The Influence and the Limitations of Sea Power Author(S): Paul Kennedy Source: the International History Review, Vol
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The Influence and the Limitations of Sea Power Author(s): Paul Kennedy Source: The International History Review, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Feb., 1988), pp. 2-17 Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/40107086 Accessed: 24-05-2020 09:49 UTC JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms Taylor & Francis, Ltd. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The International History Review This content downloaded from 79.147.42.147 on Sun, 24 May 2020 09:49:51 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms PAUL KENNEDY The Influence and the Limitations of Sea Power must be almost exactly a century ago that Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, United States Navy, was drafting and redrafting the chap- ters of what would become one of the most significant and enduring books on international affairs : The Influence of Sea Power upon His- tory, 1660-1783 (first edition, Boston, 1890). Extolled by presidents such as Teddy Roosevelt and by emperors such as Wilhelm II, quoted (sometimes even read) by admirals and navy leagues everywhere, trans- lated into numerous languages, used as a textbook by naval and military colleges across the globe, and appearing in over forty editions, it is one of the few non-fiction works of 1890 - perhaps the only one? - that is still available (and in paperback) today. Purely in terms of popularity of its message, it has outstayed all comparable 'seminal' books about world politics, including those by such authors as Seeley, Mackinder, Treitschke, and Brooks Adams.1 The attention immediately accorded to Mahan's work, and the con- tinued popularity of it, was not because its author had made a revolu- tionary new discovery that challenged prevailing wisdom. As many scholars have pointed out, Mahan's conclusions about the historical significance of sea power were similar to those being advanced at the time by Sir John Laugh ton and the Colomb brothers - particularly Philip Colomb's Naval Warfare -and echoed the 'lessons' preached centuries earlier by English writers such as Francis Bacon, Ralegh, Halifax, and Bolingbroke. If Mahan's style was superior to Colomb's, he was 'not strikingly gifted' as a prose writer,2 and the greater part of 1 These various works are analysed in H. Gollwitzer, Geschichte des weltpolitischen Denkens, Volume II: Zeitalter des Imperialismus und der Weltkriege (Got- tingen, 1982). 2 D.M. Schurman, The Education of a Navy: The Development of British Naval Strategic Thought 1867-1914 (London, 1965), p. 80. See also the opinion in W.E. Livezey, Mahan on Sea Power (Norman, Okla., 1981 ), pp. 34-7. The International History Review, x, 1, February 1988, pp. 1-172 cn issn 0707-5332 © The International History Review This content downloaded from 79.147.42.147 on Sun, 24 May 2020 09:49:51 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms The Influence of Sea Power 3 his three3 Influence books consists of very detailed accounts of naval campaigns. Where he was gifted was in explicating many of the implicit conclusions of other naval authorities and putting them in a form especially suited to the late nineteenth-century positivistic mind-set, with its eagerness to accept 'general principles'. Like Marx for political economy, and Spencer for sociology, Mahan strove to be 'scientific' and to discover those 'considerations and principles [which] belong to the unchangeable, or unchanging, order of things, remaining the same, in cause and effect, from age to age'.4 Like Marx and Spencer, although with rather more doubts and reservations,6 Mahan also came to believe that he had uncovered 'immutable' laws and principles which would always underpin the study of his subject. The basic tenets of Mahanian thought - assembled chiefly in Chapter One of The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660-1783 under the title 'Discussion of the Elements of Sea Power' - are well enough known to need only a brief summary here.6 By the use of numerous historical examples, Mahan sought to demonstrate that international struggles since classical times were often greatly affected by command of the sea in wartime; and that, in peacetime, 'sea commerce' was of profound influence upon the wealth and strength of nations. Since, as he put it, 'travel and traffic by water have always been easier and cheaper than by land', it followed that any nation able to control the 'wide common' across which the vital maritime trade-routes passed would gain enor- mous benefits : its trade would be protected, its links overseas would be maintained, and its troops would pass freely to desired destinations. Conversely, a country which in wartime lost command