Left Wing Non-Voters in Poland

Home , Another Left, Left and Democrats, Polish Centre, Polish Left, The Left (Poland), United Left (Poland)

REPORT Left Wing Non-Voters in Poland

Czesław Kulesza Katarzyna Piotrowska Gavin Rae Fundacja „NAPRZÓD” ul. Mickiewicza 37/58 01-625 Warszawa tel. +48 720 785 188 e-mail: [email protected] www.fundacja_naprzod.pl www.facebook.com/fundacjanaprzod/

Front cover photo: wikipedia/Julo

This report was prepared with the support of transform! european network for alternative thinking and political dialogue. transform! europe is partially financed through a subsidy from the European Parliament. Czesław Kulesza Katarzyna Piotrowska Gavin Rae

Left Wing Non-Voters in Poland

REPORT

Warsaw 2018 Contents

INTRODUCTION ...... 5 i . tHE IMPORTANCE OF NON-VOTING FOR THE LEFT ...... 5 iii . non-VOTING IN POLISH ELECTIONS – REGIONAL AND EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE. . . .6 iv . VOTER STABILITY IN POLAND...... 7 . . v . WHO ARE NON-VOTERS IN POLAND ...... 8 . . vi . tHE LEFT ELECTORATE ...... 10 . . . vii . non-VOTERS AND THE LEFT ...... 12 viii . oPINIONS OF LEFT-WING NON-VOTERS ...... 12 . . ix . Strategies of Polish left-wing parties towards non-voters . . . . . 20. . x . CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...... 21. . . INTRODUCTION in Poland. We provide some analysis of the charac- teristics of the left-wing electorate before present- For the first time since 1918, the Polish left has ing the results and analysis of an original question- no representation in the national parliament. The naire carried out on a sample of left-wing non-voters country is now governed by a conservative nation- in the country, in order to ascertain the opinions of alist party, which has managed to gain the support this group. This is accompanied with information from sections of society that are amongst the most obtained from interviews with a number of left- excluded and dissatisfied by the reality of capital- wing non-voters. We then provide information on ism in Poland1). However, regularly around half of the strategies of left-wing parties towards gaining the electorate do not vote in parliamentary elec- the votes of left-wing non-voters. Finally we list our tions. The country has one of the lowest political conclusions and recommendations. participation rates in Europe, with an extremely low percentage of the population belonging to political i . THE IMPORTANCE OF NON- parties. In order for the left to rebuild itself, it must VOTING FOR THE LEFT examine how it can win the support of those that do not vote in elections and are not committed support- Left-wing parties are facing intense difficulties ers of any of the right-wing parties. and challenges throughout Europe. The decline in This report examines the issue of non-voting in support for many European left-wing parties has Poland and at how the left may attempt to gain the been due to a section of its core electorate either votes of left-wing non-voters in the country. Firstly voting for alternative parties (sometimes from the we examine the issue of non-voting in general and nationalist right) or abstaining altogether from the why it is that people do not vote in elections. Then political process. we analyse non-voting in Poland in comparison to Opinions as to why people do not vote can gener- other elections Central and Eastern European (CEE) ally be divided into two main perspectives. countries inside the European Union. The next stage The first point of view is that people do not vote of our study is to investigate the social composition because of structural changes that have occurred in of non-voters in Poland. We then turn to the issue of society and politics. It is postulated that there has the left and look at the correlation between the de- been a move towards a post-materialist society and cline in support for left-wing parties and non-voting economy, with values of individualism and autono-

1) ’PiS and PO Voters in the Last Twelve Years’ (‘Elektoraty PO i PiS w ostatnich dwunastu latach’), CBOS, Nr 130/2017 6

