Members and Electorates of Left Parties in Europe1 Anna Striethorst

The Membership of European Left Parties

The success of political parties is usually judged by their ability to achieve political objec- tives, to control the social and political discourse and place their elite in government offices. The election results of parties are regarded as a measurable indicator for this ability. Election results legitimize the political activities of the parties; their parliamentary presence extends their human and financial resources and enables them to form coalitions. As a result of the general decline in party activity within the public the party membership numbers are today of less importance for the political effectiveness of parties. The French Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP) or the Italian Popolo della Libertà (PdL) founded by Berlusconi in 2009, for example, no longer consider themselves to be classic membership parties. A permanent media presence is considered the most important resource by many other parties and has meanwhile replaced the priority of establishing a broad base in society through party members.2

1 This article has been published in the book Birgit Daiber, Cornelia Hildebrandt, Anna Striethorst (eds.): Von Revolution bis Koalition: Linke Parteien in Europa, Berlin 2010. Translation by Phil Hill, 2011. References in brackets refer to country studies that were published in the same publication. The data for diagrams are also tak- en from these sources, unless otherwise stated. For clarity, no detailed reference is made for freely available in- ternet sources. 2 See Peter Mair: Polity-Scepticism, Party Failings, and the Challenge to European Democracy. NIAS Uhlenbeck Lecture 24, Wassenaar 2006, p. 20. See Uwe Jun, Oskar Niedermayer, Elmar Wiesendahl (eds.): Zukunft der Mitgliederpartei, Opladen 2009, for a more detailed debate on the decline of the membership party.

1

However, with the exception of Cyprus, Norway and Iceland, parties in today´s Europe are either in opposition or are parties that are not represented in the parliament. Their party members and the constituencies which they work in possess significantly less financial, media and personnel resources in comparison to "media parties", large and populist parties. Thus, the membership of the left parties in Europe must still be regarded as a crucial indicator for their success. Parties with few members can also have election successes, but these successes will usually be of short duration if the left parties do not manage to gain relevant numbers of committed members with whose support they can mobilize voters and finance political activities. Normative considerations also favour a wide membership base: without members, the left parties cannot maintain their claim to be a linkage between the rulers and the ruled, representing citizens and recruiting personnel for public office. The numbers of members of the almost 60 left parties in Europe which are joined in the European Left (EL) or other European forms of cooperation, indicate a variety of very different parties. There are eight parties in the family of left European parties with more than 30,000 members and a stable parliamentary presence. (Fig. 1) Alongside these, the European Left includes several medium-sized parties with approximately 8,000 to 17,000 members which are represented in parliament or even in government. Among these are the Nordic left parties, the Greek (SYN) and the Portuguese Bloco de Esquerda. In addition, there are numerous small extra-parliamentary parties with 5,000 or less members, such as, for example, the German DKP or the Austrian KPÖ. The European Left (EL) consists of 26 member parties and 11 parties with observer status, which have approximately 500,000 members. More than 80 percent of these belong to one of the seven largest membership parties3. However, absolute numbers can distort the actual ratio to population size when directly comparing membership numbers. For example, the Icelandic Vinstri hreyfingin party only has 5,833 members, and is still one of the largest membership parties, since 1.8 percent of Iceland's population have joined. The Greek , KKE, with 30,000 members, has a much smaller degree of organization since its membership represents less than 0.3 percent of the total population. Nevertheless, the KKE still is above the average for other left parties in Europe. The Cypriot government party, AKEL with 15,000 members and 5.8

3 According to European figures. 2 percent of the population, is a genuine popular party with 31.1 percent of votes and represents an exception.4

Figure 1: European left parties with more than 30.000 members, in thousand5

The differences in membership size have to some extent to do with factors outside the parties. A comparison across Europe has to acknowledge that the overall proportion of party members with respect to the population varies from country to country.6 In some countries, as for example in Great Britain, the nature of the electoral system impedes the establishment of independent left parties. In other countries a specific anticommunism and a rightist conservative to extreme rightist basic trend is dominating the social climate, and membership growth of the marginalised left parties is almost impossible. This applies to almost all Central and East European countries with former communist state parties as well as to Austria and to Turkey, where another left party, the DTP, was banned recently. (Schukovits, Sey) There are two exceptions in Central and Eastern Europe. One is the Czech Republic, where the communist KSČM has more than 70,000 members. Another is Moldavia, where the PRCM enjoys a strong membership (30,000 members) and was part of government up to 2009. However, both these parties also encounter massive social opposition: membership in the KSČM can have a huge negative impact on professional careers in the Czech Republic (Holubec), and in 2010, the PRCM had to fight a state ban on its hammer and sickle symbols.

4 See Richard Dunphry, Tim Bale (eds.): Red Flag still flying? Explaining AKEL - Cyprus's Communist Anomaly, Party Politics Vol. 13, 3/2007, p. 300. 5 According to the author’s calculations. The newly formed Italian Sinistra Ecologia Libertà (SEL) should also be mentioned, which, by its own account, has nearly 42,000 members. Currently, the SEL is not represented in the Italian parliament. 6 On the varying degrees of organization in the European parties see Thomas Poguntke: Parteiorganisation im Wandel. Gesellschaftliche Verankerung und organisatorische Anpassung im europäischen Vergleich. Wiesbaden 2000. 3

