PIN•Points Processes of International Negotiation Network Perspectives 44 juni 2017

IN THIS ISSUE: CURRENT AND FUTURE CHALLENGES IN NEGOTIATION MEDIATION IN WEST-AFRICA AND THE LEVANT NEGOTIATION AND MEDIATION IN EURASIA PREVIEWS OF PIN PUBLICATIONS 2 PIN•Points 44/2017

EDITORIAL

The world today is faced with a will continue. Earlier mediation lenges, has bruited a new approach plethora of obstinate negotiation by two of the world’s leading dip- involving the whole region’s coming challenges: Syria, Cyprus, Pales- lomats went nowhere because the together in a cooperative secu- tine, North Korea, South Sudan, UN Security Council did not support rity endeavor, drowning the smaller Russia, not to speak of the im- its own mandate and the conflict cancer in a common health club. pending multilaterals over NAFTA, was not ripe in the central parties’ A pound of convention is worth an Brexit, NATO cost-sharing, and minds, a situation elaborated on in ounce of cure. Unlike Syria and others. Some of these represent an article by I. William Zartman and Cyprus, agreement may be more missed opportunities, others tacti- Raymond Hinnebusch in this issue within reach at this higher level; cal experiments, still others chal- of PINPoints. anyhow, it’s worth a try, as another lenge to creativity and construction, article by Moti Cristal in this issue and others the need for a tough Cyprus presents an opportunity for of PINPoints examines and Dr. Go- approach, but all have some les- resolution every decade and until lan speaks eloquently of it as well. sons for negotiating. The list is this decade has been destroyed elaborated on in the remarks of four by one party or the other, facing South Sudan, newly independent leading commentators presented at an S5 (Soft, Stable, Self-Serving from (North) Sudan, immediately the PIN-sponsored negotiation Day Stalemate) situation. This time, all fell into a fratricidal civil war when in Washington DC at the Johns Hop- depends on whether the leader of its external enemy was removed. kins University School of Advanced one of the patron parties, Turkey, Incredibly, two rival leaders, backed International Studies (SAIS) on 27 newly narrowly confirmed as dicta- by decades and more of tribal ani- February: Ambassador Thomas R tor, will throw his weight in favor of mosities, have been able to cause Pickering, former US Undersecre- an agreement that both North and hundreds of thousands of deaths, tary of State and ambassador to 6 South Cypriot parties grudgingly absorb billions of dollars of devel- different countries and the UN; Am- see in their own interests, prefer- opmental aid, absorb quantities of bassador Princeton Lyman, former able to a continued S5. As in Syria, arms from bystanding states, rank US Assistant Secretary of State and the external patrons generally op- second to last (175th) on Transpar- ambassador to Nigeria and to South erate to keep accord from breaking ency Inc.’s corruption scale, and Africa; Dr Galia Golan, professor out since the stalemate is serving thumb their noses at UN and emeritus at the Hebrew University most to their own selves. There may Western efforts to arrange a truce and at the Interdisciplinary Center be better chances of agreement if and peace. (The African Union com- Herzlia; and Dr. Vali Nasr, Dean of the local parties could be left alone mittee, with patrons of each side in SAIS and special advisor to Rich- to make their own agreement, as its membership, says only that they ard Holbrooke in Afghanistan and analyzed by Paul Meerts in an arti- should try again). Unfortunately, Pakistan. cle in this issue of PINPoints. there is no lesson because there is no process. An article in a fellow Syria represents a sick outcome Palestine/Israel still on the docket, publication, International Negotia- to the encouraging story of the despite efforts every US presiden- tion, examines the insolent tragedy Arab Spring, the only major case tial mandate to show that ripeness and Ambassador Lyman speaks of (among Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen is a subjective thing within the par- it as well. and Libya) where egregious au- ties, no matter what the objective tocracy, formerly considered the facts would indicate. As in Syria, North Korea poses an escalating Arab way of government, has not the parties both feel that they can challenge of serious proportions. been overthrown. It is now subject win but even more, that they daren’t The Six Party Talks have not met to a ceasefire that neither side re- lose. Yet it may be that the patron under Kim Jong Un and Barack spects, with no indication of what powers do feel the hurt of a stale- Obama, but the missile and nuclear comes next; the khilafa will be mate and the threat of a common industry in North Korea have made destroyed, leaving tentacles of the enemy. The new US administration, dangerous progress. New US Sec- hydra on their own, and civil war which seems to like Great Chal- retary of State Rex Tillerson has not

www.pin-negotiation.org 3

CONTENTS COLOPHON PINPoints 2 EDITORIAL Copyright 2017 PIN

4 POTENTIAL NEGOTIATIONS IN THE UPCOMING YEAR: A SYMPOSIUM PINPoints is the biannual publication THOMAS PICKERING, PRINCETON LYMAN, GALIA GOLAN, VALI NASR of the Processes of International Negotiation Program (PIN). 17 ECOWAS MEDIATION IN THE GAMBIA MARK ANSTEY PIN is a non-profit group of scholars and practitioners that encourages 21 CYPRUS NEGOTIATIONS ON THE BRINK and organizes research on a broad PAUL MEERTS spectrum of topics related to international negotiation seen as 26 A REGIONAL PARADIGM FOR THE MIDDLE-EAST a process. The PIN network includes CONFLICT more than 4,000 scholars and MOTI CRISTAL practitioners of international negotiation. The organization is 30 RUSSIA IN CONFLICT MEDIATION: presided over by a Steering Committee, NEW OPPORTUNITIES, NEW TACTICS? which organizes its many activities and I. WILIAM ZARTMAN & MIKHAIL TROITSKIY edits the PINPoints.

33 TUG OF WAR: NEGOTIATING SECURITY IN EURASIA, PIN is a project of the Netherlands A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK Institute of International Relations FEN OSLER HAMPSON & MIKHAIL TROITSKIY ‘Clingendael’, a leading think tank and academy on international affairs, 37 NEGOTIATING HISTORY IN EURASIA European integration and security VALERIE ROSOUX issues based in The Hague.

45 IN MEMORIAM – MORTON DEUTSCH Issue Editor: I. William Zartman GUY OLIVIER FAURE

Associate Editors: 46 NEGOTIATING JUSTICE: FROM CONFLICT TO Chloe Colbert, Paul Meerts and COOPERATION 2017 PIN PROJECT ANNOUCEMENT Jan-Willem Pot CECILIA ALBIN Design and lay-out: 49 NEGOTIATING RECONCILIATION IN PEACEMAKING: Symon Maks - www.maksimaal.nl QUANDRIES OF RELATIONSHIP BUILDING BOOK PREVIEW ED. I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN Contact The Netherlands Institute of 51 INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION: A JOURNAL OF International Relations ‘Clingendael’ THEORY AND PRACTICE Wilbur Perlot, PIN Coordinator JOURNAL PREVIEW Clingendael 7 2597 VH The Hague The Netherlands

STEERING COMMITTEE: T +31 70 374 6681 E [email protected] W www.pin-negotiation.org M. CRISTAL MEERTS P. F. O. HAMPSON F. M. ANSTEY G. O. FAURE C. ALBIN W. PERLOT W. ROSOUX V. R. SCHÜSSLER ZARTMAN I W. M. TROITSKIY 4 PIN•Points 43/2016

ruled out negotiations but only after PART 1: AMBASSADOR THOMAS PICKERING “denuclearizing, giving up their weapons of mass destruction” or, POTENTIAL NEGOTIATIONS IN THE UPCOMING as earlier intimated, at least some YEAR: A SYMPOSIUM of them. That is not a promising start for a conflict that has known a US-DPRK Framework Agreement in 1994, Six-Party Talks in 2000-2008, In a world of tremendous and very open for that is a fundamental area of and several promises to denuclear- rapid change, change itself is part and common agreement. Were we able to ize. What it has not now, half a cen- parcel of all international problems we reach agreement on a one sentence tury after the war, is a peace treaty, are facing. Let us postulate some sets communique that says that we are and the escalating confrontation of issues on where negotiation can be both committed to keeping air and raises so many preceding hurdles a useful tool in dealing with them. sea lanes open, that would not only that it is ever more difficult to turn have begun the destruction of the to the underlying issue. In a classic First of all, issues of great power fiction of the nine-dash line, but it security dilemma, Pyongyang feels rivalries, for example the West would also open the door for other that the US is targeting it with sanc- dealing with Russia. There is a need agreements in the region. tions and if course it is right. It then for reducing the number of nuclear takes more measures to raise the weapons on both sides. We seem to The United States needs to avoid ante, in response or independently be prohibited by Putin’s reservations destroying Europe or allowing or for domestic reasons, all invit- from getting there and Trump’s Europeans destroy Europe, there is ing more sanctions. Such vicious blandish don’t seem to have opened no formula for that. The French voted spirals are hard to break. The only the door. Several of the precursors wisely and so did the Dutch. Hopefully lesson is that, as often, analysis is for that may well be how, and what the Germans will follow these not praxis, perception is not policy, way, ABM cooperation could be examples. It is hoped that our friends empathy is not engagement, and designed and usefully pursued. And in London are confecting an article 50 that understanding is useless if it in a world of logic and rationale that legislation for the British parliament does not help us think how to im- would be an important step towards that will build in the notion that the prove the situation. a more stable and peaceful world. people of the United Kingdom will yet Then is also the Ukrainian problem have another choice between what This issue of PINPoints has grouped that sits in the way, but this is an seems to be the truly bad deal that its articles in two clusters, one on issue that could be solved. One has to Mrs. May is condemned to make with “Negotiations of the Day” and an- begin in Ukraine, with the economic the Europeans on the one hand and other on “PIN Projects” plus a few inferences and then see whether a what they already have with the EU on other features and announcements. large, international program could be the other. an inducement to repair. In the next I. William Zartman two decades Ukraine can become a Moving on to the Middle East: Syria better bridge country than one fought pops out as a major question and over by both sides. Saudi-Iranian differences are the heart of one of the many plays going China is the next problem to be dealt in the Middle East in contest for with. The West does not have much hegemony and for difficulty and could common ground with China, although lead to greater difficulty. Yemen may solving the South China Sea issue by be a starting place, where exhaustion trying to enforce navigation rights, is beginning to take its toll and where is merely putting the heat under the Saudi success is not measurable pressure cooker when the valve is on any real standard and where welded shut. You need a door through the Iranians have jumped onto an which to think about walking, and opportunity rather than creating one that door is narrowly based on the by malevolent meddling in Houthi fact that 40% of China’s trade moves politics. So it is in that sense ripe for through the South China Sea and a move from feckless war to hopefully that keeping the sea and air lanes some kind of a negotiated solution. www.pin-negotiation.orgwww.pin-negotiation.org 5 5

And that in itself would help to bridge charge of such things as turning the ‘in the world of the blind the one-eyed the gap in the early abutments of which water back on, dealing with the rubble man is king’ syndrome, which tends to we now see in the Kuwaiti Foreign and the roads, and beginning to open hang over this particular set of ideas, Minister’s visit to Tehran and some both medicine and education again to should not stop us from exploring invitations to Saudis also to go there, young Syrians. This would be an effort further. It is in its own way subject to which appear to be on the verge of to consolidate the ceasefire and to resolution through determination and acceptance. An Iranian-Saudi capacity begin something that pretends to be innovation and hard negotiating. The to work together on something like a proto government, which could lead gang of four – Perry, Schultz, Nunn Syria is not a bad thing. It could be to dealing with governmental issues, and Kissinger – had the right idea very helpful in moving that ahead. which are now so politically divisive. when they pulled this issue out of the However, the recent row between closet, and said it’s worth spending Qatar and the other Gulf states does So, let us hop on. It is terribly time on. not give much hope for a negotiated disappointing that the Obama common future between Arabs and administration didn’t take their steps Poverty, growth and development Iranians. to the final stage of Security Council remain out there as an alarming, approval. It would have been a real difficult, serious and challenging In Syria a ceasefire is needed – a addition to where we are. The question problem. Better work in water, food very important step, even if it doesn’t of the illegal settlements on the West and agriculture, in health and medicine universally hold. But the traditional Bank is significant in helping to set and some real attention to energy view, that a transitional government the stage for something; whether questions are vital for a sustainable and a new constitution plus public it will come sooner or later, and world. One should be looking at approval through an electoral process whether that requires a sense of the the challenge of development, not will be the way to give peaceful conflict replacement of the leaders in the area as a silver bullet solution, but as resolution through negotiation a to get there is a huge challenge. something confected country by fair chance, will encounter serious country with national leadership. This difficulties. Whatever the next step Four or five issues other issues are out is a very important way of proceeding. should be taken after a ceasefire, it there. Weapons of mass destruction It involves a negotiation of the most should at least reinforce the ceasefire remain important and there should be primordial importance as we move and not yet adumbrate the question of US-Russia leadership on this. We need ahead. And it requires a great deal who runs Syria in the future too early. to continue to give serious attention more donor collaboration than we see There should be a technocratic facility to the idea to get to zero weapons in this process ahead - and much less that might look like a government but and if our new military conventional competition. Certainly, the fact that would put Syrians of technical capacity capabilities are beginning to serve as State Department and EPA are being and administrative achievement in a potential important deterrent. The cut to make tanks and planes, is not a 6 PIN•Points 43/2016

good harbinger of future US interests PART 2: AMBASSADOR PRINCETON LYMAN in this particularly demanding and important problem. POTENTIAL NEGOTIATIONS IN THE UPCOMING YEAR: A SYMPOSIUM Energy, climate change and environment are very much closely linked and are also extremely significant. One wonders whether We should honor ambassador existence – exponential population there hasn’t been time yet to tear up Pickering’s creative optimism. growth, rapid urbanization, climate Paris either literally or figuratively Let us deal however with issues change and a global financial crisis along with Iran and other things. Or particularly of conflict: where we are all converging at the same time whether in fact we are going to go see today not just conflict but mass – a phenomenon unprecedented anywhere in that area. But we should atrocities, where we see instances in the history of humanity with do everything we could to encourage of approaching genocide. We could huge complexities for developing moving down the particularly argue that the conditions that breed countries like ours. This will important role on next steps on these conflicts and these mass exacerbate poverty, unemployment climate change as a negotiating atrocities are going to be with us and inequality.” challenge - however divorced from for some time and we will thus see reality that particular counsel may more of such conflicts in the future. Or to Eghosa Osaghae who writes seem at the present time. of the conflicts going on in Nigeria, In Africa, we’ve seen the loss of not just Boko Haram – but the “We should begin with millions of lives in the past decade, vicious conflicts going on between diplomacy and development as in the Democratic Republic of the nomads and agriculturalists as they we approach issues and use Congo, in Nigeria, in South Sudan, in fight over scarce land and water wars only as a last resort in the Central African Republic, and in resources. “Issues of contested defending vital interests.” Somalia. But it is not only in Africa. citizenship, resource inequalities, We see it in Syria, Yemen, and Libya uneven development, political We have a big challenge before us. The in the Middle East. None of the issues exclusion and marginalization add world economy has stumbled forward that led to the Arab Spring - whether to the governance failures of a weak from 2008 to 2009 in to what we would it was democracy, or employment, state, the inability to cope with the call a very slow roll recovery. And or opening to the modernized unusual, unconventional and new the lessons we have picked up along world - have been resolved. They forms of conflict like Boko Haram the way have not yet been carefully lie waiting for the next confluence or in the Niger delta, the ethnic translated either domestically or of events that erupt into the next riots of the Fulani, etc. These are all internationally into the kinds of explosion or terrorism or new forces prototypical. And they are fueled by institutional arrangements that can of repression. We see some of those the forces of globalization.” help us both guard against a return same forces in Pakistan, Bangladesh but also put us in a stronger position and other areas in South Asia. We should add to these the so-called as a tool of world economies to build, youth bulge in Africa and the Middle strengthen and advance our approach The challenge for practitioners, East. Africa has the youngest to the question. A final set of advice for mediators, is that most of the population in the world. They in the negotiating and policy range. driving forces of conflict lie outside represent 60% of the unemployed. Wars haven’t settled problems very the reach of the mediators. They are In the Middle East, 65% of the well. They are not good substitutes beyond their mandate or control. unemployed are under the age of for diplomacy. We should begin with Listen to Vasu Gounden, founder thirty. And what is significant is that diplomacy and development as we and director of ACCORD – one of the opportunities for employing approach issues and use wars only as a the premier conflict resolution this population are diminishing, last resort in defending vital interests. organizations in Africa. He says, facing governments with impossible As Harry Truman once famously said, “The pressures on African societies pressures. There is a recent study by “Vital interest for the United States today are greater than ever before. the US National Defense University is survivability and prosperity” and to For the first time in the history of on the impact of the combination that we should add ‘and of the friends humanity, we face the convergence of robots, improved artificial and allies of the US’. of factors that threaten our very intelligence, and 3-D printing that www.pin-negotiation.org 7