my surpassing material values such as scarcity and downturns occurred in the eastern countries of the security2). On the left, this was encapsulated in the region, that belonged to the former Soviet Union. theory of the Third Way and the move of major social However, the economies in the west of the region democratic parties (such as the British Labour Party also went through a contraction on a scale unprec- and the German Social Democratic Party) towards edented in peacetime Europe. Poland has been con- the political centre during the 1990s3). Accordingly, it sidered to be one of the most successful economies is postulated that the left should adapt itself to these in CEE, however even its level of GDP fell by almost socio-economic changes, accept the dictates of a free- one-quarter between 1989 and 1991 and unemploy- market economy and express the post-materialist ment rose from 1% to 16% from 1989 to 19934). values of a supposedly expanding middle class. This It was in this context of economic and social de- first perspective has been brought into question by cline, that the democratic political systems in CEE the global economic crisis, growing social inequali- were formed from 1989. Table 1, displays the differ- ties and the era of austerity politics. Also, the sharp ent rounds of parliamentary elections that have tak- decline in support for many left-wing parties in Eu- en place since the fall of Communism, in the CEE rope (e.g. Poland, Hungary, Holland, France, Greece, countries that belong to the European Union5). Ireland) has been accompanied by these parties in- If we take the region as a whole, we can observe troducing neo-liberal policies whilst in government. that at the beginning of the transition turnouts in par- An alternative viewpoint, assumes that non- liamentary elections were generally high. Therefore, voting primarily occurs due to growing social in- in the first round of parliamentary elections in CEE, equalities and exclusion. This creates an expanding turnout exceeded 86% and in the second round 73%. section of society that feels dissatisfied with the po- In countries such as the Czech Republic, Croatia and litical system; believes that they are not represented Latvia the turnouts were particularly high in these by any political party; nor that that voting will bring elections, far exceeding those in Western Europe. Al- about any positive change in their lives or address though it may have been expected that these turnouts society’s inequalities. When people believe that they would decline after the initial euphoria of the political are not properly represented in this system then transition, the scale of this drop has been alarming. they will often decide not to vote or participate in Therefore, by the fifth round of parliamentary elec- politics. This tends to be the poorest and most ex- tions, the turnout in CEE averaged just 58% and in cluded in society, which in turn increases these so- the seventh round it stood at less than 55%. Although cial disparities. As large parts of the left have moved there has been a steady decline in the turnout at elec- towards the ‘political centre’, so increasing sections tions in Western Europe, this has not been on the same of the electorate have lost their traditional represent- scale as those in CEE. For example, in the most recent ative in politics and have therefore looked towards parliamentary elections, the turnout in Germany was supporting parties from the nationalist right or ab- 75%, Italy, 80%, France 61% and the UK 63%. staining from voting altogether. The turnout in parliamentary elections in Po- land has been consistently low, averaging just 48% ii . NON-VOTING IN POLISH ELECTIONS - (the lowest in the whole of CEE) and exceeding 50% REGIONAL AND EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE just three times. At the beginning of the transition turnout in Poland was exceptionally low, standing At the beginning of the 1990s all of the former at only 42.8%, the lowest out of all the ‘post-Com- communist countries underwent large econom- munist’ countries under study6). The trend in Po- ic contractions and a huge increase in unemploy- land has not followed most other CEE countries, as ment and labour deactivation. The largest economic it has actually risen slightly over the past two and

2) Ronald Inglehart, R, The Silent Revolution. Princeton (Princeton, 1977) 3) Anthony Blair and Gerhard Schroeder The Third Way (Berlin, 1999); Anthony Giddens, The Third Way. The Renewal of Social Democracy (Cambridge, 1998) 4) Rae, G. (2012) Poland’s Return to Capitalism. From the Socialist Bloc to the European Union. London. IB Tauris 5) We have tried to group these rounds of elections as close as possible to those in Poland, although of course some countries have had more or less elections over this timescale. 6) The first parliamentary election included here is that held in 1991. In 1989 there was a semi-free election to parliament, in which candidates from the Solidarity opposition movement won the vast majority of votes in those seats it was allowed to contest. 7 a half decades. However, in the last parliamentary shows how turnouts in presidential elections fell elections turnout was only just above 50% and has sharply from 2005, and that this reached a nadir in averaged below 49% during this whole period. Si- 2015, when less than half of the electorate partici- multaneously, we have seen other CEE countries pated in the presidential elections. converge with Poland’s very low rate of participa- Therefore the ‘post-Communist’ countries in the tion in parliamentary elections, with Romania now EU have an increasing democratic deficit, with Po- even having a significantly lower turnout than Po- land having one of the lowest average turnouts in land during the last parliamentary elections. the region. These are young democracies without The highest turnout in Poland tends to be in Pres- strong political parties and generally have a weak idential elections, although in contrast to parliamen- left7). In order to understand the situation in Poland tary elections the trend here is downwards. Table 2 further, we shall look at the issue of voter stability.

Table 1: Parliamentary Election Turnouts in Central and Eastern Europe8) Czech Latvia Poland Croatia Estonia Average Slovenia Bulgaria Slovakia Republic Romania Hungary Lithuania

Elections 8 51.05 51.05 59.48 64.23 61.84 58.8 52.93 50.92 41.76 59.82 51.73 54.87 Elections 7 52.49 52.49 62.6 63.53 64.38 59.49 48.59 48.92 39.2 59.11 65.6 56.03 Elections 6 60.64 60.64 64.47 61.91 67.57 64.72 46.04 53.88 58.51 58.84 63.1 60.02 Elections 5 55.76 55.76 57.95 58.24 70.52 60.98 58.18 40.57 65.31 54.67 60.64 58.05 Elections 4 66.63 66.63 74 57.43 57.01 71.17 52.92 46.18 76.01 70.07 70.36 64.40 Elections 3 58.87 58.87 76.29 68.91 68.92 71.9 75.22 47.93 76.29 84.25 73.67 69.19 Elections 2 75.23 75.23 84.68 67.84 65.1 71.9 71.72 52.08 79.69 75.41 85.9 73.16 Elections 1 83.87 83.87 96.33 78.2 – 89.88 – – – 84.68 – 86.13 Average 63.06 63.06 71.97 65.03 65.04 68.60 57.94 48.64 62.39 68.35 67.28 –

Table 2: Turnout in Presidential Elections (%) 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 First Round 61 65 61 51 55 49 Second Round 53 68 - 61 55 55 iii . VOTER STABILITY IN POLAND high voter turnout instability then this creates a sense of volatility and indicates that there is less connection Voter turnout stability refers to the extent to which between sections of society and political parties9). those who vote or do not vote are the same groups According to comparative data on voter stability, of people from election to election. Stability in voter collected by the Comparative Study of Electoral Sys- turnout is important as it provides predictability and tems’ project, just 72.1% of the Polish electorate that inhibits a break down in the democratic process. It voted in the last parliamentary election also voted also facilitates the establishment of a party political in the one before, compared to an average of 78% in system that is embedded within society and indicates all the other countries studied10). Figure 1 displays that at least a section of society feels connected to cer- Poland’s voter stability in relation to all the other tain political parties. If, on the other hand, there is CEE countries that have been included in this study.