The large variations in European left party membership also come from differing party histories and identities. Thus, for example, the Communist Parties of France, Italy and Spain used to consider themselves to be mass parties with large memberships and strong organizations. Only the PCF has succeeded in maintaining its membership at a high level. It has 134,000 adhérents (supporters)7 by its own account, but only 66,000 members pay dues.8 The Spanish Communist Party (PC) is suffering from a huge loss of membership which has declined from 200,000 members back in 1977 to 20,000 today. This membership loss, however, is partly compensated by the membership strength of the Izquierda Unida, in which the PCE participates since the 1980s. (Heilig) The loss of membership occurred much more rapidly in the PRC, the successor party to the Communist party of Italy (PCI): the PRC membership dropped from a high of 130,000 in 1997 to only 38,000 members. This coincided with dramatic election defeats at the national and European level, revealing a weak commitment from traditional voters and a very low mobilization of the remaining members. In 1992, there were 5.4 voters for each party member, in the 2006 elections there were only 4.2. (Hagemann) Three reasons were crucial for such a large PRC loss in membership and voters which had already started before the party split in 2009. Firstly, there was the lack of a common identity among the members of a party that since its foundation in 1991 had always been a "reservoir of various 'souls'". (Hagemann) Only a few unifying elements exist alongside independently acting currents. Additionally, the PRC does not have a common party programme. Secondly, the PRC has not been able to justify its claim to be a rank and file party with a strong local constituency. The party has not been able to establish a dense network of local party organisations as desired, so they could not present themselves as a "party which cares". Thirdly, the PRC claims that its party members should show their commitment by renewing their membership once every year. This has led to an even greater decline through the "resignation" of passive or temporarily disaffected party members. The Socialistische Partij (SP) of the Netherlands experienced a completely different development. From its very beginnings, this has been a cadre party, only admitting members after a probation period. Even today, the members exhibit a close cohesion and demonstrate a rigorous sense of duty towards the party. Elected members of parliament, for example, have to pass on all of their expense allowances to the SP and receive a salary amounting to the average Dutch wage.

7 According to the PCF executive board. 8 See Elisabeth Gauthier: Das politische Spektrum zwischen Dekomposition und Rekomposition. Zu den Regionalwahlen in Frankreich. In: RLS Standpunkte International 13/2010, p. 4. 4

On other issues, the SP has departed from its avant-garde tradition. Today, the SP is successful at the local political level and is characterized by high visibility, professional campaigns and effective membership recruitment. (Wirries) All these changes and measures have increased the SP membership level from 27,000 in 2000 to 50,000 in 2009. There was a reversal in this membership trend in 2010 and today the SP has only 47.000 members. Nevertheless, it remains one of the strongest membership parties of the left party family in Europe. The membership development of the DIE LINKE party in Germany is also remarkable: in common with other socialist state parties, the number of PDS members decreased steadily after the fall of the Soviet Union. An ageing membership and resignations caused the number of PDS members to decline from 281,000 in 1990 to 65,000 members in 2005.9 However, the party succeeded in reversing this trend after the merger of the PDS with the smaller WASG, which by its own account had 10,000 members. Within three years, the number of party members in the new DIE LINKE party increased to over 78,000 in 2009. A large discrepancy still exists between Eastern and Western Germany: although the membership growth is mainly attributed to the Western federal states, only 37 percent of the members come from Western Germany. (Hildebrandt) Consequently, the membership development in some Western federal states can barely keep up with the electoral successes in recent years. In Eastern Germany, DIE LINKE is a popular party with a strong presence in municipal and regional parliaments, but it is still a party coming into being in the West German federal states. Some of its political personnel have still to be recruited and trained in municipal political work.

The social structure of left parties

Parties provide citizens with an exclusive access to political deliberation. Party members can articulate their interests and convert their convictions and objectives into practical politics. Consequently, it is highly relevant to analyse the milieus that use this access to an extraordinary extent and which party they choose. The Cleavage theory assumes that belonging to a given social class, professional or social group significantly determines which party a person will join. Thus, members of a certain party have their own social profile which distinguishes them from the members of other

9 See Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung: Mitgliederentwicklung der Parteien. Online 2009. 5 parties. The newer resource-based approach questions this to some extent, since there are parallels between the members of various parties. According to this approach, the group of party members with an extended access to resources is generally different from the average member of society, and differences between the social profiles of the parties are not so important.10 A survey of the social strata of German party members conducted in 1998 suggests that both differences must be carefully considered in any article concerning left party members: the difference between party members and the population, and what distinguishes left party members from those of other parties.11 But this would require a large scale study of European parties, which, however, is not yet available. Instead, this text will primarily compare the members of the European family of left parties. The comparison must also distinguish between individual characteristics such as gender, and changeable circumstances such as employment status or level of education. With respect to diversity, it is basically desirable that the parties represent gender, age groups and minorities according to their proportions in the population at large.12 The question then arises as to what extent the diversity of left party members corresponds to the diversity in society and how disproportions can be changed. At the same time, the left parties make the explicit claim of mainly representing the socially marginalised or the disadvantaged under capitalism. Consequently, an analysis on whether the left parties correspond to such a self portrait with respect to employment status and education, being a "workers' party" or "party of the ordinary people", will follow. In addition, the claim that disadvantaged groups can voice their own interests should be evaluated in relation to the active membership (e.g. delegates and candidates).

Female members

Concerning the membership composition of European left parties, the proportion of women, compared to the average population, is significantly low in almost all parties. The proportion of women slightly corresponds to the regional status of gender equality in Europe.

10 See Roberto Heinrich, Malte Lübker, Heiko Biehl: Parteimitglieder im Vergleich. Partizipation und Repräsentation. Potsdam 2002, p. 9. 11 See ibid, p. 10. Party members differ from the average population. In Germany the proportion of party members belonging to the three top social strata (middle, upper middle class and upper class) amounts to 80 percent. Thus, it is well above that of the overall population at 62 percent. At the same time, with 39 percent, the proportion in the PDS was below that of other parties and of the entire population. 12 For a comprehensive presentation of these proportions in the European population see Steffen Mau, Roland Verwiebe: Die Sozialstruktur Europas, Konstanz 2009. 6

(Fig. 2) The proportion of women in left parties in Northern Europe is above the average of the parties compared in this article (40 percent). In Southern Europe, where women are traditionally less involved in party politics, the proportion of women is far below the average.13

Figure 2: The proportion of women in selected left parties in Europe14

SV - Norway SF - Denmark VG - Iceland KSČM - Czech Republic KPÖ - Austria Men SP - Netherlands Women DIE LINKE - Germany PRC - Italy AKEL - Cyprus (estimated)