Voice of America News: Scott Bobb reports from Aleppo, Syria

is going to change dramatically “But peace agreements International Criminal Court. But the placement and nature of rarely incorporate the it’s questionable whether the United manufacturing and of employment in implementation of such States, in the future, will have the the globalized market. commitments nor the will, the ability and the capacity to dramatic changes to political, mobilize the collective action among What that may mean for developing environmental and economic all the nations necessary, or to do so countries faced with its youth policies that would be for all the conflicts that are likely to bulge is that the traditional needed.” arise. That is already the case. path out of unemployment Take South Sudan – an area that I’ve and into industrialization - the So, what do we do as peacemakers? worked on for a long time and which labor-intensive industries like Well, we rely on a number of rather is in a horrific, deplorable situation. textiles or small components for traditional, tried and sometimes true The regional organization that is in computers, etc. – these pathways methods. One is to appeal to leaders charge of the peace process – the may disappear. And that we’ll need to avoid exacerbating the conflicts Intergovernmental Authority for whole new economic paradigms and get them to at least contain them Development (IGAD) – insists on for dealing with the employment with a combination of pressures on being in charge but refuses to take pressures that these countries are the one hand, enticements on the the actions necessary to end the facing. I don’t see those economic other. This has worked in some cases. conflict. The U.S., so long divided paradigms yet. It worked in South Africa; it worked in over its own policy has been unable Kenya in 2007; it works to a limited to move the needle in any way. In So, what is the practitioner’s role? extent in the Central African Republic. these circumstances, the UNSC has What is the mediator’s role in this And it has worked in some other been left with making only empty world when faced with conflict, and cases. But there are few Mandelas appeals for the conflict to end. This having no control – no mandate and de Klerks in the world today. It lack of effectiveness continues - over all these underlying factors has not worked in South Sudan or despite the UN’s own assessment that are producing these pressures? Syria or Yemen or even in Myanmar that the country is on the brink of Peacemakers may give lip service where a democratic administration acts of genocide. to the need for these underlying cannot deal with the problems of the causes to be addressed, and peace Rohingya. It works even more rarely Perhaps it is best to stop talking of agreements will say that these with non-state actors like ISIS or Boko “Never Again.” That slogan implies will be addressed. But peace Haram. Where appeals to leaders that the world will feel such revulsion agreements rarely incorporate fail, mediators look to regional and at the prospect of genocide or mass the implementation of such international actors to pressure atrocities that it will organize to commitments nor the dramatic them. We use sanctions, we use contain and stop them. But that is not changes to political, environmental peacekeepers – sometimes militarily true. Countless such atrocities have and economic policies that would be intervention. And now we’ve added taken place over the last few decades, needed. to the mix accountability through the and at best only mixed results in 8 PIN•Points 44/2017

containing them. And as suggested, inhibiting the provision of such and Kenya. Maybe then IGAD will the pressures for more such violence supplies to its enemies. Why don’t rise to the occasion of putting real is pulsating within societies in many we refuse to provide aid under such pressure on the contending parties places in the world. dire circumstances, with higher and doing more to end the war. costs and lower effectiveness, and Maybe what we should do instead is putting at risk the lives of the aid Well, of course, we never will reach to prepare ourselves for continuing workers? Why don’t the leaders of those conclusions, and we don’t outbreaks of such violence – South Sudan have to pay the price, suggest that we do. It is hard despite sometimes vicious and horrible, and political and economic, for the the obstacles placed in the way, and recognize that without addressing humanitarian disaster they have the frustrations in the peace efforts, the underlying causes the best we as created? Would that move them to make the victims pay even a practitioners can do is put band aids to change course? Would it cause greater price. And it is not clear that on them - contain them to a degree such upheaval that they would be taking such stand would have much – postpone them a little bit into the forced to do so? effect on the powers arrayed in Syria future until the next time. Or until or Yemen. we finally get new leadership and There are also more than 1.5 new paradigms that will address the million South Sudan refugees But we do need to look at new underlying problems. that have flowed into neighboring paradigms. We need to confront the countries. UNHCR, with U.S. and fact that such conflicts are likely There is of course one more thing others support, provides the tents going to arise again and again. We we could do. But as often as we have and the food and the care for these cannot rely only on past promises of raised this with colleagues around refugees. Supposing we didn’t do “Never Again,” of improved warning the world and especially with the that? Supposing we said to Uganda, systems, and the like. We need new humanitarian agencies, we all come “Those 800,000 South Sudanese ways to confront the forces that will to the same conclusion - that it is refugees are yours. You are not almost surely continue to lead people impossible to do what I am about doing much to end this war in your and their leaders to tear each other to suggest. But let’s look at it once neighboring country. You’re not as apart. We need to find new ways to again. One of the standard responses a member of IGAD doing enough. manage these forces both long term to conflict is to provide humanitarian So why don’t you pay the price for and in their immediate impact. This assistance to the victims. It is the those refugees that are now flowing has to be our task. If mediators do politically easiest thing to do, and it daily into your country?” The same not raise these issues, who will? makes a lot of sense. It shows that could be said to Ethiopia, Sudan, we are doing something, and it helps the victims.

But in effect with now such massive amounts of such aid, we are in effect paying for the wars. The international community is providing two billion dollars a year in humanitarian aid to South Sudan, most of which coming from the U.S. It is doing that against the wishes, if you will, against the obstacles placed in their way by both sides in the war. Nearly 80 aid workers have been killed trying to get humanitarian aid to the people in need. Meanwhile, the government of South Sudan profits from the money spent in country, the food it steals for its soldiers, and it’s DFID - UK Department for International Development www.pin-negotiation.org 9

Mr. Kate - Own work, CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=19991121

PART 3: GALIA GOLAN POTENTIAL NEGOTIATIONS IN THE UPCOMING YEAR: A SYMPOSIUM

Let us deal with the challenges with the US, would never accept the other side. No partner on the other left over from past negotiations, US in the region, and even if they side – peace is impossible, it will the lessons from the past, and the signed an agreement with the US, it never happen, and even if there things that remain with us. Many wouldn’t last. This feeling persisted should be an agreement, it cannot things went into past failures, but by the way of conviction: Even be trusted and would not last. But some things are still with us and Yitzhak Rabin told President Ford the point of this is that this mistrust are going to return if we ever have that “no Arab leader will ever make has been so strong, and is so once negotiations again. genuine peace with us.” Although again today, that even when a he said it could change; a long peace offer was on the table, it was The first such factor, the one that period of testing would be needed. rejected. There was a preference is absolutely critical going all the That was the beginning of a different amongst Israeli leaders for security way back, was mistrust, beyond the attitude, one apparent later also for precautions, even when they knew usual mistrust of the other side. right wing leader Ehud Olmert, but that those security precautions Israeli negotiators for whom the disappeared more recently under were deal breakers – whether feeling, the conviction, was that Netanyahu, who returned to the with Jordan, whether it was with the Arabs would never make peace idea that there is no partner on the Syria, and even if it was with the 10 PIN•Points 44/2017

Egyptians, the Yom Kippur War from the Mediterranean to the they gave up their claim to 78% could have been avoided, in fact. Jordan River – maybe even beyond of mandated Palestine and went And this is the case with regard to – it’s theirs. The difference between for the two-state solution, what the Palestinians to this day. someone like right-wing leaders they called a mini-state limited to Menachem Begin or Netanyahu, on the West Bank and Gaza with East The major challenge that has the one hand, and Yitzhak Rabin, for Jerusalem as the capital. They said, returned is this mistrust and, example, was that Rabin himself “We gave up 78%, and now you therefore, the preference said that the difference between want to negotiate the 22%.” This basically for demands for security the right wing and the Labor was so-called symmetrical approach arrangements that are in fact [is] that Labor is willing to give up of the Israeli negotiators was also certain deal-breakers. Specifically some of it. Thus it is a matter of this problematic. of the demand for an Israeli military concept of “theirs” – if it is exclusive, presence in the Jordan River Valley, proprietary, ours to divide, or not. Now, mediation is intended to where there would be a border It’s not just that the Jews have overcome the asymmetry. That is between a future Palestinian certain rights in this area. Maybe natural in most negotiations, but state and Jordan. There are other others have certain rights in this that does not work for us since examples of such demands, with area as well, but those of the Jews the usual mediator is the United the Syrians too, in the past. But are exclusive and proprietary. And States, and the United States has this mistrust is linked to the issue this means that in negotiations, the a “special relationship” with Israel. of legitimacy, and for Israelis, approach of the Israeli negotiator The United States is far from being with regard to our presence in the is: “This is ours, but we’re going an even broker in a negotiation. Nor region, that also means identity: to be generous and we’re going is it viewed by either side as an even The idea of the right of Jews to be to give you some of it.” Instead of broker, even if we look at the most in the ‘promised land’, the right of approaching negotiations from the recent negotiations conducted by Jews to have a state, and in this point of view -- as one Palestinian Secretary of State Kerry, what we particular place. Sadat understood negotiator put it – that these are call the Kerry Initiative. As in past this matter; Arafat did not. your needs, these are our needs and negotiations, Kerry, the American interests, that is, an interest-based mediator, turns time and again to For example, Arafat greatly negotiation, the Israeli approach is the Israelis to see what Israel will underestimated the issue of quite different, ignoring the rights accept, consulting with the Israelis, Jerusalem and the importance of of the other side. well before going to the other side. Jerusalem for Israelis. At Camp This was something that occurred in David, he said that the ancient Connected with this is another every case of mediation on the part Jewish Temple was probably not perhaps tactical element: the of the United States, but certainly even in Jerusalem. That was the asymmetry of the situation, which in the most recent case one could one serious mistake he made at has been pointed out. Israeli count the far greater number of Camp David because Jerusalem negotiators tend to ignore the meetings between Kerry and Israel symbolically – geographically asymmetry, which obviously is than those between Kerry and the as well – is the symbol of our there, but as Rob Malley and Hussein Palestinians. connection to that specific place. Agha pointed out after the Camp Thus, this was a misunderstanding David talks, Israeli negotiators “Now, mediation is of the importance of this issue for acted as if there were symmetry. intended to overcome Israeli negotiators and their whole As if basically we are equals; we’ll the asymmetry.” attitude toward the other side. give a little, and you’ll give a little – we’ll make a compromise and you’ll This imbalance certainly has not This comes into another problem make a compromise. Netanyahu been helpful from the Palestinian that occurs in negotiations with later called it, “We give – you point of view, particularly because Israelis, linked to this legitimacy give.” It’s reciprocity, he called the US has a special relationship, issue and our place in this physical, it – a sort of a tit for tat. Except which meant that from the geographic area. It is the idea or that the Palestinians believed they Palestinian point of view, America basic conception, held by every had already made their major was representing Israel in the Israeli leader to this day, with no compromise -- what they called negotiations. This does not have exceptions, that this land is theirs; their “historic compromise” -- when to be the case of course. There www.pin-negotiation.org 11

By U.S. Department of State from United States - Secretary Kerry, Special Envoy Lowenstein Sit With Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, National Security Adviser Cohen Before Bilateral Meeting in Washington

have been periods when the United But there is another side to all of it has been written about – is that to States exerted pressure on Israel. this, maybe even a crucial factor, and sell an agreement, to persuade the I wish that had happened more that is the issue during negotiations public to accept, a leader will often recently, but certainly in the past of the conversation between the say things necessary to placate the America has offered sticks as well leaders - in this case, the Israeli public, which in fact send exactly as carrots, for example, in 1975 leader -- and the public regarding the wrong message to the other for the Interim Israeli-Egyptian the negotiations themselves. This side. Agreement and at Camp David in is raising the issue in which way a 1978. In both cases, it was America leader handles potential spoilers. A classic example of this occurred that leveraged the agreements. Ultimately, it has been spoilers on in the negotiations between Israel Of the more recent negotiations, our side, not just on the other side, and Syria at Shepherdstown, totally Ambassador Dan Kurtzer has that have disrupted and ultimately destroying what by most accounts written extensively about what defeated negotiations. Much has to could have been a successful might have greater improved do with how the leader, in the case negotiation. Prime Minister Ehud American mediation, particularly by of Oslo, Yitzhak Rabin, “sells” the Barak was seriously concerned taking a more proactive role in the whole idea, what is being negotiated about public opinion at home - which course of the talks. and when. This is particularly was not favorable to an agreement important as negotiators get close with the Syrians because people to a settlement: just how a leader did not want to give up the Golan sells the expected settlement to Heights. Therefore, he leaked an the public. Very often what happens American document (that in fact – and this is of course nothing new, had been just a draft proposal) 12 PIN•Points 44/2017

and in sought to demonstrate and denial of a peace offer that has come is saying: it’s not the occupation the boast about what a great deal he along or entering negotiations with Palestinians are objecting to, it’s was getting and what the Syrians no intention whatsoever of reaching Jews, it’s anti-Semitism. were being forced to give up to the an agreement. advantage of Israel. The Syrian So, for Netanyahu, negotiations negotiators were furious; that “The concept of leadership are interesting as a process, only ended the negotiation and the is critical to political will, as a process. With the present chance of achieving an agreement if indeed the leader has government coalition, it may even with Hafiz al-Assad. that political will...” be the case that negotiating is unacceptable, undesirable, or There were similar incidents, on And unfortunately, we have such a would politically exploit agreement the part of Arafat, for example, who, situation now – perhaps we should to talks as a sign of weakness on in placating his own hard liners, call it “alternative facts” whereby the part of Netanyahu. Actually, spoke of continued jihad against Netanyahu has said clearly and Netanyahu does seek a regional Israel. While there were many loudly that the Palestinians have negotiation; he has indeed spoken interpretations to the word jihad, not changed, have never recognized of such a meeting. But that is Arafat was clearly speaking to his Israel. Most Israelis today believe based on the hope that Israel own skeptics, but Israel picked him, believe that the Palestinians could be officially talking to the that up and ran with it as proof of have never recognized Israel – in Arab states in particular Saudi the Palestinians real intentions. So, fact, this was said in Netanyahu’s Arabia, and thus gain that kind of the rhetoric is very important and press conference with Trump. acceptance in the region, without selling an agreement or dealing Yet, in 1988, the Palestinians, the dealing with the Palestinian issue. with spoilers may be critical. There PLO, accepted Israel’s right to There is no Arab state that will go are many ways to deal with that exist – not just that the country to a regional conference with Israel but I recently co-edited a book happened to exist, but our right to without talking about resolution on spoilers and how to deal with exist within secure and recognized of the conflict between Israel and spoilers because of the crucial, borders. It was again put in writing the Palestinians. But Netanyahu indeed fatal role they can play (even in September 1993 in the exchange (and Trump, perhaps) may think non-violent spoilers). of letters between Rabin and otherwise. Arafat just prior to presenting the Let us make one last point about a Oslo Accords. But today that is Finally, the major factor, above matter we saw recently in the Kerry simply ignored; never happened. all else (or perhaps underlying negotiations. And that is with what The same way the government of all) is the political will of the Oliver Richmond has called the Netanyahu ignores the Arab Peace leader, whether the leader has the devious actor. A devious actor is a Initiative, unanimously adopted political will to go through with an negotiator (a leader) who enters and reiterated by the Arab League, agreement. To a large degree, the negotiations with no intention of promising not only recognition but determination of a leader to reach making an agreement. He/she normal relations, end of conflict an agreement may depend in turn on does it for various reasons; maybe and security. the leader’s concept of leadership to buy time, maybe to placate – whether you follow the public, public opinion or public opponents Similarly, the government presents which was Barak’s problem, or you domestically; maybe to relieve Hamas and the PLO as if they are lead the public, which was Rabin’s outside pressure. We have had one and the same thing – out to just and Olmert’s attitude. The concept these devious actors in the past, destroy us. Those were the words of leadership is critical to political under the Labor party as well as Netanyahu used in the White House will, if indeed the leader has that the right-wing in Israel. These are press conference: the Palestinians political will, and of course there leaders who knowingly ignore peace want to destroy us. You do not have are many, many circumstances and offers, even hide them or lie about a Palestinian leader today in the factors that lay behind that very them - denying that they actually PLO or in the Palestinian Authority critical thing. What brings about exist. We can give you example after who advocates anything but a this political will? example since 1967. Something two-state solution. And yet, most that, as an Israeli, I find totally people in Israel or at least a large depressing and indeed tragic: the proportion, believe what Netanyahu www.pin-negotiation.org 13

PART 4: VALI NASR POTENTIAL NEGOTIATIONS IN THE UPCOMING YEAR: A SYMPOSIUM

By Office of the President of the United States - @realDonaldTrump on Twitter, Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=57074244

At the very macro level, particularly very narrow, nationalist agendas in like European Union or broader outside the U.S., listening to pushing for conflicts. And of course, trade agreements. concerns outside, the context in the rhetoric that the United States which the low resolution of conflicts has put on the table – “America One other sort of facet that is and the encounter of conflicts has first” – if it’s universalized into “me worrisome but is very much on taken place or expected to take place first”, is suggestive of more of a people’s radars is that the chaos has now clearly shifted. Particularly zero-sum approach to conflicts as in Washington in decision-making the assault on globalization, on they go forward, giving more reason is a vacuum, a palpable vacuum, in trade, on the sort of the economic to fight than to stop fighting. There decision-making and not making context, the sense of global are more incentives on the table for an incentive for ending conflicts community that could have served gaining as much as possible through but rather an accelerator of trying as a break on a set of conflicts or conflicts than prospects of what to get as much as possible before could have provided incentive for might be taken from a settlement. adults return to run things. That engagement of actors in certain Particular examples where I’ve is literally the way in which people conflicts in order to bring an end heard those ideas of being included see it, that in the short run, the way to them is no longer there. The rise into international trade systems, in which Washington works, the of illiberal nationalism particularly into European Community, into a palpable chaos, actually creates an in the United States but also in broader international community opportunity to drive harder. So, going Europe is a source of worry. Largely as an incentive for ending conflicts back to our last speaker, why not many think outside that it actually is no longer as credible, as tangible, build more settlements as quickly as gives greater license to pursuing particularly in the future of an entity possible where no one is actually in 14 PIN•Points 44/2017

the State Department to pick up the very early on in terms of structure, level right about grand bargains. Can phone and actually object. And so, you process, and strategy tend to exist there be a grand bargain between can create facts on the ground that are not being made with influence of Russia and the United States over will become established. Now, that diplomats and that might create much not just division of power in Syria or of course goes from something as more of a permanent imbalance Ukraine, but over division of power small as building more settlements that would be consequential going in Europe, the future of NATO, the to potentially issues that have to forward. But it also saps the U.S.’s future of Europe. And can there be deal with territory or getting certain moral authority in approaching a grand bargain between the United advantages that create instability. conflict resolution. States and China, which would then decide many things in Asia from The second issue at the larger “This is not to say that trade to South China Sea, East China level is that where there are adults militaries don’t engage Sea, North Korea, etc. or responsible stakeholders in in negotiations, but they Washington, they tend to come now approach the negotiations These are sort of tantalizing ideas, predominantly from the military, from a very different vantage but what are the challenges here? particularly in the White House. And point than diplomats.” One is that approaching these that’s not only at the level of senior large conflicts can unleash a lot military leaders and generals, but The third issue at a larger level is, more smaller conflicts. This kind as a lot of the lower ranks This sort what the Trump administration has of rebalancing, at least President of militarization of foreign policy is really put on the table in a big way, Obama was trying in one theater in certainly being reflected in budget is basically resetting the world order, the world in Asia. Trying to do it in distribution as Tom mentioned. It and in a larger way redefining who Europe and Asia at the same time, suggests that a kind of corporate are America’s fundamental allies and abandoning allies that had been sort identity or corporate way of who are its fundamental enemies. of the Transatlantic Reliance that has thinking about world problems is Some of this has been jarring and been the main-stay of the post-World going to dominate in Washington counter-intuitive in the way in which War II order for us and trying to that doesn’t favor diplomats or the foreign policy establishment replace it with something else will diplomatic solutions to problems. across the aisles thinks about it - by definition be turbulent, and it This is not to say that militaries that Europe or the European Union, could unleash many different sort don’t engage in negotiations, but if not an enemy or not an adversary, of conflicts. So, trying to settle the they approach the negotiations is definitely not an asset to the larger conflicts could unleash many from a very different vantage point United States. Certain elements of smaller conflicts. And it could also than diplomats. We already had a the administration would like the send signals that may be not hopeful. problem over the balance of power European Union to go away and are between the military and diplomats. maybe even be willing to provide On the Arab-Israeli issue –the idea It was something that President a lending hand. Rather, Russia is that a mini rebalancing administration Obama already problematized in actually America’s natural ally in is promoting trying to create an Arab his own approach to foreign policy, confronting a lot of global problems, Israeli alliance around opposition to but he was very clear about that and China should be treated much Iran. The end-result about which the particularly outside the United more singularly as a threat, or as a administration is hopeful would be States. That balance has been lost strategic counterpart to the United an Arab recognition of Israel despite at least within this administration States. Now, these are sort-of big the promise to move the capital to within a very clear, palpable way. ideas – sort of Kissingerian ideas Jerusalem, expand settlements about balance of power, about and send a politically, challenging There’s a deafening silence at the rebalancing. They are much grander ambassador to Israel as far as the State Department that is very, very and much sharper on its edges than Arabs are concerned at least. Despite noticeable. The Secretary of State President Obama’s notions of pivoting all of these ideas, there can somehow is not engaged in a lot of their to Asia, which did not have the same be a grand bargain between the opinions that are being laid out. The kind of conflictual tones to it. Now, Arabs and the Israelis but at a cost Department of State is not manned, the interesting thing about this sort of because Iran is such a strategic the secretaries are not in place, resetting is that it connotes that the bogey in the East. They send various deputies are not in place. All of that most important negotiations perhaps signals to the Israeli government in is suggestive that key decisions are going to be at the most macro terms of balance of power vis a vis www.pin-negotiation.org 15