7) There are some exceptions to this, such as the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM) which has had a consistent presence in parliament since 1989 and has been the third/fourth strongest party throughout this period. KSČM position was weakened by the result of 2017 general elections when it fell to fifth place. 8) ‘Voter turnout in national and EU parliamentary elections’, EU Open Data Portal (https://data.europa.eu/euodp/data/dataset/ npwrZFRNr3If1FqEWYBg) 9) Cześnik, M (2009) ‘Voter Turnout Stability – Evidence from Poland’ Polish Sociological Review. No.165 (2009), pp.107-122 10) http://www.cses.org/ 8

Figure 1

Voter-Turnout Stability in Poland and Other ‘post-Communist’ Countries

Albania Bulgaria The Czech Republic Hungary Poland Romania Russia Slovenia

60 65 70 75 80 85

Source: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems

We can see that Poland has the second lowest level Table 3: Turnout in Parliamentary Elections in Poland of voter stability amongst these ‘post-Communist’ According to Income countries after the Czech Republic. 1999 2001 2005 2007 2011 Part of the reason for this lack of voter stability First in Poland is the weak connection between political 48.4 56.7 43.3 53.3 56.2% Quarter parties and the electorate. Less than 1% of the Polish Second electorate is a member of any political party, which is 55.9 58.4 50.4 63.4 59.8% the lowest number of any European Union country Quarter Third after Latvia (the European Union average is around 60.9 58.2 57.3 70.6 64.0% 5%)11). This indicates that there is a void within the Quarter Fourth political system, whereby people do not feel associ- 70.8 71.1 58.3 80.2 71.5% ated strongly with any political party and therefore Quarter lack loyalty to parties during elections, which has intensified as support for the left has declined. Be- with a higher income are significantly less likely to fore looking at this issue in more detail we shall now vote in elections than those with a lower income, consider which social groups are more or less likely with turnout increasing as income rises. to vote in parliamentary elections in Poland. When we look at how education affects turnout (table 4), we can see that persons with a higher educa- iv . WHO ARE NON-VOTERS IN POLAND tion are much more likely to vote in a parliamentary

The tables below display the turnouts for differ- Table 4: Turnout in Parliamentary Elections in Poland ent social groups during parliamentary elections According to Education between 1997 and 2011. There is unfortunately no 1997 2001 2005 2007 2011 comparative data for the last parliamentary elec- 12) tions in Poland, that took place in 2015 . Basic 48.4 52.1 39.7 51.3 48.6% Table 3 displays the turnouts in parliamentary Technical 49.3 52.3 49.7 62.1 56.7% elections according to income, with the first quarter referring to the lowest income bracket and fourth Medium 67.1 62.6 58.8 75.5 65.6% quarter representing the highest. As we can see, in High 78.5 76.3 66.1 90.7 70.03% all of the elections represented in the table, those

11) Biezen, I. (2013) ‘The decline in party membership across Europe means that political parties need to reconsider how they engage with the electorate.’ LSE European Politics and Polity (http://bit.ly/YjotAq) 12) Data in this section is taken from the Polish National Election Study (http://www.ads.org.pl/opis-szczegE.php?v=E&id=22) and Polish Centre for Public Opinion Research (http://cbos.pl/PL/home/home.php) 9

Table 5: Turnout in Parliamentary Elections in Poland ed in a parliamentary election, in 2011 slightly more According to Gender women than men cast their vote. 1997 2001 2005 2007 2011 The differences are greater with regards to age (table 6.) The general trend shows that there is a posi- Women 54.2 58.3 49.7 63.8 61.6% tive correlation between age and voter turnout. In all Men 60.7 59.2 54.2 70.1 59.0% elections the age group that has voted the most are those aged between 56 and 65, with the lowest turnout being in the 18 to 25 and 26 to 35 age brackets. Table 6: Turnout in Parliamentary Elections in Poland One noticeable change is that turnout has grown sig- According to Voters’ Age nificantly over the years for the youngest age group 1997 2001 2005 2007 2011 during these elections, although around a half of voters in this age group still tend to abstain from voting. 18-25 38.1 47.2 44.2 55.8 54.3% Finally we come to the issue of religiosity, meas- 26-35 51.7 46.9 39.9 62.5 51.9% ured by how often one attends Church. Table 7 shows how those who attend Church regularly are much 36-45 60.3 60.1 52.7 63.5 58.7% more likely to vote in an election than those who go 56-55 64.6 67.3 61.2 73.9 61.1% less than once a week. This is important, as Poland 56-65 69.3 69.1 64.2 76.9 73.1% is a relatively religious country, with over 90% of society defining themselves as Catholic. The rise of 66+ 61.1 65.1 51.9 68.4 63.2% the conservative right in the country has brought politics and religion closer together, with sections of Table 7: Turnout in Parliamentary Elections in Poland the Catholic Church playing a direct role in politics. According to Church Attendance In summary, we can see that those who are bet- 1997 2001 2005 2007 2011 ter educated and earn more are more likely to vote in elections. This means that the more socially ex- Every Week 68.7 68.1 61.1 73.1 68.6% cluded and disadvantaged voters make up a great- or More Often er share of non-voters. Simultaneously, elder voters Less Than 46.3 49.3 43.1 61.7 53.9% are more likely to vote in an election, while young Once a Week people abstain heavily from the electoral process. election in Poland than those with a lower education. Also more religious people tend to vote more than For example in the 2011 parliamentary elections the those who practice religion less. This is more likely turnout of those with a basic education was over 20% to favour the parties of the conservative right, which less than those with a higher education. are strongly connected to sections of the Catholic The difference in turnout is lower when we con- Church. sider gender (table 1). Whilst in the previous four More recent data on non-voters is available for the parliamentary elections more men than women vot- last presidential election (table 8.) This closely rep-