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

In most Western and Southern European parties that measure the proportion of women, between 30 percent and 40 percent of the members are female. The KPÖ leads with 42 percent, but the Italian PRC barely achieves a female proportion of 29 percent. (Schukovits, Hagemann) The Scandinavian left parties present a completely different proportion. (Seierstad, Johansen) In both Norway and Denmark, more than half of the members are women (SV: 57 percent, SF: 52 percent). Among the Scandinavian left parties, only the Finnish VAS party has a female proportion of less than 40 percent. The proportion of female members in former socialist state parties in Central and Eastern Europe is also above the European average of the left parties. In the Czech KSČM, 44 percent of the members are female, and in DIE LINKE, the proportion of female members in the Eastern regions, at 44 percent, is also far higher than in Western Germany, at 24 percent. (Holubec, Hildebrandt) Since the proportion of women among new members is only 24 percent, it is to be expected that the present proportion of women will decline even further. (Hildebrandt)

13 For a comprehensive report on gender equality in European countries see European Parliament: Gender Equality in the EU in 2009. Special Eurobarometer 326, Brussels 2010. 14 According to the author’s own calculations. 7

No exact numbers of female members are available for other left parties. This suggests that increasing the proportion of women is not seen as a high priority, and that women are only marginally represented in such parties as the Cypriot AKEL – with an estimated 20 percent – and the Greek SYN – with 25 percent. Female representation in party committees and in parliament also indicates the attractiveness of a party for women: Only 14 of the 77 members of the Greek KKE central committee in 2005 were women, and 17.5 percent of the deputies in the parliamentary party are female. 15 of the 115 AKEL central committee members are women. (Marioulas) One explanation for the generally low proportion of women among the members of political parties is the traditional male-dominated hierarchical structures and discussion cultures in large organizations such as political parties. Research also reveals that women are much less prepared to run for political office.15 Left parties could increase female participation if they alter their structures and challenge the prevalent discussion culture. Support of independent female structures, such as female working groups, forums and plenaries, as well as campaigns against sexism in the daily party routine and the use of gender-sensitive language are tried and tested means of influencing such participation. An influence can be made by selecting women for political personnel. The proportion of women in the KSČM has risen from 26 to 42 percent among its parliament members in 2010. Therefore, the KSČM fraction is now the fraction with the greatest proportion of women in the Czech parliament. (Holubec) Many other parties are attempting to fulfil their representative function by motivating women for party work by applying quotas in party elections, in composing election lists, and allocating speech times. (Johansen, Hildebrandt, Schukovits) These quotas vary between a third in SYN and 50% in DIE LINKE.16 The question why in particular the left parties attract fewer members than, for example, the green parties, is often answered with respect to the main policies of the parties. In fact, studies of voting decisions show that men have a significantly greater interest in the left party's main theme of economics.17 Both sexes, however, perceive social justice and labour market policies, which are emphasised at least as much by left parties, as equally important.

15 See Ulrike Heß-Meining: Politische Partizipation und bürgerschaftliches Engagement. In: Waltraud Cornelißen (ed.): Gender-Datenreport. 1. Datenreport zur Gleichstellung von Frauen und Männern in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend 2005, p. 404. 16 With reference to DIE LINKE, however, it should be noted that in some region the quota can be reduced to 25 percent. Thus, the party's claim of representing women according to their proportion in the population is not completely achieved. 17 See Heß-Meining: Politische Partizipation und bürgerschaftliches Engagement, p. 387. 8

In this respect the high political commitment of women in the Scandinavian parties can only partially be explained by the priority given to the content of policies. Admittedly the policy issues of these parties have for a long time included supposed “women’s issues” such as education and ecology. Yet, at the same time the parties are strongly concerned with the organisation of public services, maintaining social infrastructure such as health and care work. Thus, they support structures that traditionally employ a lot of women. It also plays a role in which way left parties present their policies in terms of usefulness to every day life. This is shown by the experience of the SP in the Netherlands and of the Eastern regional branches of DIE LINKE. There, policies giving priority to local issues which are strongly related to the daily experience of people are accompanied by a high proportion of women among the party members. Additionally, a high proportion of women is favoured by strong feminist movements within the parties. Outside Scandinavia, this is to be found in the Austrian KP, for example, which has, as the only European left party, a women's programme and its own chairwoman. (Schukovits)

Minorities

The explanations in relation to the proportion of women among members also apply to minorities and socially marginalised groups. The percentage of migrants, Roma, disabled persons, lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transsexuals (LGBT) represented in the left parties is still below their proportion in the general population. Some parties have created their own LGBT structures, as for example, the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Queer in der LINKEN in Germany or the Collectif Lesbien-Gay-Bi-Trans in the PCF in France. Exact membership numbers, however, are not available and subliminal prejudice also occurs in left parties and probably does not make party work very attractive for many LGBT people. The proportion of migrants in the membership of left parties can also only be estimated. With regard to migrants, some parties such as the very much committed Greek party SYN, for example, explicitly invite migrants to join. (Marioulas) However, many parties are content with assuming that the migrant membership is above that of other parties. (Seierstad, Wirries) The situation of ethnic minorities such as the Roma and their absence among party members is not even addressed by the left parties. (Holubec, de Nève/Olteanu) Persons with disabilities and the chronically ill are more likely to be target groups of left party work than actively participate in party work as members. Only a few structures exist for

9 persons with disabilities, and their membership proportion is completely marginal in relation to their numbers in the general population. The low level of interest of left parties in minorities and their low proportion as party members creates a vicious circle: the sparse presence of minority representatives among party members leads to the marginalisation of the few who are committed. This causes a further decline in the presence of their representatives, and their policies lose even more significance – the party becomes increasingly unattractive for members of minorities. If the left parties wish to counteract the marginalisation of minorities among their members, they must directly address discrimination within the party and in society and develop instruments similar to those used to increase the proportion of women. Recognising independent structures in which minority groups can create their own space beyond the internal cultural majority within the party, and including these structures in the party's decision making processes are of crucial importance.

