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Use of Mixed Signaling Strategies in International Crisis Negotiations

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Use of Mixed Signaling Strategies in International Crisis Negotiations USE OF MIXED SIGNALING STRATEGIES IN INTERNATIONAL CRISIS NEGOTIATIONS DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Unislawa M. Wszolek, B.A., M.A. ***** The Ohio State University 2007 Dissertation Committee: Approved by Brian Pollins, Adviser Daniel Verdier Adviser Randall Schweller Graduate Program in Political Science ABSTRACT The assertion that clear signaling prevents unnecessary war drives much of the recent developments in research on international crises signaling, so much so that this work has aimed at identifying types of clear signals. But if clear signals are the only mechanism for preventing war, as the signaling literature claims, an important puzzle remains — why are signals that combine both carrot and stick components sent and why are signals that are partial or ambiguous sent. While these signals would seemingly work at cross-purposes undermining the signaler’s goals, actually, we observe them frequently in crises that not only end short of war but also that realize the signaler’s goals. Through a game theoretic model, this dissertation theorizes that because these alternatives to clear signals increase the attractiveness, and therefore the likelihood, of compliance they are a more cost-effective way to show resolve and avoid unnecessary conflict than clear signals. In addition to building a game theoretic model, an additional contribution of this thesis is to develop a method for observing mixed versus clear signaling strategies and use this method to test the linkage between signaling and crisis outcomes. Results of statistical analyses support theoretical expectations: clear signaling strategies might not always be the most effective way to secure peace, while mixed signaling strategies can be an effective deterrent. Finally the theoretical as well as empirical findings help to address the age-old debate between “hawks” and “doves” — foreign policy, which ii combines threats and cooperative elements, can be cheaper and more effective than foreign policy which relies on threats alone. iii This is dedicated to my family. iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank Dr. Pollins, Dr. Schweller, Dr. Verdier, Michael Reese, Dr. Morelli, Dr. Wright, Dr. Box-Steffensmeier and Dr. Nelson for their helpful comments and suggestions. v VITA May 30, 1977 . Born - Bielsko-Biala, Poland 1999 . .B.A. Public Policy 2000 . .M.A. International Relations 2001-present . .Graduate Teaching Associate, Ohio State University. PUBLICATIONS Research Publications With Alois A. Obwegeser, Ryan J. Uitti, et al. “Simultaneous Thalamic Deep Brain Stimulation and Implantable Cardioverter-Defibrillator”. Mayo Clinic Proceedings, January 2001. FIELDS OF STUDY Major Field: Political Science Studies in: Statistics Prof. Brian Pollins Game Theory Prof. Daniel Verdier International Security Prof. Randall Schweller vi TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Abstract . ii Dedication . iv Acknowledgments . v Vita . vi List of Tables . x List of Figures . xi Chapters: 1. Introduction . 1 1.1 Overview of the Dissertation . 9 2. Debunking the Threats-Only Assumption: Clear and Mixed Signaling Strategies in the Literature . 11 2.1 Clear Signaling . 12 2.1.1 Theoretically Driven Deterrence Literature . 13 2.1.2 The Signaling Critique of the Deterrence Literature . 18 2.2 Mixed Signaling . 29 2.2.1 The Empirically-Driven Bargaining Literature . 30 2.3 Discussion: Synthesizing the Theory with Empirics . 37 2.4 Conclusion . 40 vii 3. When Do Mixed Signaling Strategies Work and When Are Clear Effective: Game Theoretic Analysis . 42 3.1 Assumptions . 43 3.2 Players . 45 3.3 Actions and Payoffs . 46 3.4 Strategies and Beliefs . 47 3.5 Equilibrium . 48 3.6 Sequence of Moves . 48 3.6.1 Conceptualization of Signaling . 49 3.6.2 Sunk Cost Complete Information Case . 49 3.6.3 Sunk Cost, One-Sided Asymmetry, p < a, Case . 51 3.6.4 Sunk Cost, One-Sided Asymmetry, p > a, Case . 55 3.6.5 Sunk Cost, Two-Sided Asymmetry, p < a Case . 58 3.6.6 Sunk Cost, Two-Sided Asymmetry, p > a Case . 62 3.6.7 Tying-Hands, Two-sided Asymmetry Case . 65 3.7 Model with Deals and Credibility . 70 3.7.1 Deals and Credibility, Two-Sided Asymmetry Case . 72 3.8 Discussion . 74 3.9 Conclusion . 79 4. War and Peace: Large-N Empirical Analysis . 89 4.1 The BCOW Dataset . 92 4.2 Observing and Clarifying Signaling Strategies . 93 4.3 Tests of the Relationship Between Signaling Strategies and War . 98 4.3.1 Logistic Analysis . 99 4.3.2 Bayesian Analysis . 102 4.4 Discussion . 110 4.5 Conclusion . 111 5. The Failures of Kosovo: Case Study Analysis . 113 5.1 Expectation and Case Selection . 