Year: 1976) ...... 139 306 – South Sudan I (Target: Sudan; Year: 1956) ...... 140 307 – South Sudan II (Target: Sudan; Year 2011) ...... 141 309 – II (Target: ; Year: 1979) ...... 142 321 – Kurds II (Target: ; Year: 1984) ...... 142 322 – Kurds I (Target: ; Year: 1972) ...... 143 323 – Kurds II (Target: Iraq; Year: 1980) ...... 144 324 – Kurds III (Target: Iraq; Year: 1991) ...... 145 325 – Kurds IV (Target: Iraq; Year: 1995) ...... 146 327 – Palestinians I (Target: ; Year: 1947) ...... 147 328 - Palestinians II (Target: Israel; Year: 1988) ...... 148 330 – South I (Target: Yemen; Year: 1994) ...... 149 331 – South Yemen II (Target: Yemen; Year: 2007) ...... 151 336 – Uighurs III [Xinjiang] (Target: China; Year: 1990) ...... 154 340 – II (Target: China; Year 1950) ...... 157 341 – Tibet III (Target: China; Year: 1956) ...... 158 342 – Tibet IV (Target: China; Year: 1979) ...... 160 344 – Eastern Mongols (Target: China; Year: 1946) ...... 161

3 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019

345 – Hui (Target: China; Year: 1953) ...... 162 351 – Hyderabad (Target: ; Year: 1948) ...... 163 352 – I (Target: India; Year: 1947)...... 166 353 – Kashmir II (Target: India; Year: 1989) ...... 168 354 – Assam (Target: India; Year: 1989) ...... 170 355 – Meitei (Target: India; Year: 1964) ...... 172 356 – Boro/ Bodo (Target: India; Year: 1986) ...... 174 357 – Mizos (Target: India; Year: 1966) ...... 176 358 – Nagas (Target: India; Year: 1948) ...... 178 360 – II (Target: India; Year: 1986) ...... 180 361 – Tripuras (Target: India; Year: 1978) ...... 183 362 – E. (Target: Pakistan; Year: 1971) ...... 185 363 – (Target: Pakistan; Year: 1958) ...... 186 364 – (Target: Pakistan; Year: 1947) ...... 189 365 – Chittagong (Target: Bangladesh; Year: 1975) ...... 192 366 – Arakanese I (Target: Burma; Year: 1948) ...... 195 367 – Arakanese II (Target: Burma; Year: 1980) ...... 197 368 – Kachin I (Target: Burma; Year: 1949) ...... 198 369 – Kachin II (Target: Burma; Year: 1961) ...... 199 370 – Kachin III (Target: Burma; Year: 2011) ...... 201 371 – Karenni (Target: Burma; Year: 1949) ...... 202 372 – Karens (Target: Burma; Year: 1949) ...... 203 373 – Mons (Target: Burma; Year: 1949) ...... 204 374 – Shans (Target: Burma; Year: 1958) ...... 208 375 – Tamils (Target: ; Year: 1981)...... 209 376 – (Target: ; Year: 1963) ...... 213 377 – (Target: Vietnam; Year: 1964) ...... 214 379 – Abu Sayyaf (Target: Philippines; Year: 1991) ...... 215 380 – Mindanao (Target: Philippines; Year: 1972) ...... 216 381 – Irian Jaya (Target: Indonesia; Year: 1975) ...... 218 382 – East Timor (Target: Indonesia; Year: 1999) ...... 220 383 – Atjeh I (Target: Indonesia; Year: 1950) ...... 221

4 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019

384 – Atjeh II (Target: Indonesia; Year: 1988) ...... 223 385 – Ambonese (Target: Indonesia; Year: 1950) ...... 225 386 – Sulawesi (Target: Indonesia; Year: 1958) ...... 226 388 – Bougainville I (Target: Papua New Guinea; Year: 1975) ...... 227 389 – Bougainville (Target: Papua New Guinea; Year: 1990) ...... 230 391 – Maori (Target: New Zealand; Year: 1975) ...... 231 392 – Guadalcanal (Target: Solomon Islands; Year: 1999) ...... 231 403 – Sardinia II (Target: Italy; Year 2002) ...... 235 Works Cited: ...... 237

5 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 Compiled Notes on Secessionist Movements

Template Case # – Region Name (Target ; Year): Variables to code for each: (Confidence variables are for each variable they are next to; the variables capturing variation in extra-institutional strategies [e.g., ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent, ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent, ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent, and ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent] do not have individual confidence measures. Rather, ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence captures overall confidences for these four extra-institutional indicators.)

Instl_Narrow (year, year + 1, and year +2): (Confidence: ) ExtraInstl_Narrow (year, year + 1, and year + 2): (Confidence: ) Instl_Wider (year-2, year-1, year, year+1, and year+2): (Confidence: ) ExtraInstl_Wider (year-2, year-1, year, year+1, and year+2): (Confidence: ) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: . ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: . ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: . ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: . ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence:

1 – Hawai’i (Target: USA; Year: 1994)

Mixed institutional and non-violent extra-institutional

Instl_Narrow (1994-96): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1994-96): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1992-96): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1992-96): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: No ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: 1

• Following on from a formal apology in 1993 by the Congress “to the Hawaiian for the illegal overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii…”1 a century earlier, “activists proclaimed the independence of the Sovereign of Hawai’i at ‘Iolani Place, the former royal palace in Honolulu”2 on 16 January 1994. o This was a non-violent extra-institutional action taken after an institutional action. • Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 122) observe that, “[i]n 1996, in a ballot sponsored by the state government and restricted to persons of Hawaiian descent, 73 percent voted in favour of sovereignty.” o This was institutional action, although one that resembles an extra-institutional action: elements within the state apparatus of Hawai’i organizing an apparently

1 Minahan (2002, p. 724) 2 Minahan (2002, p. 724)

6 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 non-binding vote of some residents (80,000 according to Minahan (2002, p. 724)), possibly to place political pressure on other institutional elements of the system. o Of some interest here is the definition of persons of Hawaiian descent, which is unusually restrictively set. “Whereas much legislation benefiting American Indians is tied to membership of a , all legislation for Native Hawaiians define “Native Hawaiian” be ancestry, as “any descendant of not less than one-half part of the blood of the races inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands previous to 1778…”.3 • Out of scope for the timeline under consideration are the attacks by ‘Hawaii for Hawaiins’ against U.S. military personnel in 1979.4

10 – Lokatah (Target: USA; Year: 2007) Combination of extra-institutional nonviolent contention and institutional strategies.

Instl_Narrow (2007-09): Yes (Confidence: .75) ExtraInstl_Narrow (2007-09): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (2005-09): Yes (Confidence: .75) ExtraInstl_Wider (2005-09): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: No ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: 1

• Summary/write-up: This is a Native American movement in the north central plains region. The Lakota have pushed for greater recognition and autonomy since at least the 1970s and had a conflictual relationship with the US government in the 19th and early 20th centuries. On December 17, 2007, the Lakotah state was declared. A delegation was sent to Washington D.C. to announce a unilateral withdrawal from the US. This is taken to be a declaration of independence. The Lakota don’t consider themselves to be a secessionist movement because their takeover by the US was always illegal. Their leader was the activist / actor Russell Means, who died in 2012. The current movement is clearly non-violent, and they are engaged in extra-institutional non-violent activities like marches and unilateral declarations to the US govt. The big question with this movement is whether it was also institutional. The movement does not appear to be formally represented in the local or national government. However, Russel Means did run for office at Pine Ridge Reservation and nearly won in 2004, and he was evidently joined by Tribal Elders when he issued the independence declaration. Still, on Jan 8, 2008, a collection of tribal leader and organizations stated publicly that Means and his independence group do not represent any elected Lototah tribal government. Overall, it seems that they are trying to work through

3 Benjamin (1996, p. 539) 4 Refer http://www.nytimes.com/1979/05/27/archives/hawaiian-civilians-beat-and-kill-servicemen-in-series-of- incidents.html?_r=0 , accessed August 2016

7 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 the institutional apparatus of local government, but they’re just not that successful. We decided to code this as a “yes” on institutional, since there exists the equivalent of a running on independence (even if they’re not currently that successful). • “On December 17, 2007, a disaffected group of Lakota [(also known as Sioux)] leaders from Pine Ridge Reservation in South Dakota traveled to Washington, D.C., to inform the U.S. State Department they were seceding. … Although the U.S. government never responded to the declaration and elected Lakota leaders distanced themselves from it, the continued to pursue their claim.”5 o This is an example of extra-institutional non-violent action in the narrow timeframe. • A leading figure of the separatist movement is Russell Means, who “won 45 percent of the votes in the Pine Ridge tribal elections in November 2008 campaigning on his freedom ticket.”6 • “The Black Hills Council in August 2009 send an ‘amended declaration’ to the United and U.S. governments aimed at invoking rights inherent in the 1851 and 1868 Fort Laramie treaties the Council claims the Sioux have been denied.”7 • Sources employed: o (2011) o Charters (1997) o Hewitt and Cheatham (2000) o Minahan (2016) o http://www.republicoflakotah.com

11 – Quebec (Target: Canada; Year: 1962) Initially extra-institutional non-violent contention followed by institutional contention; also contained a violent extra-institutional component to the movement.

Instl_Narrow (1962-64): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1962-64): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1960-64): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1960-64): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: 1

• “The quiet revolution, a period of intellectual, social, and political ferment, began in 1959 with the death of Maurice Duplessis, provincial premier and leader of the Union Nationale.”8

5 Beary (2011, p. 105) 6 Beary (2011, p. 106) 7 Beary (2011, p. 108) 8 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 243)

8 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019

o Alternative date for beginning of Quiet Revolution: “1960, the first year of the Quiet Revolution”9 o “The Quebec independence movement developed from the 1960s and became known as the ‘Quiet Revolution.’”10 • Potential extra-institutional nonviolent mobilization in wider temporal period: o “Pierre Trudeau and Gerard Pelletier founded the journal Cite Libre, which denounced the backwardness and corruption of the old regime.”11 o “The year 1961 saw the publication of Marcel Chaput’s Pourquoi je suis separatist (Why I am a separatist), which argued that the French Canadians formed a nation and that Quebec was its territory.”12 • Emergence and actions of separatist parties: o “A number of separatist parties emerged, including the Rassemblement pour l’Independence National and the Parti Québécois.”13 o Violent mobilization by FLQ, including in narrow temporal period: § “The self-proclaimed Quebec Liberation Front (FLQ – Front de Libération du Québec), created in 1963, instigated numerous terrorist acts, such as using Molotov cocktails to damage symbols of political power (military installations, mailboxes, government offices). In all, nine people were killed, including the Labour Minister Pierre Laporte in 1970.”14 § “the FLQ experienced frequent 'generational changes' during the nine years it was active. In Les Québécois Violents, Marc Laurendeau identifies nine distinct periods of FLQ activity, from 1963 to 1971, and within those periods, fifteen separate networks identifying themselves as the FLQ.”15 § “Between February 1963 and October 1970, groups and individuals identifying themselves as the FLQ carried out (or attempted) 232 acts of violence (excluding demonstrations or riots). The largest proportion of these were bombings: 163 incidents (47 bombs were defused or failed to detonate). The years 1963 and 1968-70 experienced the majority of incidents (165 in total).”16 § “The FLQ operated primarily between 1962 and 1972 and was responsible for the death of seven people, the injury of several others, countless property damage, the theft of dynamite, and several bank robberies (Ross, 1988).”17 o Additional organizing and extra-institutional mobilization by separatist groups: § “Another important separatist organization was the ASIQ, formed in August 1960.”18

9 Charters (1997, p. 137) 10 Beary (2011, p. 130) 11 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 243) 12 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 243) 13 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 243) 14 Rocher (2002, p. 78) 15 Charters (1997, p. 138) 16 Charters (1997, p. 141) 17 Ross (1995, p. 285) 18 Ross (1995, p. 291)

9 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 § “Several revolutionary independence movements preceded the formation of the FLQ. Of these, the Réseau de résistance (RR) advocated vandalism as a means of . Another group, the Comité de libération nationale, created in 1962, preached violence as a way to achieve political ends. This group started to form cells within the Rassemblement pour l’Indépendance Nationale (RIN), a precursor of the Parti Québécois, and within the Action socialiste pour l’indépendance du Québec (ASIQ), a sovereignty movement founded in 1960 by a Communist Party militant. The FLQ was formed by the more radical elements of the Comité de libération nationale and the RR.”19 § “From 1965 to 1967, the FLQ associated itself with the activities of striking workers, without, however, succeeding in infiltrating the unions.”20 • This, in itself, doesn’t quite cross threshold for NV extra-institutional action, and is outside the relevant temporal period. § “In the early 1960s several parties and movements sprang up, preaching independence within a variety of social frameworks ranging from the extreme left to the extreme right. Of these, the Rassemblement pour l'indépendance nationale and the Ralliement national participated actively in the 1966 provincial election.”21 o RIN mobilization: § “One of the most important separatist organizations was the RIN, which began in September 1960. The RIN was a Montreal-based group that advocated a leftist, independent Québec where only one official language (French) would be recognized.”22 § “The militant base of […] the Rassemblement pour l’indépendance nationale (RIN), also contributed to the founding of the PQ. The RIN had begun as a citizen movement in 1960, and in 1963 it became the first pro-independence political party in Québec’s history.” (Parti Québécois, Canadian Encyclopedia23). • Solid evidence of institutional in the narrow window. Additional information below. • RIN pre-1963 also appears as evidence of extra-institutional nonviolent in narrow and wider timeframes. § RIN moves towards institutional mobilization, as does RN (Rassemblement Nationale) • “In 1963 the revolutionary Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ) began planting bombs in Montreal to focus public and governmental attention on the nationalist issue. During the next two years, two other political parties—Rassemblement pour l'Independence Nationale (RIN) and Rassemblement Nationale (RN) were founded.

19 “Front de libération du Québec,” Canadian Encyclopedia. 20 “Front de libération du Québec,” Canadian Encyclopedia. 21 “French Canadian ,” Canadian Encyclopedia. 22 Ross (1995, p. 290) 23 “Parti Québécois,” Canadian Encyclopedia.

10 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 Both RIN and RN advocated the separation of Quebec, but, unlike the FLQ, they believed in working from within the existing political system. […] Both parties ran candidates in the 1966 election and together received more than 200,000 votes.”24 o Since RIN founded in narrow temporal period, then contested elections immediately afterwards, assume they were preparing for this during the relevant time period, and will count institutional as a Yes. o A bit more on extra-institutional . Publications appear to constitute nonviolent extra-institutional component to the movement in the narrow time frame: § “The construction of bombs and explosives was aided through articles published in La Cognée, the first official organ of the FLQ. It appeared in October 1963 and stopped publication in April 1967.”25 § “The rise of the FLQ was also encouraged by the theoretical guidance of Vallières and Gagnon. Several actions helped the two activists establish themselves as the ideological leaders of the FLQ. In September 1964, Vallières and Gagnon founded Revolution Québécoise, a Marxist and proindependence magazine. Vallières, who was 26 at the time, ‘was also secretary of the Syndicat des journalistes de Montréal (CSN) and one of the leaders of the strike then in progress at La Press’ (Fournier, 1984, p. 70). Gagnon, 25, ‘the secretary of the editorial committee, was a lecturer at the University of Montréal, . . . and was very active in the student movement’ (Fournier, 1984, p. 70). In 1965, Vallières, Gagnon, and their friends secretly joined the FLQ.”26 • The above constitutes evidence of extra-institutional nonviolent action during the narrow temporal window. o Additional info on institutional: § “As it is legal to campaign for peaceful , French Canadian separatists have mostly channeled their energies into the democratic political system. The main Quebec separatist party has two branches: PQ at the regional level and the Bloc Québecois (BQ) at the national level. While independence is the long-term goal, in the short term the two parties are pushing for Quebec’s provincial government to be given greater control over its language, immigration, and cultural policy; they want French to become even more dominant in the province; and they want to boost Quebec’s presence on international bodies[...] The PQ was established in 1968 by journalist Rene Leveque. The BQ was established in 1991[.]”27

24 Quirion (1972, pp. 85-6) 25 Ross (1995, p. 288) 26 Ross (1995, p. 289) 27 Beary (2011, p. 131)

11 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019

• Both of these examples follow the relevant temporal period, but have their roots in earlier mobilization, discussed above.

13 – Nevis (Target: St. Kitts and Nevis; Year: 1996) Largely/ entirely institutional

Instl_Narrow (1996-98): Yes (Confidence: 1)

ExtraInstl_Narrow (1996-98): No (Confidence: .75) Instl_Wider (1994-98): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1994-98): No (Confidence: .75) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: No ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .75

• The Nevisians have periodically sought political independence since approximately 1958 (see Minahan (2002, p. 1362-1363) via a series of political actions, with the most recent being the 1998 referendum, in which the 61% vote in favor of independence did not meet the two thirds requirement under the constitution.28 • The referendum was held after “Premier Vance Amory of Nevis declared [in June 1996] that he had instructed the island’s legal department to prepare a bill for secession from the two- island federal state.”29 The bill was supported by both the island’s political parties, the Concerned Citizens Movement and the Nevis Reform Party, when it was presented to parliament in October 1997.30 • The U.S. Department of State’s 1999 Country Report on Human Rights for St. Kitts and Nevis states that “[a]ll parties involved adhered to constitutional procedures, and no acts of violence were reported in connection with the secession question.”31 • All standard sources referenced suggest that political, legal, and constitutional means have been utilized and there is no evidence to suggest violence had developed in association with the independence movement at the time under consideration. o Additional information and sources appear to confirm this: § Midgett (2004): Doesn’t seem to mention any extra-institutional component to these efforts. § Qvortrup (2014) doesn't’ mention any extea-institutional component, either: • “In June 1996, the Nevis Island Administration under the Concerned Citizens’ Movement led by Premier Vance Amory—a former international cricketer—announced its intention to become independent. After the Nevis Reformation party blocked the bill of secession, Amory called for elections to be held on 24 February

28 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 204) 29 Minahan (2002, p. 1363) 30 Minahan (2002, p. 1363) 31 US Department of State (2000)

12 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 1997. Although the elections produced no change in the composition of the assembly, the premier pledged to continue his efforts towards independence. A referendum—which could be regarded as ultra vires—was held in 1998, but only 61 percent voted in favour of the proposition, and hence it failed.”32

105 – (Target: United Kingdom; Year: 1968) Mixed institutional and extra-institutional contention

Instl_Narrow (1968-70): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1968-70): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1966-70): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1966-70): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: 1

• Protestants outnumber Catholics in Northern Island, with two thirds of the population and have been able to retain the link with the United Kingdom through the Unionist Party, which holds a ‘permanent majority’ over the Catholic nationalists in parliament.33 o Participation in elections is an example of institutional action in the wider and narrow timeframes. • “The Catholic minority, watching American civil rights demonstrations on television, began to organize demonstrations for Catholic Civil Rights in 1966.”34 o The demonstrations are an example of extra-institutional non-violent action in the wider timeframe. • “The Catholic minority suffered from various forms of political and economic discrimination, and in the 1960s, the Northern Irish Civil Rights Association organized a series of demonstrations. Their campaign provoked a violent backlash from Protestants, and widespread clashes took place in Belfast and Londonderry. As the disturbances escalated, the British government intervened, sending troops in July 1969 and taking over the administration of the province in March 1972.”35 o The demonstrations are an example of extra-institutional non-violent action in the narrow timeframe, while also potentially involving some degree of armed and/or violent extra-institutional mobilization. Additional information below confirms appropriateness of yes codings for both nonviolent and violent extra-institutional mobilization.

32 Qvortrup (2014, p. 12) 33 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 211) 34 Minahan (2002, p. 1404) 35 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 211)

13 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019

o De Fazio (2013) argues late 1960s was initially nonviolent, after multiple earlier armed insurgencies that were unsuccessful, but that the movement quickly shifted: § “In the late 1960s, the Irish-Catholic minority in Northern Ireland finally took up nonviolent protest to challenge Unionism’s discriminatory policies and, inspired by the struggle for civil rights in the United States, coalesced around a civil rights movement… ”36 § “In a short period of time, the originally peaceful and reformist CRM [civil rights movement] turned to increasingly contentious and violent tactics, and some embittered protesters eventually enrolled in underground republican organizations like the IRA (Bosi 2012; White 1989). The aspirations of the movement also changed, as it eventually demanded the abolition of the Northern Ireland state once and for all, rather than its gradual reform through legislation. […] The struggle around civil rights was progressively supplanted by an ethnonationalist insurgent campaign to achieve a United , rather than a reformed Northern Ireland. The nearly moribund and inoperative IRA reorganized, unleashing a violent conflict between paramilitary groups and security forces—the so-called ‘Troubles’— which claimed the lives of more than 3,600 people in more than thirty-five years of brutal contention.” 37 o New strategy including armed action adopted after Aug 1969: § “It was the Provisional IRA that, after the sectarian violence in August 1969, adopted a strategy of ‘active defense’ against Protestants, police, and the . At the top of figure 3, we can observe how republican paramilitaries began to target those state authorities.”38 § Armed mobilization seems to have been spurred by violence as demonstrators contended with both the state and counter-demonstrators, as described in De Fazio: • “Civil Rights and Civil Disturbances (August 1968 to July 1969)”39 o “The CRM resolution to defy the ministerial prohibitions to demonstrate often resulted in clashes with loyalist counter- demonstrators and with police forces trying to separate the rival crowds. The collision between the civil rights strategy of contention and loyalist staunch opposition to it created multiple opportunities for violent street confrontations. These civil disturbances generated the bulk of violent contention in the first year of the CRM’s campaign of direct action.”40

36 De Fazio (2013, p. 475) 37 De Fazio (2013, p. 476) 38 De Fazio (2013, p. 486) 39 De Fazio (2013, p. 482) 40 De Fazio (2013, p. 483)

14 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019

o “Most of the politically motivated violence in this period was the direct outcome of street confrontations among protesters, counterprotesters, and the police.”41 o “…several violent confrontations occurring between Catholic crowds and the RUC, a conflict which would critically contribute to the radicalization of contention in the following months.” 42 • Discussion of events falling partially within narrow temporal period, providing evidence of armed mobilization, under heading of “The Outbreak of Ethnic Antagonism (August 1969 to January 1971)” in De Fazio (2013, 485) o “Protest-related contention gave way to interethnic violence and riots (see the thickness of the tie connecting Protestants and Catholics). When the British Army suddenly appeared in the political equation, civil rights activists had to retreat and leave the control of the Catholic minority to traditional republican organizations. In fact, while the CRM became a lesser target of police repression, radicalized sections of the Catholic community engaged in a violent fight with the state and its security apparatus (see the ties linking Catholics with the police and the British Army).”43 o “As the conflict radicalized, a new violent actor emerged: republican paramilitary organizations.”44 o “In December 1969, the Irish Republican Army split into two groups for ideological and tactical reasons. While the Provisional IRA was committed to achieving the traditional republican goal of ending through armed insurgency, the Official IRA maintained a Marxist agenda aimed at unifying the Catholic and Protestant working classes against the oppressive Unionist regime[.]”45 o “After the violent clashes in August 1969, when the British Army assumed control over internal security and law and order, the issue of the constitutional position of Northern Ireland became the issue for a vast section of the Irish- Catholic minority.”46 o Direct quote within block quote within De Fazio (2013, 487): “When the police were using guns against people, the issue of

41 De Fazio (2013, p. 484) 42 De Fazio (2013, p. 484) 43 De Fazio (2013, p. 486) 44 De Fazio (2013, p. 486) 45 De Fazio (2013, p. 486) 46 De Fazio (2013, p. 486)

15 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 military defence, and in the Irish context the issue of the IRA, came on the agenda. So the nature of the conflict and of the struggle began to change, the forces of the State became more hostile, more militarized and more directed on people’s homes and the issue of defence and that sort of activity came onto the agenda. That’s when IRA started reforming. (Bosi 2011: 135-136)”47 • Actions by paramilitaries against British military seem to begin in earnest shortly after the temporal window. Nevertheless, coding of yes for armed/violent mobilization merited for this movement even preceding these developments: o “Between February and July of 1971, republican paramilitaries forcefully entered into the saga of , altering again the nature of the conflict in Northern Ireland. […] On February 6, 1971, a Provisional IRA sniper in Belfast shot dead Gunner Robert Curtis, the first on-duty British soldier to die during the Troubles (Deutsch and Magowan 1973: 92). The Provisional IRA had now officially declared war on the British Crown with the stated goal of achieving a , waging an armed campaign against British ‘peace-keeping’ forces in Northern Ireland. Thus, in addition to the ongoing intercommunal rioting, and the conflict between Catholics and security forces, republican paramilitaries embarked on a campaign of violent insurgency, primarily targeting British soldiers and army facilities.”48

106 – Scotland (Target: United Kingdom; Year: 1992) Largely institutional action, with more marginal extra-institutional mobilization

Instl_Narrow (1992-94): Yes (Confidence:1 ) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1992-94): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1990-94): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1990-94): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: No ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .75

47 De Fazio (2013, p. 487) 48 De Fazio (2013, p. 487)

16 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019

• Minahan (2002, p. 1691) notes that a poll taken in January 1992 recorded separatist sentiment on Scots at 50%, although a poll conducted by Ipsos-MORI in January of the same year only records a cumulative 40% for an independent Scotland.49 • There are no events of note, institutional or otherwise, mentioned in Minahan (2002) or Hewitt and Cheetham (2000). • Action would seem to be mostly through officially organized elections and corresponding formal channels. • Institutional: o Scottish (SNP) platform, discussed in Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, 266-67) § “In 1948, the declared its goal to be ‘the restoration of Scottish national sovereignty by the establishment of a democratic Scottish government whose authority will be limited only by such agreements as will be freely entered into with other nations[.]’”50 § “After the defeat of a 1979 referendum, the party downplayed the independence issue […] The party’s poor showing the 1979 election also led to bitter internal disputes. The party chairman argued that the SNP should adopt a moderate stance on devolution while the largest faction was in favor of an uncompromising ‘independence or nothing’ position. The most extreme group called for a Scottish socialist republic and advocated civil disobedience.”51 • Extra-Institutional: o No violent actions: “There has not been a significant militia group fighting for independence in Scotland.”52 o Mention of “marginal” extra-institutional actions in the 1990s in Beary (2011): “In the 1990s radical groups, including one called Settler Watch, registered a marginal presence, but there has been little activity since 2000.”53 § Entry for “Scottish Watch” in Barberis et al. (2000, pp. 407-08), may justify extra-institutional nonviolent coding of yes, though a bit tenuous § “In the early 1990s, two small fringe groups, Settler Watch and English Watch, targeted English in Scotland but made little impact.”54 o Additional evidence for Coding Extra-Institutional Nonviolent Yes from Barberis et al. (2000): § Entry #“1471” for “Scottish Watch” in Barberis et al. (2000, 407-8): “Dates: 1992-present [Line Break] A body by this name seems to have been associated with veteran campaigner Wendy Wood. It is said to have been a youth movement, but its chronology and even its existence remains

49 Refer Ipsos MORI (1995). 50 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 266) 51 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 267) 52 Beary (2011, p. 337) 53 Beary (2011, p. 337) 54 Keating (1998, p. 44)

17 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 uncertain. During the 1990s Sottish Watch, along with a similar body, Settler Watch, has been active in disseminating anti-English propaganda north of the border. The SCOTTISH NATIONAL PARTY [145655] has been swift to [p. 407] condemn this activity, bringing legal action in some areas.”56 § Entry #“1425” for “Scotland United” in Barberis et al. (2000, 394): “Dates: 1992-present [Line Break] Scotland United is one of the more significant of the movements that emerged after the 1992 Election (see also CAMPAIGN FOR SCOTTISH [1385]; COMMON CAUSE [1388]; DEMOCRACY FOR SCOTLAND [1398]). High-profile nationalists such as pop singers Ricky Ross and Pat Kane were involved, as were a number of Labour politicians. It campaigned (successfully in the end) for a referendum on Scotland’s place in the Union, organizing a series of rallies, most notably those in Glasgow in the aftermath of the 1992 election.”57 § Entry # “1454” for “Scottish National Liberation Army (SNLA)” in Barberis et al. (2000, 403): “Dates: 1980-present [Line Break] Journal: Saorsa [Line Break] A somewhat obscure but apparently durable nationalist paramilitary formation, the SNLA probably originated from a group which called itself the Scottish Citizen’s Army of the Republic. There have been unconfirmed links with the SCOTTISH REPUBLICAN SOCIALIST PARTY [1465] and the similarity of nomenclature has fuelled further (unsubstantiated) press speculation of parallels with the IRISH NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY [778]. In truth, the links established by the SNLA and indeed the precise nature of its activities remain uncertain. These characteristics it shares with other paramilitary nationalist organizations – the Army for Freeing Scotland, the Scottish Civilian Army, the Scottish Liberation Army, the Scottish Republican Army, and the TARTAN ARMY [1477]. These and other similar organizations have probably had links to political groups such as those of Arm nan Gaidheal see with SIOL NAN GAIDHEAL [1475] and the Army of the Provisional Government with the 1320 CLUB [1479].”58 § Does not constitute sufficient evidence of armed mobilization during the relevant temporal period. Coding “No” for violent mobilization for this temporal period. • Should be noted that there have been attacks attributed to the Scottish National Liberation Army in the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), accessed via Wikipedia, but that these did not occur in the relevant temporal windows: o https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scottish_National_Liberat ion_Army

55 Reference to other entry in Barberis et al. (2000), not my insertion. Similar references occur in following quotes. 56 Barberis et al. (2000, p. 407-8) 57 Barberis et al. (2000, p. 394) 58 Barberis et al. (2000, p. 403)

18 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019

o http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?per petrator=2854 o See, also: § Brand et al (1994): § Paterson et al. (1992): Discusses 1992 election results, with SNP taking 14% of the vote, translating to three seats (see p. 627)

152 – Basques (Target: France; Year: 1975) Both institutional and extra-institutional components to the movement.

Instl_Narrow (1975-77): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1975-77): Yes (Confidence: .75) Instl_Wider (1973-77): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1973-1977): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .75

• A brief summary of what was happening around this temporal period in French Basque country: o “In the Basque country, an ethno-regionalist movement was in evidence from the 1960s (Izquierdo 2001). At this time the Enbata movement (1963) was a cultural and political group galvanised by a set of Basque students who had gone to Bordeaux to finish their studies. Very early on, they put forward the idea of creating a Basque département, with the aim of founding a Basque state which would unite the Basque provinces of Spain. However the activities of these activists were closely linked with the Basque nationalist movement operating on the other side of the border in Spain. The political and media influence of ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna) alienated the supporters of their rather moderate political and cultural projects. Divisions appeared within the group over the question of what kind of support should be given to ETA. In 1974, Enbata was banned by ministerial order for the support it had given terrorism. From then on, the Basque movement essentially focused on the issue of a Basque département and the defence of the Basque language.”59 • Extra-Institutional Mobilization: o “Though Iparretarrak emerged in the early 1970s, the groups is registered in TWEED with 12 acts of terrorism in the 1983 to 1985 period. The group is registered as responsible for the death of three people.”60 § Looking at the Terrorism in Western : Events Data (TWEED) directly (see Engene 2007) shows Iparretarrak active with 12 entries in the 1983 to

59 Pasquier (2015, p. 50) 60 Engene (2004, p. 124)

19 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 1987, rather than 1985, period. This conflicts with the Engene (2004) quote above, but either way, it is outside the relevant temporal period.61 o Beck (2004, 101) identifies 1973 as beginning of violent campaign by Iparretarrak.62 o “Iparretarrak… committed its first act of political violence in 1973, yet it would never reach the virulence of ETA… After 1973, the group lay dormant until 1977, when it renewed a series of attacks on tourism-industry targets.”63 § This puts violent group as active in both the narrow and wider temporal periods, though there are no values for Iparretarrak in TWEED until 1983.64 o Nonviolent Extra-Institutional Resistance? § Some identified prior to the relevant temporal period, but close in terms of proximity: • “In the wake of the events of 1968 in Paris, a new radicalized youth movement emerged to redefine in Iparralde. In 1972, this resulted in a series of hunger strikes, in favor of the refugees [from Spain] and against French state repression, by several young militants from Iparralde. The overall effect of the changes of the the late 1960s and early 1970s was for Enbata to move towards the political left. As early as 1971, it defined itself as a ‘Basque Socialist Party,’ and in the increased climate of French state suspicion towards, and repression of, Spanish state Basque refugees, this would become the platform on which the movement mobilized throughout the 1970s.”65 § Because Enbata was banned in 1972, but was “continued as a periodical” subsequently, this publication will be counted as nonviolent extra- institutional resistance: • “The first party, Enbata, which was founded by Basque students at the University of Bordeaux in 1963, banned by French authorities in 1972 and dissolved in 1974, was the first nationalist party to take part in elections. After its banning in 1974 Enbata continued as a periodical up to today.”66 • Institutional o Enbata: § Electoral participation prior to the relevant time periods:

61 Iparretarrak is value “14047” for “v6” in TWEED, according to the codebook (Engene 2006, 7-8). Twelve entries for Iparretarrak, all in the 1983-87 period, when looking at TWEED data. in conflict with the quote above. 62 “Since the appearance of Iparretarrak in 1972 (‘Those of the ETA of the North’) who since 1973 have used violence following ETA’s example, the electoral success of Enbata’s successor parties has suffered from negative imagery in the media. The press often associated radical nationalism with violence. Since its introduction in Iparralde, violence has polarized the Basque nationalist community in France (Jacob 1994: 384).” (Beck 2004, 101) 63 Watson (2003, p. 392) 64 See Engene (2006, 2007) regarding TWEED data. 65 Watson (2003, p. 391) 66 Beck (2004, p. 100)

20 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019

• “Enbata could only modestly attract voters, although they seemed to have an initial success in supporting Michel Labéguerie who was elected as a deputy for the centrist MRP [end p. 100] in the National Assembly in 1962. Enbata support was soon reduced to 5 per cent of the votes in the 1967 legislative elections and remained almost bereft of militants and voters in 1968.”67 • Participation but low support in 1967 and 1968 French elections68 o Enbata successors § “…EHAS was a reincarnated version of Enbata’s radical current. From 1967 onwards, the nationalists had two distinct electoral support bases.”69 § “By 1973-74, the Enbata movement would all but disappear as a political organization. In its wake, there emerged two clear tendencies within the Basque political movement of Iparralda: an openly socialist formation, Herriko Alderdi Sozialista (HAS; Popular Socialist Party), and a radical group following the example of ETA, Iparretarrak (IK; ‘Those of the North’). [paragraph break] HAS took part in the electoral process and condemned the use of political violence, but openly pressed for Basque unification of Hegoalda and Irappalde.”70 • Merger of HAS and EAS into EHAS in 1975. 71 • Participation by EHAS in 1977 elections at municipal level.72 o Example of institutional action in narrow and wider timeframe • “…in the legislative elections of 1978 EHAS candidates could only poll between 3 and 4 percent of the vote.”73 • 1978 as end of EHAS’s involvement in French electoral : o “The emergence of Enbata was followed by an ideological split along three lines: the federalist and centrist position of the Mouvement Démocrate Basque; the pro-independence and inter-class position represented by the weekly publication Enbata – which replaced the organization of the same name that was banned in the 1970s; and a pro- independence and class-orientated current which found expression in the party EHAS. The latter filled the electoral space left vacant by Enbata, until its decision in 1978 to cease its activities in the French Basque Country as it considered its strategic area of struggle to be the Spanish Basque Country alone – the Basque Autonomous Community (BAC)

67 Beck (2004, pp. 100-01) 68 See Watson (2003, pp. 389-90) 69 Beck (2004, p. 101) 70 Watson (2003, p. 390) 71 Watson (2003, p. 390) 72 Watson (2003, p. 391) 73 Watson (2003, pp. 391-92)

21 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019

and the Foral Community of Navarre (FCN).”74 § EHAS dissolved in 198175 § See, also: de la Calle 2015 on the Basque experience in France.

153 – Brittany (Target: France; Year: 1970)

Instl_Narrow (1970-72): Yes (Confidence .75) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1970-72): Yes (confidence: .9) Instl_Wider (1968-72): Yes (confidence .75) ExtraInstl_Wider (1968-1972): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .5

• Background: o “The postwar suppression of the and culture provoked a Breton cultural revival in the 1950s, with a parallel growth of nationalism over the next decade. The revival of the language and culture, including the standardization of Breton grammar, led to a renewed interest among the population. Numerous cultural, nationalist, and separatist groups emerged, the most militant employing violence and terrorism to press their cause of Breton independence.”76 o “During the 1960s, … [c]oncerts by Breton folksingers such as Gilles Servat were like mass political rallies, with the audience enthusiastically applauding songs about French oppression and Breton resistance.”77 • Extra-Institutional Action: o While there was a cultural movement, as discussed above, no evidence in consulted sources that this rose to the level of extra-institutional nonviolent resistance during relevant temporal windows. o Sven-Meyer (2006, 1342) puts the period of active attacks between 1966 and 1980. This differs somewhat from Engene (2004), presumably because it lumps together the FLB and the FLB splinter groups. Seems fair assumption that there were militants operating even in Engene’s seeming ‘gap years’. Additional corroboration would increase confidence of relevant extra-institutional codings. o Engene (2004, 120) identifies three terrorist organizations associated with Brittany: § Front de Libération de Bretagne, active in 1968, wth 33 actions but zero deaths

74 Gurrutxaga (2005, p. 78) 75 “EHAS ceased to exist in 1981 because its leaders were menaced by Iparretarrak (Jacob1994:223–5).” (Beck 2004, 102) 76 Minahan (2002, p. 327) 77 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, pp. 51-2)

22 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 § Front de Libération de Bretagne – Armée Républicaine Bretonne, active 1973-79, with 24 actions and one death § Front de Libération de la Bretagne pour la Libération Nationale et Socialisme, active in 1974, with two actions but zero deaths o “As regionalist groups managed to establish themselves, a spectrum of groups appeared. In contrast to the inclinations of Breton groups before and during the [second world] war, several of the new groups were leftist in orientation. Most prominent among the leftist national liberation fronts was the Front de Libération de Bretagne (FLB), a goup that rose to prominence with a series of violent attacks in 1968. From this group emerged the Front de Libération de Bretagne – Armée Républicaine Bretonne (FLB-ARB), the main group fighting for independence for Brittany. […] A third group, Front de Libération de la Bretagne pour la Libération Nationale et Socialisme (FLB-LNS), was the result of a split within the extreme Breton movement in 1972/73… The FLB-CNS collapsed after carrying out only a few acts of violence. Terrorim in conjunction with activities on the behalf of the largely ceased in the late 1970s.”78 o “The radical FLB (Front de libération de la Bretagne) appeared in 1966 and was responsible for various attacks on public property, including the palace of Versailles, between 1966 and 1980. A more recent separatist movement is Emgann (Battle or struggle), founded in 1983[.]”79 • Institutional participation o Lower confidence regarding institutional codings for narrow and wider temporal windows reflect concerns about counting UDB as separatist party, rather than a regional party pushing for more autonomy/privileges. See discussion below. o MOB and UDB § “In 1957 a tentative return to politics emerged with the establishment of MOB (Mouvement pour l’ organisation de la Bretagne). By 1964, Brittany had a nationalist political party once more in the form of the UDB (Union démocratique brettone). This is a left-wing party, which also identifies itself with ecologically sensitive issues. Since the 1970s it has been a member of the ‘unified left’, allying itself with other French left-wing parties in municipal elections, and thus has the support of dozens of mayors and locally elected councillors. This was reflected in the elections of March 2001[.]”80 § “Right-wing tendencies re-emerged in 1968 with the creation of Jeune Bretagne, which, by 1972, had become Strollad ar Vro (Party of the region). Meawhile MOB developed into POBL (Parti pour l’organisation d’une Bretagne libre), founded in 1982, an organization marginal in politics, but with a strong position within the cultural movement.”81

78 Engene (2004, p. 124) 79 Sven-Meyer (2006, p. 1342) 80 Sven-Meyer (2006, p. 1342) 81 Sven-Meyer (2006, p. 1342)

23 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 § UDB participation in electoral politics: • “Since the 1971 municipal elections, the UDB has put forward candidates at political elections, at all spatial levels, more consistently than any other Breton movement. However, as regards national elections, the legislatives of 1973, 1978 and 1981, the results have been pitiful and hardly ever exceeded 2 %. The UDB was more successful at municipal and cantonal elections, obtaining seats on a number of municipal councils.”82 o Should UDB be counted? § “the development of a more politicized , aiming at decentralization and home rule. As early as 1956, the Mouvement Pour l’organisation de la Bretagne (MOB) had been formed, calling in a manifesto signed by several thousand for decentralization of the French state, a special statute for Brittany with an elected assembly, as well as immediate economic measures. Some of its members were elected to municipal councils in the 1950s. In 1963 it split, following the defeat of a conference resolution calling for Algerian independence, to give birth to the Union démocratique bretonne (UDB), a political party, both socialist and internationalist. Campaigning on the internal colonial slogan ‘The Breton worker is doubly exploited; he is exploited as a Breton and as a worker’, and calling for a European of regions, the UDB formed tactical alliances with other left-wing parties and several of its members were elected to municipal councils on union-of-the-left lists. […] In 1968 it expelled those members sympathetic to the violent Front de libération de Bretagne (FLB) and in 1970, after moving to a strict Leninist line, expelled its gauchiste libertarians and aligned itself with the Communist Party. Nevertheless, by the 1970s there was a firm association of Breton with the left[.]”83

154 – Corsica (Target: France; Year: 1978) Mixed institutional and extra-institutional contention, including bombing campaign with no casualties during relevant temporal periods

Instl_Narrow (1978-80): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1978-80): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1976-80): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1976-80): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .5

82 Schrijver (2006, p. 212) 83 Keating (1985, pp. 9-10)

24 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019

• “The first autonomous movement, the Parti Course Autonomiste, was founded in 1927, but opposition to French rule was insignificant until the 1960s.”84 • By the 1970s, “[t]he autonimist groups included the Azzione per Rinascita Corsa, which focused on publicizing regional economic grievances; its successor organization, the Union du Peuple Corse (UPC); and the militant Front de Libération Nationale de la Course (FLNC). Although autonomists have occasionally run in local and national elections, their candidates have done poorly, getting only 3.4 percent of the vote in the 1973 legislative elections and 7.3 percent in 1978.”85 o The wording in Hewitt and Cheetham, that these were organizations, including a militant one, who occasionally contested elections implies that the bulk of their work was extra-institutional, and thus extra-institutional non-violent action will be coded yes in both the wider and narrow timeframes. § Further corroboration of extra-institutional nonviolent action during the relevant period(s) would increase confidence. • “The demands of the nationalist movement reached much farther than the recognition of the local language. After decades of opposition—militant at times—against French centralized administration, peace was restored with the designation of Corsica as a ‘territorial collectivity’ of France. It is the only French territory in Europe to enjoy cultural and administrative autonomy, a status granted to the island in 1981 and confirmed in 2000.”86 • Violent extra-institutional mobilization: o “Perhaps as a result [of the failure to win significant support at the ballot box], separatist violence increased steadily after 1973, and since that date several hundred explosions in Corsica and on the French mainland have been attributed to pro-independence groups.”87 § Although bombings are clearly not non-violent, there is no reference to casualties within the period under consideration. Coding yes for violent, though, due to bombing campaign. • Additional notes on Corsican separatist violence: o “France’s only long-standing ethnic nationalist terrorist group is the Front de la Libération Nationale de la Corse (FLNC) […] FLNC was formed in [125] 1976 when two earlier groups, the Ghijustizia Paolina and the Frenta Paesanu Corsu di Liberazione (FPLC), joined forces.”88 § “The group is known to carry out large numbers of coordinated bomb attacks, often directed against material targets within the Corsican tourist industry or symbolic targets of the Frenc state. For the 1976 to 1991 period the group is registered as responsible for 1291 acts of terrorism, which is

84 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 72) 85 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, pp. 72-3) 86 Haarmann (2013, p. 283) 87 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 73) 88 Engene (2004, pp. 124-25)

25 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 nearly half of all acts of terrorism in France. Nevertheless, the group is mostl careful to avoid inflicting personal injury in its attacks, and in all its actions the group is responsible for killing nine people.”89 • Looking at the TWEED dataset: o There are a lot of actions in the relevant time frames by FLNC (v6=14024), though the actions with casualties come from 1982-87 § Yes for violent extra-institutional for narrow and wider o FPCL (14025) § Have 48 actions from 1973-76, with no casualties. This is in the wider temporal window. o Action pour la Renaissance de la Corse - ARC (14002) § 4 in 1975, outside timeframe, including one killed § 1 in 1976 – in wider temporal window o Action Révolutionnaire Corse (ARC) (14026), § One action in 1976, no casualties o and FTPC (14028)? § 2 in 1981, outside time frame • Additional Notes on Nonviolence: o “From the 1960s, the Union des étudiants corses (Corsican Union of Students) put itself forward as a political alternative, seeking to promote Corsican language and culture and evoking the possibility of political autonomy. But it was Action régionaliste corse (ARC, Corsican Regional Action) which really pushed for specific Corsican policies. However, competition from clandestine movements rapidly damaged the transparency of this type of activism; and during the 1970s, when the Front de libération nationale de la Corse (FLNC, Corsican National Liberation Front) first appeared, many regionalist activists were drawn into clandestine activities. ”90 § This is tentative evidence of extra-institutional nonviolent mobilization, but could use further corroboration to increase confidence. o Nothing substantial mentioned in Beary (2011) entry on Corsican .

155 – Savoy (Target: France; Year: 1997) Mixed institutional and non-violent extra-institutional action

Instl_Narrow (1997-99): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1997-99): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1995-99): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1995-99): Yes (Confidence: ) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes

89 Engene (2004, p. 125) 90 Pasquier (2015, p. 52)

26 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: No ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: 1

• In 1994, a separatist movement called the Savoy League “published a platform for an independent Savoyard state that would embrace the traditional territories that formed part of historical Savoy…”.91 o While outside the date range for the data set, this would seem to be a key act in uniting various other pro-independence groups. • “Nationalists organized the first Savoyard national day in Aix-les-Bains on 19 February 1997… [where participants]…, including the mayors of several local towns, pledged support for a sovereign Savoyard state and announced the nullification of the 1860 annexation of western Savoy to the French state.”92 o This is an example of a non-violent extra-institutional action, albeit one with some support from institutional actors. • “In 1998 French regional elections over 5% of the electorate supported the pro- independence groups…”.93 o This is an example of institutional action.

174 – Basques II (Target: Spain; Year: 1968) Mostly/ entirely extra-institutional contention, initially without violence and then with violence

Instl_Narrow (1968-70): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1968-70): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1966-70): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1966-70): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .5

• “Basque nationalism dates from the latter part of the nineteenth century when the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) was founded … and favored a nonviolent parliamentary strategy.”94 • “All expressions of Basque nationalism were savagely repressed during the Franco era, and it became illegal to speak Euskera or to display the Basque flag. In the 1950s, younger and more radical Basques became increasingly dissatisfied with the PNV leadership and formed

91 Minahan (2002, p. 1672) 92 Minahan (2002, p. 1672) 93 Minahan (2002, p. 1672) 94 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 39)

27 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019

Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA), which launched a guerilla campaign in 1968.”95 This campaign was launched after “Spanish government pressure drove ETA underground”.96 o The formation of ETA, prior to onset of violent campaign, is possible evidence of extra-institutional non-violent action in the wider timeframe. o The guerilla campaign is an example of extra-institutional violent action in the narrow timeframe (this conflict meets the 25-battle-death threshold in UCDP-Prio). • “In December 1973, ETA assassinated Spain’s prime minister, Luis Carrero-Blanco.”97 • Additional info on extra-institutional mobilization: o “Under Francoism, Basque nationalism found a violent expression in the creation, in 1959, of Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA). In contrast to the EAJ-PNV, ETA stressed the linguistic (rather than racial) roots of Basque nationalism and had a violent and more overtly left-wing agenda. The movement has also professed its support for European federalism. ETA carried out its first terrorist bombing, resulting in the death of a 22-month old child, in June 1960. Under Franco’s regime, with non- violent forms of political and cultural expression tightly controlled, ETA gained a degree of domestic and international sympathy, particularly in 1970 when several ETA members were sentenced to death in the ‘Trial of Burgos’.”98 o “The traffic policeman José Pardines, who was killed on 7 June 1968, is generally seen as ETA’s first political killing. In the Spanish Basque newspaper El Correo of 19 September 2000 Ernest Lluch – a former socialist Minister who himself was killed by ETA on 21 November 2000 – wrote that the first victim was not Pardines, but Begoña Urroz Ibarrola. Begoña was a baby of 22 months who was accidentally killed by the explosion of an object on the railway station of Amara in San Sebastián on 27 June 1960. Neither the Spanish authorities nor ETA have officially acknowledged her death as a result of ETA’s violence. ETA’s death toll since 1960 is claimed to be more than 800, plus over 25 battle-related deaths. This would qualify the conflict as a ‘minor armed conflict’ (Wallensteen and Sonnenberg 2000: 542, 648). Although, from a military perspective, the conflict is limited and contained, there is widespread concern about violence in Euskadi.”99 o While coding “Yes” for extra-institutional nonviolent contention in both temporal windows, confidence would be enanced by additional corroboration: § Additional information could be compiled on the EAJ-PNV. (What were its activities, if any, during the relevant temporal period?) § Additionally, what were ETA’s actions between its founding in the 1950s and the start of its guerrilla actions in 1968? o “Under the dictatorship, Basque nationalist parties were not able to continue clandestinely. During the 1960s, ETA filled the nationalist political void. Soon after its foundation in 1959, the organization began to use violent methods. […] From the

95 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 39) 96 Minahan (2002, p. 287) 97 Beary (2011, p. 205) 98 Notholt (2009, p. 7.09) 99 Beck (2004, p. 176)

28 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 mid-1960s, the PNV and the women’s association EMA reappeared as underground organizations. PNV had representations in more than one-third of the municipalities of which Vizcaya was the stronghold (De Pablo et al. 2001: 280–1).”100 § Underground organizations suggest clandestine nationalist activities meeting threshold for extra-institutional nonviolent mobilization, though further corroboration would be useful. Coding Yes for both narrow and wider extra-institutional nonviolent, though noting concerns.

175 – Basques III (Target: Spain; Year: 2000) Mixed institutional and extra-institutional action, including violent mobilization.

Instl_Narrow (2000-02): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (2000-02): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1998-2002): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1998-2002): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .75

• The Basque separatist movement has involved the use of violence, although “[i]n 1998 the Spanish Government and ETA [Basque Homeland and Liberty] … agreed a ceasefire.”101 This was abandoned by ETA in 1999 and a new round of hostilities throughout Spain followed.102 Regular political assassinations, bombings, and other attacks by ETA followed.103 o This is an example of violent extra-institutional action. • During 1999 to 2000, the Basque separatist movement had considerable extra-institutional non-violent support in the Basque region of France, outside the target state for this case.104 • During the period under consideration (1998 – 2002), political parties representing constituents who favor Basque independence in Spain (both moderate and extreme) have competed in regional and national elections, with the moderates having greater success at the ballot box.105 o This is an example of institutional action. • “Official peace negotiations have been held between the Spanish government and ETA on at least four occasions. The first round of negotiations took place during the Spanish transition in the late 1970s; the second round happened in Algiers between 1986 and 1989; the third round in Zurich in May 1999; and, finally, the fourth round in 2006 in Loiola (Basque Country). The last peace talks were called off by the government in December 2006,

100 Beck (2004, p. 135) 101 Minahan (2002, p. 288) 102 Minahan (2002, p. 288) 103 Minahan (2002, p. 288) 104 Minahan (2002, p. 288) 105 Minahan (2002, p. 288)

29 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 immediately after ETA exploded a van loaded with over 200 kilograms of explosives in the car-park of Madrid’s Barajas international airport.”106 • “In 1992, the left-wing nationalist movement in the Basque Country experienced a serious setback when the entire leadership of ETA was arrested in the south of France. In the next few years, the so-called (and self-proclaimed) Basque National Liberation Movement, or MLNV, forced on to the defense both militarily and politically, modified its strategy in order to regain its former strength. As a consequence of this change, ETA actions, though fewer than before, came to have a much greater impact on Basque (and Spanish) society. But it was above all the frequent riots, acts of sabotage, and other expressions of street violence in many towns and villages of the Spanish Basque Country which began to condition social life in the region.”107 • “In September 1998, the radical nationalist party coalition Herri Batasuna (HB) and two moderate nationalist parties, together with a number of smaller political parties and social movements, signed the Lizarra Agreement, in which they expressed their compromise to work jointly towards a solution of the conflict. A few days later, ETA declared a ceasefire. Although the ceasefire was revoked again in November 1999, for well over a year Basque society experienced a situation of relative peace: that is, no ETA actions against politicians, police, and military forces took place in this period. However, acts of sabotage, intimidation, and harassment by radical Basque youth still continued. The continuity of the popular struggle, which was also criticized by many HB supporters, frequently strained the collaboration among the nationalist parties.”108 • “[A]lthough ETA kept a long-term ceasefire period from September 1998 onward, so as to facilitate negotiations between the MLNV and the Spanish Government, radical Basque youth continued to commit acts of street violence against Spanish interests.”109 • “This denomination, Movimiento para la Liberacion Nacional Vasco (MLNV), was adopted by the radical nationalist movement to establish parallels with the national liberation movements in other parts of the world (e.g., Algeria, Vietnam) and to convey the image of a guerrilla army with general and wide support within Basque society. In this conception, ETA is the MLNV’s military branch, Herri Batasuna (HB) its political organization, and Jarrai its youth movement. (In recent years, and anticipating judicial attempts to declare organizations belonging to the MLNV illegal, Herri Batasuna changed its name to ‘Euskal Herritarrok,’ then to ‘Batasuna,’ and, recently, to ‘Sozialista Abertzaleak,’ whereas Jarrai became ‘Haika,’ and, later, ‘Segi.’)”110 o Above seems sufficient for coding extra-institutional nonviolent as Yes in narrow (and wider) time frame(s), though could use additional corroboration to further increase confidence.

106 Muro (2013, p. 2) 107 Van den Broek (2004, p. 714) 108 Van den Broek (2004, pp. 714-15) 109 Van den Broek (2004, p. 715) 110 Van den Broek (2004, pp. 733-34)

30 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 178 – Catalans III (Target: Spain; Year: 1974) Extra-institutional movement, violent and nonviolent.

Instl_Narrow (1974-76): No (Confidence .5) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1974-76): Yes (Confidence .75) Instl_Wider (1972-76): No (Confidence .5) ExtraInstl_Wider (1972-76): Yes (Confidence .75) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .5

• Summary/write-up: o This is a complicated case for a number of reasons. After the Franco regime ended, as Spain moved from autocracy towards democracy, Catalans began to push for heightened autonomy through institutional means. The main actor in these efforts, the Republican Left of (ERC), did not fully embrace independence as an objective until substantially past the close of the temporal periods under review – a wrinkle that deserves closer scrutiny, perhaps, but one that results in a “No” coding for institutional efforts by the secessionist movement. Nevertheless, these institutional efforts to increase the autonomy of the Catalan community built on extra-institutional efforts to solidify , which predated the fall of the Franco regime. These extra-institutional efforts appear predominantly nonviolent, and constitute the main thrust of this iteration of the movement’s efforts. Nevertheless, there does appear to have been some violent component to these efforts, resulting in a “yes” coding for the indicators of extra-institution violence in both the narrow and wider temporal windows. Further corroboration, particularly regarding the violent components of these efforts, would increase the confidence of these codings. • Background: o “Ever since Spain transformed itself from a centralized autocracy to a decentralized democracy in the late 1970s, the Catalans have been increasing their autonomy through peaceful means.”111 o “After Franco died in 1975, a separate Catalan identity began to reemerge. In 1979 the Catalans, along with the Basques (see separate essay), were granted autonomy. The Catalan autonomous community held its first regional elections in March 1980.”112 o “The forces that articulated Catalan nationalism changed greatly under the impact of the Franco regime. … [C]ultural transofmation meant that by the early 1970s Catalonia exhibited a number of expressions: regime-based folkloric regionalism,

111 Beary (2011, p. 309) 112 Beary (2011, p. 310)

31 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 high cultural expressions of Catalan culture and the populist Catalanism closely linked to the left.”113 • Institutional: o ERC: § “The largest political party campaigning to split from Spain is the Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC). Banned during the Franco era (1939-1975), the ERC was legally recognized in 1977. It typically has garnered between 8 and 16 percent of the Catalan vote. No European government, including Spain’s, supports independence for Catalonia. The Catalans have however, forged strong links with like-minded autonomy movements in Europe… In 1981 these various movements came together to form the …”114 § “The ERC was established in March 1931. It initially supported autonomy inside of Spain but since 1989 has advocated full independence.115 § Marcet and Argelaguet (1998, 81) put the reconstitution of the ERC as occurring in 1974. § “In the 1977 Spanish elections, ERC – still illegal – formed a coalition with PTE (Party of Work of Spain, Maoist) and other left-wing fores, under the name Esquerra de Catalunya (Left of Catalonia).”116 • Because ERC does not formally embrace independence as a goal until 1989, counting pre-1989 actions by the party as secessionist (rather than autonomist) would be potentially problematic. To determine if this was a tactical decision by the ERC and count pre-1989 actions as separatist, further corroboration would be needed. • Additionally, 1977 falls immediately following the relevant temporal period. • These concerns account for lower institutional confidence. o Non-separatist, pro-autonomy, actors: § “The ERC usually wins fewer votes than its more moderate rival, (CiU), which supports autonomy but not independence for Catalonia. Established in November 1978… It is an alliance of the Democratic Convergence of Catalonia (CDC)…and the Democratic Union of Catalionia (UDC)… CiU won 21 percent of the Catalan vote in the March 2008 Spanish elections, securing ten seats in the Spanish parliament; this compares to the ERC’s three seats.”117 • Extra-Institutional o Nonviolent actions and mobilization in run up to relevant temporal period:

113 Dowling (2013, p. 94) 114 Beary (2011, p. 310) 115 Beary (2011, p. 310) 116 Marcet and Argelaguet (1998, p. 81) 117 Beary (2011, p. 311)

32 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 § “In the final years of Franco’s regime, all areas of cultural expression were consolidated. […] The language had attained a small place within radio and television, and in the comarcas (regional districts) over 50 publications published articles in Catalan.”118 § “…growing organisational capacity of the movement.”119 • Formation of Coordination Commission of the Political Forces of Catalonia in Dec 1969120 • Permanent Assembly of the Intellectuals of Catalonia created in Dec 1970121 § Continued mobilization into relevant temporal perod: • “The Assemblea de Catalunya in November 1971 brought together [p. 96] over 300 representatives of clandestine political groups. […] The Assemblea was a dramatic demonstration of the unity of aims that existed amongst the political opposition in Catalonia. … This unity would last until 1977 and would ensure that the meeting of Catalan demands became a state priority in the post-Franco era.”122 o More on assembly: “From the late ‘60s, there were secessionist political forces in Catalonia, but they remained broadly subordinated to the assembly of Catalonia, an all- party clandestine association that articulated Catalan demands for democracy (Rubiralta 2004).”123 • Seems there was a government-in-exile for the region, as well, : o “…the regional government in exile officially returned to Catalonia in late 1977 and remained in place until the first regional election was held in 1980.”124 o Violent actions: § Violent militance prior to temporal period: • “…the Front d’Alliberament Catalá (FAC/Liberation Front of Catalonia) tried to use violence against the dictatorship in the early ’70s…”125 • “…the killing of one civilian in 1971”126 § Violent militance during the relevant termporal period: • This reference implies that violent mobilization may have occurred during the wider temporal period:

118 Dowling (2013, p. 95) 119 Dowling (2013, p. 95) 120 Dowling (2013, p. 95) 121 Dowling (2013, p. 95) 122 Dowling (2013, pp. 95-6) 123 de la Calle (2015, p. 93 n. 48) 124 de la Calle (2015, p. 94) 125 de la Calle (2015, p. 93) 126 de la Calle (2015, p. 93)

33 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019

o “…when the Front d’Alliberament Catalá (FAC/Liberation Front of Catalonia) tried to use violence against the dictatorship in the early ‘70s, it found that the only constituency interested in joining the organization was made up of left-wing radicalized immigrants. None of the main separatist political organizations wanted to endorse the FAC because they preferred to stay within the unitary platforms (Vera 1985). In addition, state reaction against terrorist attacks (around one-hundred until the transition period) was clever, either out of rational learning or out of a special treatment for Catalan opposition. For instance, the killing of on civilian in 1971 was sienced by the government, and the FAC did not claim the attack (Rubitalta 2004).”127 • While sourcing on this could be improved, Wikipedia entries imply that violent mobilization took place during the relevant temporal window(s): o “In 1972 a series of FAC militants were captured and tortured. A major section of the movement went into exile, first to Andorra and the Catalan region of France, and later to Brussels. In exile the organization oriented itself towards the left, adopted Marxism-Leninism as its and proclaimed its objective to form a Communist Party of Catalonia. These changes were confirmed at the First Conference of FAC, held in Brussels 1973. FAC started publishing Catalunya Roja. In 1974 the group Revolutionary Left joined FAC. [Paragraph break] The armed operations of FAC were then carried out by a 'Special Organisation' (Organització Especial). In 1975 FAC again suffered a wave of detention and captures. Part of the organisation formed the Catalan Revolutionary Movement (MRC) in 1975, to mobilise popular and legal support to the struggle of FAC. By 1977 both FAC and MRC had ceased to exist.” (“Catalan Liberation Front,” Wikipedia) o Wikipedia page on Catalan People’s Army (in Spanish) puts dates of operation between 1976 and 1980, within the relevant temporal period. See Exèrcit Piopular Català, Wikipedia. § Violent militance in 1980s, after the relevant temporal period: • “Free Land” organization, after relevant temporal period:

127 de la Calle (2015, p. 93)

34 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019

o “A militant separatist group, Free Land (Terre Lluire), operated in the 1980s and early 1990s but disbanded in 1995.”128 o “In Catalonia the group Tierra Lliure (TL, meaning ‘Free Land’) was active with 13 acts of terrorism from 1986 to 1988, killing two people.”129 o “all small Catalan terrorist cells with a nationalist agenda coalesced together in 1979 around (Free Soil)[.]”130 • Additional notes/concerns for future versions: o ERC legally recognized in 1977, but didn’t call for total independence until 1989 (see notes above); this was likely a tactical decision, distinct from situations where former separatists embrace engagement in federalist systems following substantial political change. However, additional corroboration would be required to consider ERC’s pre-1989 actions as separatist. o Additionally, the 1974 date means that the temporal windows just miss the 1977 elections – meaning that clear cut evidence of institutional engagement in institutional contention in the 1977 election (if ERC were counted as separatist) would be missed. § The Franco era ends in 1975, and (excluding Phalangists) parties can’t legally organize till 1977. • “During Franco’s reign, all parties but the Phalangist Party were banned and there were few channels of legal expression of dissent within Spain. Political parties were only allowed to organize early in 1977 and free elections were held for the first time since 1936.”131 § 1974 date for movement most likely connected to following actions/developments: • “Despite its almost total disappearance, ERC managed to survive during the Franco regime, acting either secretly underground or from exile. In 1974 it was re-formed by Heribert Barrera.”132 • Additionally: “CDC…formally came into being in November 1974[.]”133

201 – Giulians (Target: Italy; Year: 1947) Mix of institutional and both violent and nonviolent extra-institutional methods.