Average age and age structure

The age structure of parties refers, on the one hand, to the ability of parties to secure the allegiance of different generations to the party, and in this way to secure their continued existence. On the other hand, the age structure is an indication of which conflict dimensions are taken up by the party and which interest groups the party wants to represent, politically and culturally. For the party itself, it is important that the party leadership keeps an eye on diverging interests of the different generations in the membership. In many parties older members with traditionally firm party loyalties encounter younger members whose party allegiance is no longer life-long. For the younger members, the traditional principles of party leadership and organisation appear to be out of date in many ways. A special characteristic of left parties is the experience of personal failure that many older party members associate with the collapse of state , and this is not shared by the younger membership generation. At present, only a small amount of empirical material is available on the age structure of left parties. Due to different methods of data acquisition, a European-wide comparison is impossible. However, even on the basis of a few selected examples, considerable age differences within the membership of the European family of parties can be identified. This starts with obvious differences in the average age: for the Icelandic Vinstri hreyfingin and the Danish Enhedslisten it is 42.5 years. (Erlingsdóttir, Johansen) DIE LINKE party members are

10 significantly older with an average of 63 years. (Hildebrandt) The Czech KSČM is faced with constant membership loss through ageing. The average member's age of more than 70 years can scarcely be compensated by the recruitment of new members. (Holubec) Similarly, there are differences in the proportion of certain age groups in a party. The proportion of members younger than 30 years in the Icelandic Vinstri hreyfingin is 27 percent; in the Enhedslisten 34 percent are even younger than 20 years. (Erlingsdóttir, Johansen) The Portuguese Bloco de Esquerda, the Luxemburgian Déi Lénk and the Turkish ÖDP also have high proportions of young members. (Soeiro, Wagener, Sey) The Finnish VAS exhibits a completely different age structure, and like the KSČM faces a loss of membership through ageing: nearly a third of the membership is more than 70 years old, 25 percent are younger than 50 and barely five percent are younger than 30. (Kontula/Kuhanen)18 In the Italian PRC, the age structure has remained almost completely unchanged and relatively equable over the years, with a high proportion of young members. (Hagemann; Fig. 3)

Figure 3: The membership of the Italian PRC according to age group, as percentage19

100% Over 65 80% 56-65 60% 46-55 40% 36-45 20% 0% 26-35 PRC Under 25

Differences in age structures not only occur at the international level in comparisons between European left parties, as is shown by the example of DIE LINKE: significant regional opposites can be observed, for instance in comparing the age structures of German Eastern and Western regions. (Fig. 4) The high proportion of those aged over 70 in the Eastern regions is particularly significant. On the contrary, in Western Germany, the age group between 41 to 60 years is one of the politically most active age groups and accounts for 50 percent of the party members. With a

18 Apart from the situation with the former socialist state parties, this situation is not a problem specific to left parties. Many other political parties are also suffering from ageing membership. This is also due to demographic development, and represents a challenge for other activities of civil society as well. 19 According to the author’s own calculations. 11 large number of members under 35 years, the branches in Western Germany have considerably more protest potential than the ones in the East.20 Some disputes in DIE LINKE also reveal a conflict situation between different generations among its members.

Figure 4: Members of DIE LINKE according to age group, as percentage21

100%

80%

60% Over 70 40% 41-60 years 20% Under 35 0% DIE LINKE East DIE LINKE West

The age distribution among the active members is of importance for the political work of the left parties and their public image. Lists of candidates and delegates for party conventions provide an indication of significant differences between the parties and which age group is most strongly represented. Thus, younger delegates are much more strongly represented in DIE LINKE than in the Cypriot AKEL, although the AKEL members are on average younger than those in the DIE LINKE. (Hildebrandt, Marioulas) Such differences can be explained in part by the fact that some parties consciously try to increase the degree of participation of younger members by considering them for delegate mandates and candidacies above their proportion in the party membership. Almost all European left parties have youth organizations either integrated into the party or associated with the party. But there are wide differences in their right to be heard and the influence that younger members have on the practical work and the policies of left parties. (e.g. Kontula/Kuhanen, Pilawski/Politt, Steiner, Sey) Obviously, some parties consciously promote the commitment of their young members. Parties probably profit from a high proportion of younger more active members, for instance with regard to modern media and forms of action, and the resolution of classical questions under new conditions, as, for

20 For a comprehensive presentation of the age structure of the entire DIE LINKE see Oskar Niedermayer: Parteimitglieder in Deutschland. Version 1/2009, Arbeitshefte aus dem Otto-Stammer-Zentrum, no. 15, Berlin 2009, p. 16. In 2007, the age group of those over 60 decreased significantly. The wave of new members, not surprisingly, contributed to the rejuvenation of the party. For this, see also Kajo Tetzlaff, Alexander Reetz: Statistische Untersuchung der Parteieintritte DIE LINKE 2004/2007 (May-August), Power Point-Presentation, pages 9 ff. 21 According to the author’s own calculations. 12 example, the question of intellectual property rights of digital knowledge. Additionally, youthfulness is regarded as a positive characteristic in society, which considerably increases the party's public prestige and which can attract new members and voters.

Occupation status, professions and education levels of left party members

Again, only a small amount of significant data on different social levels such as occupation status, profession and education levels is available for a European comparison. In the following, some examples are presented to highlight the membership structure of individual parties and to indicate higher proportions of particular occupation groups. Fig. 5 shows a high proportion of non-wage earner members. In some parties, more than half of the members are pensioners, unemployed, self-employed or students.

Figure 5: Members of left parties, according to employment status, as percentage22

KSCM employees

DIE LINKE unemployed/pensioners

PRC self-employed

SP other

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

The variation among the parties, however, is very large, and a detailed analysis also shows that there are clear differences within the group of non-wage earners. Thus, for example, 67.1 percent of the party members in the Czech KSČM are pensioners and there are virtually no students, unemployed or single parents in the party. (Holubec) Compared to this, the Italian PRC has a high proportion of students (14.2 percent). Pensioners only amount to 8.4 percent, and the proportion of unemployed amounts to more than ten percent. (Hagemann) Since many left parties want to explicitly address the interests of unemployed and poor citizens, the low proportion of unemployment among the party members comes as a surprise. For example, this proportion is 7.6 percent in the PRC and approximately seven percent in the