Table 8: Social Composition of Voters Compared to Non-Voters13) Age 18–24 25–34 35–44 45–54 55–64 65+ Voters 9 18 18 15 18 22 Non-voters 13 22 19 14 16 18 Place of Residency Village Town to 19,999 20,000 to 499,999 500,000 to 499,999 900,000 and above – Voters 36 14 18 19 13 – Non-voters 47 18 18 13 4 – Education Basic Technical Medium High – – Voters 17 19 32 31 – – Non-voters 27 35 26 12 – – Income To 649 zł 650–999 zł 1,000–1,399 zł 1,400–1,999 zł 2,000 and above – Voters 13 17 19 25 26 – Non-voters 30 20 24 17 9 –

13) ‘Support for Presidential Candidates’ (‘Porparcie dla kandydatów w wyborach prezydenckich’), CBOS, 28/2015 10

licates the figures for the parliamentary elections, mer opposition movement, most prominently the with non-voters tending to be younger, live in a vil- Labour Union (UP). The combined vote of the left lage or small town, have a basic education and live in 1991 was just above 10% (Figure 2.)14). However, on a relatively low income. by 1993 this had grown above 22% and the SLD was These figures on the social composition of voters, able to form a coalition government with the Polish reveal a couple of interesting points when we con- Farmers Party (PSL). Although the SLD lost power sider specific elections. Firstly, in 2007 the first con- in 1997, it actually expanded its support, with the servative nationalist government (led by the Law left winning over 30% of the votes. Then in 2001, left and Justice Party – PiS) was defeated after winning parties scored their greatest electoral success, win- the 2005 elections. Here we can see that the major ning more than 41% of the votes, leading to the SLD change in voter turnout was a very large increase in forming a coalition government with UP and PSL. participation by those with higher incomes, a higher This government implemented a series of neo- education and those who attend Church less regu- liberal economic reforms; refrained from introduc- larly. We can conclude that this section of society is ing any progressive social reforms (such as liber- more drawn to the liberalism and secularism and alising the abortion law) and supported the war in voted negatively against the conservative govern- Iraq. This led to a sharp fall in support for the left, ment of PiS. Secondly, in 2001 the Democratic Left declining to just 15% in 2005. The left has not been Alliance (SLD) won over 40% of the vote, but this able to rebuild its support since this time and politics declined to just 15% in 2005 (see below). The posi- has been dominated by two parties from the right: tive 2001 vote for the SLD was primarily caused by Law and Justice (PiS) and Citizens’ Platform (PO). an increase in votes by people with a lower income Support for the left continued to decline until the and education and those who attend Church less 2011 elections, at which the SLD was replaced as the regularly, which then again fell significantly when main self-proclaimed party of the left by the liberal the SLD was defeated in 2005. This shows how the populist Palikot Movement. This new party had de- SLD was able to mobilise the more socially disad- clined in support and been incorporated into an al- vantaged sections of society along with those who liance with the SLD by the time of the 2015 elections, are less religious and that their electoral decline was when support for the left fell to just 11%. These elec- partly caused by the loss of the support of these so- tions were an historical defeat for the left, being the cial groups. first time, since the Polish Republic was formed after We shall now examine some of these issues in World War One, that the left had failed to enter par- more depth, by looking at voter turnout and sup- liament. The SLD had stood as part of an electoral port for the left. coalition, failing to cross the 7% threshold needed for coalitions to enter parliament (for parties it is 5%). v . THE LEFT ELECTORATE Meanwhile a new young left-wing party (Together - Razem) was created, winning more than 3% of the Following the collapse of the Polish People’s Re- vote, meaning that it now has access to state funding. public (PRL) the left vote was extremely small, with The decline in support for the left can be further left-wing ideas and organisations discredited. Dur- observed when we consider the declared political ing the early 1990s the left began to reorganise it- opinions of Poles. Figure 3 shows that at the begin- self with the main party of the left consolidating ning of the transition the share of the electorate de- around the ‘‘post-Communist’’ Democratic Left claring themselves to be left wing or right wing Alliance (SLD). Alongside the SLD some left-wing were relatively even, with the largest stated political parties were formed that were organised around position being centre. Those declaring themselves organisations and individuals connected to the for- to be left wing then fell during the early 1990s and