the Arabs, so that the assumption is language that the administration is we really don’t have a vital interest. that Iran is a much more important promoting without actually calling it Right, so the Trump administration factor for Arab governments than the that, but essentially trying to revamp is almost intimating that we do have Palestinians are. You hear comments the strategic map in many places, a vital interest in Syria, and we think like the Israeli Defense Minister which then would change the context the Russians do, so we’re willing to saying, “Yeah, Arabs don’t care about for many of the conflicts. Now, to this give him a peace deal for Ukraine in Palestine. They care about Iran”, you can add the problem that you’re exchange for something in Syria that and therefore, Israel really doesn’t trying to do strategy without having neither we care about nor they care have any pressure on it as far as the strategic vision. In other words, about. It almost sounds like a gift. Palestinians are concerned – there everyone understands that what the is no international pressure, there administration is really putting on Similarly with China. What is the is no regional pressure, in fact it the table is completely changing the administration’s leverage? There can basically have its cake and eat nature of transatlantic relations and might be leverage in forms of trade, it too. It can have what it wants in U.S.-Russia relations or rebuilding etc., but it’s not articulated what that terms of territory, settlements, final the Middle East completely. But it’s leverage is and therefore, how do you solution, but at the same time get the unable to articulate this or put it in negotiate and what is it that you are recognition and support that it wants. a way forward that other people can putting on the table. And the Palestinians will end up with actually build their policies around no strategic umbrella in the region. it. And that is actually creating much And also, it is one thing when you more guessing, hedging and worry. It say that it is the Tom Pickerings Now that would make for a very is also problematic when it’s not clear or the Zbigniew Brzezinskis or the different conversation at the table and what the administration’s leverage Kissingers of the world are going to you go beyond the devious actors to is here. What is it actually going to be managing these as opposed to the completely obdurate actors. Actually, offer Russia and what is it going to current sort of administration trying it’s very difficult to see how there will get from Russia? If you talk to the to manage the strategy. And there’s be any peace process if Israel doesn’t Europeans, you’re offering them a perception that the administration even see the necessity for it. That’s the Syria, where technically President actually does not have the capacity consequence for this grand bargain Obama went to great lengths to say in terms of manpower or in terms of

Russian-Chinese talks. President Vladimir Putin with First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov (right) and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov | The Russian Presidential Press and Information Office 16 PIN•Points 44/2017

audacity of the rearrangement of the Russians or Russia plus America can more militarily confident, especially global strategic scene that is taken actually add risks that a diverse set of given the poor performance of the on to actually do anything other than interests in the region without serious Saudi military in Yemen, and so any create chaos. You know simultaneous negotiations because we forget that negotiation at this point in this time grand bargain with the Russians, at the end of the day, Russia and is not likely to arrive anywhere near Chinese, Europeans, in the Middle the United States don’t live in the to what the Saudis want. The Saudis East is beyond the capacity of the Middle East. All the countries around would probably like the U.S. military best administrations, let alone the Syria and Iraq have to live with the or the U.S. government to bring Trump’s one. This US administration consequences of a deal for the rest Iranians down a notch before they go is going to encourage a lot more of their lives, so they care about it to the table – something like Sadat hedging, a lot more free-lancing much more. There’s no way to see having to go to war in 1973 before he by different actors, and a lot more that currently that either Iran wins could engage the Israelis because conflict, and much less capability on or the Saudi-Sunni alliance wins, you you couldn’t go to the table with the the part of the international system have to give them something in order humiliation of 1967. to prevent these conflicts to manage to balance this out. these conflicts, and then end these Now, that course of action is very conflicts. And as mentioned, the Iran- Saudi different from what the Obama issue is one of those places where administration was doing, which was Let us end by just going to points that it’s not a common conflict within to balance a relation with the Arabs were raised about the Middle East. a territory, but it’s much more a with Iran. A confrontation between The Middle East matters because regional conflict of the kind that U.S. and Iran increasingly seems like it’s going to provide a particular set we’ve dealt with before of trying to what this administration is signing up of challenges and conflicts that will reduce tensions. It is much more like to, and in some ways is also good for be on our radar going forward. So a Greece-Turkey conflict of a different Israel because Israel has a different correctly, Tom Pickering identified time period and here the solutions agenda. The more Iran becomes Syria, and I would add to it Iraq are not that simple. The Saudis problematic, the more likely it is that as places that are going to need have obviously adopted a very tough the Arabs will have to accept whatever some form of serious approach to position on Iran. Basically, what Israel gives on the Palestinians in negotiations. So, after ISIS is gone they want is for the United States to order to build an alliance. It actually or after Mosul is liberated, the key remove Iran from the region, put it in has consequences. It could actually question is how do you decide the its own country, create a containment unleash many more conflicts in Iraq future of Syria and Iraq? Are they wall and hand over Iraq, Syria, and Syria, and Iraq will explode as going to be one country? Are they Lebanon and Yemen over to Saudi a consequence of the U.S.- Iran going to be many countries? Are the Arabia and its allies on a silver platter. confrontation. And also the nuclear Kurds going to be independent, or That literally is their ideal position. deal may be put on life support if not they going stay in Iraq or is this going But at the same time, they’re also completely out of commission, and to be a hyper-federated, cantonized hedging the idea of making another that you know would undo a major nation-state? Or is it going to be offer to Iran in the form of a Kuwaiti negotiation victory of the previous a unitary state? And that would delegation. And Tehran suggests that administration. require of course some serious they’re not quite sure that a Trump negotiations, which Secretary Kerry administration would do that, and It also sort of raises an interesting had tried to do without leverage for they should at least explore a plan question which nowadays we have some time. Now, if at some point the B, which might be some form of an to ask literally about whatever we Trump administration would have to opening window. talk – what about Russia? So, the confront this issue, their approach to Russians are now a very big player in this is that we’re just going to make But you know the Saudis have the the Middle East. The Administration nice with Russia and therefore there same dilemma than let’s say the is trying to make nice with Russia at is nothing to negotiate with. We’ll Palestinians have in dealing with the same time it wants to go against just both be in agreement about the Israelis, which is they have the Russia’s ally in the region, which an outcome. The problem is first, weaker hand. They can go to the is Iran, and that’s sort of a level of I’m not sure that Russian and U.S. negotiation table, but obviously, complication, which is something the interests are aligned in the Middle the Iranians control more territory, new US administration has yet ready East. Secondly, it’s not a given that hold more of the cards, and are put its mind around. www.pin-negotiation.org 17

Air Force Brig. Gen. Richard N. Harris, Chief of Joint Staff of Vermont Air National Guard, bids farewell to Senegalese Admiral Ousmane Ibrahima Sall, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of Senegal. The United States Marine Corps.

BY MARK ANSTEY ECOWAS MEDIATION IN THE GAMBIA

DEMOCRACY IN DECLINE consecutive year. There are, of rise in authoritarianism in large course, problems of classification strategically important countries From the 1970’s the world experienced and counts, and unresolved debates such as Turkey. African autocrats a prolonged surge (a third wave) in about whether the picture reflects have been very willing to adopt the democratic governance (Huntington simply a stalling or the start of an Chinese model of development 1997). Whereas only about 30% international decline in democracy. before democracy, but Diamond of nations (46) were classified as Some argue that only liberal argued that there has been a democratic in 1974, by 2006 this had democracies are really democratic decline in democratic confidence, risen to about 60% (peaking at 119). and that classifications have been too commitment and functionality, even Freedom scores also improved across generous for many democracies that in nations as the USA. the world. However, Huntington are simply electoral (e.g. low quality) worried about the sustainability of with few freedoms. These freedoms The Middle East and Africa had the the third wave and in Democracy come in the form of competitive worst freedom scores globally in 2016 in Decline? (2015)1 Diamond and authoritarian systems. (Freedom House 2017), and 29 of 49 Plattner conclude that democracy sub-Saharan African states (almost worldwide has been in a ‘mild but Between 1974 and 2014, 29% of 60%) experienced declines in their protracted’ recession since 2006. all democracies broke down at freedom scores. Diamond argues an accelerating rate (Diamond that ‘there is not a single country In its annual report of 2017, Freedom 2015). 25 democracies collapsed on the African continent where House proposed that freedom scores between 2000 and 2015. Of these, democracy is firmly consolidated have globally declined for the 11th military interventions caused eight and secure’. Nations such as South democracies to fail, but 13 state Africa have experienced declines in 1 See also other relevant recent works such failures occurred as a consequence their scores for transparency and the as Diamond,L, Plattner MF, Walker C (eds). 2016. Authoritarianism Goes Global: of internal erosion – ‘abuse of rule of law (Diamond 2015:107-8). The Challenge to Democracy. Baltimore, power and the desecration of For some years, the South African Johns Hopkins University Press. Haggard democratic institutions and President Jacob Zuma’s use of S and Kaufman RR. 2016. Dictators and Democrats: Masses, Elites and Regime practices by democratically elected public funds to upgrade his private Change. Princeton, Princeton University rulers’ (Diamond 2015:106). residence in Nkandla and his Press. This has been accompanied by a evasive responses to the Public 18 PIN•Points 44/2017

Protector’s recommendations to Contests of control between an gained independence from the repay some of the monies caused executive who believes its edicts United Kingdom in 1965. Former serious dissension in the South should be unbounded and a judiciary President Jammeh came to power in African House of Assembly. When whose job is to hold lawmakers 1994 through means of a bloodless the matter was eventually referred accountable to the Constitution are coup, assumed the mantle of a to the Constitutional Court, it found not limited to developing nations. civilian president and won successive that the President had failed to fulfill The childlike twittering of Mr. elections in 2001, 2006 and 2011 his primary obligation to “uphold, Trump’s early presidency will be through a regime accused of human defend and respect the Constitution”, remembered precisely for such rights violations and political coercion. and that the National Assembly had a contest! The USA, so long the failed in its duty to hold the President model for a democracy founded on The 2016 elections were preceded accountable and to follow the correct principles of liberty, has become by high levels of tension and civil (judicial) procedures if its members a model of rollback of freedoms society protest led by the opposition disagreed with the recommendations (Diamond 2015). Encouragingly, United Democratic Party (UDP). of the Public Protector. The US Courts seem willing to obstruct The government arrested over 50 impeachment motion failed, which President Trump’s efforts to opposition leaders, three died in was always likely as the ruling party translate his ill-founded prejudices detention, prompting the UN to stalled in its leadership. The reality and political bluster into law. call for the release of all political is that these duties can only really prisoners. The pre-election be upheld where there is political In the context of a wider global fact-finding missions of the African will – and this has been increasingly democratic recession and Africa’s Union (AU), the UN and ECOWAS in question for some years. sharp decline in freedom scores, noted shortcomings in the system the recent case of The Gambian that would undermine it as a free and As Marr (2012) and Zacharia (2004) presidential election represents a fair process. point out, democracy is less about case study of a West African region institutions than culture. The real willing to act collectively to protect There was some surprise on value of the Court’s findings lies in principles of democracy. Brown December 2, 2016 when Jammeh its clarification of the roles of the Odigie’s (2017) excellent article accepted his defeat at the polls to President, the National Assembly, summarized below on the role of Adama Barrow in a 45,5% to 36,7% the Judiciary and the office of the ECOWAS in The Gambia provides vote, but he soon reconsidered. On Public Protector to uphold, defend and insight into the implementation of a December 9, 2016 Jammeh called respect the Constitution. A proportional principled mediation process. for a rerun of the elections. Such representation system, a dispensation moments gave rise to a range of driven by the logic of cadre deployment ECOWAS AND GAMBIA questions in terms of external to entrench the control of the African intervention: Should there be National Congress (ANC) in power, The Economic Community of West intervention, and by whom? For what and the use of a block vote saw the African States (ECOWAS) comprises purpose, under whose authority, and President survive the opposition 15 nations. Despite declines in scores using what means? impeachment initiative but laid bare in a number of member nations, the very problems of political design ECOWAS comprises nations rated by In Article 58 of the revised 1993 that concerned the court. Declining Freedom House as free and partly ECOWAS Treaty, member states trust in the Presidency has seen the free. During the 2015-2016 period, are obliged to cooperate with the emergence of a civil society, the ‘Save 10 of the ECOWAS fifteen member ECOWAS community in the use of South Africa’ movement, including states conducted elections. In its appropriate peaceful mechanisms for ANC stalwarts, calling for an end to 2017 report, Freedom House ranked dispute prevention and the resolution corruption and for President Zuma to Senegal, Ghana, Benin, Cape Verde as of inter and intrastate conflicts. In step down. The real test is whether “free” and The Gambia, Nigeria, Cote 1999 ECOWAS adopted the Protocol South Africans at the grassroots d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, Relating to the Mechanism for level can cohere around the values Togo, Mali, Liberia, Burkina Faso, Conflict Prevention, Management, espoused in the Constitution and Guinea Niger as “partly free”. Resolution, Peacekeeping and put national interests above those of Security, which was integrated into party, or whether it will descend into A small country with a population the 2001 Protocol on Democracy polarized politics. of about two million, The Gambia and Good Governance. The Gambian www.pin-negotiation.org 19

Authority of the Heads of State and asylum for the King of Morocco had conducted air surveillance over the Government (AHSG) is the highest offered Jammeh a ‘golden asylum’. Gambian capital of Banjul. In this body empowered to act on these On December 17, 2016, the AHSG context, the President of Mauritania issues of dispute. decided to uphold the election eventually persuaded Jammeh to step results and provide protection to down without resistance. Jammeh “Mediation seeks to bring President-Elect Barrow. The body subsequently took the opportunity parties in conflict towards a appointed President Buhari and of exile as provided by Equatorial mutually satisfying, or at least, Ghanaian President Mahama as the Guinea. Finally, on January 20th while a mutually bearable mediators of the conflict, but also under threat of a forceful removal, resolution of differences. charged them with the creation of Jammeh relinquished power and flew It should not be a process a smooth transition of power to to Equatorial Guinea for asylum in unbounded by principle.” maintain peace and stability in The exile. Jammeh was guaranteed safety Gambia. In short, the mediation was and security as a former president ECOWAS observed the December not an open-ended process but one and the assurance that authorities 2016 elections in the Gambia with strict terms of reference. would not-seize the assets and as credible and thus adopted a properties lawfully belonging to him carrot and stick approach to its Jammeh countered this edict by or his family members. The Gambian intervention. It joined the United declaring a state of emergency, and election and presidential succession Nations and the African Union in the Gambian parliament responded process was a good example of calling on The Gambian Authority by extending his regime for 90 days. ‘muscle mediation’ to ensure a to abide by its constitution and to In meetings on January 13th and bloodless transfer of power. uphold the result of the polls. Early 17th of this year with the Presidents attempts for diplomacy were blocked of Mauritania and Guinea, Jammeh PRINCIPLED MEDIATION by Jammeh, who refused to meet again refused any external asylum. with the Chair of ECOWAS, Liberian Mediation seeks to bring parties President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf. On January 19th Barrow was in conflict towards a mutually Jammeh even refused the landing inaugurated as new President in satisfying, or at least, a mutually rights for Johnson-Sirleaf’s plane the Gambian embassy in Senegal. bearable resolution of differences. It when she tried to fly into the country. ECOWAS continuously pressured should not be a process unbounded By December 13, 2016, President Jammeh to formally relinquish his by principle. Adopting a quiet Johnson-Sirleaf and Nigerian power. ECOWAS used diplomacy to diplomacy approach guided simply President Buhari assembled a try to persuade Jammeh to relinquish by values of non-evaluation may high-level ECOWAS team to meet power peacefully, but it also used be useful to achieve access to a with Jammeh and Barrow. However, its persuasive muscle. ECOWAS conflict, but it is no guarantee of Jammeh was obdurate, refusing to assembled troops in Senegal, put meaningful influence. In asymmetric step down and accept the offer of a warship in Gambian waters and power relations, mediators may find

President Tusk meets Adama Barrow, President of Gambia, European Council President – Flickr.com 20 PIN•Points 44/2017

themselves simply claiming abuses given conflict situation. The people not only to the sustainability of based on power disparities. of Gambia have been freed of their democracy but to rapid and equitable former president and have exercised development that will give it prospect. Mediation should be impartial, of their right to change who governs It is important, if democracies are to course, but impartiality must be them. This is a more principled use of survive, that they deliver a sense of judged against principles. Mediation’s process. The Gambia in many senses material improvement in peoples’ aim is not to support any side or to however is a small test for what Africa lives (Marr 2012). Support from support particular leaders, but to will do in cases involving powerhouse ECOWAS will be needed for much support the creation of a normalized economies where the power realities longer than an electoral crisis if political environment (Anstey 2007). are different and difficult. What a culture of democracy is to be As with other recent interventions would ECOWAS do if one of its more developed. ECOWAS also needs in Africa, mediators must choose influential members, such as Nigeria to equitably manage the tensions whether to support the popular will or Ghana, drifted in the direction of between population groups and as reflected in a poll or see a conflict the Jammeh regime in the Gambia? within armed forces (Odigie 2017). simply in terms of competing elites. Diamond and Plattner (2015) argue It is the duty of the power holders’ old that no democracies in Africa can References friends to not to turn a blind eye to be taken for granted – and for this Anstey, M. 2007. Zimbabwe in Ruins: their human rights abuses but to help reason the Gambian case should be Mediation Prospects for a Conflict Note Yet Ripe for Resolution. International Negotiation. them achieve standards acceptable widely celebrated. 12, 415-442. to the international community. Odigie (2017) argues the importance Anstey, M. 1993. Practical Peacemaking. Cape Town, Jutas In cases such as Zimbabwe (Anstey of coherence, complementarity 2007) and Kenya, where leaders and coordination in the Gambian Diamond, L. and Plattner, MF (eds) 2015. Democracy in Decline. Baltimore, Johns refused to accept defeat at the case. These are factors reflected Hopkins University Press polls, mediation witnessed the in the success of mediation in the popular vote being traded against Rhodesian-Zimbabwe intervention Freedom House. 2017. Freedom in the World 2017. Downloaded on 5th February 2017 peace. Power-sharing deals saw that evolved into the Lancaster House from https://freedomhouse.org/report/ powerholders such as Zimbabwean Agreement in 1979 (Anstey 2007). freedom-world/freedom-world-2017

President Mugabe retain power In short, successful interventions Huntington, S. 1997. After Twenty Years: in the face of elections criticized supportive of democracy require The Future of the Third Wave. Journal of by observer missions as lacking neighbors interested in building Democracy. 8,4:3-12. credibility. In The Gambia case, the a regional community of nations Marr, A. 2012. A History of the World. London, mandate given to the mediators by the that hold such values dear. They Macmillan.

ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State need to build a democratic culture Odigie, B. 2017. In Defense of Democracy: and Government was not to mediate communally and hold one another to Lessons from ECOWAS Management of The away popular will but to affirm it. its standards. Gambia’s 2016 Post-Election Impasse. Accord Policy and Practice Brief, 46, January 2017. The matter for mediation was not how to share power but to ensure its DEMOCRATIC PROSPECTS IN Zacharia, F. 2004. The Future of Freedom. New York, WW Norton. peaceful transition to a new leader THE GAMBIA elected in a credible ballot, and to Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the determine the terms of departure for Elections of course are not in National Assembly and Others; Democratic Alliance v Speaker of the National Assembly the previous incumbent. themselves sufficient to democracy, and Others (CCT 143/15; CCT 171/15) [2016] but they are its essential cornerstone. ZACC 11 (31 March 2016) at http://www.saflii. org/za/cases/ZACC/2016/11.html downloaded There have been other outcomes for Electoral democracies fall short 11 April 2016. mediation efforts too. Both the Libyan of the standards of political and rebels and Libyan President Qadaffi civil rights that characterize liberal turned down offers of mediation in democracies. Now that Jammeh is the Libyan crisis in 2010, and when gone, Barrow must still deliver The faced with fight or facilitated asylum, Gambia to a rule of law, demonstrate Qadaffi misjudged the power reality. commitment to protecting human And thus, the conflict ended poorly as rights, and achieve reconciliation a result of this misjudgment. Much between opposing groups in the depends on power realities in any country. It will require attention www.pin-negotiation.org 21

Green Line” - Nicosia, Cyprus, Julian Nitzsche - Own work, CC BY-SA 3.0

BY PAUL MEERTS CYPRUS NEGOTIATIONS ON THE BRINK

Why is it so difficult to reunite the North and the South disagree determinants, including the desire Cyprus (Saner 2012)? After all, the on the nature of the problem to be to rectify past injustices, which island has peace, democracy, strong solved. This severely limits the room reconciles human rights and group international support and leaders for convergence (Flynn and King security, with the expectation of who are committed to resolving the 2012: 427). upholding the fundamental precepts conflict. Nevertheless, efforts to of liberal democracy, while fortifying bring the two parts of the country Michael (2014: 118) ponders ‘… how the foundations for sequential together are facing some tough to construct a legal-constitutional integration/unification’. problems. For instance, Cypriots in order, dictated by a set of historical 22 PIN•Points 44/2017

Other scholars believe the problems coastline. These Sovereign Base was triggered by an attempt of the of the peace process in Cyprus might Areas fall under the British crown Greek enosis movement to join have to do with ethnic outbidding, and are therefore not part of the Greece. This action was instigated which ‘… occurs in the context of European Union. What are the options by the colonels who ruled Greece electoral politics when political and which are the obstacles for a at the time and had grabbed power parties compete for support within an successful bargaining process that through their own coup d’état some ethnic group, having few incentives will re-unite the island and therefore years before. In the turmoil, Greece to cultivate support from other create a Federal Republic of Cyprus? and Turkey, both members of the ethnicities’ (Moore, Loizidis, Sandal North-Atlantic Treaty Organization and Lordos 2014: 159). THE PAST (NATO), came close to war. Cyprus itself is a non-aligned republic. The Richarte (2005: 218) sums up twelve Cyprus has a civilization going back United Nations brokered a cease-fire obstacles that have so far prevented to millennia before the Christian and that left one third of the country under a re-unification of Cyprus, but he the Muslim eras. Neolithic tribes, Turkish occupation. Many Greeks fled points out that ‘democracy is a Phoenicians, Greeks, Persians, from the North to the South, many distinct aspect of the Cyprus issue, a Romans, Byzantines, Arabs, Turks sought refuge in the opposite rarely seen feature of other conflict Frankish and British Crusaders, the direction. Therefore, both sides, the zones in the world’ (Özkaleli and Ottomans and finally the Brits (de Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Hasgüler 2013: 273). facto from 1878, the jure from 1925) Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC, all ruled the country before it became only recognized by Turkey), have a Every now and then the Greek and an independent sovereign republic largely homogeneous population, Turkish Cypriots try to negotiate the in 1960, under the leadership of though there are still small Greek re-unification of their island. ln 1974, Archbishop Makarios. From the very and Turkish minorities in both parts a coup d’état sponsored by the military start of Cyprus as a de-colonized of the island, and small communities junta in Greece and a Turkish invasion country there were problems between of other nationalities. put an end to its feeble unity. The the Greek majority and the Turkish latest series of talks started in 2015 minority, and they worsened between THE PRESENT and commentators were optimistic 1963 and 1967. These tensions soon about the possibilities to reach a deal led to the installation of a United Notwithstanding the split between in Geneva early 2017. Agreements Nations Peacekeeping force. At the the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, there were reached on territory, property, time of independence about 80% of is something like a common feeling the economy, the relationship with the population saw itself as being of belonging together (Grigoriadis the European Union, power sharing Greek and many of them wanted 2017: 2). After all, Turks and Greeks and governance, but not on security enosis – unification – with the Greek lived together for many centuries, and here the process got stuck. Still, motherland. This majority regarded often in the same cities and villages. there seems to be more reason for itself as Greek both in language and Underneath there is a common optimism than in the past 40 years. religion, and belonging to the Greek Cypriot culture. Apart from this there Orthodox Church. About 18% of the is a feeling in the North of the country Why is this the case? What can inhabitants were of Turkish decent, that the future looks bleak. Farmers be expected before this issue of speaking Turkish and following from Anatolia are threatening Cypriot PINpoints arrives on your bookshelf, Islam. Many of them wanted taksim, culture of which they have never been or, even better, in your computer? unification with Turkey. part and parcel. The North is poor, What are the ingredients of this the South is five times as rich – partly ongoing negotiation ordeal? How is After the occupation by the Turkish because of tourism and Russian it possible to come to closure in a army of the northern part of the and Israeli money laundering - and situation when all negotiation factors country, followed by an influx of it successfully survived the banking and actors are tangled up in one farmers and other immigrants from crisis of 2008. People from the enormous ball? Cyprus, a member Turkey, the population now more or North cannot freely travel outside state of the European Union, faces less consists of 30% Turkish Cypriots the country beyond Turkey, unless a unique problem. Its Northern part and Turks, and 70% Greek Cypriots. they have Turkish nationality as well. is occupied by a non-EU member, In addition, there are 30,000 Turkish This is one of the reasons why 75% while sovereign British bases take troops on the island. The intervention of the Turkish Cypriots voted in a up important parts of its southern by the Turkish armed forces (1974) referendum in favour of the so-called www.pin-negotiation.org 23

Annan Plan (2004) that was rejected the Germans, who were eager to if the Constitution of Cyprus were by 65% of the Greek Cypriots who absorb the countries of Central and to be endangered: Turkey, Greece were of the opinion that the North Eastern Europe into the EU, were and the United Kingdom. In 2008 should have made more concessions willing to give in to the demand that Demetris Christofias (for the Greek to facilitate re-unification. De Soto Cyprus become a member without Cypriots) and Mehmet Ali Talat (for suggests that ‘perhaps the Greek re-unifying first. This is how the most the Turkish Cypriots) started serious Cypriots were knocked off balance important incentive for re-unification negotiations for re-unification under by their first face-to-face encounter was lost and small Cyprus (only 0.1% the aegis of the United Nations. ‘The with a federal solution’ (2012: 401). of the EU population) was victorious main reason for the resilience of hope in its negotiation process with the is the presence of two of the most Anyway, as a consequence, Cyprus much more powerful European moderate Cypriot political leaders at entered the EU as a divided island. states. It says something about the the helm of the negotiation process From a negotiation point of view difference between structural power than at any time before’ (Grigoriadis the European Union made a major (the European Union) and situational 2017: 2). For a long time one of the contextual mistake in tackling the power (Cyprus) and the chances main problems, compensation for the Cyprus issue (Meerts 2015: 70). It for the structurally weaker party 165,000 Greeks who were refugees wanted to use EU-membership as a to override the structural stronger in the South, could not be solved. carrot to get the Cypriots to re-unify, party if the context allows for it. Of Another huge stumbling block was but it made the strategic fault to course, this can only be achieved if the presence of the Turkish army. announce enlargement of the EU the weaker party’s negotiators use Nevertheless, a series of talks in by ten countries in one stroke: the the opportunity well. 2010, 2014 and 2015 generated some former socialist countries from the hopes for progress. In 2014 both East and the Mediterranean island PARTIES AND PEOPLE sides declared their willingness to states of Malta and Cyprus. This gave create a unified federal Cyprus. Greece the opportunity to threaten Apart from the Greek and Turkish to veto the enlargement effort if sides there are three relative The 2015 talks continued – with the EU did not allow the Republic outsiders who have a vested interest serious hiccups – till today and led to of Cyprus (in effect, Greek Cyprus) in Cyprus, officially being mandated to the Geneva negotiations of January to become a member. Especially intervene collectively or individually 2017 involving as a mediator the

Nicosia view with the European Union flag waving Cyprus presidency of the EU, NewNicosia - Own work, CC BY-SA 3.0 24 PIN•Points 44/2017

Norwegian former Foreign Minister largely to the early 2013 collapse significance, let alone the Turkish and UN Special Advisor Espen Barth of the Cypriot economy (and) the army, should the need arise. It is Eide, the President of the Republic of growing concern that Turkey’s recent for this reason that the South wants Cyprus Nicos Anastasiades and the foreign policy direction is pulling it the Turkish army to go home, while President of the Turkish Republic away from the European Union … ‘ the North wants it to stay, though in of Northern Cyprus Mustafa Akinci. (Sitilides 2014: 77). smaller numbers than at present. Shortly after the start of the talks The Turkish army itself has huge they were joined by the Ministers of The South hopes for compensation stakes in casinos and other activities Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom, of the properties lost and if possible in the North and is quite unwilling to the Turkish Republic and the Hellenic return of some of the refugees to give that up. Republic (Greece). Towards the their houses in the North, especially end, UN Secretary-General Antonio to the Varosha quarter of the city of Here, of course, President Erdogan Guterres, the President of the Famagusta. As the North seems to be comes in. For years, he did not want European Commission Jean-Claude willing to give up part of its territory, to solve the Cyprus problem as he Juncker, the EU High Representative Greek control over some of the lost could use that as a trump card in his for Foreign and Security Affairs lands and places might be restored. negotiations to successfully join the Federica Mogherini and the The Brits have declared that they European Union at a reasonable price. Presidents of Greece and Turkey are willing to hand over about half of It was hoped that he would be milder joined the negotiators. From the very their sovereign bases Dhekelia and on the issue of re-unification as his start Pieter van Nuffel, the Personal Akrotiri. The South does not want aspirations for Turkey to become Representative of Juncker, helped to to make any concessions regarding an EU member state are fading keep the process flowing. the demand of the North to have a away. Not only because of the EU rotating Presidency. Before the split criticism of his human rights policy, POSITIONS AND the President was Greek and the but also because EU membership PREFERENCES vice-President Turkish Cypriot. In would limit his power at a time he other words, the Turkish Cypriots is more and more in full control of In recent times the position of the demand a larger stake in the Turkey, especially if the country North has become more mild, for government than before, while they turns into a Presidential Republic several reasons. As mentioned want to have as much autonomy at (Cyprus by the way has always been before its isolation takes its toll and the same time. The Greek Cypriots a Presidential Republic). Erdogan, the uncertainty about the ownership are trying to limit the involvement in other words, is and has been the of real estate frustrates the of the Turkish citizens as much as key to the re-unification of Cyprus development of villages, towns and possible and while the North prefers and the only people who can really tourist resorts. To become a part of a confederal structure, the South push him to agree to re-unification a federated Cyprus would also mean would go for a mild federation, in are his ‘own’ Turkish Cypriots. They that the standard of living could go order to secure the dominance of the want to become citizens of the up, also because the North could then Greek Cypriot populace. European Union, one of the most hopefully get its share of the large important reasons for them to strive gas reserves found off the southern PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS for re-unification. shore of Cyprus in a field bordering What is it Erdogan wants for on the Israeli shelf, with equally rich As mentioned before, the questions allowing the Geneva negotiations prospects. On top of this the Turkish of the boundaries between the two to come to closure, recreating a Cypriots are getting tired of the communities, the restitution of land unified Cyprus? As presidential Turkish army and the farmers from and real estate, compensation for elections in Southern Cyprus are Anatolia and they wonder to what those who do not want to return to scheduled next year February extent they themselves are really in their homesteads and a fair share in the window of opportunity might charge of the TRNC. Furthermore, the economy and the state institutions close soon. What could president there is the threat of losing democratic have all been resolved. The main Erdogan win by agreeing to a control over their own destiny in view obstacle at the moment is, however, unified Cyprus? of the undermining of democracy on the question of security guarantees. the Turkish mainland. ‘(The) renewed Both sides do not trust the UN ‘Erdogan himself ended the interest (of Southern Cyprus) in peacekeepers, who are of good will long-standing Turkish objection resolving the Cyprus question is linked but are no match for a force of any to any compromise agreement in www.pin-negotiation.org 25

Cyprus in 2004 with his support is not too difficult to imagine. Most major issues have been settled in for the Annan Plan. It is therefore Turkish troops can be withdrawn principle. possible that he would support a from the North in phases and there compromise deal that is designed in is no reason why the South should References a win-win structure in which Turkey’s fear a new Turkish intervention M.K. Flynn & Tony King (2012). ‘Deadlock and strategic interests in the Eastern under the present circumstances. (Mis)Trust in Cyprus’. Peace Review, 24:4, 421-429. Mediterranean are advanced. Energy A symbolic presence of the Turkish Internet Sources: https://www.europa.nu.nl could be a significant instrument army in a designated base on the & https://www.theguardian.com/world. in the respect, given that conflict North-Eastern peninsula can do the Ioannis. N. Grigoriades (2017). ‘Faraway, resolution in Cyprus would pave the job, provided there should also be So Close: Approaching the Endgame in the way for the monetization of Eastern a Greek symbolic base in the South Cyprus Negotiations’. SWP Comments, Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 1-4. Mediterranean gas reserves; the while the territory of the UK bases construction of a pipeline from the will shrink to 50% of their present Paul Meerts (2012). ‘Cyprus Case: A offshore Eastern Mediterranean territory. It all boils down to the Multi-party Exercise on a Status Settlement between Northern and Southern Cyprus.’ gas fields of Cyprus, Egypt, and political will of the Turkish president. Workbook on International Negotiation, The Israel to Turkey appears as the most There is no apparent reason to Hague: Clingendael Institute, 5, 8, 35, 49, 51-52, 66. cost-effective way to achieve this’ doubt his intention to contribute to a (Grigoriadis 2017: 4). solution of the Cyprus problem. Paul Meerts (2015). Diplomatic Negotiation, Essence and Evolution. The Hague: Clingendael Institute. “Erdogan, in other words, Now that he has won the referendum is and has been the key to about his presidential powers on Michális A. Michael (2014). ‘Cyprus and the Peace Process.’ The Round Table, 103:1, the re-unification of Cyprus 16 April, expectations were high 117-118. and the only people who can that he would take a clear stand on really push him to agree to Cypriot re-unification. But he did Gavin Moore, Neophytos Loizides, Nukhet A. Sandal & Alexandros Lordos (2014). ‘Winning reunification are his ‘own’ not and spoilers on both sides of the Peace Frames: Intra-Ethnic Outbidding in Turkish Cypriots.” ‘Green Line’ between Northern and Northern Ireland and Cyprus.’ West European Politics, 37:1, 159-181. Southern Cyprus – for example the One could add to that as the Assad Holy Synod of the Greek Orthodox in F. Murat Özkaleli & Mehmet Hasgüler regime is regaining control over the South - are getting active again, (2013). ‘The Cyprus Game: The Evolutionary Approach to Conflict Resolution Revisited’. Syria, Erdogan would have to find some say supported by the Russians Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, an alternative for the lost Syrian who see a unified Cyprus as a threat to 15:4, 459-477. energy resources and he can do their economic and political interests Hugh Pope, ‘New Hope for Peace in this by helping to negotiate Cypriot in the Eastern Mediterranean. It Cyprus.’ International Crisis Group Report, re-unification. On top of this, the seems that time is not yet ripe for 14-02-2014. United States might pressure closure of the negotiations on Cypriot Marie-Pierre Richarte (2005). ‘Cyprus’. I. him to accept re-unification as an reunification, although some sources William Zartman & Victor Kremenyuk (eds.). Peace Versus Justice, Negotiating Forward- instrument to get the gas flowing as predict intensified negotiations this and Backward-Looking Outcomes. Rowman & the American company Noble Energy summer. Littlefield Publishers, Inc.: Lanham, Boulder, has a great stake in developing these new York, Toronto, Oxford, 201-219 (PIN Book). fields. Besides, ‘… if a settlement ‘While all sides would benefit from doesn’t materialize quickly, energy a settlement – any settlement – Raymond Saner (2012). ‘The Cyprus Conflict: Will it ever end in Agreement?’ Guy-Olivier experts say that Israeli developers failure to make the politically painful Faure (ed.). Unfinished Business: Why will choose a more expensive, but compromises necessary to reach International Negotiations Fail. University of more certain, alternative export an outcome quickly will deepen the Georgia Press (PIN Book). method, such as a floating terminal de facto partition of the Island … John Sitilidis (2014). ‘The Modern Geopolitics that freezes and liquefies the gas to and Greece and Turkey will most of the Cyprus Question’. Mediterranean Quarterly, 25:1, 77-94. load into tankers’ (Pope 2014: 1). likely fail to solve their expensive maritime-boundaries dispute in Alvaro de Soto (2012). ‘Can Cyprus be Solved?’ IN CONCLUSION the Aegean’ (Pope 2014: 2) as a Peace Review, 24:4, 398-405. consequence of a failed negotiated As all the other obstacles are out Cypriot re-unification. Time is ripe to of the way now, security is the only come to closure on the Cyprus issue problem to be resolved, and a solution but it does not show yet, though all 26 PIN•Points 44/2017

BY MOTI CRISTAL A REGIONAL PARADIGM FOR THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