22 According to the author’s own calculations. 13

Slovak KSS.23 Thus, the unemployed are under-represented in the left parties relative to their proportion among eligible voters. However, membership as a form of participation mostly attracts a certain part of the population with good access to resources, and the proportion of unemployed in the European left parties is still higher than in other parties. Therefore the German party DIE LINKE, for example, is justly perceived to be the representative of the unemployed. With just over 8 percent, the proportion of unemployed among the members far exceeds that of the other parties represented in the Federal Parliament.24 The image of the left as "workers' parties" or "parties of the wage earners" must also be put into perspective. Workers are a minority in most left parties at present. In some countries, there is a large number of pensioners in the parties. Thus, for example, in the KSČM, only 13.6 percent of the party members are workers. (Holubec) Even independent of working status, the proportion remains low. In Scandinavian countries, mainly salaried staff and the middle class are now joining the left parties. (Steiner) DIE LINKE in Germany states it has only 16.3 percent workers at present; more than half of the members are salaried staff employed in private economy or public service.25 Just as with the proportion of unemployment, the low number of workers can partially be explained by the disproportionate representation of the part of the population with a good access to resources. It is also due to the social and structural transformation from the traditional industrial society to a services society: As the overall number of workers in the population decreases, the traditional environment of the left parties is changed and the number of workers in the left parties is also reduced. Some of the parties which were formed since the 1980s no longer consider themselves to be traditional workers' parties, and instead, like SYN and DIE LINKE, they aim for a diversified membership. However, these parties do not attract completely different income groups now. Most left parties are still "parties for the common people" with a relevant proportion of members in the low income sector and in precarious employment. (Wirries, among others) The general membership statistics do not completely describe party membership, especially since the membership of left parties is undergoing a transformation, just like other parties. For example, the occupational situation of new and active members to some extent deviates considerably from the present average membership. For instance, an analysis of the

23 See Heiko Kosel: The Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS), in: Birgit Daiber, Cornelia Hildebrandt: The Left in Europe. Political Parties and Party Alliances between Norway and Turkey, Brussels 2009, p. 150. 24 See Ulrich von Alemann, Markus Klein (eds.): Deutsche Parteimitgliederstudie 2009 (in print). 25 Ibid. 14 professions of new members of DIE LINKE from 2004 to 2007 shows that more than half of the new members are employees or self-employed.26 This is a clearly higher percentage than in the party as a whole. In 1998, members without waged work, especially pensioners, comprised two thirds of the membership; in 2009, they still accounted for much more than half.27 The proportion of students among new members of DIE LINKE in 2004 was just under a third, and even the 7.4 percent of students in 2007 is far above the proportion of students in the PDS in 1998 and DIE LINKE in 2009 (one to three percent respectively).28 The analysis also reveals that many unemployed joined DIE LINKE in 2004 and 2007. In 2007, at 18.4 percent, the proportion of unemployed among new members significantly exceeded that of the population at large and in the party as a whole.29 The characteristics of the active members again deviate from the statistics of both the overall party membership and the new members. Wage earners and self-employed made up the vast majority of the delegates at the DIE LINKE party congress in Rostock in 2010.30 The third group consisted of pensioners (nine percent). Thus, their proportion among the delegates represents only a fraction of their actual strength among the DIE LINKE membership. Compared to their number among the new members, students and pupils are poorly represented among the delegates (six percent). With only three percent the unemployed are represented below their proportion in party membership and far below their numbers among new members. As in most other parties, the top political personnel in DIE LINKE are of a completely different professional structure; parliamentarians have mainly academic professions and university education.31 The occupational heterogeneity of members that have joined at various times and the large discrepancy between party members and political leadership leads to significant conflict situations, not only in the DIE LINKE party. This is also expressed in

26 See Tetzlaff, Reetz: Statistische Untersuchung der Parteieintritte DIE LINKE, slide 32. 27 See Heinrich, Lübker, Biehl: Parteimitglieder im Vergleich, p. 12; von Alemann, Klein (eds.): Deutsche Parteimitgliederstudie 2009. 28 See ibid. 29 See Tetzlaff, Reetz: Statistische Untersuchung der Parteieintritte DIE LINKE, slide 32; von Alemann, Klein (eds.): Deutsche Parteimitgliederstudie 2009. 30 Source: Mandatsprüfungskommission (commission for checking mandates), report on 15 May 2010. A comparatively high proportion of wage dependent employees can also be observed among the active membership of other left parties, thus, for example among the Cypriot AKEL congress delegates (63.6 percent) and among the Luxemburger Déi Lénk candidates in the national elections (50.2 percent). The proportion of self- employed was 15 percent and the proportion of unemployed was 19.4 percent for AKEL congress delegates. In the "worker party" Déi Lénk, there were no self-employed among the candidates and 24.9 percent were unemployed or pensioners. (Marioulas, Wagener) 31 See Klaus-J. Holzapfel (ed.): Kürschners Volkshandbuch. Deutscher Bundestag 17. Wahlperiode, Rheinbreitbach 2010, p. 297 ff. 15 confrontations between different party cultures. More extensive data on the social structure is required to analyse the influence of membership development on the emergence of such conflict situations. Concerning the sectors in which left party members are employed, an especially large number of members work in public services or the service industries, especially in the Scandinavian left parties. (Johansen, Steiner, Seierstad) 75 percent of the SV members are employed in public services, and this also applies to the Greek SYN, the German DIE LINKE32 and the Déi Lénk in Luxembourg. (Marioulas, Wagener) Teachers and employees in the educational sector are also especially well represented in some parties such as the Dutch SP, for example, where more than a tenth of the membership is employed in the educational sector. The SP is also a party with a strong profile on health issues. According to a poll among members, every fifth member was employed in the health sector, and many physicians were among its members. (Wirries) The number of left party members with a degree in higher education is way above average. However, there are large differences between the European left parties: the number of the members with a university degree fluctuates between 40 percent (SP; Wirries) and 9 percent (KSČM; Holubec). In many of the left parties there is a high proportion of academics as well as a high proportion of those with only elementary school education, as, for example in the Finnish VAS (Kontula/Kuhanen), and in DIE LINKE33. There are also differences with respect to education levels between party members and active members. More than a third of the delegates at the last Greek SYN party congress were university educated - a proportion which slightly exceeds that of the party membership as a whole, despite the student character of the party. (Marioulas)

The Electorates of Left Parties

Who are the voters of the radical left parties? According to Luke March, three groups can at present be discerned with respect to their political orientation and their main reason for opting for left parties. Firstly, the left subculture consisting of people who already exhibited sympathies for the left before 1989, as well as those active in ecological, students' or women's