of the sea would suffer both militarily and commercially, probably to the extent of being unable to continue the struggle. Securing sea control was no easy task. It required the construction and deployment of a battlefleet strong enough to defeat the enemy's. In Mahan's words, it implied 'the possession of that overbearing power on the sea which drives the enemy's flag from it, or allows it to appear only as a fugitive; and which, by controlling the great common, closes 3 That is, not only The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660-1783, but the later works, The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire (2 vols., London, 1982), and Sea Power in its Relations to the War of 18 12 (2 vols., London, 1905). 4 Mahan, Influence of Sea Power upon History (repr. London, 1965), p. 88. 5 Schurman, The Education of a Navy, pp. 72-3, explores Mahan s hesitations about laws and principles. 6 Apart from Livezey and Schurman, see also the discussion by P.A. Crowl, 'Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian', in Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. P. Paret (2nd ed., Princeton, 1986), pp. 444-77. This content downloaded from 79.147.42.147 on Sun, 24 May 2020 09:49:51 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 4 Paul Kennedy the highways by which commerce moves to and from the enemy's shores'.7 By comparison, a strategy of guerre de course, while probably leading to the capture of some of the enemy's merchant-ships, could never itself bring command of the sea. In much the same way, a merely regional maritime superiority (say, in the Baltic, or western Mediter- ranean) would vanish as soon as a preponderant battlefleet arrived in those waters to drive the local squadrons into their harbours. Sea power, in Mahan's view, was pervasive wherever large warships could operate; it also tended to be monopolistic. Very few nations, then, could achieve true sea power; many more had sought that goal, and failed. The prospects of success were heavily dependent upon what Mahan described as the six 'principal conditions affecting the sea power of nations' : 8 geographical position ; physical conformation; extent of territory; number of population; national char- acter; and character and policy of governments. Put briefly, Mahan's reading of history taught him that a state that had neither to defend nor to extend itself by land was much more favourably placed to con- centrate upon the growth of its sea power than one that had constantly to be prepared against land neighbours; that a well-situated position, flanking important oceanic waterways, provided a further crucial ad- vantage, as did good harbours and a seaboard not too great for a country's defence requirements, and not (like France's seaboard) divided; and that a sparse soil and climate was often an inducement to overseas endeavour, whereas the inhabitants of a richly endowed nation had less inclination to leave home. By number of population, Mahan meant those 'following the sea', both in terms of being engaged in mari- time commerce and being readily available to the navy -just as na- tional character referred to a specific proclivity to exploit the sea, as would be the case with a nation of enterprising traders, willing and able to make a sufficient standing investment in naval strength to protect its interests upon the oceans. The government's role was to foster the country's maritime and commercial potential in time of peace and, by the skilful exploitation of sea power in wartime, to secure a victory that would further enhance the country's position in the world when the conflict was over. It was necessary to emphasize all this, Mahan felt, because of the relative neglect of the maritime dimension in most historical studies; his book was thus offered as a corrective to the prevailing ignorance. Yet it is interesting to note that, on the page following his discourse upon 'The Elements of Sea Power', he willingly admitted the dangers 7 Mahan, Influence of Sea Power upon History, p. 138. 8 Ibid., pp. 29-84. This content downloaded from 79.147.42.147 on Sun, 24 May 2020 09:49:51 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms The Influence of Sea Power 5 of over-emphasizing the naval aspect: 'Sea history ... is but one factor in that general advance and decay of nations which is called their his- tory; and if sight be lost of the other factors to which it is so closely related, a distorted view, either exaggerated or the reverse, of its impor- tance will be formed.'9 Predictably enough, such a caveat was swiftly forgotten (if it was at all comprehended) by a host of more extreme navalist writers and by 'big navy5 lobbies in Great Britain, the United States, Germany, and elsewhere who eagerly quoted Mahan's writings as the gospel of sea power during their own political struggles to obtain a larger navy.