RocQ Photography - Journey to the Middle East - Flickr.com

“One State, Two States, it does However, the Trump administration conflict was endorsed by the Arab not really matter, as long as you, could, and should, - and seems as League in 2002, and re-endorsed Israelis and Palestinian agree to a might as well - present a major at the 2007 Arab League summit. deal”, stated US President, Donald opportunity for implementing Understanding the major flaws in Trump, in February 2017, during the long awaited paradigmatic the Israeli-Palestinian bilateral his first presidential meeting with change in addressing the Middle negotiations, which were evident in Israel’s Prime Minister, Netanyahu. East conflict: from a bilateral the failed 2000 Israeli-Palestinian Singling out one component of any Israeli-Palestinian negotiation to a Camp David summit, the API was future negotiated outcome, this regional comprehensive approach introduced during the peak of the off-hand remark, describing more addressing the current Middle violent second intifada. It calls for of a mindset than a thoughtful policy East challenges. Actually, Egypt, normalizing relations between Arab direction, stirred further anger Jordan Israel and some Gulf states states and Israel, in exchange for a amongst Palestinians, and confusion gradually, cautiously, but constantly full withdrawal by Israel from the among US Arab allies such as Jordan have been moving towards this West Bank and Gaza, East Jerusalem and Egypt. regional approach in addressing the and the Golan Heights, and a “just Middle East conflict. settlement” of the Palestinian While confusing “outcome” with refugee problem which will be “process”, and being accustomed to The corner stone of the regional agreed based on UN Resolution 194. the traditional bilateral negotiations’ approach lies in the Arab Peace Since its introduction in 2002, Israel’s paradigm, most stakeholders Initiative (API), known as the “Saudi reaction to the API has evolved from involved in this conflict found this Initiative”. This short proposal total rejection (PM Sharon, 2003) comment to be very disturbing. for an end to the Arab–Israeli through a cautious welcome (PM www.pin-negotiation.org 27

Olmert 2009), to a tentative support empowering Iran and Hezbollah, who Netanyahu and Abbas, when it was which welcomes the idea of Arab fought alongside Russia to guarantee already evident that any negotiations states’ involvement (PM Netanyahu, the survival of the Assad regime; between Israel and PLO, under the 2016). This evolution of Israel’s current leaderships and the current reaction to the API, as well as the (5) As a result of these dynamics, regional dynamics, see no ZOPA increasing relevance of the regional Israel’s security challenges have (Zone of Possible Agreement). approach, should be seen in the changed dramatically. From light of the major changes that have conventional risks emanating from Summarizing the flaws of the occurred in the Middle East in the hostile Arab countries, Israel faces bilateral approach goes beyond this last decade: today two major security risks, that brief piece; however, three major have been changing its military spheres of negotiating activity (1) The emergence of Iran, the doctrine: in the short term, massive should be identified in this regard: Muslim Shiite power, its aspired rocket attacks from Hamas (south) outcome, structure and process. regional hegemony status coupled and Hezbollah (north) and in the The bilateral approach assumes by nuclear capabilities, the global medium-long term confronting Iran’s a two-nation-states agreement attention it received as a result nuclear capabilities. which relies on the parties making of the 2015 “Iran Deal,” the Joint “significant concessions towards Comprehensive Plan of Action (6) Realities on the ground – peace”. From an Israeli perspective, (JCPoA), and its direct military settlements expansion and lack based on her national psyche and involvement in Syria, Iraq, and of foreseeable political separation recent security instabilities, no one Yemen, have positioned the tensions between Israel and Palestine – can provide significant guarantees along the Sunni-Shiite divide as one have created unstable economic, for its security once a Palestinian of the most destabilizing dynamics political and security conditions, state will be established. From a in current Middle East. Forcing of an explosive nature. In Hamas’ Palestinian perspective, based on Sunni Arab states to form internal controlled Gaza it is manifested with their national narrative, they already and external coalitions to confront routine rounds of violence across made their historic concession, the Shiite threat, new alliances’ the fence, and in the West Bank therefore no more compromise maps emerge; with constant security and military on full-fledge Palestinian state, low-intensity frictions; in particular, from the territorial (2) The collapse of Syria and Iraq perspective. And to this, one as nation states has changed the (7) Leadership questions, and mainly should add the religious ideological security and economic balance the uncertain succession of power dimension, on both sides, that in these countries, as well as in in Palestine and Israel, offer a took reign in last decade. In classic neighboring countries (mainly tremendous legitimacy challenge to negotiation framings, since the 2000 Jordan), sending refugees’ shock any current negotiation process. Camp David failure, there is no ZOPA waves to Europe; for a conflict resolution agreement. These dynamics require a critical (3) The emergence of ISIS, as a look at the “Peace Process” led by From a structural perspective, no US high-profile global terror player, the US in the last 20 years. In 1993, mediation has managed to address which roots its infrastructure in secret back-channel Oslo talks the spoilers on both sides, and to the no-man’s-lands of Syria, Iraq, between Israel and PLO framed the build a coalition of moderates. US Yemen and Libya, as well as Sinai, Israeli-Palestinian bilateral process. mediation, on this bilateral process, Gaza, West Bank and Jordan, draws Since then, through a set of failures has tried to “bring peace” – with all international resources to destroy to reach a comprehensive deal, the the concessions and risk involved - it militarily, rather than drying its bilateral negotiation paradigm was between the moderate parties. This ideological swamp; never genuinely challenged. In 2000, further delegitimized dovish Israeli President Clinton failed to broker leaders and moderate Fatah within (4) Independent from these dynamics, a deal between Barak and Arafat. their people. Russia’s involvement in the region, In 2008, President Bush failed with aiming to secure its geo-strategic Olmert and Abbas, and President Process-wise, since Oslo (1993) interests in Syria, has created a shift Obama, through his ambitious the leading process paradigm is in the balance of power in the region: Secretary Kerry, failed repeatedly negotiating a conflict resolution weakening the US’ role as well as in 2009, 2014, and 2016 with (“peace”) deal, based on two-states 28 PIN•Points 44/2017

framework, which will be Israel-Hezbollah, and in the West Qatar and Egypt which will include incrementally implemented, trusting Bank, this definition should turn conclusion of prisoners’ exchange the confidence parties built during from S5 to MDS (Mutually Destructive deal between Israel and Hamas, the various phases. A process design Stalemate). While S5 describes accelerated reconstruction plan for that already failed during early current reality, MHS (Mutually Gaza and foreign security presence stages of the process (1994-1995). Hurting Stalemate) describes a (Turkey, Egypt, Qatar) to prevent In military phrases, this is called a reality when parties exhaust their offensive activities on behalf of failed strategy which led to military belligerent alternatives, the MDS Hamas. (2) Lebanon: Upgrade the defeat, and therefore should never be describes a reality overshadowed Israeli-Russian military coordination reused. In the Middle East process, by an approaching, inevitable, in order to contain Hezbollah’s this failed convention was tried catastrophe. Negotiation under motivation to escalate, and (3) again and again, believing that a new MDS, in any given context, should Post-Abbas: Levering the new US US administration (Clinton, Bush, aim to reach three outcomes: administration in order to engage Obama) had the wisdom to carry out (a) regional “deescalating” with future Palestinian leadership. this strategy in a successful way. All understandings among as many All parties involved, including the attempts so far have failed. relevant stakeholders as possible; rival parties as well as superpowers (b) conflict management agreement have no interest in escalation, and “What seems as a new “Cold between the main rival parties, and some already apply some of these War” dynamic, under the (c) indicate the general trajectory steps. current Middle East realities of the conflict system, without that represent a Mutually indicating a specific timeline. Second, progressing in reaching Destructive Stalemate, a set of formal and informal should be seen as a unique Applying this framing to the current understandings – result of various opportunity to change the Middle East dynamics, and building different negotiation settings nature of the Middle East on the evolution of the API and (coordinated unilateralism, bilateral, Peace Process.” Israel’s reaction to it, formulates mediated, and multilateral) which the following negotiation scope: (a) will be implemented on the ground As we see in recent years, the Prevent escalation through a set including: completion of the security intractable Israeli-Arab conflict of reciprocal unilateral actions by fence in the West Bank; cessation became part of wider, major, Israel, PLO, Hamas and Hezbollah. of settlement activities which are regional and global developments. These will be mediated by a not within existing settlement This, by itself, opens opportunities “mediators’ beehive”; (b) conflict blocks; accelerated Palestine State – both outcome- and process-wise management agreements which will building including a comprehensive – and requires a fresh perspective, secure stability in Syria, Iraq and set of financial and economic adopting the “regional approach”, Palestine, redrawing new territorial support to the PA; continued not as a slogan, but rather as a and political borders, and allowing institution building, including process design. (c) closer economic regional East Jerusalem; intensification of cooperation in order to resettle the Israel’s commercial and economic The first challenge in adopting a Palestinian, Syrian and Iraqi refugees activities in the Gulf; a regional plan regional approach is the framing in their homelands. Evidently, it will for resettlement of Syrian refugees challenge. The imperative phase require a multilateral give-and-take currently in refugees’ camp in of “framing” is well known to that addresses parties’ concerns Jordan; and a political discourse scholars and practitioners in for the short term, and generates a for updating the API to incorporate international negotiations. In 2005, benign, rather than hostile, dynamic recent geo-political changes. I William Zartman framed the along a clear trajectory. Arab-Israeli conflict as a “Soft, Once these steps, all within political Stable, Self-Sustained, Stalemate” An outline of such a process – to reach, and carrying – if done (S5) as an alternative to a Mutually address its Israeli-Palestinian properly – no political risk to any of Hurting Stalemate (MHS) that axis – includes three steps. current leaders, are implemented produces negotiations. However, First, implementing preventive to whatever degree possible, the with the recent cycles of violence, engagement strategies, on three third phase - Russian-US Road Map and the high risks of escalations main fronts (1) Gaza: Set up a for Middle East Stability - will be between Israel-Hamas, and de-escalating mechanism, led by initiated. This Middle East Stability www.pin-negotiation.org 29

Artillery, Infantry & Armored Corps Exercise in the Golan, Israel Defense Forces – Flickr.com

Road Map comprised of two big nature of political process, we envoy, Jason Greenblat, allied Arab trade-offs, which will be presented allowed ourselves time lag between leaders (Egypt and Jordan) and as a Russian-US outcome: (1) Iran concluding this piece and its paid an important visit to the Arab for Syria. In consideration for US summary. In this time lag, Trump’s Summit (March 2017). agreement to allow the Assad presidency which started with regime stay in power, and turn it to isolation approach (“America first”), What seems as a new “Cold War” legitimate “official” Russian front close relations with Russia on the dynamic, under the current Middle base, Russia will support US effort international arena, and a warm East realities that represent a to fixing the flaws in the current Iran applause from far-right hawks Mutually Destructive Stalemate, deal, and (2) Endorsing an updated in Israel and concerns from Arab should be seen as a unique Arab Peace Initiative which will countries on the regional level, opportunity to change the nature lead to a two-nation-state outcome made already a dramatic course of the Middle East Peace Process. for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, change. Launching a signaling From the failed bilateral/US stronger economic integration attack on Syria, threatening to mediated approach, towards a of Israel in Arab markets, and take military action against North regional one. The regional approach establishing an Arab alliance Korea, and raising tensions with assumes multilateral give-and-take against Islamist terrorism which Putin, might indicate that the new that addresses parties’ concerns kills thousands of citizens in Arab US administration is willing to for the short term, and generates and Muslim countries. challenge traditional concepts. In its a benign, rather than hostile, Middle East policy, President Trump, dynamic along a clear trajectory of a Being familiar with the dynamic directly and through his special two-nation-states outcome. 30 PIN•Points 43/2016

The President of Russia Vladimir Putin at the Arctica international forum in Arkhangelsk, By The Russian Presidential Press and Information Office

BY I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN & MIKHAIL TROITSKIY RUSSIA IN CONFLICT MEDIATION: NEW OPPORTUNITIES, NEW TACTICS?

I. William Zartman PROJECTING THE POWER forefront as a key mediator in the OF MEDIATION? wake of its active campaign against In the mid-1980s as the establishment the resistance forces, especially the of a Processes of International In Syria, Russia’s support for Bashar air strikes to break the stalemate Negotiation (PIN) program was being al-Asad, and its association with both in Aleppo. It then moved in the early planned in Vienna at the International Turkey and Iran behind the Syrian March to establish a “security line” Institute of Applied Systems Analysis regime, has gained it a major strategic separating the forces of Asad from the (IIASA), Soviet Foreign Minister position in the area, facilitated by the Turkish-supported rebels, and then Eduard Shevardnadze is reported to withdrawal of American attention to arrange an agreement for Kurdish have noted that when countries have from the area under Barack Obama. People’s Protection Units (YPG) to join a conflict it was the US and not the While the future of American policy the efforts of Asad’s forces to block USSR that was called on to mediate under Donald Trump is only beginning the advance of the Turkish forces. and negotiate. As a result, he sent to be written, the great power vacuum a security member to Vienna to join created over the past years has given The master stroke of Russian PIN and learn the tricks of the trade. Russia an open window of opportunity. diplomacy that lay behind the Astana With Turkish and Iranian support, initiative was the turn-around it Russia appears to have learned some Russia mediated a shaky ceasefire effected on Turkish policy. Russia has lessons and today seeks to use its among many of the parties in Syria pulled Turkey away from its absolute strengthened position in the Middle in late December 2016, ostensibly to opposition to Asad (after its earlier East and post-Soviet Eurasia to assert better fight the Islamic State (ISIS). absolute—even personal—friendship itself as a mediator. Moscow’s key Moscow then arranged negotiation in with Asad) by giving active military purpose in doing that is to claim for Astana, Kazakhstan on 23-24 January support around Aleppo and al-Bab to itself the status of an indispensable between the Syrian regime and the its conflict with the YPG, arm of the global power, increase its presence Saudi-backed Islamic Army (Jaish Western-allied Kurdish Democratic in the region, and demonstrably al-Islam), in the presence of Iran, Union Party (PYD), claimed to be an fill the void left by the Obama Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, extension of the Kurdish Workers’ administration and its European Lebanon, Egypt, Iraq, and China, laying Party (PKK), Turkey’s subversive allies. This, however, carries the risk the foundation for talks on the future movement. Russia does not have the of painful entanglements or difficult of Syria in Geneva IV the following problems of the US trying to support strategic choices at best and serious month. However, no resolution of the both the Kurds and Turkey and trying setbacks at worst, as does any conflict itself was advanced beyond to uphold human rights in protecting mediation venture. the limited conflict management a Turkish opposition figure, measure. Moscow moved to the Fethullah Gulen, from extradition to www.pin-negotiation.org 31

a manifestly unfair trial, but its latest and Hamas to finally form a unity it with verbal agreement in mid-2016 mediation efforts move it closer to government; the agreement has yet after a bout of armed hostilities the Turkey-Kurd squeeze. to be consummated. The election of when border incidents and internal Donald Trump, with contradictory propaganda led to an outburst of In Libya, Russia has taken an ambitions announced for the conflict, violence. Given that there are two open position behind the aspiring makes for a new game, but Russia is salient options backed by strong strongman, Gen Khalifa Hifter, nonetheless positioning itself for a international principles—national head of the Libyan National demarche of its own if/when Western self-determination vs territorial Army that supports the UN-and efforts fail again. integrity—the search for a solution is Western-backed Dignity Government logically as well as politically difficult. of National Accord (GNA). While the In Afghanistan, where Moscow has a Yet it would be a big political plum to West works for national unity in Libya, wound to lick after its defeat 30 years get the two sides to pull out of the hat Russia, with Egypt, supports Hifter as ago, Russia is working with both the the third salient option of guaranteed a political and military option. Russia Taleban and the Ghani government in N-K autonomy in exchange for prints money for the GNA, maintains an effort to fight the local franchise Armenian withdrawal from the $4-$10 million pre-revolutionary of the IS, as in Syria. Representatives “occupied territories” surrounding oil and gas contracts, and has $4.2 of China and Pakistan met in Moscow the province. billion arms contracts in waiting for in mid January to discuss the ISIS when the UN embargo is lifted. threat in Afghanistan, and Russia RUSSIA’S CALCULUS has opposed political moves of But Russia, as in Syria, is also making the present Afghan government, In the Cold War, the Soviets viewed contact with the western Libyan Dawn while coordinating information “conflict management” as “US General National Congress (GNC) and activities with the Taleban, efforts to keep a conflict alive but “government” in Tripoli and its main seeking the possibility of mediation non-violent so as to be able to benefit militia support in Misrata. In late cooperation between government from its instability” and preferred the February, Russia announced that it and Taleban as opposed to the hard term “conflict reduction.” (Zartman had mediated an agreement between line of the US and the government. & Kremenyuk 1994). Russia may be Hiftar and Khalifa al-Ghwell, former While giving aid and support to the taking on the definition as its own in head of the Dawn government. Such Ghani government, Moscow has the current situation, and is moving contacts can develop into the basis also been developing contacts—and into good positions to win support for a Russian-mediated try at a new allegedly financial and military through mediation efforts, working conflict management effort to replace materiel support—for the Taleban, between conflicting parties rather the inconclusive efforts of UN SRSG in an effort again to step in as the than just supporting one of them. Martin Kobler over the past two years mediator between the two forces, Such conflict management attention to gain support for a government of ostensibly uniting them against the does not counter Russia’s military national unity. Successful mediation Islamic State inroads. policies in the same regions, and the where UNSMIL (Support Mission latter even strengthen its attempts at in Libya) failed is a long shot but The conflict overNagorno-Karabakh , appearing as a balanced mediator, would put Russia in the same strong the Armenian-inhabited Azerbaijani replacing stalled UN and Western position it occupies in Syria. province that has declared its efforts, with all the risks involved. But independence with Armenian they do indicate a new, dual strategy Israel and Palestine constitute a third support, offers the most delicate to increase its local presence and its area of similar sensitivity concerns, situation for Russian mediation. world power claims with efforts to where Russia maintains close Russia sells arms to both states, reduce as well as support conflict. relations with both parties. Prime but is an active co-chair (with the Minister Benyamin Netanyahu visited US and France) of the OSCE Minsk Reference: I William Zartman & Victor Kremenyuk, eds, Moscow as the Western countries Group created to mediate the 1994. Cooperative Security: Reducing Third turned against him on the settlements conflict. Moscow’s interest therefore World Wars (Syracuse University Press). issue (where Moscow was already is to avoid both war and the risks positioned), and in mid-January 2017 associated with mediation that often Russia mediated an agreement in falls prey to its own contradictions. Moscow between Fatah, the core It mediated the ceasefire in 1994 of the Palestinian Authority (PA), ending a two-year war and restored 32 PIN•Points 44/2017

ARSONIST OR FIREMAN? remains out of the question. At the so much to a “strategy of sowing CONTINUING THE same time, safe operation of the instability,” but rather to Moscow’s CONVERSATION Russian naval and air bases in Syria belief in resource geopolitics and (and, some would suspect, deploying Russia’s unrelenting quest for status Mikhail Troitskiy one in Libya) requires firm control in the international arena. by an internationally recognized William Zartman argues that in government over a sufficiently large The Kremlin cherishes direct control its mediation efforts, Moscow may chunk of land surrounding the bases. over oil- and natural-gas fields and now be playing from the Cold War In the absence of such strategic depth, transportation routes, deposits of playbook that prescribes nourishing a very high—if at all achievable—and other minerals and fresh water conflicts short of all-out wars in order costly readiness to withdraw would be reservoirs. Russia views much of the to inflict a controlled level of pain on necessary to maintain. contemporary world politics as being regional and/or global rival powers. driven by the ruthless struggle for Attractive as any conspiracy theory, The same applies to the lucrative deals such resources and is determined to such description hardly fits Russia’s Moscow is looking to secure for itself secure physical access to and direct mediation behavior in the Middle East in Libya. Stable peace is necessary control over them wherever possible. and post-Soviet Eurasia—primarily for the UN arms embargo to be lifted because Moscow’s leverage is and the Russian oil contracts to be Also, according to the view of current insufficient to be able to adjust the honored in that country. Continuation international politics influential in “heat” as necessary. of the war of all against all in Libya Moscow, the United States’ foreign does not help Moscow to achieve policy as well as its alliances are in It is unclear what benefits Moscow any of those goals. In a similar disarray, so Russia cannot afford to can currently derive from sowing vein, throwing full Russian weight miss this opportunity of asserting “instability” for its own sake in those behind the Palestinian cause does itself as a powerful player on the regions. Given the reluctance by nothing to help Moscow maintain world stage, unfazed by the threats the United States and other major close relations with Israel whose of terrorism and determined to put powers to forcefully intervene and general endorsement of Moscow’s out the fire of violent conflict in the impose a lasting solution, Russia new activism in the Middle East gives places where US policy failures may be left to sort out the chaos Russia just enough freedom hands. have allegedly created the problem alone or together with medium-size in the first place. This can arguably ambitious and unpredictable powers, Indeed, this activism and Russia’s elevate Russia’s status and enhance such as Turkey, Iran, or Saudi Arabia. mediating strategies need not—and its bargaining position with the West Moscow’s relations with each of them most likely will not—be aligned with and other actors on a broad variety of are ridden with contradictions and those of the United States and its international issues where Moscow are fragile, so long-term coordination European allies. But this is due not has a stake.