Instl_Narrow (1947-49): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1947-49): Yes (Confidence: 1)

128 Beary (2011, p. 311) 129 Engene (2004, p. 132) 130 de le Calle (2015, p. 94) 131 Engene (2004, p. 130) 132 Marcet and Argelaguet (1998, p. 81) 133 Marcet and Argelaguet (1998, p. 72)

35 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 Instl_Wider (1945-49): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1945-49): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: 1

• Summary/write-up: This is an unusual case. It refers to the ethnic mix of people in the region around Trieste, at the top of the Adriatic Sea. Traditionally called the Julian March, this was a frontier zone between Italian, German, and Slavic peoples. It was once an imperial city and had been under Habsburg rule for some time but was under Italian rule during World War II. After the war it was occupied by allied forces who debated what to do with territory – cede it to Italy, cede it to Yugoslavia, or make it independent. Although this was complicated by the advent of the , the various parties went to some lengths in 1945 and 1946 to determine the ethnic contours of the region and devise a way to divide the territory. There were various political parties representing independence (e.g. the Independence Front) or union, and extrainstitutional demonstrations and marches. Finally, as part of the Paris Peace Agreement of 1947, the Free Territory of Trieste was declared – Minahan treats this as a declaration of independence. The result was a territory managed by the UN with some uncertain possibility of becoming truly independent down the line. However, the allied governors struggled to agree on what locals should govern the region – mostly because of rising Cold War disputes – and eventually in 1954 the region was split in half and ceded to both Italy and Yugoslavia. There was some minor violence at points – e.g. Italian extremists with apparently irredentist sympathies attacked Slavic and pro- communist organizations in September 15, 1947, killing three people (Sluga 2001, 144). But the violence levels were insufficient to make the cutoff for the UCDP dataset. Overall, this is an unusual case given the UN administration, but it roughly represents an institutional and extrainstitutional attempt at independence without violence levels high enough to count for UCDP (probably because the city was occupied by allied forces). We did code qualitative observations of violence even though nothing was recorded in the civil war datasets (see UCDP).134

204 – Padania (Target: Italy; Year: 1996)

Mixed institutional and extra-institutional with limited armed action, though so limited as to result in a “No” coding for extra-institutional violent action.

Instl_Narrow (1996-98): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1996-98): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1994-98): Yes (Confidence: 1)

134 In addition to Sluga (1994), this entry draws on Minahan (2002).

36 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 ExtraInstl_Wider (1994-98): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: No ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .5

• “On 15 September 1996 Umberto Bossi [leader of the Northern League political party, which held a number of seats in parliament] symbolically declared the independence of the Federation of Padania at a rally in Lombardy attended by an estimated two million people.”135 o The political participation, i.e. contesting and winning seats in the elections of the state, was within the institutional framework, however, the unilateral declaration was an extra-institutional action. • Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 223) state that “[i]n October 1997, the league organized an election for the Padanian assembly to draw up a constitution for the proposed new state. Although the vote was dismissed as a meaningless joke by most Italians…”. o The organization of separate elections is clearly a non-violent extra-institutional act. • Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 223) go on to state that “[i]n May 1997, armed separatist rebels seized a[n] historic tower in Venice, but government troops recaptured the tower and arrested the rebels without bloodshed.” The Northern League did not claim credit for this act and sought to distance themselves from it.136 o Because of extremely limited nature of armed mobilization, a well as lack of corresponding violence, coding this a “No” for the extra-institutional violent variables. • While outside the date range for the data set, Minahan (2002, p. 1113-1114) states that there were “[s]evere and violent clashes between Lombards [the region central to the Padanian secessionist movement] and immigrant gangs in 1999-2000”. • Overall, this case can be characterized as one in which secessionists initially pursued institutional means and then moved further to extra-institutional means when the system did not accommodate them. 205 – Sardinia I (Target: Italy; Year: 1965)

Largely nonviolent extra-institutional resistance, with mobilization falling short of outright violence. Further investigation might call for changing this coding, but this version codes “No” for extra-institutional violent in both temporal windows. Although there was institutional contention by the Sardinian Action Party, it was autonomist, not secessionist, during the relevant temporal period, resulting in “No” codings for institutional contention.

Instl_Narrow (1965-67): No (Confidence: .75). ExtraInstl_Narrow (1965-67): Yes (Confidence: .5) Instl_Wider (1963-67): No (Confidence: .75)

135 Minahan (2002, p. 1113) 136 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 223)

37 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 ExtraInstl_Wider (1963-67): Yes (Confidence: .5) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: No ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .25

• Background: o “In the late 1960s, a nationalist movement began to emerge as intellectuals rediscovered their local culture and called for the use of Sard in schools.”137 o “The first embryonic appearance of subversion in Sardinia goes back to the second half of the ’60 s. at the time of Gian Giacoo Feltrinelli’s project wanting to transform Sardinia into a Mediterranean . To this end, a guerrilla group connected to the ‘Partisan Action Groups’ was established in the region. Such Partisan Action Group was a sort of embryonic military Marxist – Leninist vanguard whose purpose was to convey local autonomist requests towards a revolutionary strategy, with the collaboration of common criminals like Graziano Mesina.”138 o “In 1968 Sard nationalists attempted to stir up a separatist uprising on the island, but the movement collapsed following arrests and the arrival of Italian troops.”139 o “More moderate nationalists used threats of separatism to pressure the Italian government for more autonomy and for the development for the economically backward and bandit-infested island.”140 • History of Sardinian Action Party: o “Unlike the Lega Nord (Northern League), Sardinia’s stateless nationalist and regionalist parties (SNRPs) have failed to pose a major threat to the territorial integrity of the Italian state or to catalyse constitutional reforms in Italy . But Sardinia is an interesting case for several reasons. The Partito Sardo d’Azione (Sardinian Action Party) is the oldest SNRP in Italy, and was the first to demand autonomy and recognition of its nationhood within the modern Italian state .”141 o “The first party congress was held on 16 April 1921 in Oristano, making the Psd’Az ‘the first and most important autonomist movement’ as well as one of the oldest surviving parties of any kind in Italy (Vallauri , 1994: 199). 1 In the elections tha t year, the party won 36% of the popular vote, establishing itself as a mass movement for the autonomy of Sardinia. In the following year, the party developed a more specific political orientation as a republican -federalist party during its second Congress. ‘ First Sards, then Italians ’ was the message of the first Sardista demonstration in Cagliari organized [p. 4] by the Psd’Az (Cubeddu, 1995: 270).

137 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 265) 138 Gnosis (Feb. 2005). "Sardinia a political laboratory" 139 Minahan (2002, p. 1664) 140 Minahan (2002, p. 1664) 141 Hepburn (2009, p. 1)

38 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 The party did not want independence, but rather a clear federal Italian pact. It also made references to the creation of a Federazione mediterranea, a theme that would occur in later party programmes ( Mattone , 1982: 74; Cubeddu, 1995: 270).”142 o “The rump of the Partito Sardo d’Azione, under the direction of Lussu, re-emerged following the fall of in Italy in 1943 after years in exile. By this time, the autonomist movement had come to mean many different things for different groups[.]”143 o “…the party was still considerably large and influential (with 40,000 members, making it the strongest mass party on the island), and set about developing a constitutional programme : ‘the Psd’Az is firmly convin ced that only a restructuring of the state along republican -federal lines will save and reinforce national unity, guarantee and intensify the exercise of individual, communal and regional rights, and allow for the realisation of a substantive social justice’ (cited in Melis , 1982: 30).”144 o Splits in Psd’Az: § “The Psd’Az suffered another severe set -back in 1948. Emilio Lussu, the party’s best - known protagonist, decided that he was tired of accommodating the conservative -moderate elements in the party, and established his own Partito Sardo d’Azione Socialista (Psdas) in order to revive the socialist sardism of the post -First World War era. During the elections that year, the Psd’Az obtained 10.5% of the vote with seven seats in the Assembly, and the Socialist Psd’Az took 6.6% and three seats. The split served to benefit neither party: ‘one lost its radical wing and found itself weakened in the face of moderate Christian democracy, the other, viewed with suspicion as a potential rival by the communist party, was never able to find its own niche’ (Addis Saba , 1982: 135) . Lussu’s Psdas finally merged with the Partito Socialista Italiano in 1949, which thereafter became more favourably disposed towards greater regionalisation of Italy. Meanwhile, the Partito Sardo d’Azione – having lost its socialist strand – veered to the right and began a long collaboration with the Christian Democrats, which was to last until the 1980s when the party moved again to the Left.” 145 § “The precarious position of the Psd’Az was soon reversed as it began to take advantage of the burgeoning success of a new cultural nationalist movement, known as neo-sardismo. This movement, which was based on the demand for the use of the Sard language in schools and the media, and the maintenance of Sardinian cultural traditions, soon gained considerable popular success in the late 1960s . The expression of Sardinian identity was one of the mantles taken up by the militant student movement, and was supported by intellectuals and cultural associations across the island. Indeed, a number of organisations were established during the early

142 Hepburn (2009, pp. 3-4) 143 Hepburn (2009, p. 4) 144 Hepburn (2009, p. 4) 145 Hepburn (2009, pp. 4-5)

39 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 1970s that sought to achieve these explic itly socio-cultura l goals. The movement soon acquired political overtones, namely a demand for independence based on territorial and cultural grievances that were framed in the language of anti -colonialism and ‘third- worldism’ . Its new political protagonists included Il Fro nte Indipendentista Sardo , Sardinnya e Libertat , Democrazia Proletaria Sarda and Su Populu Sardo . The latter organisation, established in 1973, was a militant student group that temporarily merged with the Psd’Az in 1981 (it would later split away again to form a competitor nationalist party in Sardinia, Sardignia Natzione ). As a result of this, and the Psd’Az ’s adoption of specifically cultural and linguistic goals, the party enjoyed a boom in electoral support, and in 1985 the Psd’Az received over 15% of the vote across the island, which increased to over 20% in Oristano and quarters of Cagliari.”146 o “The involvement of the Psd’Az in the neo- sardism movement had other effects on its organisation and policy. The party adopted many of the neo -sardist movement ’s goals , such as making the Sard language official in public institutions and taught in schools. Prior to this, the party had rarely mentioned language in its policies and goals (Clark, 1980: 452). Most significantly, the party officially changed its main go al from federalism to supporting independence in 1979- 80 (Petrosino , 1988). This led many neo-sardisti to join the party, thus expanding and diversifying the party’s membership. In response to its new membership, the Psd’Az moved again to the left. However , the goal of independence was unclear. The party argued that its support for independence was ‘functional’ but did not detract from their goal of reforming the Italian state on the basis of a federal constitution. This ambivalence frustrated its new members, leading to internal divisions and the creation of a new political party with the explicit goal of creating an independent Sardinia along socialist lines (see below). The Psd’Az itself, having lost its militant wing, thereafter engaged in a governing coalition with the left (the Communists and Socialists) and others (PRI and PSDI) in 1984-89.”147 o More on the transition to embracing independence as a goal: “…the XIX Congress of the PSd’Az held in 1979. At this congress, the young leadership took over the organizational offices and put forward a clear-cut program calling for independence.”148 o Participation in European institutional politics beginning mid-1980s: § “These Europhile aspects of its programme and rhetoric allowed the Psd’Az to position itself as the most pro- European and Europe-savvy party in Sardinia. And with the introduction of direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979, this opened up a new and important channel for the Psd’Az to advance its territorial project. When it first competed in European elections in 1984, the Psd’Az managed to elect one of its representatives, Mario Melis, to the European Parliament (see Table 1).”149 • Additional notes on extra-institutional contention:

146 Hepburn (2009, pp. 6-7) 147 Hepburn (2009, p. 7) 148 de le Calle (2015, p. 217) 149 Hepburn (2009, p. 8)

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o Around discussion of 1979 PSd’Az embracing independence: “the minority refused to endorse the electoral path and kept working on the fringes of the system. Even though not explicitly backing the use of violence, they toyed with the idea for a while. This idea was not new to the island: Simon Mossa, a leaing theorist of the separatist branch of the PSd’Az, had already written in the late ‘60s [work embracing the possibility of armed action…] Mossa was unable to develop these thoughts in detail because he died in 1971, before the emergence of the second-wave of Sardinian nationalists. Yet, the theme of violence received straightforward condemnation during the years of the Bilingual campaign.”150 • Additional Notes/Concerns: o In future versions, it may make more sense to use 1968 over 1965 as the year for this movement. Using 1965 means that the 1968 uprising, mentioned above, falls outside the relevant temporal period. Additionally, as also mentioned the neo-sardist movement seems to have occurred towards the end of 1960s. Use of 1965 misses these potentially important developments. o On institutional contention, the Sardinian Action Party does not explicitly adopt independence as a goal until after the relevant temporal periods. This may be a tactical consideration, as with other movements. In the interim, giving it a .75 confidence.

206 – South Tyrol (Target: Italy; Year: 1965) Instl_Narrow (1965-67): Yes (Confidence: .75) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1965-67): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1963-67): Yes (Confidence: .75) ExtraInstl_Wider (1963-67): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .75

• Background: o “In 1957, 35,000 southern Tiroleans rallied with shouts of Los von Trient (“quit Trento”). The party representing the German minority, the Sudtiroler Volkspartei (SVP), became more militant and withdrew from the regional council. Tensions rose, and a terrorist campaign, waged by Befreiungs Ausschuss Sudtirol, began in 1957. Finally, after lengthy negotiations between the SVP and the Austrian and Italian governments, a new autonomy statute was enacted in 1969.”151 • Extra-Institutional Violence:

150 de la Calle (2015, p. 217) 151 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 278)

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o From the late 1950s the discontent in South Tyrol made itself violently felt in the appearance of the Befreiungsausschuss Südtirol (BAS)[.] From 1957 onwards this organization launched a campaign of terrorist attacks, mainly directed at material targets and targets symbolic of South Tyrol’s position as a part of Italy… The aim of his campaign was to force through a political solution to the South Tyrol conflict based on the principle of self-determination that the BAS hoped would reunite the province with . The conflict was thus raised to the bilateral Italian-Austrian level and in 1964 a tentative agreement was reached that met a number of the demands advocated by the South Tyrolese. However the most important political party among the German- speaking population, the Südtiroler Volkspartei (SVP), did not trust the promises of the Italian government, and the party declined to support the agreement. Continued negotiations followedand finally, in 1969, a deal was struck that was supported by the SVP.”152 o Violence by the BAS: § “As negotiations gave promise of a solution to the conflict, the BAS turned in the extreme right direction, partly under Austrian influences. The organization continued its attacks against targets representing the Italian state, such as border and customs posts, and their actions started to claim lives. A total of 14 people were killed by the BAS in the course of the campaign that lasted until 1969.”153 • Engene puts the BAS campaign at 231 actions with 14 deaths, and active from 1957-69. There was another campaign from 1986-88, but this is far outside the temporal scope. (Engene 2004; see Table 6.9 on p. 136) • 1957-69 embraces both the narrow and wider temporal periods for extra-institutional contention, generally, and its violent component, in particular. o Nonviolent extra-institutional: § Violent extra-institutional conflict was the main thrust of this movement. Haven’t seen mentions of nonviolent extra-institutional conflict during relevant time period(s). • Institutional: o SVP’s actions during the relevant time period can be considered separatist, in broad sense: § “In 1957, Silvius Magnago became the chairman of the South Tyrolean People’s Party (Südtiroler Volkspartei, SVP). The party was founded on 8 May 1945. Initially, its main goals were to assert claims to self-determination and to find a solution to the question of how to deal with those who had opted to emigrate to the German Reich but after the war had desired to return to South Tyrol. Over the course of the 1950s and, in particular, after Magnago became the chairman of the party, the calls for provincial autonomy became stronger and stronger within the SVP. Since its inception, the South Tyrolese had disliked the union

152 Engene (2004, p. 140) 153 Engene (2004, p. 140)

42 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019

with Trentino.”154 § “The party conference in 1957 markd a turning-point in the party line when a new leadership changed the course towards a nationalist and more radical policy that aimed at separation not only from Rome but also from Trentiny. The attitude towards the Roman government can be described as pragmatic and calculated, whereby the SVP hoped to gain more autonomy. It is worth point out that in contrast to the Lega Nord the SVP never aspired to ‘overthrow’ the Iralian government,even if according to them it was competent. The subsequent agreements, such as the ‘package agreement in 1969 and recent confirmations of the autonomous statute, can be seen as a consequence of the tactics chosen by the SVP.”155 § SVP participated in 1964 and 1968 provincial elections156

207 – Serbs (Target: Croatia; Year: 1992) Largely/ entirely extra-institutional with the presence of violence

Instl_Narrow (1992-94): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1992-94): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1990-94): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1990-94): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: 1

• The Serbs and Croatians, while occupying the same lands for many years, have been subject to different cultural influences, with Croatians having a largely Western European Roman Catholic orientation and Serbs traditionally being Eastern Orthodox under the influence of the Byzantines, Turks, and Russians.157 • The Serbs comprised approximately 15% of the Croatian population at the time of Croatia’s independence from the Yugoslav state in 1992 and mostly lived in the regions of Slavonia and Krajina.158 • External support for independence in these areas was critical in this case, and “with the aid of the Serb-dominated Yugoslavian army, Serbs in Krajina and Slavonia seceded from Croatia and established Serbian autonomous regions (SARs) throughout those areas.”159 o This is an example of extra-institutional action

154 Lantschner (2008, p. 11) 155 Holzer and Schwegler (1998, p. 164) 156 Holzer and Schwegler (1998, p. 159) 157 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 77) 158 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 77) 159 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 77)

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• Violence followed and, although outside the time scope for this project, in 1995 “the Croatian army reconquered the bulk of the … territories in Krajina and western Slavonia, forcing Croatian Serbs to flee to Bosnia and Serbia proper.”160 o This is evidence for extra-institutional violence • Additional Notes o Background on Yugoslav state breakdown and Croatian independence: § “On 25th June 1991, the Republics of Croatia and Slovenia unilaterally declared their independence, after unsuccessful negotiations on either a confederative solution or independence.”161 • Serbian moves against newly-declared Croatian Republic: o “At the same time, the JNA [Yugoslav People’s ] reinforcements that had been sent to the Serbian enclaves in Croatia clashed with Croatian forces, following the foundation of their self-proclaimed ‘Serbian Autonomous District’, which refused to recognise Croatian authorities and began demanding annexation to Serbia.”162 § Given that the Serbs did not recognize the Croatian government, this provides evidence that this secessionist movement did not utilize institutional channels. o “On 7th September 1991, when the Peace Conference was opened under the auspices of the European Community, Serbian paramilitary formations and JNA units established control over almost a third of the Republic of Croatia territory and Yugoslav federal institutions to a large degree ceased to operate.”163 § Armed mobilization in wider temporal period o “Many truces were agreed under the sponsorship of the European Community, all of which were ineffective until the

permanent cessation of hostilities entered into force on 3rd January 1992. That ceasefire ensured the implementation of plans for establishment of the UN peacekeeping force (UNPROFOR) in the conflict zones of Croatia. [Paragraph Break] The new Yugoslav State, composed only of the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro, was proclaimed in

Belgrade, on 27th April. Croatia and Slovenia obtained the general international recognition with its acceptance to the membership of the UN, on 22nd May 1992.”164

160 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 77) 161 Radovic (2004, p. 33) 162Radovic (2004, p. 33) 163 Radovic (2004, p. 34) 164 Radovic (2004, p. 34)

44 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 § While ceasefire very early in calendar year 1992, any actions beforehand count as armed/violent mobilization in narrow temporal window. Additionally, any maintenance of armed units following cessation of hostilies would support violent contention coding.

208 – Montenegro (Target: Yugoslavia; Year: 2006) Largely/ entirely institutional contention. Though the “yes” campaign for the referendum utilized rallies and propaganda such as billboards, these were targeting voters, and not the state. In other words, these actions were in concert with the institutional campaign, and were aimed at voter turnout. Thus, coding a “no” for extra-institutional conflict, though with lower confidence reflecting concerns over this judgement.

Instl_Narrow (2006-08): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (2006-08): No (Confidence: .5) Instl_Wider (2004-08): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (2004-08): No (Confidence: .5) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: No ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .5

• Montenegro held an independence referendum on 21 May 2006, where 55.5% of the population voted to secede from Yugoslavia, meeting the 55% minimum set by the the . • The referendum results were recognized by all permanent members of the Security Council and the European Union and the Assembly of the Republic of Montenegro made a formal Declaration of Independence on 3 June 2006. • Institutional: o Party-Action: § “The situation in Montenegro changed after the ouster of Milošević in 2000. The government and the opposition in Montenegro, which had previously defined themselves through their relationship to Milošević, reconstituted their political identities. Since the Montenegrin government boycotted the federal presidential elections in 2000, an alliance was created between the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (Demokratska opozicija Srbije, DOS) and the SNP. The SNP affirmed their commitment to the preservation of the federal state with Serbia and attracted the votes of those who self-declared as Serbs after 2003 (Jenne and Bieber 2014; Džankić 2014). The DPS, which opposed Milošević, became the proponent of Montenegrin independence and a separate Montenegrin . Other minorities, including Albanian, Bosniak/Muslim and Croat, were supportive of Montenegrin independence. According to Bieber (2003), since 1998, the DPS attracted the non-Serb minorities through its rhetoric on multiculturalism and

45 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019

inclusiveness, thus ‘instrumentalizing’ their votes to stay in power.”165 o Referendum: § “Earlier this week, the Montenegro Referendum Commission formally confirmed the result of the referendum, in which 55.5% of the people voted to secede from Serbia, just above the necessary threshold of 55%.”166 § Referendum process laid out by Montenegrin legislature in 2006: • See Teslik (2006): “In order to win EU recognition of the legitimacy of the referendum, Montenegro agreed to structure the vote such that a 55 percent majority is necessary to legally secure independence. Under the terms of the 2003 agreement that bound Serbia and Montenegro federally, Montenegro could not appeal for secession for three years, making this is the first chance for separatists. […] That number was officially set by the Montenegrin parliament in February, when they laid out the terms of the referendum.”167 § “From 1997 until the country became independent in 2006, Montenegrin politics was dominated by strong internal divisions over whether Montenegro should be an independent state and an equally intense discord over whether Montenegrins were a separate nation or a sub-group of Serbs (Morrison 2009). The intensity of internal Montenegrin struggle was mirrored in the results of the 2006 referendum, whereby the number of voters that supported Montenegro’s independence exceeded the required threshold of 55% set by the European Union (EU) by 2095 votes (CDT 2006). The restrictive Montenegrin citizenship regime, established between 2006 and 2008, is a consequence of the country’s political trajectory.”168 • Extra-Institutional o Armed or Violent: § Other than the reconstitution of Monenegrin armed forces, no evidence of any armed/violent mobilization. Since this follows success, rather than forming part of the campaign leading to it, will not count this. o Nonviolent/Unarmed: § Efforts appear to have largely been within institutional channels; see also Vuković (2010). § However, some street-level mobilization to support efforts through institutional channels. • “The government’s independence campaign took a positive note from the beginning, starting with a large rally in the old royal capital

165 Zuber and J. Džankić (2017, p. 213) 166 BBC (2006). “Montenegro declares independence.” 167 Teslik (2006)o 168 Dzankic (2012, p. 338)

46 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 of Cetinje and targeting youth, its pro-independence core of Montenegrin loyalists and the national minorities.”169 • “In an effort to reach the minorities, the independence forces placed ‘da’ billboards throughout the country, using both Cyrillic and Latin alphabets, depending on the ethnic makeup of the local population. There were also billboards in Albanian, bearing the word ‘po’ (Albanian for ‘yes’). This was a contrast to the unionists’ exclusive use of Cyrillic. [paragraph break] The independence campaign ended with a massive rally in Podgorica’s Square of the Republic on 18 May, three days before the referendum. Over 40,000 people attended, wearing red ‘da’ t-shirts and waving red and gold Montenegrin flags. Afterwards independence supporters drove around the city waving flags and honking car horns until the early morning.”170 § Nevertheless, because the targets of these actions are really voters, not the state, and because this is mobilization to turn out voters for an institutional effort, will not count it as extra-institutional conflict.

209 – Macedonia (Target: Yugoslavia; Year: 1991) Initially institutional contention, supplemented by extra-institutional non-violent contention

Instl_Narrow (1991-93): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1991-93): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1989-93): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1989-93): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: No ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .75

• “[W]hen secessionist movements began to strengthen in Slovenia and Croatia, Macedonia … [began to fear] the prospect of finding itself once again in a Yugoslavian state dominated by Serbia. That and the Macedonian Communist Party’s relinquishing of its monopoly of power paved the way for pro-independence proposals to be enacted by the legislature, and in 1991, Macedonia declared itself a .”171 o Passing of generally supportive legislation in the local legislature is an example of institutional action (in the wider time frame). • “When war broke out in Croatia and Bosnia in 1991 and 1992 and given the continuing tense situation in neighbouring Kosovo … a 1,000-member UN force, largely American, was dispatched to Macedonia [in 1993].”172

169 ICG (May 2006, p. 5) 170 ICG (May 2006, p. 5) 171 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 178) 172 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 178)

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o This does not meet the prerequisite for violence, and as there is no indication that the peacekeeprs were dispatched due to potential imminent violence on behalf of separatists, a violence rating of zero will be applied. • Institutional: o “25 January 1991: The Sobranje [Macedonian legislature] unanimously adopted a declaration of Macedonia’s sovereignty, including a statement of its right to secede from the SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] […] 7 June 1991: The Sobrange changed the state’s name to the Republic of Macedonia; among other constitutional amendments and against a background of increasing tension in Croatia and Slovenia, which were attempting to secede from the deferation, the Sobranje declared Macedonian neutrality and also provided that it alone could authorize a state of emergency (this was done on 4 August). [line break] 8 September 1991: Some 95% of the two-thirds of eligible voters who participated in the referendum were in favour of an independent and sovereign Macedonia; the large ethnic Albanian minority boycotted the poll. [line break] October 1991: Croatia and Slovenia declared their final independence. The IMRO---DPMNU announced that it was to leave the Government, following the resignation of Georgievski as Vice-Presient. Later, the Macedonian Government announced that more than 60% of federal bases in the republic had been evacuated; the total withdrawl of federal troops was completed in March of the following year. [line break] 17 November 1991: The new Constitution was enacted, despite opposition from the majority of the ethnic Albanian deputies and three of the IMRO---DPMNU deputies; with the promulgation of the new Constitution Macedonia was declared to be an independent country.”173 § Above seems sufficient reason to include an institutional contention coding of Yes within the narrow temporal window. • Nonviolent Extra-Institutional: o “July 1992: Following a vote of ‘no confidence’ passed in the Sobranje, and after demonstrations by more than 100,000 people in the capital protesting at its failure to gain recognition for an independent Macedonia, the Government resigned.”174 § Demonstration aimed at putting pressure on institutional system, presumably, in addition to potentially audiences elsewhere in Yugoslavia. • Violent/Armed Extra-Institutional: o Successor state military following success does not count for coding violent/armed action. No evidence apparent that would merit a positive coding for violence in either temporal window.

173 Europa Publications (2003, p. 154) 174 European Publications (2003, p. 154)

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210 – Croatia (Target: Yugoslavia; Year: 1991) Institutional contention followed by extra-institutional violent contention

Instl_Narrow (1991-93): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1991-93): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1989-93): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1989-93): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .5

• “As had been the case when Yugoslavia was a kingdom, Croats chafed under the power wielded by Serbia in the central government [after World War II, when Croatia became part of the Yugoslav Communist state]. During a period of liberalization from 1969 to 1971, Croation nationalist sentiments were frequently expressed, and these tendencies were strengthened by the support of Croatian émigré groups in Europe and the United States. In 1971, the central government in Belgrade, fearing a threat to national unity, launched a crackdown and purged and imprisoned Croat politicians and intellectuals, including Franjo Trudjman, who became president of the Croatian republic in 1990.”175 • “In 1990, with the weakening of Communist rule in Eastern Europe and the ascension to power in Belgrade of the Serb nationalist, Slobodan Milosevic, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), founded and led by Franjo Trudjman, won 75 percent of the vote in the Croatian elections.”176 o This is an example of institutional action in the wider time period (the election of pro-independence members of a recognized parliament). • “In 1991, Croatia, along with Slovenia, Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzogovina declared independence from Yugoslavia, touching off a war between Croatia and the rump Yugoslav state, which now consisted of only Serbia and Montenegro.”177 This was achieved by an act of the Croatian parliament. o This is an example of institutional action in the narrow time frame (declaration of independence by the relevant parliament) followed by extra-institutional violent action in the narrow time frame (war with the state from which the region is seeking to secede). • “In 1992, the new Croatian state was recognized by the European Community and the United States.”178

175 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 77) 176 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 77) 177 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 77) 178 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 77)

49 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 211 – Bosnia (Target: Yugoslavia; Year: 1992) Initially largely institutional contention, followed by extra-institutional efforts including (if not entirely consisting of) armed mobilization. While Bosnia nominally achieved its goal of independence through institutional means, the ensuing civil wars accompanying the and the secession of other successor republics led to armed mobilization to maintain and protect the independence of Bosnia.

Instl_Narrow (1992-94): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1992-94): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1990-1994): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1990-94): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .5

• Institutional: o Bosnians voted in favour of a 1992 independence referendum in response to the increasing instability of the Yugoslav state, with the support of Bosnia’s President, Alija Izetbegovic, whose political position was in favour of maintaining Bosnia as a multiethnic state of Serbs, Croats, and .179 § This is an example of an institutional action, albeit in exceptional circumstances, as independence was attained through elected officials acting in a democratic manner. • “However, an analysis of the voting … reveals a pronounced and persistent split along ethnic lines, with Muslims and Croats generally favouring independence, because of their fears of Serb domination, and Serbs opposing it.”180 Indeed, “[t]he Bosnian Serbs boycotted the vote…” and, subsequent to Bosnia’s declaration of independence, “their leaders partitioned Bosnia and forced non-Serbs in their Serb-designated zone to leave.”181 These actions were reciprocated in Bosniak and Croat areas and led to full-scale civil war.182 • “The Bosnian government’s declaration of independence was recognized by several Western governments on April 6, 1992. Initial Serb campaigns in 1992 rapidly led to the capture of about 60 percent of Bosnia’s territory, gains that remained basically intact until the fighting ended in autumn 1995. ”183 • Extra-Institutional o On armed mobilization:

179 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 50) 180 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 50) 181 Beary (2011, p. 280) 182 Beary (2011, p. 280) 183 Baskin and Pickering (2011, p. 285)

50 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 § “Along with the acceptance of TO BH as their armed forces, the BH Presidency, ie it muslim [sic] part started the negotiations with the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of SFRJ […] The period of unsuccessful negotiations with JNA and Yugoslavia ends on 20 June 1992, when the BH Presidency declares the state of war.”184 § Armed mobilization: “After the conflict had broken out in Sarajevo, the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina proclaimed, on 8 April [1992], the Territorial defence its armed force, which met with the energetic reaction of the political leadership of BH Croats.”185 § “The Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina had least reasons for satisfaction. At the end of 1992, it had under its control the most unfavourable ratio between the number of people and the area it controlled. Unlike HVO, BH Army transformed into a corps organization of a JNA model, creating the units of a manoeuvre structure, and those of a territorial structure.”186 § Armed struggle as much of Bosnian territory occupied by Serb forces: • “International negotiators succeeded in compelling Croat forces in Herzegovina and the Bosnian government to cooperate against Serb forces by forming a federation in early 1994. By mid-1995, Serb forces became increasingly assertive, culminating in their conquest of Srebrenica in the largest single post–World War II European massacre. Soon afterward, NATO air intervention and a Bosniac- Croat offensive ended the fighting and led to U.S.-led negotiations in Dayton, Ohio, in November 1995. Most estimates hold that between 200,000 and 300,000 people died in the conflict.”187 o Nonviolent Extra-Institutional § Request for EC recognition: “Muslim and Croatian politicians kept on pushing for independence and in December 1991 the [BH] Presidency submitted a request for diplomatic recognition by the European Community.”188 • Request for European recognition in 1991, prior to 1992 referendum. Counting this as extra-institutional nonviolent in wider time frame.

212 – Kosovo (Target: Yugoslavia; Year: 2008)

Instl_Narrow (2008-10): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (2008-10): Yes (Confidence: 1)

184 Marijan (2004, p. 263) 185 Marijan (2004, p. 262) 186 Marijan (2004, p. 265) 187 Baskin and Pickering (2011, p. 286) 188 Radovic (2004, p. 35)

51 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 Instl_Wider (2006-10): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (2006-10): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: 1

This is a tough case to code since the movement had been running since the early 1980s and it’s not clear that is ever formally stopped (Coggins and Griffiths code it as one continuous movement). This creates a problem if we want to catch the right moment in the movement, because there are different circumstances between 1981, 1991, 1998, and 2008. In this case we went with 2008 as a way to catch the birth of the state that year and not have this key event be excluded from the dataset. Kosovo declared independence on February 17, 2008 under UN administration. This is counted in COW as the birth of the state even though its formal recognition is somewhat mixed. The movement was clearly institutional with multiple political parties advocating independence and running on that platform within a UN-managed democratic electoral system. Of course, this wasn’t through institutions of the Serbian state but the UN – a distinction that needs to be made. In addition, there were ample marches and protests and that sort of thing (for and against independence) so I coded extra-institutional methods. I noted qualitative observations of non- violent violent extra-institutional stuff like the protests on February 10, 2007 by Vetëvendosje, a radical independence group that opposed the orderly UN process. They planned destructive activity and some people were killed in the resulting riots. This is low-level stuff, to be sure, and it wasn’t aimed at the Serbian state. But it was violent, and ultimately the UN came because of considerable violence. Overall, we coded this as a full movement (INST, NV, and V).189

213 –Slovenia (Target: Yugoslavia; Year: 1990) Initially institutional contention followed by extra-institutional violent contention

Instl_Narrow (1990-92): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1990-92): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1988-92): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1988-92): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .5

• “A Slovenian independence movement gained strength and legitimacy in the 1980s. The establishment of independent trade unions, political parties, open elections, and a relatively free press, combined with the deterioration of the central government of the Yugoslav federation … gave Slovenians the means to vote themselves out of Yugoslavia in 1991.”190

189 This summary draws on Beary (2011), Hewitt & Cheatham (2000), Geldenhuys (2009), and Minahan (2002). 190 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 272)

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o This is an example of an environment characterized by widespread extra- institutional capacity building for independence, although it does not appear to be linked to any particular independence movement. • In December 1990, a referendum on independence was held in Slovenia, which passed with 88.2 percent in favor, with a voter turnout of 93.2 percent.191 o This is an example of institutional action in the narrow timeframe. • “In 1991, as the central control of the Yugoslavian state deteriorated, Slovenia seceded from the federation and declared independence.”192 o This is an example of institutional action in the narrow timeframe. • Following the declaration, there was a brief war fought between Solvenia and Yugoslavia, in which Slovenia was successful in defending their territory.193 o This is an example of extra-institutional violent action in the narrow timeframe (war fought against the state from whom independence is sought). • “In 1992, Slovenia was recognized as a sovereign nation by the European Community.”194 • Institutional: o “Throughout the eighties national tensions increasingly heightened while the federal power weakened before the growing assertiveness of the republics. This process was significantly accelerated with the end of the one-party rule of 1990 and multi-party elections held in all 6 republics. The nationalist parties (DEMOS in Slovenia and the Croatian Democratic Union in Croatia) did well everywhere, while the new Slovenian and Croatian governments started pushing towards confederation and, finally, independence.”195 • Extra-Institutional: o “The Slovene government declared independence on June 25, 1991, following careful preparations for defense that effectively stymied an ill-prepared JNA (Yugoslav People’s Army) offensive. By June 30, Serbian leaders ordered the JNA to prepare to abandon Slovenia. There were eight military and five civilian deaths among the Slovenes, and thirty-nine members of the JNA died. Slovenian independence was formally acknowledged on July 18.”196 § Military efforts constitute violent extra-institutional mobilization. o While there were protests within Slovenia, some or all of these seem to have been directed at nationalists, rather than by nationalists: § “During wartime, exclusivist leaders succeeded in deflecting the effect of citizen-initiated protests that had become common in the late 1980s through 1991 in Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia.”197

191 Refer Republic of Slovenia Government Communications Office (2000). 192 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 272) 193 Refer Niebuhr (2011, p. 506) 194 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 272) 195 Radovic (2004, pp. 32-33) 196 Baskin and Pickering (2011, p. 284) 197 Baskin and Pickering (2011, p. 299)

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• Exclusivist leaders appear to be nationalist leaders; these protests thus wouldn’t appear to be part of the secessionist movement. Coding “No” for nonviolent extra-institutional mobilization, though further corroboration would increase confidence.

214 – Serbs (Target: Bosnia; Year: 1992) Largely/ entirely non-institutional with violence. While Serb leaders within Bosnia participated in institutional politics within that republic, they boycotted the institutional attempts to separate Bosnia from the Yugoslav federation. When faced with the success of these institutional efforts , they took extra-institutional steps in an attempt to sever the so-called “” from Bosnia territory.

Instl_Narrow (1992-94): No (Confidence: .75) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1992-94): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1990-94): No (Confidence: .75) ExtraInstl_Wider (1990-94): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: 1

• Bosnian Serbs were generally opposed to the 1992 move by Bosnia secede from the Serbian-dominated Yugoslav state, while Bosnian Croats and Muslims generally supported independence.198 • Subsequent to Bosnia’s declaration of independence, Bosnian Serb “leaders partitioned Bosnia and forced non-Serbs in their Serb-designated zone to leave…” in cycle of escalating violence which resulted in the July 1995 murder of 8,000 Bosniaks in Srebrenica by the Bosnian Serb army and police.199 o This is an example of extra-institutional action, in the unilateral declaration of independence without following an institutional process, and also one that subsequently resulted in violence. o The violence in 1995 is outside the timeline under consideration for this project, however the violence leading up to this event is relevant. • While out of scope for the timeline of this project, “[t]he war ended with the signing of the of an agreement in Dayton, Ohio, in November 1995. The terms of the agreement provided the Bosnian Serbs their own autonomous entity, Republica Srpska, as part of an independent Bosnia.”200

198 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 50), Beary (2011, p. 280). 199 Beary (2011, p. 280) 200 Beary (2011, p. 280)

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• “On January 1992, the SDS politicians proclaimed the formation of the ‘Srpska Republika of Bosnia-Herzegovina’ (later abbreviated to the ‘Republika Srpska’) stating that the proclamation will be realised should Bosnia-Herzegovina be recognised as an independent state. By means of this proclamation the SDS leadership obviously wanted to exclude the possibility of the Serb-inhabited districts of Bosnia-Herzegovina (including those where they were a minority) being left out of the Yugoslav Federation. At the same time, they asserted that they did not consider the Bosnian President and Ministry of Foreign Affairs to be legitimate representatives of Serbian people of BiH abroad any more. Also, they accused the Muslim and Croatian communities of actually destroying by their decision to proceed towards independence (pushing by force the Serbian community into their proclamation) the foundation on which that federal unit had been constituted. Nevertheless, the SDS leadership continues to formally participate in the republic bodies.”201 o Evidence of extra-institutional mobilization. • Attempts to fight institutional efforts of Bosnia to secede from Yugoslavia: o “…in January 1992, the SDA and HDZ members of parliament voted for a referendum on the independence of the republic, to meet the conditions for recognition imposed by the European Community. […] The SDS leadership refused to acknowledge the legality of this decision… One day prior to the holding of the referendum, Radovan Karadžic, leader of the SDS, stated that the referendum did not exist for Serbs and that would neither prevent nor obstruct it. Then he proposed division of the republic into ethnic cantons as a solution to the BiH problems.”202

215 – Croats (Target: Bosnia; Year: 1992) Appears largely or entirely extra-institutional.

Instl_Narrow (1992-94): No (Confidence .75) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1992-94): Yes (Confidence 1) Instl_Wider (1990-94): No (Confidence .75) ExtraInstl_Wider (1990-94): Yes (Confidence 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .5

• Extra-Institutional: o “Milošević and Tudjman’s talks in March 1991 set in motion a series of lower-level discussions and partition plans. Tudjman met with hard-line HDZ members from Bosnia in June 1991, and together they came with a agreement that the ‘Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina must finally undertake a decisive and active policy which will lead to the realization of our age-old dream—a common Croatian state. Moderate HDZ

201 Radovic (2004, p. 35) 202 Radovic (2004, pp. 35-6)

55 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 leadership in the person of Stjepan Klujić was still in charge in Bosnia, but from this point forward their opposition to the national regionalization push by the SDS was undermined.”203 o “plans were mad by the HDZ leadership for the establishment of ‘Croatian regions’ within SRBH. This found initial expresson with the proclamation by local HDZ party officials of a ‘Coatian Community of Bosanska Posavina’ incorporating eight municipalities in northwest Bosnia on 12 November 1991 (fig. 3.1). This seeming copycat ethnoterritorialism was tempered by the fact that the expressed purpose of the bosy was to ‘unify all political activities in the defense of the sovereighnty and integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to strengthen the Croatian population in it’). A week later on 18 November 1991 HDZ party officials fom western Herzegovina announced the formation of a more expansive and ambitious ‘Croatian Community of Herceg- Bosna’ (…HZ H-B)… In this instance there was no public statement about defending [p. 105] the territorial integrity of Bosnia.”204 o “The preamble to the declaration establishing the HZ H-B declared that it came into being by a decision of the ‘Croats of Hosnia and Herzegovina,’ that it was established by ‘government representatives of the Croatian people in Bosnia and Heregovina,’ and that its purpose was the ‘defense of Croatian ethnic and historical territories and the Croatian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina.’ Though he held no elective office, Boban was appointed as president of the new entity.”205 § This is non-violent extra-institutional action; creation of ‘parallel institutions’ o “The Bosnian declaration of independence [from Yugoslavia] led Bosnian Serbs to declare their territories an independent state, the Republic of Srpska, under the leadership of Radovan Karadzic. By 1994, aided by the truncated Yugoslav state in Belgrade, Serbian military forces under General Ratko Mladic had taken control of over 70 percent of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. […] With encouragement from Zagreb, Bosnian Croats seized control of territory inhabited by Croats and engaged in military battles with Muslims, declaring Croatian areas of Bosnia to be the new state of Herzeg-Bosnia.”206 § Extra-institutional armed mobilization • More Background on HDZ, regarding whether or not to count their efforts as institutional: o “In Bosnia, however, the HDZ of BiH was the major political party of Bosnian Croats in the Republic of BiH. One of the proclaimed goals of the HDZ of BiH was to ‘ensure the right of Croatian nation to the self-determination up to secession’. [Paragraph break] ‘The Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia’ (HZ H-B) proclaimed its existence on 18th November 1991, claiming to be a separate and clearly expressed ‘political, cultural, economic and territorial entity’ in the territory of BiH. One of its aims was the establishment of closer relations or unity with Croatia, which is indicated by the use of the Croatian currency and language in the HZ H-B, and granting of the Croatian

citizenship to Bosnian Croats by Croatia... On 28th August 1993, the (HR H-B) proclaimed itself ‘the Croatian Republic of Herzeg Bosnia’ (HR H-B), at the head of which there were a President and Vice president. The international Community has never recognised either the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia (HZ H-B) or the Croatian Republic of Herzeg Bosnia (HR H-B), while the Constitutional Court of BiH declared the (HR H-B)

203 Toal and Dahlman (2011, p. 103) 204 Toal and Dahlman (2011, pp. 104-05) 205 Toal and Dahlman (2011, p. 105) 206 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 50)

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illegal on 14 th June 1992.”207 § HR H-B deemed extralegal by Bosnian courts o Armed Extra-Institutional: § “…a large number of Croatian paramilitaries, members of the HOS (Croatian Armed Forces) linked to the extreme nationalist Croatian Party of Rights (HSP), were alleged to have been in Western Herzegovina as early as January 1992. From the very beginning of fighting, HOS forces were reinforced by quite a few Muslim volunteers.”208 § “The Croatian Defence Council (HVO) is the key Croatian military force in Bosnia. Officially it consists of Bosnian Croats, including persons who were permitted to leave the Croatian Army (HV) in order to fight in Bosnia as volunteers. However, there are numerous reports on the strong links between the Croatian Army (HV) and the HVO, as well as those on Croatian Army units or soldiers bearing the insignia of the Croatian Army (HV). The HVO had a complex alliance with the TO of the Bosnian Government and seemed to be mainly occupied with defence and expansion of the territory of the ‘Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia’. However, as early as October 1992, the HVO attacked the Bosnian Muslims at the municipality of Prozor. There followed an armed conflict of the HV and HVO with the armed forces of the BiH Government that ended in February 1994 by the signing of the Washington agreement.”209 • Evidence of armed extra-institutional • Institutional: § Does Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) participation in elections within B-H constitute secessionist institutional action? • Not counting CDZ action in Bosnia through institutional channels prior to this secessionist effort as part of the movement’s actions, given the target. Additional corroboration/investigation would be useful to ensure that the movement did not use institutional channels later, and that efforts through the judicial system did not form a substantial part of this campaign. These concerns are reflected in current confidence coding. § “After 45 years of the communist one-party system in Bosnia and Herzegovina, on 18 November 1990, the first democratic, multi-party elections were held. National parties, Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), and The Party of Democratic Action (SDA) won overwhelmingly. […] In Bosnia and Herzegovina [HDZ’s] very name was the key to its success among local Croats. The inaugural assembly of the party was held on 18 August 1990 in Sarajevo. It advocated confederation and co-existence on equal footing of the three constitutional nations.”210 • In late 1990, HDZ still held pro-confederation stance. Addtional reason not to count HDZ actions as institutional component of this secessionist movement.

207 Radovic (2004, pp. 37-8) 208 Radovic (2004, p. 37) 209 Radovic (2004, p. 38) 210 Marijan (2004, p. 251)

57 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 217 – North Cyprus (Target: Cyprus; Year: 1983) Extra-institutional non-violent contention, plus maintenance of armed force, though without corresponding outbreak of violence during the relevant temporal window

Instl_Narrow (1983-85): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1983-85): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1981-85): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1981-85): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: 1

• Cyprus, an island inhabited mainly by the Greek Orthodox, with a Turkish-speaking Muslim minority, was annexed by the British in World War II and the British, along with the Turkish and were party to a 1959 agreement with the Cypriots that brought an end to a guerilla campaign aimed at uniting Cyprus and Greece.211 • Under the agreement, “Cyprus became independent with a constitution that gave the Turkish minority veto power, extensive autonomy, and disproportionate representation in the legislature and civil service.”212 • “Both sides smuggled in weapons, and in 1963 fighting broke out between Greek Cypriots and . The United Nations sent in troops to supervise a cease-fire between the two sides, but the political stalemate remained unresolved despite several rounds of negotiations.”213 • “In 1974, supporters of [unification with Greece], backed by the ruling Greek military regime, staged a coup … [which] provoked the Turkish government to invade, and their forces overran the northern part of Cyprus, turning some 200,000 Greek Cypriots into refugees.”214 “Forty-three thousand Turkish troops occupied the north, making Cyprus one of the mose militarized places in the world.”215 o The coup and resulting invasion by Turkey are before the period under consideration, however, the maintenance of an armed force necessitates a violence rating of “Yes” in both the wider and narrow timeframes. • “The Turkish zone, occupying 37 percent of the island, was declared to be the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, with Rauf Denktash as its president. In 1983, this became Turkish Republic of [(TRNC)]. The entity is not recognized diplomatically by any state except Turkey”.216

211 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, pp. 77-78) 212 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 78) 213 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 78) 214 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 78) 215 Beary (2011, p. 295) 216 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 78)

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o The presence of a parallel government is an example of extra-institutional non- violent contention. • “There is much residual resentment between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Social contact is limited; however, there has not been any major outbreak of violence since 1974.”217 • “The TRNC issues its own passports, but only the United Kingdom – which ruled Cyprus from 1878-1960 – the United States, and Turkey accept them as a valid form of identity.”218 • Notes on armed action by Turkish Cypriots: o Wikipedia219 puts founding of “” in 1976. o Additional source backing up decision to code “Yes” for armed/violent mobilization: Cyprus: A Country Study (Solsten [Ed.], 1993) § Turkish military forces in North Cyprus220 § But also local forces: “Even before independence, the Turkish Cypriot community had maintained its own paramilitary force (the TMT), trained and equipped by the Turkish Army contingent on the island. In 1967 this force were named the Mucahit (fighter), and in 1975 the Miicahit was renamed the Turkish Cypriot Security Force. As of 1989, the strength of this force was believed to be about 4,000. It was organized into seven infantry battalions armed with light weapons plus some artillery units equipped with mortars.”221 § “A unified military-civilian defense staff of the ministry was responsible for defense policy and strategy. Although legally separate from the Turkish Army on the island, the Turkish Cypriot Security Force was believed to remain under the de facto operational control of the Turkish forces.”222

218 – Transnistria (Target: Moldova; Year: 1991) Initially extra-institutional non-violent contention followed by extra-institutional violent contention

Instl_Narrow (1991-93): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1991-93): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1989-93): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1989-93): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: 1

217 Beary (2011, p. 295) 218 Beary (2011, p. 295) 219 “Security Forces Command”, Wikipedia. 220 See Solsten (Ed.) (1993, pp. 231-32). 221 Solsten (Ed.) (1993, p. 232) 222 Solsten (Ed.) (1993, p. 232)

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• Unlike the majority of Moldova, the inhabitants of the Transnistria region are Russian and Ukranian Slavs.223 • “When Moldova declared independence from the in 1991, Transdniester seceded from Moldova and declared itself the Transdniester Republic.”224 o This is an example of extra-institutional non-violent action in the narrow time frame. • “A five-month war erupted in which more than 200 were killed before a cease-fire was negotiated after Russian troops entered the region as peacekeepers.”225 o This is an example of extra-institutional violent action in the narrow time frame. • “In December 1995 elections (which were not recognized by Moldova), voters approved by 81 percent a new constitution for the republic.”226 • “On August 1990 (i.e., even before Moldovan independence) a Republic of was declared in the south, followed by the declaration, on 2 September 1990, of the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic, the latter having its capital in Tiraspol. Clashes broke out in November between Transnistrian and Moldovan authorities, and the welcomingby Tiraspol of the short-lived Soviet counter-coup in Moscow in August 1991 further soured relations. By March 1992, the security situation had deteriorated to the degree that a state of emergency was declared throughout Moldova. The fighting culminated in June 1992 when Transnistrian forces unsuccessfully attempted to size the right bank city of Bendery. Following discussions between Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) leaders in Moscow, a peace plan was evolved which led to a ceasefire and the deplotment of CIS peacekeeping forces in July 1992. This effectively froze the conflict, although sporadic clashes have taken place since.”227 • “Russian involvement in Transnistria has been ambiguous. Rusian military forces were accused by the Molovan authorities of aiding the separatists in 1991-2 and there is clear evidence that local Russian forces provided training, logistics and recruitment support to the creation of the Transnistra Republican Guard. On the other hand, Russia brokered the 1992 ceasefire and has largely been responsible for its enforcement.”228 • “Even before the 1991 coup, the Chisinau government had lost control of the left bank. The ‘Gagauz SSR’ proclaimed its independence on 19 August 1991, and Transdniestria followed on 2 September 1991. Conflict commenced from that point, with both break-away territories forming military units.”229

219 – Gagauz (Target: Moldova; Year: 1991) Mostly/ entirely extra-institutional contention with armed mobilization

Instl_Narrow (1991-93): No (Confidence: 1)

223 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 296) 224 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 296) 225 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 296) 226 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 297) 227 Notholt (2009, pp. 7.18-7.19) 228 Notholt (2009, p. 7.19) 229 Chinn and Roper (1995, p. 301)

60 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 ExtraInstl_Narrow (1991-93): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1989-93): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1989-93): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .75

• The Gagauz are a minority who speak a Turkic dialect in predominantly Romanian-speaking country (Moldova).230 • “In 1989, when Romanian-speaking nationalists were in power, Romanian was declared the only official language. Fearful that Moldova might unite with , several thousand Gagauz held a protest rally.”231 o This is an example of extra-institutional non-violent action in the wider time period. • “In August 1990, the Gagauz movement, Gagauz Khalk, a separatist organization, declared secession from Moldova and petitioned Moscow to become a socialist republic of the Soviet Union. The movement set an October date for Gagauz elections. Moldova reacted by rejecting the secession demand and sending troops and volunteers into the region to prevent the elections. Three Gagauz died in clashes and, and Soviet troops were dispatched to restore order.”232 o This is an example of extra-institutional non-violent action in the wider time period (the declaration). • “In 1991, following the disintegration of the USSR, Moldova declared its independence, and Gagauzia and the heavily Russian Transdniester region, fearing , continued to press for autonomy.”233 • “In July 1994, the Moldovan parliament granted Gagauzia autonomy within the Moldovan Republic. The Gaguaz were permitted to establish a parliament and executive and to have their own budget. They were also granted the right to secede if Moldova ever merged with Romania.”234 • “In August 1995, Moldova granted amnesty to Gagauz movement activists, and the movement’s troops then disbanded.”235 • “Even before the 1991 coup, the Chisinau government had lost control of the left bank. The ‘Gagauz SSR’ proclaimed its independence on 19 August 1991, and Transdniestria followed on 2 September 1991. Conflict commenced from that point, with both break-away territories forming military units.”236

230 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 109) 231 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 109) 232 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 109) 233 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 109) 234 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 109) 235 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 109) 236 Chinn and Roper (1995, p. 301)

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o Proclamation of independence seems to be extra-institutional nonviolent in narrow time frame. o Formation of military unit constitutes violent/armed extra-institutional action. • “On 19 August 1990 (i.e., even before Moldovan independence) a Republic of Gagauzia was declared in the south, followed by the declaration, on 2 September 1990, of the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic, the latter having its capital in Tiraspol.”237

221 – Moldova (Target: USSR; Year: 1991) Mixed institutional and extra-institutional action without violence

Instl_Narrow (1991-93): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1991-93): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1989-93): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1989-93): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: No ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .75

• “Four different Moldovan groups with overlapping interests and agendas coalesced in 1988 and 1989 on a platform which combined general democratic and specifically national demands, the overarching goal at that stage being the attainment of Moldovan sovereignty within a reformed, confederal USSR.”238 These groups represented different interests and population bases. • “These were the main constituencies which joined together to found the Moldovan national movement which represented the rapidly rising Moldovan political class [since ], aspirint to displace the Communist apparat. Activists of the national movement launched in mid-1988 the Moldovan Democratic Movement in Support of Restructuring and the Alexe Mateevici Cultural Club, country-wide organizations with overlapping networks of local support groups.”239 • “As its public support grew and the center’s authority weakened, the movement increasingly focused on demands for national emancipation, which by early 1989 included: official status for the native language (in place of the Russian) and its reconversion to the Latin script; devolution of powers in key economic and political areaas from Moscow to Chisinau; and a repudiation by Moscow of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and its admission of the illegitimacy of the formation of the Moldovan SSR and its incorporation into the USSR.” o The final demand constitutes the turn to a separatist agenda and is an example of extra-institutional action in the wider timeframe.