32 For DIE LINKE, 29.7 percent of party members polled were employed in the public services. See von Alemann, Klein (ed.): Deutsche Parteimitgliederstudie 2009. 33 According to current censuses, approximately 47 percent of the members of DIE LINKE have a university or university of applied sciences degree. At the same time, 21 percent have a certificate of secondary education. See ibid. 16 rights groups. Secondly, there are discontent centre-left or green voters in countries with weak green parties. Thirdly, there are the protest voters, those voting for the first time and those who previously abstained.34 In the following it will be analysed which milieus the voters of left parties come from, whose interests the parties represent and which groups are not reached sufficiently by the party's policies. The analysis is restricted to the gender, age, occupational and educational status of left voters.35 An examination of the proportion of voters from minority communities must be excluded for lack of empirical data. Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that some left parties such as the British Respect coalition, the Dutch SP and the Swedish Vänsterpartiet obtained an especially high number of votes from migrants. (Kachel, Wirries, Steiner)

The proportion of women among voters

There is a significantly high proportion of female members in Scandinavian left parties that correlates with the high proportion of women voters. (Kontula/Kuhanen, Johansen) Thus, the Norwegian SV obtained 14 percent among female voters, but only 7 percent among the male voters. (Seierstad) In comparison: DIE LINKE achieved only 10.6 percent among female voters and 13.3 percent from male voters. (Hildebrandt) This means that DIE LINKE attracted fewer female voters than the average of West European left parties which receive a little more support from men than from women.36 The most recent available figures on the comparative proportion of female voters amongst the total left party electorate date from 2004. The proportion of 47.4 percent female voters exceeds the proportion of women among party members in a comparison of 13 left parties.

34 See Luke March: Parteien links der Sozialdemokratie in Europa. Vom Marxismus zum Mainstream? FES Internationale Politikanalyse, November 2008, p. 8. The amount and the relevance of the protest voters for left parties is a matter of dispute. However, a poll within the framework of the German Federal elections of 2009 indicates that the proportion of this very heterogeneous group should not remain unnoticed. 60% of those voting for the left party said they did so out of "disaffection", and this was a higher proportion than for any of the other parties represented in the German Federal Parliament. Die Tagesschau: Wahlarchiv Bundestagwahl 2009. Mobilisierung. 35 For a presentation on party strongholds as well as distribution in urban and rural areas see Stanislav Holubec: Die regionale Unterstützung der europäischen radikalen Linken. 36 See Tim Spier (2009): Linksparteien in Westeuropa. Eine kohärente Parteienfamilie? A lecture presented at the conference: „Parteienfamilien – Identitätsbestimmend oder nur noch Etikett?“ at the AK Parteienforschung der DVPW (Prof. Jun, Prof. Niedermayer), meeting within the framework of the DVPW Congress in Kiel 2009, p. 13. Spier's calculations are largely based on the data of the European Social Survey, 3rd wave 2006. On the disputed thesis that women generally support left parties and positions, see Hans Geser: Frauen als Stützen linker Parteipolitik, in: Sociology in Switzerland: Politik und Parteien im Wandel, Online Publications, Zurich 2005. 17

(Fig. 6) Current studies, however, show that this proportion is still lower than that for the Greens and the Social Democrats.37 As with party membership, there is a slight North-South gap with regard to gender. The Scandinavian SV and SF38 as well as the Dutch SP parties receive significantly more votes from women than from men. With the exception of the French PCF, all the parties with the highest proportion of male voters among the left party electorate are in Southern Europe. The fact that the gender proportion can also vary strongly between parties within a country is shown by the two Portuguese parties. The Bloco de Esquerda had a significantly higher proportion of female voters (51.6 percent) than the PCP (39.6 percent).

Figure 6: Election results for left parties according to gender 39

SP - Netherlands SV - Norway SF - Denmark PRC - Italy VAS - Finland BLOCO - Portugal DIE LINKE -Germany Men Czech Republic Women KKE - Greece IU - Spain PCP - Portugal SYN - Greece PCF-France

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

If the left parties want to reach women more than at present, then women's specific issues must be reflected in the debates and policies of the parties. Again, however, more work on supposed "women's issues" is not sufficient to reach women. These issues are also of low

37 See Spier: Linksparteien in Westeuropa, p. 13. 38 This is true, even though the Scandinavian party system also has its own women's parties with parliamentary representation competing with the left parties. (Erlingsdóttir, Steiner) The large proportion of women among left party voters is also due partially to the high proportion of salaried women in the public sector (which is defended by the left). (Seierstad, Johansen) 39 See Dietmar Wittich: Synopse sozialer Umfelder ausgewählter europäischer Linksparteien, in: Michael Brie, Cornelia Hildebrandt (ed.): Parteien und Bewegungen. DIE LINKE im Aufbruch, Berlin 2006, p. 235. 18 priority to many women,40 and abandoning their economic and socio-political focus cannot be a convincing option for left parties. Instead, women's interests must be directly addressed within the core policies of left parties.41 Parties can emphasize their usefulness for women with issues such as, for example, pay inequality between men and women, reduction of working hours and part-time work, discriminatory taxation and pension systems or job security in the public sector.