116 5.2 Sources . 119 5.3 The US Signaling — Combining Carrots and Ambiguous Threats . 119 5.4 Serbian Resistance . 131 5.5 Was the War Avoidable? . 136 5.6 Conclusion . 139 viii 6. Conclusions and Future Work . 141 6.1 Debunking The Threats-Only Assumption . 142 6.2 When Do Mixed Signaling Strategies Work and When Are Clear Effective . 147 6.3 War and Peace . 150 6.4 Combining Ambiguity and Deals: The Failures of Kosovo . 152 6.5 Discussion . 154 6.6 Future Research . 157 Appendices: A. Mathematical Appendix to the Game Theory Chapter . 159 A.1 Sketch of the Proof for Proposition 1 . 159 A.2 Sketch of the Proof for Proposition 2 . 162 A.3 Sketch of the Proof for Proposition 4 . 174 A.4 Sketch of the Proof for Proposition 5 . 178 B. Additional Data Analysis . 183 Bibliography . 239 ix LIST OF TABLES Table Page 4.1 Prevalence of each of the signaling strategies. 98 4.2 Logit model of the relationship between signaling strategies and war . 100 4.3 Bayesian models of the relationship between signaling strategies and war. .................................... 106 4.4 Bayesian models of the relationship between signaling strategies and compromise. 107 4.5 Bayesian models of the relationship between signaling strategies and compromise. 108 B.1 Bayesian model with diffuse prior and war/no war outcome variable. 232 B.2 Bayesian model with strong positive prior and war/no war outcome variable. 233 B.3 Bayesian model with strong negative prior and war/no war outcome variable. 234 B.4 Bayesian model with diffuse prior and compromise outcome variable. 235 B.5 Bayesian model with strong positive prior and compromise outcome variable. 236 B.6 Bayesian model with diffuse prior and yield/yielded outcome variable. 237 B.7 Bayesian model with strong positive prior and yield/yielded outcome variable. 238 x LIST OF FIGURES Figure Page 3.1 Mixed-Signal Model — Sunk-Costs. 48 3.2 Mixed-Signal Model — Tying-Hands: This tree models reputational costs associated with sending credible mixed or clear signals. 66 3.3 Mixed-Signal Model: Deals and Credibility. This tree models potential problems of credibility in offering inducements. 72 3.4 One-sided information asymmetry and p < a case in the sunk-cost game: Equilibrium outcomes given a = 1 (beliefs omitted). 81 3.5 One-sided information asymmetry and p < a case in the sunk-cost game: Equilibrium outcomes given a choice a = 1 or 0 ≤ a ≤ 1 (beliefs omitted). 81 3.6 One-sided information asymmetry and p < a case in the sunk-cost game: Given 0 ≤ a ≤ 1, conflictual outcomes are represented by the vertically shaded area; Given a = 1 conflictual outcomes are repre- sented by the horizontally shaded area.. 82 3.7 One-sided information asymmetry and p < a case in the sunk-cost game: Shaded area represents T’s payoff if a < 1 is higher or equal to T’s payoff if a =1. ............................ 82 3.8 One-sided information asymmetry and a < p case in the sunk-cost game: Equilibrium outcomes given a = 1 (beliefs omitted). 83 3.9 One-sided information asymmetry and a < p case in the sunk-cost game: Equilibrium outcomes given a choice a = 1 or 0 ≤ a ≤ 1 (beliefs omitted). 83 xi 3.10 One-sided information asymmetry and a < p case in the sunk-cost game: Given 0 ≤ a ≤ 1, conflictual outcomes are represented by the vertically shaded area; Given a = 1 conflictual outcomes are repre- sented by the horizontally shaded area.. 84 3.11 One-sided information asymmetry and a < p case in the sunk-cost game: Shaded area represents T’s payoff if a < 1 is higher or equal to T’s payoff if a =1. ............................ 84 3.12 Two-sided information asymmetry and p < a case in the sunk-cost game: Equilibrium outcomes given a = 1 (beliefs omitted). 85 3.13 Two-sided information asymmetry and p < a case in the sunk-cost game: Equilibrium outcomes given a choice a = 1 or 0 ≤ a ≤ 1 (beliefs omitted). 85 3.14 Two-sided information asymmetry and p < a case in the sunk-cost game: Given 0 ≤ a ≤ 1, conflictual outcomes are represented by the vertically shaded area; Given a = 1 conflictual outcomes are repre- sented by the horizontally shaded area.. 86 3.15 Two-sided information asymmetry and p < a case in the sunk-cost game: Shaded area represents T’s payoff if a < 1 is higher or equal to T’s payoff if a =1. ............................ 86 3.16 Two-sided information asymmetry and p < a case in the tying-hands game: Equilibrium outcomes given a = 1 (beliefs omitted). 87 3.17 Two-sided information asymmetry and p < a case in the tying-hands game: Equilibrium outcomes given a choice a = 1 or 0 ≤ a ≤ 1 (beliefs omitted). 87 3.18 Two-sided information asymmetry and p<a case in the tying-hands game: Given 0≤a≤1, conflictual outcomes are represented by the verti- cally shaded area; Given a=1 conflictual outcomes are represented by the horizontally shaded area.
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