Russia’s Admiral Kuznetsov aircraft carrier on its way to the Mediterranean Sea, Andrei Luzik/Russian Navy Northern Fleet Press Office/TASS www.pin-negotiation.org 33

Russian-China summit meeting - flickr.com

BY FEN OSLER HAMPSON AND MIKHAIL TROITSKIY TUG OF WAR: NEGOTIATING SECURITY IN EURASIA, A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Our article attempts to offer borders (none of the Central Asian The region and the outside conceptual insights into the modes countries have fully demarcated stakeholder powers are also and utility of negotiation in resolving their borders), arms races, territorial extremely diverse providing ample conflicts in Eurasia, a region that expansion or even trade disputes that empirical data to test hypotheses has its own unique political, cultural reverberate throughout the region. about “cultures of negotiation” and economic characteristics and (Berton et. al. 1999; Brett 1998; an evolving security dynamic in WHY EURASIA? Cohen 1997; Fisher and Shapiro interstate relations following the 2005; Lee, et. al. 2012). Negotiating dissolution of the Soviet Union. The geographic area within our focus parties include such “culturally For the purposes of our study, we lies at the intersection of global divergent” players as China and understand Eurasia to be the vast and regional conflicts and within a Russia, the United States (U.S.) and geographic space stretching from the contested geographical and political Afghanistan, the European Union western borders of the former Soviet space where great (and small) and Armenia, and the Ukrainian Union to East Asia and encompassing powers are jockeying for influence government and pro-Russian the sub-regions of Eastern Europe, and control as are regional and global separatist rebels. This region also South Caucasus as well as Central, powers (Thompson 2014). Regional lends itself to comparisons of South, and North-East Asia. controversies in Eurasia often affect different types of negotiating actors – relations among other great powers from Tajik tribal leaders and political “Negotiating security” is conceptually on a global scale. The region is also elites negotiating over contested broader than meaning negotiations rich in natural resources (e.g. oil, territories as Nagorno-Karabakh and aimed at resolving a “hot” conflict gas, uranium reserves, coal, gold, Transnistria to negotiations between where violence is widespread and and copper) which fosters regional Russia and the European Union. there is a major loss of life. We competition. also need to examine interstate ASYMMETRICAL BARGAINING negotiations in less antagonistic This competition and strategic IN THE EURASIAN REGIONAL settings where longer-term issues of rivalries have also been accompanied CONTEXT political and economic engagement by cooperation based on a degree of as opposed to negotiating ceasefires mutual self-interest. For example, Most international negotiations rarely or redrawing state boundaries are Moscow was willing to honor take place on a “level” playing field, at discussed. Beijing’s demands regarding the least as measured by the power and Sino-Russian border in Northeast resources available to the parties. There is yet another class of Asia because Russia sought to Asymmetry is a fact of life though negotiations that can be characterized upgrade its relationship with China weaker parties potentially have as preventive diplomacy or conflict to an alliance aimed at constraining multiple sources of leverage to tip the management. It is where a conflict US power both globally and in the negotiating scales in their favor when that is not “hot” nonetheless features regions around Russia. negotiating with their more powerful simmering controversies over neighbors or with great powers. 34 PIN•Points 44/2017

Bargaining asymmetries typically these are new states that have their The Caspian Sea has proved to be can take various forms (Hampson own inherent vulnerabilities in terms an area of converging economic 1995; Zartman 1987). They may, of the political legitimacy of ruling interest among Russia, Kazakhstan, for example, involve inequalities elites and institutions and recurring and Azerbaijan. However, the story in the context of bargaining domestic security challenges. is a complicated one because it is relationship itself where the parties not only about the extraction of oil are unevenly matched in terms of At the same time, the picture is and gas, but also about transporting their power, wealth, prestige and becoming both more—and less— energy to markets for which military capabilities (e.g. the classic complicated with the corresponding the opportunities are constantly so-called “David versus Goliath” changes that are taking place changing. Iran’s general skepticism problem or “Athens versus Melos” in regional and global power about Russia as a long-term security dilemma in Thucydides’ account of balances and evolving economic partner, notwithstanding Russia’s the Peloponnesian wars) (Waelchli interdependencies among the states and Iran’s shared interests in Syria, is and Shah 1994). They may also in the region. Russia’s position as due in part to the lack of agreement involve inequalities in the needs a regional hegemon in post-Soviet between the two sides on the status of the bargainer (e.g. “I want this Eurasia (and more broadly Eurasia and delimitation of boundaries in agreement more than you do” as we see it) is being challenged the Caspian Sea. Far from being a and therefore I am prepared to which affects Russia’s relations cooperative playground in Eurasia, work harder to get it and/or more with its smaller neighbors. There the Caspian Sea is generating plenty committed to getting a settlement are other powerful external players, of controversy too. on terms that are favorable to me); such as China, the EU, and the U.S., although, this asymmetry, unlike a which pursue their own interests in EURASIA’S INTRACTABLE structural power imbalance, can cut the region. Moscow now finds that CONFLICTS both ways (Bacharach and Lawler it cannot ensure Russia’s dominant 1986). The powerful are sometimes role in the resolution of long-standing Eurasia also has its fair share of just as deeply committed to an issue conflicts or be a regional locomotive so-called intractable conflicts. or a matter of negotiating principle of economic growth. In fact, Russia’s Scholars and practitioners have as their weaker negotiating partners. “counter-sanction” policies vis-à-vis grappled with the definition of the West adopted in August 2014 have intractability (Crocker, Hampson, Negotiations in Eurasia are “nested” proved divisive for the Russian-led Aall, 2005; Crocker, Hampson, Aall, - that is, embedded in a regional Eurasian Economic Union. 2003). The concept typically refers to security complex (Buzan and Waever conflicts that persist over time and 2003). However, this regional security Even those countries that are firmly refuse to yield to efforts—either by complex is a changing one as we allied with Russia enjoy a freedom the direct parties, or, more often, with discuss below—of asymmetrical of maneuver that gives them some third party assistance—to arrive at a power relationships (in the structural negotiating latitude vis-à-vis Moscow. political settlement. The resistance sense) complicated by longstanding No longer the “last dictatorship in to a settlement generally derives cultural ties and historically Europe,” Belarus is courting the EU. from multiple causes which manifest shaped norms of cooperation and Armenia cherishes its diaspora in themselves in several behavioral engagement. In the normal course the U.S. which can at times be more attributes that make negotiations of events, small powers can tip the helpful to it than Russia. Russia’s difficult to launch and difficult—if power scales as noted above to negotiating hand with Belarus, not impossible—to conclude. This is advance their interests. Some of Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, because political elites believe their this is harder to do in the Eurasian Tajikistan, and possibly Uzbekistan political objectives are fundamentally context because of longstanding is still quite strong, but the incentive irreconcilable and they have more rivalries and animosities between to cooperate to address so-called interest in waging war or a campaign smaller powers, as in the case “common aversions” like Islamic of military violence than exploring of so-called “-Stans” countries, extremism is more rhetorical than alternative political states of being. which make it difficult to form real. While Central Asian countries countervailing coalitions to reduce cautiously cooperate with Russia, The Moldova/Transnistrian conflict is economic and cultural dependencies they are simultaneously suspicious one example of an intractable conflict on the powerful neighbors (Russia of Moscow’s potentially hegemonic in Eurasia. The longstanding dispute and China). The fact is that many of intentions. between Azerbaijan and Armenia www.pin-negotiation.org 35

Nagorno Karabach, Photo RNW.org – Flickr.com

over Nagorno-Karabakh is another. are especially important during hand, competing security orders The evolving and ongoing conflict different types of transition. We have emerged around Russia, and in eastern Ukraine, which contains have witnessed plenty of such between NATO and the European two, new unrecognised political transitions (e.g. territorial, political Union on the other hand. Each of entities, the DNR (Donetsk People’s and power-related transitions, these actors have sought to promote Republic) and the LNR (Lugansk surges in ethnic conflicts, etc.) in their own negotiation agendas and People’s Republic), may also prove post-Soviet Eurasia over the last 25 underlying principles, which has to be intractable given the political years. Negotiation gives the parties damaged the fabric of cooperative dynamics and pressures that are a chance to find mutually satisfying security that was built around currently at play. solutions, although sometimes they institutions like the Organization for fail to produce tangible results. Security and Cooperation in Europe In the Eurasian context, including the (OSCE). cases mentioned above, intractability Whereas so-called structural is complicated by competing theories of negotiation focus on Normative repolarization (e.g. understandings between Russia and a combination of intrinsic and differences in approaches to the West about what constitutes extrinsic barriers to negotiation (e.g. democracy, human rights, accepted spheres of influence, communication barriers, imbalance sovereignty, and territoriality) are also national identity, political authority, of resources, capabilities, situational contributing to political uncertainty and legitimate memberships or pressures, etc.), constructivist and negotiation challenges. Arguably, affiliations between small states approaches draw our attention to cross-cultural negotiation challenges and regional and/or international the logic of appropriateness (e.g. are more pronounced in the East-West institutions. So-called internal the agreed upon norms, rules, and context, but they are also evident conflicts within states have fallen institutions that shape negotiating in the East-East context—within prey to a broader regional dynamic in behaviors and interactions between post-Soviet Eurasia and between which the conflict itself and the local parties) (March and Olsen 1998). In Russia and China. While Moscow parties to the conflict are pawns in the Eurasian political space, such has generally sought to maintain the a bigger struggle between the more norms, rules, and institutional orders status quo, arguing that any attempts powerful actors in the region which are by-and-large contested spaces. at accelerating resolution processes are trying to promote their own They are like the rope in a proverbial for the “frozen” conflicts may backfire, norms, rules, and conceptions of tug of war in which different actors the EU and NATO have pursued “legitimate” governance. are trying to not only assert their the possibility of progress through different interests, but also their own externally-supported change. NEGOTIATION AND competing normative claims about DIPLOMACY the nature of sovereignty and political CONCLUSION legitimacy. We assume that negotiation is a Security negotiations in Eurasia are more optimal and comparatively In the Eurasian political space, status unique because of the presence of risk-free way of resolving disputes and security ownership issues are all types of actors—from contested compared to fighting or other forms fueling security dilemmas among states to competitors for the status of direct confrontation. Negotiations regional and external actors. On one of the regional hegemon to an 36 PIN•Points 43/2016

offshore superpower which has its References Faure, Guy Olivier ed., (2012). Unfinished own interests at play in local conflicts. Business: Why International Negotiations Bachrach, S. and E. Lawler, (1986). “Power Fail. Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press. These actors interact on both bilateral Dependence and Power Paradoxes in and multilateral fronts. Negotiated Bargaining.” Negotiation Journal 2 (2): Gilpin, Robert (1981). War and Change in 167-174. World Politics. Cambridge University Press. conflicts range from those that have Hampson, Fen Osler (1995). Multilateral been partially resolved to “frozen” Bazerman, Max and Deepak Malhotra, (2007). Negotiations: Lessons From Arms Control, intractable conflicts to those that are Negotiation Genius. New York: Bantam. Trade and the Environment. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. still in the “hot” phase, with armed Berton, P, H. Kimura, and I. W. Zartman, eds. hostilities taking lives daily. Eurasia (1999). 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(2012). “East lack of “ripeness” for resolution to In Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Asians’ Social Heterogeneity: Differences asymmetrical expectations of the Managing International Conflict. Edited by in Norms among Chinese, Japanese, and Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Korean Negotiators.” Negotiation Journal, 28: parties to wide-ranging cultural Pamela R. Aall. Washington, D.C.: United 429–452 differences and intricate procedural States Institute of Peace Press. Pp. 209-226. Levy, Jack S. (2001). “Theories of Interstate and Intrastate War: A Levels-of-Analysis controversies that mask other political Buzan, Barry and Ole Waever (2003). Regions Approach.” In Chester A. Crocker, Fen differences (Faure 2012). Sometimes and Powers: The Structure of International Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, eds. these obstacles are surmounted: Security. Cambridge: Cambridge University Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing Press. International Conflict. 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Global Games, Institutions and Logics of Appropriateness. An period of flux with power transitions Local Rules: The New Great Power Contest Introductory Essay.” ARENA Working Paper # in Central Asia. New York: Oxford University 13. August. http://www.arena.uio.no looming on the horizon (or underway Press. Fisher, Roger and Daniel Shapiro, (2005). depending upon your point of view), Beyond Reason: Using Emotions as You Crocker, Chester A., Fen Osler Hampson, Negotiate. New York: Viking. Eurasia has been in such a state for and Pamela Aall (2005). Taming Intractable at least the last two decades. It has Conflicts: Mediation in the Hardest Cases. Sebenius, James J. (2013). “Level Two seen several internal ethno-political Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Negotiations: Helping the Other Side Meet Its Peace Press. ‘Behind-the-Table’ Challenges.” Negotiation and inter-state conflicts, including a Journal, 29, 1: 7–21. number of shooting wars. 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BY VALERIE ROSOUX NEGOTIATING HISTORY IN EURASIA

Blue Mosque in Istanbul, Turkey - By Moonik - Own work, CC BY-SA 3.0

This article focuses on the versus concealment), and to this mere alternative between interactions between geopolitics determine their consequences accentuation and downplaying of and history in Eurasia. The analysis for security issues. A systematic the past, is there a way to accept is based on three historical cases emphasis on the conflictual past the past as a whole with the that are particularly emblematic jeopardizes peace processes and can complexity and the contradictions of the burden of the past. In the lead to an escalation of violence, the that often characterize it? If so, first case (Russia-Poland), former goal pursued by each party being to can this function as a long-term enemies decided to launch an official impose its own single interpretation confidence-building measure? initiative to explicitly address painful of the truth. Rather than underlining questions of the past. In the second their interpretations, foreign policy The analysis of these case studies case (Armenia-Turkey), parties actors may attempt to hide certain refers to negotiation in the broad considered their posture towards aspects of the past or at least pass sense of the term. It considers not the past as non-negotiable. Finally, over them in silence. When official only the explicit negotiations that the third case (Russia-Ukraine) representatives resort to this take place at the official level, but illustrates the challenge of dealing mechanism, their objective is not, also tacit bargaining (Schelling, with divided historical memory. as it is in the accentuation process, 1960; Downs and Rocke, 1990) by The aim of this article is not to to impose a single interpretation mixed commissions of historians. analyze these three cases from a of the past. Rather, it is to avoid This study is guided by the following historical perspective, but to observe any interpretation at all. Again, the set of questions: Who refers to the these cases from various strategies representation of the other party past? When does it refer to the towards the past (accentuation is not taken into account. Beyond past? Besides official leaders on 38 PIN•Points 43/2016

each side, what is the potential commemorating the 70th Polish and Russian, respectively). role of historians and memory anniversary of the onset of World This book assessed the most difficult entrepreneurs? Who are the spoilers War Two in Gdansk. Rather than problems in bilateral relations who resist any modification of the commenting further on the Katyn over ninety years, from 1918 to meaning given to the past? massacre during his speech, Putin 2008, taking a “mirror” approach equated this episode with the fate of incorporating both the Polish and RUSSIA/POLAND: Soviet soldiers who were captured Russian perspectives. INSTITUTIONAL (DIS) by the Polish troops in 1919-1920. CONTINUITY In Poland, many considered this to The explicit willingness “to clear” be a tit-for-tat argument, basically the relations between the two The notion of institutional continuity identifying victims on one’s own states “of the lies and deceit that is at the core of the memory side to allegedly counterbalance the have accumulated over the years” issues that still divide Russian and weight of an embarrassing past. The was based on the conviction that Polish leaders. Should Russia, as same approach was taken in 1990 by historical facts were indisputable; a successor to the USSR, assume Mikhail Gorbachev. When the former yet, their interpretation varied responsibility for the crimes general secretary of the Communist (Rotfeld and Torkunov, 2015: 1). committed against the Poles during Party of the Soviet Union admitted This common work on memory may the Soviet period? In Russia, the official responsibility for the murder be analyzed as a particular form fear of compensation claims from of thousands of Polish officers in of negotiation. As in a negotiation relatives of the victims regularly a forest near Smolensk, he also process, the interpretation tended disappoints the expectations of initiated a campaign to look into the to “reconfigure” reality. It aimed at many in Poland. For Poles, the deaths of thousands of Red Army producing a mutually acceptable mass execution of more than 4,000 soldiers taken captive on Polish reappropriation of the past. Polish officers in the Katyn forest soil during the Soviet–Polish war of in 1940 became the symbol of the 1919–1920. The traditional steps in any many victims of Stalinism. The negotiation can be identified as fact that Soviet leaders insisted for PROCESS the preliminary phase, information decades that the Polish officers phase, argumentation phase, found at Katyn had been killed Beside the highs and lows of the adjustment phase, or the formation by the Germans in 1941 - an official relations between Poland of an agreement (Dupont, 1994). explanation accepted by successive and Russia, it is worth paying The preliminary contacts took place Polish communist governments attention to the establishment of the on “neutral” ground in Brussels until the late 1980s – left a deep “Polish-Russian Working Group for in February 2008 (Rotfeld and scar in Polish-Russian relations. Difficult Matters”. This group was Torkunov, 2015: 2). Both teams In 1992, the Russian government formally established in February exchanged proposals about the released documents proving that 2002 during Prime Minister Vladimir composition of the group, its the People’s Commissariat for Putin’s official visit to Poland. It was procedures, and the range of issues Internal Affairs (NKVD in Russian) only in 2008, after a visit to Moscow requiring discussion. During the and the Soviet Politburo had been by Prime Minister Donald Tusk, information and argumentation responsible for the massacre and that the Group resumed activities, phases, each party described cover-up, revealing that there may chaired by Professors Adam Daniel and justified the interpretations it have been more than 21,000 victims Rotfeld, a former Polish foreign retained of the past. (Etkind et al, 2012). In 2000, a minister, and Anatoli V. Torkunov, Russian-Polish memorial gravesite the rector of the Moscow State In the adjustment/reconstruction – the Katyn memorial complex – was Institute of International Relations, phase, the parties admitted that officially opened. The problem of MGIMO-University. This semi-official “different nations have different acknowledgement and responsibility group of scholars (e.g. historians, assessments of the same events” for the Katyn Massacre crystallizes political scientists, lawyers, etc.) and (Rotfeld and Torkunov, 2015: 1), the tensions and dilemmas faced by politicians published a joint volume and tried “to find tactical ways of the actors. entitled White Spots-Black Spots: reaching compromise” (ibid., 8). Difficult Matters in Polish-Russian During this phase, parties were not Nine years later, Vladimir Putin Relations 1918–2008, published only challenged by the existence of participated in the ceremonies both in Warsaw and Moscow (in differences and, even, contradictions, www.pin-negotiation.org 39