The age structure of voters

A European comparison shows that left party voters are younger than those of other parties. Left parties are very attractive to young voters, especially for those aged between 18 and 29.42 However, there are contrasting trends, both nationally and at the European level. If, for example, the votes of the Czech KSČM are compared with those of the KKE and the election alliance in Greece in the last parliamentary elections, the results exhibit completely different party histories and campaigns. (Figs. 7 and 8)

Figure 7: KSČM votes according to age group, as percentage

35 30 18-24 25 25-34 20 35-44 15 45-54 10 5 55-64 0 65 and older KSCM (Overall 13 %)

40 Only 16.4 percent of women interviewed during the German Federal Elections of 2002 declared that environmental policies were of decisive importance, and for education it was 18.3 percent. The employment situation and economic policy influenced 30.3 to 31.4 percent of women voters. Heß-Meining: Politische Partizipation, p. 387. On voting decisions of women at the European level, Directorate General Communication of the Commission and the European Parliament: Women and European Parliamentary Elections. Analytical Report, Flash EB Series 266, European Communities 2009. 41 See Silke Ötsch: Women, Finance and the Left. Gender Relations in a Hegemonic Left Project, Lecture at the Seminar “Why Does the Crisis Seem to Favour the Right Rather than the Left?”, Transform! Europe 3/2010, slide 21. 42See Spier: Linksparteien in Westeuropa, p. 14. 19

Figure 8: KKE and SYRIZA according to age group, as percentage

12

10 18-24 8 25-34 6 35-44 4 45-54

2 55-64 65 and older 0 SYRIZA (Overall 4,5 %) KKE (Overall 7,5 %)

The Czech KSČM was more successful than SYRIZA and KKE in recent parliamentary elections. However, these results have been attributed to the votes of those aged over 65. The party tries to propagate the image of conserving state socialist values and privileges to this age group. (Holubec) The KKE and SYRIZA are characterised by contrasting preferences in the various age groups they target. Compared to the more traditional KKE, SYRIZA has a younger electorate. SYRIZA achieved nine percent among students and pupils, about twice its average result. Consequently, it is not surprising that SYN, member of the SYRIZA alliance, strongly sympathised with the youth protests in December 2008. (Marioulas) Other parties whose programmes and campaigns attract young voters are the Scandinavian parties Enhedslisten and Vänsterpartiet and the Portuguese Bloco de Esquerda. (Johansen, Steiner, Soeiro) Just like SYRIZA and the KKE, the Bloco which predominantly attracts young voters, is accompanied by another left party, the Portuguese CP (PCP), which appeals more to an older electorate.43 The Dutch SP and the Norwegian SV are attractive to both young voters and middle-aged people. (Seierstad, Wirries) Parties which are preferred by middle-aged and older voters include, for example, the Finnish VAS and the French PCF - whose proportion of voters aged between 18 and 25 is less than 3.5 percent (Sahuc). The proportion of DIE LINKE voters is slightly higher, but its core support is in the group aged 45 to 59. At 11 percent, its share of first-time voters is below the party's overall electoral result.44

43 See Wittich: Synopse sozialer Umfelder ausgewählter europäischer Linksparteien, p. 236. 44 See Der Bundeswahlleiter: Bundestagswahl 2009. Repräsentative Ergebnisse der Männer und Frauen nach Altersgruppen, 2010; Die Tagesschau: Wahlarchiv Bundestagswahl 2009. Wer wählte was? - For comparison: the obtained nine percent of the votes from the youngest voter group.

20

Occupational Status, Profession and Education Level of Left Voters

The occupational status of the left electorate largely reflects the age structure of their voters, as revealed by another comparison between the KSČM and the PRC. Thus, an ageing electorate is accompanied by a high proportion of pensioners among KSČM voters. Many of the younger PRC voters are students, thus the proportion of student voters at twelve percent corresponds approximately to the percentage of student members in the party. However, such a similarity between members and voters is not always the case. In contrast to a common assumption, the voters for a given party do not necessarily mirror the membership of that party. Thus, for example, the proportion of pensioners among those voting for the PRC is, at 21 percent, significantly higher than their proportion within the PRC. Equally, the proportion of unemployed PRC voters at three percent is not even half of the already low proportion among PRC members. (Hagemann) The number of those in precarious employment is also low; they see the PRC as "the party of workers with 'secure' jobs". (Porcaro) The latest data available for analysing the ratio of wage earners and unemployed in the electorate of left party dates from 2004. The proportion of wage earners was above 50 percent for most parties, and was thus higher than among party members. The low proportion of unemployed voters, much lower than in the general population, is again significant. The PCF had the highest proportion of unemployed voters with approximately six percent.45 However, it is necessary to consider to what extent people living in precarious circumstances actually exercised their right to vote, and to what extent the left parties and the policies they offered took account of their circumstances and needs. The fact that some left parties can reach out to unemployed persons more strongly than other parties in the political spectrum is shown by the example of DIE LINKE. With a result of 25 percent in the German Federal elections in 2009, DIE LINKE received a remarkably large number of votes from the unemployed. DIE LINKE obtained 18 percent of workers' votes46, a preference above average. A similar but weaker preference is also detectable in a comparison among European parties.47 Parties enjoying a high support among workers include, for example, the Finnish VAS, with 43 percent of workers' votes. (Kontula/Kuhanen) Measured against their electorate, many left parties can be considered to represent the workers, intentionally or unintentionally.

45 See Wittich: Synopse sozialer Umfelder ausgewählter europäischer Linksparteien, p. 237. 46 See Die Tagesschau: Wahlarchiv Bundestagswahl 2009. Wähler nach Tätigkeit. 47 See Spier: Linksparteien in Westeuropa, p. 13. 21

The high support among social and cultural professions is also significant in comparison to a series of other parties.48 This support included salaried staff in public services and in service industries; the self-employed were also strongly represented. The Norwegian SV is such an example: in 2005, half of its voters were employed in public services. The SV obtained eleven percent support from the self-employed, but only 2 percent support from workers in an overall result of 8.8 percent. At the same time, the SV votes achieved among students were twice as high. (Seierstad) The Swedish Vänsterpartiet is also very attractive to those in social and cultural professions and to students. (Steiner) Just as with age groups, these two occupational groups among voters of left parties can be compared between two parties who stand for election in one country. The KKE in Greece especially addresses unemployed, workers and employees in the private economy. SYN, as part of an election alliance with SYRIZA, mainly receives its votes from students, private and public services employees and the self-employed. Worker results lie below the average results for SYRIZA. (Marioulas) Apart from small overlaps, the KKE and SYRIZA attract very different occupational groups. Instead of competing with each other for the same voters, together they obtain broad electoral support from many occupational groups. The distribution of occupation is largely reflected in the educational status of left voters. On average, they have a higher education level than the voters of other political parties across Europe.49 SYRIZA, SV and SF receive an especially high number of votes from academics and voters with higher education. (Hildebrandt, Holubec, Marioulas) The Dutch SP provides an interesting discrepancy between party members and voters. Whereas approximately 40 percent of SP members have a university degree, those with a secondary education dominate the SP electorate and those with university education are under-represented. (Wirries)

