Is an Ultimatum the Last Word on Crisis Bargaining? Mark Fey∗ Brenton Kenkely March 1, 2019 Abstract We investigate how the structure of the international bargaining process affects the resolution of crises. Despite the vast diversity in bargaining protocols, we find that there is a remarkably simple structure to how crises may end. Specifically, for any equilibrium outcome of a complex negotiation process, there is a take-it-or-leave-it offer that has precisely the same risk of war and distribution of benefits. In this sense, every equilibrium outcome of a crisis bargaining game is equivalent to the outcome of an offer in the ultimatum game. Consequently, if a state could select the bargaining protocol, it would choose an ultimatum or another protocol with the same result. According to our model, if states are behaving optimally, then we should observe no relationship between the bargaining protocol and the risk of war or distribution of benefits. An empirical analyses of ultimata in international crises supports this claim. ∗Professor, Department of Political Science, 109 Harkness Hall, University of Rochester, Rochester NY 14627. Email:
[email protected]. yCorresponding author. Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, 324 Commons Center, Vanderbilt University, Nashville TN 37203. Email:
[email protected]. 1 Introduction One of the main tenets of the international conflict literature is that war is the result of bargaining failure. To understand why states fight each other, we must identify why they were not able to reach a deal at the bargaining table (Fearon 1995). In other words, to understand war we must understand pre-war negotiations.