with regard to the facts, but by the the relationship between the two Soviets responsible, and 28 percent intensity of emotions. The two chairs States. On April 7, 2010, Vladimir maintained that the Nazis committed of the group mentioned a “feeling Putin visited the Katyn memorial the crime; 53 percent were not sure of nervousness and irritability” site with the Polish Prime Minister who was responsible (Levada Tsentr, and an “apprehensiveness” due to Donald Tusk to commemorate quoted by Adler, 2012: 331). public expectations and reports in the seventieth anniversary of the the press (ibid., 8). These emotions massacre. The statements of the ARMENIA/TURKEY: THE formed a backdrop, which showed prime ministers at the graves of the GEOPOLITICS OF DENIAL that the conflicts did not only belong victims were extensively reported to the past. The conclusion of the in the media. This time, Putin HISTORICAL CONTEXT agreement did not mean that the expressed deep sympathy with the parties managed to develop one victims of the atrocities committed Turkey closed its border with common representation of the past. under the Soviet Union and placed Armenia after the outbreak of war The aim of the contributors to the responsibility on Stalin and other between Armenia and Azerbaijan, book was to go beyond incompatible Soviet leaders. This position was in a Turkish ally. However, there narratives in order to present line with the approach of Adam D. was a deeper division - far beyond diverging – but not contradictory Rotfeld: “[I]t was not a crime of the territorial disputes. As in the – interpretations of their common Russians, but of a criminal regime, previous case study, it concerned past. Two separate texts were whose victims, alongside Poles, the way to address the past. This therefore prepared on each topic included Russians, Ukrainians, conflict was rooted in the dying days by Polish and Russian authors. This Belarusians, Jews and many other of the Ottoman Empire. The most process shows that the search for nationalities in the USSR.” In his explosive issue that still prevents any a common language about the past opinion, Katyn could be perceived Turkish-Armenian rapprochement does not fully do away with plurality. as a “place of mutual pain” and concerned the deportation and It actually means that some therefore become a reconciliatory mass killing of Armenian subjects disagreement may be accepted. site (Przekrój, 30 March 2010). of the Ottoman Empire by the Young We could speak of “reasonable Turk government during World War disagreement”, which appears to Three days later, a plane carrying I (WWI). There is broad consensus be accepted by the parties. In that Polish President Lech Kaczynski to among historians that the campaign sense, the work of memory remains another commemoration ceremony was a deliberate attempt to destroy a process concerning memories in crashed near Smolensk and the the Armenian people and was thus the plural. Katyn site. These events of April 7th a genocide. As a successor state – 10th triggered a wave of empathy in to the Ottoman Empire, Turkey CONSEQUENCES Russia. One month later, President has recognized that atrocities took Medvedev agreed to declassify the place but has consistently refused To what extent can we consider Katyn files and rehabilitate the to acknowledge the existence that the process was successful? victims of this crime. As for the of a genocidal policy toward the In the view of some observers, the general public, Andrzej Wajda’s film Armenians. book could have opened the minds Katyn, shown on the main channel of many people on both sides, if of Russian public television, made For the Armenian diaspora, most only they were “prepared to read the Russian audience aware of of whom are grandchildren of it and pause for thought” (Marian the circumstances of this crime. surviving Anatolian Armenians, this Wojciechowski quoted by Andrzej However, these events did not attitude denies their identity. They De Lazari, 2011: 73). From this seem to have a strong impact on do not want to forget those who perspective, the group could have the ambivalence of the Russian were turned out of their homes and played the role of a catalyst in authorities towards the Stalinist sent on death marches through the Polish-Russian bilateral relations. past, the frequent mixed official Mesopotamian desert without food However, a second condition seems messages and the frequent political or water or those who were drowned to be vital to understanding the uses of history (Adler, 2012). In in rivers, crucified, or burned actual impact of this initiative: the terms of public opinion, a 2010 alive. By most historical accounts, Polish-Russian political situation. In survey found that only 43 percent of more than one million Armenians this regard, one key moment could those polled knew anything about were killed. Since the 1960s, the have provoked a turning point in Katyn, 19 percent considered the Armenian diaspora has lobbied for 40 PIN•Points 44/2017

international acknowledgement of sadness and resentment interfere what the truth is, but to open new the massacres that took place in the and prevent any forward-looking horizons” and “enhance mutual years after 1915. According to some negotiation process (Zartman & understanding” (Ozdem Sanbeck, experts, the debate over the use of Kremenyuk, 2005). former Turkish Ambassador to the word genocide to describe the Britain, New York Times, July 10, fate of the Armenians of Eastern PROCESS 2001). Anatolia, whom were deported and massacred, has turned into “an ugly In 2001, a Turkish-Armenian The commission asked the bargaining process” (De Waal, 2010: Reconciliation Commission was International Center for Transitional 1). established to foster cooperation Justice (ICTJ) to facilitate an and lead to direct talks between the independent legal analysis On the one hand, government officials governments of the two countries. regarding the appropriateness in Turkey did offer condolences The Turkish and Armenian of the term genocide. The ICTJ to the Armenian victims, but they governments were not directly experts concluded that the “events” dispute the number killed and involved but tacitly approved the constituted genocide as defined the circumstances, emphasizing initiative supported by the U.S. in the Convention because they that hundreds of thousands of State Department. To note, there were perpetrated with the intent Ottoman Muslims died during the was not a historian among the ten of permanently resolving the same period. On the other hand, members. The participants included “Armenian Question”. After this most Armenians are offended by former officials and academics stage, the Commission did not any moral equivalency and remain from both parties, including an succeed in bridging the divide. In the committed to having the WWI killings Armenian member who was an absence of trust, the reconciliatory recognized as genocide. The whole adviser to President Vladimir Putin role of the Commission was probably debate is highly emotional. Both and an American facilitator. As its too ambitious. Moreover, the parties consider that it is a question name indicates, the intent of the emphasis on the genocide as a focal of honour and dignity. Shame, guilt, commission was “not to find out point made it impossible to promote

Akhurian River, Turkey-Armenia border – by Martin Lopatka – Flickr.com www.pin-negotiation.org 41

rapprochement between the parties. Istanbul under the banner “We are (1993: 677). Since the independence all Armenians”. of Ukraine in 1991, the two countries In 2007, Swiss diplomats facilitated have been in conflict over several talks between Turkish and Armenian However, the divide between the issues - from the future of the Black officials. The negotiations resulted two societies remains wide. A Sea fleet to the control of ownership in two protocols on normalizing survey study investigated Turkish of nuclear weapons. The annexation their relationship (Zurich, 10 Oct. students’ perceptions of the of Crimea by the Russian Federation 2009). The protocols were designed massacres of Armenians at the and the seemingly intractable to allow the opening of borders beginning of the 20th century conflict in East Ukraine reinforce the and to establish formal diplomatic with regard to attributions of long shadow of history, starting with relations between the two countries. responsibility and perceived severity the Pereyslav agreement in 1654 and However, the protocols faced of harm. The results demonstrated above all, the famine that followed intense criticism in both countries. a high correspondence between Stalin’s drive to collectivization. The Turkish Parliament refused participants’ individual views and The memories of the horrific winter to sign the protocols as a result of the official Turkish narrative of the and early spring of 1932-33 that domestic and Azerbaijani demands events (Bilali, 2013). took more than 2 million lives in (since the Protocols did not refer to Ukraine (Kupfer & de Waal, 2014) the Nagorno-Karabakh issue), while At this stage, two major elements remained unrecognized throughout some Armenians accused their make it difficult to foresee radical the Soviet period. In the aftermath government of selling out. change in the relationships between of independence, the use of what both states in the near future. First, came to be called Holodomor, or CONSEQUENCES the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh “extermination by hunger”, as a remains one of the most severe defining cornerstone of Ukrainian Since 2007, there has not been a problems facing the South Caucasus national identity exacerbated turning point, nor a real negotiation (Hopmann and Zartman, 2010). serious fractures between Russia process. Some experts have Second, recent developments in and Ukraine and within Ukraine suggested that the centenary national Turkish politics confirm itself. of the Armenian genocide was the Justice and Development In Russia, Kremlin officials do not an opportunity for the Turkish Party as a dominant political force. deny that the Holodomor was a authorities to modify their denial Political repression has worsened tragedy. However, they consider that policy by deploying diplomatic since the coup attempt in July. In it was not intentional, and that other measures of apology (Laycock, 2015; these circumstances, willingness regions in the Soviet Union suffered Marian, 2015). Nonetheless, the to control the opposition forces at that time. Within Ukraine, parties weight of the past remains obviously will likely imply an eagerness to have increasingly highlighted too heavy to imagine a rapid change consolidate control over the national those experiences that divide them in that matter. memory. without paying attention to common Several initiatives were taken by experiences. Turkish civil society to promote RUSSIA/UKRAINE: THE a critical representation of the DREADED AND HATED PROCESS national past. Fethiye Çetin’s OTHER memoir, My Grandmother (2004), Contrary to the first case, where confronted Turks with the fact that HISTORICAL CONTEXT some Polish and Russian historians hundreds of thousands of Turkish attempted to move beyond citizens had Armenian grandparents The third case is clearly vital in nationalist representations of the who assimilated after 1915. Authors terms of regional security. To past, the some historians’ roles and editors such as Orhan Pamuk Johan Morrisson, “[j]ust as the have intensified the demonization (recipient of the Nobel Prize for Franco-German partnership of the “other”. In glorifying their Literature) and Hrant Dink (an proved crucial to the development national heroes and victims and ethnic Armenian and Turkish citizen) of postwar Western Europe, the erasing the dark sides of the story promoted an Armenian– Turkish Russian-Ukrainian relationship (e.g. the role of some Ukrainian dialogue. Dink’s assassination is likely to influence the political, nationalist groups in the Holocaust in 2007 provoked a non-violent military and economic outlook for and the mass ethnic cleansing of demonstration in the streets of much of Central and Eastern Europe” Poles during WW2), these historians 42 PIN•Points 43/2016

Battalion “Donbas” in Donetsk region, Ukraine, Ліонкінг - Own work, CC BY-SA 4.0

have exacerbated conflict rather debate rapidly polarized the Nazi collaborators – demonstrated than resolving legacy issues. Thus, positions between the country’s that there was little room for it does not come as a surprise west and its more Russified east. alternatives to these two extremes. that “[a]lthough events of 75 years Since then, binary opposites reflect ago may seem like settled history, Contradictory narratives a seemingly irreconcilable divide they are very much a part of the progressively reinforced the social that remains emblematic of “the information war raging between fragmentation of the country. In bloodlands” described by the Russia and Ukraine” (Cohen, 2016). focusing on either a Russian past, historian Timothy Snyder (2010). At or a national past, these narratives this stage, all official actors resort to In 2006, a resolution passed by became mutually exclusive. Some two mechanisms in the construction the Ukrainian parliament referred voices systematically highlighted of the strategic narrative meant to to the Holodomor as an “act of the national liberation from the create and develop their specific genocide against the Ukrainian “Soviet occupation”, while others identity. They accentuate the people”. This legislative change commemorated above all the conflictual past by emphasizing was not supported by the then liberation from the Nazi occupying past persecution of their group and prime minister Viktor Yanukovych forces thanks to the “Great Patriotic conceal embarrassing episodes in and over 200 parliamentarians War”. Black and white “mirror” their own past. Both mechanisms coming from the Russian-speaking pictures of the victim and perpetrator have common and fundamental southeast. Four years later, when were constructed. During the Orange characteristic aspects. They are he became president, Yanukovych Revolution in 2004, these two unilateral in nature. They do not did not refer to the famine as a narratives crystallized the conflict imply any sort of recognition for genocide, but as an “Armageddon” between supporters of Yushchenko the perspective of the members or a “tragedy”, “a common tragedy and of Yanukovych. The political of the other group, nor any of the states that made up the maneuvering of figures such as awareness of the existence of united Soviet Union” (quoted by Stepan Bandera - depicted as either that other interpretation. They are Kupfer and de Waal, 2014). This heroes of the national liberation, or incompatible with the idea of a new www.pin-negotiation.org 43

identity resulting from negotiations that many see as necessary to the expectations. In the Polish-Russian with the other party. settling of bitter conflicts. In these case, the influence of Donald Tusk circumstances, negotiating security was decisive in launching the CONSEQUENCES and moving forward means that the negotiations to provide a common past has to be put aside – at least in platform to clear some areas of An emphasis on past conflicts the short run. historical mines. The shift from leads to an escalation of violence. an adversarial duel to a dynamic Furthermore, such a process may CONCLUSION partnership relied on two pairings: not be associated with any form of political leaders determined to negotiation. The perspective that The initial question of this study was find mutually satisfying “solutions” one party has of past events is not the following: should we address and historians determined taken into consideration by the other. painful questions of the past in to explore the pre-conditions The goal pursued by each party is to order to favor regional security? for cohabitation of diverging impose a single interpretation of the If so, when is the situation ripe to experiences. The Turkish-Armenian past - its own. do so (Zartman, 2001)? The case and Russian-Ukrainian cases are studies show that quite aside from characterized by an absence of The war against the Donbas structural factors and diverging leaders committed to moving from separatists has probably consolidated norms regarding democracy, confrontation to some degree of Ukraine’s political nationhood. sovereignty or territoriality, cooperation in resolving historical However, major questions remain differences in approaches to issues. regarding the inclusivity of this history and in particular to national process. How can we troubled past events constitute The second factor is connected with reconcile this over-emphasized critical obstacles to negotiating the robustness of institutions, at strategic narrative with the individual security. These differences go both the societal and governmental memories of the Donbas separatists? beyond the normal challenges of levels. Former adversaries will In Ukraine, the gradual fragmentation cross-cultural negotiation. They only try to commit themselves to of identity indicates the limitations of reflect incompatible identities such demanding common work on any attempt to impose one unique and indicate persistent types of memory if it serves both their own narrative on people with different nationalism, which take effect at and the national interest. The best experiences and, therefore, different various levels. way to ensure this is to establish joint expectations (Ostriitchouck, 2016). projects. To create domestic support At this stage, Ukrainian nationalists All the case studies illustrate and to gradually change perceptions perceive Russia as Ukraine’s true not only the clash between of the past, and therefore of the enemy, “Other” – even though Russians do strategic narratives, but also leaders need to establish robust and not seem to perceive Ukrainians as the tensions between public and credible institutions where all parties foreigners, but rather as “a branch of private practices, official and have to work together. In this regard, the greater Russian tree” (Molchanov, underground memories. They help the Franco-German example is 2015: 209). Perceptions of Russia’s us to understand why negotiations inspiring. It remains an open-ended “betrayal” of Ukraine at the birth actually happened between Polish process, but the establishment of the of Ukrainian national sovereignty and Russian representatives – Franco-German Youth Office, to give have led to the development of a even though they failed to produce just one example, was a decisive step “permanent inferiority complex and a political tangible results - and why towards developing a more complex lack of confidence in negotiating with the chance for such negotiations approach to otherness. Moscow” on the part of the Ukrainian was missed in the two other cases. political elite, who cannot stop In terms of practical and theoretical Third, case studies indicate how fearing “that any deal with Russia lessons, they point to at least three essential timing is when the is a potential trap” (Morrison, 1993: main variables that should be borne objective is to change an adversarial 679-680). in mind regarding the links between relationship. The emotional security and memory issues. resonance of official apologies This case study shows that until concerning past human rights losses have been mourned, groups First, leadership is critical to violations is such that it would be are unable to alter their positions fostering a better understanding of naïve to think in terms of normative and to develop the kind of empathy the others’ interests, perceptions and process. Research carried out so far 44 PIN•Points 43/2016