14) We count the left vote as the sum vote for all parties that define themselves as left-wing. This self-definition conception of left wing is problematic. For example, in the 2011 elections the Palikot Movement defined itself as a left-wing party, although it was more of centre liberal party. However, for the scope of this article, the self-definition concept provides the clearest way of calculating support for the left. The following parties have been included as left-wing parties: 1991: Democratic Left Alliance and Solidarity Labour; 1993: Democratic Left Alliance and Labour Union; 1997: Democratic Left Alliance and Labour Union; 2001: Democratic Left Alliance-Labour Union and Polish Socialist Party; 2005: Democratic Left Alliance, Social Democracy Po- land and the Polish Labour Party; 2007: Left and Democrats and Polish Labour Party; 2011: Democratic Left Alliance and Polish Labour Party; 2015: United Left and Razem. Figure 2

Voter-Turnout and Support for the LeVParliamentary Election s

60 52.08 53.88 48.92 50.92 47.93 46.18 43.2 50 40.57 40 30 41.14 31.87 20 22.56 10 18.81 15.97 14.14 0 11.05 11.17 Turnout LeV Vote

Figure 3

15 Declared Political Opinions of Poles (1990–2017) 40 40

30 30

20 20

10 10

0 0 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

LeV-Wing Centre Right-Wing

Table 9: Social Composition of Left-wingers in Poland Compared to the General Electorate16) Age 18–24 25–34 35–44 45–54 55–64 65+ Left-wing 6 21 16 15 20 22 General 8 29 19 15 18 21 Occupation Basic Technical Medium High – – Left-wing 14 17 33 37 – – General 19 24 31 26 – – Town to 19,999 20,000 to 499,999 500,000 to 900,000 and above Place Residence Village – inhab. inhab 499,999 inhab. inhab. Left-wing 28 12 24 19 16 – General 40 14 21 15 10 – Few Times a Once or wice a Church Attendance Once a week – – – week week Left-wing 3 29 13 27 27 3 General 5 43 17 22 13 5

15) ’Left-Wing Voters since 2005’ (’Elektorat lewicy od roku 2005’), CBOS, 105/2017 (http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2017/K_105_17.PDF) 16) ’Left-Wing Voters since 2005’ (’Elektorat lewicy od roku 2005’), CBOS, 105/2017 (http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2017/K_105_17.PDF) 12

averaged around 20% until 1998. Then, during the voted in 2005. Only 30% of the 2001 SLD electorate period of the unpopular right-wing coalition gov- then voted for the party in 2005, with 19% voting for ernment, those defining their opinions as being left- PO and 17% casting their votes for PiS. Also 37% of wing sharply increased up to above 30%, becom- those that voted for the SLD in 2001 abstained from ing the most commonly declared political position voting in 2005. We can further observe the disinte- in Poland. The unpopularity of the second SLD-led gration of the SLD vote when we look at how those coalition government resulted in a steep decline in who voted for the SLD in 2005 then voted in 2007. left-wing opinions in Poland, falling below 15% and Here we can see that only 30% of them again vot- still having not risen to 20% by 2018. ed for the SLD in 2007 and a staggering 45% actu- Table 9 shows the social composition of those who ally switched to voting for PO. The disorientation define themselves as left-wing in comparison to the of the Polish left electorate has deepened, with re- general population. We can see here that left-wing- cent research showing that the party which would ers are slightly older than the general population; gain the largest share of left-wing votes is the cen- are higher educated are more likely to live in a town tre-right party Citizens’ Platform (38%), followed by or city and less likely to attend Church. Support the Democratic Left Alliance (19%). Twice as many for the left is therefore concentrated within social left-wingers in Poland would vote for the Law and groups that would be expected to be more drawn Justice Party (8%) than would vote for Razem (4%). to liberal democratic, secular politics, whilst they Despite this political disorientation, a greater per- have less support within many of the more disad- centage of left-wing voters (78%) declare that they vantaged sections of society who would tradition- will participate in the next elections compared to ally have supported left-wing parties. the general electorate (68%). This may be due to the fact that Poland is being governed by a party of the vi . NON-VOTERS AND THE LEFT conservative-nationalist right, which left-wing voters would want to help remove from office17). We can see in Figure 2 that the rise in support for We are now able to compare the social composi- the left in the 1990s did not coincide with a growth tion of left-wing voters in comparison to non-vot- in the turnout at elections. Also, the subsequent fall ers18). As shown above, non-voters tend to be young- in the left vote after 2001, did not lead to any sig- er; more likely to live in a village or small town; nificant drop in the turnout rate. As we know that achieved a basic or technical education; live on a low turnout stability is low in Poland, then it seems that income and go to church regularly. Apart from for whilst the left lost a large section of its electorate age, non-voters are markedly different to the typi- and that many of them may have become non-vot- cal supporters of the left; which tend to be wealthier, ers, many others chose to vote for parties from the live in urban areas; receive a relatively high income right. Also, when the left gained its largest vote in and have a high level of education. We can once 2001, it was able to mobilise such people as those on again conclude therefore that a large section of non- low incomes and with a basic education more than voters (apart from those that attend church regular- in any other election. However, in 2011 the propor- ly) is made up of people who would have been ex- tion of these social groups that voted had returned pected to traditionally support the left. If the left is almost to the level that it had been in 2001, showing to expand its electoral base in the future it will have that right-wing parties have been able to gain the to consider how it can reach this section of the elec- support of this part of the electorate that had pre- torate and build out from its present core support. viously voted for the left. This is confirmed by the figures showing the social composition of those de- vii . OPINIONS OF LEFT-WING NON-VOTERS claring themselves to be left-wing. As noted above the left vote collapsed in 2005 and The next stage of our analysis is to present the it has never since come close to matching the more original data gathered through our questionnaires than 40% it had gained in 2001. The instability with- and interviews with left-wing non-voters. The pur- in the Polish political system and the lack of party pose of this analysis was to gather information loyalty amongst left voters is evident when we look about the opinions of left-wing non-voters and how at how those who supported the SLD in 2001 and they compare to those of left-wing voters.