237 Notholt (2009, pp. 7.18-7.19) 238 Socor (1995, p. 188) 239 Socor (1995, p. 189)

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• Many similar organizations which had proliferated and, in May 1989, united to form the Moldovan .240 o It should be noted, however, that the official position of the Moldovan Popular Front still did not call for total independence from the USSR, rather enhanced sovereignty within some sort of union.241 As outlined above, however, the demands regarding the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, when taken with the rest of the agenda, place the balance of probabilities that this was indeed a separatist organization in all but name by this time. Indeed, “[i]n their appeals to the people of Moldova, the leaders of the national movement described the political struggle over language as an early struggle on a long road, at whose distant end it was possible to glimpse the goal of Moldova’s sovereignty.”242 • The Moldovan Popular Front organizaed mass rallies, originating with the native village population and then centering in the immigrant cities, throughout 1989, which “put the leadership on the defensive and exposed its impotence.”243 o This is an example of extra-institutional non-violent action in the wider timeframe. • “In March 1989, before having reached organizational maturity, the national movement contested the elections in Moldova to the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies … and unexpectedly won nearly half of the 43 seats at stake”.244 o Contesting official elections is an example of institutional action in the wider timeframe. • “Moldova held its first competitive elections for the republican legislature in February and March 1990 … prior to the introduction of the multiparty system and therefore based on individual candidacies, [although] the contest was largely seen as bipolar, Front versus [Communist] Party.”245 • “[T]he Front and allied groups … put together a working majority of two thirds in the legislature.”246 o This is a potential example of institutional action, although at this stage, the push was publicly for a reformed confederation in the near term.247 As discussed below, though, additional evidence supports a “Yes” coding for institutional contention in both temporal windows. • “In June 1991 Moldova instituted its own citizenship, separate from that of the USSR. Based on the ‘zero option’ (i.e. waiving residency and language requirements), the law made natives of Moldova and all nonnatives who legally resided in Moldova as of the date of the declaration of sovereignty (23 June 1990) automatically eligible for Moldovan citizenship,

240 Socor (1995, p. 189) 241 Socor (1995, p. 190) 242 Socor (1995, p. 191) 243 Socor (1995, p. 190) 244 Socor (1995, pp. 191-192) 245 Socor (1995, p. 192) 246 Socor (1995, p. 192) 247 Socor (1995, p. 194)

63 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 nonnatives being required to opt within one year for either Moldovan or another citizenship.”248 o The declaration of sovereignty took a similar form to that of other republics – the assertion of the supremecy of local Moldovan law over central Soviet law.249 The act of creating a separate citizenship by the elected parliament is an institutional action in the narrow timeframe. • “In late 1990 and early 1991 a major realignment of political forces took place[, with] … part of the Popular Front’s leadership adopt[ing] a program of unification of Moldova with Romania, redefining independence as a mere step in that direction and repudiating the concept of Moldovan statehood.”250 • The Popular Front’s position was first declared “openly and explicitly” to be the “full independence and secession from the USSR” at the Popular Front’s second Grand National Assembly in December 1990.251 • “The abortive putsch in Moscow in August 1991 precipitated Moldova’s decision to proclaim independence from the USSR. That decision capped the process, pushed forward since early 1990 by the new Moldovan élite, of institution-building and unilateral appropriation of sovereign functions from the center.”252 • “Faced with threatening movements by motorized columns of the USSR’s 114th Army and other units around Chisinau and other Moldovan towns, the Moldovan leadership organized the defense of those towns and of key buildings with barricades and massive cordons of volunteers, mainly peasants from surrounding villages. According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, more than 100,000 civilians throughout the republic joined the cordons or performed guard duty as volunteers from August 19 to 21.”253 o While this was at the behest of the official leadership, this kind of mass mobilization of citizens sits outside the realm of institutional action. The civilians were also unarmed,254 and so a violence coding is not warranted. It is thus an example of extra-institutional non violent action in the narrow timeframe. • After the Moldovan declaration of independence, pro-Soviet elements formed militias and commenced an insurgency against the Moldovan government in September 1991, seizing territory and replacing the local authorities with “pro-communist and pro-military elements dedicated to imperial restoration.”255

223 – Estonians II (Target: USSR; Year: 1991) Initially extra-institutional non-violent contention quickly followed by institutional contention

Instl_Narrow (1991-93): Yes (Confidence: 1)

248 Socor (1995, p. 194) 249 Socor (1995, p. 193) 250 Socor (1995, p. 195) 251 Socor (1995, p. 195) 252 Socor (1995, p. 202) 253 Socor (1995, p. 203) 254 Socor (1995, p. 204) 255 Socor (1995, p. 205)

64 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 ExtraInstl_Narrow (1991-93): No (Confidence: .5) Instl_Wider (1989-93): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1989-93): Yes (Confidence: .75) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: No ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .75

• A longer history of nationalist struggle in the Baltic Republics (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia) by Dzintra Bunbgs contains an excellent description of the evolution of nationalist actions from the post World War II period until independence.256 • Organized civil society groups grew out of the environmental movement in Estonia in 1987 after the Gorbachev’s decision to liberalize aspects of Soviet society in 1985.257 • Another group that rose to prominence, the Estonian Popular Front, was formed in April 1988 from more liberal elements of Estonia’s Communist Party and contested the elections of 1990 as an alternative to the CPSU.258 o Contesting official elections is an example of institutional action in the narrow timeframe. o It should be noted, however, that “[i]n late 1988 and early 1989, the leadership of the Estonian Popular Front persistently denied any separatist aims, calling for turning the Soviet Union into a union of sovereign states.”259 o “Not until July 1989 did the Estonian Popular Front officially call on the Estonian Supreme Soviet to declare the Soviet occupation of Estonia illegal and invalid”,260 which is an example of extra-institutional non-violent action in the wider timeframe. • Similar to other republics of the USSR, but somewhat before them, the Estonian Supreme Council passed a resolution in November of 1988 which “stated that locally passed laws took prededence over those made by all-Union bodies in Moscow”.261 o This is of the character of rebalancing power within the state, rather than a separatist act per se, and as such is not coded for this project. • “Estonia formally declared, on 30 March 1990, the start of a transition period that was to lead to full independence.”262 o This is an example of institutional action in the wider timeframe. • While there was some push back by Moscow, Estonia largely avoided the excesses of the Soviet military and Ministry of Internal Affairs that occurred in Latvia and Lithuania.263

256 Bungs (1995a, pp. 139-42) 257 Kionka (1995, p. 144) 258 Kionka (1995, p. 144) 259 Bessinger (2002, p. 176) 260 Bessinger (2002, p. 177) 261 Kionka (1995, p. 144) 262 Kionka (1995, p. 145) 263 Kionka (1995, p. 145)

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• After a period of stalemate with Moscow, “[o]n 20 August [1991], as the tank columns were advancing on Tallinn and the putsch was in full swing in Moscow, the Estonian Supreme Council declared full independence and set forth the provisions for writing the new constitution.”264 o This is an example of institutional action in the narrow timeframe. • “At a news conference the next day Russian Federation President recognized Estonian independence, a move that led the international community to accord recognition.” • “On 6 September, the USSR’s provisional governing body, the State Council, took a step that had long been awaited in Tallinn. As its first act, the council voted to recognize the independence of the three Baltic States.”265

225 – Latvians II (Target: USSR; Year: 1991) Extra-institutional non-violent contention followed by institutional contention

Instl_Narrow (1991-93): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1991-93): No (Confidence: .75) Instl_Wider (1989-93): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1989-93): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: No ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .75

• A longer history of nationalist struggle in the Baltic Republics (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia) by Dzintra Bunbgs contains an excellent description of the evolution of nationalist actions from the post World War II period until independence.266 • Two organizations which formed in the late 1980s, following the public acts of the Helsinki 86 human rights group, to progress Latvian independence were the “National Independence Movement, founded in June 1988, and the People’s Front of Latvia [(PFL)], founded in October 1988.”267 • “Soon the PFL, supported by both Latvians and non-Latvians (who comprise nearly one-half of the population), became the country’s largest political organization, despite its claim to be just a popular movement. The PFL had far more members and greater moral authority than the Latvian Communist Party.”268

264 Kionka (1995, p. 146) 265 Kionka (1995, p. 146) 266 Bungs (1995a, pp. 139-42) 267 Bungs (1995b, p. 148) 268 Bungs (1995b, pp. 148-49)

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o While the PFL endorsed candidates for the 1990 election,269 it did not itself run candidates, and thus falls within the category of extra-institutional action in the wider timeframe. • This endorsement of deputies for the Latvian Supreme Soviet election produced pro- independence results and it is worth quoting at length from Bungs (1995b) about the subsequent developments: “At their first session, on 4 May 1990, the parliamentary deputies declared that Latvia was entering a transition period leading to the restoration of the independent Latvia first proclaimed on 18 November 1918. The deputies also decided that the official name of Latvia should be either the Republic of Latvia, or simply Latvia (thus rejecting the name Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic) and the Supreme Soviet would be known as the supreme council. They also reinstated the maroon and white flag and the coat of arms of interwar Latvia as the country’s official symbols. Subsequently the supreme council set to work forming a new government and promulgating new laws. At the same time, efforts were made to establish – bypassing Moscow – good relations with Western and various republics of the USSR.”270 o This is an example of institutional action in the wider timeframe. • Pro-Soviet elements in Latvia, with the assistance of Moscow (which was divided between the moderates and the conservatives about exactly how to react) planned a coup which was abandoned and subsequently “started a series of attacks on the Latvian customs posts, beating up customs officers and destroying property”,271 and “a spate of mysterious explosions that had started in the late fall of 1990 continued”.272 o These actions these were carried out by a counter-movement who had been taken by surprise by how quickly the independence movement had come to power and progressed their agenda, and thus do not impact coding for the secessionist movement, itself.273 • After progress was not made using these measures, plans were developed for a new coup attempt, and it is again worth quoting from Bungs (1995b) at length: “the assault did not come until 19 August, when supporters in Latvia of those carring out the putsch in Moscow tried to assume power in Riga. Soldiers, tanks and armored vehicles of the USSR Baltic military district took up key positions in and around Riga; and the Soviet military commander, General Fedor Kuzmin, announced he was prepared to assume control of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania on behalf of the State Committee for the State of Emergency that attempted to seize power in Moscow. The Latvian Communist Party First Secretary Alfreds Rubiks announced that a similar committee and a new government would be formed in Latvia and that all political parties, except his own, would be disbanded. In contrast to the events on January, this time both OMLON [a special force of the USSR

269 Bungs (1995b, p. 149) 270 Bungs (1995b, p. 149) 271 Bungs (1995b, p. 150) 272 Bungs (1995b, p. 150) 273 Bungs (1995b, p. 149)

67 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 Ministry of Internal Affairs] and military units took part in the occupation and ransacking of key buildings and in attacks against the civilian population.”274 o Similar to above, this does not qualify for a violence rating as it was not coming from the pro-independence movement. • “On the morning of 19 August, the first day of the coup in Moscow, [the Latvian leadership] … declared that the State Committee for the State of Emergency and its representatives had no legal authority in Latvia. The sped and clear wording of the Latvian statement showed that both the government and legislature intended to stand their ground, come what may. The independence proclamation of 21 August 1991 was a logical concequence of this stand. The document, known as a constitutional law, stated: “Latvia is an independent democratic republic in which the sovereign power belongs to the people of Latvia, and whose internal legal status is defined by the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia of 15 February 1922.”275 o This is an interesting scenario to determine whether this action was institutional or extra-institutional, the answer to which depends on whether you view the declared of the parliament the day before to be valid. The pro-Soviet elements withdrew from contention after it was clear their Moscow coup attempt had failed, and with it any legitimacy that their actions in Latvia may have had. The independence proclamation was therefore an institutional action in the narrow timeframe. • Latvia quickly proceeded to be recognized as an independent state by most of the rest of the world, including the USSR in September of 1991.276

228 – Lithuanians III (Target: USSR; Year: 1991) Mixed institutional and extra-institutional non-violent contention

Instl_Narrow (1991-93): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1991-93): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1989-93): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1989-93): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: No ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .75

• A longer history of nationalist struggle in the Baltic Republics (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia) by Dzintra Bunbgs contains an excellent description of the evolution of nationalist actions from the post World War II period until independence.277

274 Bungs (1995b, p. 150) 275 Bungs (1995b, pp. 150-51) 276 Bungs (1995b, p. 151) 277 Bungs (1995a, pp. 139-42)

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• “While the August coup provided an opportunity for other Soviet republics to abandon the collapsing USSR, it merely helped Lithuania to gain international rcognition for the independence that its parliament had already declared on 11 March 1990. The declaration created an unprecedented situation. The USSR, on the one hand, refused to recognize Lithuania’s independence and through its armed forces retained control. On the other hand, it did not attempt to overthrow the Lithuanian authorities and allowed them to run domestic affairs.”278 • “Although the Lithuanian authorities were aware of their vulnerability to armed force, they acted as if independence were real, at least in regard to internal matters and enacted legislation instituting major reforms, while ignoring many Soviet laws.”279 o On balance, the declaration of 1990 was an institutional action in the wider timeframe. • Prior to this, the main pro-refurm/ pro-independence movement (the Lietuvos Persitvarkymo Sajudis (Sajudis), which was founded by intellectuals in June of 1988 and had organized a number of mass demonstrations along patriotic lines)280 ran candidates in the elections for the USSR Congress of People’s Deputis in March 1989, in which they won 36 of a possible 42 seats.281 o The earlier demonstrations (and distribution of various texts) constitutes extra- institutional non-violent contention in the wider timeframe, and contestation of official elections represents institutional contention in the wider timeframe. • On 22 August 1989, the Lithuanian “parliament adopted a statement urging the reestablishment “by unified peaceful methods of an independent democratic Republic of Lithuania, not subordinate to the administrative system and jurisdiction of the USSR.””282 o This is an example of institutional action in the wider timeframe. • On 11 March 1990, a newly elected parliament reaffirmed this position by voting “overwhelmingly for a declaration proclaiming the restoration of an independent Lithuanian state. Subsequently the parliament adopted a new constitution, emphasizing its continuity with the prewar Lithuanian republic”.283 o This is an example of institutional action in the wider timeframe. • There was a subsequent reaction from Moscow, in which an economic blockade and military intimidation was implemented, and on “8 January 1991 [pro-Soviet Lithuanian Communists] … stormed the parliament building but were barely beaten back. Soviet pressure was intensified, and on 11 January the military took control of the press center and the national defense department in Vilnius, wounding several civilians in the process. On 13 January tanks at the Vilnius television tower opened fire on the crowd that had gathered, killing fifteen people and wounding hundreds.”284

278 Girnius (1995, p. 153) 279 Girnius (1995, p. 153) 280 Girnius (1995, pp. 153-54) 281 Girnius (1995, pp. 154-55) 282 Girnius (1995, p. 155) 283 Girnius (1995, p. 155) 284 Girnius (1995, pp. 156-57)

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o While these acts would have constituted a violence rating of at least 0.5 if they had been conducted by the pro-independence movement, for the purposes of the coding system in this project they do not qualify as violent. o The acts of the crowd are an example of extra-institutional non-violent action in the narrow timeframe. • The European Community and Canada subsequently withheld aid from the USSR and the Lithuanian parliament held an “opinion poll” on independence that received 90.5 percent support with 76.5 percent of registered voters participating.285 o This is an example of institutional action in the narrow timeframe. • Military intimidation continued, however, including attacking customs posts, and in one instance, executing seven guards.286 • Subsequent to the failed coup in Moscow, the USSR was no longer able to sustain its attempts to keep Lithuania within the union.287

230 – Ukrainians II (Target: USSR; Year: 1991) Mixed institutional and extra-institutional non-violent contention.

Instl_Narrow (1991-93): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1991-93): No (Confidence: .75) Instl_Wider (1989-93): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1989-93): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: No ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .75

• Leonid Kravchuk was the chair of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet in 1990 and was key, along with Russia, in the breakup of the Soviet Union.288 • An initial act in 1990, following Russia’s lead and shortly after the announcement of the commencement of the process to draw up a new Union Treaty for the USSR, was for Ukraine to declare that its law was sovereign over rules set by the central state.289 This was a similar process followed by many other Soviet states, and is not necessarily separatist in itself, representing a rebalancing of power within a . • “A major turning point – not only with regard to Ukraine’s position on the Union Treaty, but for Ukrainian domestic politics in general – was the hunger strike begun by Ukrainian students in early October 1990, which brought down the government headed by Vitalii Masol. The strike began against the background of large demonstrations against the Union

285 Girnius (1995, p. 157) 286 Girnius (1995, p. 157) 287 Girnius (1995, p. 158) 288 Solchanyk (1995, p. 119) 289 Solchanyk (1995, p. 119)

70 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 Treaty and in support of Ukrainian independence, and one of the specific demands put forth by the students called rejection of the treaty.”290 o These are examples of extra-institutional non-violent action in the wider timeframe. • “With every passing month, however, Ukraine’s position hardened. By the fall of 1990, Kravchuk was eemphasizing that a unitary state was unacceptable and must be replaced by “a Union of free, independent, sovereign, socialist, state-republics.””291 This position was agreed bilaterally between Russia and Ukraine in November 1990 and in December it was put to the Fourth Congress of USSR People’s Deputies, where it failed to secure sufficient support.292 o This is an example of institutional action in the wider timeframe. o It is also demonstrates cooperation between separatists in the seceding state (Ukraine) and an outside state (Russia). • “On 24 August 1991, the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet proclaimed Ukraine’s independence subject to a referendum on 1 December.”293 o This is an example of institutional action in the narrow timeframe. • “A further blow for Gorbachev was the shift in the Bush administration’s position on Ukraine at the end of November. After consistently supporting the center, Washington finally gave up on Gorbachev and indicated its readiness to recognize an independent Ukraine in the event that the referendum, as expected, showed that Ukraine wanted independence. The margin by which voters , including the more than 11 million ethinic Russians, cast their ballots in favor of Ukrainian independence exceeded everyone’s expectations. According to official results, 90.32 per cent supported the independence declaration.”294 • Foye (1995) identifies Ukraine as attempting to create (or assert control over) its own armed forces during the collapse of the USSR: o During discussion of 1991: “…the Ukrainian political leadership moved quickly to create an independent army based on the remnants of the former Soviet armed forces that had been deployed in Ukraine—thus acceleraintg a process of disintegration that had begun well before the coup and leading to a division of the old army among the newly independent states of the former USSR.”295 § This implies that the attempt to assert control over armed forces may have occurred after the coup. Given that the coup was in August 1991, and the assertion of nominal independence was, as well, not clear that thede efforts actually preceded independence declaration. Given this uncertainty, coding violent/armed mobilization “No,” though should be further evaluated in future versions of this dataset.

290 Solchanyk (1995, p. 121) 291 Solchanyk (1995, p. 120) 292 Solchanyk (1995, p. 120) 293 Solchanyk (1995, p. 123) 294 Solchanyk (1995, pp. 125-26) 295 Foye (1995, p. 82)

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o “Even with the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States, however, the army remained in a juridical no man’s land, formally subordinate to the ineffectual CIS Council of Heads of State but in fact answering to no one government. In addition, it soon became apparent that the Commonwealth of Independent States embodied, at most, a very weak confederation, and that Ukraine and several other former Soviet republics were determined to go their own way and were particularly determined to create their own independent armies.”296 • Concerns/notes: While there were possible attempts to create armed forces during the narrow temporal period, additional corroboration is necessary to code “yes” for armed/violent mobilization.

231 – Belarus (Target: USSR; Year: 1991) Mixed institutional and extra-institutional non-violent contention

Instl_Narrow (1991-93): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1991-93): No (Confidence: .75) Instl_Wider (1989-93): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1989-93): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: No ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .75

• “After Chernobyl and the publication of papers implicating Stalin in the deaths of more than 200,000 Belarusians, a nationalist group, the (BPF) called for independence from the USSR [in 1988].”297 • The BPF contested the elections of 1990, winning 25 seats from the 360 available.298 o This is an example of institutional action in the wider timeframe. • While Belarusian separatists were not able to maintain a consistent turnout in extra- institutional action, such as existed in some other Soviet republics, they were able to mobilize some approximately 100,000 people in February of 1990 for “a mass demonstration espousing separatist demands.”299 o This is an example of extra-institutional action in the wider timeframe. • “Following an abortive 1991 coup against Gorbachev, the BPF in alliance with disaffected Communists in parliament, voted for Belarusian independence. The first president of the new republic was the former Communist Stanislav Shushkevic.” o This is an example of institutional action in the narrow timeframe.

296 Foye (1995, p. 90) 297 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 41) 298 Bessinger (2002, p. 255) 299 Bessinger (2002, p. 253)

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232 – Armenia (Target: USSR; Year: 1991) Initially extra-institutional non-violent contention followed by institutional contention

Instl_Narrow (1991-93): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1991-93): No (Confidence: .75) Instl_Wider (1989-93): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1989-93): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .5

• “On May 28 [1988], the anniversary of Armenia’s independence in 1918, the radical Association for National Self-Determination mobilized thirty to fifty thousand people, some carrying the tricolor of independent Armenia, in a demonstration calling for the day to be marked as a public holiday.”300 There were further protest actions in July of 1988, especially of note is the attempt to shut down an airport outside Yerevan, which resulted in the death of one protester and the wounding of thirty-six by Soviet soldiers, demonstrating an escalation.301 Despite the above, the main organizing body for the protests (the Karabakh Committee) still stopped short of demanding full independence in August 1988, instead focusing on of Soviet politics and a greater degree of autonomy for Armenia within the context of the USSR.302 “The first large-scale mobilizations by the Karabakh Committee in which some speakers overtly called for Armenian independence occurred in mid-September 1988 in the wake of a wave of violent attacks against Armenians in Azerbaijan.”303 While sessesionism was in some ways becoming an identity marker for nationalists, it was not “openly embraced by the Karabakh Committee as a goal, and Armenian independence did not appear among the demands voiced at most of the major rallies of the time.”304 o While these events occur before the period under consideration, they are worthy of note for context. • “What with the Armenian earthquake, the declaration of , and the arrest of Karabakh Committee leaders in December 1988, it was not until May 1989 that significant mobilization over secession materialized again, after mass secessionist sentiment had already appeared in neighbouring Georgia.”305 This included a 300,000 person demonstration on the unofficial 1918 independence day, although secession was not

300 Bessinger (2002, p. 187) 301 Bessinger (2002, p. 187) 302 Bessinger (2002, p. 187) 303 Bessinger (2002, p. 188) 304 Bessinger (2002, p. 188) 305 Bessinger (2002, p. 188)

73 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 consistently voiced, with many believing that the “territorian transfer of Karabakh appeared likely to require that Armenia remain within the USSR.”306 o This is an example of extra-institutional non-violent action in the wider timeframe. • There was a further hardening of secessionist sentiment, however, over the course of 1989 after a lack of progress on the Karabakh issue with Soviet authorities.307 • “With the vitory of the Karabakh Committee’s successor, the Armenian All-National Movement, in republican elections [of 1990], opinion consolidated around the eventual introduction of Armenian independence. In August 1990 the new Armenian government formally declared its intention to become an independent state.”308 o Participation in elections and the declaration of intention are examples of institutional action in the wider timeframe. • “By the time Armenians voted in a referendum on the issue in September 1991, after the collapse of authority in Moscow, 99 percent favored independence.”309 o “94 per cent of the electorate … participated”.310 § This constitutes institutional in the narrow time frame • Armed/Violent Mobilization o Bessinger points out that “Georgian, Armenian, and Azerbaijani nationalist movements, for instance, while fomenting massive levels of violence over the definition of the borders of their respective republics, generally did not contest the issue of secession from the USSR through violence.”311 o Context is May 1990: “Armenia thus became one of the first republics of the Soviet Union to make the transition from a communist-dominated to a non-Communist government. The new leadership was almost immediately subjected to pressure from Moscow, and complied, albeit reluctantly, with Gorbachev’s presidential decree demanding the disbanding of all informal paramlitary formations. (Several such units had been engaged in fighting in Nagorno-Kaabakh.)”312 § Coding “Yes” for violent/armed action in the wider timeframe, given this paramiltary mobilization.

233 – Georgia (Target: USSR; Year: 1991) Initially extra-institutional non-violent contention followed by institutional contention

Instl_Narrow (1991-93): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1991-93): No (Confidence: .75) Instl_Wider (1989-93): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1989-93): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: No

306 Bessinger (2002, p. 189) 307 Bessinger (2002, p. 189) 308 Bessinger (2002, p. 190) 309 Bessinger (2002, p. 190) 310 Fuller (1995a, p. 164) 311 Bessinger (2002, p. 287) 312 Fuller (1995a, p. 163).

74 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: No ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .5

• “In Georgia a political opposition to the ruling Communist Party emerged only in the summer of 1987 following the release from the gulag of several prominent human rights activists who promptly formed an informal political organization [the Ilya Chavchavadze Society (ICS)].”313 • The ICS “convened a series of demonstrations in defense of Georgian national interests in towns across Georgia in the autumn of 1988, culminating in mass protests in November against the proposed amendments to the USSR Constitution that would have circumscribed the right of the Union republics to secede from the USSR.”314 o This is an oblique extra-institutional action. While the demonstraitons may not have advocated directly for independence, the demand of greater defense of national interests together with the strong reaction to the proposed removal of the mechanism by which to achieve a possible secession, when taken together, strongly imply that the subtext to these actions was secessionist. o The text also references “spiraling violence” as a result of dissolusionment with peaceful protest, however no details are given so the case has not been coded for violence in the strict sense. § “Bessinger goes on to say, however, that “Georgian, Armenian, and Azerbaijani nationalist movements, for instance, while fomenting massive levels of violence over the definition of the borders of their respective republics, generally did not contest the issue of secession from the USSR through violence.”315 Fuller (1995a) does say that, to a greater or lesser extent, “pro-independence sentiments grew stronger, in all three [Transcaucasian] republics, … [and] the issue of national self-determination came to overshadow demands for for the creation of a more democratic society.”316 • After a violent intervention by Soviet troops of a protest about the transfer of the Abkhaz “autonomous republic on Georgia’s Black Sea coast to the RSFSR”, the question in Georgia became when and how, not if, Georgia would break away from the USSR.317 “[A]n opinion poll conducted several months later revealed that 89 per cent of those questioned supported the idea of “real independence”.”318 • “Rival political parties [to the Communist Party] proliferated; by early 1990 they were aligned in two main groups. The radicals argued that Soviet power in Georgia had no legal

313 Fuller (1995a, pp. 160-61) 314 Fuller (1995a, p. 166) 315 Bessinger (2002, p. 287) 316 Fuller (1995a, p. 161) 317 Fuller (1995a, p. 167) 318 Fuller (1995a, p. 167)

75 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 foundation … and announced their intention to boycott the Supreme Soviet elections scheduled for 1990 [they intended to hold elections for an alternative parliament]. The moderates for their part were prepared to work within the existing political framework to establish a multiparty system as a preliminary step towards the restoration of independence.”319 o A “political party” that does not intend to ever contest elections, and indeed hold alternative elections, is acting in an extra-institutional manner. A political party that intends to compete through the existing structures to further its aim of independence is acting institutionally and there is therefore institutional contention in the wider timeframe. • In addition to the above, the elections of the October 1990 elections for the Georgian Supreme Sovietwere won by the “Round Table/ Free Georgia coalition headed by ultra- nationalist Zviad Gamsakhurida [who co-founded the ICS], who promptly embarked upon a confrontation course with Moscow.”320 o This is further evidence of institutional contention in the wider timeframe. • “On 9 April, 1991, Georgia declared its independence from the USSR; on 26 May, Gamsakhurdia was elected President.”321 o The declaration of independence is an example of institutional contention in the narrow timeframe.

234 – Azeris (Target: USSR; Year: 1991) Mostly/ entirely institutional contention

Instl_Narrow (1991-93): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1991-93): No (Confidence: .75) Instl_Wider (1989-93): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1989-93): No (Confidence: .5) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: No ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .5

• Azerbaijan suffered an internal civil war in 1988, with the Armenian north of the country, with the support of the Armenian military, taking control of a sizeable section of the country.322 • “In 1990, the Soviet Union intervened on the Armenian side in the Azeri-Armenian war. This generated anti-Russian sentiments that translated into a call for independence from the Soviet Union, and in 1991, Azerbaijan seceded from the USSR. Initially, Azerbaijan refused

319 Fuller (1995a, p. 167) 320 Fuller (1995a, p. 167) 321 Fuller (1995a, p. 168) 322 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 32)

76 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 to join the Commonwealth of Independent States, joining only after Grigori Alievev became president in 1993.”323 o The declaration was institutional contention in the narrow timeframe. • “In March 1989, two dozen Azerbaijani intellectuals founded the Azerbaijan Popular Front (AzPF). While its primary aim was to maintain Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, it also affirmed support for and called for greater political, economic and cultural autonomy for Azerbaijan. Unlike comparable organizations in the Baltic republics, however, at least initially the Azerbaijan Popular Front did not support the idea of independence from the USSR.”324 • The AzPF became increasingly anti-Armenian and instigated much of the violence that led to the Soviet military intervention.325 • Bessinger, however, asserts that “Azerbaijan had been prevented from … [declaring independence] only by bloody military intervention.”326 Bessinger goes on to say, however, that “Georgian, Armenian, and Azerbaijani nationalist movements, for instance, while fomenting massive levels of violence over the definition of the borders of their respective republics, generally did not contest the issue of secession from the USSR through violence.”327 Fuller (1995a) does say that, to a greater or lesser extent, “pro-independence sentiments grew stronger, in all three [Transcaucasian] republics, … [and] the issue of national self-determination came to overshadow demands for for the creation of a more democratic society.”328 o On balance, there appears to be little evidence to suggest that there was extra- institutional contention over the issue of independence from the USSR, with what agitation there was mainly directed at inter-Soviet republic competition, however a confidence of 0.5 will be assigned to the wider timeframe in this case. • As additional background, Fuller (1995a) contains this assessment: “it was the events of early spring, 1988 – the peaceful demonstration in Erevan by up to a million Armenians, the horrendously savage retaliation by Azerbaijanis against the Armenian population in the Baku industrial satellite, Sumgait, and Gorbachev’s failure to offer any response other than the stereotyped condemnation of both the Armenian and the Azerbaijani leadership – that served to open the floodgates of national resentment which found expression throughout the former Soviet Union, initially in calls for the revision of interrepublican borders, then in the emergence of political opposition movements that espoused, first, glasnost and perestroika as a means of achieving greater autonomy, then, as Moscow proved unwilling to devolve power to the periphery, to pro-independence movements. It was these trends which, over the next four years, undermined the authority of the local Communist Party leaderships and then, by extension, the very foundations of the USSR.”329

323 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 33) 324 Fuller (1995a, p. 164) 325 Fuller (1995a, p. 165) 326 Bessinger (2002, p. 386) 327 Bessinger (2002, p. 287) 328 Fuller (1995a, p. 161) 329 Fuller (1995a, p. 161)

77 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 236 – Turkomen (Target: USSR; Year: 1991) Mostly institutional contention with some extra-institutional contention in the wider timeframe

Instl_Narrow (1991-93): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1991-93): No (Confidence: .5) Instl_Wider (1989-93): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1989-93): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: No ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .75

• appears to be of the same archetype of other Central Asian republics of the USSR, in that its declaration of independence was as a response to the collapse of the center, rather than pro-actively sought. As in other cases, the independence process was used by the existing elite to retain their positions after the dissolution of the apparatus which previously provided them with external support.330 • Bessinger, however, does provide some reference in the case of Turkmenistan of the existence of pro-independence nationalist movements prior to 1991, such as the “Agzybirlik movement, created in September 1989, [which] called for Turkmen independence from the USSR and claimed as many as a thousand members, though visitors to Turkmenia found an attitude of indifference with most of the public to the appeals of the separatists.”331 The group was banned several months later, and while they later protested in 1991 after the failed coup in Moscow, Bessinger has not determined this to be independence oriented, with its focus on internal political power within Turkmenistan.332 o The presence of an organized separatist group in Turkmenistan did not itself lead to the independence of Turkmenistan. This was driven by the local elite and, ultimately, external events. It should not, however, be ignored and Turkmenistan will be coded for extra-institutional in the wider timeframe and institutional in the narrow timeframe. It is important to note, however, that the coding is reflecting the actions of two different, and opposed, groups.

237 – Tajiks (Target: USSR; Year: 1991) Mostly/ entirely institutional contention

Instl_Narrow (1991-93): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1991-93): No (Confidence: .5) Instl_Wider (1989-93): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1989-93): No (Confidence: 0) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: No

330 Brown (1995, p. 182) 331 Bessinger (2002, pp. 231 – 232) 332 Bessinger (2002, p. 232)

78 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: No ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .5

• Bessinger asserts that there were efforts in 1987 to “mobilize populations around nationalist issues in … Tajikstan”.333 • Brown (1995) makes clear, however, that the nationalist issues which were being contested were about control of the republic (the Communist Party and Supreme Soviet on one side and the Islamic Reneisance Party, the Democratic Party of Tajikstan, and the Tajik nationalist Rastokhez (Rebirth) Movement), rather than independence from the USSR.334 This is also reflected in Hewitt and Cheetham.335 • “Even the declaration of independence, adopted by the parliament on 9 September, seems to have made little impression on the opposition. The Tajik film-maker who headed the USSR Cinematographers’ Union, Davlat Khudonazarov, spoke for many in the opposition when he said that Tajikstan’s independence could well represent the republic’s secession from its democratic counterparts.”336 • The failure to reconcile internal political differences between the establishment communists and the three major opposition groups eventually led to a bloody civil war in 1992.337 o Because this is an internal conflict, rather than directed against the USSR, not counting this as violent mobilization. • The independence of Tajikstan is classified as institutional contention in the narrow timeframe.

238 – Khyrgiz (Target: USSR; Year: 1991) Mostly/ entirely institutional contention

Instl_Narrow (1991-93): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1991-93): No (Confidence: .5) Instl_Wider (1989-93): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1989-93): No (Confidence: 0) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: No ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .5

333 Bessinger (2002, p. 73) 334 Brown (1995, pp. 180-82) 335 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 287) 336 Brown (1995, p. 181) 337 Brown (1995, p. 182)

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• Similar to the other Central Asian republics of the former USSR, Kyrgyzstan was not seeking independence from the USSR prior to its collapse in 1991. Indeed, “Kyrgyzstan declared its independence on 18 September, after it had become apparent that most union republics were going to take this step. According to [president] Akaev, the declaration, adopted by an emergency session of the republican Supreme Soviet, was intended to gain maximum maneuvering room for the republic in its dealings with the Moscow authorities. He and his supporters in Kyrgyzstan remained convinced that therepublic lacked the resources and infrastructure to function as an independent entity.” o The independence of Kyrgyzstan is therefore classified as institutional contention in the narrow timeframe.

239 – Uzbeks (Target: USSR; Year: 1991) Mostly/ entirely institutional contention

Instl_Narrow (1991-93): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1991-93): No (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1989-93): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1989-93): No (Confidence: .75) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: No ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .75

• According to Hewitt and Cheetham, the Uzbeks were “[s]taunchly hard-line Communist [and] Uzbekistan supported the 1991 attempted coup against , and when the Soviet Union collapsed shortly after that, Uzbekistan reluctantly declared independence.”338 • Bessinger provides some context: “Uzbekistan was a Soviet creation of the 1920s formed around a language community and carved from the territories previously belonging to several khanates and the Russian province of Turkestan. Uzbek nationalism was thus an entirely modern phenomenon fostered to a large extent by the ways that Soviet authority chose to delineate political space in .”339 • Dissatisfaction with Moscow was focused mainly on the management of the major Uzbek cotton crop and also to the extent that Uzbeks felt a crackdown on corruption in the industry by Moscow was unfairly singling out their republic.340 o Similar to some other examples from the breakup of the USSR, Uzbekistani independence can be viewed as a response to the failure of the Soviet state, where mobilization to that point was focused more on the division on the internal arrangements and balance within the Soviet state, rather than seeking separation

338 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 311) 339 Bessinger (2002, p. 257) 340 Brown (1995, p. 172)

80 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 from it. The independence of Uzbekistan is therefore classified as entirely institutional in the narrow timeframe.

240 – Kazakhs (Target: USSR; Year: 1991) Mostly/ entirely institutional contention

Instl_Narrow (1991-93): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1991-93): No (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1989-93): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1989-93): No (Confidence: .75) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: No ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .75

• According to Hewitt and Cheetham, the independence of Kazakhstan was a response to the collapse of the Soviet Union, rather than the result of agitation for independence.341 Indeed, Bessinger also asserts that shortly after independence, there were “powerful currents of opinion in support of re-creating the Soviet state”.342 o The independence of Kazakhstan is therefore classified as entirely institutional in the narrow timeframe. • It should be noted, however, that there was some contention in the late 1980s by ethnic Russians of the northern part of Kazakhstan that the territory should be separated from Kazakhstan and joined with the Russian Federation, although this does not form the focus of the independence event under consideration for this case.343

243 – Dagestan (Target: Russia; Year: 1999) Mostly/ entirely extra-institutional action with violence

Instl_Narrow (1999-2001): No (Confidence: .5) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1999-2001): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1997-2001): No (Confidence: .5) ExtraInstl_Wider (1997-2001): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .75

341 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 153) 342 Bessinger (2002, p. 53) 343 Brown (1995, p. 174)

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• In comparison to other North Caucasian republics that form part of the Russian Federation, Dagestan is geographically large and its population of approximately 2.6 million is ethnically heterogenous, with at least 30 ethnic groups.344,345 The main groups are the Avars (29%), the Kumyks (14%), the Lezgins (13%), and the Dargins (16%), who held the Dagestani presidency from 1983 until 2006, when the Avars won the presidency.346 • Dagestan is almost entirely Muslim, with both the Avars and the Dargins practicing the Islamic faith.347 Most are moderate Muslims, although the influence of radical Wahabis increased, resulting in clashes between them and the moderates. The government subsequently banned the Wahabis.348 • Despite the ban, “[i]n August 1999, several thousand Islamic militants connected to the Wahabi groups crossed into Dagestan from Chechnya in an attempt to gain support for an independent …”349 by capturing “several villages in the Botlik and Tsunadinsky regions… [and] …uniting Chechnya and Dagestan.”350 These “incursions were denounced by the Dagestan government and received little public support. Russian Federation troops subsequently entered the conflict, driving the rebels back into Chechnya.”351 o This is an example of extra-institutional action with the presence of violence. o Of note is that this action was taken by a quasi-outside group, i.e., while there may have been some local support in the areas captured, the action itself was taken by individuals from a different republic within the Russian Federation. One of the two Islamist who declared the Islamic state in Chechnya and Dagestan, triggering the invasion of Dagestan, was Jordanian by birth, the other was Chechen.352 • Hewitt and Cheetham wrote in 2000 that “[i]n recent years, Islamist movements like the Islamic Democratic Party of Dagesan and the Party have become increasingly active”353, although there is no suggestion in any of the texts referenced that these groups advocate secession from the Russian Federation.

247 – Abkhazia (Target: USSR; Year 1989) Mixed institutional and nonviolent extra-institutional mobilization.

Instl_Narrow (1989-91): Yes (Confidence: .5) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1989-91): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1987-91): Yes (Confidence: .5)

344 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 81) 345 Beary (2011, p. 268) 346 Beary (2011, p. 268) 347 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 81) 348 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 81) 349 Minahan (2002, p. 514) 350 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 81) 351 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 81) 352 Beary (2011, p. 272) 353 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 81)

82 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 ExtraInstl_Wider (1987-91): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: No ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .5

• “In 1988, during the liberalization of Soviet life, a nationalist popular front organization known as Aiglara (Unity) formed, and for the first time since 1921 the Abkhaz National Council [originally formed by nationalist leaders after the February 1917 revolution that ended the ]354 was convened.”355 o This is an example of extra-institutional non-violent action in the wider timeframe. • “From the latter part of 1988, the Abkhaz began lobbying for the transfer of their autonomous republic on Georgia’s Black Sea coast to the RSFSR – despite the fact that they [ethnic Abkhazians] constituted less than twenty per cent of the total population [of Abkhazia].”356 o This is an example of institutional action in the wider timeframe, as the lobbying was presumably though the Abkhaz Supreme Soviet, which was not “dissolved” by Georgia until 1992.357 The institutional action, through the locally elected parliament of the autonomous region of Georgia can reasonably said to have continued throughout the period under consideration. • “On 18 March 1989, the council called for Abkhaz secession from Georgia, which provoked a strong Georgian nationalist reaction.”358 o This is an example of extra-institutional non-violent action in the narrow timeframe (the council was not an official part of the state apparatus). • Bessinger also points to extra-institutional mobilization for the Abkhaz across the 1987 to 1992 period, although the precise timing is not provided.359 • Fighting between Georgia and Abkhazia did not begin until 1992, outside the timeline under consideration for this instance.360 This was in response to a separate independence vote taken within Abkhazia at that time.361

248 – South Ossetia (Target: USSR; Year: 1990) Mixed institutional and extra-institutional non-violent and violent contention

Instl_Narrow (1990-92): Yes (Confidence: .5) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1990-92): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1988-92): Yes (Confidence: 1)

354 Minahan (2002, p. 10) 355 Minahan (2002, p. 11) 356 Fuller (1995a, p. 166) 357 Fuller (1995b, p. 308) 358 Minihan (2002, p. 11) 359 Bessinger (2002, p. 211) 360 Beary (2011, p. 245) 361 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 11)

83 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 ExtraInstl_Wider (1988-92): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: 1

• The reforms to political freedoms implemented by Mikhail Gorbachev “spurred a surge of nationalism among Georgians.”362 • “In the 1980s, as Georgian separatists pushed for independence from the Soviet Union, South [who enjoyed their own autonomous region and parliament within Georgia]363 began a campaign to secede from Georgia and form a state with North Ossetia.”364 • Bessinger notes that there were a number of nationalist demonstrations by Ossetians.365 o Demonstrations are an example of extra-institutional non-violent action in the wider timeframe. • Minahan also observes that there was “a rapid and dramatic rise of nationalism among the divided Ossetian peoples. In 1988 the South Ossetians in Georgia demanded secession and unification with North Ossetia. The secessionist demands set off violent clashes between Ossetians and Georgians, often with the encouragement of the ethnocentric Georgian government of Zviad Gamsakhurdia. Over 1,500 died in the fighting, and 40,000 Ossetian refugees fled across the mountains to North Ossetia.”366 • These clashes were between “Georgian and South Ossetian militias, the precursors to fully- fledged armies, … [proceeded] from 1989-1992, with South Ossetians receiving support from Russia.”367 o Militia violence is an example of extra-institituional violent action in the wider and narrow timeframes. • In December of 1990, two major events occurred: the South Ossetian parliament declared that South Ossetia was an independent repuiblic within the Soviet Union; and the Georgian government revoked South Ossetia’s autonomous status within Georgia, effectively dissolving the South Ossetian parliament. There are conflicting accounts, however, as to which event took place first.368 o On balance, the declaration is an example of institutional action in the narrow timeframe. o Any continued operation of local structures would represent extra-institutional non- violent action in the narrow timeframe.

362 Beary (2011, p. 286) 363 Beary (2011, pp. 285-286) 364 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 277) 365 Bessinger (2002, p. 211) 366 Minihan (2002, pp. 1478-479) 367 Beary (2011, p. 286) 368 Minihan (2002, p. 1479); Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 277); Beary (2011, p. 286)

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• “When the Soviet Union was dissolved in late 1991, the United Nations recognized Georgia’s independence and considered South Ossetia part of it.”369

251 – Ajars (Target: USSR; Year: 1988) Mostly/ entirely extra-institutional non-violent contention

Instl_Narrow (1988-90): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1988-90): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1986-90): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1986-90): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: No ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: 1

• “The relaxation of stern Soviet rule under Mikhail Gorbachev in the late 1980s encourage[d] the Ajars to lobby for removal from Georgian authority in 1988-89. In 1989 the first openly nationalist organization formed in Batumi.”370 o This is an extra-institutional non-violent act in the narrow timeframe. • Minahan wrote in 2002 that Ajaria is the “only region of Georgia not to have experienced violent confrontation since Georgia regained its independence”.371 “The Georgian government, already at odds with the Abkhaz and Ossetians, has been careful not to inflame Ajar nationalism.”372 • The Ajars might also be understood to be split between cultural affinity with their Turkish neighbors and security provided by Russia as a result of the Russian military port in Ajaria on the Black Sea373. o Ajar separatism has therefore never progressed past the activities of relatively fringe groups in an extra-institutional setting.

256 – Chechnya I (Target: Russia; Year: 1991) Combination of institutional contention and both violent and nonviolent extra-institutional methods.

Instl_Narrow (1991-93): Yes (Confidence: .5) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1991-93): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1989-93): Yes (Confidence: .5) ExtraInstl_Wider (1989-93): Yes (Confidence: 1)

369 Beary (2011, p. 286) 370 Minahan (2002, p. 66) 371 Minahan (2002, p. 67) 372 Minahan (2002, p. 67) 373 Minahan (2002, pp. 66-8)

85 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .75

• Chechnya is a republic of the Russian Federation in the Northern Caucasus, a region that is one of the most militarized in the world.374 The insurgents across the region pursue varied goals and “have tended to target the Russian military, local police, and government officials. The total numbers killed throughout the from 1994-2009 is estimated at 75,000-100,000”.375 • “The Russian government admits to having had four thousand soldiers killed since 1990 as a result of the Chechen conflict, although the true figure is thought to be much higher as attacks in the region are relatively underreported.”376 • “The Soviets adopted a new constitution in 1977 that in theory permitted individual republics to withdraw from the union, although in practice no republic attempted to secede. When the Soviet Union was dissolved in December 1991, the North Caucasian republics became part of the Russian federation.”377 • “Chechnya first declared its independence in November 1991.”378 “In 1991, former Soviet general Dzhokar Dudayev ousted the ruling Communist government; in October 1991, he was elected president of the republic and declared Chechnya independent of Russia.”379 o The ousting of the existing government, which was not done through regular institutional means, was an extra-institutional action. • “Russia, in adopting a new constitution in 1993, did not adopt a provision permitting its constituent republics to secede.”380 o This would imply that, at the time of the Chechen declaration of independence, it was an institutional non-violent action. This was, however, not recognized by the Russian state, who subsequently adopted a constitution which did not allow for the secession of Chechnya. Since Chechnya was not recognized as an independent state internationally, the Chechen secessionists became extra-institutional in 1993 when the constitutional changes were adopted. • Despite Chechnya’s 1991 declaration, “[i]t was not until December 1994 … that Russia launched a full-scale military invasion of Chechnya. The Chechens resisted fiercely, but in February 1995 the Russians captured the Chechen capital of Grozny. Ten thousand Russians and twenty-five thousand Chechens were killed in the fighting.”381

374 Beary (2011, p. 268) 375 Beary (2011, p. 268) 376 Beary (2011, p. 268) 377 Beary (2011, p. 270) 378 Beary (2011, p. 270) 379 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 64) 380 Beary (2011, p. 270) 381 Beary (2011, p. 270)

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o While this would be seen as extra-institutional violent contention, it falls outside the time frame under consideration for this example. o Nevertheless, coding “Yes” for “Violence,” as there was armed mobilization by separatist actors during the relevant temporal windows. § “6 September 1991: Dudaev's armed supporters penetrate the building of the Supreme Soviet during its regular session […] 7 November 1991: the President of the RSFSR declares a state of emergency in Chechnya. The newly elected Chechen parliament responded by voting emergency powers to Dudaev, who ordered martial law and mobilized the National Guard.”382 • Additional corroboration/details would increase confidence of coding.

257 – Chechnya II (Target: Russia; Year: 1999) Mixed institutional and extra-institutional action with the presence of violence

Instl_Narrow (1999-2001): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1999-2001): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1997-2001): Yes (Confidence: .75) ExtraInstl_Wider (1997-2001): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .75

• Chechnya is a republic of the Russian Federation in the Northern Caucasus, a region that is one of the most militarized in the world.383 The insurgents across the region pursue varied goals and “have tended to target the Russian military, local police, and government officials. The total numbers killed throughout the North Caucasus from 1994-2009 is estimated at 75,000-100,000”.384 • “The Chechen general Aslan Maskhadov [who led the recapture of Grozny] was elected president in January 1997.”385 o As a pro-independence candidate, this represents institutional action. • “By early 1997 Chechnya was far more independent than many in Russia wished to admit, but far less independent than most Chechens desired. A treaty signed on 12 May 1997 effectively ended the Chechen War but again left the question of independence undecided. In July 1997, President Boris Yeltsin offered a power-sharing agreement similar to that between the Russian Federation and Tatarstan, but the offer was rejected.”386

382 Vorkunova (2018). 383 Beary (2011, p. 268) 384 Beary (2011, p. 268) 385 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 65) 386 Minahan (2002, p. 441)

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o Negotiations at the political level are an example of institutional action. • “In January 1998, Maskhadov vowed he would never permit Chechnya to become a dependency of Russia, nor would he accept the status of Chechnya as a freely associated member of the Russian Federation.”387 • “In the summer of 1999, Islamic radicals from Chechnya invaded the neighboring republic of Dagestan, and a series of bombings in Moscow were blamed on Chechen terrorists. In response Russian troops launched a second invasion of Chechnya in October 1999.”388 o This is an example of extra-institutional violent action. • “During the Second Chechen War in 1999-2000 Grozni and other cities were reduced to rubble, and over 200,000 Chechen civilians fled the fighting. By mid-2000 the Russian military controlled most Chechen territory, but determined rebel groups in the mountainous south continued to fight a bloody guerilla war… The Russian soldiers in the region faced a nightmare of ambushes and car bombings.”389 o This is an example of extra-institutional violent action. • “Yeltsin’s successor, Vladimir Putin, appointed a Muslim cleric [Akhmad Kadyrov] to head the Russian-controlled administration in the Chechen Republic in June 2000.”390 Kadyrov had supported the Russian occupation of Chechnya, despite previously backing Chechen independence, after a dispute with former president of Chechnya, Maskhadov.391 • “In October 2001 the Russian government announced that negotiations would begin with the Chechen leadership … [and] on 18 November 2001, the presidents of Russia and Chechnya had their first acknowledged meeting.”392 o This is not an example of institutional action, as the Chechen leadership with whom Russia was negotiating was itself installed by Russia and was not pro-independence.

270 – Tatars (Target: Russia; Year: 1992) Largely institutional contention with the presence of non-violent extra-institutional action

Instl_Narrow (1992-94): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1992-94): Yes (Confidence: .75) Instl_Wider (1990-94): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1990-94): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: No ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .75

387 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 65) 388 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 65) 389 Minahan (2002, p. 441) 390 Minahan (2002, p. 441) 391 Minahan (2002, p. 441) 392 Minahan (2002, p. 442)

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• In 2002, there were approximately 7 million Tatars in Russia and other former Soviet states, making them a large minority in the Russian Federation.393 Similar to other peoples of the Northern Caucasus, the Tatars are mostly Sunni Muslim.394 • “The reforms introduced by Mikhail Gorbachev in the late 1980’s raised expectations among the Tatars that old grievances would finally be addressed. Demands for full republican status within the Soviet Union led to a declaration of sovereignty by the Tatar republican government in August 1990.”395 o This is an example of institutional action by the regional government in the wider timeline. • “The complete collapse of the Soviet Union in August 1991 set in motion a strong Tatar nationalist movement and sparked huge pro-independence rallies in Kazan. A number of nationalist groups formed, the more moderate advocating greater self-government within a new , while militants demanded a declaration of independence before undertaking negotiations with the new Russian state.”396 o This is an example of extra-institutional action. § Additional corroboration regarding timing would increase confidence. o Minahan speaks here of ‘militants’ but no further details are available. • 61% of Tartars voted for sovereignty in a March 1992 referendum, and the Tartar President then “refused to sign a new Russian federation treaty”. 397 o This is an example of institutional action. • “[T]he Tartar parliament approved an amendment declaring Tartarstan a sovereign state freely associated with the Russian Federation” in November 1992.398 o This is an example of institutional action. • “Tartar national leaders… insisted that Tartastan’s relations with Russia and other states must be governed by treaty… [and] [i]n July 1993… negotiated 12 bilateral treaties with Russia.”399 o This is an example of institutional action. • “In February 1994 the Tartar leaders of the republic approved a treaty to normalize relations with the Russian Federation and finally signed the 1992 federation treaty. The treaty, revised through two years of often acrimonious negotiations, … recognition of Tartastan as a sovereign state freely associated with the federation and the right to legal secession.”400 o This is an example of institutional action. o The point about the new treaty allowing “legal secession” implies that secessionist actions previously had been illegal. In the context of the project, however, this will

393 Minahan (2002, p. 1856) 394 Minahan (2002, p. 1856) 395 Minahan (2002, p. 1860) 396 Minahan (2002, p. 1860) 397 Minahan (2002, p. 1860) 398 Minahan (2002, p. 1860) 399 Minahan (2002, p. 1860) 400 Minahan (2002, p. 1860)

89 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 not make such actions extra-institutional as they were conducted through the institutional organs of the Tartastan.

273 – Crimea (Target: Ukraine; Year: 1992) Mostly/ entirely institutional contention without violence

Instl_Narrow (1992-94): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1992-94): No (Confidence: .5) Instl_Wider (1990-94): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1990-94): No (Confidence: .5) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: No ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .5

• There are two large groups in Crimea, the Crimean Tartars and the Crimean Russians, both of whom wish to have their respective languages established as national languages and neither of whom feel close to the Ukraine as an independent entity.401 The Crimean Russians had the political ascendency in the region during the early 1990’s.402 • “On 30 June 1991 the Mejlis, the elected national congress, declared the sovereignty of the Crimean Tartars and adopted a and flag”403 and, also in 1991, the Ukraine granted Crimea the status of an independent republic.404 o This is an example of institutional action • “In 1992, the parliament of the Russian Republic passed a resolution restoring Crimea to Russia”,405 effectively reversing “Nikita Khrushchev’s [1954] transfer of the Crimea from Russian to Ukranian jurisdiction”. 406 o This action is not categorized under this project, as it is an act by a foreign state and not attributable to either a secessionist group or the country from which it is desiring to secede. • “Spearheaded by the Republican Movement of Crimea and in control of the local parliament, Crimean Russians adopted a constitutional amendment affirming Crimea’s right to secede from Ukraine.” o This is an example of institutional action.

401 Beary (2011, p. 250-251) 402 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 74) 403 Minahan (2002, p. 503) 404 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 74) 405 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 75) 406 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 75)

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• “In 1994, the legislature elected a president of the Crimean Republic, the Russian separatist Yuri Meshkov, and further measures were approved that weakened Crimea’s ties to Ukraine.” o This is an example of institutional action. • “Ukraine reacted strongly. It abolished the new office of president and nullified the Crimean Republic constitution and much assembly legislation it deemed illegal under the Ukrainian constitution. By 1995, Ukraine had assumed direct rule over much of Crimean affairs.”407 o The actions of Ukraine here do not, in retrospect, make the earlier actions of the Crimean Republic extra-institutional. Had the Crimean Rupublic attempted to continue operating, issuing and enforcing its own laws in competition to those of Ukraine, it would have become extra-institutional.

274 – Abkhazia (Target: Georgia; Year: 1994) Initially institutionan contention followed by extra-institutional contention with violence

Instl_Narrow (1994-96): No (Confidence: .5) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1994-96): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1992-96): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1992-96): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .75

• “Abkhazia is a breakaway autonomous republic of Georgia located in the northwest of Georgia on the Black Sea… [with] a population of more than 500,000” before the conflict with Georgia.408 “After the conflict, some 200,000 Georgians, Russians, and other non- Abkhazians fled the region.”409 • “In 1992, after Georgia had declared independence from the Soviet Union, Abkhazians revolted and declared themselves independent. In the ensuing war, Abkhazian forces prevailed”.410 o This is an extra-institutional violent action. • “On 23 July 1992 the Abkhaz legislature, with widespread support, reinstated the republic’s 1925 constitution, effectively declaring Abkhazia an independent republic. In response, the Georgian military occupied the region, setting off a bitter war of secession.”411 o This is an example of institutional contention.

407 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 75) 408 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 11) 409 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 11) 410 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 11) 411 Minahan (2002, p. 11)

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• The Abkhaz forces captured their capital, Sukhumi from the Georgians in 1993 and 3,000 Russian troops maintained stability between Abkhazia and Georgia through deployment on the border in June 1994. 412 o This essentially establishes Abkhazia as a protectorate of Russia. • “On 26 November 1994, the Abkhaz parliament formally proclaimed the sovereign Republic of Abkhazia. The parliament then elected as the republic’s first president the parliament chairman, Vladislav Ardzinba.”413 The election was not recognized by either Georgia or Russia.414 o This could be seen as either institutional or extra-institutional. The fact that the move was not recognized by either of Abkhazia’s major neighbours (Georgia and Russia), implies that this is the establishement of a ‘parallel government’, despite Russia otherwise providing a degree of territorial protection to Abkhazia from further incursions by Georgian troops. On the other hand, more recent information (see below points) shows that the continued operation of this parliamentary institution has not been successfully challenged and continues to operate in Abkhazia as the prime governing institution. The key point is, however, that at the time the move was made, it was extra-institutional. • UN-backed peace talks ended in 1997 without success and “the Abkhaz continue to exist in a diplomatic no-man’s-land.415 o Independently sponsored peace talks are an example of non-violent extra- institutional contention. They may be conducted through the ‘institution of the United Nations’, however for the purposes of this project, the institutional setting that matters is that of the region from which the separatists are attempting break away from. • “Although mostly unrecognized, Abkhazia functions as an independent state. In 2008 a Georgian move to reassert control led to a brief war, with Russian troops sent to support Abkhazia.”416

275 – South Ossetia (Target: Georgia; Year: 1992) Mostly extra-institutional with the presence of violence and non-violence, although initially institutional

Instl_Narrow (1992-94): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1992-94): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1990-94): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1990-94): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes

412 Minahan (2002, p. 11) 413 Minahan (2002, p. 11) 414 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 11) 415 Minahan (2002, p. 11) 416 Minahan (2016, p. 4)

92 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: 1

• South Ossetia is a small region, measuring approximately 45 miles east-west and 30 miles north-south, with a population of 70,000 (2011 numbers), equal to approximately 1.5% of Georgia’s total population.417 The population within South Ossetia is momogenously Ossetian, with ethnic Georgians having largely left the area after conflicts between South Ossetia and Georgia from 1989 – 1992.418 • “In the 1980’s, as Georgian separatists pushed for independence from the Soviet Union, South Ossetians began a campaign to secede from Georgia and form a state with North Ossetia.”419 o While before the time period under consideration for this project, this would be extra-institutional action. • “In 1990, the South Ossetian parliament declared the region independent. Georgia responded by abrogating South Ossetia’s autonomous status. In subsequent fighting, the Ossetians succeeded in driving the Georgian forces from their territory.”420 o This was initially an institutional act through the parliament of South Ossetia, however, there then followed an extra-institutional act with the presence of violence. • Russian soldiers help to enforce a ceasefire,421 and, as of 2011, Russia was the only major state to recognize South Ossetia’s status422 and “[m]ost South Ossetians are Russian citizens … and possess Russian-issued passports.”423 • In a referendum of January 1992 which was boycotted by South Ossetia’s Georgian minority, the region proclaimed its independence from Georgia.424 o Given the state of the conflict and the lack of meaningful international recognition for South Ossetia’s status as a state when the referendum was held (continuaing to this day), this is a non-violent extra-institutional act. • “From 1992-2004 the Ossetia-Georgia conflict was referred to as a ‘frozen conflict’ … [where] hostilities had mostly ceased but no long-term settlement was in sight.”425 o This implies that the contention continued for the period under consideration as extra-institutional and mostly non-violent, although violence cannot be excluded completely as the separatists maintained an armed force. o Also, see discussion of Case #248 above:

417 Beary (2011, p. 284) 418 Beary (2011, p. 284) 419 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 277) 420 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 277) 421 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 277) 422 Beary (2011, p. 284-285) 423 Beary (2011, p. 284) 424 Beary (2011, p. 284) 425 Beary (2011, p. 285)

93 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 § Minahan also observes that there was “a rapid and dramatic rise of nationalism among the divided Ossetian peoples. In 1988 the South Ossetians in Georgia demanded secession and unification with North Ossetia. The secessionist demands set off violent clashes between Ossetians and Georgians, often with the encouragement of the ethnocentric Georgian government of Zviad Gamsakhurdia. Over 1,500 died in the fighting, and 40,000 Ossetian refugees fled across the mountains to North Ossetia.”426 § These clashes were between “Georgian and South Ossetian militias, the precursors to fully-fledged armies, … [proceeded] from 1989-1992, with South Ossetians receiving support from Russia.”427 o Additional supporting evidence for “Yes” coding regarding violent extra- institutional contention: § First, Beary (2011, 286) notes that South Ossetian militias participated in clashes with Georgian militias “from 1989-1992”. § Even without this, the frozen nature of the conflict doesn’t mitigage the maintenance of armed forces.