Conclusion

The comparison of membership numbers, social structures of members and voters shows that the parties in the European left family of parties offer a high degree of diversity. This should not come as a surprise, since these consist of former socialist state parties, orthodox communist or eurocommunist parties, left greens and many other parties with their own programmes, differing national traditions and varying sizes of party membership. There are

48 See ibid. 49 See ibid. 22 always overlaps and exemptions when these parties are classified into groups or ideal types, especially since gender, age groups and education levels are very different categories. With respect to membership two groups can roughly be discerned. The common subdivision of parties into (a) parties with a post-modern educated middle class with young members and a high proportion of women and (b) "workers' parties" with older, mainly male members and a low level of education tends to be seen in Europe's left parties, but this does not entirely characterise all the parties. In the "middle class" group of (a) parties, the West Scandinavian parties, the Dutch SP, the Austrian CP, the Portuguese Bloco de Izquierda and, with a smaller proportion of women, the Greek SYN and the Italian PRC are significant as models of this type. "Workers' parties" as models of type (b) are more difficult to identify. Parties with mainly older male members of low educational status include, for example, the French, Greek and Portuguese CP, the VAS in Finland, DIE LINKE and the Czech KSČM. But none of these parties completely comply with the characteristics described above, and some of these parties are consciously distancing themselves from the image of a "workers' party".50 Tim Spier (2009) and Dietmar Wittich (2004) proposed three or four conclusive ideal types of voters to describe the electorate, which can then be subdivided roughly into middle class parties and labour parties. Analysing the social environment from which left parties are more likely to find the voting potential they need, Wittich differentiates between "the milieu of the traditional " and the "modern producers and service providers".51 The first two types of electorate coincide with the types of membership, and the parties mentioned above in (a) and (b) can be classified accordingly. The first type, as described by Wittich, includes parties with older and mainly male voters. This type is characterised by workers, pensioners and many voters of low educational level. Parties of the second type appeal especially to salaried staff, especially those in the service professions. This type is dominated by people with a college or university education, and the voters are more likely to be young and female. Type three corresponds to the situation in Greece and Portugal, with the parallel existence of two left parties in the same country, which address different social environments in a kind of division of labour. In the fourth type, the milieu of the labour movement and of the modern

50 Interestingly, there are slight parallels to the classification according to ideological criteria as applied by Luke March. Thus the group (a) correlates largely with the "Democratic Socialists" identified by March, which is seen as an ideal by many advocates of the German reform left. See March: Parteien links der Sozialdemokratie in Europa, p. 5ff. 51 See Wittich: Synopse sozialer Umfelder ausgewählter europäischer Linksparteien, p. 240. 23 services industry coexists together in the same party. As examples, Wittich lists the Danish SF, the Swedish Vänsterpartiet, the Italian PRC and the PDS in Germany.52 Tim Spier classifies the electorate of left parties as: 1) old communist, 2) green-alternative or 3) radical young left. The old communist electorate includes those in or coming from the labour movement, that is, the traditional voters of left parties. These voters are characterised by older male voter groups of low educational status and a high proportion of manual labourers. They partially resemble the social structure of the members of the left parties they vote for, such as the PCF and the KKE. The old communist electorate of the PRC and Vänsterpartiet does not correspond as much with the membership structure of these parties. The green alternative electorates are characterised by a high proportion of women, a high level of education and large numbers of voters in social and cultural professions, corresponding roughly to the second type described by Wittich. The radical young left electorate which voted for the Enhedslisten, the French LCR/LOS (now the NPA) and Bloco de Esquerda has contributed, in the case of Bloco, to an election result of nearly ten percent in the parliamentary elections of 2009. In the case of Enhedslisten and NPA, however, addressing younger voters of medium to high educational status has not yet been reflected in significantly higher numbers of votes. Some other parties as well as party alliances cannot easily be classified within this scheme, according to Spier. These include such parties as DIE LINKE, Izquierda Unida and Sinn Féin.53 Despite some overlapping and classification difficulties it is obvious that relying on the dwindling group of factory workers as a target audience is by far not sufficient for left party election campaigns. Further, radical left parties find themselves in a fierce competition with social democratic parties, which currently have higher proportions of workers among their voters than the left parties.54 Consequently, left parties must appeal to different social environments in order to capture the loyalty of a large number of core voters and so guarantee permanent electoral success. They must attract voters in social and cultural professions, public service employees, the middle class, the self-employed, and those in precarious employment. The strategy of the Scandinavian left parties since the collapse of state socialism shows that this course is possible:

"By adopting a sustainable and ecological political approach, the Scandinavian left parties have been able to attract new milieus that previously rejected communist parties.

52 See ibid. 53 See Spier: Linksparteien in Westeuropa, p. 14. 54 See ibid., p. 13; Die Tagesschau: Wahlarchiv Bundestagswahl 2009. Wähler nach Tätigkeit. 24

These milieus extend far into the liberal middle class, and serve at least quantitatively to balance the loss of the traditional proletariat which backed Communist parties, a loss caused by the social and structural changes and the increasing dissolution of the traditional labour milieu. Instead this even opens up new approaches towards society. The intelligentsia, the new social movements have become visible subjects for self-reforming left parties in Europe".55

The comparison of the model types of parties described above reveals that many aspects still remain unclear concerning who actually are the "green alternative" voters or the "modern producers and service providers" for which the Scandinavian parties in particular compete so successfully with the Greens and other parties. Which professions are among these classifications, and what motivates these voters to vote for a particular party? How could this extended electorate support the left parties towards success, and under which circumstances (note the example of young electorates from the radical left!)? And which parts of society have not yet been sufficiently addressed by the parties? To determine these factors larger milieu studies at the European level are urgently required.

Anna Striethorst, political scientist, is researcher at the Brussels Office of German think tank Rosa Luxemburg Foundation.

55 Dominic Heilig: Vereinigte oder vereinte Linke? Vereinigung der Linken stößt an ihre Grenzen, in: Zeitschrift Marxistische Erneuerung, no. 75, 9/2008, p. 60. 25