17) ’Left-Wing Voters since 2005’ (’Elektorat lewicy od roku 2005’), CBOS, 105/2017 (http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2017/K_105_17.PDF) 18) This information is taken from research carried out on those who did not vote in the Presidential election in 2015. REF 13

A . Questionnaire: least one of the previous three parliamentary elections. We received 50 completed questionnaires of The questionnaire was conducted on two sam- left-wing non-voters. We then chose 50 respondents ples of left-wing voters and non-voters. We deter- from the first sample, statistically matching them mined whether a respondent was left-wing though according to demographic factors (age, gender, edu- ‘self-classification’ i.e. when the respondent defines cation, work status) to the sample of non-voters, in her/himself as being left-wing. The questionnaire order to make our comparison of opinions between consisted of questions on the following: voting and left-wing voters and non-voters as valid as possible. elections; socio-economic topics; social and political The answers were given on a scale of 1 to 4, with matters; and historical topics. The first sample was 4 signifying agreement and 1 disagreement with the gathered using a convenience/voluntary sampling statement. We have presented the mean results of method, through promoting the questionnaire on these answers in the figures below19). During our social media. After having posted the question- analysis we used the mann whitney u test, in order naire on social media for a few weeks during the to check for statistically significant differences be- second half of 2017, we gath- tween voters and non-voters20). ered around 119 respondents, The first set of questions who defined themselves as be- There is no one to vote for. The concerned the opinions to- ing left-wing and were voters. Left has no vision of governance, wards voting and elections We only received completed it is divided, it has lost its ability (figure 4). The differences be- questionnaires from three left- to rule independently or in coali- tween left-wing voters and wing non-voters. We therefore tion. Does voting in such a situ- non-voters in this section are moved to the next stage of our ation make any sense? – Quote all statistically very signifi- research of finding a sample of from interviews cant21). As would be expected left-wing non-voters. In order left-wing voters are more like- to do this, we commissioned ly to agree with the statement the polling agency Biostat to find us a sample of left- that it is worth voting in elections and that it is a citi- wing non-voters through their data base of respond- zen’s obligation to do so. They are also more likely ents. A ‘non-voter’ was defined as someone who did to disagree with statements that it is not worth vot- not vote in the last parliamentary election and in at ing, because elections are unfair; do not change the

Figure 4

Opinions of Voting Report Mean 40 30 Group 20 leV-Wing Mean Voter 10 3.94 3.24 3.96 3.04 2.51 3.22 1.90 2.92 1.63 2.90 2.20 3.24 leV-Wing 0 NON-voter It is worth Voting is It is only worth It is not worth It is not worth It is not worth voting as you a citizen voting in an voting as it does voting as voting in an have an inﬂuence and patriotic election when not change election are election if you on the situation obligation there is much usualy unfair have ‘no one to in the state a party/coalition vote for’ which you really support

Variables

19) Throughout this research the mean results are presented. Because not all of the distributions are ‘normal’ a non-parametric test was used to compare the groups. The group medians are presented in the appendix. 20) If the p value is below 0.05 then the score is significant. 21) The spearman’s score for all of these questions was 0.00 apart from for the first question (0.003) and second question (0.008). 14 , , s 2.838 owned such a the arm s industry energy an d of industry 3.143 should be state oter ng ng telecomunications Strategic branches Wi Wi te r 3. 348 NON-v Vo leV- leV- to for the Grou p shoul d poores t citizens housing The state ensure access 3.674 comunal/socia l at e 2.415 home s te school s ate old- healt h clinics, as priv priv 2.591 state subsidies people ’s Instructions such or pri va should not recei ve ay 2.906 stment is Public to figh t 3.348 a good w in ve unemployment e d e of el y r been ed fo r 3.209 recei ve lokking fo rk, s/he should 3.217 they ha ve unemploy benefits from th e person is activ the lenght of tim If an unemplo ye wo state irrespectiv ls 3.646 ersa l at all le ve shoul d citizens The State univ educatio n 3.646 guarantee its access to free e er erment 2.925 means should (employ civil societ y orgnisations 2.512 organizsations the state but b Non-gov funded by other and trade unions ) organisations and not be financed b y riables Va 2.895 progressi ve proportio n 3.178 A is the most jus t taxation system taxation system of their income ) more pay a higher (i.e. those who earn . at e 1.659 to of if the estment ) e the right should financial society – for a public inv confiscating 2.455 property (e.g in the interes t hav compensatio n restrict priv property without land is to be used The State – acting e ould 2.410 Aitudes Towards Socio-Economic Issues e a higher uld agree pensio n of social 2.600 insurance if it I wo receiv pensioners w meant that current to pay a higher rat 2.195 ersal it s univ guarantee to free and health care 1.690 citizens access The stateshould y 3.771 The state econom 3.851 sholuld not interfer in the 2.054 ermen t are no t armin g global counte r estments t o w necessary 1.511 Gov ivv 2.333 orkers ees should e a salary company salaries o f in the sam e 1.901 other w The maximum receiv not be regulated should be free t o much higher than employ (e.g. a senior manager