276 – Nagorno Karabakh (Target: Azerbaijan; Year: 1991) Initially institutional contention followed by extra-institutional violent contention

Instl_Narrow (1991-93): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1991-93): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1989-93): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1989-93): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .5

• “Since 1994 ethnic Armenians living in Nagoro Karabakh (NK), a small mountainous region of Azerbaijan … have enjoyed de facto independence … [after] a war with the Azerbaijani military fought from 1992-1994.”428 “Thirty thousand people were killed in the war”.429 o This is an example of extra-institutional violent contention in the narrow time frame. • Their status as an independent state has not, however, been recognized by any other country.430 • “NK is technically landlocked inside Azaebaijan, having no border with Armenia or any other country. In practice, however, it has been connected to Armenia via the so-called

426 Minihan (2002, pp. 1478-1479) 427 Beary (2011, p. 286) 428 Beary (2011, p. 262) 429 Beary (2011, p. 264) 430 Beary (2011, p. 262)

94 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 Lachin corridor, an area comprised of seven districts surrounding Karabakh that the ethnic Armenian forces from both NK and Armenia seized control of in 1992. Consequently, 22 percent of Azerbaijan’s territory is now under Armenian control.”431 o This indicates that the separatist movement had significant assistance from an external state. • As a pretext to the conflict, “[i]n February 1988, the NK autonomous government, encouraged by the greater political freedoms that Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev had introduced, asked for the transfer of NK to Azerbaijan to Armenia. The Soviet authorities briefly attempted to rule NK directly from Moscow before returning it to Azerbaijani control in November 1989.”432 o While falling just outside the wider time frame, this would be an example of institutional contention. • “On August 30, 1991, Azerbaijan declared independence from the Soviet Union, taking NK with it; Armenia declared independence on September 23, 1991. The NK authorities organized a referendum on independence in December 1991, which passed, although the Karabakh Azeri minority boycotted the vote. The NK Parliament declared independence on January 6, 1992”.433 o This is an example of institutional contention in the narrow time frame, with action being organized through the local authorities. • See also: Notholt (2009): o “Armenian deputies to the National Council of Nagorno-Karabakh voted for incorporation into Armenia in February 1998 [sic; means 1988] and day later armed clashes broke out in the region. Violence thereforce started even before the formal dismemberment of the USSR.”434 o “In December 1991 Nagorno-Karabakh voted for full independence and by 1992 Armenian regular and Nagorno-Karabakh forces were in a state of full-scale war with Azeri forces. By the end of 1992, Armenian forces held most of Nagorno- Karabakh and the territory between it and Armenia proper[…] Despite periodic attempts at negotiation, no permanent peaceful solution to the issue has been devised. ”435

277 – Talysh (Target: Azerbaijan; Year: 1993) Entirely extra-institutional

Instl_Narrow (1993-95): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1993-95): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1991-95): No (Confidence: 1)

431 Beary (2011, p. 262) 432 Beary (2011, p. 264) 433 Beary (2011, p. 264) 434 Notholt (2009, p. 7.17) 435 Notholt (2009, p. 7.17)

95 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 ExtraInstl_Wider (1991-95): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .75

• The Talysh are a group of approximately 500,000 - 2,000,000 largely Shi’a Muslims who occupy a region along the Caspian sea in the territories of Azerbaijan and Iran.436,437 • “Since the independence of Azerbaijan in 1991 [from the Soviet Union], many younger Talysh have rejected the assimilation [project] by the Azeri government. New interest in their language and culture has spurred the formation of an autonomy movement, with a small, but growing, separatist movement in the Talysh homeland.”438 o Potential example of nonviolent extra-institutional mobilization. • “In 1993, Alikram Gumbatov led a mutiny in southern Azerbaijan and declared a Talysh republic. The mutiny was suppressed by the government of Azerbaijan, and in 1996, Gumbatov was arrested and sentenced to death.”439 o Unilateral declaration is example of extra-institutional nonviolent. As discussed below, because military (e.g., armed) components participated, this will also be coded as “Violent”. • Gumbatov was leader of the Talysh Mugan Autonomous Republic and after international pressure, his sentence was commuted to life imprisonment and later exile to the Netherlands, where he continues to advocate for Talysh independence.440 • “Azerbaijan has accused Iran of aiding the insurrection.”441 • “During the June 1993 revolt of Surat Huseinov in Azerbaidzhain, the Talysh, a group of about 22 thousand Iranian-speakers that was once thought to have been completedly assimilated by the Azerbaidzhanis, used the confusion to declare into existence a Talysh- Mugan Autonomous Republic on the frontier between Azerbaidzhan and Iran. The local revolt continued for two months before it was put down by the new government of former communist boss Gaidar Aliev.”442 • “In 1993… a short lived attempt was made to establish a Talysh-Mughan Autonomous Republic, in the extreme south-east of Azerbaijan, along the border with Iran. As with the Lezghins and other minorities, the Talysh claimed their culture was being undermined by integration into the Azeri state. Talysh nationalists, aided by local military elements (and with the tacit support of Russia) seized control of sourthern districts in June 1993. The insurgency was suppressed by August 1993, although autonomist sentiments continue.”443

436 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 288-289) 437 Minahan (2016, p. 409-410) 438 Minahan (2002, p. 1841) 439 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 289) 440 See BBC (Feb 2003). “Azerbaijan in a stir over political prisoner” 441 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 289) 442 Beissenger (1997, p. 242) 443 Notholt ( 2009, p. 7.17)

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• Leader of movement was a colonel: “On 20 July 1993 Colonel Alikram Gumbatov declared the Talysh-Mughan Autonous Republic and proclaimed himself as president, but a month later the Azerbaijani government suppressed the autonomist movement and jailed Gumbatov and his closest supporters.”444 o Based on the above, seems fair to assign a Yes value for Violence in both temporal windows.

279 – Faroe Islands (Target: Denmark; Year: 1946) Solely institutional movement.

Instl_Narrow (1946-48): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1946-48): No (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1944-48): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1944-48): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: No ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: 1

• Summary/write-up: The movement began shortly after WWII. The trigger was the British occupation of the island and several years of separation from Denmark on account of the Nazi invasion. It was in this context that Iceland, another Danish dependency, declared independence in 1944. The Faroese parliament, the Lagting, held a plebiscite on September 14, 1946 (Crawford 2006, 404) where a narrow majority favoured secession over continued autonomy. A declaration of independence was made four days later on September 18, 1946. The Danish government was caught off guard, and on September 24, 1946, the Danish King, acting on the advice of the Danish Government unilaterally dissolved the Faroese parliament and called for a new election. In that election, the Faroese party favouring continued autonomy (Home Rule) won a majority, thereby checking the independence drive. Two years later in 1948, the Faroese completed their negotiations for greater autonomy, basically giving them local rule. By all accounts this appeared to end the formal independence drive, though it has persisted as a mostly local issue since then. In sum, there is no record of extrainstitutinal methods and no record of violence. This was a purely institutional effort. • Sources employed: o Crawford, James (2006) o Hewitt and Cheetham (2000) o Minahan (2002)

444 Coene (2009, p. 162)

97 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 281 – Casamance (Target: Senegal; Year: 1982) Initially extra-institutional non-violent contention followed by extra-institutional violent contention

Instl_Narrow (1982-84): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1982-84): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1980-84): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1980-84): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: 1

• “The Casamance region, which is isolated from the rest of Senegal by the Gambia, was historically neglected, both under French colonial rule [from circa 1870] and after Senegal became independent in 1960.”445 • “Several movements for independence emerged in the early 1960s, but the first serious clashes between separatists and the Senegalese army occurred in 1982 in the town of Ziguinchor. Violence broke out again in 1987 and 1990, and over 1,000 people were killed.”446 • Prior to this, however, Victor Dialla, who was educated in France, cofounded the “Movement of Democratic Forces of the Casamance (MFDC) [in 1947] to affirm the Casamance identity. He was murdered, possibly by French agents, on 20 November 1948.”447 • Another separatist organization that emerged later was the Casamance Autonomy Movement (MAC), which in 1959 went on to form the “nucleus of a Casamance-based political party, the Parti de Regroupment Africain-Senegal, known as PRA-Senegal.”448 “Following Senegalese independence in 1960 the party was banned as secessionist and forced underground.”449 • “The Casamançais nationalist movement resurfaced in … 1982, led by the MFDC [(although this was a new organization who reclaimed the name of the former MFDC)450], with the aim of separating Casamance from Senegal.”451 • “The formation of the armed wing of the MFDC, the Atika, led to secessionist demonstrations. Severe rioting in December 1983 provoked the Senagalese government to abolish Casamance province and to divide the territory into two new regions”.452

445 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 61) 446 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 61) 447 Minahan (2002, p. 398) 448 Minahan (2002, p. 398) 449 Minahan (2002, p. 398) 450 Cruise O’Brien, D., Dunn, J. and Rathbone, R., eds (1989, p. 159) 451 Minahan (2002, p. 399) 452 Minahan (2002, p. 399)

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• Another account maintains that, “[s]ince 1981 the Diola people of the Casamance have been in a state of rebellion: the revolt of the lycée students (1981), then the following year the more important demonstration in front of the governor’s mansion in Ziguinchor during which the Senagalese flag was replaced by the Casamance movement; new riots in December 1983 (twenty-five dead and eighty wounded) at the outcome of legal proceedings involving members of the independence movement; new confrontations between demonstrators and the forces of order in November 1986 and January 1987 resulting in around ten deaths.”453 o Here we have examples of extra-institutional non-violent action in the wider timeframe and extra-institutional violent action in the narrow timeframe. • “Discontent with how the Senegalese authorities were administering Casamance began to bubble up in the late 1970s. While initial protests were peaceful, by the early 1980s the conflict bean to turn violent as the Senegalese government adopted a policy of repression towards protesters.”454 • “The MFDC, the main secessionist movement in Casamance, attracts most of its support from the ethnic Diola. The organization was founded not as a pro-independence movement, but rather as a regional political party… It ceased to exist in the 1950s… Casamance reparatists resurrected the name in the early 1980s, although, according to Professor Evans, there was no direct historical connection between the two organizations.”455 • Peaceful nonviolent extra-institution in narrow time window, and later formation of armed wing: o “On December 26, 1982, the MFDC in its separatist reincarnation organized a peaceful march demanding independence, which the authorities repressed using force. In 1986 the authorities arrested 152 people for attending an MFDC secret meeting. The MFDC eveloped a military wing, ATTIKA, that became fully mobilized in 1990. ATTIKA waged a low-level campaign of violence interspersed with sporadic cease-fires.”456 § Evidence of nonviolent extra-institutional in narrow time frame • More on armed/violent mobilization: o “In mid-December 1983, hundreds of demonstrators—armed with spears, machetes, and hunting rifles, covered in protective charms, and chanting incantations to render them invulnerable to bullets—invaded the streets of Ziguinchor to call for the independence of a region in the southwest corner of Senegal—the Casamance. The government responded with a heavy hand, leaving an official toll of 80 injured and 29 dead. A handful of those retreating, led by veterans from the Senegalese army, under the banner of the Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance (MFDC), headed to the mangroves and dense forest of lower Casamance to set up rebel bases. They started military training and planning attacks on government positions. In doing so, they began a guerrilla war that has left

453 Coulon & Cruise O’Brien (1989, p. 158) 454 Beary (2011, p. 32) 455 Beary (2011, p. 32) 456 Beary (2011, p. 32)

99 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 thousands killed and the south of Senegal strewn with land mines. After 20 years of failed negotiations and aborted attempts at achieving military victory, no end to the war is in sight.”457 o Shift from more peaceful to more violent: § “On December 26, 1982, the MFDC organized a peaceful march through the streets of Ziguinchor,culminating in the lowering of the Senegalese flag at key government buildings and the raising of a white flag in its stead. This time, Senegalese forces responded by violently dispersing the march, killing a number of activists and arresting many more. [paragraph break] In anticipation of further problems, the government increased its security operations in the zone.These included a raid on a gathering in a sacred Diola forest on the outskirts of Ziguinchor in early December 1983. In reaction to the perceived violation of the forests, three of the gendarmes were immolated.These sacrifices were followed by more in an attempt to undo the damage to the forests. Through this act of cult, Casamance stumbled into a new stage of violent resistance.”458 § Beginnings of armed organization: • “With tensions mounting, a larger and more aggres- sive demonstration in Ziguinchor was again dispersed violently, leaving an official toll of 29 dead. [paragraph break] A group of those not killed or arrested left Ziguinchor to found a new armed branch of the MFDC, Atika (“warrior” in Diola), in the dense forests outside Ziguinchor, dedicated to achieving independence for the region. At their head were veteran Senegalese army soldiers Sidy Badji and Léopold Sagna. In moving to the maquis—or rebel base—the veterans and their followers were ill prepared for a violent struggle.Armed with traditional weapons and a small number of hunting rifles, most of the group had had no prior military training. And Atika had no military or political plan. [paragraph break] In fact, the group took almost no military actions until late 1986.”459 o Footnotes #11 and #12 in Humphreys and Mohamed (205, p. 290): “11. In some documents the MFDC date the founding of Atika to early 1984. [line break] 12. The MFDC’s files record 1,000 men joining the maquis on December 6, 1983, a date that would indicate the formation of the maquis after the immolation of the gendarmes rather than after the Ziguinchor march.”460

457 Humphreys and Mohamed (2005, p. 247) 458 Humpheys and Mohamed (2005, p. 250) 459 Humphreys and Mohamed (2005, p. 251) 460 Humpreys and Mohamed (2005, p. 291)

100 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 § This is sufficient evidence of armed mobilization to code “Yes” for violent extra-institutional contention in both temporal windows.

282 – Anyi (Target: Ivory Coast; Year: 1961) Initially institutional contention followed by extra-institutional non-violent contention

Instl_Narrow (1961-63): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1961-63): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1959-63): Yes (Confidence: .25) ExtraInstl_Wider (1959-63): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: No ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: 1

• “Anyi nationalism grew rapidly in the 1950s, fanned by conflicts with the colony’s predominant Baule tribe. Early in 1959, as it became clear that the Ivory Coast colony would become an autonomous state, King Amon Ndoffou II of Sanwi asserted the Anyi right to separate independence based on [previous] treaties. The king established a provisional government and sent emissaries to Paris to argue the Anyi case for separation.”461 o This is an example of institutional contention in the wider timeframe, provided this was within the scope of royal prerogative while awaiting word from Paris. • “The French government rebuffed the Anyi delegation, and the Anyi kingdoms moved toward secession.”462 o These further moves were now extra-institutional non-violent action in the wider timeframe. • “On 5 February 1960, the king of Sanwi declared his kingdom independent of France and the Ivory Coast. The other Anyi kingdoms voted to join Sanwi in an independent Anyi state, provoking an armed response from the new Ivorian government.”463 o This is a further example of extra-institutional non-violent action in the wider timeframe. o There is no indication of a violent resistance by the Anyi to the Ivorian government action and thus continued resistance464 is an example of extra-institutional non- violent action in the narrow timeframe.

461 Minahan (2002, p. 149) 462 Minahan (2002, p. 149) 463 Minahan (2002, p. 149) 464 Minahan (2002, p. 149)

101 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 283 – Southern Cameroons (Target: Cameroon; Year: 1999) Mostly/ entirely extra-institutional contention including nonviolent and both armed and violent elements

Instl_Narrow (1999-2001): No (Confidence: .5) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1999-2001): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1997-2001): No (Confidence: .5) ExtraInstl_Wider (1997-2001): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .75

• Cameroon is a country split between francophone and anglophone populations, with the Southern Cameroons making up the anglophone minority.465 The various regions of Cameroon have not had a unified past and the state was formed as part of the process of decolonization of the French and British empires.466 • Southern Cameroon has been particularly vocal since the abolition of the federal system in 1972, essentially annexing the minority Southern Cameroonians to the francophone majority.467 • “Opposition … formed around the English-speaking elite in the early 1980s, particularly following the official change of name to La République du Cameroun, in 1984. Most of the groups advocated a return to the former federal system that allowed the anglophone provinces considerable cultural, political, and economic autonomy. More militant groups supported a demand for complete separation and independence….”468 • Nationalist sentiment for independence continued to grow and the Southern Cameroons Advisory Council was formed with members “including nonelected and retired politicians, clergy, fons, and chiefs”.469 “An informal referendum was held in the two western provinces from 1 to 30 September 1995” and “nationalists took their case to the UN in 1995.” 470 • Cameroon adopted a new constitution in 1996 which further cemented the influence of the central government and, in response, “[n]ationalists organized an informal referendum on independence; over 85% of the adult respondents supported independence through a negotiated constitutional separation from Cameroon.”471 • “Militants attacked government facilities in Northwest Province during rioting in March 1997. Over 300 were arrested; most were later released… [and] [t]here are reports of a

465 Minahan (2002, p. 1776) 466 Minahan (2002, p. 1773-1775) 467 Minahan (2002, p. 1775) 468 Minahan (2002, p. 1775-1776) 469 Minahan (2002, p. 1776) 470 Minahan (2002, p. 1777) 471 Minahan (2002, p. 1777)

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number of dead and wounded in violent confrontations.”472 The attacks were on a police post in the town of Bamenda by guerillas associated with the Southern Cameroon National Congress.473 o This is the first event within the time period under consideration for this project and is an example of extra-institutional action in the wider temporal window. o Additional information on this incident, providing evidence that it merits a full “Yes” coding for violent extra-institutional mobilization in the wider temporal window: “The SCNC is the leading secessionist group representing English-speaking Cameroonians. […] The government blamed the SCNC for a series of armed attacks in March and April 1997. These attacks, in which ten people were killed, targeted local administrative officials and military police in the Northwest region, one of two Anglophone areas (the other being the Southwest).”474 • Additionally, it should be noted that Beary (2011) argues that post-1996, with reforms not meeting expectations: “The Anglophone separatist movement has continued to simmer ever since, never rising to the level of an all-out armed conflict, but causing considerable domestic tension as the government has sought to clamp down on various separatist groups.”475 • “On 30 December 1999, Justice Alobwede Frederick Ebong formally proclaimed the restoration of Southern Cameroons sovereignty and independence. He and other nationalist leaders were arrested and later condemned to death for treason. The independence declaration was condemned by many Southern Cameroonian groups as premature and illegal; the arrests and condemnations led to widespread protests and increasing nationalist activities.”476 o This is an example of extra-institutional non-violent action. • Despite hundreds of arrests in January 2001 at pro-independence demonstrations, the South Cameroonian nationalist movement assert their desire to “pursue a peaceful, legal campaign.”477 o This is an example of extra-institutional non-violent action. • Violent Extra-Institutional Mobilization in Narrow Temporal Window: o “Southern Cameroon National Council (SCNC). [… in 2000:] The council remained formally committed to noviolence, although that philosophy was expected to be reconsidered at a ‘consitutent assembly’ scheduled for late September in which a constitution secretly adopted in 1996 also was scheduled for review. […] Meanwhile, the Biya administration maintained its hard line toward the SCNC. In October 2001 violent clashes between police and SCNC demonstrators on the 40th anniversary of unification left three dead and dozens injured. In July 2001 Ebong

472 Minahan (2002, p. 1777) 473 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 60) 474 Beary (2011, p. 58) 475 Beary (2011, p. 58) 476 Minahan (2002, p. 1777) 477 Minahan (2002, p. 1777)

103 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 announced the formation of his ‘cabinet,’ and the SCNC boycotted the 2002 legislative elections and the 2004 presidential polling.”478 § This, combined with likely maintenance of armed forces (additional corroboration necessary to verify this), results in Yes coding for violent extra-institutional contention in the narrow time frame. • Additional corroboration of lack of institutional participation by SCNC would increase confidence of coding for institutional variables. However, given discussion of boycotts immediately following temporal period, and contentious interactions between state and the movement, “No” coding appears appropriate choice.

284 – Edos (Target: Nigeria; Year: 1967) Mostly/entirely Extra-institutional mobilization, including violent action

Instl_Narrow (1967-69): No (Confidence: .25) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1967-69): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1965-69): No (Confidence: .25) ExtraInstl_Wider (1965-69): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .75

• “Nigeria became an independent state in 1960, a federation of three regions, each dominated by one of Nigeria’s three largest .”479 • “In 1963 the Edos voted to separate their historical homeland from the Yoruba-dominated Western Region.”480 • “The outbreak of civil war following the secession of the neighboring Ibos in the Eastern Region … brought chaos to the region … [and] [t]he federal government granted the Edos a major degree of autonomy in 1967, in an effort to undermine nationalists’ threats to follow Biafra into secession”.481 o While some might argue that this is an example of institutional action in the narrow timeframe, it seems that these efforts were actually intended to increase autonomy. Coding “No” for institutional contention, but with low confidence to reflect uncertainty over this. • “Chaos followed an invasion by Biafran forces on 10 August 1967. The Edos responded by rebelling against both the federal forces and the Biafran invaders. Mutineers from Edo battalions seized Benin City and on 18 August 1967 declared Benin independent of both

478 Lansford (2012, p. 229) 479 Minahan (2002, p. 760) 480 Minahan (2002, p. 569) 481 Minahan (2002, p. 569)

104 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 Nigeria and Biafra. Federal troops ended the secession on 20 September 1967, but the Edo homeland remained a battlefield until the end of the civil war in 1970.”482 o This is an example of extra-institutional violent action in the narrow timeframe. • Could use additional corroboration for the “No” coding for extra-institutional nonviolent contention (both temporal windows) to increase confidence coding.

285 – Ibos [Igbo] (Target: Nigeria; Year: 1967) Entirely/ mostly extra-institutional contention

Instl_Narrow (1967-69): No (Confidence: .75) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1967-69): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1965-69): No (Confidence: .75) ExtraInstl_Wider (1965-69): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: 1

• “Nigeria became an independent state in 1960, a federation of three regions, each dominated by one of Nigeria’s three largest tribes.”483 • “Resentment of the dominant position of the Northern Region, dominated by the Hausas, and the extravagant use of the East’s oil revenues for northern development projects, finally erupted in an Ibo rebellion in January 1966. Ibo military officers staged a bloody coup and replaced the Muslim-dominated Nigerian government with a new administration under an Ibo president.”484 o Because this appears intended to seize power within the national state, as opposed to separate the Ibo-occupied territory, will not count this as an action by the separatist movement. • After a counter-coup, “[t]he Nigerian government, amid rising tribal tension, adopted a new constitution in 1967 that divided the three regions into twelve ethnic states … [but] three days later the Ibo proclaimed the Republic of Biafra and withdrew the entire Eastern Region from the Nigerian Federaion.”485 This was not accepted by the Nigerian government.486 o This is an example of extra-institutional non-violent action in the narrow timeframe. • In response, the Nigerian government sent troops in March 1968 and were able to retake some regions.487

482 Minahan (2002, p. 569) 483 Minahan (2002, p. 760) 484 Minahan (2002, p. 764) 485 Minahan (2002, p. 760) 486 Minahan (2002, p. 765) 487 Minahan (2002, p. 760)

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o Ibo resistance to Nigerian troops is an example of extra-institutional violent action in the narrow timeframe. • “The Ibo-inspired and largely Ibo-led 'Biafra' movement between 30 May 1967 and I I January 1970 provided yet another crucial test for the of a culturally heterogeneous, newly emergent African state.”488 • “Regional differences and resource conflicts precipitated the Biafra War (1967–1970). In 1966, several thousand Igbo people were killed in ethnic or religious attacks throughout parts of northern Nigeria. That same year, a military coup installed General Yakubu Gowon as the first military leader of Nigeria. In 1967, the east- ern part of the country, under Igbo leadership, seceded from the republic, sparking a civil war, also known as the Nigerian- Biafran War, which caused millions of civilians to starve as a result of ravaged crops and mili- tary attacks. Estimates range from 1 million to 3 million war casualties. The eastern region eventually was reintegrated into the republic[.]”489 • Additional corroboration of lack of institutional contention would further increase confidence for “No” codings for institutional action in both temporal windows.

286 – South Katanga (Target: Dem Rep Congo; Year: 1960) Combination of institutional and both violent and nonviolent extra-institutional contention.

Instl_Narrow (1960-62): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1960-62): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1958-62): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1958-62): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .75

• “The Belgian Congo gained its independence as the Democratic Republic of the Congo on June 30, 1960. The country was ill-prepared for independence and had never had elections before 1957. Its population was divided into more than 150 ethnic groups, and most of the political parties that existed were regionally based.”490 • After Kasaian success in the municipal elections, “Moise Tsombe, with a European cofounder, organized the Confederation of Tribal Associations of Katanga (Conakat), which

488 Tamuno (1970, p. 583) 489 Abidogun (2013, p. 653) 490 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 327)

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quickly became the party of Katangan nationalism”.491 “In 1960 Conakat won control of the provincial assembly.”492 o While some might interpret participation in elections at this point as an example of institutional action in the wider and narrow timeframes, this was arguably autonomist, not separatist. (Regardless, additional evidence supporting “Yes” coding for institutional contention, below.) § “Conakat called for the repatriation of the immigrants and a federal Congo. […] Originally, Canakat includd Balubakat, representing th Baluba , but Balubakat broke away from Conakat in 1959. In the May 1960 elections, Conakat won eight of sixteen Katangan seats in the national legislature and twenty-five of the sixty seats in the provincial assembly. […] In the period before independence, the leader of Conakat, Moise Tshombe, attemptd to alter the constitution in order to obtain more autonomy for Katanga.”493 • Solid evidence of institutional efforts to obtain independence: o “Tshombe declared Katanga independent on July 11, and the Katangan Assembly unanimously approved the secession (the Balubakat representatives had withdrawn earlier).”494 • “The province of Katanga seceded [11] days after independence”.495,496 • The province of Katanga was “[p]rotected by its Belgian-officered and supplied army”,497 which ensured peace and prosperity for a time. The new leader of the Democratic Republic of Congo (Mobutu Sese Seko), who was installed in a military coup, was successful in gaining United Nations support in the effort to return Katanga and, “[t]he UN troops invaded Katanga in December 1961.”498 o The armed resistance to the UN is an example of extra-institutional violent action in the narrow timeframe. Additionally, Katanga maintained substantial armed forces, as discussed below – providing additional corroboration for coding violent extra- institutional contention “Yes.” • See, also, “Katanga Secession.” in Kisangani and Bobb (2010, pp. 270-71): o “At independence, Moïse Tshombe’s Confédération des Associations Tribales du Katanga (CONAKAT) swept the local elections, leading to a single-party provincial government. The causes of the Katanga secession are many. Stated simply, CONAKAT was unhappy with its representation in the central government because it received relatively minor representation in the first cabinet of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba. Supported by private business interests and its sizable

491 Minahan (2002, pp. 968-969) 492 Minahan (2002, p. 969) 493 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 151) 494 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 152) 495 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 327) 496 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 151) 497 Minahan (2002, p. 969) 498 Minahan (2002, p. 969)

107 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 expatriate population, Katanga seceded on 11 July 1960. For three years, Tshombe stonewalled reunification attempts by Congolese leaders and the UN.”499 o “The UN carried out two military operations in Katanga, Operation Rumpunch and Operation Morthor, ostensibly aimed at removing foreign mercenaries who were the backbone of the Katangan military forces, but also designed to weaken the Katangan government and its foreign supporters. The Katangan government, although recognized by several countries, was unable to withstand the pressure, and the secession ended on 14 January 1963.”500 • See, also, “Katanga Province.” (Kisangani and Bobb 2010, pp. 266-70): o “At independence, Moïse Tshombe’s Confédération des Associations Tribales du Katanga (CONAKAT) swept the local elections, leading to the formation of a one- party provincial government. Unhappy with CONAKAT’s representation in the central government and encouraged by private commercial interests and an organization of European residents called the Union Katangaise, Katanga seceded on 11 July 1960. The Katanga secession held world attention during the next two years as Tshombe stalled mediation efforts and frustrated UN attempts at reunification. Congo’s first prime minister, Patrice Lumumba, and UN Secretary- General Dag Hammarskjöld died in Katanga, and thousands of Luba and Lunda were killed in interethnic fighting during the secession. After a series of mediation efforts and two military operations by UN forces (Operation Rum- punch and Operation Morthor, the latter widely condemned by some members of the international community), the Katangan secession ended on 14 January 1963.”501 • See, also, ICG (Jan 2006): “Katanga: The Congo’s Forgotten Crisis” “Major immigration to Katanga began with the establishment of the mining industry o in 1906. […] Most [immigrants to the region] were from the Luba ethnic group of Kasai, in particular from the poor and neglected south east. At independence, the Luba ran much of the administration and business sector of the province, creating discontent and antagonism among other communities. Moise Tshombe and his CONAKAT movement used the discontent to demand more power for locals in the administration, and tensions between him and the Luba were aggravated at independence when the Kasaian community sided with Patrice Lumumba against the secessionist south. Katanga’s interior minister, Godefroid Munongo, orchestrated the first operations against the Luba, and the UN evacuated much of the community from the province. ”502 o “In the Katangan political imagination, the province is divided into north (Tanganyika and Haut-Lomami districts) and south (Kolwezi, Haut-Katanga and

Lualaba districts). There are ethnic differences between the two regions: the north is predominantly Lubakat and Hemba, while the south is settled mostly by the Lunda, Bemba and Songwe tribes. […]These political differences first surfaced in 1960, when the northern members of the provincial assembly sided with the nationalist first prime minister of the Congo, against the secessionist southerners. After Tshombe launched his independence movement, northern politicians created

a youth militia, the Balubakat Youth of Katanga (JEBAKAT). When Katanga seceded, the north declared an independent Popular Republic of Lualaba, which Tshombe’s

499 Kisangani and Bobb (2010, p. 270) 500 Kisangani and Bobb (2010, p. 271) 501 Kisangani and Bobb (2010, p. 267) 502 ICG (Jan 2006, pp. 4-5)

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troops put an end to in March 1961 by seizing its capital, Manono.”503 • Operating extra-legal parallel state institutions as evidence of extra-institutional nonviolent resistance: o “Despite initial sympathy on the part of some Western governments, and an ambitious lobbying campaign, Katanga was unable to secure full diplomatic recognition from any country.”504 o “In August 1961, the UN special representative in Katanga, Conor Cruise O’Brien, delivered an ultimatum to Tshombe. He must go and negotiate with the central government. When Tshombe refused, UN troops seized the center of Elisabethville… Heavy fighting broke out, and after a series of cease-fires, Tshombe, in December, recognized the ‘indivisible unity’ of the Congo and President Kasavubu as its chief of state. However, the Katangan assembly refused to accept or implement this declaration, and a further series of abortive discussions took place between the Congolese central government and the Katangese in early 1962. In January 1963, UN forces launched an attack against the Katangese forces, and on Jauary 14, 1963, the Katangan government declared that its secession was ended.”505 o “Amid these disturbances, the southeastern province of Katanga announced its secession on 11 July. Scholars of the period are unanimous in describing the political entity that emerged as independent of Leopoldville, as possessing its own military, the Katanga Gendarmes, numbering 5-7,000 troops plus foreign mercenaries, and of governing its territory.”506

287 – South Kasai (Target: Dem Rep Congo; Year: 1960) Combination of institutional and both violent and nonviolent extra-institutional contention.

Instl_Narrow (1960-62): Yes (Confidence: .5) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1960-62): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1958-62): Yes (Confidence: .5) ExtraInstl_Wider (1958-62): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .75

• “The Belgian Congo gained its independence as the Democratic Republic of the Congo on June 30, 1960. The country was ill-prepared for independence and had never had elections before 1957 [municipal elections]. Its population was divided into more than 150 ethnic groups, and most of the political parties that existed were regionally based.”507

503 ICG (Jan 2006, p. 5) 504 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 152) 505 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, pp. 152-53) 506 Lemke (2011, p. 56) 507 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 327)

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• “In … Kasai Province, Albert Kalonji, whose faction of the Congolese National Movement won twenty-one of the provincial assembly seats, declared the formation of the state of South Kasai.”508 o Participation in elections is an example of institutional contention in the wider and narrow timeframes. § Lower confidence for institutional coding reflects concerns about whether this party (and/or factions of it) were explicitly secessionist, either at this time or ever, or if the secession effort just involved party members. See “MOUVEMENT NATIONAL CONGOLAIS (MNC) [NATIONAL CONGOLESE MOVEMENT].” (Kisangani and Bobb 2010, 372; English translation in original): “One of the few parties at independence that eschewed regionalism and attempted to develop a national base of support, the MNC tried to develop a cogent ideology and took its inspiration from African nationalists such as Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah and Guinea’s Ahmed Sékou Touré. It sought to establish a nationalistic program of economic, political, and cultural development and supported the concept of Pan-Africanism. By 1959, however, the MNC had begun to splinter. Albert Kalonji left following the massacres of Luba in Katanga with a group that came to be called the MNC/Kalonji.”509 • “In Kasai, armed Luluas launched attacks on Luba areas and overran Luluabourg, setting off a bloody civil war in the province.”510 o Assuming this is a two-sided armed conflict, this is an example of extra-institutional violent action in the narrow timeframe. Additional corroboration would increase confidence in coding “Yes” for violent extra-institutional contention. • “... Albert Kalonji declared the independence of the Republic of South Kasai on 9 August 1960.”511 o The declaration is an example of extra-institutional non-violent action in the narrow timeframe, along with the maintenance of parallel state institutions, discussed below: § See “Kasai.” (Kisangani and Bobb 2010, 261) • “Originally one of the six colonial provinces, Kasai was the second richest in minerals after Katanga and, at its peak in the 1960s and 1970s, produced two-thirds of the non-Communist world’s industrial diamonds. On 8 August 1960, under the leadership of Albert Kalonji, the southern portion of Kasai seceded and proclaimed itself the Independent Mining Republic of South Kasai. Kalonji ended the secession in early 1962. South Kasai was, however, represented when parliament reopened on 25 July 1961, at Lovanium University under United Nations protection. On 24

508 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 327) 509 Kisangani and Bobb (2010, p. 372) 510 Minahan (2002, p. 949) 511 Minahan (2002, p. 950)

110 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 December 1966, Kasai was divided into two provinces, Kasai Occidental and Kasai Oriental, partly because of tensions between the Luba and Lulua.”512 § “Adding to Leopoldville’s troubles, on 8 August 1960 the southern part of Kasai province asserted its independence as the Autonomous State of South Kasai (alternately known as the Mining State of South Kasai, and as the Diamond State). Local leader Albert Kalonji was dissatisfied (as was Katangan leader Tshombe) with the political manoeuvres that rendered Lumumba Prime Minister, and this discontent, coupled with the diamond wealth of South Kasai, encouraged this second secession. In South Kasai, 'a state was created' that 'enjoyed two years of self-rule', supporting claims that the polity qualifies as an APE. Its independence was not recognised by any official states, although Katanga and South Kasai signed treaties 'for economic, financial, and military cooperation’.”513

288 – Stanleyville (Target: Dem Rep Congo; Year: 1960) Mostly/entirely extra-institutional contention with armed mobilization

Instl_Narrow (1960-62): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1960-62): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1958-62): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1958-62): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: 1

• “The Belgian Congo gained its independence as the Democratic Republic of the Congo on June 30, 1960. The country was ill-prepared for independence and had never had elections before 1957. Its population was divided into more than 150 ethnic groups, and most of the political parties that existed were regionally based.”514 • Unlike the secessionist movements in Katanga and South Kasai, which were seeking secession from the new nation (refer cases 286 and 287), the brief rebel government established in Stanleyville by Antoine Gizenga in support of Patrice Lamumba (the first Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo) was intended as an alternative to the central government in Léopoldville.515

512 Kisangani and Bobb (2010, p. 261) 513 Lemke (2011, p. 57) 514 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 327) 515 Mazov, S. (2007, passim)

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• Gizenga had previously been Deputy Prime Minister to Patrice Lamumba before the former’s dismissal by President Kasa-Vubu, on 5 September 1960, although as head of the most popular political party, Lamumba retained majority support in the parliament.516 • The constitutional crisis was broken by the army’s Chief of Staff Joseph-Désiré Mobuto through a bloodless coup on 14 September 1960, which ultimately favored President Kasa- Vubu and resulted in the house arrest of Lamumba. • “After Lumumba was ousted, his followers began to gather in the Oriental Province situated in the eastern part of the Congo. Antoine Gizenga, President of the Parti de la Solidarité Africaine and deputy Prime Minister of the Congo between June and September 1960, led the opposition to the central government in Leopoldville and declared himself acting Prime Minister after Lumumba's arrest. On 12 December 1960 Gizenga formally declared Stanleyville, the capital of Oriental Province, the new headquarters of the ‘only legitimate’ government in the Congo.”517 o This is an interesting example, as Lamumba’s (and Gizenga’s) supporters included members of parliament, although it does not seem that they were able to pursue their case through the parliament in Léopoldville. The establishing of the separate government in Stanleyville should therefore be seen as an extra-institutional non- violent action in the narrow timeframe. • The Stanleyville army “numbered 8,000 – 9,000 soldiers armed with ‘relatively modern’ Belgian weapons.”518,519 o While there is evidence that the government in Stanleyville maintained a professional standing army, there is no reference to battlefield casualties and the Correlates of War does not code this case for violence. However, due to maintenance of military forces, coding “Yes” for violent extra-institutional mobilization. • The dispute was resolved peacefully (after the assassination of Lamumba) after a rapproachment between Gizenga and the United States following Gizenga’s inability to secure sufficient resourcing from the Soviets to sustain the rebel government and its army.520 Gizenga was appointed vice Prime Minister of the government in Léopoldville in December 1961 after endorsement by the Congolese Parliament in August,521 however was later dismissed on 15 January 1962 and then imprisoned at the end of January 1962 for the next thirty months (coder’s translation).522 • The arrest and imprisonment of Gizenga led to further instability amongst his political base, leading to open rebellion in mid-1963 (coder’s translation).523 o Any action leading up to the open rebellion and occurring within the relevant timeframe (up to 1962) would be classified as extra-institutional non-violent, which

516 Mazov, S. (2007, passim) 517 Mazov, S. (2007, p. 429) 518 Mazov, S. (2007, p. 433) 519 Also refer to Mazov, S (2007, p. 430) for discussion of Soviet funding for the Stanleyville army 520 Mazov, S. (2007, p. 434) 521 Mazov, S. (2007, p. 434) 522 Gerard-Libois, J. & Verhaegen, B. (1966, p. 202) 523 Gerard-Libois, J. & Verhaegen, B. (1966, p. 202)

112 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 has already been coded for. The rebellion itself comes after the relevant timeframe for this case. • “In spite of his disputes with Tshombe, Kalonji, Kasavubu, Mobutu and Hammerskjold, Lumumba remained the most popular politician in the country and enjoyed particularly strong support in the north and east. When his house arrest persisted for several months, and when the UN's Credentials Committee recognised Kasavubu and Mobutu's representatives (on 10 November 1960), 'the strategy emerged of establishing a rival government in Stanleyville (Kisangani) and carrying [58] on the struggle from there [...] support of the provincial government was assured and pro-Mobutu officers were removed from the army detachments. By the end of the month, Lumumbist control over Orientale had been consolidated.' Vice Premier Gizenga, Lumumba's chief deputy, led these efforts, and Stanleyville emerged as a fourth relevant actor and third APE.”524 • Lumamba’s “…death was announced in February, but even without him the Stanleyville APE flourished. It overturned the pro-Leopoldville government of Kivu province on 25 December 1960, and expanded into Katangan and Kasaian territory by late February 1961. These expansions increased the territory and population of the Stanleyville APE, and that combined with negative reactions to Lumumba's murder 'helped Gizenga consolidate his regime, and several African and Soviet bloc countries accorded it official recognition’.”525 • “By April 1961, facing military collapse, Gizenga entered negotiations with Mobutu and Kasavubu about resolving the dispute over which government would officially represent the country. After initially agreeing to the installation of Adoula as the new Prime Minister (in August 1961), Gizenga returned to Stanleyville and reasserted the APE's independence from the govern ment in Leopoldville. But now Leopoldville was able to exploit divisions within Gizenga's Stanleyville government, and that coupled with the blockades led to military collapse. By September 1962 Gizenga was imprisoned in Leopoldville, and all of Stanleyville APE was governed from Leopoldville.”526

289 – Bankonjo I (Target: Uganda; Year: 1963) Initially non-violent extra-institutional followed by mixed violent and non-violent extra- institutional contention. The violent insurgency against the Ugandan state appears to have ended some two decades after the primary year of mobilization by this iteration of the Bankonjo secessionist movement.527

Instl_Narrow (1963-65): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1963-65): Yes (Confidence: 1)

524 Lemke (2011, pp. 57-8) 525 Lemke (2011, p. 58) 526 Lemke (2011, p. 59) 527 See Reuss and Tetica (2017, 132): “In 1982, a political settlement formally ended the low-intensity rebellion. Rwenzururu forces laid down their arms in return for a degree of local autonomy and the integration of their leaders in the Kasese administration.” Minahan (2002, p. 1621) identifies 1983 as the year in which the movement’s leader surrendered (see case #290, below).

113 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 Instl_Wider (1961-65): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1961-65): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: 1

• Note: referenced as the Ruwenzoris in Minahan (2002, p. 1617) as this is the region in which the Bankonjo live, and Rwenzururu in Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 259). • The Bankonjo were incorporated into the Toro kingdom, and later the Ugandan state, by colonial Britain.528 • The Bankonjo were not satisfied with this arrangement, which was not helped by the ethnocentric nationalism of the Toro kingdom, and in “1960 the Ruwenzoris insisted that a new constitution for the kindom be adopted that recognized the three tribes as the peoples of Toro, replacing the ethnocentric view that the Toros were the only legitimate inhabitants.”529 • “In early 1962, consultations took place in the Toro parliament, but the Ruwenzori leaders broke off the talks when their demands for recognition were rejected.”530 • “In 1962, the Rwenzururu Movement was formed and called for a separate district to be set up.”531 • “On the eve of Ugandan independence in October 1962 the Toro kingdom adopted a new constitution that ignored the Ruwenzoris’ demands for official recognition of the kingdom’s three peoples. The Toro kingdom accepted semifederal status within the newly independent Ugandan state.”532 • As a result of the failure of negotiations over the Toro constitution, “[Isaya] Mukirane [,a leader of the Bakonjo movement,] set up the secessionist Kingdom of Rwenzururu with its own army, taxes, and schools. The rebels raided Batoro villages and received wide support from the Bakonzo. Given the inaccessible terrain, the secessionist regime was able to maintain a defacto independence until the 1970s.”533 o This is an example of extra-institutional violent and non-violent action in the narrow timeframe.534

290 – Bankonjo II (Target: Uganda; Year: 1986) This iteration of the Bankonjo secessionist movement arose in the wake of the 1986 change in government within Uganda, in which Museveni came to power. While the National Army for the

528 Minahan (2002, p. 1619) 529 Minahan (2002, p. 1620) 530 Minahan (2002, p. 1620) 531 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 259) 532 Minahan (2002, p. 1620) 533 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 259) 534 Minahan (2002, p. 1621) places the date of declaration for the Kingdom of Ruwenzururu as 13 February 1963.

114 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 Liberation of Uganda (NALU) did not initiate its campaign of attacks against the government until 1989, the year following the close of the temporal window, it was founded in 1988, within the relevant time period. As a result of this armed mobilization, coded “Yes” for violent mobilization in both temporal windows.

Instl_Narrow (1986-88): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1986-88): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1984-88): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1984-88): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .5

• Note: referenced as the Ruwenzoris in Minahan (2002, p. 1617) as this is the region in which the Bankonjo live, and Rwenzururu in Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 259). • For additional context, refer to Bankonjo I (case 289, year 1963). • “In 1980 the Ugandan government took a more conciliatory stance to the continuing Ruwenzori insurgency. A couple of health dispensaries were opened in the region, but … the region remained isolated and neglected. Charles Iremangoma, the last Ruwenzori king and the leader of the separatist movement, the Ruwenzuru Movement, surrendered to government troops in 1983.”535 • After a change in the Ugandan government in 1986, the “Ruwenzoris quickly lost faith in the new government, which ignored their petitions for regional autonomy. The 40-year Ruwenzori rebellion resumed.”536 • Additional background: o “…the Rwenzururu rebellion launched in 1962 sought independence from Tooro and the establishment of a Rwenzururu kingdom. As Doornbos (1970, 1069) argued, the Rwenzururu movement was an attempt to redress ‘inequalities in the distribution of power; in access to the political centre for the allocation of benefits; in wealth and welfare; and in dignity and social status’. In 1974, the regime of Idi Amin created Rwenzori District for Bakonzo (roughly Kasese District today), Semliki District for Bamba (Bundibugyo today) and Kabarole District for the Batooro. However, the Rwenzururu rebellion’s aspiration to an independent state was not addressed, and Rwenzururu leaders were excluded from the district leader- ship structure (Syahuka-Muhindo and Titeca 2016). In 1982, a political settlement formally ended the low-intensity rebellion. Rwenzururu forces laid down their arms in return for a degree of local autonomy and the integration of their leaders in the Kasese administration. However, some secessionist Rwenzururians who rejected this reconciliation took up arms again, by forming the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU). In 1989, NALU fighters carried out attacks, killing some local council leaders in the highlands of Kasese. In 1993, NALU was defeated

535 Minahan (2002, p. 1621) 536 Minahan (2002, p. 1621)

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and its leader killed (Syahuka- Muhindo and Titeca 2016).”537 § Formation of NALU as evidence of armed mobilization, supporting “Yes” coding for violent extra-institution mobilization. Although the beginning of violent attacks by NALU against the regime are dated from 1989, immediately after the relevant temporal windows, the formation fo the organization is put in 1988 – within the narrow temporal period being considered. • “NALU… An inheritor of the long-standing Rwenzururu guerrilla movement formed by the Bakonjo tribe of Western Uganda which has been fighting the central government in Kampala since the 1950s to demand its regional autonomy from Bunyoro. NALU was created in 1988 to fight the Museveni regime. It went into eclipse after 1992; many of its fighters later went into the ADF.” (Prunier 2004, 362) • Background on NALU also in Scorgie (2011, 84-85): “…the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU), which fought the NRA from 1989 until 1993. NALU was an attempt by former Obote official, Amon Bazira, to revive the Rwenzururu Kingdom Movement of the 1960s. When Obote fell in 1985, Bazira fled and gathered disgruntled Rwenzururu that had not been absorbed by the Ugandan army through the agreement he had helped broker in 1982.” (Day 2011, 447) o Additional corroboration regarding the lack of nonviolent extra-institutional resistance, as well as for coding violent extra-institutional mobilization “Yes,” would increase value of the extra-institutional strategies confidence indicator.

291 – Somaliland (Target: Somalia; Year: 1991) Extra-institutional movement, both violent and nonviolent.

Instl_Narrow (1991-93): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1991-93): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1989-93): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1989-93): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: 1

• “The of the share a common language, culture, and religion [Sunni ], but during the colonial period, they were divided among French, British, and , the region of Ethiopia, and the Northern Frontier District of Kenya.”538

537 Reuss and Titeca (2017, p. 132) 538 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 274)

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• Presently, “the Somali people are dispersed among four countries – Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia. [The] decision to divide ethnic Somalis across political borders has caused great resentment … [with] [t]he Somalis living in modern-day Ethiopia and Kenya [being] especially critical. Unlike Somalis in Djibouti and Somalia, Ethiopian and Kenyan Somalis are ethnic [and religious] minorities … [which] has led to major tensions that for decades have regularly escalated into violent conflict.”539 • Within Somalia, the territory of Somaliland is located in northwestern Somalia and “contains a third of the population of Somalia and covers a fifth of its territory.”540 • Somaliland has a population of approximately 3.5 million ethnic Somalis, who practice .541 • “By the late 1980s, Somalia had begun to fall apart; the Barre regime finally collapsed in 1991. On May 18, 1991, Somaliland announced its secession, and the [Somali National Movement] SNM, formerly an , became the civil authority in Somaliland.”542 • “Somaliland’s status as a de facto independent country came about when a rebel group that had taken control of northern Somalia, the Somali National Movement (SNM), on May 18, 1991, declared an independent Republic of Somaliland. At the same time, rival groups were fighting for control of the rest of the country.”543 o The previous two points are an example of extra-institutional violent contention in the wider time period (1989, 1990) followed by further extra-institutional contention (both violent and nonviolent) in the narrow time period. • “After a decade of autonomous rule, its independent status was confirmed by a referendum on May 31, 2001, in which 97 percent of the voters endorsed a new constitution”,544 although Somaliland does not yet enjoy the recognition of the international community as a state separate to Somalia.545 • Additional Background: o “Civil war broke out in Somalia after Barre’s ouster, Northern Somaliland declared its independence, and on January 1, 1991, President Ali Mahdi Mohammed of the United Somali Congress was made interim president.”546 o “Modern Somalia was created out of two former colonies: Italian Somaliland and, in the north, . The latter was, in fact, separately independent for five days (26 June-1 July 1960) before joining the new Republic of Somalia. On 18 May 1991, after the collapse of the central government in Somalia, the territory of former British Somalialand re-asserted its independence as the Republic of Somalialand. […

539 Beary (2011, p. 51) 540 Beary (2011, p. 46) 541 Beary (2011, p. 46) 542 Beary (2011, p. 48) 543 Beary (2011, p. 46) 544 Beary (2011, p. 46) 545 Beary (2011, p. 46) 546 Ragavan (2013, p. 80)

117 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 It] has thus far been denied recognition by an international community still insistent on resurrecting the failed Somali state.”547 o “After independence, Somalia followed a democratic system and held regular elections until 1969, when the government was deposed in a coup staged by Mohamed , who suspended the 1961 constitution and replaced it with a socialist-leaning junta called the Supreme Revolutionary Council.”548 o “After the downfall of Siad Barre, the northern region declared itself independent. The Somaliland Republic, led by Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, had its own courts and police force and has been able to maintain people within its territory. Schools have reopened, and the economy is booming.”549 § Existence of these parallel institutions support “Yes” coding for nonviolent extra-institutional contention. • Discussion of armed/violent activity persisting during narrow temporal window: o “…two consecutive phases. The first of these begins with the conclusion in early 1991 of the civil war against the regime of Siyaad Barre and culminates in the Burao conference held between April and June 1991, at which independence was unilaterally declared. The second starts with the collapse of the Somali National Movement (SNM) immediately after the Burao conference, and ends with a conference held in Borama in the first half of 1993, which saw the election of a civilian government. The Borama conference is today considered one of the most successful of Somaliland's reconciliation meetings, and although it did not end the cycle of conflict and negotiation that had started prior to the grand conference in Burao, it laid the foundation for the period of sustained stability that has prevailed in recent times.”550 o “The civil war in Somalia effectively began in 1982 when the Somali National Movement (SNM), established in London the previous year, moved its operations to Ethiopia. Dominated by the , the SNM nevertheless fostered ties with a number of other insurgent groups over the course of the conflict.”551 o Fighting still continuing in 1991, supporting “Yes” coing for violent extra- institutional mobilization in the narrow (and also wider) temporal window(s): § “In January 1991, in one of the final acts of the northern war, SNM militia had pursued retreating government forces to the town of Dilla, where they fought a ferocious battle. SNM militia had then continued into the main Gadabuursi town of Borama. However, because the SNM leadership believed that the Gadabuursi wished to seek peace, they withdrew their units within 24 hours to allow discussions to take place without the shadow of occupation.”552

547 Notholt (2009, p. 2.21) 548 Ochwada and Danver (2013, p. 670) 549 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 274) 550 Walls (2009, p. 373) 551 Walls (2009, p. 377) 552 Walls (2009, p. 378)

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o Cease-fires between SNM and in the north, and subsequent steps to establish state-like institutions: § “With bilateral ceasefire agreements in place with each of the primary non- SNM-aligned northern clans, the next step was to consolidate these and to move on to a collective discussion on the creation of administrative capacity. The SNM was clearly in control of the northern regions, so it fell to them to host and fund multi- conferences of reconciliation. The first of these was held in [.]”553 § “The Berbera conference achieved two things: first, it generated a collective confirmation of the bilateral ceasefires between the SNM and the Gadabuursi and Harti. Second, it was the context for agreement that a second conference would be held in Burao, again involving all the clans of the ex-British Protectorate.”554 § “The elders met for a week and agreed a list of six resolutions, the most dramatic of which was the first: a declaration that the northern regions would establish a separate administration without links to . This declaration needs to be placed in context. It had never been SNM policy to establish an independent state in the north, and many members of the leadership were against the idea, believing the northern regions too war- ravaged and weak to survive on their own. [paragraph break] However, there had long been a growing enthusiasm for the notion amongst the grassroots.” 555 § “Consequently, when on 31 January 1991 - in contravention of agreements between the USC and SNM - Ali Mahdi announced the creation of a USC-led government for 'the whole of Somalia, from ... to Ras Kamboni', the ghosts of past unsatisfactory experiences loomed large. By the time of the Burao conference at the end of April, public sentiment in the north had consolidated overwhelmingly in favour of independence. As the elders met in the first session of the conference, people from around the country, including many SNM militia, gathered. There was a sense of expectation, and a significant latent threat of volatile consequences should the decision not support independence.” 556 § “In the event, the intensity and breadth of public opinion swayed the [SNM] Central Committee. In fact, concerned that the elders' resolution was not worded strongly enough, the Committee rewrote it to make the declara- tion of independence more unequivocal. No longer simply the creation of a separate administration, the new resolution declared that the northern regions would revert to the sovereign status they held at independence from Britain on 26 June I960 and the Chair of the SNM, Abdirahman Ahmed Ali

553 Walls (2009, p. 378) 554 Walls (2009, p. 379) 555 Walls (2009, p. 379) 556 Walls (2009, p. 380)

119 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 ‘Tuur', assumed the role of President of Somaliland for a period of two years.”557 • “Ethiopia’s threatened expulsion of the SNM provoked an escalation of fighting in northern Somalia that soon led to full-scale civil war, provoked a reverse influx of Ethiopian returnees and Somali refugees into eastern Ethiopia, and was the beginning of the end of

the Siad Barre government. In January 1991 the Somali government collapsed.”558

292 – Eritrea (Target: Ethiopia; Year: 1993) Mostly extra-institutional contention with violence, followed by institutional contention.

Instl_Narrow (1993-95): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1993-95): Yes (Confidence: .5) Instl_Wider (1991-95): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1991-95): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .75

• Eritrea has two equally sized communities divided between highland Christians and lowland Muslims, with the Christians being closer culturally to Ethiopians and Muslims being generally in favour of independence.559 • “The Eritrean separatist struggle against Ethiopian rule lasted four decades before Eritrea became independent in 1993”,560 the year of interest to this study. • Armed resistance to Ethiopian rule developed in response to the removal of autonomous local governance structures by the central government and the imposition of Amharic as the official language.561 • “The Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) began guerilla warfare in 1961, and after the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) split from the ELF, it began its own campaign in 1970. Generally speaking, the ELF was supported by the Muslims, and the EPLF was supported by the Christians.”562 • The EPLF was more radical than the ELF and “[i]n 1984, the EPLF went on the offensive and defeated the Ethiopian forces in May 1991, subsequently occupying Asmara, the Eritrean capital, and setting up a provisional government.”563 o This is an example of extra-institutional action with violence.

557 Walls (2009, p. 380) 558 HRW (June 2008, p. 20) 559 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 87) 560 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 87) 561 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 88) 562 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 88) 563 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 88)

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• The “Ethiopian regieme was itself subsequently overthrown by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front, which was allied with the EPLF.”564 o While not directly related to Eritrea’s efforts for independence, it does mean that a new Ethiopean regieme was now in place that supported Eritrean independence, making future actions by separatists more likely to qualify as institutional contention. • “In a referendum held in April 1993, 99.8 percent of the Eritreans voted for independence.”565 o This is an example of institutional action in the narrow temporal window. • While the main thrust of the movement’s efforts dring the narrow temporal period were institutional, the secessionists presumably continued to maintain both armed forces and parallel state institutions, even as institutional channels were (successfully) pursued. For this reason, coding “Yes” for both violent and nonviolent extra-institutional mobilization in the narrow temporal band, as well. Further corroboration would incease confidence. o “Upon capturing ample supplies of Soviet made heavy armaments in 1984, the EPLF transformed its guerilla army into a formidable, disciplined, well-organised national army crucial in the 1992 onslaught against Mengistu's forces and the capture of Addis Ababa.”566 o “During its long struggle, Eritrea was able to assist an ally in the neighbouring Ethiopian province of Tigray, the TPLF. As the Mengistu regime decomposed, TPLF forces in coalition with other Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) forces and backed by organised EPLF troops, armoured units and tanks, moved on to capture the capital Addis Ababa itself and install an EPRDF government. Outstanding military success, principle and kinship (the Tigrinya element) paved the way for Eritrean recognition by the new Ethiopian regime.”567

294 – Tigray II (Target: Ethiopia; Year: 1991) Initially extra-institutional violent contention followed by institutional contention

Instl_Narrow (1991-93): Yes (Confidence: .5) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1991-93): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1989-93): Yes (Confidence: .5) ExtraInstl_Wider (1989-93): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .5

564 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 88) 565 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 88) 566 Adam (1994, p. 30) 567 Adam (1994, p. 36)

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• Tigray amed group ended up participating in coalition to overthrow Ethiopian government and then Tigrays took positions within the central government, including presidency. As noted below, TPLF ostensibly gave up independence as a goal in 1978. See Behre (2004, 591). Nevertheless, given a history of secessionist action by this group, will count actions of TPLF as secessionist during the relevant temporal periods. • The Tigray state in Ethiopia has a history of separatist sentiments over more than a century.568 • “In 1975, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) called for an “independent democratic republic” and began an insurgency against the Mengistu regime … present[ing] itself as a defender of religion against the atheistic Communist central government.”569 • “In alliance with the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front, the TPLF became the core of an antigovernment coalition, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front. After their troops marched into Addis Ababa on May 28, 1991, the leader of the TPLF, , became president of Ethiopia.”570 o The narrow set (1991, 1992, 1993) is an example of institutional action, although there is some room to debate this as the presidency was assumed through extra- institutional violent action. Additional concerns center around the fact that these actions appear center-seeking, rather than secessionist. o The narrow set is also an example of extra-institutional violent action, being the taking of Addis Ababa in 1991. o The wider set (1989, 1990) is an example of extra-institutional violent action. • Additional notes regarding TPLF position on secession: o “At the foundation of the TPLF, 'self-determination' was understood to mean autonomy or self-rule for Tigray in a democratic, poly-ethnic Ethiopia. Later, in the early days of the struggle, self-determination was interpreted by an ultra- nationalist group within the emerging TPLF to mean secession from the Ethiopian nation-state, with the aim of establishing an independent republic of Tigray, as declared in the TPLF manifesto of 1976. This standpoint of an independent republic was included in the manifesto by the group that had been given responsibility for drafting and printing it, which incidentally happened to be the core of the ultra- nationalist section, included Abay Tsehay, Sibhat Nega, Seyoum Mesfin and Meles Zenawi, the current prime minister. The idea of secession, however, was contem- plated only by a section of the leadership and not by the rank-and-file of members or by the people of Tigray, who constituted the historic core of the Ethiopian polity. This extreme position was challenged as soon as it emerged and was relinquished straightaway, since it had no popular support but remained for some time a source of subsequent splits in, and defections from, the organization. [paragraph break] In 1978, the secession option was proclaimed to have been dropped, after pressure

568 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 295) 569 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 296) 570 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 296)

122 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 from an internal opposition and from other Ethiopians who saw no future in secession.”571 o “…the TPLF had fought first for independence, or at least autonomy, but later framed its war in the wider context of a democratic Ethiopia.”572

o “In May 1991 the TPLF led by Meles Zenawi, Ethiopia’s current prime minister, succeeded in taking control of Addis Ababa and ousting Mengistu’s repressive government. The TPLF headed a coalition of political opposition groups called the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). The TPLF gained support by including within the EPRDF groups claiming to represent different regions and ethnicities. It also established a federal administrative structure based on ethnic and linguistic distinctions, a model commonly known as ‘.’”573 § TPLF as fighting for different vision of Ethiopia, as opposed to for Tigray independence, in period close to 1991. • Despite these concerns, will be counting TPLF actions as secessionist for this version of the dataset; additional corroboration/investigation of this point would be useful for future versions of this dataset. • Additionally, further corroboration of “No” coding for extra-institutional nonviolent action would increase relevant confidence variable.

295 – Somali I (Target: Ethiopia; Year: 1963) This is an extra-institutional, violent movement to challenge Ethiopian control over the Ogaden. Had support of Somali state, but also was the result of extra-legal, clandestine resistance to Ethiopian control. Does not seem to be any nonviolent extra-institutional component to the Somali challenge to Ethiopian control.

