Zia's Politics and Diplomacy 1977-1988

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Zia's Politics and Diplomacy 1977-1988 P-ISSN: 2709-6254 Journal of Development and Social Sciences June 2020,Vol. 1, No. 2 O-ISSN:2709-6262 http://dx.doi.org/10.47205/jdss.2020(1-II)6 [57-70] RESEARCH PAPER Zia’s Politics and Diplomacy 1977-1988: External Trends / Internal Moves 1 Dr. Ghulam Fareed* 2 Dr. Zahid Yaseen 3 Muhammad Abid Nazir 1. Assistant Professor of Political Science, Govt. College, Depalpur, Punjab, Pakistan 2. Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, GC Women University Sialkot, Punjab, PAPERPakistan INFO ABSTRACT Received:3. Ph. D Scholar, Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab Lahore, Punjab, Pakistan Accepted: Zia’s diplomacy may be studied as vixen to vixen shrewdness. April 11, 2020 Pakistan’s covert move to start counter-insurgency on its own against Online: June 15, 2020 Soviets in Afghanistan was really the dictate of superpower to the strategic institution to formulate a strategy for long-term capitalist Keywords: June 30, 2020 designing and unipolar preponderance. In Pakistan strategists and policy makers’ philosophical code of belief the ontological perception Adversary, strengthens the 1971 episode of Pakistan’s disintegration was majorly Constructivist, the result of Soviet-patronized India’s strategy. To avenge on Soviets Diplomacy, for Pakistan’s past demise of national interest and the US revenge for Plenipotentiary, Americans’ casualties in Vietnam war of 1960s the opportunity was *PreCorresponding-Negotiation. constructively availed as Wendt endeavors the anarchy is Author:Provocative constructivist social designing. The rent proxies were the phenomenon to induct ergo-oriented strategies for US-Pak harmony of interest to be achieved. The manufacturing of surrogates remained the strategically offensive/defensive business on politico-religious grounds. Zia’s diplomacy smashed the communist idol with the power gfareed.advocate Introduction of ideologically radicalized militia equipped with scientific product of @gmail.com modern weaponry. Pre/post elemental-enrichment process up-to weapon-grade silently dedicated Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission’s (PAEC) Project 706/ERL/KRL with non- questionable authenticity and authorization. With such potent domestic measures the external enactment in the shape of Symington 1977 and Glenn 1978 the US sanctions’ Amendments generally pressurized to constrain the non-signer NPT member states to undo or roll-back the progress. The coercive diplomatic strategy was operationalized seemingly generally on South Asia and peculiarly the practicality of enforcement accelerated on Pakistan. (Rodney: 1987). Whereas, India’s apparent offensive purposes, related components and the technology was identified peaceful and remained unquestionable/scot-free from the US and Canada despite actor’s nuke-test (Parmano Prickshan) the Pokhran-I. Zia’s Politics and Diplomacy 1977-1988: External Trends / Internal Moves US tended to move with negative assumption against Pakistan’s intended transitional move for unconventional Arms’ sophistication and retrospectively did not coerce India even on actor’s explicit claims, and conversely/sanctimoniously acknowledged peaceful the purposes. US enticed Pakistan to be delivered with 120 Fighter Air-crafts if Pakistan would go to cancel the France Uranium Processing Plant Construction Deal (FPND). Bhutto’s mindfully preferred move was obsessed with US persuasive carrots. Bhutto was induced with 110 A-7 Aircrafts as well as pledges (future rewards) of massive military-political support the Premier denied blatantly. The Pakistan’s contemporary domestic political situation in 1977 was constructively strewn under allegations of rigged general elections. A military coup d etat in Pakistan generated an availability for US to protect and maximize her strategic interest and changed the situation in zero-sum game/favorite to the superpower. The external situation in Afghanistan created a space and strategic necessity for US to consolidate politico-military- intelligence relationship to strategize comprehensively the covert design for grand realisticDiplomacy outcome. Consistency: Shielding the Clandestine Nuclear Process Post India’s first nuclear test on 18 May 1974 Z.A. Bhutto declared; ‘Pakistan will get the same strategic power to balance the threat and threatIf I levelAm Assassinated”, even if the Pakistanis will have to chew the grass.’ (Talbot, 2012). In 1977, Bhutto tended to the autonomy of Pakistan’s security with nuclear power and denoted in “ (p.138); ‘Hindus, Christians, Jewish and even the Communist civilizations have the capability of nukes and Islamic world has yet not such potentiality. So, what distinction does my life about to make now when I came to realize that eighty million Pakistanis are standing defenseless under the nuclear cloud hovering threats (Nizamani, 1998). Consistence on the same paved tracks and facing dynamic diplomatic external pressures on nuclear and intuitively never abandoning but staunchly stick to the strategic national interest Zia constructed counter-orchestras not to sign the NPT protocol. Zia emphasized on relative contingency with adversary for signing the IAEA-endorsed obligation. The NPT instrument Pakistan diplomatically tagged with India’s nuclear design condition to be signed first. To neutralize deftly the counter-moves it remained skeptical. (Abraham I.: 2009). Deliberately the duo professional diplomats Munir A. Khan and Agha Shahi respectively responded with suggestive counter move of single repudiation of using atomic weapon. Pak. leader’s philosophical code of belief stuffed in the analogous persisted consistently to the 7th June 1981 Israel’s Babylon/Opera brand operation against Iraq’s under-development (NRO) Nuclear Reactor Osirak. Skeptically, it might be an offensive toe-line from the neighbor adversary. The percept’s susceptibility of tangible evidence Gen. Shamim A. Khan the Pakistan’s Chief of Staff and aide-de-camp to President Gen. Zia discussed, and showed incapacity/incapability to be resisted at fixed hours and space if the situation emerged critical. Zia sought strategic consultancy from Munir A. Khan who singled out the alternative the Track II diplomacy the informal/non-governmental/Back- Channeled connectivity via the (NSA) Non-State-Actors. (Usman, 2004). The matured track-II successfully conveyed the assurance of credible retaliatory move of (MAD) the second strike/surprise attack/ provocative option of nuclear warfare and possibly evidenced to enterprise. It was a diplomatic deterrence the threat of de- 58 Journal of Development and Social Sciences (JDSS) June, 2020 Volume 1, Issue 2 securitization/securitization. Diplomacy may emerge successive to dissuade the adversary not to be willed plan against status-quo/desired peace ends. To divert the adversary’s direction from challenging moves the leader’s historical belief steered them in the rational direction to make additional increments in strategic strength. Pakistan rushed to the purchases of Fanton A-5 Jets and Falcon F-16, and initiated sentinel exercises to thwart the perceptible nefarious agenda of Indo-Israel deliberated aggressive machination. (Anwar S.: 2010). This operational diplomacy bolstered and forced the Indian Premier Indira to hurry to negotiate on nuclear issue which took the diplomatic response by dispatching delegates the plena in re potest as to Pakistan. The outcome was of reciprocation between the hostile actors and pledges were exchanged not to attack/assist to attack on each other’s nuclear facilities. The blurring Words and smeared lines in diplomacy make murky the leaders/actors’ external macroscopic mirrors about adversary’s expected behavior to be rationally/irrationally directed. Pakistan formulated the policy of pre-determined denials. Indulging eyes into eyes faced the piercing queries of world public/international media and credibly assured, Pakistan was neither going on such tracks the evolutionary/processing/complementary to touch the weapon-grade nuclear nor any programmatic pathways to form either in future. It would never be in the individuals as actors’ intentional cognitive pipeline to be planned. The principles of Israel’s functional precedent of camouflaged centrifuges the elemental enriching technicalities and nukes’ achieving ends Pakistan followed to be concreted practically on flexible financial consumption and scientific expertise. In 1980s Walter V. the US diplomat denoted to dispatch the USDS; “Either Zia did not have the knowledge about Nuclear project……….Or he was superb hyper and liar the patriotic.” (www.dawn.com/) There was even/uneven situation the incredible single exempli clue the state was striving for non-traditional weapon. The sustenance of lying and cheating the moving on realist paved zigzags the ergo the Machiavellian prescribed diplomacy was conducted to ensure the protection of vital strategic interest despite the world powers’ diplomatic concerns the neo-realist powerful system constraints. In American strategic telescope the manifestation pertaining to Nuclear Pakistan (NP) would be a source of horrific annihilation and instability particular to the security of SA region and for US a continuous anxiety. Arthur W. Hummel, the US Ambassador to Pakistan (1977-1981) submitted reports pertaining to the meetings with Zia, and the US President Jimmy Carter’s and the USDS reports comprised on declassified documents relevant to the SA’s nuclear issue unveiled the critically constructed truth. The apparent conflictive issue was the text, specific to the centrifuges
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