shows that an adjustment regarding events and continue to attempt Kupfer, Matthew &Thomas de Waal. 2014. diverging interpretations of the to impose their vision of past and “Crying Genocide: Use and Abuse of Political Rhetoric in Russia and Ukraine,” available at past may function as a long-term present realities. http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/07/28/ confidence-building measure. crying-genocide-use-and-abuse-of-political- However, this change cannot occur The socially constructed nature rhetoric-in-russia-and-ukraine-pub-56265. Laycock, Jo. 2015. “Beyond National at any time. The acknowledgement of national memory presents Narratives? Centenary Histories, the First of embarrassing events does not possibilities for change – even if World War and the Armenian Genocide,” appear to be dictated by the mere change is neither easy nor systematic Revolutionary Russia, IIXXX 2: 93-117. wish to dispense justice. It depends, – and, therefore, opportunities for Marian, Michel. 2015. « Génocide arménien. rather, on pragmatic factors. It is conflict transformation. As a result, Retour sur un centenaire », Politique étrangère, 3:83-91. probable that the situation of former the real question is probably not adversaries will only be recognized if whether or not the past should be Morrison, John, 1993. “Pereyaslav and this appears useful and necessary in confronted – but rather when, how, after: the Russian-Ukrainian Relationship”, International Affairs, ILXX 4: 677-703. the eyes of all protagonists. National and by whom such an exercise interest is a major constraint in should take place. In terms of timing, Ostriitchouk Zazulya, Olha. 2016. Mémoires de conflits, mémoires en conflits. that respect: a reciprocal change periods of transition offer windows Affrontements identitaires, tensions will occur in identities if and where of opportunity to turn the page from politiques et luttes symboliques autour du protagonists are convinced that a troubled past. In the aftermath of passé, Brussels, Peter Lang. rapprochement is vital. the Fall of the Berlin Wall, dealing Rotfeld, Adam Daniel and Torkunov, Anatoly with the past was particularly 2015. White Spots – Black Spots: difficult matters in Polish-Russian Relations, In these circumstances, how can emphasized as a transitional justice 1918-2008, Pittsburgh, University of leaders devise commemorations that mechanism. War periods, however, Pittsburgh Press. are forward-looking rather than only (as in the Donbas) are not good times Schelling, Thomas. 1960. The Strategy of focusing on the past? Blaming “absent to negotiate memories, and therefore Conflict. Cambridge: Harvard University parties” can be a rather effective construct (in)security. Press. Snyder, Timothy. 2010. Bloodlands: Europe tactic in that regard. In blaming Between Hitler and Stalin, New York: Stalin and Soviet representatives, References Basicbooks. Vladimir Putin helped to encourage Adler, Nanci, 2012, “Reconciliation with – or Zartman, I William and Kremenyuk, Victor, a common perspective on the rehabilitation of – the Soviet past”, Memory eds. 2015. Peace versus Justice: Negotiating Studies, V 3:27–338. conflictual past. The process was Forward- and Backward-Looking Outcomes. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. identical when French and German Bilali, Rezarta, 2013. “National Narrative and leaders emphasized the difference Social Psychological Influences in Turks’ between the Germans and the Nazis. Denial of the Mass Killings of Armenians This distinction was, for instance, as Genocide”, Journal of Social Issues, 69: 16–33. highlighted by former French Foreign Cohen, Josh. 2016. “The Historian Minister, Roland Dumas, whose whitewashing Ukraine’s Past”, Foreign Policy, 22 mai. father was a Resistance fighter, killed in 1944: “I do not confuse what was De Lazari, Andrezej, 2011. “Polish-Russian Nazism and what are the German Difficult matters”, The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs, 1. people. That is to say that I hate fanaticism, fascism and violence, but De Waal, Thomas. 2010. “Armenia and Turkey: bridging the gap”, Carnegie I do respect peoples and I particularly Endowment for International Peace, Policy respect the German people and its Brief, 87. genius” (Der Spiegel, 2 June 1990). Downs, G. and Rocke, D. 1990. Tacit Equally, Charles de Gaulle drew Bargaining, Arms Races, and Arms Control, attention to the personal heroism of Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Konrad Adenauer who represented Dupont, Christophe. 1994. La Négociation. “a new Germany” (June 27, 1962). Conduite, théorie, applications. Paris: Dalloz. This tactic is highly unlikely to be Etkind, Alexander et al. 2012. Remembering Katyn, London: Polity adopted in the Turkish-Armenian and Russian-Ukrainian cases, where Hopmann, P. Terrence and I. William Zartman. 2010. “Overcoming the most parties remain deeply attached Nagorno-Karabakh Stalemate”, International to a series of particular founding Negotiation ,XV 1: 1-6. www.pin-negotiation.org 45

BY GUY OLIVIER FAURE IN MEMORIAM – MORTON DEUTSCH

fascinating life. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor he joined the US Air Force as a psychologist. Then, as a navigator, he participated to thirty bombing missions over Nazi Germany. At the end of the war he studied at MIT under the mentoring of Kurt Lewin for his Ph.D.

The major institution where he found an intellectual home was Teachers College, at Columbia University. There he published two important works, The Resolution of Conflict (1973) and Distributive Justice (1985) and became known as an authority in the fields of conflict resolution, social justice, intergroup relations, and social psychology. In 1986, he founded the International Center for Cooperation and Conflict Resolution (ICCCR) at Columbia.

Mort Deutsch has conducted pioneering studies on cooperation and competition leading to ground breaking insights. The impact of his work was not only theoretical but also practical. He has, for instance, provided a framework for several US - Soviet negotiations, and for the peaceful transition from Communist rule in Poland in 1989. Morton Deutsch passed away at was associated to a book gathering 97 years old. A brilliant social essays inspired by his work (Bunker Mort Deutsch’s work in the field has psychologist but first of all, one of and Rubin: Conflict, Cooperation and ranged from experimental studies - as the founding fathers of the field of Justice. Jossey-Bass publishers, in The Resolution of Conflict - to policy conflict resolution. Everyone working 1995). Much more recently I was orientated works such as Preventing in this domain owes him something. again associated to another of his World War III – and ultimately to a Some of us at PIN had close relations remarkable initiatives, a summary compendium of the current state of with him such as Jeffrey Rubin, of what is known on Conflict knowledge in the domain with The former PIN Steering Committee Resolution (Deutsch, M., Coleman, Handbook of Conflict Resolution; member, who was his PhD student. I P. T., & Marcus, E. C. The Handbook Theory and Practice. Mort has personally met him for the first time of Conflict Resolution: Theory and passed away but his achievements in the early seventies. I was a young Practice ,3rd ed.: Jossey-Bass,2014). will stay as an essential milestone researcher and I had the privilege to Inexhaustible apostle of conflict in the development of the field of attend his seminar and benefit from resolution, Mort Deutsch had a conflict resolution. He will remain an his intellectual radiance. Later on, I inspirational force to all of us. 46 PIN•Points 44/2017

BY CECILIA ALBIN NEGOTIATING JUSTICE: FROM CONFLICT TO AGREEMENT 2017 PIN PROJECT ANNOUNCEMENT

PIN is undertaking a new book project This third book project will address Among the alternatives may be during 2017, entitled ”Negotiating the central question of how conflicting to: strike a balance between and Justice: From Conflict to Agreement”. notions of justice are handled – combine different notions of justice in International negotiation is a central and can be better handled – in an agreement, agree to settle issues tool for tackling global issues, but international negotiation processes. based on considerations other than faces repeated stalemates or slow A classic notion is that parties justice (for example, by redefining the progress in many areas. A major negotiate a compromise by inching problem), and to negotiate agreement and much overlooked problem is step-by-step from a single shared based on one party’s single notion of conflicting notions of justice held by principle and interpretation of it (e.g., justice (as may happen when parties parties, with regards to both process some form of equality, such as equal are unequal in bargaining power). and outcome issues. This is the third shares). However, this seldom holds project done by PIN in that subject up in real cases, especially not in 3. Do some ways of handling conflicting area. multilateral ones. All too frequently, justice notions lead to “better” parties endorse opposing principles (e.g., more integrative, more stable) The first dates back to 1992-1993 when or interpretations of justice for a outcomes than others? PIN sponsored pilot studies in the new variety of reasons – for example, terrain. They laid out, conceptually divergences in cultural norms, Theory development will be combined and empirically, the multiple roles historical experience, resources, or with discussion of a variety of which justice can play in international responsibility for the problem under empirical cases of negotiation, negotiations (Albin, 1993, 1995). The negotiation (Albin, 2001). A clear-cut bilateral and multilateral, from many PIN AGNEDA second demonstrated some ten years illustration is climate change talks, different issue areas. later that success in ending conflict which to a large extent concern through negotiation depends on the conflicting notions of justice with The working topics and themes to type of justice pursued: The pursuit regards to who should undertake include, as now planned, are: of forward-looking, inclusive notions greenhouse gas emission cuts and at • Negotiating Justice: A Conceptual of justice enhances the chances of a whose costs. The divergent stances Framework resolving outcome while those looking on justice here stem from differences • Justice in Finding a Negotiating backward to the past and previous in past, current and future projected Formula wrong-doings erode them (Zartman emission levels, and in responsibility • Justice and Power in International & Kremenyuk, 2005). for the climate problem, in resources, Negotiations and in gains to be had from emission • Negotiating a Just World Order Numerous studies and projects abatement. • Justice and Culture in Negotiation done by individual PIN members in • Justice, Islam and Negotiation collaboration with others or alone have Among the core questions to be • Negotiating Intergenerational also contributed much knowledge addressed by contributing authors Justice and insights – for example, on how are: • Negotiating Environmental Justice negotiation success may depend on 1. What are the sources of conflicting • Justice in Negotiating Sustainable parties adopting a shared notion of notions of justice, which parties Development. justice (Zartman, 1995; Zartman et al., bring to the international • Explaining Justice Adherence in 1996), and on reliance on procedural negotiating table? International Negotiations or distributive justice principles (e.g., 2. How do conflicting notions of justice • Negotiating Justice: Lessons for Albin & Druckman, 2012, 2014a, affect the negotiation dynamics? Theory and Practice and Training 2014b). Normative studies of justice What are different ways in which are crucial in the all important area parties handle conflicting notions A workshop for authors is scheduled of trade as well as climate change of justice while negotiating, and for 22-23 September 2017. negotiations. attempting to reach an agreement? www.pin-negotiation.org 47

References Albin, C. and Druckman, D. (2014a). Zartman, I. W. (2005). “Looking Forward and “Procedures matter: Justice and effectiveness Looking Backward on Negotiation Theory.” In Albin, C. (1993) “The role of fairness in in international trade negotiations.” European Zartman, I. W. and Kremenyuk, V., eds. (2005). negotiation.” Negotiation Journal, Vol. 9, No. Journal of International Relations, published Peace versus Justice: Negotiating Forward- 3, pp. 223-244. online before print June 3. and Backward-Looking Outcomes. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Albin, C. (1995) “Rethinking Justice and Albin, C. and Druckman, D. (2014b). Zartman, I. W. and Kremenyuk, V., eds. (2005). Fairness: The Case of Acid Rain Emission “Bargaining over Weapons: Justice and Peace versus Justice: Negotiating Forward- Reductions.” Review of International Studies, Effectiveness in Arms Control Negotiations.” and Backward-Looking Outcomes. Lanham, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 119-143. International Negotiation, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 426-458. Albin, C. (2001). Justice and Fairness in International Negotiation. New York: Zartman, I. W. (1995) ”The Role of Justice Cambridge University Press. in Global Security Negotiations.” American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 38, No. 6. Albin, C. and Druckman, D. (2012). “Equality matters: Negotiating an end to civil wars.” Zartman, I. W. et al. (l996). “Negotiation as a Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 56, No. 2, Search for Justice”. International Negotiation, pp. 155-182. Vol. 1, No. 1, l996, pp. 79-98.

PIN ROADSHOW: 21 SEPTEMBER 2017 German Institute of Global and Area Studies (IGIGA)

BOOK WORKSHOP: JUSTICE AND NEGOTIATION 22-23 SEPTEMBER 2017 Uppsala University, Peace and Conflict Resolution Program PIN AGNEDA

ROADSHOW: EARLY MARCH 2018 University of Economic, International Diplomatic Studies Program, Prague, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe

PANEL ROUNDTABLE, INTERNATIONAL STUDIES ASSOCIATION, 4-7 APRIL 2018 San Francisco, CA

BOOK WORKSHOP 2018: 23-24 APRIL Armenia The Clingendael Institute sees the need for negotiation training NEGOTIATION support as part of the larger international conflict resolution toolkit and has therefore, with the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, taken the initiative to provide TRAINING negotiation training for:

1 Representatives of groups in conflict AS A CONFLICT 2 Mediators RESOLUTION The goal of the initiative is to strengthen the capabilities of participants in peace and mediation processes. To do so, INSTRUMENT Clingendael aims: • To enhance the quality and competences of mediators and representatives of groups in conflict taking part in During peace talks, success and failure negotiation processes; at the negotiation table are largely • To contribute to conflict resolution capacities locally and regionally; determined by the negotiation skills of • To support peace initiatives of international and regional the representatives of conflicting groups organisations. or the facilitation skills and expertise of The Clingendael Institute cooperates with international the mediator. Yet in conflict resolution organisations and partner institutions to identify groups in conflict in need and demand of training, thereby increasing the the importance of the stakeholders’ chances for peace and complementing existing efforts. negotiation and mediation capacity in This means that the training courses are: achieving a successful outcome is often Demand driven underestimated. Enhancing the • In order to contribute to conflict resolution where it is most relevant and needed, the courses will be provided to represen- negotiation skills and knowledge of tatives and mediators in need of and willing to receive training parties involved in peace processes can as identified by international organisations; Flexible greatly increase the chances of success. • Clingendael has the capacity and flexibility to quickly respond to specific training requests from mediators, parties in a conflict and international and regional organisations involved in a peace process; Tailor-made • The training needs will determine the type and focus of each course, taking into account the different stakeholders, topics under discussion and regional context. The timing, length and location of the training will be determined depending on the needs. www.pin-negotiation.org 49

NEGOTIATING RECONCILIATION IN PEACEMAKING: QUANDRIES OF RELATIONSHIP BUILDING EDS: VALERIE ROSOUX AND MARK ANSTEY

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODCUTION:

Negotiating Perilous Relations

Anstey, Mark (Nelson Mandela BOOK PREVIEW 2017 Metropolitan University) and Rosoux, Valerie (University of Louvain - UCL)

CHAPTERS:

1. Reconciliation as a puzzle: walking 10. Negotiating and sharing power: Burundi’s bumpy among definitions road to reconciliation without truth Rosoux, Valerie (UCL) Stef Vandeginste (University of Antwerpen)

2. Ethics in Reconciliation: Reconciliation, Morality 11. Negotiating and sharing power: Burundi’s bumpy and Moral Compromise road to reconciliation without truth Schussler, Rudolf (University of Bayreuth) Stef Vandeginste (University of Antwerpen)

3. Power, Negotiation and Reconciliation 12. Introducing Soft Security 2.0 to Reconciliation Anstey, Mark (NMMU) Dynamics Cristal, Moty (NEST Negotiation Strategies) 4. Power, Negotiation and Reconciliation Anstey, Mark (NMMU) 13. Reconciliation and the Land Question: a case for Negotiation? 5. Gender and Peace Negotiations: Why Gendering Bradshaw GJ and Haines R and Mark Anstey Peace Negotiations Multiplies Opportunities for (NMMU) Reconciliation Feron, Elise (Tampere Peace Research Institute, 14. “When shall we not forgive?” – The Israeli- University of Tampere, Finland) German Reparations Agreement: amid Justice and Reconciliation 6. Reconciliation and Development Melamud, Moti and Melamud, Aviv Anstey, Mark (NMMU) 15. Negotiating Grassroots Reconciliation in the 7. Rwanda: the limits of a negotiated justice context of social disintegration in post-apartheid Rosoux, Valérie (UCL) and Aggee Shyaka Mugabe South Africa (University of Rwanda) Rubin Richards (South African Practitioner)

8. The refugee issue in the Israeli-Palestinian peace 16. Lessons for practice process: The (im)possibility of negotiating ac- Anstey, Mark (NMMU) countability Bucaille, Laetitia (Cessma, Paris) 17. Lessons for theory Rosoux Valerie (UCL) 9. Russian-Polish Reconciliation and Negotiation Gretsky, Igor (St Peterbsurg State University) 50 PIN•Points 44/2017

HOW NEGOTIATIONS END: NEGOTIATOR BEHAVIOR IN THE ENDGAME BY I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN, EDITOR THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY SAIS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION:

What is Enough? How Negotiations End

BOOK PREVIEW 2017 I William Zartman, SAIS-JHU, USA

CASES:

1. Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 10. Mediating Closure: Mediators’ Timing Ariane Tabatabai, Georgetown University, USA Isak Svensson, Uppsala University, Sweden

2. Greek-EU Debt Agreement 11. Facing Impediments: Information Diana Panke, Freiburg University, Germany Andrew Kydd, Wisconsin University USA

3. Colombian FARC Agreement 12. Facing Impediments: Prospecting Carlo Nasi & Angelika Rettberg, Universidad de Janice Stein, Toronto los Andes, Colombia 13. The End of the End: Uncertainty 4. Chinese Business Negotiations: Closing the Deal Mikhail Troitskiy, MGIMO Guy Olivier Faure, Sorbonne 14. The End of the End: Approach Avoidance 5. France’s Reconciliations with Germany and Alge- Dean G Pruitt, George Mason University, Russia ria Valerie Rosoux, Université Catholique de Louvain 15. The End of the End: Unclaimed Gains and the Home Team 6. Bilateral Free Trade Negotiations P Terrence Hopmann, SAIS-JHU Larry Crump, Griffith University, Australia LESSONS: 7. Defining Components: Turning Points Daniel Druckman, Australian National University 16. Lessons for Theory and George Mason University, USA I William Zartman, SAIS-JHU

8. Defining Components: Managing or Resolving 17. Lessons for Practice Michael Butler, Clark University, USA Chester Crocker, Georgetown University

9. Mediating Closure: Driving vs Resisting Mediators Sinisa Vukovic, SAIS-JHU www.pin-negotiation.org 51

INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION A JOURNAL OF THEORY AND PRACTICE

CONTENTS Vol. 22 No. 1 2017

Camp David and Dayton: Comparing Jimmy Carter Process Peace: A New Evaluation Framework for and Richard Holbrooke as Mediators Track II Diplomacy Hamza Karcic Nathaniel Allen and Travis Sharp

Beyond Push and Pull: The Sudan Peace Process as The Eastern Nile River Waterscape: The Role of a Case Study Power in Policy-Making and Shaping National Nar- Amira Schiff ratives Lylia Khennache, Jan Adamowski and Nicolas Kosoy JOURNAL PREVIEW 2017 Reforming the United Nations Security Council: Feasibility or Utopia? The Importance of Power Balance in Nuclear Arms Kai Schaefer Negotiations: An Addendum Casey LaMar

INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION A JOURNAL OF THEORY AND PRACTICE

CONTENTS Vol. 22 No. 2 2017

This issue: Federalism and International Negotiation

Guest editors: Federalism and Liberalization: Evaluating the Im- Christian Lequesne, CERI–Sciences Po, Paris pact of American and Canadian Sub-Federal Gov- Stéphane Paquin, École nationale d’administration ernments on the Negotiation of International Trade publique, Montreal Agreements Christopher J. Kukucha Federalism, Paradiplomacy and Foreign Policy: A Case of Mutual Neglect Federalism and Foreign Affairs in Mexico: The Inter- Christian Lequesne and Stéphane Paquin national Negotiations of Mexican Sub-State Govern- ments The Role of U.S. State Governments in International Jorge A. Schiavon Relations, 1980-2015 Earl H. Fry The Growing Power of States in India’s Foreign Policy The Implementation of the Western Climate Initia- Anamika Asthana and Happymon Jacob tive: How North American States and Provinces Lead International Climate Negotiations Sub-State Diplomacy: Catalonia’s External Action Annie Chaloux Amidst the Quest for State Sovereignty Caterina García Segura Casey LaMar