Extra-Institutional Narrow (1963-65): Yes (Confidence: 1) Institutional Narrow (1963-65): No (Confidence: 1) Extra-Institutional Wider (1961-65): Yes (Confidence: 1) Institutional Wider (1961-65): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstlNonViolentNarrow: No ExtraInstlNonViolentWider: No ExtraInstlViolentNarrow: Yes ExtraInstlViolentWider: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: 1

• The Somalis in Ethiopia live in the Ogaden region and there is a history of friction between them and the central government.574 • “Growing resistance to Ethiopian rule culminated in the formation of the Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF) in 1975.”575

571 Behre (2004, p. 591) 572 Reid (2003, p. 371) 573 HRW (June 2008, p. 20) 574 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 217) 575 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 217)

123 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019

• “After a series of border clashes between Somali and Ethiopian troops, war broke out in between the two countries in 1964, and the Somalis were decisively defeated in a matter of days.”576 • “In the Ogaden a struggle for independence among Somalis began in 1963 with an uprising called Nasrullah, an term meaning ‘sacrifice for .’”577 • “By the end of 1963 a Western Somali uprising led by Muktal Dahir sparked border skirmishes between Ethiopian troops and forces of the Somalia government.”578 • Additional Background on 1963-64 uprising in Hagmann (2014): o “The 1960s marked the apex of modern Somali nationalist uprisings against the Ethiopian Government in the Ogaden. Resistance to Ethiopian rule began in the 1940s during the British Military Administration (BMA) as various clan groups in the northern stretch of the province and, later on, members of the nationalist (SYL) rallied against imperial rule. Ogaadeen leaders had begun to clandestinely recruit followers in preparation for rebellion since the late 1950s under the cover of a ‘self-consciously Islamic association’ named Nasrallah Ogaden the as well as ( ﺮﺼﻧ ا ﻟ ﻞ or Arabic, in cause’ Allah’s for ‘sacrifice meaning) Company for Trade and Industry (OCTI). Somali nationalist sentiment peaked across the Somali territories after Somalia gained independ- ence on 1 July 1960. When the imperial government imposed a livestock tax in February 1963, popular frustrations found an outlet in an armed rebellion led by Makthal Dahir, a chief of the Rer Isaaq Ogaaaden subclan.”579 o “According to Markakis, the rebels first gathered in Hodayo near Wardheer on 16 June 1963. Their leaders were former members of Nasrallah, the OCTI, local chiefs, and state appointees, like Makthal Dahir, who had deserted their government posts. The al-jaysh rebels were at times also referred to as the Ogaden Liberation Front (OLF) or Nasrallah. From the few sources available, it appears that the al-jaysh enjoyed broad popular support. Its leaders were prominent Ogaadeen chiefs who capitalized on widespread anti-habesha sentiments and promises of integration with the new Somali state. By September 1963 the front had some 3000 members, but it lacked weaponry and an integrated command structure. The rebels were active in Degehabur, Wardheer, Quabridehar, Fiq, Godey, and Kelafo, where they overran police stations and ambushed army convoys.”580 o “…limited attacks and incidents along the Ethio-Somali border continued after 1964. By 1965, remnants of the al-jaysh had run out of ammunition and were being chased out of the region by the imperial army.”581 o Background on Ogaden in Markakis (1987): § “Nationalist ideals had little political urgency in the pastoral sector, least of all, it seems, among the Ogaden. […] The traditional social structure of the pastoralists had survived the turmul of war and the succession of alien rulers, and the Oaden chiefs and elders remained the legitimate representatives of the people. A few had found the restoration of Ethiopian rue in 1948 intolerable and fled across the border to neighbouring Somali

576 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 274) 577 Beary (2011, p. 53) 578 Minahan (2002, p. 2068) 579 Hagmann (2014, p. 729) 580 Hagmann (2014, p. 729) 581 Hagmann (2014, p. 730)

124 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 territories. The rest acquiesced in the change of regime, which ws accompanied by Ethiopian promises of development assistance and forbearance in matters of taxation.”582 o “The appeal of as it neared its goal of independence in 1960 was another crucial development related to the stirrings of nationalism in the Ogaden in the late 1950s. […] clandestine activity commenced in the Ogaden in the late 1950s. Two grops were formed about the same time. One was a loosely formed association that became known as Nassir Allah (God’s grace), and te other took th form of a commercial enterprise called the Ogaden Company for Trade and Industry. Since they had the same aim, overlapping membership, and were fused during the 1963 rebellion, the distinction between them has become blurred even in the memory of the participants.”583 o Appears to have been largely/entirely armed action, as portrayed in Markakis (1987, 169): See “The Ogaden Rebellion of 1963” in Chapter 7: “The Somali unification struggle”

296 – Somali II (Target: Ethiopia; Year: 1994) Mixed institutional and extra-institutional with both violence and non-violence

Instl_Narrow (1994-96): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1994-96): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1992-96): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1992-96): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .75

• “The Somalis of the Horn of Africa share a common language, culture, and religion [Sunni Islam], but during the colonial period, they were divided among French, British, and Italian Somaliland, the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, and the Northern Frontier District of Kenya.”584 • Presently, “the Somali people are dispersed among four countries – Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia. [The] decision to divide ethnic Somalis across political borders has caused great resentment … [with] [t]he Somalis living in modern-day Ethiopia and Kenya [being] especially critical. Unlike Somalis in Djibouti and Somalia, Ethiopian and Kenyan Somalis are ethnic [and religious] minorities … [which] has led to major tensions that for decades have regularly escalated into violent conflict.”585 • “The four million Somalis in Ethiopia constitute about 7 percent of the overall population of Ethiopia … [and] [i]n terms of economic subsistence, the Somalis are mostly livestock farmers.”586

582 Markakis (1987, p. 56) 583 Markakis (1987, p. 175) 584 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 274) 585 Beary (2011, p. 51) 586 Beary (2011, p. 51)

125 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019

• “In Ethiopia, the strongest secessionist movement is in the Ogaden region in the east, where a separatist group, the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), has been mounting an insurgency campaign for over two decades. According to Human Rights Watch (HRW) in a June 2008 report, fighting between the Ethiopian government and ONLF rebels has affected tens of thousands of people”.587 o This is an example of violent extra-institutional action. • While the ONLF has been a traditionally strong group, the secessionists in Ethiopia are not united. They are split along clan lines and, since 2000, “a religiously-based insurgency led by Islamic militants” has emerged.588 • “In 1992 Ethiopia tried to defuse its separatist tensions by decentralizing the country. A form of ethnic federalism was introduced, with the country divided into nine regions, including a Somali one, and two city states.”589 Thus, “the Somali region has its own parliament and president. The ONLF won the first regional elections and formed the new government. But in the intervening years its dominance has been challenged by rival parties representing non-Ogaden Somali clans”.590 o This is an example of non-violent institutional action, which stretches across the wider and narrow time periods under consideration. • “Most of the ONLF’s top officers live abroad where they canvas for support from the Somali diaspora by stressing Somalis’ common identity as muslims.”591 o This is an example of non-violent extra-institutional action. Additional corroboration of non-violent extra-institutional would increase confidence of coding. • “Growing resistance to Ethiopian rule culminated in the formation of the Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF) in 1975. In 1977, Somalia’s armed forces seized control of the Ogaden but were drived out by the Ethiopians in 1978. After that, the WSLF waged a guerrilla campaign for sveral years from bases in Somalia. In 1981, the WSLF announced that it was seeking an independent state of Western Somalia rather than unification with Somalia. Guerrilla attacks by the WSLF declined in the late 1980s, but a new organization, the Ogaden National Liberation Front[,] emerged in 1986 and was still active in 1996.”592 • “The ONLF was formed in 1984, by young Ogaadeeni intellectuals who had previously been members of the WSLF youth league. They felt betrayed by Siyad Barre’s handling and manipulation of the WSLF and, more broadly, the Ogaden cause. In its initial stage, the ONLF was essentially a small, secretive diaspora organization with representatives in East Africa, the Arab Gulf States and Europe. After the downfall of the Derg in May 1991, the ONLF began to build up its membership and presence within the newly created Somali regional state, successfully inserting itself into a new political landscape that put a [731] premium on ethno-national politics. The ONLF achieved a dominant position in regional politics in the

587 Beary (2011, p. 51) 588 Beary (2011, p. 51) 589 Beary (2011, p. 53) 590 Beary (2011, p. 54) 591 Beary (2011, p. 54) 592 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 217)

126 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 1992 elections, when its cofounder Abdillahi Mohamed Saadi was elected as the first regional president. The ONLF-led administration lasted only until the beginning of 1994, when regional parliamentarians demanded a referendum on self- determination. Ethiopian security forces chased the ONLF out of office, and the ruling Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) replaced it with a new party, the Ethiopian- Somali Democratic League (ESDL), dominated by non-Ogaadeen leaders.”593 • “Since the mid-1990s, the Ogaden heartland – namely, the six predominantly Ogaadeen- inhabited administrative zones of Godey, Qabridehar, Afdheer, Fiq, Wardheer, and Degehabur – have been embroiled in low-intensity conflict between the ONLF and Ethiopian troops.”594 • See, also, Hagmann (2005): o “By 1992 the EPRDF had fallen out with Al-Ittihad, a radical Muslim group that lacked a proper social constituency in the region but was funded by foreign fundamentalist groups[.]”595 o “Two years later, ONLF leaders were imprisoned or fled into exile, and the front exchanged politics for the barrel of a gun.”596 • ONLF institutional efforts under new Ethiopian regime: o “By 1992 Somali Region became one of nine ethnic regions of Ethiopia delegated

regional autonomy with its own president and Parliament. That year the first regional elections took place, contested by a number of clan-based, politically inexperienced, and disorganized political parties in what was nonetheless an

unprecedented display of multi-party politics. Although the ONLF was not a member

of the EPRDF coalition or an ally of the TPLF, it won 60 percent of regional parliamentary seats and formed the new government. [Paragraph Break] As the ONLF continued to assert its demands for self-determination for the Ogaden, its relations with the EPRDF soured.”597 o “In February 1994 the ONLF-dominated regional assembly triggered a confrontation with the central EPRDF government by voting to exercise the ‘right to self- determination’ for Somali Region.”598 • Additional potential evidence of secessionist violence during relevant temporal period, if Itihaad is counted as secessionist: o “Little is known about the precise agenda and size of a second armed opposition group, the United Western Somali Liberation Front (UWSLF), which surfaced in

2006 and briefly took two aid workers hostage. However, their public statements

suggest an Islamist and Somali nationalist agenda, in contrast to the essentially

Ogaadeeni clan-based agenda of the ONLF. The UWSLF may draw support from the remnants of the militant Islamist group known as al-Itihaad al-Islaami ee

593 Hagmann (2014, pp. 730-31) 594 Hagmann (2014, p. 731) 595 Hagmann (2005, p. 514) 596 Hagmann (2005, p. 515) 597 HRW (June 2008, p. 21) 598 HRW (June 2008, p. 22)

127 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 Soomaaliya Galbeed (the Islamic Union of Western Somalia), which began to operate

in the Somali Region by 1991. An Ethiopian military offensive in 1996 reportedly destroyed most of al- Itihaad’s military capacity in both eastern Ethiopia and

southwestern Somalia. Al-[p. 29] Itihaad claimed responsibility for several grenade attacks and bombings in 1995 and 1996, including in Addis Ababa, which killed and

wounded dozens of people.”599

297 – Cabinda (Target: Angola; Year: 1975) Extra-institutional, both nonviolent and violent contention

Instl_Narrow (1975-77): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1975-77): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1973-77): No (Confidence: .5) ExtraInstl_Wider (1973-77): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: 1

• It is worth noting that – while this case specifically designates Angola as the target – the timeframe under consideration also includes a period when Cabinda was under Portugese control. As discussed below, actions directed toward Portugal are not treated as part of this movement’s methods for the purposes of this coding. • “The 1933 Portugese constitution recognized Cabinda [(Portugese Congo)] as a separate colony, distinct fron the Angolan territory to the south”, although this was later joined with Angola for administrative reasons. 600 • “The enclave became the scene of serious nationalist agitation in the early 1960s. Fearing domination by the larger Angolan tribes, the Cabindans agitated for a resumption of separate status, the agitation gradually evolving into a nationalist, anticolonial mass movement.”601 • “The Portugese government, drained by long and costly colonial wars, was overthrown in a popular revolution in 1974. A new leftist regime in Lisbon, determined to rid Portugal of its colonial burden, moved to grant independence to the remaining possessions within two years. The Cabindans’ petition for separate independence aroused fierce opposition from Angola’s three rival nationalist organizations.”602 o This would be classified as institutional action in the wider timeframe if the target of the action was Angola, not Portugal. However, because independence was being

599 HRW (June 2008, pp. 28-9) 600 Minahan (2002, p. 350) 601 Minahan (2002, p. 350) 602 Minahan (2002, p. 351)

128 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 sought from Portugal, and Angola as its own entity was not independent yet, will not count this as institutional action for the Cabindan movement in this coding. However, lower confidence of variable capturing institutional action in the wider time frame reflects some concern about this approach. • “The premature departure of the Portugese administration left behind a three-way civil war in Angola but created an opportunity for the Cabindan nationalists. In February 1975, the new Angolan government declared it was ready to negotiate with the separatists in Cabinda.”603 The negotiations did not produce a result and fighting continued.604 o The civil war is an example of extra-institutional violent action in the narrow timeframe. • “In addition to the conflict between UNITA and the MPLA, there is also a separatist movement in the oil-rich Cabinda enclave. The region accounts for two-thirds of the country’s oil production but receives little back from the national government. The Cabinda separatists were originally split between several groups, but in 1963 they became united as the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC). The separatists have received support from Zaire and the Congo and have allied themselves with UNITA.”605 • “Article 3 of the Alvor Accords legitimized the annexation of Cabinda as a province of Angola. At the time, Cabinda was producing nearly all of Angola's oil, which accounted for close to half of the nation's gross national product. Cabindans unilaterally rejected the Alvor Accords and declared their independence from Angola. In November 1975, Angolan troops, supported by Cuban and Soviet forces, occupied Cabinda and declared it Angola's eighteenth province. In response, FLEC conducted an insurrection against Angolan troops, often attacking government soldiers with guerilla-style tactics, such as kidnapping oil company employees, in an attempt to heighten public awareness.”606 • Website of the Government in exile of the Front of Liberation of the State of Cabinda (http://www.cabinda.org/english.htm) o Evidence of nonviolent extra-institutional mobilization. • “…the province has carried on a struggle for independence all its own. Strong separationist tendencies are evident in the activities of FLEC (‘Frente de Libertaçao de Cabinda,’ or Liberation Front of Cabinda) and FDC (‘Frente Democratica de Cabinda’, or Democratic Front of Cabinda). FLEC is Cabinda's popular liberation movement and includes two rival military wings.”607 • Competing parallel state institutions: “During 1975, while MPLA consolidated its position in Cabinda, FLEC was torn apart by dissension and old rivalries reappeared. In July 1975 in Paris, Nzita Tiago, the Vice-President, announced the creation of a Provisional Revolutionary Government of Cabinda with himself as Prime Minister; and in August 1975 in Kinshasa, Ranque Franque the President of FLEC, denounced Tiago's actions and named a rival Cabina [sic] government in exile with himself as President. A third faction operates in Congo-Brazzaville and is led by Augusto Tchioufou. Thus, at the time of Angolan Independence, although FLEC had considerable popular support in Cabinda, its efforts were

603 Minahan (2002, p. 351) 604 Minahan (2002, p. 351) 605 Minahan and Cheetham (2000, p. 24) 606 Lyle (2005, pp. 704-05) 607 Koné (1998, p. 2)

129 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 hopelessly weakened by internal division, while MPLA and its forces controlled the enclave.”608 • 1974 FLEC banned in Cabinda: o “For a few months following the Portuguese coup of April 1974, FLEC was able to open an office in Cabinda city. An abortive raid on a Portuguese military post by armed FLEC supporters from Congo-Brazzaville was the occasion for FLEC again being outlawed from the enclave.”609 • Extra-institutional, violent and potentially nonviolent o “Article three of the Alvor Accord, signed in January 1975, maintained that Cabinda would remain an integral part of Angola. FLEC appealed to the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations, but, receiving no satisfaction, took up armed struggle against the MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola) government of Angola. The ensuing guerrilla war saw attacks on government troops stationed in Angola and the occasional kidnapping of Chevron employees. During the 1980s FLEC split over strategic differences to form FLEC-FAC, the main armed faction of FLEC, and FLEC-Renovada. FLEC-FAC has maintained some armed activities but was severely weakened by the overthrow of their patron, Zaire’s president Mobutu Sese Seko, in 1996.”610 § This is additional evidence in favor of a yes coding for nonviolent extra- institutional mobilization.

299 – Inkatha [KwaZulu] (Target: South Africa; Year: 1994) Initially extra-insitutional violent and non-violent contention followed by institutional contention

Instl_Narrow (1994-96): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1994-96): No (Confidence: .75) Instl_Wider (1992-96): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1992-96): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .75

• “KwaZulu is the Zulu homeland in the province of Natal and the scene of the most militant black separatist movement within the Republic of South Afriaca.”611 • “Negotiations over a new constitution between the South African government, the [African National Congress] ANC, and seventeen other political groups began in 1991. These negotiations, called the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA), were boycotted by Buthelezi [the leader of the Inkatha dissidents] although Inkatha delegates attended.”

608 Martin (1977, p. 59) 609 Martin (1977, pp. 58-9) 610 Shantz (2006, p. 24) 611 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 164)

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• Inkatha sought to expand nationally from 1990, although this resulted in “black-on-black violence, culminating in a [1992] massacre of thirty-eight people in Boipatong township by Inkatha supporters … [leading] to greater cooperation between the ANC and the South African government.”612 o This is an example of extra-institutional violent action in the wider temporal window. • “Buthelezi, sensing that he was being marginalized, … began to talk of civil war if his demands were not met. He insisted that the Zulu had the right to self-determination and that the KwaZulu-Natal should become a virtually sovereign state with its own president, courts, and army.”613 o This is an example of extra-institutional action. • “A state of emergency was declared in Natal, and only a week before national elections were due to be held in 1994, Buthelezi agreed to participate.”614 o This is an example of institutional action. • The ANC won the majority nationally, “[h]owever Inkatha won a narrow majority (50.3 percent) in KwaZulu-Natal itself, as well as being awarded three cabinet posts in the new national coalition government.”615 o Participation in government is an example of institutional action. • “In early 1995, the Inkatha delegates walked out of the national assembly after repeated clashes between President Nelson Mandela and Buthelezi over the issue of greater autonomy for KwaZulu-Natal.”616 o This is still institutional action. • “[I]n the 1995 elections, Inkatha’s share of the provincial assembly vote in kwaZulu-Natal declined to 42 percent while the ANC’s share rose to 29 percent.”617 o This shows that Inkatha was continuing to act institutionally and there is no mention in the referenced sources about extra-institutional or violent incidents at this point in time. Additional corroboration of lack of extra-institutional mobilization in narrow temporal window would increase relevant confidence measures.

300 – Basters [Rehoboth] (Target: Namibia; Year: 1990)

Instl_Narrow (1990-92): No (Confidence .5) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1990-92): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1988-92): No (Confidence: .5) ExtraInstl_Wider (1988-92): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes

612 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 166) 613 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 166) 614 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 166) 615 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 166) 616 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 166) 617 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 166)

131 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: No ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .5

• “The people of Rehoboth have remained active politically with a number of political parties forming and splitting before independence. Independence found some Basters supporting the South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) and some working within the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, among others. The then Baster Kaptein (“Chief), Johannes (“Hans”) Diergaardt, was elected to the Constitutent Assembly on the Federal Convention of Namibia list but refusd to accept dissolution of the second-tier governments that allowed Rehoboth Basters to have self-government. Two days before Namibia became independent, he challenged the new government by declaring a Unilateral Declaration of Independence for the Rehoboth Gebiet. A later attempt to secure autonomy through the courts also failed. In the 2004 elections, SWAPO received a majority of votes in the town. Political parties remain competitive in rural and urban Rehoboth in later years, as some voters supported the Congress of Democrats or Rally for Democracy and Progress.”618 • Entry for Johannes Diergaargt (“Hans”) also useful: o “…Diergaardt, a Baster born in Rehoboth, was a farmer and a businessman… In 1968, he founded the Rehoboth Volkspartei and subsequently, along with David Jacobus (Dap) Izaaks, formed the Rehoboth Liberation Party and also became part of the new National Convention on Namibia. [paragraph break] Diergaardt was one of the representatives at the Turnhalle Conference until the party withdrew from it in 1976. In late 1988, Diergaardt became the founder and president of the Federal Convention of Namibia (FCN) in hopes of putting together a successful electoral alliance of traditionally oriented Africans. The FCN stood for a federal Namibia in which diversity would be recognized and traditional authority and local autonomy protected. The FCN won only one seat in the 1989 National Assembly elections, and, after Dierhaardt resigned because of poor health, the seat was filled by Mburumba Kerina… Meanwhile, he and his council launched a Unilateral Declaration of Independence from Namibia on 19 March 1990 in direct opposition to the unitary constitution of Namibia. He even threatened to take the issue to the International Court of Justice. … In September 1990, Prime Minister Hage Geingob helped to defuse the situation by convincing Diergaardt and a group of followers to vacate government-owned property they had been ‘occupying.’ This avoided a confrontation between the police and armed Basters.”619 § This limited mention of armed action is not sufficient for a full Yes coding for violent extra-institutional mobilization. Further investigation of this coding

618 Tonchi et al. (2012, p. 363) 619 Tonchi et al (2012, p. 85)

132 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 decision would increase value of extra-institutional variation confidence measure. § While there was institutional engagement by relevant actors, it seems they were pushing for a federalized system and/or increased autonomy, and thus institutional engagement is coded “No.” However, the .5 confidence level for the two relevant institutional variables reflects uncertainty over this approach. • Rehoboth Volkspartei later was incorporated into SWAPO.620

301 – Lozi [Caprivi Strip] (Target: Namibia; Year: 1998) Combination of international and both violent and nonviolent extra-institutional methods.

Instl_Narrow (1998-2000): Yes (Confidence: .9) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1998-2000): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1996-2000): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1996-2000): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .5

• The Lozi occupy a lowlands region of south-central Africa primarily in modern-day Zambia, but also in the Caprivi strip of Namibia, which was ceded to by Britain after the formation of the Kingdom of Barotseland by the British in 1889, allowing the Germans access to the Zambezi river.621 • “The Caprivi region is one of the least developed and poorest in Namibia. The high levels of unemployment and poverty and its neglect by the Namibian government enabled Lozi nationalists to win support. In October 1998 the Namibian army discovered a training camp for nationalists in the region.”622 • “On 2 August 1999 members of the Caprivi Liberation Army fought a fierce battle with Namibian security forces in the Caprivi capital, attempting to take control of the local television station and the airport. The separatists were routed; and over 2,000 Lozis fled the region. At least 75 people were prosecuted for treason and other crimes. The Caprivi region as placed under a strict curfew, and the number of troops in the region as increased, although the majority of the population does not support the secessionist movement.”623 “At least 14 people, among them five policemen and three soldiers, and some insurgents and civilians caught in the fire, were killed”624 in the fighting.

620 Tonchi et al. (2012, p. 401) 621 Minahan (2016, p. 248-249) 622 Minahan (2002, p. 1120) 623 Minahan (2002, p. 1120) 624 Melber (2009, p. 465)

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o A death toll of 14 falls below the 25 battle-death threshold, but the armed attempt to seize installations and corresponding casualties are sufficient for a “Yes” coding of violent extra-institutional mobilization. • The Namibian government has applied consistent pressure to counter the separatist efforts since the incident in 1999 and there have been no similar incidents since. In a continued effort to crack down on separatists, the Namibian government banned, “with effect from 1 September 2006 the United Democratic Party (UDP) [founded in 1985], which as political organization in the east Caprivi promoted self-rule”.625 • Additional Info on Exra-Institutional Mobilization: o “A perceived increase in crime in the borderland has also been linked to high- profiled [sic] incidents of secessionism and low-profile guerilla warfare in Namibia’s northeast. On August 2, 1999, a group of several dozen men with small arms attacked Namibian army barracks, border checkpoints, and a radio station at Katima Mulilo. The Namibian police and army quickly crushed the poorly planned attacks, and in the aftermath several hundred suspects were arrested in Caprivi and over the border in Zambia. The attackers had been plotting the secession of the Caprivi Region from the rest of Namibia, support for which was concentrated among people of Fwe background.”626 o “Rivalries between the two existing chieftaincies became entangled with the political legacy of SWAPO’s years as a guerilla movement. The Fwe leadership supported the main opposition party DTA while Subiya generally supported SWAPO. Government’s recognition of a Fwe breakaway-chieftaincy contributed to a gradual process of radicalization. On 2 August 1999 armed militants launched attacks on Namibian government installations in Caprivi, resulting in fifteen casualties and a three-week long state of emergency. The secessionist movement now appears to be a spent force. Their leadership is largely dead, on trial for high treason or in exile.”627 o “By 1998, the secessionists’ ideas had ripened and led to organised action. Namibian security forces discovered a training camp of the newly-formed Caprivi Liberation Army (CLA) in the Mudumu Game park near the Botswana border. […] Allegedly escaping torture, rape and intimidation, some 2,500 people, mostly Fwe and Khwe, subsequently fled to Botswana where they found shelter in the Dukwe refugee camp. […] a hard core of CLA members managed to regroup on Angolan and Zambian territory. On 2 August 1999 they launched poorly coordinated attacks on government installations around Katima Mulilo. These were quickly beaten back by the Namibian army and police but resulted in 15 casualties. during the ensuing state of emergency, Namibian security forces again reportedly used unlawful methods to interrogate suspects and the wider civilian population in Caprivi, this time in some of the SWAPO-voting areas as well.”628

625 Melber (2009, p. 476) 626 Zeller (2007, p. 84) 627 Zeller (2010, p. 13) 628 Zeller and Kangumu (2007, p. 199)

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o Further corroboration of “Yes” coding for extra-institutional nonviolence would increase value of relevant confidence variable. • Additional Information on Institutional Contention: o “The United Democratic Party was founded in 1985 by Muyongo and his followers as a successor to CANU in overt opposition to SWAPO. A few years after its birth, the UDP joined the DTA coalition but was expelled from this alliance in 1998 after it openly voiced support for the secession of Caprivi. Following an attempted revival of the party in 2006, a government directive in September that year declared all its meetings illegal. The SWAPO government insists that the party is illegal not only because it is not duly registered, but also, and above all, because one of the pillars of its ideology is the secession of Caprivi from the rest of Namibia, in violation of the Constitution.”629 § UDP website says group ceased affiliation with DTA in Jan 1999.630 o UDP activities: § “The Katima Mulilo Resolution (set out on the party’s website), which was adopted during the UDP’s Third National Convention in Katima Mulilo on 10 April 1997, is also relevant to our enquiry.”631 o Role of DTA officials in secessionist activities: § “The hitherto official opposition, the Democratic Tumhalle Alliance (DTA), has been losing support and momentum since revelations of South African covert support ahead of the 1989 elections. In October 1998, Mishake Muyongo, former DTA president and its presidential candidate against Nujoma in 1994, led an exodus of some 2,500 refugees from the Caprivi Strip into Botswana following what the army claims was the discovery of a secessionist plot led by Muyongo. Many have since returned under a government promise of safe conduct, but the torture of some senior local DTA and Muyongo supporters following the armed attack on the regional capital, Katima Mulilo, in early August 1999, has been well documented. The Caprivi remains somewhat tense, so the election there was keenly awaited.”632

302 – Anjouan I (Target: Comoros; Year: 1997) Extra-institutional action, both violent and nonviolent

Instl_Narrow (1997-99): No (Confidence: .5) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1997-99): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1995-99): No (Confidence: .5) ExtraInstl_Wider (1995-99): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes

629 Guijarro (2013, p. 344) 630 UDP (June 16, 2005) http://www.caprivifreedom.com/history.i?cmd=view&hid=23 631 Guijarro (2013, p. 344) 632 Simon (2000, pp. 113-14)

135 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: 1

• “[Anjouan] joined with other islands to form the independent Comoros in 1975. Instability, coups, and the plundering of natural resources generated nationalist sentiment, with Anjouan declared an independent state in 1997. Anjouan was reunited with the Comoros in 2002, though continued confrontations led to a second declaration of independence in 2007. The rebellion was ended by an invasion in 2008. Reintegrated into the Comoros state as an autonomous island, pro-independence sentiment remains widespread.”633 • “[R]egistering its precense as a separatist group in Anjouan from 1996 was the Organization for the Independence of Anjouan (OPIA). Linked to many anti-government demonstrations, the OPIA’s leader was Mohamed Ahmed Abdou. References to its activity have been limited since 2000.”634 o This is an example of extra-institutional non-violent action. • “In 1997 Anjouan, along with Mohéli, declared its independence. The island’s name was officially changed to Nzwani – the traditional name locals have always used – and its inhabitants expressed a wish to reunite with France. The French government rejected this request and did not recognize the secession, nor did the Organization for African Unity, the precursor to the AU.”635 o This is an example of extra-institutional non-violent action, as the declaration was made by “[a] Koranic scholar, Abdallah Ibrahim, the leader of the Anjouani separatists”.636 • “The government on Grand Comoro dispatched troops to subdue the separatists on Anjouan, but the islanders repulsed the soldiers, killing many and taking 80 prisoners.”637 o This is an example of extra-institutional violent action. o Note that this refers to a confrontation following the 1997 independence declaration, not the later 2007 declaration. • “The breakaway states were brought back into the Comoronian fold in 2001 after a peace agreement was signed on February 17. Anjouan renounced secession in return for a new constitution in which each island formed a semi-autonomous government”.638 • “The implementation of federalism in the Comoros in 1978 can be seen as an attempt to achieve an acceptable compromise between the three islands under one central government. However, the federal arrangement has not succeeded in overcoming the secessionist tendencies of the islands, and in 1997 matters came to a head when Nzwani [Anjouan] and Mwali [Moheli] declared their independence from the Comoros (or the island

633 Minahan (2016, p. 29) 634 Beary (2011, p. 24) 635 Beary (2011, p. 22) 636 Minahan (2002, p. 127) 637 Minahan (2002, p. 127) 638 Beary (2011, p. 22)

136 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 of Ngazidja), and expressed their aim to be reattached to France, like neighboring (Baker 2009, 216). Referring to the uti possidetis principle in international law, the Organization of African Unity launched a military intervention on the secessionist islands, after which political negotiations followed. These negotiations culminated in the ratification of a new constitution in 2001, as part of which the country’s name was changed from a ‘Federal Islamic Republic’ into the ‘Union of the Comoros.’ Although the agreement stipulated that the autonomy of the various islands would be further extended, the specific arrangements of decentralization were not yet defined in the new constitution (Baker 2009, 225). Whereas the political agreement was accepted by Mwali, Nzwani [Anjouan] could not be convinced, and only after a second intervention in 2007 the rebellion on this island could be quelled. […] While the term ‘federal’ had already been removed from the constitution in 2001, the constitutional revision of 2009 effectively ended the federal framework in the Comoros.”639 • Note: In coding “no” for institutional contention, a 0.5 confidence rating has been assigned to the two relevant variables. Additional confirmation of lack of institutional mobilization would further increase value of relevant confidence variables.

303 – Anjouan 2 (Target: Comoros; Year: 2007) Mostly/ entirely extra-institutional

Instl_Narrow (2007-09): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (2007-09): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (2005-09): No (Confidence: .5) ExtraInstl_Wider (2005-09): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: No ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .5

• “[Anjouan] joined with other islands to form the independent Comoros in 1975. Instability, coups, and the plundering of natural resources generated nationalist sentiment, with Anjouan declared an independent state in 1997. Anjouan was reunited with the Comoros in 2002, though continued confrontations led to a second declaration of independence in 2007. The rebellion was ended by an invasion in 2008. Reintegrated into the Comoros state as an autonomous island, pro-independence sentiment remains widespread.”640 • “Secession reared its head again in June 2007, following a disputed Anjouanais presidential election in which outgoing president Bacar refused to step down at the end of his five-year term.”641

639 Veenendaal (2015, p. 12) 640 Minahan (2016, p. 29) 641 Beary (2011, p. 22)

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• “… Bacar became increasingly repressive, detaining and imprisoning critics, including journalists, intellectuals, politicians, and teachers, many of whom were tortured.”642 • “The [African Union] AU imposed United Nations-endorsed sanctions against the Anjouan political and business elite, restricting their free movement and freezing financial assets. In March 2008, Bacar was deposed after President Smbi dispatched four hundred Comorian and six hundred AU troops … to Anjouan, causing Bacar to flee first to Mayotte and then to Réunion, a French-ruled island in the Indian Ocean.”643 o This represents an interesting case, as the secession declaration was made by an individual who still occupied a relevant institutional office. Key here, however, is that he occupied it illegitimately, as evidenced by the United Nations-backed sanctions. The declaration therefore represents an example of extra-institutional non-violent action in the narrow timeframe. • Notes/concerns: o While a “no” value has been assigned to the variables for violent extra-institutional mobilization, further corroboration would increase value of relevant extra- institutional confidence variable. Concerns center around imprisonment/torture of opponents of secession. o Additional corroboration of the “No” coding for institutional action in the wider timeframe would increase confidence. This should involve further evaluation of Bacar’s position prior to his electoral defeat.

304 – Mohéli (Target: Comoros; Year: 1997) Mostly/ entirely extra-institutional non-violent contention

Instl_Narrow (1997-99): No (Confidence: .5) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1997-99): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1995-99): No (Confidence: .5) ExtraInstl_Wider (1995-99): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: No ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: 1

• For background on the broader context, refer case 302: Anjouan 1. • “On 11 August the leaders of the Moheli people announced that their island would join the new [Anjouan] state”,644 which had been declared on 5 August 1997. o This is an example of extra-institutional non-violent action. • The subsequent violence associated with the breakaway island occurred between the the Anjouanis and the government of Grand Comoro on the island of Anjoaun.

642 Beary (2011, p. 24) 643 Beary (2011, p. 22) 644 Minahan (2002, p. 127)

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• Note: confidence of 0.5 for institutional contention has been given as the presence, or not, of official political organizations seeking independence was not able to be confirmed in the negative or positive.

305 – Saharawis (Target: Morocco; Year: 1976) Mostly/ entirely extra-institutional contention utilizing both violence and non-violence

Instl_Narrow (1976-78): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1976-78): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1974-78): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1974-78): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: 1

• “In 1966, the Spanish government promised the United Nations that it would eventually allow self-determination in the territory, but that promise was never kept.”645 • As a result, “[r]ebellious tribal leaders formed the popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hama and Rio de Oro (Polisario) in 1973 … [and] overran all but the main towns by early 1975.”646 o This is an example of extra-institutional violent action in the wider timeframe. • “pressured by world opinion, the Spanish government finally signed an agreement with the Polisario leaders allowing for the orderly withdrawal of Spanish troops as a prelude to Sahrawi independence. The UN General Assembly passed a resolution endorsing the Sahrawis’ right to independence.”647 o This is an example of extra-institutional non-violent action in the wider timeframe. • “In October 1975, a United Nations mission reported that the majority of the inhabitants of the Spanish colony of Spanish (later Western Sahara) favoured political independence.”648 • Despite this, the following month Moroccan troops and civilians crossed into the territory, announcing their intention to “reclaim the Sahara” and the region was then “divided between Morocco and .”649 • In response, “[t]he Polisario Front began a guerilla war to obtain independence”, and they are recognized as the legitimate government in exile by more than half the memebrs of the Organization of African Unity”, whom the front joined in 1984 as the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic.650

645 Minahan (2002, p. 1625) 646 Minahan (2002, p. 1625) 647 Minahan (2002, p. 1625) 648 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 319) 649 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 319, 320) 650 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 320)

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• “In December 1975 the International Court of Justice ruled on the conflict, favouring independence for Western Sahara.”651 • “On 26 February 1976 Morocco formally annexed the northern districts, and Mauritania annexed the southern third of the territory. Polisario leaders rejected the partition as illegal and appealed to the UN to enforce its earlier endorsement of Sahrawi independence. On 27 February 1976 the rebel leaders declared the independence of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic and launched a guerilla war against Morocco and Mauritian occupation forces.”652 o The declaration is an example of extra-institutional non-violent action in the narrow timeframe and the guerilla war is an example of extra-institutional violent action in the narrow timeframe.

306 – South Sudan I (Target: Sudan; Year: 1956) Extra-institutional, largely nonviolent movement, with some violent/armed elements.

Instl_Narrow (1956-58): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1956-58): Yes (Confidence: .5) Instl_Wider (1954-58): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1954-58): Yes (Confidence: .5) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .5

• Summary/write-up: This movement ran from 1956-1972, when a peace agreement ended the secessionist bid for about 10 years. 1956 is also the year when Sudan became independent from Britain. The South Sudanese had lobbied the British for independence separate from the north, but this was denied. As such, the secessionist bid began in the south at the same time Sudan became independent. I coded this as an extrainstitutional, non-violent movement. For the first few years the Southern political parties in Khartoum were pro-federalist, like the Southern Sudan Federal Party, and did not formally seek independence. During this time the primary secessionist effort was led by Southern guerrillas, but they were weak and evidently their efforts were not sufficient to count as a civil war. O’Ballance (2000, 18) writes that “It can be said that the `guerrilla survival' period was between 1955 and 1963.” This comment lines up with both the UCDP and Fearon and Laitin civil war datasets, which both record a conflict beginning in 1963. This is thus a questionable coding; there is no doubt that the secessionists were in full motion by 1963, but the preceding seven years were dominated by a small guerrilla movement – the Anyanya – that were pro-independence but too small to create a serious civil war. Given the existence of the Anyanya, we do code qualitative observations of violence, but account for

651 Minahan (2002, p. 1625) 652 Minahan (2002, p. 1626)

140 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 related uncertainty regarding their salience in the confidence variables for the extra- institutional methods. • Sources employed: o Beary (2011) o Hewitt and Cheatham (2000) o Minahan (2002) o O’Ballance (2000)

307 – South Sudan II (Target: Sudan; Year 2011) Institutional and extra-institutional, both violent and nonviolent

Instl_Narrow (2011-13): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (2011-13): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (2009-13): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (2009-13): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: 1

• Write-up/summary: This is the second iteration of the South Sudanese movement. It’s also a modified case like East Timor and Kosovo, in which the start date occurred many years before the eventual birth of the state. Given the project we decided to move the critical date from 1983 to 2011, when South Sudan was born as a sovereign state. In all, this is a full movement combining institutional with both non-violent and violent extra-institutional methods. N ot unlike Kosovo or even East Timor, the final referendum on independence and declaration took place under heavy international observation and management. In this case, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005 ended roughly 20 years of civil war and gave South Sudan an autonomous government and the possibility of a referendum down the line (one that the central government in Sudan was finally willing to accept). There is clearly an institutional wing of the movement with many parties vying for control, and most of them were for independence. There was also violent conflict done extra-institutionally by various groups, some against northern Sudanese forces, especially in the oil-rich border region, but also conflict between groups. We also observed qualitative evidence of non- violent political rallies in Juba on the run-up to the referendum (see Jan 8, 2011). This is a full case. Interestingly, the development of an institutional wing and route to independence made violence less frequent and perhaps even necessary. • Sources employed: o Beary (2011) o Hewitt and Cheatham (2000) o Minahan (2002)

141 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 309 – Kurds II (Target: Iran; Year: 1979) Extra-institutional, violent and nonviolent

Instl_Narrow (1979-81): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1979-81): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1977-81): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1977-81): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: 1

• Iranian Kurdish separatist activity was active in the 1960s, however, support for their struggle from Iraqi Kurds was withdrawn when the Shah of Iran provided support to Iraqi Kurds in their fight against the Iraqi state and the “insurgency was finally crushed by the Iranian army in 1968.”653 • “After the 1979 Islamic revolution, the Kurds again demanded autonomy, but the Khomeini regime refused, fearing that if it made concessions to the Kurds, other Iranian minorities would make similar demands.”654 • Summary write-up: This is the Kurdish rebellion in Iran beginning in 1979 and continuing as a secessionist movement since then. It began in 1979 and centered on the region around Mahabad (the site of the short-lived breakaway state in 1946). The catalyst was the Iranian revolution that year. Initially the Kurds were receptive to the revolution because they’d been oppressed by the Shah. But in the general unrest that followed the revolution, the Sunni Kurds made a bid for independence and the result was a bloody conflict that led to at least 1,000 battle deaths per year until 1996 according to the UCDP. There is plenty of violent conflict here and initial protests indicating non-violent extrainstitutional methods. We did not find evidence of institutional methods however. This is, in large part, because the Iranian state was fairly autocratic and became increasingly so. In addition, the rebellion began shortly after the revolution and there was little time for the Kurdish political parties to seek independence through institutional channels in Tehren. • Sources employed: o Beary (2011) o Hewitt and Cheatham (2000) o Minahan (2002)

321 – Kurds II (Target: Turkey; Year: 1984) Extra-institutional contention with violence

Instl_Narrow (1984-86): No (Confidence: 1)

653 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 132) 654 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 132)

142 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 ExtraInstl_Narrow (1984-86): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1982-86): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1982-86): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .75

• “Eastern Turkey is home to about 12 million Kurds, the largest concentration of this stateless people in the world. Known officially as Mountain Turks, the Turkish Kurds make up 20 percent of the country’s population.”655 • “Taking advantage of the increased freedom of expression and association permitted under the liberal 1961 constitution, the separatist Kurdish Democratic Party was founded in 1965. However, following the military coups of 1971 and 1980, Kurdish political parties were banned, and thousands of Kurdish activists were arrested.”656 o The banning of Kurdish political parties prior to the time period under consideration precludes the possibility of institutional action in the wider timeframe, however, given the persistence of Kurdish nationalist movements, extra- institutional non-violent action can be assigned to the wider timeframe. • “Since 1984, an insurrection led by the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) has claimed some 30,000 lives.”657 o This is an example of extra-institutional violent contention in the narrow timeframe. • Concerns/notes: Additional corroboration of lack of nonviolent extra-institutional action in narrow timeframe would increase value of ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence variable.

322 – Kurds I (Target: Iraq; Year: 1972) Extra-institutional contention with violence

Instl_Narrow (1972-74): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1972-74): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1970-74): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1970-74): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .5

655 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 301) 656 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 301) 657 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 301)

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• “The Kurds of Iraq launched an armed rebellion against the government in 1961. In 1969 the Iraqi army attacked the kurds in the northern provinces, leaving a reported 60,000 dead.”658 A cease-fire was negotiated in 1970.659 o This is an example of extra-institutional violent contention in the wider timeframe (in 1970, prior to the cease-fire). • The cease-fire contained a number of measures that would have seen institutional channels developed through which the Kurds could be represented, and presumable further their case for a separate state, should they wish, however disagreements in implementation prevented this from taking place and fighting again broke out in 1974.660 o The negotiations are not coded for in this project, as they were for, on the face of it, the establishement of Kurds as part of Iraq, albeit with better representation and freedoms. • “Supported covertly by the United States, Israel, and Iran, the Kurds again rebelled in March 1974. The Iraqi regime had to use tanks and planes … [and] [t]housands were killed”.661 o This is an example of extra-institutional violent action in the narrow timeframe. • Concerns/notes: Additional corroboration of lack of nonviolent extra-institutional action in both narrow and wider timeframes would increase value of ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence variable.

323 – Kurds II (Target: Iraq; Year: 1980) Extra-institutional, violent and nonviolent

Instl_Narrow (1980-82): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1980-82): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1978-82): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1978-82): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: 1

• “The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in September 1980 provided the Kurds with another opportunity [for independence]. Iraqi troops were preoccupied with the war front in the south, and fewer were available to confront the resurgent Kurds.”662 o This is an example of extra-institutional violent action in the narrow timeframe. • Write-up/summary: This Kurdish movement occurs at the same time as the Kurdish movement in Iran (case = 309). There was overlap between the two movements and they

658 Minahan (2002, p. 1059) 659 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 132) 660 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 132) 661 Minahan (2002, p. 1060) 662 Minahan (2002, p. 1060)

144 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 were structurally connected by the Iran-Iraq war, but they were two separate movements aimed at two separate states. The movement in Iraq was one of many chapters in the conflicts between the Iraqi Kurds (usually led by the Barzani clan) and the Iraqi govt, especially Sadam Hussein. There was violence throughout the entire episode from 1980- 1988, ending with the chemical weapon attack on the Kurdish village of Halabja in 1988. Extra-institutional violence was par for the course. We found no evidence of institutional methods during this time given the extreme autocracy of Hussein. There were Kurdish political parties seeking independence like the KDP, but they weren’t formally working through the Iraqi state during this period. However, they were active political parties engaging in both violent and nonviolent extrainstitutional activities. • Sources employed: o Beary (2011) o Danilovich, A. (Ed.) (2016) o Hewitt and Cheatham (2000) o Minahan (2002)

324 – Kurds III (Target: Iraq; Year: 1991) Extra-institutional, violent and nonviolent

Instl_Narrow (1991-93): No (Confidence: .75) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1991-93): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1989-93): No (Confidence: .75) ExtraInstl_Wider (1989-93): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .75

• “In Iraq, Kurds live mainly in three provinces: Duhok, Erbil, and . Since 1991 they have enjoyed autonomy under the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG).”663 • This autonomy was secured, in part, through a revolt by the Kurds after the 1991 . Although the revolt was put down by the Iraqi army, the brutality of their response led to the western powers declaring a no-fly zone, which enabled the Kurds to take control of their territory.664 • Kurdish autonomy in Iraq was thus helped by the two Iraq wars (1991 and 2003), which limited the ability of the central Iraqi regime to exert direct control over the northern part of the country.665

663 Beary (2011, p. 210) 664 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 132) 665 Beary (2011, p. 210)

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• The Iraqi Kurds have, however, suffered from factional disputes, with one major group (the KDP) aligning itself with in 1996 to expel the PUK after the PUK took control of “the lucrative border trade” in 1994.666 o This is an example of extra-institutional violent action. Indeed, “[t]he northern mountains of Iraq are home to no fewer than five Kurdish guerilla armies.”667 • While in some respects the Kurdish territories in Iraq could be regarded as a form of Kurdish state, with their own bureaucracy and elections, it is not recognized internationally as its own state separate from Iraq, which makes it difficult to classify the actions of the Iraqi Kurds as institutional. • Concerns/notes: Additional corroboration of nonviolent extra-institutional mobilization, particularly in the form of `parallel institutions,’ would increase value of ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence.

325 – Kurds IV (Target: Iraq; Year: 1995) Extra-institutional, violent and nonviolent

Instl_Narrow (1995-97): No (Confidence: .75) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1995-97): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1993-97): No (Confidence: .75) ExtraInstl_Wider (1993-97): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .75

• “In Iraq, Kurds live mainly in three provinces: Duhok, Erbil, and Sulaymaniyah. Since 1991 they have enjoyed autonomy under the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG).”668 • This autonomy was secured, in part, through a revolt by the Kurds after the 1991 gulf war. Although the revolt was put down by the Iraqi army, the brutality of their response led to the western powers declaring a no-fly zone, which enabled the Kurds to take control of their territory.669 • Kurdish autonomy in Iraq was thus helped by the two Iraq wars (1991 and 2003), which limited the ability of the central Iraqi regime to exert direct control over the northern part of the country.670

666 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 133) 667 Minahan (2002, p. 1060) 668 Beary (2011, p. 210) 669 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 132) 670 Beary (2011, p. 210)

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• The Iraqi Kurds have, however, suffered from factional disputes, with one major group (the KDP) aligning itself with Saddam Hussein in 1996 to expel the PUK after the PUK took control of “the lucrative border trade” in 1994.671 o This is an example of extra-institutional violent action (indeed, “[t]he northern mountains of Iraq are home to no fewer than five Kurdish guerilla armies.”672) • While in some respects the Kurdish territories in Iraq could be regarded as a form of Kurdish state, with their own bureaucracy and elections, it is not recognized internationally as its own state separate from Iraq, which makes it difficult to classify the actions of the Iraqi Kurds as institutional. • Concerns/notes: Additional corroboration of nonviolent extra-institutional mobilization, particularly in the form of `parallel institutions,’ would increase value of ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence.

327 – Palestinians I (Target: Israel; Year: 1947) Initially extra-institutional violent contention followed by extra-institutional non-violent contention

Instl_Narrow (1947-49): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1947-49): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1945-49): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1945-49): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: 1

• Palestine, as it was then known, was under a United Nations endorsed British mandate until 1947, when “the British government finally turned the problem over to the United Nations in 1947.”673 • “The UN Special Committee on Palestine suggested partition into Arab and Jewish states, with under UN administration. The accepted the compromise, but the Palestinian , supported by the surrounding Arab states, rejected the plan.”674 o No action can be coded at this point, as the Israeli state has not yet been officially formed. • “The Palestinian Jews, supported by the United Nations resolutions, declared the independence of the State of Israel on 14 May 1948.”675

671 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 133) 672 Minahan (2002, p. 1060) 673 Minahan (2002, p. 1495) 674 Minahan (2002, p. 1495) 675 Minahan (2002, p. 1495)

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o Given this declaration had tacit United Nations backing, it can be said to constitute the start of the Israeli state and Palestinian action from this point onwards can be coded. • “The armies of the neighbouring Arab states immediately invaded [in support of the Palestinian Arabs].”676 o This is an example of extra-institutional violent action in the narrow timeframe. • “A United Nations-brokered cease-fire left the Israelis in control of 30% more territory than had been envisioned in the UN compromise … [however] [n]o peace settlement was possible; neither side would compromise.”677 • “By the end of the war, between 600,000 and 800,000 refugees had left the areas that fell to Israeli control … [and in the refugee camps] Palestinian nationalists mobilized and formed a number of organizations [who represented Palestinian Arab interests at the United Nations peace talks].”678 o These negotiations are an example of extra-institutional non-violent action in the narrow timeframe, as the advancement of a Palestinian state was not progressed through the institutions of the new Israeli state from which they were seeking to separate.

328 - Palestinians II (Target: Israel; Year: 1988) Extra-institutional non-violent and violent contention

Instl_Narrow (1988-90): No (Confidence: .5) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1988-90): Yes (Confidence: ) Instl_Wider (1986-90): No (Confidence: .5) ExtraInstl_Wider (1986-90): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .75

• “The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was founded in 1964 in order to unite Palestinian civic and political organizations and to coordinate efforts to achieve a Palestinian state.”679 “An umbrella group, the PLO included student groups, trade unions, and professional organizations. It also included militias of the Palestinian resistance movement – , the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) being the most prominent.”680 • “In 1974, the UN General Assembly recognized the PLO and granted it permanent member status, allowing it to participate in most UN agencies. In the 1980s, the PLO increased its

676 Minahan (2002, p. 1495) 677 Minahan (2002, p. 1495) 678 Minahan (2002, p. 1495) 679 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 225) 680 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 225)

148 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 activities among Palestinian refugees, establishing businesses and social service agencies and providing educational and vocational training programs.”681 • “In 1988, [the chairman of the PLO, Yasir] Arafat declared the PLO and its governing bodies the legitimate government of Palestine”.682 subsequently relinquished its territorial claims over the West Bank in favor of the PLO.683 • “In 1993, the PLO and Israel signed the Oslo peace accord, in which the PLO accepted the existence of the state of Israel and renounced violence as a means of achieving a Palestinian state.”684 o At the time of the 1988 declaration, the PLO was recognized by the UN General Assembly as being representative of the Palestinian people and had expanded its governmental services to this population. It was simultaneously undertaking violent confrontations with Israel. • Concerns/notes: The operation of the PLO, and its unique status (particularly following UN General Assembly recognition), are responsible for the low confidence coding for institutional contention. The operation of this quasi-state also constitutes operation of ‘parallel institutions,’ resulting in the “yes” coding for nonviolent extra-institutional contention. However, a confidence rating of .75 is assigned to the extra-institutional variables’ confidence indicator to reflect the line of argument that this constitutes institutional engagement. Additional corroboration of PLO’s official status at this point would help mitigate these confidence concerns.

330 – South Yemen I (Target: Yemen; Year: 1994) Extra-institutional, violent and nonviolent

Instl_Narrow (1994-96): No (Confidence: .75) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1994-96): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1992-96): No (Confidence: .75) ExtraInstl_Wider (1992-96): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .75

• “North [population 9 million/ traditional Islamist] and Southern [population 2.4 million/ secular Marxist] Yemen, two very different societies, were united in May 1990” with political representation in the national government for both sides.685 • The two sides maintained separate military units after unification and, amongst accusations of neglect by the North of the South, and the South’s demands for the creation of a federal

681 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 227) 682 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 227) 683 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 227) 684 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 227) 685 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 324)

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system, these military units clashed in May 1994.686 “The conflict ended with a victory for the more numerous northerners, but thousands had lost their lives in the three months of fighting”.687 • Beary (2011, p. 231) asserts that the conflict was started when “[a] group of southerners, bitter at how the new administration became dominated by northerners, tried to secede in 1994”. • “By late 1993, relations between Saleh [President/ north] and al-Beidh [Vice President/ south] had deteriorated. Al-Beidh demanded greater decentralization of authority and called for investigations into a spate of assassinations of his fellow party members. In April 1994, hostilities ignited between the northern and southern military units, which had never been merged, and on May 21 al-Beidh announced the south’s secession. The Yemeni military quickly defeated the secessionists, taking in July 1994. Al-Beidh was dismissed and went into exile, and many southerners were purged from the government.”688 o This is an interesting example, with the call for secession from the Vice President being a delicate case: in the end, is it an institutional actor acting in an extra- institutional manner? Or is it, by virtue of his position, institutional? On balance, the declaration was determined to be (nonviolent) extra-institutional since, even it was were carried out by an institutional actor, it does not appear to have been made through official institutional channels. o Fighting involved two state military units, and is regarded as extra-institutional violent secessionist action by those forces aligned with southern Yemen.. o The sequencing of events is of interest here, with demands first for a more federal system, then the outbreak of violence, quickly followed by a declaration of secession. o Here, the advocation of a more federalist system by the Vice President is not regarded as a relevant act in the coding (i.e. there will be no institutional contention recorded) as this was not secessionist and related to negotiations over the internal organization of a newly formed state by a key actor in that state. • Additional background: o Regarding the YSP: § “The YSP was the of South Yemen from its establishment in 1978 until unification in 1990. It served in a coalition government with the north-based GPC party in the early 1990s. By [end 233; begin 235] the mid- 1990s, however, the parties were squabbling bitterly over the speed at which northern and southern military units should be integrated, as well as over anti-corruption and terrorism policies. Since 2005 the two sides have engagd in talks aimed at bridging the gap between them. The YSP continues to compete in Yemeni elections, although it has occasionally boycotted sessions of the Yemeni Partliament. The dominant figure in the YSP for the

686 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 324) 687 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 325) 688 Beary (2011, p. 233)

150 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 past two decades has been exiled Yemeni vice president al-Beidh. […] Several YSP leaders were put on trial in July 2008 for encouraging secession.”689 • Appears that while YSP includes separatist actors, it does not push for separatism in its institutional actions. o Regarding other extra-institutional mobilization in relevant time frame: § “Another separatist group is the Sons of Yemen League, set up in 1990 to represent the interests of tribal leaders in the south. Its leader is Abd al- Rahman al-Jifri, who was vice president of the short-lived 1994 South Yemen republic and who fled to London, , when the secessionist government fell.” (Beary 2011, 235) • Concerns/notes: o Additional corroboration of nonviolent extra-institutional mobilization in both narrow and wide timeframes would increase value of ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence variable. o Confirmation that YSP did not pursue secession through institutional channels would increase value of institutional confidence variables for both timeframes.

331 – South Yemen II (Target: Yemen; Year: 2007) Mostly/ entirely extra-institutional contention, initially non-violent and later with violence

Instl_Narrow (2007-09): No (Confidence: .75) ExtraInstl_Narrow (2007-09): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (2005-09): No (Confidence: .75) ExtraInstl_Wider (2005-09): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: 1

• The central government of Yemen’s “failure to reinstate, or pay pensions to, approximately 100,000 southern military and civilian officials forcibly retired in 1994 [refer case 330]” has contributed to continued animosity between the north and the south of the country.690 • In addition, the general level of gun ownership in Yemen, which has “an estimated sixty million guns, or almost three per person on average”691 may help lead to escalation. • “Tensions, protests, and sporadic violence followed and continued to increase [since reunification]. By the mid-2000s, many Southerners had completely lost trust in Salih. At

689 Beary (2011, pp. 233-35) 690 Beary (2011, p. 233) 691 Beary (2011, p. 232)

151 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 the same time, the conflicts that had occurred in Saada exposed the regime’s vulnerabilities, proving that the central government was, in fact, weak.”692 o This implies a degree of nascent extra-institutional non-violent action in the wider timeframe. • Human Rights Watch notes that “[s]ince 2007, southern Yemenis have conducted sit-ins, marches and demonstrations to protest what they say is the northern-dominated central government’s treatment of them, including dismissal from the civil and security services. The protests escalated and by 2008 many southern Yemenis were demanding secession and the restoration of an independent southern Yemeni state, which had existed up until the union of the and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen in 1990.”693 o Marches and demonstrations are an example of extra-institutional non-violent action in the narrow timeframe. • “In May 2007, former Southern military officers, headed by General Nasir ʿAli al-Nuba , who had been forced into early retirement with worthless pensions after the 1994 war, began holding weekly sit-ins in the streets. Fearing the spread of this opposition, the government detained al-Nuba and a few of his colleagues later that year. Protests nevertheless grew to tens of thousands.”694 o This is further corroborating evidence of extra-institutional non-violent action in the narrow timeframe. • “By spring 2008, the anti-government protests, while having no central leadership, began organizing under the name “al-Ḥirāk al-Silmi al-Janūbi” or the “Peaceful ,” that later became known as simply al-Hirak. They demanded equal citizenship, jobs, greater local decision-making power, and more control over the South’s economic resources. By 2009, demonstrators began waving the flag of the former South Yemen, which had not been seen publically since the 1994 war.”695 o This confirms that the movement had developed into a solidly separatist one. • “There have also been at least two incidents involving clashes between groups of armed men and the security forces, following which the Yemeni authorities have accused the Southern Movement [sometimes referred to as Hirak] of harboring an armed component. Armed clashes in the Ahmarain mountains around Habilain some 100 kilometers northeast of Aden in late April and early May 2009 left several soldiers dead and civilians wounded. In July 2009 a clash between followers of Tariq al-Fadhli and security forces in Zanjibar, the capital of Abyan province, left at least 12 persons dead in the wake of a ‘festival’ promoting southern demands.”696

692 Alwazir (2015, p. 6) 693 Human Rights Watch (December 15, 2009) 694 Alwazir (2015, p. 6) 695 Alwazir (2015, p. 7) 696 Human Rights Watch (December 15, 2009)

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o This is an example of extra-institutional violent action in the narrow timeframe and may well be as a result of al-Hirak attracting unwanted radical elements, some of which may have ties to terrorist organizations, as noted by Alwazir (2015).697 • “While still exceptional—and contrary to the stated peaceful orientation and conduct of the bulk of the Southern Movement—these incidents underline the combustible nature of the situation and danger that violence may escalate. The armed clashes show the potential for armed conflict throughout the south, and appear to be indicative of elements that sympathize with the goals of the Southern Movement but are prepared to pursue them by violent means.”698 o This is further evidence in support of a violence rating of “yes” in the narrow timeframe. • It should be noted that there have been no references to institutional actions in the source materials referenced. • “The current wave of separatism in the south is led by a diverse and loosely structured coalition that in June 2009 established the Southern Movement and appointed a Council for the Leadership of the of the South. The movement includes top figures from the (YSP), the main southern political party; tribal sheikhs such as al-Fadhli; forcibly retired civil servants and military; and lawyers, academics, students, and journalists angry over the government’s anti-separatist crackdown.” (Beary 2011, 233) • “In 2004 the Southern Democratic Assembly was established in the United Kingdom. Led by Al Nasser Mohammed, a former Yemeni president, its goal is self-determination or federalism.” (Beary 2011, 235) • “There was a marked rise in separatist protests in southern Yemen in 2009. In April and May, Yemeni security forces and separatists clashed in the town of Al Habilayn and in July in Zinjibar, leading to several deaths and injuries. In September there were further protests in Al Habilayn, with demonstrators attacking government buildings, removing Yemeni flags, and displaying South Yemen flags[.]” (Beary 2011, 235) • An HRW “…report cited emerging secessionist leader al-Fadhli telling HRW, ‘I am in favor of [armed] resistance and instituting a military movement,’ while adding that his secessionist allies were ‘unanimously in favor of [limited] self-defense and the peaceful option.’” (Beary 2011, 235) • “The YSP was the ruling party of South Yemen from its establishment in 1978 until unification in 1990. It served in a coalition government with the north-based GPC party in the early 1990s. By [end 233; begin 235] the mid-1990s, however, the parties were squabbling bitterly over the speed at which northern and southern military units should be integrated, as well as over anti-corruption and terrorism policies. Since 2005 the two sides have engagd in talks aimed at bridging the gap between them. The YSP continues to compete in Yemeni elections, although it has occasionally boycotted sessions of the Yemeni Parliament. The dominant figure in the YSP for the past two decades has been exiled Yemeni

697 Alwazir (2015, p. 7) 698 Human Rights Watch (December 15, 2009)

153 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 vice president al-Beidh. […] Several YSP leaders were put on trial in July 2008 for encouraging secession.”699 o Appears that while YSP includes separatist actors, it does not push for separatism in its institutional actions. • Concerns/notes: Confirmation that YSP did not pursue secession through institutional channels would increase value of institutional confidence variables for both timeframes.