4 3 2 1 0

Report Mean

alues V Figure 5 15 situation much; or that there tervene into the economy to is no one to vote for. We can I cannot forgive the Left that replace or restrict the private therefore conclude that left- during its rule (SLD-PSL gover- sector22). They however hold wing voters believe that it is ments) for the first time there was similar pro-state opinions on a duty to vote in elections and talk of introducing payment for issues such as providing free that by doing so they can in- higher education, the labour code universal public services, influence the situation in the was liberalised, and the health come redistribution, etc. country. Also, interestingly, service was privatised by imple- The next set of questions a significantly higher num- menting a public-private partner- concerns social and political ber of non-voters believe that ship. The left, after all, stands for issues. Here we are looking at it is only worth voting if there free access to health care, educa- topics on cultural and moral is a party that they really sup- tion, social security and equal issues; democracy and civil port, suggesting that there is opportunities. – Quote from inter- liberties; and nationalism and no party or coalition that cur- views multiculturalism. We are con- rently mobilises them to par- cerned with the liberal/con- ticipate in elections. servative and libertarian/au- On socio-economic issues the differences be- thoritarian dimensions of the right/left divide and tween left-wing voters and non-voters are less clear trying to determine to what extent left-wing voters/ (figure 4.) In general both samples hold opinions that non-voters hold similar or diverging opinions on are close to classical left-wing attitudes towards the these issues. economy, rather than the more neo-liberal third way In figure 6 we can see that left-wing voters/non- version of social democracy. Therefore, they strong- voters both hold strong liberal opinions on a num- ly support such things as free health care and educa- ber of issues such as legalising marihuana; a wom- tion, progressive taxation, unemployment benefits, an’s right to choose have an abortion; couples having public investment to tackle unemployment, state the right to in-vitro treatment; and separation of the provision of communal housing and state owner- Church and State. These opinions are clearly left- ship of strategic industries. Such ‘pro-state’ opinions wing and show how those who define themselves are less clear on issue like regulating maximum sal- as being left-wing tend to hold liberal opinions on aries; state interference in the economy and the state these topics. However, on some other issues we restriction of private property. On the whole, opin- can find significant differences in the opinions of ions of left-wing voters are left-wing voters/non-voters. slightly more ‘pro-state’ than Firstly, there are large differ- left-wing non-voters. The dif- “I would never vote for Law ences on the issue of sexual ferences in opinions between and Justice, but I like how it has rights. Non-voters hold sig- voters and non-voters are sig- implemented its electoral pro- nificantly more conservative nificant in the case of five of gramme. Many decisions have opinions both on the issue of these questions. These are been made for people. It is good same sex couples having the on whether the state should that the government does not right to legalise their relation- not interfere in the economy bend under the pressure of Euro- ship (p:0.000) and also wheth- (p=0.006); the state should in- pean structures and first solve er homosexuals should have vest to tackle global warming; national problems” – Quote from the legal right to adopt chil- the state should have the right the interviews dren (p:0.000). Furthermore, to restrict private property left-wing non-voters also hold rights (p=0.001); unemploy- stronger nationalist opinions ment should be fought through public investment than left-wing voters. Non-voters are therefore more (p=0.013); and the state should ensure citizens’ ac- likely to believe that the law should prioritise the cess to communal housing. On all of these ques- protection of Poles in areas such as work (p:0.000). tions non-voters are less pro-state than voters. We This trend extends into the issue of refugees and at- may conclude from these results that non-voters titudes towards Islam, which have been controver- are less convinced that the state should directly in- sial topics within Polish politics over the past cou-