336 – Uighurs III [Xinjiang] (Target: China; Year: 1990) Initially extra-institutional non-violent followed by extra-institutional violent contention

Instl_Narrow (1990-92): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1990-92): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1988-92): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1988-92): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .75

• “The Uyghurs’ sense of national identity strengthened in the 1980s as the political atmosphere in China relaxed somewhat, and Xinjiang was visited by growing numbers of tourists, businesspeople, and journalists.”700 • There was a large protest on May 19, 1989, in the capital of Xinjiang, Urumqi, in which a number of police were injured, however, the protest was in relation to the publication of a book offensive to the Uyghur community and not specifically related to separatism.701 • “In April 1990, an armed uprising took place in the town of Baren in [Akto county of] Xinjiang where organizers used to disseminate a call to arms.”702 “On April 4, 1990, Zeydun Yusup, head of the East Turkistan Islamic party that was secretly established in Baren township in 1989, led 200 or more men to protest against the 250 forced abortions enforced by the government upon the local Uyghur women. They marched to the local government office and demanded an end to the mass immigration of Han Chinese into Xinjiang. They also demanded that … the Han Chinese leave Xinjiang”.703 “The conflict ended on April 10, 1990, with a total of 23 people killed and 21 wounded and the eventual capture of 232 Uyghur fighters.”704 o While this incident is not an explicit enunciation of a desire for Xinjiang to secede from China, it is clearly an escalation from previous incidents and warrants

699 Beary (2011, pp. 233-35) 700 Beary (2011, p. 189) 701 Guo (2015, p. 43) 702 Beary (2011, p. 189) 703 Guo (2015, p. 44) 704 Guo (2015, p. 45)

154 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 inclusion in the data set. While there is some uncertainty among sources as to the exact death toll (Minahan [2002, p.1962] puts the figure at more than 60 people), there is sufficient indication of violence for the incident to be recorded as such. o Also of interest is the fact that this incident was organized by an illegally established political party, in direct opposition to the power of the Chinese party-state. The formation of this group in 1989 constitutes extra-institutional non-violent action in the wider time frame. § If this organization continued to operate in 1990, then it possibly constitutes extra-institutional nonviolent action in the narrow time frame – although this may have been largely an armed movement. Regardless, other contentious acts without premeditated violence took place in the relevant time window (largely prior to 1990, but also in Jan 1990, as discussed below), supporting a “yes” coding for extra-institutional nonviolent action in the narrow (and wider) timeframe. • “In 1992-1993 explosions and bombings occurred. There was a further spike in violence in 1996-1998, which China responded to by rounding up suspected terrorists.”705 o Bombings in 1992 is an example of further violent extra-institutional action in the narrow time frame. • “In early March 1993 Uighur nationalists took their message and their plea for independence to the United Nations, but they received little open support.”706 o This would have been an example of extra-institutional non-violent action, however it occurred outside the time period under consideration. • “In August 2002, the United States, under pressure from China, agreed to designate the East Turkmenistan Islamic Movement a terrorist organization.”707 • Additional Info: o “For more than a decade, beginning in 1988, China’s ability to rule its largest province, Xinjiang, was challenged by a wave of contention primarily orchestrated by ethnic Uighurs, a Turkic Muslim minority. During the course of this wave, Uighur participants attempted to achieve greater autonomy in the administrative unit that bears their name, the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR), by using a diverse set of anti-state tactics ranging from relatively peaceful protests to riots, assassinations, and targeted bombings. By the second half of the 1990s this wave did not appear to be abating, which clearly concerned Chinese officials.”708 o “Although scholars of Xinjiang commonly view the violent uprising that occurred in [1990 in] the southern town of Baren as a watershed moment in the region’s contentious recent history, Figure 2 suggests the need for a slightly more nuanced interpretation. Based on its location on the graph, the Baren events should be understood as part of the wave of protests that began in April 1988 with a demonstration in Ghulja. The decision to view the Baren uprising as embedded

705 Beary (2011, p. 189) 706 Minahan (2002, p. 1962) 707 Beary (2011, p. 189) 708 Hierman (2007, p. 48)

155 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 within a wave of contention does not downplay the significance of that event (in which reportedly up to 3,000 Uighurs were killed).”709 o “While Baren is often depicted as the inauguration of the wave of contention, the Ghulja uprising of 1997 is generally understood as the beginning of the end. Dru Gladney has written that this event marked the ‘apex of the Uighurs . . . a marked decline in Xinjiang civil unrest and so-called separatist events set in thereafter.’ Figures 2 and 3 lend some support to Gladney’s observation, because 1997 did indeed mark the peak of contentious events in the region. It is important to note, however, that twelve events occurred in 1997 after the Ghulja uprising. Nevertheless, in support of Gladney, most of them were acts of premeditated violence rather than spontaneous mass protests. This provides empirical justification for labeling the Ghulja uprising the ‘apex’ of the mass expression of Uighur dissatisfaction with the Chinese state.”710 o Hierman (2007, 54) notes that there was a demonstration in January 1990 in Yarkand, not involving premeditated violence. § Evidence of extra-institutional narrow nonviolence; all events mentioned in Hierman are not necessarily separatist, though movement morphed into such. o “The Baren uprising in April 1990 began with a protest in a against family planning, weapons testing, and oil exploitation before turning into a violent riot with calls for ‘jihad’ and the overthrow of (Bovingdon n.d.; Dillon 2004: 62–65).”711 o Other Uighur organizations, potentially (though not necessarily) within relevant temporal windows; additional investigation to figure out timing of their existence and operation would be useful in future versions: § “China’s official statement on ‘ terrorists’ published in January 2002 listed several groups allegedly responsible for violence, including the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), the East Turkistan Liberation Organization (ETLO), the Islamic Reformist Party ‘Shock Brigade’, the East Turkestan Islamic Party, the East Turkestan Opposition Party, the East Turkestan Islamic Party of Allah, the Uyghur Liberation Organization, the Islamic Holy Warriors and the East Turkestan International Committee.”712 § “The internal Chinese publications that comprise our main source on unrest in Xinjiang during the 1980s also mention an ‘East Turkistan Independence Organization,’ led by a seventeen-year-old Uyghur from Akto county near Kashgar, and a group or groups known as ‘Spark’ or ‘Spark Alliance’ organized by middle and high school students in Akto and Yining and accused of anti-Chinese, antisocialist, and separatist views as well as

709 Hierman (2007, p. 48) 710 Hierman (2007, p. 50) 711 Bovingdon (2004, p. 8) 712 Davis (2008, p. 6)

156 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 stockpiling weapons. Though it is unclear how real a threat small gangs of teenagers posed to state security, such groups nevertheless suggest a degree of disenchantment with the Chinese state among young Uyghurs in the 1980s.”713 o “Peaceful demonstrations in the late eighties against racial discrimination and socio- economic inequalities gave way first to rioting that coincided with the 1989 pro- democracy movement in China proper, and then to violent riots in south Xinjiang in the summer of 1990. The Baren riots, as they came to be known began with a speech in a mosque, and culminated in a mass protest against CCP birth control policy, nuclear testing and the export of natural resources. For the first time since 1949, the rioters called for the establishment of an Eastern Turkestan state. […] Since that time, the independence movement has gradually increased in militancy. In February 1992, some separatists turned to terrorism and carried out bomb attacks in Uriimchi, Ghulja, Xotân, Chôchàk, and Bortala. Further bombs exploded in the region's towns during the years that followed.”714 • Concerns/notes: Additional corroboration of nonviolent extra-institutional mobilization in both narrow and wide timeframes (especially narrow) would increase value of ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence variable.

340 – Tibet II (Target: China; Year 1950) Mostly/ entirely extra-institutional contention with both violent and non-violent action

Instl_Narrow (1950-52): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1950-52): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1948-52): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1948-52): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: 1

• While Tibet considered itself independent, China maintained that it had authority over Tibet at the turn of the century, “[h]owever, the 1911 revolution, which overthrew the Manchu dynasty and established the Chinese Republic, provided an opportunity for the thirteenth Dalai Lama to declare Tibetan independence in 1912.”715 • “At the end of World War II, the Chinese Nationalist government still maintained its claim to sovereignty over Tibet while the Tibetans … considered themselves to be independent.”716

713 Millward (2004, pp. 8-9) 714 Smith (2000, p. 197) 715 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, pp. 293-294) 716 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 294)

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• “On October 7, 1950, Chinese Communist troops invaded Tibet and easily overcame Tibetan resistance.”717 o As Tibet was not formally recognized as an independent nation in its own right, this must be interpreted as an example of extra-institutional action with violence in the narrow timeframe. It is, however, not a clear case, as many viewed China as having little more than suzerainty over Tibet, and even then only on paper. • “An appeal by the dali lama to the United Nations was denied, as were pleas to the British and Indians.”718 o This is an example of extra-institutional non-violent action in the narrow timeframe. • “On May 23, 1951, a seventeen-point agreement was signed between the Tibetans and the Chinese … [promising] that Tibet would be governed under a system of “national regional autonomy” and that there would be no alteration in the country’s religious or political system.”719

341 – Tibet III (Target: China; Year: 1956) Entirely/ mostly extra-institutional contention with violence

Instl_Narrow (1956-58): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1956-58): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1954-58): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1954-58): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .75

• “The supreme communist leader, Mao Tse-tung, announced his intention to change the Tibetan-majority population on Inner [(eastern)] Tibet to a Chinese majority of five to one. To that end he launched massive immigration to the region in 1954.”720 • “In 1955, the process of a ‘socialist transformation’ in Chine was extended to ethnic minority areas, including Tibet.”721 This included a litany of deliberate humiliations of the existing power structure operating in Tibet at that time. • “Revolts broke out in eastern Tibet [(which had been incorporated into several adjacent Chinese provinces)] in 1956, with thousands taking to the hills and fighting a guerilla campaign.”722 The guerilla fighters in eastern Tibet were “determined to reunite their region with Outer Tibet under the rule of the dalai lama.”723 Beary writes that “the U.S. Central

717 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 294) 718 Minahan (2002, p. 1892) 719 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 294) 720 Minahan (2002, p. 1892) 721 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 294) 722 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 295) 723 Minahan (2002, pp. 1892-1893)

158 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 Intelligence Agency was giving military assistance to a Tibetan resistance movement called ‘Four Rivers, Six Ranges.’”724 o This is an example of extra-institutional violent action in the narrow timeframe. Did Dalai Lama preside over alternative institutions during the relevant time period on Chinese territory? If so, this would constitute NV extra-institutional in the relevant temporal period. Arguably, even the maintenance of these institution outside of Chinese territory might qualify. Future research should validate the lack of parallel institution building during this period of secessionist mobilization. • “In 1958, the revolt spread to central Tibet, including the Tibet Autonomous Region, and in March 1959, a series of anti-Chinese demonstrations in Lhasa led to an uprising.”725 o 1959 demonstrations outside of relevant time frame, otherwise they would potentially constitute evidence of nonviolent extra-institutional mobilization. • Prior to the Dali Lama retreating to exile in India in March of 1959, “he formally repudiated the seventeen-point agreement and established a government in exile.”726 o The repudiation, while outside the timeframe under consideration, confirms that the fighting was, or at least had become in part, separatist in nature. o If this government in exile had been declared during the relevant temporal period, would likely constitute nonviolent extra-institutional resistance – but it falls outside the temporal window(s) under consideration. • “People often tend to forget that the 1959 revolt was only the culmination of a revolt that started in Eastern Tibet in 1952-53, when ‘widespread fighting broke out in Kham and Amdo.’ According to George Patterson, who perhaps knew more than did anyone else about the revolt, over 80,000 rebels were involved in the initial rebellion, out of which ‘some’ 12,000 were deserters from the Kuomintang. The revolt however died down with ‘no immediate help forthcoming from either India or America, and because the Chinese, at the persuasion of East Tibetan leaders, relaxed their policy of immediate land reforms.’ But by 1953 a ‘large number of activists including ordinary people joined hands with the guerrillas’ and the following year the revolt spread [83] gradually ‘all over eastern and north-eastern Tibet.’ The New York Times of 28 August 1954 reported, quoting Taiwanese sources, that ‘40,000 farmers took part in an uprising in East Tibet, which was suppressed by the 18th Chinese Army.’ But by far the most significant revolt in Kham was what has been termed ‘the Kanting Rebellion,’ 1955-56.”727 • “The Kanting rebellion broke out in the winter of 1955-56 and took the form of murdering Central Government officials and Han citizens, there being no PLA in the area. As soon as the PLA arrived, they easily put down the rebels, but these fled into deeper hills and eventually into Chando. Arms were easy to get, for at least fifty thousand muskets and rifles had been left in the area from the warlords' battles between Tibetan and Szechwan warlords.... The Szechwan-Chando rebellion was basically repressed by the end of 1956, though isolated

724 Beary (2011, p. 183) 725 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 295) 726 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 295) 727 Norbu (1979, pp. 82-3)

159 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 groups would remain as bandits as long as any monastery or until ' local people's control ' was organized. The bulk of the defeated rebels moved into Tibet.”728 • “…sporadic uprisings were widespread in most parts of Eastern Tibet by the mid-1950s, fighting against one common enemy but in separate uncoordinated pockets[.]”729 • “A series of major uprisings started in Kham in 1956-57, moved to Amdo in 1958, and finally swept into Lhasa in 1959. Most fierce fighting broke out in Lithang, Bathang, Dergue, Chamdo, Kanze, etc., places where the major monasteries of Eastern Tibet were located. Perhaps the most fighting took place in Lithang Monastery, lasting for 64 days. What all this demonstrated was that Chinese Communism faced strong ideological opposition from the traditional Tibetan ideology, . By early 1956 Chamdo, Lithang, Bathang and Kanze were ‘temporarily over-run by Khamba irregulars’ who numbered about 6,000.”730 • “…the Tibetans who were by tradition notoriously allergic to organization of any kind began to organize themselves and to try to co-ordinate their tribal fighting units into a single organization called Chushi Gangdruk, meaning ‘Four Rivers and Six Ranges,’ an ancient name for Kham in Lhodrak (Dha[r]ma Dzotlg) on 16 June 1958. About 5,000 Khamba rebels including 300 ‘volunteers from various parts of Tibet,’ were organized under the command of Gombo Tashi Andrugtsang.”731 • Concerns/notes: Additional corroboration regarding the lack of nonviolent extra- institutional mobilization in both narrow and wide timeframes would increase value of ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence variable.

342 – Tibet IV (Target: China; Year: 1979) Extra-institutional nonviolent movement.

Instl_Narrow (1979-81): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1979-81): Yes (Confidence: .5) Instl_Wider (1977-81): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1977-81): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: No ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .75

• Prior to the Dali Lama retreating to exile in India in March of 1959, “he formally repudiated the seventeen-point agreement and established a government in exile.”732

728 Strong 1960, quoted in Norbu (1979, p. 83) 729 Norbu (1979, p. 83) 730 Norbu (1979, p. 84) 731 Norbu (1979, p. 85) 732 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 295)

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• “Persecution of the Tibetan population in China abated in the late 1970s with the end of the Cultural Revolution, but repression resumed when the Tibetans renewed their claims to autonomy or independence.”733 • “From 1974 the Dalai Lama’s position began to evolve from pro-independence to pro- autonomy.”734 “The Chinese leadershipin 1979 began engaging with the Tibetan government-in-exile, and the Dalai Lama in 1987 formally adopted his “Middle Way” pro- autonomy stance.”735 • Write-up/summary: This refers to the most recent and ongoing iteration of the Tibetan independence movement. It begins in 1979 and continues until 2011, the last year of the dataset. There is no declaration of independence here; rather, the early 20th century declaration is adopted, in keeping with practice regarding multi-episode movements. The year 1979 does not immediately jump out as a start year, but the timing was inherited from Coggins (2014) I suspect that she chose that year because it marks the renewed engagement by the Dalai Lama as a leader advocating autonomy and not independence, and the gradual emergence of civil society groups (mostly outside Tibet) advocating for independence. Overall, it’s an imperfect start date. However, it’s fine for the purposes of this dataset because alternative start dates shouldn’t change the coding: an extrainstitutional non-violent movement. One note is that the shift towards autonomy from secessionist objectives reduces the confidence of codings for secessionist action in the narrow temporal window. • Sources employed: o Beary (2011) o Hewitt and Cheatham (2000) o Minahan (2002)

344 – Eastern Mongols (Target: China; Year: 1946) Extra-institutional, violent and nonviolent

Instl_Narrow (1946-48): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1946-48): Yes (Confidence: .5) Instl_Wider (1944-48): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1944-48): Yes (Confidence: .75) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .75

• Write-up/summary: This was a two-year movement starting in 1946 and ending in 1947. According to Minahan (2002, 559) the Eastern Mongols, a group that inhabits a portion of

733 Minahan (2002, p. 1893) 734 Beary (2011, p. 183) 735 Beary (2011, p. 183)

161 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 Western Manchuria, declared the independence of the People’s Republic of Eastern Mongolia on January 15, 1946. We were unable to gather much information on this case, so confidence is low. The episode seems to be one element of the Chinese civil war and war against Japan (WWII). Indeed, the Eastern Mongols were evidently armed by the Japanese and fought for the puppet state. After the Japanese defeat, the Chinese Civil War resumed and part of the fighting took place in the region where the Eastern Mongols resided. They declared independence in 1946 and were evidently defeated by 1947. This raises a question about whether this should be coded as a violent defeat. However, none of the conflict datasets show casualties specific to the Eastern Mongolian secessionist attempt, perhaps because the related violence was simply folded into the larger conflict of the Chinese Civil War. We code this case yes for qualitative observation of violent extra- institutional mobilization, though additional corroboration would increase our confidence. Similarly, additional corroboration of nonviolent extra-institutional mobilization (particularly in the narrow temporal window) would be useful for future versions, including tracking down the details of the secessionist claim. • “From the sixteenth century until the twentieth, much of Inner and Outer Mongolia was under the control of the Mnchu dynasty of China. Following the Chinese revolution of 1911, Outer Mongolia gained a degree of autonomy but gradually fell under Russian domination. In 1924, it was declared a people’s republic and, until 1991, remained closely tied to the Soviet Union. Inner Mongolia remained under Chinese control, and when the Communists took over the government in 1949, Inner Mongolia begame an autonomous region of the People’s Republic of China. The Chinese government recognized the independence of the Republic of Mongolia, and in return, the latter accepted Inner Mongolia as an integral part of China.”736 • “In the twentieth century, there have been several movements calling or the unification of the two Mongolias. […] Another conference of Mongolian nationalists, held in Gegin in 1945, called for unification and also issued a Declaration of Inner Mongolian Liberation.”737 o This constitutes extra-institutional nonviolent mobilization in the narrow temporal window. • Sources employed: o Hewitt and Cheatham (2000) o Minaham (2002)

345 – Hui (Target: China; Year: 1953) Extra-institutional, violent and nonviolent

Instl_Narrow (1953-55): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1953-55): Yes (Confidence: .5) Instl_Wider (1951-55): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1951-55): Yes (Confidence: .5) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes

736 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 193) 737 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 193)

162 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .5

• Summary/write-up: This was a single year movement in 1953. This refers to the Hui people in north central China, an Islamic minority. There’s a history of tension between the Hui and the Chinese state, including a violent struggle in the 1850s and 1860s that was associated with the larger Taiping rebellion. Evidently, during WWII Mao promised the minorities self- determination and even the right to secession (on the Soviet model) in exchange for their participation (Dru 1991, 88). The Hui were caught up in the civil war afterward, mostly siding with the nationalists. Minahan (2002, 745) claims that the Hui declared independence as the Chinese Islamic Republic on August 9, 1953: “The republic lasted less than one month before government troops retook the region.” We could not find this story substantiated elsewhere, so have correspondingly low confidence in the coding. Moreover, there are hints of violence but no record of conflict in the UCDP data. In sum, we coded this as a non-violent, extrainstitutional movement, but with low confidence. Given that there were signs of violence, and that took place in the context of the Chinese Civil War (and therefore could have been missed by UCDP) we did code qualitative observations of violence. Additional corroboration and improved sourcing would increase value of confidence indicators. • Sources employed: o Gladney (1991) o Minahan (2002)

351 – Hyderabad (Target: India; Year: 1948) Mixed institutional and violent extra-institutional movement

Instl_Narrow (1948-50): Yes (Confidence: .75) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1948-50): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1946-50): Yes (Confidence: .75) ExtraInstl_Wider (1946-50): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .5

• Hyderabad was a nominally independent principality outside the agreement between Britain and India and, as such, India was required to negotiatie with Hyderabad for its inclusion as part of India.738

738 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 143)

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• “[Hyderabad’s ruler] sought to maintain the state’s independence and appealed to the UN Security Council in August 1948, whereupon India invaded and Hyderabad was forced to join India.”739 o The appeal is treated as an example of institutional action in the narrow timeframe given that it used the apparatus of the Hyderabad state. • Additional background on Hyderabad: • “In the twentieth century its ruler, the Nizam, still had autocratic powers largely undiluted by constitutional reforms.”740 • “By 1947-48, Hyderabad was one of the three princely States which continued to refuse accession to India as demanded … But the refusal of Hyderabad to join the Indian Union was, because of the State’s size and location, perhaps the greatest impasse which the Government of India had to try and solve through negotiation. When this finally failed, military takeover appeared to be the only solution. However, the integration of Hyderabad was a turbulent chapter in the history of post-Independence India[.]”741 • Integration into India: o “…integration was unilaterally imposed from the top and, despite earlier promises, no plebiscite was ever held in Hyderabad (Menon 1961) to confirm that the State’s population saw integration as the only solution fulfilling the aims of the preceding agitation against the Nizam’s regime. Indeed, even the nature and extent of this agitation are not yet known reliably.”742 o “The victory of the Indian over the Nizam’s forces was greeted in the state, not unexpectedly, with elation by and gloom by Muslims.”743 o “…once defeated, the Nizam showed utter compliance to the victors’ wishes.”744 o “though the Government of India originally had intended to establish a constituent assembly in Hyderabad, and to transfer power to a civilian government composed of Hyderabadis, within a few months of the police action, both objectives were soon shelved. The government in refused to hand power to democratically-elected representatives when the Hyderabad State Congress remained in ideological and

organisational disarray. It therefore orchestrated a more gradual transfer of power, and did not sanction state-wide elections until 1952.”745 • Extra-Institutional armed mobilization: o Uma (2003) references Razakkars as paramilitary arm of Ittehad – ul Muslimeen: § “The rise of the Razakkars gives a new turn to the history of Nizam's rule in Hyderabad. They were the military wing of the Ittehad - ul Muslimeen established to bring about initially unity [sic] among the Muslims. In course of time the Razakkars under Kasim Razvi, an intelligent lawyer from Lattur turned communal leader, whipped the communal passions of the Muslims

739 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 143) 740 Benichou (2000, p. 1) 741 Benichou (2000, p. 3) 742 Benichou (2000, p. 5) 743 Benichou (2000, p. 236) 744 Benichou (2000, p. 237) 745 Sherman (2007, p. 20)

164 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 and added a new dimension to Hyderabad politics. They were allowed to grow to such an extent that they could not be contained even by the ruler. The Nizam came under their influence and took a stand which lead to his doom. The Police Action led to the dismemberment of the Razakkars. Chapter IV deals with the role and influence of the Razakkars”746 § “India claimed that the government of Hyderabad was edging towards independence by divesting itself of its Indian securities, banning the Indian currency, halting the export of ground nuts, organising illegal gun-running from Pakistan, and inviting new recruits to its army and to its irregular forces, the Razakars. These moves were regarded in Delhi as part of a ‘comprehensive plan to break up the economic cohesion of India.’”747 § See Benichou (2000, 207) on origins and purpose of Razakkars. § Razakar organization and links to Majlis-i-Ittehad-ul-Muslimein: • “Forces loyal to the Nizam of Hyderabad sought to repress this communist movement. These forces comprised of police and military as well as local members of the Razakars. The Razakars, headed by Kasim Razvi, were a paramilitary organisation comprised of volunteers who were said to be as enthusiastic as they were

undisciplined. Razvi and his volunteers were associated with the Majlis-i-Ittehad-ul-Muslimein, a political party with considerable influence over the Nizam and dedicated to maintaining Muslim rule in Hyderabad.”748 § Forces fighting India in Hyderabad include Nizam and communists, though at other points these forces also were in conflict with one another: • “tactical alliance” between communists and the Nizam in 1948 against Indian Union o “While the primary fight up until early 1948 had been between the communists and the Nizam’s forces, in May 1948, the Nizam and urban members of the communist party struck an improbable tactical alliance against a common enemy, the ‘bourgeois’ Indian Union. According to the agreement, which aimed to bolster the fight for the independence of Hyderabad, the Nizam amnestied communists from jails, cancelled outstanding arrest warrants and lifted the ban on the party.”749 • Armed resistance to Indian state: “During the summer of 1948, the Razakars continued to seek out and eliminate the enemies of the

regime. They targeted not only Hindus, but Muslims whose loyalty

was in doubt. As it became clear that negotiations with the Indian Union were stalemated, they also courted confrontation with Indian forces. Their raids against trains and villages in Madras, the Central Provinces (CP) and Bombay raised panic in these provinces.”750

746 Uma (2003, p. 10) 747 Sherman (2007, p. 5) 748 Sherman (2007, pp. 6-7) 749 Sherman (2007, p. 7) 750 Sherman (2007, p. 7)

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o Violent extra-institutional conflict in narrow time-frame o Given context of end of British rule in India, these negotiations are treated as institutional engagement. • Concerns/notes: o Additional confirmation of lack of nonviolent extra-institutional mobilization would increase value of ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence variable. o Actions of Indian communists in Hyderabad during relevant temporal period are not treated as component of secessionist movement. This was a complicated decision due to the “tactical alliance” between the Nizam and communists in 1948 (see discussion above). In the end, it was determined that the struggle by communists in Hyderabad would be treated as part of a greater struggle against the Indian state, and not a component of the Hyderabad secessionist movement.751

352 – Kashmir I (Target: India; Year: 1947) Mixed institutional and extra-institutional (violent) contention

Instl_Narrow (1947-49): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1947-49): Yes (Confidence: .75) Instl_Wider (1945-49): Yes (Confidence: .5) ExtraInstl_Wider (1945-49): Yes (Confidence: .75) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .5

• “The British authorities at the end of World War II began preparations to grant independence to the two divisions of British India, Hindu-dominated India and Muslim Pakistan. Kashmir’s Hindu majaraja, Hari Singh, imprisoned Abdullah for leading a pro-Pakistani campaign and refused to cede his state to either India or Pakistan.”752 Kashmir’s population was Majority Muslim.753 o This is an example of institutional action in the wider timeframe. • “Faced with a widespread Muslim uprising, the raja released Abdullah, who kept Kashmir calm as violence and massacres flared in many other areas of India and Pakistan during the political partition of British India.”754 • “Pushtun Muslim tribesmen from Pakistan invaded, and a pro-independence uprising erupted within the state. On 4 October 1947 a provisional government deposed the raja and decared the independence of the Republic of Azad-Kashmir (Free Kashmir). Maharaja Hari Singh fled to Delhi, where he signed a treaty of cession to India on 17 October 1947.”755

751 See Sherman (2007, p. 28) on divisions within the Communist Party of India. 752 Minahan (2002, p. 956) 753 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 143) 754 Minahan (2002, p. 956) 755 Minahan (2002, p. 957)

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o The actions of the tribesemen constitute extra-institutional action in the narrow timeframe. As discussed below, these extra-institutional actions included armed mobilization, resulting in a “yes” coding for violent mobilization. § Was this declaration of Republic of Azad-Kashmir accompanied by parallel institutions in any meaningful way? Any notable nonviolent component of extra-institutional action? • Indian troops entered the territory on 27 October 1947 and “suppressed the separatist government, and in 1948 a United Nations ceasefire effectively partitioned Kashmir between India and Pakistan, but only as a temporary measure until a referendum could be organized to decide Kashmir’s future.”756 o Whether the actions of the separatist government are institutional or extra- institutional depend on whether 1) the deposing of the Maharaja is deemed a legitimate transfer of power, and 2) whether the 17 October 1947 treaty is seen as a valid instrument of cession to India. On balance, this will be classified as extra- institutional action in the narrow timeframe. • “The Indian troops landed in Srinagar on 27 October 1947. The Indian Government claimed that this was done after the Maharaja signed the Instrument of Accession on 26 October 1947. This, however does not seem to be true as the person (V.P. Menon), who claimed to have got the signature of the Maharaja on the Instrument, was in Delhi on 26 October and had a meeting with Alexander Symon, the British Deputy High Commissioner there. Alexander Symon confirms that V.P. Menon was scheduled to go to Srinagar, but could not. Thus, the most probable date of Maharaja signing the Instrument of Accession, (if he ever signed it), was 27 October 1947, when the Indian troops had already landed in Srinagar.”757 • “When the Indian troops landed in Kashmir, the Prime Minister of Pakistan convened a meeting to discuss the Kashmir situation in the changed circumstances on 27 October 1947. […] During the course of discussions, General Akbar proposed action in Jammu as the war in Kashmir had broken out and the tribesmen had penetrated Kashmir for around 80 miles. However, as the was not involved directly in the uprising, and was careful not to provoke India into a war, all except Qaiyum Khan and the Nawab of Mamdot opposed this proposal. […] unofficially, later on, Qaiyum Khan used all his influence to help the Mujahidin who wanted to go to the war front and take part in the Kashmir War. ”758 • “Once the tribal invasion started, more and more people were attracted towards the war in Kashmir. Tales of Muslims’ taking different parts of the State were alluring, and thus numerous people of tribal territory, , Bajaur, Chitral, , etc., started moving towards Kashmir, fully armed and ready to fight. (Special Branch daily dairy [sic] 15 October 1947: bundle no. 50, s.no. 816) Tribesmen, both from settled and tribal areas, held meetings at different places, and made preparations for going to the warfront. Those who wanted to go were provided free arms, ammunition, transport, and ration [sic] at . ”759

756 Minahan (2002, p. 957) 757 ul Hassan (2015, p. 3) 758 ul Hassan (2015, p. 3) 759 ul Hassan (2015, p. 3)

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• Appeals to support armed actions, though these fall short (on their own) of constituting evidence of nonviolent extra-institutional mobilization: o “In November 1947, appeals for more and more volunteers also appeared on the walls of the city through posters and through the advertisements in newspapers. One such poster “Quaid-i-Kashmir ki Appeal”, was published by weekly ‘Shorah’ at Peshawar. In this poster, Sardar Mohammad Ibrahim Khan had appealed to the people to join the Free Kashmir Army. (CID daily dairy [sic] no. 244, 3 November 1947: bundle no. 50, s.no. 816) Then, on 10 November 1947 an article entitled, “Inshallah victory is surely ours” was published in ‘Mazloom Duniya’. The article was written by its editor, Abdur Raya and highlighted the atrocities of non- Muslims over Muslims in India and Kashmir and the Muslims were urged to join the Holy War against the infidels.”760 • Clear armed mobilization in support of detaching Kashmir from India: o “The Manchester Guardian, on the authority of an Indian source, estimated that about 75,000 tribesmen were involved in the Kashmir War, of whom around 25,000 were active participants. According to this report, ‘They are armed with .303 rifles, Bren and Sten guns and medium machine-guns. They used infantry tactics resembling the German methods of World War 1 and paid heavily for the departure from their tradition. In one engagement, it was believed 2,000 were killed.’ (Khalid 1998: 80)”761 • Concerns/Notes: Additional corroboration of “no” coding for extra-institutional nonviolent mobilization would increase value of ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence variable.

353 – Kashmir II (Target: India; Year: 1989) Full movement, with institutional and (both violent and nonviolent) extra-institutional mobilization

Instl_Narrow (1989-91): Yes (Confidence: .5) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1989-91): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1987-91): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1987-91): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .75

• “In 1983, … Farooq Abdullah [son of Sheikh Abdullah, who was a key independence leader before his arrest and later rapproachment with the central government, after which he became chief minister of Kashmir in 1975] was elected chief minister [of Kashmir], but by supporting a group of defectors from the National Conference, the local Congress Party was able to bring down his government. In 1987, the Cogress Party switched its support back to Farooq, but these political maneuvers discredited Farooq and alienated Kashmiri

760 ul Hassan (2015, p. 3) 761 ul Hassan (2015, pp. 3-4)

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opinion.”762 This provided a backdrop for increasing Islamic fundamentalism and the rise of the Muslim United Front in Kashmir.763 • The Conference-National Congress alliance proceeded to win the elections of the late 1980s “amid claims of widespread electoral fraud”.764 o Contesting of elections by separatist groups, such as the Muslim United Front, is an example of institutional contention (i.e. persistent political parties competing in elections over time). As illustrated below, institutional engagement is clearly documented in the wider time frame and likely was also employed in the narrow time window. It is correspondingly coded “yes” for both, though with lower confidence in the narrow temporal window. • Extra-institutional action: o “Increasing violence climaxed in December 1989 when massive demonstrations by Muslim militants in Srinigar, the capital city, led to the declaration of ‘president’s rule.’ By the early 1990s, a full-scale insurgency was raging.”765 § This is an example of both violent and nonviolent extra-institutional action in the narrow (and thus also wider) timeframe. o “A separatist insurgency in Indian-controlled Kashmir broke out in 1989. The level of violence declined from 2004 until 2010 when there was a renewed spike in violence. An estimated fifty thousand people have been killed in the insurgency.”766 § Further corroboration of armed mobilization. o “The insurgents fall into two groups: those fighting for an independent Kashmir and those fighting to join Kashmir to Pakistan. Although more than 100 organizations are involved, the main ones are the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front [(JKLF) – which led the violence beginning in 1988]767, which seeks independence, and the Hezb ul , which favours union with Pakistan. The former originally had the most widespread support, but Muslim fundamentalism, stimulated by the Islamic revolution in Iran, is growing stronger.”768 “Pro-independence sentiment spread to Pakistani Kashmir. The mounting tension in the region, and Pakistani support of the pro-Pakistani Kashmiri groups, brought India and Pakistan close to war in 1990.”769 • Additional information on institutional participaton: o Institution action clearly took place within wider temporal window, but not necessarily within the narrow timeframe (due to boycotts by separatists): § “Indian prime ministers and Rajiv Gandhi, her son and successor, entered into alliances with Kashmiri leaders in the 1970s and 1980s, including with Sheikh Abdullah and his son Farooq; this did not

762 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 143) 763 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 144) 764 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 144) 765 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 144) 766 Beary (2011, p. 204) 767 Minahan (2002, p. 957) 768 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 144) 769 Minahan (2002, p. 958)

169 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 result in any new autonomy framework, however. The 1987 Kashmir parliamentary elections were marred by allegations from separatist candidates that the ruling parties had rigged the vote. The 1989 Indian parliamentary elections were boycotted by the separatists.”770 § “In India, a democratic, secular state, there are pro-independence Kashmiri political parties that can compete in elections as long as they do not advocate violence. Twenty-six such Kashmiri goups came together in 1993 and established the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) with the goal of reuniting the ‘occupied territories’ through peaceful means. The APHC has offices in both India and Pakistan. It boycotted elections in India in 2002 and 2004. […] Key individual Indian-based Kashmiri political parties include the Jammu Kashmir Democratic Freedom Party, founded in 1998, and the Jamaat-e-Islami Jammu Kashmir, the Indian branch of a Pakistan-based party established in 1941. [Paragraph break] The first Kashmiri pro- independence party, the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), was established in 1964. The JKLF split in 1995 into the militant JKLF-A, which was led by the party’s founder, Amunullah Khan, and was based in Pakistan, and the JKLF-Y faction led by Muhammad Yasin , which opposed violence and based itself in India.”771 • Concerns/notes: o Additional corroboration of institutional engagement during the narrow temporal window would increase variable of relevant confidence variable. o Additional corroboration of noviolent extra-institutional mobilization would increase value of ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence variable.

354 – Assam (Target: India; Year: 1989) Extra-institutional non-violent contention followed by violent contention

Instl_Narrow (1989-91): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1989-91): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1987-91): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1987-91): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .75

770 Beary (2011, p. 206) 771 Beary (2011, pp. 206-07)

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• The Assam region in northeastern India has received considerable irregular migration from and Bangladesh, leading to nationalist sentiments. “The most important insurgent groups [for independence] include the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA); the Mizo National Front; the National Socialist Council of Nagaland; the People’s Liberation Army of Manipur…; the Tripura National Front; and the All-Bodo Students Union.”772 o It is important to note that some of these groups represent other minority groups in Assam, and are discussed in other cases, including Meitei (#355), below. • “A theme in the ideology of Assamese subnationalism in the 1980s was the unity of all ‘indigenous’ northeasterners, not an unproblematic concept in a region known for heavy immigration. The term ‘United’ in ULFA's name reflects the importance of this theme, which became more formalized as time went on. In May 1990 ULFA, the NSCN, the United National Liberation Front of Manipur (UNLFM), and some Burmese insurgent organizations signed a memorandum of understanding. According to Indian military intelligence, the objective of these organizations was to establish an independent state comprising the northeastern states of India and northwestern Burma. They formed a common organization called the Indo-Burma Revolutionary Front (IBRF), noting in their agreement that the people living in northeastern India and northwestern Burma are of the same racial stock and that historically and culturally they are set apart from the inhabitants of mainland India and Burma. The governments, they said, have neglected these far-flung regions, ‘which must unite and fight their war of independence.’”773 • “In November 1990, the Indian federal government again dissolved the state government as separatist sentiment took hold in areas and among classes previously little affected.”774 • “The major nationalist organization, ULFA, was outlawed, and many Assamese separatist leaders fled to Myanmar. In 1992 the Indian government suspended its military operation, and ULFA agreed to end its four-year campaign of violence; however, fighting resumed within months.”775 o This is evidence of violent extra-institutional mobilization in narrow and wider time windows. • “During this period the army … arrested over 7,000 suspected terrorists. By 1995, more than 300,000 people were living in refugee camps, and over 5,000 had been killed by the army or the insurgents.”776 o This is an example of extra-institutional violent contention in the narrow timeframe. • “Violence intensified in the late 1980s, with ULFA militants operating what was virtually a parallel government, which levied ‘taxes’ on the plantations. This breakdown of law and order led to the imposition of ‘president’s rule’ from November 1990 until June 1991.”777 o Parallel government meets extra-institutional nonviolent threshold, at least in wider time frame.

772 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 30) 773 Baruah (1994, p. 870) 774 Minahan (2002, p. 202) 775 Minahan (2002, p. 203) 776 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 30) 777 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 30)

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• “Apart from its long-term goal of achieving Assam's independence, ULFA was engaged in what can be called a social agenda, conducting trials of people involved in drugs and prostitution rings. It punished corrupt government officials-though it is alleged that it had as often extorted money from them by blackmail-and those neglecting public responsibilities, such as government doctors who engaged in private medical practice or teachers employed in government schools who made money through private tuition at the expense of their classroom commitments. ULFA also intervened in Assamese cultural and social life. In April 1990, on the eve of the Assamese festival, Bohag Bihu, it issued a writ asking people not to engage in corruption of the spirit of the traditional festival by playing film songs and disco music.”778 o This parallel institution building is additional evidence of nonviolent extra- institutional mobilization, here in narrow time frame. • Concerns/notes: o Additional corroboration of noviolent extra-institutional mobilization would increase value of ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence variable.

355 – Meitei (Target: India; Year: 1964) Mostly/ entirely extra-institutional contention with and without violence

Instl_Narrow (1964-66): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1964-66): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1962-66): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1962-66): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .75

• “On 15 August 1947, the day india gained its independence, the Manipuri government signed an interim agreement acknowledging Indian responsibility for the state’s defense and foreign relations.”779 o This suzerainty effectively established the Meitei as part of India. • “Faced with large anti-Indian demonstrations and demands for full independence, the Indian government dispatched troops to dissolve the Manipur state administration.”780 • “The circumstances attending Manipur’s merger with India haunts the politics of the state to this day.” • “Tanghul and Kubai Nagas, who had begun to assimilate into Meithei culture, launched a campaign to separate their hill tracts from Manipur and to join northern Manipur to the

778 Baruah (1994, pp. 869-70) 779 Minahan (2002, p. 1222) 780 Minahan (2002, p. 1222)

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newly created Nagaland state in 1963.”781 (This is Nagam not Meithei, mobilization – but it spurred a relevant reaction for the purposes of this case.) o “The Naga revolt provoked a Meithei nationalist backlash. The campaign became openly nationalist, with Meithei leaders demanding independence for a new country to be called Meithei Laipak or Kangleipak.”782 o This is an example of extra-institutional non-violent action in the narrow timeframe. o Note that it is not institutional as Manipur was under direct rule from New Delhi.783 • “A violent sessessionist war spread across Manipur in 1965.”784 o This is apparent evidence of extra-institutional violent action in the narrow timeframe, though could use additional sourcing/corroboration regarding timing. • Additional Info: o The Assam region in northeastern India has received considerable irregular migration from West Bengal and Bangladesh, leading to nationalist sentiments. “The most important insurgent groups [for independence] include the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA); the Mizo National Front; the National Socialist Council of Nagaland; the People’s Liberation Army of Manipur…; the Tripura National Front; and the All-Bodo Students Union.”785 o “Armed uprisings erupted in the Mizo Hills following a famine in 1966. A year later, guerrilla bands became active in Manipur and Tripura. Since most of these rebel groups found safe bases, weapons and training in what was then East Pakistan, the defeat of the Pakistani armed forces in 1971 adversely affected the rebels from northeast India. For nearly seven years, they were deprived of a major staging post in a contiguous foreign nation. China, which trained and armed several batches of Naga, Mizo and Meitei since 1966, had stopped help by the early 1980s. By then, however, Bangladesh’s military rulers, foisted to power by the bloody coup that killed the country’s founder Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, had revived the Pakistani policy of sheltering, arming and training rebel groups from northeast India. Almost all the separatist groups in the Northeast—Nagas, Mizos, Meiteis, Tripuris, and now even those from Meghalaya—have subsequently received shelter and support in Bangladesh.”786 § This puts guerrilla action in Manipur as beginning in 1967, which is immediately after the relevant temporal period. Additional corroboration regarding timing is necessary. o “China, which trained and armed several batches of Naga, Mizo and Meitei since 1966, had stopped help by the early 1980s.”787

781 Minahan (2002, p. 1222) 782 Minahan (2002, p. 1222) 783 Minahan (2002, p. 1222) 784 Minahan (2002, p. 1222) 785 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 30) 786 Bhaumuk (2004, pp. 223-24) 787 Bhaumik (2004, p. 224)

173 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 § This implies but doesn’t definitively put armed mobilization in relevant time period. o “Manipur has a particularly wide array of insurgent groups, including the People’s Liberation Army, United National Liberation Front, People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak, Kangleipak Communist Party, Kanglei Yaol Kanba Lup, Manipur People’s Liberation Front, and Revolutionary People’s Front. The number of insurgent groups has been matched by corresponding violence.”788 o “The major Meitei insurgent group is the United National Liberation Front (UNLF), founded in 1964 under the leadership of Samarendra Singh. The UNLF faced a major setback in 1971 when most of its leaders were arrested during the Bangladesh war. Even before this setback, the Metei secessionist movement quickly fractured, with several rump organizations being formed, including the Revolutionary Government of Manipur, People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK), Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP), and the People’s Liberation Army. Obviously, many of these groups are very leftist, and there have been reports that some members received training in China. There have been at least two attempts to forge a common front among the insurgent movements, including the Indo-Burma Revolutionary Front (which also included the Nagas), the Revolutionary Joint Committee, and the Manipur People’s Liberation Front. Given the factionalism of the various groups, it is unlikely that these coalitions will ever be terribly effective.”789 § This is additional evidence of armed mobilization during both the narrow (and wider) temporal period(s). • Concerns/notes: o While a “yes” coding has been given for violence extra-institutional contention in the narrow and wider time periods, additional corroboration regarding timing would increase the value of ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence.

356 – Boro/ Bodo (Target: India; Year: 1986) Extra-institutional contention, both violent and nonviolent

Instl_Narrow (1986-88): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1986-88): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1984-88): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1984-88): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .75

788 Cline (2006, p. 128) 789 Cline (2006, p. 137)

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• “The major cause of the growth of nationalism among the Bodos is the fact that they are being outnumbered in their homeland by Bengali-speaking Hindu and Muslim immigrants and Santal tribal people, who settled in Assam from other parts of India.”790 • “Encouraged by the Assamese self-assertion campaign of the 1980s, the Bodos launched a movement for greater autonomy and the expulsion of migrants from their homeland. Later other groups demanded separation and the creation of a separate Bodoland state.”791 • After disenchantment with the new Assamese government in 1986, the All Bodo Students Union (ABSU) formed the core of the push for an independent Bodoland, separate from Assam, within India, in much the same way as the All Assam Students Union had played a similar role in the the broader Assamese campaign against the Indian state.792 o There is little evidence of a serious and organized autonomy movement in Bodo prior to this point in the relevant timeframe, with efforts being directed to secure the separation of Assam, rather that the separation from Assam. • The ABSU launched their movement for greater autonomy officially on March 2, 1987, under the name Bodo Security Force (BSF), “with the demand for creation of a full fledged state of Bodoland outside of Assam.”793 o This is an example of extra-institutional non-violent action. • “Spokesmen for the Bodo national movement mobilized the Bodos to regain control of their affairs and territory, and they mustered enough weaponry to ensure that they could not be ignored.”794 • “The campaign for autonomy turned violent in 1987, when Bodo guerillas kidnapped tea plantation managers and held them for ransom.”795 • “In 1988, the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), with its armed group, the Bodo Volunteer Force, launched a guerrilla campaign. Basic demands included a free Bodoland, the establishment of a ‘democratic socialist society’, and changing the script of the Bodo language to Roman script to distinguish it from Indian Devangri script. The last demand was probably a result of the Bodos’ Christian identity. The group’s leadership ended hostilities in 1993 after the Indian government established the Bodo Autonomous Council to give the Bodos a greater voice in government. One faction of the BVF refused to accept the agreement and maintained the title of NDFB to continue operations. […] Another movement operated under the banner of the Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT). This faction reached a very tenuous ceasefire with the government in 2000. A major advance in the counterinsurgency campaign was on 6 December 2003, when over 2,600 BLT members renounced violence and surrendered along with their weapons. This followed a settlement agreement on 10 February 2003 in which the Indian government established a Bodoland

790 Minahan (2002, p. 313) 791 Minahan (2002, p. 313) 792 George, S. R. (1994, pp. 878-880) 793 George, S. R. (1994, p. 880) 794 Minahan (2002, p. 314) 795 Minahan (2002, p. 314)

175 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 Territorial Council to provide at least limited self-rule for the Bodo areas. Despite repeated

efforts with the NDFB, peace efforts were still not finalized as at the end of 2004. In general, the Bodo insurgents have conducted as many attacks on other tribal groups – including civilians – as they have against security forces.”796 • “religion has also played a divisive role in the Bodo separatist movement in Assam. The National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) is predominantly Christian. It supports the church’s demand for the use of the Roman script for the Bodo language—similar to the NLFT’s support for a similar church demand to use Roman script for the Tripuri Kokborok language—and its guerrillas have killed many Bodo intellectuals, cultural icons and writers who oppose the demand. Their victims include a former president of the Bodo Sahitya Sabha (Bodo Literary Society). The All Bodo Students Union (ABSU), the Bodo Peoples Action Committee (BPAC) and the underground Bodoland Liberation Tigers Force (BLTF) remain committed to the ‘traditional Bodo way of life’ and oppose the demand for using Roman script for the Bodo language.”797 • “In February 1989, the Bodos, to enforce their demands, called a five-day general strike that paralyzed the region. Many people were killed, and attacks on police, bombings, arson, and looting spread across the area.”798 o This is immediately after the temporal period under consideration, but previously- mentioned armed mobilization and kidnapping support “yes” coding for extra- institutional violent mobilization. • Concerns/notes: o While a “yes” coding has been given for violent extra-institutional contention in the narrow and wider time periods, additional corroboration regarding timing would increase the value of ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence.

357 – Mizos (Target: India; Year: 1966) Institutional contention followed by extra-institutional violent and nonviolent contention

Instl_Narrow (1966-68): No (Confidence: .75) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1966-68): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1964-68): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1964-68): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: 1

• “The Mizo, whose name means ‘persons of an upland terrain’ in their native language, reside predominantly in the state of Mizoram in northeastern India; numbering approximately 400,000, they constitute a majority of the state population. Smaller Mizo communities also

796 Cline (2006, pp. 135-36) 797 Bhaumik (2004, pp. 237-38) 798 Minahan (2002, p. 314)

176 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 can be found in neighboring Myanmar (17,000) and Bangladesh (1,100). The Mizo encompass a number of tribes, including the Hmar, Lai, Lushai, Mara, Paite, Pawi, and Ralte.”799 • “The Mizo and Naga people espoused secession from India during the 1970s and early 1980s, and the granting of statehood for Mizoram in 1987 brought comparative peace.”800 • “The Mizo National Front won two of three assembly seats in the Mizo Hills of Assam in 1963, showing its growing support in the region. The leader of the MNF, Laldenga (Mizos normally use just one name), used the electoral success to press for separation from Assam. The Mizo leadership … called for secession and the creation of an independent Mizo state in 1965.”801 o This is an example of institutional action in the wider timeframe. o Mentions of institutional action in the narrow temporal window were not found in the consulted sources. Thus institutional contention is coded no in the narrow time window – though additional corroboration would increase value of associated confidence variable. • “Open rebellion broke out in February, 1966; nationalist guerillas skirmished with Indian troops stationed on the sensitive Pakistani and Burmese borders. Rebel leaders … declared the independence of Mizoram on 6 July 1966.”802 o This is an example of extra-institutional violent action in the narrow timeframe. • “Armed by Pakistan and China, the rebels launched a secessionist war from their mountain hideouts.”803 o This is an example of extra-institutional violent action in the narrow timeframe. • “One of the few apparent success stories for the Indian government in the northeast has been Mizoram. In 1961, the Mizo National Front (MNF), the main insurgent group was formed in what was then the Territory of Mizoram. As with other groups, it espoused independence and improved social and economic conditions of the Mizos; it also called for protection of the Christian nature of the Mizo people. There was a five-year gap before the MNF actually commenced armed operations, but Mizoram was subject to extensive guerrilla operations from 1966… [The organization was] subject to rather massive defections to the government, with dozens at a time (typically led by senior guerrilla leaders) surrendering. Nevertheless, a hard core of insurgents continued their operations.”804 o Additional corroboration of armed/violent mobilization. • “Almost as soon as fighting erupted, peace negotiations began. The initial impetus for peace

talks was through local religious leaders. These early attempts were abortive, but continued through several different channels. A settlement was reached in 1986 in which the MNF agreed to lay down its arms and to recognize Indian sovereignty. In return, the government established Mizoram as a full-fledged state within the Union and agreed to compensate MNF combatants. The government also ensured that the leaders of the insurgents were brought

799 Mishra (2013a, p. 551) 800 Mishra (2013b, p. 623) 801 Minahan (2002, p. 1271) 802 Minahan (2002, p. 1271) 803 Minahan (2002, p. 1271) 804 Cline (2006, p. 138)

177 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 into the government, including appointing the insurgent leader Laldenga as the chief minister in the state government. New Delhi also pumped considerable money into the state. There are still some rump insurgent movements, and extortion remains an issue, but since the agreement, the state has remained relatively stable.”805 • “The MNF high command, during an Executive Committee meeting in Aizawl in July 1965, set up its underground government and termed it the ‘Mizoram Sawrkar’ with a legislature, executive and judiciary, to project an effective demand for independence. Its armed wing, the Mizoram National Army (MNA), was created to take the fight to the streets. It recruited young men from colleges, schools, farms and also ex-servicemen, on a voluntary basis. The MNF-led insurgency finally broke out on February 28, 1966, with acts of lawlessness, violence, killings etc. The MNF declared independence on March 1, 1966, and this was followed by an Army mobilisation.”806 o Formation and operation of parallel governing institutions constitutes nonviolent extra-institutional mobilization. The specified year, 1965, puts this mobilization in the narrow temporal window – but it presumably continued into 1966, thus putting it in the narrow window, as well.

358 – Nagas (Target: India; Year: 1948) Initially institutional contention followed by nonviolent extra-institutional contention. (Although the Nagas organized an armed campaign in the 1950s, this falls outside the relevant temporal window.)

Instl_Narrow (1948-50): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1948-50): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1946-50): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1946-50): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: No ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: 1

• “During the discussions over Indian independence, the Nagas [numbering about 500,000] argued that they should be granted the right to secede from the proposed Indian Union”.807 • “On August 14, 1947 (the day before India became independent), the Naga National Council (NNC) declared the independence of the Nagas, but this declaration was ignored by the new Indian government.”808

805 Cline (2006, pp. 138-39) 806 Satapathy 2004) 807 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 201) 808 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 201)

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o While the NNC was not an elected organization, it was a political organization representing the various tribes of the region in official dealings with the British and potential Indian administrations. o This is an example of institutional action in the wider timeframe. • “The NNC was invited to send representatitves to the constituent assembly, which was drafting a new Indian constitution, but declined and again declared its desire for independence.”809 o Refusal to now participate in the newly created national institutional processes make this an extra-institutional non-violent action in the narrow timeframe. • “The Indian government “refused to recognize Naga independence and sent in the army to crush the separatist movement. Unlike other territories, Nagaland was not specifically included in the Indian Independence Act of 1947, so the Indian military occupation was technically illegal.”810 o Minahan references killings of Nagas by the Indian military but there is no discussion of whether the Naga responded with violence at this point and violence will therefore not be coded for in this instance. • “After Indian independence in 1947, the Naga became the first group to resist assimilation into the Indian state, beginning a period of seemingly endless strife known as the Indo-Naga Conflict. This struggle for Naga self-determination, which has continued for more than sixty years, is one of the oldest ethnic conflicts in . Though Nagaland was made an Indian state in 1963 and a ceasefire held until 1972, the central issues of self-determination were not addressed and violence resumed.” o Longchar (2013, p. 553) puts beginning of struggle after independence, but is not specific regarding timing. Additional sources, discussed below, put the violent insurgency years after relevant time periods. • “In 1951, the NNC conducted a plebiscite in which the Nagas voted almost unanimously for independence” but this was dismissed by the Indian government.811 o This is outside the timeframe under consideration for this project. • “The Naga National Council (NNC), the pro-independence movement, in fact petitioned the British government for independence before India achieved its own independence, but this memorandum basically was ignored by London. NNC members also met with Gandhi, who –

at least according to NNC accounts – was sympathetic to their goals. They also attempted to receive UN mediation for independence or autonomy, with no success. Their efforts also included trying to use foreign religious groups to pressure India to make concessions. [Paragraph Break] With no agreements from the Indian government and no external intervention, the NNC established a parallel governmental structure in Naga territory in 1954 and began preparing for a guerrilla campaign. The NNC began armed operations in 1956 with a strength of some 15,000 guerrillas.”812

809 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 201) 810 Minahan (2002, p. 1330) 811 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 201) 812 Cline (2006, p. 129)

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o Cline (2006) puts beginning of armed mobilization some eight years after the year designated in this dataset, thus supporting “no” coding for extra-institutional violent action. • “After the British left, the Indian nation-state faced uprisings in Tripura almost immediately after Independence and in the Naga Hills since the mid-fifties.”813 o This source also puts Naga insurgency as beginning in mid-1950s, further supporting a “no” coding for violent extra-institutional action. • “The extremist group within the NNC led by Phizo rejected the Hydari Agreement. On July 19, 1947, a Naga delegation led by Phizo met in New Delhi, who, it is claimed, re-assured them that ‘if you do not wish to join the Indian Union, nobody will force you to do that’. Though the linkage between Gandhi’s supposed statement and consequent developments is only of a speculative nature, on returning to Naga areas, Phizo along with eight other extremist NNC cadres declared independence on August 14, 1947. In 1950, the extremist group within the NNC organised a Naga conference to hold consultations with Naga tribes in Kohima. A large number of tribes took part in the conference to decide upon the future of Naga areas. The conference decided to hold a plebiscite. Surprisingly, the Assam government, which officially administered the Naga areas at that time, did not take this development seriously. However, the Intelligence Bureau’s Deputy Director, S.M. Dutt, argued that the situation was volatile and he deemed it prudent to inform Prime Minister Nehru about the conference. Yet, there was no significant response from the Union Government to these developments and on May 16, 1951, Phizo conducted a plebiscite and subsequently declared that 99 per cent of the Nagas had voted for independence. Though the legitimacy and representative character of the plebiscite were deeply contested by India and many of the Naga tribes themselves, it energised Phizo and his extremist comrades, resulting in their complete dominance of NNC affairs.”814

360 – Sikhs II (Target: India; Year: 1986) Institutional contention accompanied by extra-instituional violent contention and extra-institutinal non-violent contention

Instl_Narrow (1986-88): Yes (Confidence: .25) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1986-88): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1984-88): Yes (Confidence: .25) ExtraInstl_Wider (1984-88): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .75

813 Bhaumik (2004, p. 223) 814 Goswami (2007, pp. 291-92)

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• “In 1973 the Alkali Dal political party released the Anandpur Resolution, which called for greater autonomy for an enlarged . In 1980 a sustained campaign was launched in support of Sikh self-rule. In 1982 violence broke out between Sikhs and Hindus.”815 o Action via the Alkali Dal political party, which is present throughout the period under consideration, constitutes institutional contention. • “The nationalist territorial claims included Punjab State, Chandigarh, and the Sikh- populated regions of Haryana and Rajastan States.”816 • “Nationalist organizations proliferated as the national movement splintered between groups advocating violence and nonviolent factions.”817 • “Amid growing separatist violence the Indian authorities imposed direct rule from New Delhi in October 1983. Five months later the nationalists took control of the Sikh’s holiest shrine, the Golden Temple”.818 • “The government of Indira Gandhi … launch[ed] Operation Bluestar: Indian police and troops attacked the Sikh separatists … in the Golden Temple, leaving over 500 dead.”819 • “The Sikh revenge – the murder of Prime Minister Gandhi by her Sikh bodyguards on 31 October 1984 – set off violent anti-Sikh rioting.”820 o The previous two points constitute extra-institutional violent contention in the wider timeframe. • “In 1985 the moderate nationalists of the Akali Dal Party won the Punjab State elections, and presidential rule from New Delhi was lifted.”821 o This is an example of institutional contention in the wider timeframe. • “Gandhi’s son and successor, Rajiv Gandhi, launched peace talks, and in July 1985 he signed the Punjab Accord with Harchand Singh Longowal, leader of the Akali Dal. … Although the agreement gave Sikhs more control over their affairs, some Sikhs felt it did not go far enough, and Longowal was assassinated by extremists in August 1985.”822 o The accord between the state and the Akali Dal political party constitutes institutional contention in the wider timeframe. • A Sikh separatist terrorist attack bombed an Air India plane on June 23, 1985, killing 329 people.823 o This is an example of extra-institutional violent contentiuon in the wider timeframe. • “Amid the continuing turmoil, a group of nationalists, led by Jagjit Singh Chohan, declared the independence of Khalistan [(the proposed name for the Sikh nation)] on 30 April 1986.”824

815 Minahan (2002, p. 1724) 816 Minahan (2002, p. 1724) 817 Minahan (2002, p. 1724) 818 Minahan (2002, p. 1724) 819 Minahan (2002, p. 1724) 820 Minahan (2002, p. 1724) 821 Minahan (2002, p. 1724) 822 Beary (2011, p. 227) 823 Beary (2011, p. 226) 824 Minahan (2002, p. 1724)

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o This is an example of extra-institutional non-violent contention in the narrow timeframe. • “The secession, crushed by security forces, set off a renewed and even more violent campaign to win independence.”825 o This is an example of extra-institutional violent contention in the narrow timeframe. • “Because of the inability of the Akali Dal government to deal with Hindu-Sikh violence, presidential rule was restored in Punjab and thereafter extended … [until] February 1992”.826 • “Members of Akali Dal staged a sit-in at the Lok Sabha, the lower house of India’s parliament, to protest government inaction on claims that over 3,000 of those that had officially disappeared during the Punjab insurgency of the 1980s and early 1990s had actually been killed and cremated by the Indian security forces. In January 1997, India’s National Human Rights Commission began to investigate the alleged murders and cremations.”827 o This demonstrates that despite the suspension of regional elections in Punjab state, the Akali Dal political party was still active institutionally. • More info on Akali Dal, used as basis of coding above: o “The main Sikh political party, the Akali Dal, established itself as an independence movement in the 1920s when the British still ruled the . Since India’s independence, the party has concentrated its efforts on gaining and keeping control of the Punjab government, inceasing the Punjab government’s powers, and preserving the Sikh faith. The party competes in national elections, securing 4 of the 552 seats in the Indian Parliament in the 2009 ballot.”828 § Implies that Akali Dal is more autonimist than secessionist o Akali Dal factionalism: § “Dissidents have split from the party periodically; Sardar Simranjit Singh Mann set up a party in the mid-1990s that competes in elections. Called Shiromani Akali Dal (Amritsar), it has not won a seat in parliament since 1999. In November 2006, Mann was acquitted by a cout of sedition charges for allegedly calling for the creation of an independent Khalistan.”829 • This institutional separatist action took place after the relevant temporal window. • Concerns/notes: o Actions of Akali Dal are counted as institutional action. Future versions should corroborate that this party’s institutional engagement is secessionist, not autonomist, in order to increase value of institutional confidence measures.

825 Minahan (2002, p. 1724) 826 Minahan (2002, p. 1724) 827 Minahan (2002, p. 1725) 828 Beary (2011, p. 227) 829 Beary (2011, p. 227)

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o Better sourcing on violent/armed action and/or a more specific date for any violent mobilization (especially in the narrow temporal window) would increase value of ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence measure.

361 – Tripuras (Target: India; Year: 1978) Mostly/ entirely extra-institutional contention, first without violence and then with violence

Instl_Narrow (1978-80): No (Confidence: .5) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1978-80): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1976-80): No (Confidence: .5) ExtraInstl_Wider (1976-80): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .75

• “The Indian government’s inability or unwillingness to stem the illegal immigration [of Hindu Bengalis] in the 1960s and 1970s spurred Tripuri nationalism.”830 • The growing majority of Bengalis gained economic and political control in the Tripura region in the early 1970s, which caused resentment amongst the Trupuri, in what was now “a full state of the Indian union”.831 • “Members of Tripuri tribes formed the first avowedly separatist organization in 1978, the Tripuri National Volunteers (TNV). Gaining support in the state, and with ties to other nationalist organizations in India’s turbulent north-eastern region, the Tripuri nationalists called for an end to India’s illegal control of Tripura and for the expulsion of all Bengali migrants.”832 o This is an example of extra-institutional non-violent action in the narrow (and wider) timeframe(s). • “[T]he Tripuris, led by the TNV, launched an armed struggle in the early 1980s. The resulting ethnic and religious conflict spread across the state, leaving over 800 dead in violent clashes.”833 o This is an example of extra-institutional violent action, and, presumably continued non-violent action in the period between the formation of TNV and the commencement of violence. Depending on the timing, this may be evidence of violent extra-institution mobilization in the narrow temporal window. • “The major issue in Tripura has been immigration from East Bengal, later Bangladesh. The

original population has in fact reached minority status. Not only did the population shift

830 Minahan (2002, p. 1918) 831 Minahan (2002, p. 1918) 832 Minahan (2002, p. 1918) 833 Minahan (2002, p. 1918)

183 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 dramatically, but Bengali was adopted as the official state language in replacement of the native language. The first group to take up unrest in response to the changing demographics as a ‘protector’ of the native population was the Seng Krak (Clenched Fist), formed in 1947. This movement was short lived, but was revived again in the 1960s. [Paragraph Break] Unrest sharpened in 1967 with the formation of the Tripura Upajati Juba Samiti (Tripura Tribals’ Youth League – TUJS). This group also had an underground wing, the Tripura Sena. The leader of the underground wing, Bijoy Kumar Hrangkhawl, later formed the Tribal National Volunteers (also called the Tripura National Volunteers), which became the principal insurgent group. The TNV reportedly was the instrumental group behind an explosion of ethnic violence in May 1979 and June 1980, in which some 1,800 were killed. The TNV, in common with later groups, appeared to base its agenda solely upon anti- immigrant efforts without much further ideology.”834 o As noted above, Minahan identifies the TNV as “the first avowedly separatist organization[, created] in 1978” (2002, p. 1918). Considering this classification, the above-described role of the TVN constitutes evidence of action of extra-institutional violent mobilization in the narrow timeframe. • There does not appear to have been secessionist institutional action in the relevant temporal window(s), though there is evidence of later institutional participation by tribal organizations following the time period under consideration: o “In 2000, for the first time, the ruling Communists lost the state’s Tribal Areas Autonomous District Council to a militant tribal party, the Indigenous Peoples Front of Tripura (IPFT). [Paragraph Break] The IPFT enjoyed the backing of the separatist National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT). The NLFT’s rhetoric is secessionist but its leaders have said they are open to negotiations on an ‘appropriate power-sharing arrangement for maximum possible tribal control in the state assembly, the autonomous district council and on the state’s resources.’ The IPFT has now been renamed Indigenous Nationalist Front of Tripura, with two more tribal parties joining it. One of them is the Tripura Upajati Juba Samity (TUJS), the first exclusively tribal party in the state, and the Tribal National Volunteers (TNV), which led a bloody insurgent movement targeting Bengali settlers and the security forces between 1978 and 1988. The ruling Communists admit that they face a stiff challenge in the next state assembly elections in 2003 with the INFT tying up with the Congress, which typically wins some seats in Bengali areas.”835 • Concerns/notes: o Additional corroboration of nonviolent extra-institutional action in the narrow temporal window would increase value of ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence variable. o Additional corroboration of the lack of institutional contention would increase value of associated confidence measures.

834 Cline (2006, p. 139) 835 Bhaumik (2004, p. 231)

184 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 362 – E. Pakistan (Target: Pakistan; Year: 1971) Initially institutional contention followed by extra-institutional contention with and without violence

Instl_Narrow (1971-73): Yes (Confidence: .25) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1971-73): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1969-73): Yes (Confidence: .25) ExtraInstl_Wider (1969-73): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .75

• “The Awami League, which emerged as the main party in East Pakistan [(which was exploited economically by West Pakistan)], put forward demands for increased autonomy on several occasions.”836 • In elections held in 1970, “the Awami League won all but two seats in East Pakistan, giving it a majority in the National Assembly.”837 o This is an example of institutional contention in the wider timeframe. • Talks for East Pakistani autonomy were soon started, however they broke down in March 1971 and West Pakistani troops, which had been moved into East Pakistan during the talks, “were unleashed on the Bengalis, as many as 3 million were killed, and 8 million were driven into India.”838 o This does not meet the requirements for the coding of violence in this project, as the violence was carried out by the military rather than the separatists. o The negotiations that were continuing in the early part of 1971 are an example of institutional action in the narrow timeframe. • “The Awami League set up a government in exile” in Calcutta with the permission of India, who also provided the newly formed guerilla force, the Mukti Bahini, with weapons and safe haven, although they had little impact on the Pakistani army.839 o The establishment of a government in exile is an example of extra-institutional non- violent action in the narrow timeframe. o The deployment of a guerilla force is an example of extra-institutional violent action in the narrow timeframe. • On 4 December 1971, India declared war on Pakistan and overcame the Pakistani army in East Pakistan after two weeks, allowing the creation of the state of Bangladesh.840 • Concerns/notes:

836 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p 36) 837 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p 36) 838 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p 36) 839 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p 36) 840 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p 36)

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o Additional corroboration that Awami League pursued separatist (rather than simply autonomist) policies would increase value of confidence measures for institutional action codings. o Additional information regarding the timing of extra-institutional action (both violent and nonviolent) would increase the value of the associated onfidence measure (ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence).

363 – Baluch (Target: Pakistan; Year: 1958) Extra-institutional action, both violent and nonviolent.

Instl_Narrow (1958-60): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1958-60): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1956-60): No (Confidence: 0) ExtraInstl_Wider (1956-60): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .5

• “Since its founding in 1947, Pakistan has been ruled predominantly by , who have dominated both the administration and the military. Baluchistan has large reserves of gas, concentrated in the Sui area, which supplies factories, businesses, and homes across Pakistan. Many Baluch feel they do not receive a fair share of revenues from these gas fields and worry that their land will be taken over by outsiders.”841 • “In the 1940s, when the British were preparing to hand over authority of their Indian colony, both the Muslim League – the group that supported the creation of Pakistan – and the departing British promised the Baluch an autonomous or quasi-independent status. However, once established the Pakistani military reneged on this commitment and seized control of Kalat in March 1948”.842 • “An abortive rebellion by the khan of Kalat, the most important tribal ruler, was the pretext for a declaration of martial law by the president in October 1958. This was followed by a military takeover by General .”843 • From Minahan: “The province of Baluchistan, Pakistan’s largest in area, was abolished along with the other provinces in 1958 and became part of a unitary Pakistani state. Rejecting Punjabi domination of the new state system, the Khanate of Kalat again declared Baluchistan independent of Pakistan on 20 June 1958, with the support of most of the tribal leaders. Pakistani troops soon overran the rebel state and deported the khan, but he was allowed to return as the spiritual leader of the Baluch nation following a resumption of the Baluch uprising in 1962.”844

841 Beary (2011, p. 199) 842 Beary (2011, p. 201) 843 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 35) 844 Minahan (2002, p. 258)

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• Multiple sources describe 1958 as an armed revolt: o See Hashmi (2015, p. 69): Khan of Kalat arrested in October 1958, which was followed by armed resistance to Pakistani state lasting approximately two years: § “The imprisonment of the Khan sparked another revolt. This time Nauroz Khan the Sardar of Zarakzai tribe led the armed resistance. He presented three demands before the government, (i) Withdrawal of one unit plan (ii) extrication of Khan of Kalat and amnesty for his men (iii) exemption of his area from the land reforms (Axamann, 2008, pp.286-287). Sardar Nauroz and his impulsively organized guerrilla force fought a series of battles. The militants managed to ambushed government escorts and installations. The ninety years old, Nawab Nouroz Khan fought the guerrilla war against the army in Jhalawan and surrounding areas. The struggle lasted for about two years and gave a hard time to the government. Pakistan army responded with more anger by bombing nearby villages when they did not get desired result, negotiations were opted for.”845 • Assuming this is the secessionist rebellion, despite the demands mentioned above falling short of that threshold, this merits the a yes coding for armed/violent mobilization. o Also, see Shah (2016): “Baloch Armed Insurrection of 1958”:846 § “On the Khan’s refusal to meet the President and the Prime Minister to explain his alleged involvement in anti-state activities, the government of Pakistan finally decided to arrest him at the end of September, 1958. (, 1985). […]he Khan was detained in Kalat allegedly on the blame for starting full-scale Baloch insurgency with the help of 80,000 tribesmen. Pakistani armed forces entered on October, 6 in Kalat finding no such reported numbers of insurgents. As a result of the clashes, a number of tribesmen were killed (Axmann, 2008). […] Most Baloch considered army’s attack on Khanate in 1958 as unprovoked and aggressive. There was also strong resentment among tribesmen against authorities’ demand of turning in their weapons at local police station. (Axmann, 2008). The arrest of the Khan also caused a wave of anger to sweep throughout Balochistan.”847 § “Sardar Nauroz Khan Zarakazai… led the major Baloch armed insurrection in support of the Khan. […] The chief demand of Nauroz Khan was release of the Khan and breaking up of one unit. He also urged upon the protection of Baloch customs and traditions (Awan, 1985). He, along with his gathered guerrilla force of 1000 men, went to the Mulla Pass. The army launched bombing on the guerrilla hideouts in mountains.”848 o Results of 1958 revolt:

845 Hashmi (2015, p. 69) 846 Shah (2016, p. 75) 847 Shah (2016, p. 75) 848 Shah (2016, p. 75)

187 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 § “In early 1960s talks were started between the army and resurgent [sic], but reached no conclusion. At last, Nauroz Khan and his men were assured by the Army on the Quran that they were ready for negotiations. When the militants surrendered on the assurance of Sardar Doda Khan Zehri that all their demands had been accepted by the authorities, once again, the army dishonoured its pledge. Nauroz Khan and his insurgents were arrested and tried by a special military court (Janmahmand, 1982, p. 201). His son and eight nephews were hanged in Hyderabad. Nauroz Khan’s death sentence was alleviated to life imprisonment because of his old age (Rehman, 2005, p.4). After this revolt Pakistan Army sat up new garrisons at key points in Balochistan.”849 • Background regarding “no” coding for institutional action: o “Soon after his release in 1955, Abdul Karim again attracted the attention of the authorities by launching a new political party, Ustaman Gal, which had the stated goals of making Pakistan a people's republic, establishing a Balochi province, and preserving the and culture. According to a file compiled by the Special Branch of the Balochistan Secretariat, the party's first meeting was held in and was attended by leading Balochi and Sindhi nationalists, including Gul Khan Nasir, Muhammad Husain Unka, Ghous Bakhsh Bizenjo, G. M. Syed, and Ali Talpur. Only Balochis were actually permitted to join the party, which advo- cated peaceful, constitutional means for attaining its demands. Ustaman Gal leaders went to to organize branches in Balochistan, and there, the report states, Abdul Karim approached prominent sardārs. He also proposed that the KSNP and another Balochi nationalist organization, Dema Rowak Ulus, merge with Ustaman Gal.”850 o To resist One Unit policy, “Balochistan's ethno-nationalists… responded to the new structure by forming a series of political alliances reaching far beyond Balochistan. In 1956, the Ustaman Gal joined the Pakistan National Party (PNP), a coalition of ethno-nationalist and left-leaning parties in West Pakistan. The following year, the PNP joined with the left wing of the East Pakistan-based Awami League to form the National Awami Party (NAP). [Paragraph Break] As a national alliance of parties, the NAP's program was broad and addressed both national and international issues. Of special importance to NAP supporters in West Pakistan was the dissolution of One Unit in favor of four ethnically defined provinces. […]The NAP was to play a pivotal role in Balochi politics for the next twenty years. Key Balochi politicians notably, Ghous Bakhsh Bizenjo, Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri, Sardar Ataullah Mengal, and Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti were members or affiliates of the NAP, as were the leaders of Balochistan's Pushtun nationalist movement.”851

849 Hashmi (2015, p. 70) 850 Titus and Swider (2000, p. 50) 851 Titus and Swider (2000, p. 51)

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§ “Holding a pivotal block of seats, the NAP was able to leverage a vote against One Unit in the West Pakistan Provincial Assembly in 1957.”852 • This may constitute institutional contention in the wider temporal period. However, since NAP’s demands were within the context of the Pakistani national system, this is not being counted as secessionist institutional action. However, the confidence variable for institutional action in the wider temporal window is given a very low value, reflecting potential concerns over this judgement call. • “In January 1958, the khan was reputed to have summoned all leading Balochi sardārs to Karachi to press the government to restore Kalat State. His efforts came to naught, however. The military arrested the khan in October and used his alleged efforts to resurrect Kalat State as a pretext for imposing martial law on the country.”853 o This is used as evidence of extra-institutional nonviolent action in narrow (and wider) temporal window(s), though this coding decision could use additional corroboration/validation. • Concerns/notes: o “Yes” coding for nonviolent extra-institutional action requires additional corroboration to increase value of associated confidence measure (ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence). o Future versions should revisit issue of “no” coding for institutional action in the wider time window.

364 – Pashtuns (Target: Pakistan; Year: 1947) Initially institutional contention followed by extra-institutional contention

Instl_Narrow (1947-49): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1947-49): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1945-49): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1945-49): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: No ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .75

• See, also, Case #363 – Baluch, above (as some Pastuns were in Baluchistan). • “The Pashtun community has been divided between and Pakistan since 1893 when the United Kingdom, the dominant colonial power in the region, drew up the Duran Line that roughly corresponds to the current -Pakistan border.”854

852 Titus and Swider (2000, p. 51) 853 Titus and Swider (2000, p. 52) 854 Beary (2011, pp. 219-220)

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• “The (or Pushtunistan or Pakhtunistan) Movement was espoused by and other Pashtun leaders in the 1940s, but the Muslim League’s appeal to Islamic solidarity led many Pashtuns to support the new state of Pakistan.”855 • “After [World War II], as British India moved toward independence, the major political party, the Frontier Congress (), won widespread support with demands for separate status. The Afghan government proposed that the Pushtuns of the NWFP [(North West Frontier Province)] be allowed to vote on joining Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, or for separate independence. The Frontier Congress in the 1946 elections defeated the Muslim League”.856 o This is an example of institutional action in the wider timeframe. • “The only choices finally offered by the British authorities were attachment to Muslim Pakistan or Hindu-dominated India.”857 • “Pushtun nationalists of the Frontier Congress formed Khuda-i-Khidmatgar (Servants of God), popularly called the ‘Red Shirts,’ which called for a nationalist boycott of the accession referendum and refused to be bound by the result of the vote, which was accession to Muslim Pakistan.”858 o This is an example of extra-institutional action in the wider and narrow timeframes. • “The Red Shirts launched a terrorist campaign against the new Pakistani state and on 2 September 1947 declared the province independent as Pushtunistan, the Land of the Pushtuns.”859 o The source materials do not mention casualties associated with this campaign, and the case does not meet the 25-battledeath threshold to be coded violent in the UCDP conflict dataset. Given this, we code this case “no” for extra-institutional violent action – especially given Red Shirt adherence to nonviolence (discussed below). • “Pakistani troops invaded the breakaway state, provoking rioting in Pushtun cities.”860 • Additional Info on Red Shirts and Associated Organizations: o “To accommodate the majority of the aged and illiterate sympathisers of the Pashtoon cause, in November 1929 another organisation called the Khudai Khidmatgars (Servants of God) was formed. This new organisation quickly became very popular. Both the organisations worked for the promotion of Pashtoon nationalism and eradication of social evils from the society.”861 o “From the beginning, the Khudai Khidmatgar leaders had put great emphasis on discipline. The volunteers were organised and drilled in military fashion. They were also given military ranks, i.e. generals, , captains, etc. Before joining the organisation, the members had to pledge that they would abstain from the use of violence, intoxicants, intrigues, family- and other vices then prevailing in the

855 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 235) 856 Minahan (2002, p. 1539) 857 Minahan (2002, pp. 1539-1540) 858 Minahan (2002, p. 1540) 859 Minahan (2002, p. 1540) 860 Minahan (2002, p. 1540) 861 Shah (2007, p. 95)

190 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 society. […]The most significant feature of the Khudai Khidmatgars was their adoption of non-violence and strict adherence to it. The volunteers were taught not to resort to violence and also not to carry weapons. The emphasis was on forbearance and tolerance. They were told not to retaliate, even if humiliated.”862 o “Ghaffar Khan had developed his particular perception of non-violence since early 1910s. That was the main reasons that he disapproved the armed struggle of the Haji Sahib of Turangzai against the . Ghaffar Khan was convinced that the armed resistance would bring disaster and ruin upon the Pashtoons, who were already facing a lot of miseries as the inhabitants of a politically and strategically sensitive area.”863 § While this is an allusion to armed Pashtun resistance, the timing is not clear from this source, and the target was British control, not Pakistan. Thus, this referenced armed resistance does not impact the coding for this secessionist movement. o “The single most prominent Pushtun nationalist in Balochistan during this time, and indeed in the 20th century, was Abdul Samad Khan . Like those of several Balochi nationalist leaders, Samad Khan's political career spanned the colonial and post-colonial eras. In the lead up to Partition, he and the pro-Congress organization he founded in 1939, Anjuman-i-Watan, were frequently cited in intelligence reports. Samad Khan's followers describe the Anjuman-i-Watan as a national-democratic, anti-imperial, anti-feudal movement that sought the independence of Pushtuns. Samad Khan had close relations with the Red Shirts and their leader, Ghaffar Khan, as well as with the first generation of Balochi nationalists. […] In February 1948, the Baluchistan Muslim League took legal action against him for what it called disruptive propaganda in his weekly newspaper. The following month he was arrested and briefly detained. […]When the army took over the government in 1958, it charged him with treason and imprisoned him for ten years. All told, Samad Khan spent eighteen of Pakistan's first twenty-one years in prison. The Anjuman-i-Watan remained active while he was locked up. In 1949, the party was reported to be supporting Afghanistan's propaganda campaign for Pushtunistan and backing Balochistan's sardārs in their fight with the Muslim League over the composition of the Advisory Council.”864 • Additional info on non-Red Shirt Pashtun movements o “The first Pashtun challenge (1949–1963)”865 § “Separatist and autonomist Pashtun leaders with links to , such as Abdus Samad Khan Achakzai, were suppressed. One of the most popular, and disruptive Pakhtun leaders, the of Ipi (alias Mirza Ali Khan, leader of the Pashtun, elected by the Afghan Jirgah), resisted British attempts at

862 Shah (2007, p. 96) 863 Shah (2007, p. 97) 864 Titus and Swider (2000, p. 52) 865 Schofield (2011, p. 41)

191 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 subdual throughout the 1930s and 1940s in , and then evaded the into the 1950s, to die of natural causes in 1960.”866 • Concerns/notes: o “No” coding for violent extra-institutional action requires additional corroboration to increase value of associated confidence measure (ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence).

365 – Chittagong (Target: Bangladesh; Year: 1975) Institutional attempts to gain autonomy fail, alongside extra-institutional struggle against Bengali settlers. This gave way to a demand for independence and military conflict with the Bengali state, and nonviolent extra-institutional mobilization.

Instl_Narrow (1975-77): No (Confidence: .9) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1975-77): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1973-77): No (Confidence: .75) ExtraInstl_Wider (1973-77): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .75

• “In 1972, representatives of the Chakma king presented the Bangladeshi government with a petition for the autonomy of the Hill Tracts, but the petition went unanswered.”867 o This is arguably institutional action, but because it was aimed at securing autonomy, not independence, not sufficient to code “yes” for institutional methods. o Extra-Institutional: § “The Jummas organized guerrilla groups to fight the invasion of government-sponsored colonists in the early 1970s. In 1975 tribal leaders demanded secession and the establishment of a sovereign state. In 1977 the militants of the Shanti Bahini, the Peace Force, attacked government troops in the region. Government attempts to negotiate a solution having failed, the military won broad latitude to combat the rebellion.”868 • “Shanti Bahini an armed unit of the Parbatya Chattagram Jana-Samhati Samiti. Shanti Bahini was declared to have been formed on 7 January 1973.”869

866 Schofield (2011, p. 42) 867 Minahan (2002, p. 848) 868 Minahan (2002, p. 848) 869 "Shanti Bahini," Banglapedia

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• “The sufferings of the hill people, consequent upon the implementation of the Kaptai Hydro- electric Project in 1960, created resentment among the Chakmas, who were the worst sufferers of the project. This resentment continued for a long time, and ultimately gave rise to the formation of a political party of their own to safeguard their interests. This party, styled as parbatya chattagram jana-samhoti samiti, was founded on 15 February 1972. But the immediate cause of the establishment of this party appears to have been the emergence of Bangladesh on the basis of Bangali nationalism. The hilly people called themselves Jumya and not Bangalis. They demanded autonomy and placed before the awami league government the following 4-point demands in this regard: (i) declare as an autonomous zone with an Assembly of its own; (ii) incorporate provisions in the Constitution of Bangladesh similar to the Chittagong Hill Tracts Ordinance of 1900 AD; (iii) recognise and maintain the offices of the tribal kings, and (iv) incorporate provisions in the Constitution for safeguarding the autonomy of the Chittagong Hill Tracts.”870 • “On 24 April 1972, Manabendra Narayan Larma presented his four-point manifesto including demand for autonomy of the CHT to the committee engaged in drafting the constitution of Bangladesh. The four-point demands were: (i) declare Chittagong Hill Tracts as an autonomous zone with an Assembly of its own; (ii) inclusion of statute similar to the Regulation of 1900 in the Constitution; (iii) recognise and maintain the offices of the tribal kings; and (iv) incorporate provisions in the Constitution for safeguarding the autonomy of the Chittagong Hill Tracts.”871 • “Although Shanti Bahini was formed in 1973, it did not start any military activities during the early period of Bangladesh. It started its military operations in the Hill Tracts from 1976. Like many other guerilla organisations Jana-Samhati Samiti developed a complete political framework.”872 • “Bangladesh is one of the most ethnically homogeneous nations in the world as 98 percent of its population is made up of Bengali-speaking Muslims. However, the Chittagong Hill Tracts are inhabited by tribal peoples of Mongoloid appearance who speak Tibeto-Burman languages.”873 • “A guerilla insurgency by the Shanti Bahini (Peace Force) has been going in since 1975.”874 o This is an example of extra-institutional violent action in the narrow timeframe. • “Paradoxically, the demand of the Hill peoples for protection of their lands, lives and cultural identities was perceived by the government as secessionist and deemed to be a threat to national security. The Paharis were treated as a 'rebel' community and punitive military raids against their settlements in the CHT were carried out almost immediately afterwards by the Bangladeshi security forces... In response, a political party was set up on 7 March 1972 to represent the interests of the Hill peoples under the leadership of Manabendra Narayan Larma, named Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti... The PCJS propogated 'Jumma' nationalism and a collective 'Jumma' identity, based on the idea that all

870 "Shanti Bahini," Banglapedia 871 "Parbatya Chattagram Jana-Samhoti Samiti," Banglapedia 872 "Parbatya Chattagram Jana-Samhoti Samiti," Banglapedia 873 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 68) 874 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 68)

193 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 the various Pahari groups shared the tradition of jum (swidden) cultivation in common. Another crucial step was the formation of a military wing of the PCJSS in early 1973, known as the Shanti Bahini (SB), in order to resist the Bangladeshi state and its security forces[.]”875 • August 1975 coup, then after a number of months, General Zia took control. PCJSS outlawed.876 “This constituted the turning point when the Pahari leadership lost all hope of reaching political accommodation within the constitutional framework of Bangladesh, triggering a move towards armed insurgency.”877 • Institutional efforts appeared to be attempts to gain greater autonomy/protection, but not to pursue seccesion – though the Bangladeshi government perceived it as a secessionist movement: o “Early in 1972, leaders of the Hill peoples decided to approach the new government of Bangladesh to seek protection from further assault on their lives and property by vengeful Bengalis and obtain constitutional recognition of their rights as ethnic minority groups. Disturbingly, however, the Pahari delegations failed to get any assurances from the government regarding protection from such acts of misconstrued ‘revenge,’ as well as their demand to be recognized as groups with distinct cultural identities. […] Paradoxically, the demand of the Hill peoples for protection of their lands, lives and cultural identities was perceived by the government as secessionist and deemed to be a threat to national security.”878 • “Given the absence of any meaningful citizenship status and relationship with the state, the next step in the process was for the Hill peoples to transform themselves from suspected to actual insurgents, challenging and contesting the authority of the Bengali-dominated state Indeed, the PCJSS and the Shanti Bahini set up a parallel government in the areas under their control, displacing the Bengali administration and imposing governance through their own forces and cadres, inclusive of collecting taxes and resolving disputes[.]”879 o This parallel institution building constitutes nonviolent extra-institutional action. In discussing this, Adnan (2008) appears to put these actions in the narrow time window, at a minimum – resulting in a yes coding for extra-institutional nonviolent action in both this and the wider temporal period. § Context on timing: “Subsequently, when the Bangladeshi state realized that violent brutalization was not succeeding in crushing the insurgency, it switched to the softer strategy of cooption, attempting to 'pacify' the alienated Pahari community in order to get them to return to being loyal citizens rather than rebels. In continuation of this modified counter- insurgency strategy, the Peace Accord incorporated offers of patronage aimed at giving the Hill peoples a stake in the existing social order.”880

875 Adnan (2008, p. 32) 876 Adnan (2008, pp. 32-3) 877 Adnan (2008, p. 33) 878 Adnan (2008, pp. 31-2) 879 Adnan (2008, p. 41) 880 Adnan (2008, p. 41)

194 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019

• “The regime under General Zia responded to these Shanti Bahini attacks by launching full-scale counter-insurgency operations from late 1976.”881 • “While the counter-insurgency operations by the security forces failed to crush the resistance of the Hill peoples, the mounting costs of maintaining a large body of troops in the CHT became prohibitively expensive. considerations led to a significant shift towards a 'softer' strategy of co-opting the Hill peoples into networks of patronage and privilege. This policy change was initiated by General Ershad, who captured power in 1982, following the assassination of President Zia in 1981. In October 1983, the Ershad regime declared its willingness to suspend further transmigration of Bengali settlers to the CHT and initiate direct dialogu with the PCJSS, while granting amnesty to Pahari rebels”882 • Concerns/notes: o “Yes” coding for extra-institutional nonviolent action could use additional corroboration regarding the timing, to increase value of ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence measure. o Although there were institutional efforts in the years leading up to, and potentially including, 1975, these seemed aimed at securing autonomy and protection, rather than secession – and thus institutional action is coded “no” in both timeframes. Additional verification of this coding decision with better sourcing would increase associated confidence variables.

366 – Arakanese I (Target: Burma; Year: 1948) Mostly/ entirely extra-institutional contention, initially non-violent and then with violence

Instl_Narrow (1948-50): No (Confidence: .75) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1948-50): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1946-50): No (Confidence: .75) ExtraInstl_Wider (1946-50): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .75

• “The population of the [Arakan] region is divided between the Muslim Rohingya and the Buddhist Rakhine, groups that are bitterly hostile to one another.”883

881 Adnan (2008, p. 33) 882 Adnan (2008, pp. 34-5) 883 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 27)

195 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019

• Rohinga inhabit Arakan region884 • “Fearing dominance by the Buddhist Burman majority, in 1946 the North Arakan Muslim League called for the Muslim-majority areas to be included in East Pakistan (later Bangladesh).”885 o This is an example of extra-institutional non-violent action in the wider timeframe. • “In 1947 the Mujahid Rebellion broke out in northern Arakan. The rebellion, led by the North Arakan Muslim League, failed in its bid to join Muslim northern Arakan to newly independent Muslim Pakistan. A negotiated compromise, autonomy for all the Arakanese within a Burmese federation, was abrogated soon after Burmese independence in 1948.”886 o This is an example of violent extra-institutional action in the wider timeframe. • “Immediately following Burmese independence in 1948, the mujahidin rebels set up an Islamic republic in Northern Arakan while the Buddhists, organized into the Arakan Independence League, also demanded independence. Both revolts were crushed”.887 o This is an example of extra-institutional action, violent and non-violent, in the narrow timeframe. • “Neither side was willing to surrender weapons at the end of the war (Smith, 1994). Instead, a Muslim group calling themselves ‘Mujahids’ launched a separatist rebellion in 1946, two years before independence, then in April 1947, after the Aung San-Attlee Agreement had been signed granting Independence (but still nine months before it came into effect) a Rakhine nationalist rebellion seeking an independent Arakan began in concert with the ‘red flag’ Communist Party of Burma, the first of multiple major rebellions against the government (Smith, 2007a; Than & Thuzar, 2012). Thus, before independence both Rohingya and Rakhine separatist armies had rebelled in Arakan, both fighting for independence from the central government for competing territorial claims, the Rohingya fighting for north Arakan and the Rakhine nationalists fighting for the whole of Arakan, in addition to the multiple Rakhine communist groups. Serious instability continued until 1954, and each army had significant sympathy from both Muslim and Rakhine communities… The main Mujahedeen rebellion was militarily defeated in 1954, and the Rakhine nationalists were also significantly weakened during the 1950s. Nonetheless, a plethora of smaller armed separatist groups continued to emerge on both sides until insurgent action in Rakhine State virtually collapsed in the mid- 1990s, in the face of sustained government operations. The military has conducted at least 13 major armed operations against the Rohingyas alone since 1948 (Selth, 2004). In the face of defeat some Rakhine forces relocated to join Kachin and Karen rebel groups, while the remaining Rakhine and Rohingya forces moved across the Bangladeshi border (Smith, 2007b). Since 2005 the Bangladesh authorities have also actively sought to contain both Muslim and Rakhine cross-border insurgency, resulting in virtually no rebel activity in Rakhine State for some years.”888

884 Lintner (2003, p. 180) 885 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 27) 886 Minahan (2002, pp. 170-71) 887 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 27) 888 Ware (2015, p. 6)

196 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019

• Concerns/notes: o “Yes” codings for both violent and nonviolent extra-institutional action could use additional corroboration and better sourcing in order to increase value of ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence measure.

367 – Arakanese II (Target: Burma; Year: 1980) Mostly/ entirely extra-institutional contention with violence

Instl_Narrow (1980-82): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1980-82): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1978-82): No (Confidence: .75) ExtraInstl_Wider (1978-82): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .5

• “The formation of the Arakan Liberation Front (ALF) in 1974 marked a major escalation of the sporadic Arakanese rebellion against Burman domination.”889 • “[T]he ALF launched a coordinated military campaign” but when their commander died in battle in 1977, approximately 200,000 rebels and supporters fled to Bangladesh.890 • “In 1979 the majority returned to their homes, but the Burmese military government refused to accept some 50,000 known Arakanese separatists.”891 • “In 1982 Burma’s ethnocentric military rulers, following the announcement of the law that only Buddhists were eligible for citizenship, declared Arakan’s Muslim majority a stateless people, classifying them illegal immigrants from Bengal, now independent Balgladesh.”892 o The period covered is one characterized by continuing civil war, therefore is an example of extra-institutional action with the presence of violence. • “The main Mujahedeen rebellion was militarily defeated in 1954, and the Rakhine nationalists were also significantly weakened during the 1950s. Nonetheless, a plethora of smaller armed separatist groups continued to emerge on both sides until insurgent action in Rakhine State virtually collapsed in the mid-1990s, in the face of sustained government operations. The military has conducted at least 13 major armed operations against the Rohingyas alone since 1948 (Selth, 2004). In the face of defeat some Rakhine forces relocated to join Kachin and Karen rebel groups, while the remaining Rakhine and Rohingya forces moved across the Bangladeshi border (Smith, 2007b). Since 2005 the Bangladesh authorities have also actively sought to contain both Muslim and Rakhine cross-border insurgency, resulting in virtually no rebel activity in Rakhine State for some years. [Paragraph Break] By the 2008, the remaining Rakhine nationalist groups were the Arakan Liberation Army (ALA—aligned with the Arakan Liberation Party) and the Arakan Army

889 Minahan (2002, p. 171) 890 Minahan (2002, p. 171) 891 Minahan (2002, p. 171) 892 Minahan (2002, p. 171)

197 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 (AA—aligned with the National United Party of Arakan) (Smith, 1999; South, 2008). The Rakhine nationalist Arakan Liberation Army fought from 1968 until signing a ceasefire with the government in 2012. They still maintain 4 military camps with headquarters on the Indian border. The Arakan Army remain a combatant group, with troops currently fighting in Kachin State (BNI, 2014). Both Rakhine armies joined the Arakan National Council in 2004, which espouses ‘self-determination for the multi-ethnic Rakhine population’ and ‘peaceful co-existence’ (BNI, 2014), and have thus now changed much of their written documentation to reflect this more inclusive idea of Rakhine autonomy. However, the Arakan Liberation Army were implicated in the coordinated October 2012 ‘communal’ violence (ICG, 2013), suggesting they have not all left ethno-nationalist ideas behind. ”893 • Concerns/notes: o Nonviolent extra-institutional action requires additional corroboration to increase value of ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence measure.

368 – Kachin I (Target: Burma; Year: 1949) Mostly/ entirely extra-institutional violent contention

Instl_Narrow (1949-51): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1949-51): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1947-51): No (Confidence: .5) ExtraInstl_Wider (1947-51): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .75

• “The British allowed the Kachins to retain their own army and administration up to World War II” but immediately after the conclusion of the war, not convinced of the viability of the smaller regions to be independent states, “the British urged the creation of a Burmese federation.”894 • “After long negotiations the Kachins agreed to join the federation, but with a guaranteed right of secession under British protection after 10 years if they felt their interests were not being served.”895 • “The Burmese government, soon after independence in January 1948, abrogated the autonomy agreement and incorporated large tracts of autonomous Kachinland into neighbouring provinces. The government then created a truncated Kachin State with only semi-autonomous status, leaving the majority of the Kachin population outside the state’s borders.”896

893 Ware (2015, p. 6) 894 Minahan (2002, p. 872) 895 Minahan (2002, p. 872) 896 Minahan (2002, p. 873)

198 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019

• “The outraged Kachins rebelled and overran much of northern Burma. In March 1949 the victorious Kachins captured Burma’s second city, Mandalay”.897 o This is an example of extra-institutional violent action in the wider and narrow timeframes. • “The Burmese army finally counterattacked and drove the Kachins back to their mountains in 1950.”898 • Concerns/notes: o “No” coding for nonviolent extra-institutional action requires additional corroboration to increase value of ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence measure.

369 – Kachin II (Target: Burma; Year: 1961) Mostly/ entirely extra-institutional contention with and without violence

Instl_Narrow (1961-63): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1961-63): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1959-63): No (Confidence: .75) ExtraInstl_Wider (1959-63): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .75

• “Ten years after Burmese independence [in 1948], the Kachins formally notified the government of their intention to secede under the 1948 independence agreement. The government retaliated with arrests and military occupation.”899 o This is arguably institutional action, but if it took place in 1958, this was immediately before the wider temporal window began. Additional confirmation of the date would allow for an increase in the confidence variable for institutional action in the wider timeframe. • “The establishment of Buddhism as the official state religion of Burma in 1961 was resented by the Kachin, a predominantly Christian group, as was the ceding of three Kachin villages to China in a boundary agreement between China and Burma in 1960.”900 • The Kachin Independence Organization (KIO)was established in 1961 and the “Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the military wing of the KIO, contained many veterans of the ”.901 o The establishment of the KIO is an apparent example of extra-institutional non- violent action in the narrow timeframe. While this organization created parallel

897 Minahan (2002, p. 873) 898 Minahan (2002, p. 873) 899 Minahan (2002, p. 873) 900 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 148) 901 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 148)

199 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 governing institutions (see discussion below), additional corroboration of timing is necessary to ensure it took place within the relevant time frame. • There was consistent armed resistance by the Kachin throughout the period under consideration, some of which was funded by the Chinese communists and others by the opium trade.902 o This is an example of extra-institutional violent action in the wider and narrow timeframes. • “[T]he imposition of military rule in 1962 increasingly alienated the Kachins.”903 • “[T]he Burmese military launched a widespread offensive in 1962 … [but] [t]he government soldiers, badly mauled, retreated to a few fortified military garrisons, leaving the Kachins in effective control of the countryside.”904 o This is an example of extra-institutional violent action in the narrow timeframe. • “After heavy fighting during the 1966-1971 period, the Burmese army was forced to withdraw from the Kachin region.”905 • “KIA, the military wing of the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), was founded in 1961 to gain independence. It is the second largest and best-organized armed group in Myanmar. As the armed wing of the KIO, the KIA effectively controlled Kachin State during the 1960s-1990s. Until 1994, the cease-fire with the Myanmar government was under the Panglong Agreement of 1947. Initially, the prime objective of the KIA was to establish an ‘Independent Kachin State’ separated from Myanmar. However, after signing the [1994] cease-fire agreement with the government run by the military junta, it has since renounced its goal of independence and seeks ‘autonomy within the federal union of Myanmar’, instead. The ceasefire with the government troops allowed the organisation to control a large swathe in northern Myanmar, making them the de facto rulers.”906 • “The KIO High-Command, under a strong centralized command, commands the leadership of KIA. The KIO maintains an extra-legal bureaucracy in the Kachin State and has exclusive control over pockets of territory along the Chinese border. Within that territory, the KIO maintains a police department, fire brigade, educational system, immigration department and other institutions of self-government. […] The KIO collects taxes at border crossings with China and engages in various business deals throughout Kachin State, often related to the exploitation of natural resources such as jade, timber and gold. Some of the KIOís senior leadership is also allegedly involved in corruption owing to their business dealings with the military junta. ”907 o While this 2014 report clearly references the existence of parallel institutions, additional corroboration is necessary regarding their existence/operation during the relevant temporal windows.

902 Minahan (2002, p. 873) 903 Minahan (2002, p. 873) 904 Minahan (2002, p. 873) 905 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 148) 906 Tripathi (2014, pp. 137-38) 907 Tripathi (2014, p. 138)

200 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 370 – Kachin III (Target: Burma; Year: 2011) Mostly/ entirely extra-institutional action with and without violence

Instl_Narrow (2011-13): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (2011-13): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (2009-13): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (2009-13): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: 1

• “[T]he fighting [between the Kachins and the Myanmar state] continued more or less without cessation until 1994, when an agreement to retain arms but refrain from violence was eventually signed. In June 2011, this ceasefire in turn collapsed after being in place for seventeen years and the conflict has since then remained stubbornly impervious to resolution.”908 o This is an example of extra-institutional violent action in the narrow timeframe. • Sadan refers to “‘ceasefire capitalism’” as a possible contributing factor to the breakdown in the ceasefire in 2011. In response to foreign exploitation of resources newly available due to the ceasefire, a political resistance developed in an increasing number of (especially younger) urban Kachin not typically involved in the nationalist movement and highlighting the “limitations of engaging in such [ceasefire] agreements unless the political terrain is made more stable.”909 • 2013 saw an attempt by the Kachin leadership, under the auspices of the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), to “prevent too great a divide being created between current ceasefire and nonceasefire groups.”910 o That there were still groups abiding by the ceasefire implies that there was also extra-institutional action which was not violent in the narrow timeframe. • Under the heading “Current Situation”, Tripathi 2014 writes: “The KIO ‘provide power, roads and schools funded by taxes on the brisk trade from China as well as the jade and gold mines and teak.’ In 2002, the KIO embarked on an ambitious opium eradication program that has drawn recognition from international observers. It also started rearming itself after rejecting the government’s offer to integrate itself with the BGF [Border Guard Forces] in 2009, after the 1994 ceasefire agreement. Here, it is worth mentioning that it enjoys full membership of the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC), an umbrella organisation of all the major NSAIGs of Myanmar formed in 16 February 2011, as mentioned earlier in this article.”911

908 Sadan (2015, p. 246) 909 See Sadan (2015, pp. 249-51) for quotes and relevant discussion. 910 Sadan (2015, p. 252) 911 Tripathi (2014, p. 139)

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• “The KIO High-Command, under a strong centralized command, commands the leadership of KIA. The KIO maintains an extra-legal bureaucracy in the Kachin State and has exclusive control over pockets of territory along the Chinese border. Within that territory, the KIO maintains a police department, fire brigade, educational system, immigration department and other institutions of self-government. […] The KIO collects taxes at border crossings with China and engages in various business deals throughout Kachin State, often related to the exploitation of natural resources such as jade, timber and gold. Some of the KIO’s senior leadership is also allegedly involved in corruption owing to their business dealings with the military junta. ”912 • “Since 2011, there has been near continuous armed conflict between the government and the armed wing of the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), the Kachin Independence Army (KIA). The most dramatic changes to the governance environment have been two fold. First, there has been the displacement of approximately 90,000 people from over 100 villages, about 70,000 of whom fled deeper into KIO territory. Second, there has been a marked decrease in areas firmly controlled by the organization, as the has moved dozens more infantry and support battalions into the area. Nonetheless, the KIO administration system has persisted in many parts of its old territories, particularly in its stronghold in southeastern Kachin, but also elsewhere in the state such as in Hpakan and Tanai Townships.”913 o This is evidence of both parallel institutions and violent extra-institutional conflict in the narrow (and hence also wider) temporal window(s).

371 – Karenni (Target: Burma; Year: 1949) Mostly/ entirely extra-institutional violent contention

Instl_Narrow (1949-51): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1949-51): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1947-51): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1947-51): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .5

• “An agreement signed on 21 June 1875 recognized Karenni independence under British protection and provided for full independence should the protectorate agreement be terminated.”914 • “…the Karenni States remained nominally independent until 1948.”915

912 Tripathi (2014, p. 138) 913 Jolliffe (2015, p. 74) 914 Minahan (2002, p. 936) 915 Jolliffe (2015, p. 10)

202 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019

• At the end of World War II when Britain was starting the process of Burmese independence, “[t]he Karennis, expecting the British to honor the terms of the 1875 agreement, which had never been nullified, rejected the Burmese federation and notified the British of their wish for separate independence.”916 o There is no indication of the exact date of this notification in the source text and, in any event, the notification was to Britain and not to the target state, Burma. • “The British authorities, believing that the Karenni region was too small for separate independence, refused to honor the agreement. Their refusal and the insistence that the Karennis join Burma provoked a Karenni uprising that spread following Burmese independence in 1948.”917 • “The Burmese government finally crushed the Karenni rebellion in 1950.”918 o While there is no reference in the source text as to the extent of the violence, and the correlates of war do not list this as a violent episode, the strength of the language used provides enough assurance to classify this as extra-institutional violent action in both the wider and narrow timeframes. • Concerns/notes: o “No” coding for nonviolent extra-institutional action requires additional corroboration and better sourcing to increase value of ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence measure.

372 – Karens (Target: Burma; Year: 1949) Mostly/ entirely extra-institutional contention

Instl_Narrow (1949-51): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1949-51): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1947-51): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1947-51): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .75

• “In 1941 the Burmans, promised independence [by Japan], supported the Japanese invasion. To counter the Japanese advance, the British ensured Karen loyalty with a parallel promise of of eventual Karen independence. Less dependent on Karen support after the Burmans switched sides in 1944, the British changed tactics and began to support Burman demands for the inclusion of the non-Burman areas in an independent state.”919 • “The Union of Burma’s first president, Aung San, died at the hands of opponents soon after independence in 1948. Burma’s new leaders rejected the independence constitution and

916 Minahan (2002, p. 936) 917 Minahan (2002, p. 936) 918 Minahan (2002, p. 936) 919 Minahan (2002, p. 942)

203 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 refused to grant Karen autonomy. Their appeals to the British government ignored, the Karen nationalists led a widespread revolt. Quickly overrunning most of south-central Burma, the rebel army laid siege to the Burmese capital, Rangoon.”920 o This is an example of extra-institutional violent action in the wider timeframe. • After the murder of the Karen leadership in Rangoon on their way to negotiate a settlement, the new Karen leadership “declared the independence of the Republic of Kawthoolei on 14 June 1949.”921 o The declaration is an example of extra-institutional non-violent action in the narrow timeframe. • “A number of nationalist organizations emerged during the decades of insurgency after 1949 … [and] [a]ntigovernment Karen groups remained active, particularly in the mountainous regions, throughout the period from 1948 to the late 1980s.”922 o The continued insurgency is an example of extra-institutional violent action in the narrow timeframe. • “The KNU (Karen National Union) is a political organisation with an armed wing called the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) that represents the , an ethnic minority group of Myanmar. It operates in mountainous eastern Myanmar, and has underground networks in other areas of Myanmar where Karen people live as a minority group. It is also one of the oldest NSAIG of Myanmar formed in as early as 1949 itself with an objective of setting up an ‘independent Karen State’. However, since 1976, it has called for a federal system rather than an independent Karen State.”923 o KNU appears to renounce goal of separate Karen state in 1976; prior to that, definitely a secessionist organization. • Concerns/notes: o “Yes” coding for nonviolent extra-institutional action requires additional corroboration to increase value of ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence measure.

373 – Mons (Target: Burma; Year: 1949) Mostly/ entirely extra-institutional violent contention

Instl_Narrow (1949-51): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1949-51): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1947-51): No (Confidence: .5) ExtraInstl_Wider (1947-51): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .75

920 Minahan (2002, p. 942) 921 Minahan (2002, p. 943) 922 Minahan (2002, p. 943) 923 Tripathi (2014, p. 139)

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• “The Mon National Association was formed in 1935 among the Mon minority living in Rangoon, the Burmese capital. By the outbreak of World War II, national sentiment had spread to most Mon areas in Burma and Thailand.”924 • The Mons proceeded to try to secure their own independence (separate from Burma) from the British but were unsuccessful, in much the same way as other groups had been.925 o “Having been loyal to the British during World War II, the Mon petitioned for a separate state as Burma moved to independence after the war. Ignored by the British in their haste to leave Burma, the Mons unsuccessfully sought negotiations with the Burman authorities.”926 § Representations to the British are not coded as the target for this case is Burma, and they were not part of Burma until Burmese independence in 1948. • “In 1948 Mon nationalists formed the Mon National Defense Organization and allied themselves to insurgent Karens despite overlapping territorial claims… Mon troops occupied Moulmein and Thaton as Burma collapsed into civil war.”927 o This is an example of extra-institutional violent action in the wider and narrow timeframes. • “Fighting during the 1950s sent a wave of Mon refugees into Thailand”.928 • Discussion of the New State Mon Party (NSMP; formed after relevant temporal window), and its preceding organization, the MPF: o The NSMP “…was formed in July 1958 under the leadership of NaiShweKyin alias NaiBaLwin, after the ’s Front (MPF) surrendered to the central government. The MPF had launched an armed rebellion since 1948 and surrendered after the government promised an autonomous Mon state. Few MPF dissidents were not convinced and went on to form the NMSP. The Mon National Liberation Army (MNLA), NMSP’s military wing, formally founded as its armed wing on 29 August 1971, is one of the smaller armed ethnic minority groups in the country with about 1000 cadres based in the hills of Southeast Myanmar.”929 § This is evidence of violent/armed action. • “In 1947, the Mon sought self-determination from the yet to be established Union of Burma. Burmese Prime Minister U Nu refused, saying that no separate national rights for the Mon should be contemplated. The Burmese army moved into areas claimed by the Mon nationalists and imposed rule by force, which resulted in armed conflicts with the rebels. Mon separatists formed the Mon Peoples Front, which was later superseded by the New Mon State Party (NMSP) in 1962. Since 1949, the eastern hills of the state, as well as portions of Thaninthaya Division, have been under control of the NMSP and its military arm, the Mon National Liberation Front (MNLF). In addition to fighting the central government,

924 Minahan (2002, p. 1285) 925 Minahan (2002, p. 1285) 926 Minahan (2002, p. 1285) 927 Minahan (2002, p. 1285) 928 Minahan (2002, p. 1285) 929 Tripathi (2014, pp. 141-42)

205 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 the MNLF has fought the Karen people over control of lucrative border crossings into Thailand.”930 o Presumably this is referring to control first of the MPF, then the NMSP, given the chronology laid out in Tripathi 2014. • “By 1950, two communist factions and a number of ethnic insurgent groups, including the Mon People’s Front (MPF), had taken up arms against the government and Tatmadaw, and established ‘liberated zones’, from where they hoped to achieve independence, or at least substantial autonomy from Rangoon (the communists of course, sought to overthrow the U Nu regime). Like several other insurgent organisations however, the MPF agreed a ceasefire with Rangoon 1958, and subsequently attempted to pursue its goals from with ‘the legal fold’. However, one young MPF cadre, Nai Shwe Kyin, together with a small group of followers, rejected the agreement and, the day after the MPF ‘surrender’, established the New Mon State Party (NMSP), which was to be in the vanguard of the armed struggle for Monland for the next forty years. According to its founder, the NMSP aimed ‘to establish an independent sovereign state unless the Burmese government is willing to permit a confederation of free nationalities exercising the full right of self-determination inclusive of right of secession.’"931 o To what extent did parallel institutions exist in these “ ‘liberated zones’”? Corroborating a lack of parallel institutions would heighten confidence of “no” coding for extra-institutional nonviolent action in the narrow temporal window. • “A successor to the All Ramanya Mon Association (ARMA) and other cultural and youth groups of the 1930 and ‘40s, the MLCC [Mon Literature and Culture Committee] pioneered Mon training in the 1950s, seeking to expand and consolidate the Mon language skills, and thereby the cultural and historical awareness, of the Mon community in Burma.”932 • Number of nationalist Mon organizations, though extent of separatist vs. autonomist preferences is not necessarily clear. At least one major nationalist group was not separatist when initially formed in the mid-1940s: o “The first explicitly political Mon nationalist organization was the United Mon Association (UMA), established in November 1945 by Nai Po Cho, a Moulmein-born Christian and English lecturer at Rangoon University (South 2005: ch.7). Among the UMA’s lasting contributions to the Mon nationalist movement was the adoption of Mon National Day (a lunar event, occurring each February), celebrating the legendary foundation of Hongsawatoi. The Mon nationalist movement had not yet articulated a militant separatist agenda. Campaigning for official recognition of the Mon language and the establishment of a Mon polity within the emerging Union of Burma, the UMA positioned itself as a distinctly Mon contribution to the struggle for Burma’s independence.”933 o “By early 1947 many Mon politicians had become alienated from Aung San and the AFPFL, and their lack of support for ethnic minority aspirations. Radical Mon

930 Tripathi (2014, p. 142) 931 South (2007a, p. 17) 932 South (2007a, p. 25) 933 South (2008, p. 7)

206 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 leaders increasingly preferred to throw in their lot with the ambitious Karen leadership… Elections to a Constituent Assembly were held in April 1947, but these were boycotted by the majority (but not all: South 2008) of Karen and Mon nationalist parties. In August the Mon Freedom League (MFL) was established, and declared that ‘the Mons now demand their full birth-right for creation of a Mon State exercising full right of self-determination.’ The bulk of the Mon nationalist movement was now demanding full independence from Burma (Nai Shwe Kyin 1999). However, several prominent Mon to politicians continued work with the AFPFL, hoping to promote Mon rights within the mainstream of Union politics (South 2005: ch.7). [Paragraph Break] In late 1947 the MFL and the recently-formed Mon Affairs Organisation (MAO) were superseded by a new group, the Mon United Front (MUF) - which Nai Po Cho’s UMA refused to join, accusing it of separatist and militant tendencies. Soon afterwards, the first Mon armed organization of modern times was established - the Mon National Defence Organisation (MNDO). This militia was modelled on the Karen National Defence Organisation (KNDO), which had been founded the previous year, as the armed wing of the Karen National Union (KNU - established in February 1947). [Paragraph Break] In July-August 1948 the MUF- MNDO raided the village of Zarthabyin, and later briefly occupied Moulmein and Thaton towns, together with the KNU. Although the siege of Moulmein lasted only a week (ibid.), this marked the beginning of a Mon separatist insurgency, which got fully underway the following year, after the KNU went underground in January 1949.”934 § Participation in Constituent Assembly by some Mon nationalist groups may have constituted institutional action – but they would have to have been separatist (as opposed to seeking greater autonomy). Additional corroboration is necessary to code “yes” for institutional contention, though this concern means “no” coding for institutional action in the wider time has correspondingly reduced confidence. o “By the end of 1950, the MNDO was dissolved. Its army was later consolidated under the Mon People‘s Front (MPF) which was formed in 1952. The MPF surrendered their arms to the government in 1958 in exchange for peace and a political solution leading to the creation of Mon State[.]”935 § “In late 1951, Nai Ba Lwin and colleagues re-organised the Mon armed groups as the Mon People’s Solidarity Group (MPSG), forerunner of the Mon People's Front (MPF). Nai Ngwe Thein (later Nai Aung Htun) was chairman of the new group, with Nai Tun Thein as General Secretary. (1951 was also the year that Nai Ba Lwin adopted the nom de guerre ‘Nai Shwe Kyin’, in of the Shwegyin Buddhist sect, renowned for its strictness and discipline.) [Paragraph Break] Although it continued to be handicapped by factionalism, the MPF was the most powerful Mon insurgent force of the

934 South (2008, p. 8) 935 Mon (2010, p. 159)

207 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 ‘parliamentary era’ (1948-58). It was also the first organisation to explicitly demand the creation of an ‘Independent Sovereign State ... of Monland.’”936 § “The Mon took up arms under the leadership of the Mon People's Front (MPF) right after Burma's independence along with the Karen to fight against the Burman-dominated government. In August 1948, Mon and Karen leaders signed an agreement to fight together for the attainment of the independent Mon and Karen States.”937 • “After Burma gained independence in January 1948, Shan, Kachin, and Karenni ethnic groups were granted autonomous states in their respective territories. Chin was granted a special region status. But Mon, Arakanese and Karen were not granted autonomous states in their regions. In response, thousands of Mon demonstrated in Moulmein and demanded the government to create the Mon State with full rights of self-determination. The government crushed the demonstration and arrested Mon leaders (NMSP, 1993, p. 22). The Mon started rebellions against the government right after Burma gained her independence from the British in 1948 (South, 2003, p. 104-105). Part of their struggle was to restore Mon homeland and create an autonomous Mon State in lower Burma.”938 o This is extra-institutional nonviolent action in the wider timeframe. • As the Mon rebellion gained momentum in early 1950s, the government granted some culture and literature rights to the Mon and allowed the teaching Mon literature and language in government‘s schools (NMSP, 1993, pp. 54-57). The government also held peace talks with the Mon People‘s Front (MPF) to discuss the Mon issues, especially for creating an autonomous Mon State in lower Burma (NMSP, 1993, pp. 54-57).”939 • Concerns/notes: o “No” coding for nonviolent extra-institutional action in the narrow time window requires additional corroboration to increase value of ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence measure. Among other things, confirm (or disconfirm) that there were not parallel governing institutions set up by Mon separatist during the relevant period.

374 – Shans (Target: Burma; Year: 1958) Mixed extra-institutional violent and non-violent action

Instl_Narrow (1958-60): No (Confidence: .75) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1958-60): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1956-60): No (Confidence: .75) ExtraInstl_Wider (1956-60): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: 1

936 South (2008, pp. 8-9) 937 Mon (2010, p. 53) 938 Mon (2010, p. 95) 939 Mon (2010, p. 108)

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• “Under pressure from British authorities and promised autonomy by the majority Burman government, the Shans finally agreed to inclusion in the [1948] Union of Burma. Burma’s constitution allowed for Shan secession after 10 years if the Shans felt that continued association harmed their interests. Within months of Burma’s independence in 1948 the new Burmese government abrogated the independence constitution and attempted to impose direct rule on the Shan federation.”940 • “Led by rival princes, the Shans produced a bewieldering array of rebel forces, the groups often fighting amongst themselves. The Shan princes in 1958 notified the Burmese government of their intention to secede under the terms of the 1948 constitution.”941 o This is an example of extra-institutional non-violent action, as the constitution had already been abrogated. • After the Burmese government refusal and removal of the hereditary princes titles, this “united most of the Shan rebel groups in a war against the Burmese government.”942 o This is an example of extra-institutional violent action in the narrow timeframe.

375 – Tamils (Target: Sri Lanka; Year: 1981) Full movement, institutional and both violent and violent extra-institutional action.

Instl_Narrow (1981-83): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1981-83): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1979-83): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1979-83): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: 1

• The Tamils, previously a preferenced minority, with a distinct language and religion, under British colonial rule, were progressively disenfranchised and marginalized by the Sinhalese majority after Ceylon (later Sri Lanka) gained independence in 1948.943 A new constitution in 1972 “enshrined the Sinhala-only language policy and “the duty of the state to protect and foster Buddhism.” The name of the country was changed to Sri Lanka. Tamil youths found it increasingly difficult to get government jos, and separatist sentiments grew strong.”944 • “In 1976 a political party calling for an independent Tamil state, the Tamil United Liberation Front [TULF], was established. It became the largest party in the Tamil areas, achieving

940 Minahan (2002, p. 1700) 941 Minahan (2002, p. 1700) 942 Minahan (2002, p. 1700) 943 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 289) 944 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 290)

209 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 considerable success in the July 1977 parliamentary elections; in 1983, however, the party lost parliamentary representation when it failed to renounce separatism.”945 o Advocacy through contesting elections is an example of institutional action in the wider and narrow timeframes. o “Until July 1979, the TULF leadership was committed unequivocally to a separate state to be secured by nonviolence.”946 • Minahan states that, after the change to the constitution in 1972, “[m]oderate Tamil nationalists led a nonviolent resistance, which government ministers dismissed as a mere nuisance.”947 o This occurred prior to the relevant temporal period. • “Communal rioting between Sinhalese and Tamils occurred in May 1958, August 1977, August 1981, and July 1983. The main victims in all the riots were the Tamils; hundreds were killed in 1958, and over 1,000 died in 1977. In 1981 and 1983, the violence took the form of organized pogroms.”948 “A separatist insurgency by the Liberation Tigers of (LTTE) and other guerilla groups began in the early 1970s. The guerillas first targeted police and soldiers, but since late 1984, they have massacred hundreds of Sinhalese civilians and bombed public places in Colombo”.949 Minahan has described this sequence of events as follows: “Anti-Tamil rioting swept the island; Sinhalese mobs attacked Tamil areas, murdering, raping, and looting Tamil businesses and homes. In retaliation the militant Tamil nationalists, led by the … LTTE, launched a terrorist campaign against Sinhalese domination.”950 Beary attributes the 1983 pogrom as retaliation for the killing of 13 soldiers in the city of Jaffna.951 o The communal rioting should not be coded for in this project, as it was directed at the Tamils, rather than representing the actions of the separatists. o The Tamil nationalist response, however, should be coded. The operation of the LTTE should be broadly categorized as extra-institutional action in both the wider and narrow timeframes. Additional information on the content of their extra- institutional action, below. • “The guerrilla war waged by the LTTE since the mid-1970s illustrates the ethnic or separatist character of the political violence in Sri Lanka. Initially, five major guerrilla groups spearheaded the secessionist guerrilla war. Of the five major groups, the LTTE later achieved dominance over the other guerrilla groups.”952 • “Three phases may be identified in the pattern of the ethnic insurgency. The first phase, which is popularly known as the first Eelam war, lasted from the mid-1970s to 1989. Initially, it concentrated on assassinating Tamil moderate politicians and executing police informers. From 1977 the armed attacks focused on the police and armed forces confined to

945 Beary (2011, p. 240) 946 Siriweera (1980, p. 905) 947 Minahan (2002, p. 1847) 948 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 290) 949 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 290) 950 Minahan (2002, p. 1847) 951 Beary (2011, p. 239) 952 Samaranayake (1999, p. 116)

210 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 the Northern Province. From 1984 Sinhala civilians residing in settlements and villages within the Northern and Eastern Provinces became the LTTE's targets. In the meantime, terrorist attacks were carried out on the civilian population in Anuradhapura and Colombo.”953 o “The Eelam War One lasted from the mid 1970s to March 1990. The ethnic riot of July 1983 marked the turning point of this phase. The riots broke out as a backlash against an ambush of government military troops by the LTTE at Thirunelveli in Jaffna on 23 July 1983, resulting in the deaths of 13 army personnel. After the men’s funeral in Colombo, anti-Tamil riots spread throughout the city and the suburbs. About 400 Tamils died in the violence, and many more were injured or were victims of arson and looting. From 1987 to 1990 in the second phase of Eelam War One, the LTTE fought against the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in the northern and eastern provinces.”954 o “From 1977 to July 1983, the Tigers killed 11 Tamil politicians, 13 police informants and 16 civilians.”955 • “By the early 1970s, many qualified Tamil youth were blocked from entering government service and university. […]This together with the numerous ‘liberation’ clashes taking place in the Third World and Bangladesh’s independence in 1971 inspired Tamil youth to believe eelam was realizable, especially if India supported its creation. Soon nascent secessionist groups began robbing banks to buy weapons and assassinating police personnel and pro- government Tamil politicians whom they considered to be traitors. The LTTE was one such group, beginning as the Tamil New Tigers in 1972 and becoming the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in May 1976.”956 • “The ‘honor’ of carrying out the movement's first political assassination belonged to a young 17 year old called Velupillai Pirabhakaran, who managed to shoot the Tamil mayor of Jaffna, Alfred Duriappah, in July 1975. The following year, Pirabhakaran had another "first," a successful bank raid that netted him over half a million rupees. He then founded the Tamil New Tigers, which became the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). In September 1978, another first was credited to the outfit, a time-bomb blast in an Air Ceylon passenger jet.”957 • “The constitution that officially changed the TNT into the LTTE was written by Prabhakaran and adopted by a five member central governing committee on 5 May 1976. This committee had responsibility for both LTTE military operations and political decisions… At this time Prabhakaran also reportedly divided the activities of the LTTE military wing into three main divisions: 1) a division responsible for the ‘elimination of traitors’ and the Sri Lankan police intelligence network, 2) a second division responsible for crippling the administration of the Sri Lankan government, and 3) a third division responsible for the destruction of Sri Lankan army camps and the establishment of a nascent administrative structure which would lay the foundation for a Tamil Eelam state.”958 o Third wing of LTTE and corresponding parallel institutions as nonviolent, extra- institutional action.

953 Samaranayake (1999, p. 116) 954 Samaranayake (2007, p. 176) 955 Samaranayake (2007, p. 176) 956 DeVotta (2009, p. 1027) 957 Joshi (1996, p. 21) 958 Richards (2014, p. 13)

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• “Initially, the LTTE was one of approximately 37 Tamil militant groups. Of these 37, the five most significant groups (known as ‘the big five’) were the LTTE, the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO), the Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students (EROS), the Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), and the People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE). Both TELO and EROS were founded in 1975, the former by Nadarajah Thangathurai and Selvarajah Yogachandran (alias Kuttimuni), and the latter reportedly by Eliyathamby Ratnasabapathy and/or Velupillai Balakumar. In contrast, both EPRLF and PLOTE emerged slightly later, initially as breakaway factions from other Tamil militant groups. More specifically, EPRLF was founded in 1981 when K.S. Padmanabha broke away from EROS. Similarly, PLOTE emerged when Uma Maheswaran, the one-time chairman of the LTTE’s central governing committee, broke away from the LTTE sometime between 1978 and 1980. The ‘big five’ were involved in (attempted) killings of the security forces, bank robberies, and other criminal activities. However, Prabhakaran reportedly believed that the LTTE were the only Tamil militant group truly dedicated to armed struggle, while perceiving the others as likely to give into political rhetoric.”959 • “Officially, the LTTE dated the beginning of its war against the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) to 27 November 1982. This was the day the LTTE experienced its first death, when Lieutenant Shankar was shot and killed in Jaffna by Sri Lankan soldiers hunting for LTTE members following an attack on a police station. Fighting between the LTTE and the government forces continued at a low intensity until a notable attack on 23 July 1983, when the LTTE ambushed an army convoy outside Jaffna killing 13 Sri Lankan Army soldiers. […] Retaliatory anti-Tamil riots began the day after the convoy attack, spreading throughout Sri Lanka… As a result of these ‘Black July’ riots thousands of young Tamils, both male and female, flocked to the various Tamil militant groups including the LTTE[.]”960 o Conclusive evidence of armed insurgency during the relevant temporal window. • “As with the conflict in Sri Lanka, the nature of the LTTE system of governance resulted from the negatively symbiotic relationship between the Sinhalese and Tamils who share the island nation. A hybrid administrative system that mixed both government and insurgent civil and political institutions controlled the lives of the inhabitants of the Tamil-dominated areas of the combined north and east provinces. […]The rebels controlled vast parts of the north and east of Sri Lanka for extended periods throughout the duration of the conflict from 1983 to early 2009. Despite the open warfare between the two sides, the Sri Lankan government had a strong incentive to keep a connection to the population living within LTTE-held territory and continued to provide public goods to rebel-controlled areas throughout the war. I show how the insurgents and the government came to accept this convoluted power-sharing arrangement. […] The resulting agreement ensured that that those living within rebel territory were able to receive a steady provision of public services through the cooperation of the rebellion’s civil administration with the state bureaucracy.”961 o More evidence of parallel governing institutions, constituting nonviolent extra- institutional mobilization.

959 Richards (2014, pp. 13-14) 960 Richards (2014, p. 14) 961 Mampilly (2011, p. 94)

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376 – Malays (Target: Thailand; Year: 1963) Mostly/ entirely extra-institutional contention, both violent and nonviolent.

Instl_Narrow (1963-65): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1963-65): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1961-65): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1961-65): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .5

• “On April 28, 1948, a rebellion against Thai rule broke out in the village of Dusun Nyior in the province of Narathiwat. Malay peasants clashed with police, leading to the deaths of four hundred Malays and thirty police officers. More sustained Malay Muslim resistance began in the 1960s as armed separatist groups formed. The levels of violence peaked in the 1970s before subsiding in the 1980s and 1990s, a period when Thailand became more democratic.”962 • “In the 1960s separatist violence and fighting spread, in what was described by radicals as a Muslim holy war. The separatists received support from the several Muslim states, particularly .”963 • “Three major insurgent groups emerged in the 1950s and 1960s. The first was the National Patani Liberation Front (BNPP), formed in 1959. This group, with ‘thugs and bandits as

guerrilla leaders’, called for full independence. At its peak in the 1980s, the BNPP numbered no more than 200 to 300 members, mostly recruited from the Islamic religious schools in the area. Most remained in Southern Thailand for training, but others were sent to Libya, Afghanistan, and ; links also were forged with other Muslim countries. [Paragraph Break] The second group was the National Revolutionary Front (BRN), formed in the early 1960s by Ustaz Haji Abdul Karim Hassan, an Islamic school head teacher. The BRN stressed political organization much more than did the BNPP, but had an armed wing of about 150 to

300 fighters. One issue for the BRN was that it maintained contacts with communist parties in the area, which probably alienated some of its potential supporters. [Paragraph Break] The most significant of these groups was the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO), formed in 1968, with an ideology of ‘Religion, Race, Homeland, Humanitarianism’.”964 o Extra-institutional armed mobilization during relevant time frame • “The Islamists founded an organization, Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN, or National

962 Beary (2011, p. 162) 963 Minahan (2002, p. 1502) 964 Cline (2007, p. 277)

213 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 Revolutionary Front), whose aim was to establish the Islamic Republic of Patani. The BRN's base of support lay mainly in the pondoks. The secularists formed the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO), which claimed that it had an ‘invisible government’ whose tactic was to work by ambush. Many recent Patani university graduates as well as their fellows studying abroad supported this organization. Both organizations considered the Thai government to be an ‘internal colonial’ power with which compromise was impossible; the only option was to achieve Patani independence through armed struggle. However, the two groups did not coordinate their activities, choosing to pursue their guerilla actions independently.”965 • “BRN was much more focused on political organisation, particularly in religious schools, than guerrilla activities. It did not shy away from violence, however, and had a military wing led by Jehku Baku (alias Mapiyoh Sadalah), who commanded 150 to 300 men, mainly in Yala and some western districts of Songhkla province.”966 o Actions of BRN provide some evidence in favor of a “yes” coding for nonviolent extra-institutional action, though additional corroboration would increase value of corresponding confidence measure (ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence).

377 – Chams (Target: Vietnam; Year: 1964) Mostly/ entirely extra-institutional non-violent action

Instl_Narrow (1964-66): No (Confidence: .75) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1964-66): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1962-66): No (Confidence: .75) ExtraInstl_Wider (1962-66): Yes(Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: No ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .5

• “In 1946 the French administration created an autonomous region in the highlands centered on the Cham metropolis, Dalat. The Cham populations in both Vietnam and Cambodia increased rapidly, and by 1970, according to Cham nationalists, their numbers totaled close to a million.”967 • “The French defeat by Vietnamese nationalists in 1954, followed by the French withdrawal and eventual partition of Vietnam, left the Chams without protection. Cham nationalists mobilized the population and formed the Champa Highland Liberation Front (FLHPC) to work for an independent Cham state.”968

965 Islam (1998, p. 447) 966 ICG (May 2005, p. 8) 967 Minahan (2002, p. 427) 968 Minahan (2002, p. 427)

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• The FLHCP’s work, including through appeals to the United Nations, did not yield results and, on 19 February 1964, they declared Champa to be independent.969 o The activities leading up to the declaration are an example of extra-institutional non-violent action in the wider timeframe. o The declaration is an example of extra-institutional non-violent action in the narrow timeframe. • “In 1965 South Vietnamese government troops occupied the region, suppressed the Cham government, and ended the Cham bid for independence.”970 o There is no reference in the source materials to the use of any violence on the part of the Cham. • Concerns/notes: o “No” coding for violent extra-institutional action requires additional corroboration and better sourcing to increase value of ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence measure.

379 – Abu Sayyaf (Target: Philippines; Year: 1991) Mostly/ entirely extra-institutional violent contention

Instl_Narrow (1991-93): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1991-93): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1989-93): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1989-93): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: No ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: 1

• “The Moros constitute between 5 and 6 percent of the total population of the Philippines, and even in the southern region they are a minority in all but a few provinces.”971 • “The cultural distinctions between the Moros and the Christian majority, for whom Catholocisim is an integral part of the Filipino identity, set the two peoples apart.”972 • Abu Sayyaf is a “more globally focused Moro rebel group … which was established by dissident MNLF [(Moro National Liberation Front)] members in 1990-1991. Abu Sayyaf aims to first create an independent Islamic Moro state and build on that to help install a Muslim super-state across Southeast Asia.”973 • Abu Sayyaf has “a few hundred guerillas … [and] has been invoilved in kidnappings and is classified by the United States as a foreign terrorist organization.”974

969 Minahan (2002, p. 428) 970 Minahan (2002, p. 428) 971 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 197) 972 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 197) 973 Beary (2011, p. 174) 974 Beary (2011, p. 174)

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• In general, the Abu Sayyaf group is a more violent and religiously focused splinter group from the more established groups (MNLF and MILF) which does not seem to have engaged in institutional contention or extra-institutional non-violent contention at any stage.

380 – Mindanao (Target: Philippines; Year: 1972) Mostly/ entirely extra-institutional contention with violence

Instl_Narrow (1972-74): No (Confidence: .75) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1972-74): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1970-74): No (Confidence: .75) ExtraInstl_Wider (1970-74): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .75

• “The Moros enjoyed de facto autonomy until the late 1960s, with traditional Muslim leaders representing the community in the national legislature and being in charge of local administration.”975 • The rule of Ferdinand Marcos and an increase in Christian Filippinos migrating into the area led to an increase in tensions.976 • “Land disputes between settlers and Moros escalated in the early 1970s, and Christian- Muslim feuds led to a general breakdown of law and order and over 1,000 killed. In September 1972, martial law was declared in the region, precipitating a separatist insurgency led by the Moro National Liberation Front [MNLF].”977 “By 1971 an estimated 800,000 Moros had been driven from their lands by Christians.”978 o This is an example of extra-institutional action with violence in the narrow timeframe. • “Heavy fighting over the next five years [from 1972] devastated the region and left over 60,000 dead and 250,000 refugees. In 1977 the government negotiated an agreement that provided for an autonomous region covering 13 provinces”.979 o The 1977 agreement is outside the timescale under consideration. • “The MNLF had a precursor, the Muslim Independence Movement, launched in 1968 by Muslims who wanted to create a Bangsa Moro, or Moro nation, and who conducted a full scale revolt from 1969-1972.”980

975 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 197) 976 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 197) 977 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 197) 978 Minahan (2002, p. 1324) 979 Minahan (2002, p. 1324) 980 Beary (2011, p. 174)

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o This is an example of extra-institutional action with violence in the wider timeframe, and seemingly in the narrow period, as well. • While the Moros had autonomy and representation in national legislature, was there any participation in institutional politics by secessionist groups? This seems unlikely, as martial law was declared in the region from September 1972 (see above). • Some MIM leaders were coopted and brought into the administration: o “Moro and Cordilleran elites who chose to live and compete within this system, were merely subordinated partners in the fluid ties that bound the local with the national elites. [Paragraph Break] Those traditional elites who were not satisfied with this relationship eventually bolted out, and in varying circumstances supported, led and abetted anti-state activities. They provided the immediate leadership and/or material bases for mounting ethnic mobilisation. Retired long- time governor of Cotabato province, Datu Utdug Matalam is a prime example. He is credited with founding in 1968 the Mindanao Independence Movement (MIM), the first post-1946 or post-independence Moro organization that advocated armed struggle, secession, and the formation of an Islamic state.”981 • MNLF had observer status in Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), though starting point not immediately clear. o Negotiations between the MNLF and the central government were mediated by OIC, though this might have occurred after the relevant temporal period. § “The first attempt to find a political solution to the ‘Moro conflict’ was undertaken by the Marcos regime in the late 1970s. It is argued that at this time, some form of military stalemate had been achieved. Moreover, the oil crisis made developing friendly relations with Arab countries important to national interest. Good relations were thus sought by the Marcos regime with the OIC and Arab countries. The OIC and member countries, like Libya, had already recognized the MNLF as the official representative of the Moro people and given them observer status in the OIC. They had also condemned the use of force in Mindanao. For the Marcos government to gain their friendship, it became necessary for Marcos to talk peace with the rebels. Autonomy — rather than secession — became the compromise solution between the Marcos government and the MNLF. With the OIC as mediator, the Tripoli Agreement was signed in 1976 by the two parties. The Agreement marked the strategic shift in the negotiation agenda from secessionism to autonomy. Marcos, however, chose to implement the agreement unilaterally and alienated the MNLF.”982 § “The government tried to co-opt MIM's top leaders by providing them with high positions in the administration. This disappointed many young MIM cadres who abandoned the organization and, led by a university graduate, Nur Misuari, went on to form the militant Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). The organization's main objective was the complete liberation of

981 Ferrer (2005, p. 119) 982 Ferrer (2005, p. 125)

217 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 the Moros' homeland. The MNLF attracted the support of large numbers of Filipino Muslims who considered the movement to be spearheading a jihad against the Marcos regime. The MNLF opened an armed wing, the Bangso Moro Army (BMA), consisting of militant Muslim youths and they engaged in guerilla warfare against the Philippines Army. The MNLF also sought the support of the overseas Muslims and reported their grievances to the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). When President Marcos declared martial law in 1972, the MNLF continued its activities underground. Thousands of people lost their lives and property in the armed struggle in Mindanao.”983 • Actions of MNLF in seeking overseas support and interactions with OIC counted as nonviolent extra-institutional action, though additional corroboration is necessary to increase confidence of this coding decision. § “A delegation of four foreign ministers from Libya, , Senegal, and Somalia visited the Philippines to discuss the situation of the Muslims there with the Marcos government. The involvement of the Muslim states eventually culminated in the signing of the Tripoli Agreement on December 23, 1976, in Tripoli, Libya. This agreement provided for the creation of an autonomous region in Mindanao consisting of 13 provinces and nine cities. In return, the MNLF was forced to reduce its demand for complete independence to autonomy, settling for a peace that would keep the Bangsomoro homeland part of the Republic of the Philippines. However, after returning home the Marcos government interpreted ‘autonomy’ as an internal matter that should be solved within the framework of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Philippines. Marcos insisted that the attainment of autonomy was subject to the Philippine constitutional process. This required that a referendum be held to determine which among the provinces and cities claimed in the Tripoli Agreement should be included in the autonomous region. The MNLF strenuously objected to this plan and consequently the ceasefire that had been declared collapsed. Fighting resumed in late 1977 and MNLF leader Nur Misuari went into exile in the .”984 • Concerns/notes: o “Yes” coding for nonviolent extra-institutional action requires additional corroboration and better sourcing to increase value of ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence measure.

381 – Irian Jaya (Target: Indonesia; Year: 1975) Extra-institutional conflict, both violent and nonviolent.

983 Islam (1998, p. 449) 984 Islam (1998, p. 449)

218 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 Instl_Narrow (1975-77): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1975-77): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1973-77): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1973-77): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: 1

• “After years of diplomatic pressure by Indonesia, the Dutch handed West Irian over to the United Nations, and that body, in turn, gave it to Indonesia on May 1, 1963, with the understanding that a plebiscite would be held in 1969. However, the Act of Free Choice was a sham, rather than a genuine test of the wishes of the population.”985 • “The racist attitudes of Indonesians and their selfish exploitation of West Irian’s natural resources provoked a rebellion by the . Beginning in 1968, the rebels carried out guerrilla attacks on Indonesian forces and development projects and claimed to have killed 3,513 soldiers prior to April 1978. However in 1978, the rebel leader, Jacob Prai, was captured, and Papua New Guinea agreed to take measures to prevent its territory being used as a base by the rebels. [Paragraph break] In 1998, following the downfall of President Suharto, separatist activity inceased, and in July, pro-independence demonstrators waving Free Papua flags were fired on by Indonesian troops. Unconfirmed reports claimed that seven demonstrators were killed.”986 o This is an example of extra-institutional violent action in both the wider and narrow timeframes. • In response to the brutal Indonesian campaign to retain the province and its oil reserves, “Papuan leaders appealed to the United Nations but were ignored. On 9 December 1975 the leaders signed the Serui Declaration, a unilateral declaration of the independence of the Republic of West Papua.”987 o This is an example of extra-institutional non-violent action in the narrow timeframe. • On Indonesian separatists, summary: o “By the mid-1950s, most of the separatist movements had been suppressed by the Indonestian army, but in two territories taken over by Indonesia—West Irian (Irian Jaya)—and East Timor—separatist guerrillas [sic] activity continued. In the North Sumatra province of Aceh, the (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka) has been waging a guerrilla war since the 1970s. In August 1999, East Timor voted for independence from Indonestia, and this in turn encouraged separatists in Aceh, who demanded that they too should be allowed an independence referendum.”988

985 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 319) 986 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 319) 987 Minahan (2002, p. 2055) 988 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 129)

219 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 382 – East Timor (Target: Indonesia; Year: 1999) Full movement, institutional and both violent and nonviolent extra-institutional action.

Instl_Narrow (1999-2001): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1999-2001): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1997-2001): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1997-2001): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: 1

• Summary and note on timing: In the original rendering of this movement from Coggins and Griffiths, the start date for East Timor was 1975, with one continuous movement coded from that year until independence in 2002. This is the original rendering from Coggins (2014) and Griffiths (2015), who argued that there was no break in the movement. The problem with this approach is that the movement would be coded as a failure – given the 27 year lagtime – when it was ultimately a success. This was acceptable given the focus of Coggins and Griffiths on the start of movements, but it was undesirable for this project (Griffiths and Wasser 2018) – which focuses on a movement’s ultimate success or non- success. To remedy the problem, we coded a new start in 1999, the year of the UN- sponsored independence referendum – an event that followed the regime change in Indonesia in 1998, and kicked off the last successful round of independence efforts. From the perspective of 2002, it makes more sense to focus on 1999 as a start date than 1975. The resulting coding decisions show institutional methods (mostly under UN sponsorship from 1999 onward), extrainstitutional nonviolent methods (protests and marches in East Timor and elsewhere), and extra institutional violence as part of the conflict.989 • “The eastern half of the island of Timor in the East Indes was a Portugese colony from 1566 until 1975 when it declared itself independent.”990 • “In 1974 … three political factions were in existence in East Timor. The Uniao Democratica Timorense (UDT) advocated association with Portugal, the Associacao Popilar Democratica Timorense wanted integration with Indonesia, and the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN) called for complete independence.”991 They were established in response to the new government in Portugal which was more open to independence of the colonies and in anticipation of future elections.992 o The existence of these competing groups, particularly FRETLIN, represents secessionist institutional mobilization. However, this took place prior to the relevant temporal period.

989 Sources employed: Beary (2011), Hewitt and Cheatham (2000), and Minahan (2002). 990 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p 85) 991 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p 85) 992 Minahan (2002, p. 552)

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• “In July 1995 elections for local councils, [FRETLIN] took 55% of the vote”.993 o This is an example of institutional action, though it occurred prior to the relevant temporal period. • “The new government declared independence [in 1975]” and established various governance programs.994 o The declaration is an example of institutional action in the narrow timeframe, although it is not clear whether the government in Portugal accepted the declaration by institutional actors, and therefore whether the subsequent establishement of government functions represents an extra-institutional shadow government. • “An attempt by the UDT to seize power led to a brief civil war, which ended with victory on the part of FRETLIN.”995 Minahan disagrees, and asserts that the coup attempt was by the pro-Indonesian faction.996 • “The Indonesian government, refusing to accept the declaration or the defeat of its faction, launched an invasion of the new state nine days later. Over 50,000 East Timorese died in the first two months of the Indonesian invasion.”997 • “The United Nations refused to accept the legality of the Indonesian occupation. In April 1976, the UN called on Indonesia to withdraw and allow a referendum on independence. Ignoring the resolution, the Indonesian government annexed the territory in July and embarked upon a brutal campaign to crush widespread resistance. Up to 200,000 East Timorese perished over the next four years, about a third of the 1975 ppulation. A cease-fire was negotiated in 1983”.998

383 – Atjeh I (Target: Indonesia; Year: 1950) Extra-institutional contention, violent and nonviolent.

Instl_Narrow (1950-52): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1950-52): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1948-52): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1948-52): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .75

• “Initially rejecting inclusion in a united Indonesia, the Acehnese were finally persuaded to accept the status of an autonomous state within a federal Indonesia in 1949.”999

993 Minahan (2002, p. 552) 994 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p 85) 995 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p 85) 996 Minahan (2002, p. 552) 997 Minahan (2002, p. 552) 998 Minahan (2002, p. 552) 999 Minahan (2002, p. 27)

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• Partially in response to increased central power in Java, “[a]fter 1950 the Acehnese quickly became disillusioned with the Indonesian leadership … [and] rebelled in early 1950.”1000 By this time, Aceh’s status as an independent province had already been removed.1001 o This indicates that there was extra-institutional action in the narrow timeframe, however, there is insufficient information to determine whether this was with or without violence. • “After Indonesia became independent in 1949, the province [of Aceh/ Atjeh] was the center of a rebellion by Darul Islam, a movement that sought to transform Indonesia into an Islamic state.”1002 o Similar to above, this indicates that there was extra-institutional action in the narrow timeframe, however, there is insufficient information to determine whether this was with or without violence. • “The Acehnese rebel leaders declared Aceh independent of Indonesia on 11 February 1950, but in spite of fierce Acehnese resistance, Indonesian troops overwhelmed the poorly armed rebels and the secession collapsed.”1003 o The declaration is an example of extra-institutional non-violent action in the narrow timeframe. o The wording of the surce here is a strong indication that there was extra- institutional armed action in the narrow timeframe, resulting in a “yes” coding for violent mobilization. • “…Aceh in 1953, led by Daud Beureueh, declared itself an independent state governed by Islamic law. [However…] the 1950s rebellion was more about changing to nature of the Indonesian state [to Islamic from secular] and less about secession.”1004 o This is outside the timeline under consideration. o According to above, shouldn’t confuse 1950 declaration with Islamic rebellion in 1950s, presumably Darul Islam: § “Aceh is a region historically famous for its battles against the Portuguese in the 1520s, its four-decade war against the Dutch from 1873 and 1913, and then for its resistance against the central government in Jakarta since as early as 1953. For example, many assume that the current conflict has its antecedents in the Darul Islam (DI) rebellion in the 1950s. In fact, the conflict in the Province began to take form as a secessionist conflict only in mid-1970s with the establishment of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM).”1005 § “The declaration marked a sharp contrast between GAM and the earlier DI rebellion in the 1950s. While the DI sought to change the nature of Indonesia’s state into an Islamic republic of which Aceh would become a part, GAM sought a complete separation of Aceh from the Republic of

1000 Minahan (2002, p. 27) 1001 Minahan (2002, p. 27) 1002 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 11) 1003 Minahan (2002, p. 27) 1004 Beary (2011, p. 143) 1005 Sukma (2005, p. 6)

222 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 Indonesia. According to Hasan di Tiro, the people of Aceh represented a distinct nation with an inherent right to self-determination. In this context, it has been noted that GAM-led insurrections ‘are indeed unique in Aceh’s history of resistance, in that they are the first articulation of political opposition which asserts a secessionist rather than a regionalist goal’.”1006 • Concerns/notes: o “Yes” coding for violent extra-institutional action requires additional corroboration and better sourcing to increase value of ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence measure.

384 – Atjeh II (Target: Indonesia; Year: 1988) Extra-institutional movement, both violent and nonviolent.

Instl_Narrow (1988-90): No (Confidence: . 5) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1988-90): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1986-90): No (Confidence: .5 ) ExtraInstl_Wider (1986-90): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .75

• “[T]he Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka) has been waging a guerilla war since 1976 … [but] has been unable to establish a liberated zone. Unlike the earlier Darul Islam rebellion [(which resulted in the designation of Aceh as a special, more independent, region in 1959)], the current revolt is overtly separatist.”1007 o This is an example of extra-institutional violent action in the wider and narrow timeframes. • In 1989, the Free Aceh Movement set up a political wing under the name Aceh-Sumatra National Liberation Front (ASNLF).1008 o Formation of political wing occurs during narrow temporal window. Seeming evidence of nonviolent extra-institutional mobilization. • “GAM came into existence with the unilateral proclamation of Acehnese independence on 4 December 1976 by Hasan di Tiro in a ceremony that took place in the remote village of Pidie District. Supported by his former associates within the DI movement, Hasan di tiro declared that ‘We, the people of Aceh, Sumatra,... do hereby declare ourselves free and independent [sic] from all political control of the foreign regime of Jakarta and the alien people off the island of Java’.”1009 • “The current uprising in Aceh, which began in 1989 and has escalated since the collapse of Suharto’s rule in mid 1998, is a continuation of the conflict which had begun in the mid-

1006 Sukma (2005, p. 6) 1007 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 12) 1008 Beary (2011, p. 143) 1009 Sukma (2005, p. 6; “[sic]” and elipses in original.)

223 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 1970s. In this secessionist conflict, the main parties involved were the Government of Indonesia and the GAM.”1010 • “As GAM sees itself as the sole legitimate representative of the Acehnese people it has sought to establish governmental institutions. The first cabinet [was] set up by Hasan di Tiro during his time in Aceh from 1976 to 1979[.]”1011 • “From 1979 onward the cabinet ceased to function as a unit as some of its members were killed (such as Muchtar Hasbi), others were arrested, and yet others sought refuge overeas (such as di Tiro, Zaini Abdullah, Malik Mahmud, and Husaini Hasan)—and even they eventually factionalized with Husaini Hasan's establishment of Majelis Pemerintahan GAM (MP- GAM). This split effectively left di Tiro, Zaini Abdullah, and Malik Mahmud as the government-in-exile.”1012 • Under “Civilian Structure” subsection in Schulze (2004): o “GAM in Aceh is divided into a civilian government and military structure, the latter technically subordinate to the former. In practice, however, decisions on the ground are dictated by the realities of the conflict and thus military imperatives. The organization's civilian administrative system is modeled on Aceh's historical structures of governance dating back to the time when Aceh was an independent sultanate. These structures—or more accurately GAM's interpretation of them— were reestablished by di Tiro in August 1977 as a way of asserting Aceh's separate identity (di Tiro 1982: 93).”1013 o “At all administrative levels GAM has been carrying out functions from tax collecting and licensing to the issuing of birth and marriage certificates. Sympathizers point to these functions as civilian administration tasks not unlike those of a real state; critics call them racketeering and robbery (ICG 2000: 3). As the representative of an independent Aceh with a government-in-exile, GAM believes it has ‘the right to impose taxation on our own people which is in accordance with international law.’”1014 § These parallel governing institutions represent nonviolent extra- institutional mobilization. While the timing for the existence and operation of these parallel institutions is unclear in the source, it implies that they continued to operate during the relevant temporal window(s). • Concerns/notes: o “Yes” coding for nonviolent extra-institutional action requires additional corroboration and better sourcing to increase value of ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence measure.

1010 Sukma (2005, p. 6) 1011 Schulze (2004, p. 10) 1012 Schulze (2004, p. 11) 1013 Schulze (2004, p. 11) 1014 Schulze (2004, p. 12)

224 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 385 – Ambonese (Target: Indonesia; Year: 1950) Initially institutional contention followed by extra-institutional contention with and without violence.

Instl_Narrow (1950-52): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1950-52): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1948-52): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1948-52): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: 1

• As part of the formation of Indonesia in 1949, “[t]he Ambonese, persuaded to join the federation, won a provision allowing peaceful secession if they felt their interests were jeopardized. The Indonesian government, soon after independence, began to centralize the government over the objections of the peoples of the islands other than the central island of Java.”1015 • “In 1950 the Ambonese announced their intention to secede from Indonesia. The Indonesian government retaliated by dissolving the local administration and imposing direct rule from Djakarta.”1016 o The initial announcement is an example of institutional action in the narrow timeframe. o Any action taken after the dissolution of the local administration would be classified as extra-institutional. • “The Dutch-trained Ambonese army rebelled and drove the Indonesians from the southern islands.”1017 o This is an example of extra-institutional violent action in the narrow timeframe. • “On 25 April 1950 the Ambonese leaders declared the independence of the South Moluccaz”.1018 o This is an example of extra-institutional non-violent action in the narrow timeframe. • “In November 1950, Indonesian troops invaded the breakaway state, setting off heavy fighting. The republic collapsed after nine months of independence.”1019 o This is a further example of extra-institutional violent action in the narrow timeframe.

1015 Minahan (2002, p. 99) 1016 Minahan (2002, p. 99) 1017 Minahan (2002, p. 99) 1018 Minahan (2002, p. 99) 1019 Minahan (2002, p. 100)

225 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 386 – Sulawesi (Target: Indonesia; Year: 1958) Initially extra-institutional non-violent contention followed by extra-institutional violent contention

Instl_Narrow (1958-60): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1958-60): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1956-60): No (Confidence: .75) ExtraInstl_Wider (1956-60): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: 1

• NOTE: Suluwasi was, at the time, known as the island of Celebes. • “On 2 March 1957, a military coup overthrew the Indonesian government. Taking advantage of the chaos, the Celebes army commander and a 51-member council, mostly South Suluwesis, formally withdrew the island[, which had previously been promised a federalist autonomy within Indonesia,] from the Indonesian republic and declared it a sovereign state.”1020 o Despite the involvement of a local military commander, there is no indication that this particular extra-institutional action was violent. o Additional investigation of the 51-member council’s role is necessary to see if its actions constitute institutional action in the wider temporal window. Without this additional verification, institutional action in the wider time period is correspondingly coded “no,” but with a confidence measure of .75 reflecting the need for further investigation. • Despite this declaration, “[t]he rebels demanded self-government and that 70% of the revenues collected in the Celebes be spent there.”1021 The declaration seems to have therefore represented at this stage something of a gambit to win greater autonomy (political and fiscal) within an Indonesian state. • “In early 1958 negotiations between the South Suluwesi rebels and the government broke down. On 16 February 1958 the nationalist leaders… declared the independence of the island as the Celebes Republic. All ties to the Indonesian government were severed.”1022 o This second declaration is an example of extra-institutional non-violent action in the narrow timeframe. • “Indonesian troops were airlifted to the island, where heavy fighting finally ended the secession in May 1958. Nationalist insurgents, called Permestra, continued a guerilla war until 1961.” o This is an example of extra-institutional violent action in the narrow timeframe.

1020 Minahan (2002, p. 1755) 1021 Minahan (2002, p. 1755) 1022 Minahan (2002, pp. 1755-1756)

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• “After independence was declared by Sukarno in 1945, Sulawesi highlanders suffered further from their strategic location between the Muslim-majority peninsula of southwestern Sulawesi and the Protestant-majority peninsula of northern Sulawesi, both centers of secessionist movements during the late 1950s and early 1960s. Villagers now describe the confusing and violent overflow of these two movements—Permermesta in North Sulawesi and the Kahar Muzakkar or Darul Islam rebellion in South Sulawesi—as the time of ‘gangs’ (gerombolan). [Paragrah Break] In South Sulawesi, the Japanese occupation and surrender was followed by a mutual distrust between highland Protestant Sa'dan Toraja and lowland Muslim Bugis factions, even those with seemingly common nationalist goals.' Moreover, many lowland Muslims who fought for national independence were angered by the continuity of aristocratic privilege in the Java-centric Republic. A Bugis businessman and former Muhammadiyah teacher named Kahar Muzakkar who fought in Java during the 1945 revolution was sent by Sukarno's military to persuade disgruntled South Sulawesi secessionists to join the Indonesian Republic. He ended up joining and leading the rebels instead. In 1953, after he was denied the military command post he demanded, Muzakkar allied with the Darul Islam movement from West Java. His aim was to install on Sulawesi an Islamic Republic opposed to the ‘feudalism’ of the regional nobility, ancestral forms of worship, and Dutch influences such as Protestantism. [Paragraph Break] Armed Darul Islam rebels from South Sulawesi moved north through the mountains into Central Sulawesi to attack animist and Protestant villages. Highlanders fought back… The Permesta rebellion from North Sulawesi, which joined briefly with Muzakkar's Muslim forces, ultimately was resolved as an internal army affair in 1961. The Muslim rebellion from South Sulawesi, however, continued until Muzakkar was shot by Republican forces in February 1965.”1023

388 – Bougainville I (Target: Papua New Guinea; Year: 1975) Mixed institutional and extra-institutional action, both violent and nonviolent

Instl_Narrow (1975-77): Yes (Confidence: .75) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1975-77): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1973-77): Yes (Confidence: .75) ExtraInstl_Wider (1973-77): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: 1

1023 Aragon (2001, pp. 52-3)

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• “Bougainville Island is culturally and geographically a part of the Solomon Islands but is politically part of Papua New Guinea.”1024 • “The dispute over the Panguna mine was paralleled by rising ethnic tensions between the Melanesians and Papuan workers brought in from New Guinea. Violence between the two groups increased as Papua New Guinea moved towards independence. On 1 September 1975, two weeks before Papua New Guinea’s scheduled independence, Leo Hannet, the premier of the North Solomons, declared the islands independent as the Republic of the North Solomons. One of the first acts of the new government of Papua New Guinea, independent on 16 September, was to suspend the provincial government of the North Solomons and dispatch troops to occupy the islands.”1025 o Treating this declaration as institutional action, given that is was carried out by official of provincial government. However, additional corroboration of the processes involved in making this declaration would increase value of corresponding confidence measure(s). • “The rebels set up their own administration and in January 1976, fearing attack, dug up the airstrips. The conflict was temporarily resolved by granting Bougainville autonomy within a provincial structure.”1026 “Pro-independence violence again broke out in 1976, pushing the government to negotiate an autonomy agreement with island leaders”.1027 o A shadow government is an example of extra-institutional non-violent action in the narrow timeframe. • “On September 1, 1975, less than three weeks before PNG obtained its independence, certain popular Bougainville leaders, mainly Leo Hannett and Fr. John Momis, declared Bougainville's independence, calling it ‘The North Solomons Republic.’”1028 • “The secessionist challenges were intensified six months before independence1029 when Papua Besena engaged in unprecedented agitation for recognition, and continued six months after independence when the Bougainville movement assumed even more ominous proportions. Police and paramilitary forces were on the verge of hostilities with armed Bougainvilleans who had already burned government buildings and destroyed airfields. After six months of negotiations, the Bougainville secessionists and the central government reached an agreement, but valid reasons exist to doubt its durability when new conflicts arise.”1030 o This evidence of armed mobilization and property destruction in the narrow temporal period supports a “yes” coding for violent extra-institutional action in both the narrow and wider temporal windows. • For reference, PNG’s (e.g., target state’s) independence:

1024 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 50) 1025 Minahan (2002, p. 319) 1026 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 50) 1027 Minahan (2002, p. 319) 1028 Premdas (1977, pp. 64-5) 1029 This is presumably referring to the PNG independence date of September 16, 1975. See discussion in case notes below. Six months before would put the actions of the Bouganville movement in the narrow temporal period. 1030 Premdas (1977, p. 65)

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o “…when it became clear that was preparing Papua and New Guinea for a permanent union after independence, many Papuan leaders felt impelled to protest. By the early 1970s, several Papuans organized to form the ‘Papua Besena’ movement under the leadership of Josephine Abaijah, a popular Papuan member of the national House of Assembly. On March 6, 1975, several months before the integrated Papua New Guinea was scheduled for independence, Papua Besena unilaterally declared Papua's independence from Australia and in the view of its supporters became a separate state.”1031 § “On September 16, 1975 Papua New Guinea (PNG) obtained its independence from Australia.”1032 • “In the independence constitution-making process (1972 – 75), two contrary paradigms emerged, each claiming to be best suited to the needs of building national identity and unity. The main support for the local autonomy approach came from the Constitutional Planning Committee (CPC), a committee of the colonial legislature under the leadership of a young member of the legislature from Bougainville, John Momis. The CPC developed proposals for the independence constitution presented in a long and detailed report in mid-1974 (CPC, 1974). It saw local autonomy as both accommodating ethnic identity (thereby contributing to national unity) and improving the efficiency and responsiveness of the hitherto inefficient centralized colonial state by encouraging popular participation (Wolfers et al., 1982, p. 286; Ghai and Regan, 1992, pp. 8 – 52; Ballard, 1981). The CPC was in part responding to pressure from Bougainville (Griffin et al., 1979; Ballard, 1981; Ghai and Regan, 1992), where from 1973 the national government reluctantly conceded limited autonomy by recognizing a Bougainville Interim Provincial Government.”1033 • “After initial ambivalence the government, under Chief Minister Michael Somare, ultimately opposed the CPC proposals (on the grounds of unity, efficiency and economic rationality) and in July 1975 persuaded the colonial legislature (sitting as a constituent assembly) to reject them (Conyers, 1976; Ballard, 1981; Ghai and Regan, 1992). This precipitated a major crisis in Bougainville.”1034 • “On the rejection of constitutionally protected devolution Bougainville declared its separate independence from PNG on 1 September 1975, days before PNG’s Independence Day. Failure to secure international recognition and concern about dangers of violence encouraged Bougainville leaders to negotiate, with John Momis (who resigned from the national legislature in support of Bougainville secession) playing a moderating role (Ballard, 1981; Griffin and Togolo, 1997; Momis, 2005, pp. 312 – 314). A central government under its first prime minister, Michael Somare, who knew John Momis well, was both conscious of the risk of other areas in the fragile new nation following Bougainville’s example and concerned about possible loss of revenue from the mine. It was thus also under pressure to resolve its differences with Bougainville. Six months of

1031 Premdas (1977, p. 64) 1032 Premdas (1977, p. 64) 1033 Ghai and Regan (2006, p. 593) 1034 Ghai and Regan (2006, p. 593)

229 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 negotiations concluded with an August 1976 agreement on constitutionally entrenched autonomy arrangements for Bougainville.”1035

389 – Bougainville (Target: Papua New Guinea; Year: 1990) Extra-institution action, both violent and nonviolent.

Instl_Narrow (1990-92): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1990-92): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1988-92): No (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Wider (1988-92): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: 1

• “Bougainville Island is culturally and geographically a part of the Solomon Islands but is politically part of Papua New Guinea.”1036 • “The secessionist movement was partly inspired by a desire to control the island’s rich Panguna copper mine, which [provided] 40 percent of the value of Papua New Guinea’s exports.”1037 Although the interaction between the mine and separatists mainly takes the form of opposition, sometimes violent, to the operation of the mine, rather than seeking to control economic rents from it.1038 • “The influx of immigrants to work in the mines caused tensions between the black Bougainvilleans and the Papuans … [and] [v]iolence broke out again in 1989, and the Bouganville Revolutionary Army forced the withdrawal of police and army units from the island.” o This is an example of extra-institutional violent action in the wider time frame. • “Threatened by government troops, the rebel leaders of the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) and its political wing, the Bougainville Interim Government (BIG), declared Bougainville independent on 17 May 1990.”1039 o This is an example of extra-institutional non-violent action in the narrow time frame. • “The central government set up a blockade of the island, and the deadlock between the two sides lasted despite several rounds of talks.”1040 • “In 1992 the government again sent soldiers to end the secession, but the invasion failed and degenerated into sporadic fighting.”1041

1035 Ghai and Regan (2006, p. 593) 1036 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 50) 1037 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 50-51) 1038 Minahan (2002, p. 320) 1039 Minahan (2002, p. 320) 1040 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 51) 1041 Minahan (2002, p. 320)

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o This is an example of extra-institutional violent action in the narrow time frame. • “A 1995 agreement set up a provincial legislature for Bougainville and granted amnesty to the rebel leaders, but fighting resumed again in 1996.”1042 • “[T]he legislature of the Solomon Islands has called for the ‘reunion’ of the island with the North Solomons.”1043 o This indicates the potential for the support of an external state for the independence movement. • See also: “Papua New Guinea, History: Attempts at secession,” Encyclopedia Britannica.

391 – Maori (Target: New Zealand; Year: 1975) Mostly/ entirely extra-institutional contention without violence

Instl_Narrow (1975-77): No (Confidence: .75) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1975-77): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1973-77): No (Confidence: .75) ExtraInstl_Wider (1973-77): Yes(Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: No ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: 1

• “The Maori began to protest their situation in the 1970s.”1044 • “In 1971, annual Maori demonstrations at celebrations of Treaty of Waitangi Day, a New Zealand national holiday, began.”1045 o This is an example of extra-institutional non-violent action in the wider timeframe. • “Activists demanded formal biculturalism in place of the former assimilation, as well as sovereignty over Maori affairs.”1046 • “In 1975, Maori activists organized a land march to call for the return of their traditional lands and access to natural resources as guaranteed by the [1840] Treaty of Waitangi.”1047 o This is an example of extra-institutional non-violent action in the narrow timeframe. • “The march began a period of strikes, sit-ins, and occupations of public buildings.”1048

392 – Guadalcanal (Target: Solomon Islands; Year: 1999) This movement was primarily extra-institutional and violent. While there were institutional components to the movement advancing demands of Guale residents of Guadalcanal, the demands put forward through institutional channels were regionally-focused, not secessionist.

1042 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 51) 1043 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 51) 1044 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 185) 1045 Minahan (2002, p. 1178) 1046 Minahan (2002, p. 1178) 1047 Hewitt and Cheetham (2000, p. 185) 1048 Minahan (2002, p. 1178)

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Instl_Narrow (1999-2001): No (Confidence: .75) ExtraInstl_Narrow (1999-2001): Yes (Confidence: 1) Instl_Wider (1997-2001): No (Confidence: .75) ExtraInstl_Wider (1997-2001): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstlNonViolentNarrow: Yes ExtraInstlNonViolentWider: Yes ExtraInstlViolentNarrow: Yes ExtraInstlViolentWider: Yes ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .5

• Two of the main islands of the Solomon Islands are Guadalcanal and Malaita. “Many migrants to Guadalcanal, where the national capital is situated, come from the densely populated and underdeveloped island of Malaita. Attractions include the prospect of work in the plantations on the Guadalcanal Plains, in the government departments and businesses in Honiara, or, since 1997, in the Gold Ridge mine located east of the capital. Resentment on the part of Guadalcanal people towards these ‘settlers’ grew in many areas… [and] Malaitans were viewed as having prospered at the expense of local people and were accused of insensitivity to local custom.”1049 • “Groups of young Guadalcanal militants forced around 30,000 ‘settlers,’ mainly Malaitan, from their homes in rural Guadalcanal. In response, the Malaita Eagle Force (MEF) emerged and, along with collaborators within the police force, staged an armed takeover of the national capital on June 5, 2000, ousting the incumbent prime minister.”1050 • Malaitans are settlers on Guadalcanal; locals are represented by Isatabu Freedom Movement.1051 o “ At least 60 people have been killed and thousands forced to flee their homes in the clashes between the Malaitan Eagles and another ethnic group, the Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFM).”1052 • “…the deliberate moves of the Guadalcanal provincial government and the Guale militant groups to force 20,000 fellow citizens—mainly Malaitans—to leave the island.”1053 • “On 24 March 1998, Guadalcanal Province petitioned the Solomon Islands government to introduce state governments within a federal system, which would allow the provinces more freedom from national government control.”1054 o While this involves institutional channels, this action falls short of the secessionist threshold, and thus is not counted in favor of a “yes” coding for institutional action. • “In fact, the IFM and MEF were not the military arms of their respective provincial governments despite some close alliances, particularly between Alebua, Guadalcanal Province and the IGM. On some occasons, Guadalcanal Premier Alebua acted as the direct representative of the IFM.”1055

1049 Dinnen (2009, p. 74) 1050 Dinnen (2009, p. 75) 1051 For additional background, see: BBC (June 2000), “Coup in Solomon Islands” 1052 BBC (June 2000) 1053 Moore (2004, p. 93) 1054 Moore (2004, p. 105) 1055 Moore (2004, p. 142)

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• Extra-institutional violent mobilization: o “Groups of disgruntled young men in rural Guadalcanal had begun to stockpile home- made and rehabilitated World War II weapons as early as 1996. Organised disturbances started in late 1998 and spread rapidly throughout rural parts of the island. Militant groups — known initially as the Guadalcanal Revolutionary Army (GRA) and later renamed the Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFM) — embarked on a violent campaign of harassment and intimidation, directed mainly against Malaitan ‘settlers’. Up to 20,000 people were displaced from their homes in rural Guadalcanal and forced to seek refuge in Honiara or return to their islands of origin. Violent confrontations took place between the GRA/IFM and the Royal Solomon Islands Police. In June 1999, the government declared a state of emergency on Guadalcanal.”1056 o “The initial phase of violence and disorder that occurred between late 1998 and July 2003 is referred to locally as the ‘ethnic tension’, or the tenson in Solomons Pijin. It saw the violent harassment of settlers in rural and peri-urban areas to the east and west of Honiara, most of whom originated from Malaita, by a militia of young Guale men initially calling themselves the Guadalcanal Revolutionary Army and, later, the Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFM).”1057 o Commonwealth envoy (Rabuka) brokered agreements that did not stem militancy: § “The Ulufa’alu government sought initially to downplay the crisis as a ‘law and order’ problem. However this strategy simply aggravated the sense of grievance among Guadalcanal militants as they became the target of punitive operations by the Malaitan-dominated police field force. […] A series of peace agreements brokered by Rabuka committed the government to address the concerns of the rural Guadalcanal population, restrain police operations, and also called on the militant groups to disband, surrender their weapons, and return to their home villages. They failed, however, to stem the spreading militancy.”1058 o Split control of Guadalcanal island, between Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFM) and Malaita Eagle Force (MEF); conflict between these two groups: “With the IFM in effective control of rural Guadalcanal, Honiara became a Malaitan enclave. Another armed group — the Malaita Eagle Force (MEF) — emerged at the beginning of 2000. […] Clashes between the IFM and MEF increased with casualties on both sides. The Governor-General outlawed both organisations in February 2000. However, the MEF refused to attend peace talks until the ban was eventually lifted.”1059 o MEF mounts “de facto coup”, and IFM considers new government illegitimate:1060 § “On 5 June 2000, MEF militants, together with their collaborators in the paramilitary police field force, seized control of key installations in Honiara, including the well-stocked national armoury. Nori announced that the takeover was prompted by the SIAC government’s failure to resolve the conflict, loss of

1056 Dinnen (2002, p. 287) 1057 Allen (2012, p. 166) 1058 Dinnen (2002, p. 287) 1059 Didden (2002, p. 287) 1060 Didden (2002, p. 288)

233 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 police control over security in the national capital, and a desire for a new prime minister. He threatened an ‘all-out war’ if parliament failed to elect a new national leader. Under considerable duress, Ulufa’alu resigned on 14 June. Parliament reconvened two weeks later and elected the opposition leader, Manasseh Sogavare, as Prime Minister. His election was assisted by the absence of six government MPs who failed to attend after being threatened by Malaitan militants. The IFM refused to recognise Sogavare’s election. While many other Solomon Islanders questioned the legitimacy of the new administration, the governments of Australia and New Zealand granted it immediate recognition.”1061 o August 2000 cease fire, though groups don’t actually cease conflict. § “Under the terms of the Cease-Fire Agreement, members of the IFM and MEF were expected to lay down their arms and refrain from ‘hostile, offensive, insulting or provocative behaviour’.”1062 § Continuing violence: “Despite the Agreement, the joint operation between the MEF and elements of the paramilitary police field force continued in Honiara.”1063 • Continuing armed clashes between IFM and MEF o “Australia hosted peace talks at a military base in Townsville, Queensland, in October 2000.”1064 • “The IFM used email and an electronic newletter to present its message, publishing in 2000 a letter to the government from ‘the sons of Isatabu’, outlining the militants’ motivations.”1065 o These efforts at propaganda constitute evidence of nonviolent extra-institutional action, supporting a “yes” coding for this variable in the narrow and wider time windows – though additional verification/corroboration of nonviolent action would further bolster value of corresponding confidence measure (ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence). • “[R]ather than blaming their own elders, anger has been directed largely against the Malaitan ‘settlers’ who have bought, rented or squatted on land, particularly in north Guadalcanal. In January 1999, these grievances crystallised into what were called ‘the bona fide demands of the indigenous people of Guadalcanal’ and were presented to the central government. They included rent for the use of Honiara as the national capital, compensation for local people killed by settlers, plus restrictions on citizens from other provinces owning land on Guadalcanal.”1066 • “The uprising commenced shortly after a speech made by the then Premier of Guadalcanal, Ezekiel Alebua, in which he put a number of demands to the national government. These were later reiterated in January 1999, in a submission signed by the members of the Guadalcanal Provincial Assembly titled ‘Demands by the Bone Fide and Indigenous People of Guadalcanal’. The keynote demand was for state government for Guadalcanal under a federal system of government, a demand which had previously been put to the national government in 1988 in a document titled ‘Petition by the Indigenous People of Guadalcanal’. Other ‘Bone Fide’ demands

1061 Dinnen (2002, p. 288) 1062 Dinnen (2002, p. 289) 1063 Dinnen (2002, p. 290) 1064 Dinnen (2002, p. 290) 1065 Moore (2004, p. 107) 1066 Dinnen (2002, p. 286)

234 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 included: the return of alienated lands; the reform of land legislation to restrict ownership by people from other provinces; that Guadalcanal Province be granted 50 per cent of the revenue from resource projects on the island; and that legislation be introduced to ‘control and manage’ internal migration. (Fraenkel 2004, pp. 44-52, 197-203).”1067 o While these actions took place through institutional channels, the demands were regionalist/autonomist, though not explicitly secessionist. As a result, not counting this as evidence of institutional secessionist action. • Concerns/notes: o Although there was definitely institutional action associated with the Guale community on Guadalcanal that appears to have been regionally-focused, it was not explicitly secessionist. As a result, coding institutional action “no,” but with correspondingly reduced confidence. o Additional corroboration/verification of extra-institutional nonviolent action is necessary to increase value of ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence measure.

403 – Sardinia II (Target: Italy; Year 2002)

Extra-Institutional Narrow (2000-02): Yes (Confidence: 1) Extra-Institutional Wider (1998-2002): Yes (Confidence: 1) Institutional Narrow (2000-02): Yes (Confidence: 1) Institutional Wider (1998-2002): Yes (Confidence: 1) ExtraInstl_Narrow_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Wider_NonViolent: Yes ExtraInstl_Narrow_Violent: No ExtraInstl_Wider_Violent: No ExtraInstl_VAndNV_Confidence: .25

• Sardinia is an island off the Mediterranean coast of Italy which has remained culturally differentiated from the mainland.1068 • “Economic hardships drove between 500,000 and 700,000 Sardinians to emigrate between the 1950s and 1970s. The need to leave their homeland to find work generated the first nationalist stirrings in the 1970s.”1069 • “The PSd’Azione (Sardinian Party of Action), originally a federalist party in the immediate post-World War II period, proclaimed independence as a goal in 1979, and new members flocked into the party – its percentage of the vote increased from 1.9 percent in 1979 to 13.1 percent in 1987.”1070 • “Young Sards, unable to find work on the island but refusing the island’s traditional outlet, emigration, turned to violence to publisize the island’s plight in the 1980s. The campaign of violence escalated in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In 1991-92 over 200 bombings rocked the island. Militant Sard nationalists particularly targeted state-owned industries and Italian government offices.”1071

1067 Allen (2012, p. 166) 1068 Minahan (2016, p. 370) 1069 Minahan (2016, p. 370) 1070 Hewitt & Cheethan (2000, p. 265) 1071 Minihan (2002, p. 1665)

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• Extra-Institutional Contention: o Readings on militant groups on Sardinia. Relevant groups seemed to still be conducting bombings on Sardinia in 2002 to futher their aims, though they appear to be a small minority on the fringe, at best.1072 § The Organization Revolutionary Separatist Groups (Oir) and Nuclei for Communism (NPC).1073 § The Sardinian Autonomy Movement.1074 o (Re-)emergence of violent actor in 2002: “Little is known about the Sardinian Autonomy Movement (MAS) other than the name they chose for themselves and the circumstances of their only recent attack. The name, Sardinian Autonomy Movement, first appeared in the 1970s. However, because of the significant time gap, it is not suspected that any MAS associates from the 1970s were involved in the most recent attack of 2002. It is more likely that the name was resurrected by a new set of terrorists. When the group re-emerged in July 2002, the Sardinian Autonomy Movement claimed that its terrorist bombing was in the name of an independent Sardinia. In the words of the terrorists, they fight for a ‘Sardinia for the Sardinians.’ The message was written both in Italian and the Sard language.”1075 § However, this armed/violent component is extremely marginal, and information on the relevant actors is scarce. Consequently, will be coding “No” for violent/armed mobilization in both temporal windows – though this could be further investigated for future versions of the dataset. o “Among the most prominent figures of the independent [sic] movement, Gavino Sale stands out as a ‘historical’ figure of ‘Sardigna Natzione’. Ideologically close to the anarchist movements, Gavino Sale becomes the spokesman for the requests of the Sardinian people tied to the tradition and local economy. He also claims responsibility for the fire setting attacks against thermo-electrical production plants, tourist villages, local administration offices, and other ‘institutional’ targets. Furthermore, he also initiates some particularly strong propagandistic actions, such as a ‘sit-in’ (July 1997) at the seat of the Regional Sardinian Council, during the course of which, the Regional Junta members are accused as wanted by the Sardinian people for high treason. In October 1997, he is responsible for the occupation of the Enel production plant of Fiumesanto , protesting against the increased costs of electrical energy on the Island. In May 2001, in Montecitorio square in Rome, he protests against the presence in Sardinia of illegal open-air refuse dumps which also receive dangerous toxic products.”1076 • Institutional: o Sardinian Action Party adopts independence as goal in 1979-801077 § Sardinian Action Party participated in regional elections in 20011078 – falling within the narrow and wider temporal winows for institutional contention.

1072 Incidents in Sardinia, GTD https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?search=Sardinia&sa.x=46&sa.y=30&sa=Search 1073 Repubblica (2006). http://www.repubblica.it/2006/07/sezioni/cronaca/sardegna-indipendentisti/sardegna- indipendentisti/sardegna-indipendentisti.html 1074 “Sardinian Autonomy Movement (MAS)”, GTD 1075 “Sardinian Autonomy Movement (MAS)”, GTD 1076 Gnosis (Feb. 2005). "Sardinia a political laboratory" 1077 Hepburn (2009, p. 7) 1078 Hepburn (2009, p. 6)

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246 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 “French ,” Retrieved from http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/french-canadian-nationalism/ “Front de libération du Québec,” Retrieved from http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/front-de-liberation-du-quebec/ “Parti Québécois,” Retrieved from www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/parti-quebecois/

Encyclopedia Britannica: “Papua New Guinea, History: Attempts at secession,” Encyclopedia Britannica, Retrieved from https://www.britannica.com/place/Papua-New-Guinea/Attempts-at-secession

Global Terrorism Database (GTD) Incidents in Sardinia, retrieved from: https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?search=Sardinia&sa.x=46&sa.y=30&sa=Sear ch “Sardinian Autonomy Movement (MAS)”, Retrieved from: https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=20406

Incidents perpetrated by Scottish National Liberation Army, or in which they are suspected, Retrieved from https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=2854

Terrorism in Western Europe: Events Data (TWEED). Originally retrieved from https://www.folk.uib.no/sspje/tweed.htm See, also, http://www.nsd.uib.no/macrodataguide/set.html?id=39&sub=1 & https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/suppl/10.1177/0022343307071497

Website of the Government in exile of the Front of Liberation of the State of Cabinda, Retrieved from http://www.cabinda.org/english.htm

Website of the Republic of Lakotah, Retrieved from http://www.republicoflakotah.com

Wikipedia: “Catalan Liberation Front,” Wikipedia. Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Catalan_Liberation_Front

“Exèrcit Popular Català [Catalan People’s Army],” Wikipedia. Retrieved from https://ca.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exèrcit_Popular_Català

“Scottish National Liberation Army,” Wikipedia. Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scottish_National_Liberation_Army

247 Codebook of Contiguous Separatist Movements Accompanying Griffiths and Wasser (2019), posted January 7, 2019 “Security Forces Command,” Wikipedia. Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security_Forces_Command

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