22) Although on the question of government investment to tackle global warming it is likely that this was influenced through opinions towards the issue of climate change rather than just on attitudes to government investment. 16 s 2.51 Isla m today’ cause o f The mai n problems is 1.52 1.93 ersations , emails, state can checking should be telephon e of citizen s defend th e registerin g restricted in 1.64 order that th e terrorism (e.g . conv The civil rights country agains t personal checks ) 2.86 ay t o crime decrease Increasing best w 2.11 penalties is th e o rt y rning 3.26 at party (PiS) i s all public 3.72 The reform Justice Pa the Law and institutions t the go ve subordinatin g programme o f primary aimed e 2.00 erment o f a Kopacz land should admit th e number o f 3.39 Ew refugees int o gov agreed by th the country as Po regulations and comply with E U e 2.06 oter the right to 3.31 should hav Homosexual s in g adopt children. leV -W NON-v 3.53 Church and 3.85 State should be respected the division o f e The principle o f riables Grou p Va oles hav 3.26 ork) les (e.g . to w ing land should Po The law i n 2.00 protection o f prioritise th e priority access Po W te r ensure that P y Vo leV- 2.91 estmen t to ﬁgh t Aitudes Towards Social and Political Issues 3.35 is a good wa unemplyment Public inv e 2.70 socjety 3.40 nationalities cultures an d has a positiv The mixture of inﬂuence upon o e a 3.46 e th ersal righ t ople wh o hav treatment to in-vitro conceiv 3.70 Pe child should are not able t univ 3.05 e th ople should 1.87 receiv for carrying cruel crimes death penalt y Pe out particulary 3.55 decide men should be able to 3.74 pregnanc y whether t o terminate a Wo 3.02 adult s Access to should b e marihuana 3.37 legalised for

4 3 2 1 0

Report Mean

alues V Figure 6 17 ple of years. Non-voters are significantly more likely between left-wing voters and non-voters. There are to believe that Islam is the main cause of today’s contradictory opinions amongst left-wingers when problems (p:0.000) and that the Polish government it comes to assessing the transition from Commu- should not comply with previous agreements with nism. Therefore, whilst they tend to believe that the the European Union to take in a quota of refugees Round-Table negotiations (between representatives (p:0.000). Moreover, left-wing non-voters are much of the Communist system and the Solidarity move- less likely to consider a mixture of cultures as be- ment in 1989) should be assessed positively, they ing something that is positive for society (p:0.000). also believe that these negotiations mainly bene- On attitudes towards the present conservative Law fited an elite rather than ordinary citizens. There and Justice government, left-wing non-voters are is a significant difference between left-wing vot- far-less likely to agree with the statement that the ers and non-voters on the latter question (p:0.011), reform programme of the present government is with more non-voters agreeing that the elite were aimed primarily at subordinating the institutions the main beneficiaries of the Round-Table negotia- of the state to the ruling party (p:0.010); suggesting tions. This tends to suggest that left-wing non-vot- that left-wing non-voters are less hostile to the pre- ers associate themselves less with the tradition of sent government than left-wing voters. In line with the ‘‘post-Communist’’ left that emerged out of the this opinion, we can see how left-wing non-voters negotiated transition from Communism and was are much more likely to support strong law and or- a dominant force in Polish politics until the early der policies in order to tackle crime. Left-wing non- 2000s. We can also see that a majority of left-wing voters are significantly more in favour of increasing voters agree that the ‘Cursed Soldiers’ should not penalties to deal with crime (sig: 0.001); and crimi- be glorified and that some of them committed un- nals who commit especially cruel crimes receiving justifiable acts of violence against civilians23). The the death penalty (p:0.000). glorification of the ‘Cursed Soldiers’ has been a con- In general we can see how on many cultural and troversial issue in recent years in Poland and has moral issues left-wing voters and non-voters hold become a symbolic feature of the conservative and clear liberal opinions. However, on sexual rights; nationalist right in Poland. The respondents had nationalism and multi-culturalism; and law and or- the strongest opinion on this issue amongst all the der, left-wing non-voters are much more conserva- questions on history. However, there is still a sig- tive than left-wing voters. nificant difference in opinions between voters and The next set of questions under consideration con- non-voters on this question (sig: 0.015), with more cerns historical issues, such as attitudes towards the voters agreeing with the statement than non-voters. People’s Republic of Poland (PRL) and the transition The final question under consideration, on histori- period in Poland after 1989. Historical issues tend to di- cal matters, regards whether it is necessary to fight vide the left, with part of it connected to the PRL whilst against the symbols of Communism and the former other sections associating themselves more with the ruling party in Poland (e.g. through changing street opposition movement organised around the trade un- names.) This relates to the issue of ‘de-communisa- ion Solidarity. Also, part of the ‘‘post-Communist’’ left tion’ which is being pursued strongly by the pre- positively assess the negotiations and arrangements sent government. Here we can see a sharp divide that ushured in the new system in 1989, whilst others between voters an non-voters (sig: 0.015), with non- see these as a betrayal of the ideals of the left. voters inclined to agree with the statement, whilst In figure 7 we can see how left-wingers tend to voters are against it. agree that the PRL (despite its authoritarianism and In general left-wing voters are inclined to agree on limitation of soverignty) instigated a civilisational such historical matters as the legacy of Communism step forward for the country. There also tends to be and the ‘post-Communist’ transition. However, vot- agreement amongst left-wingers that the major pro- ers are more likely to view the Communist period and tests during the PRL were mainly aimed at improv- the legacy of the negotiated transition positively, and ing the material situation of the population, rather be more critical towards the ‘Cursed Soldiers’. The than seeking to change the system. On these ques- major point of division is around the present sym- tions there are no statistically significant differences bolic legacies of the Communist system and whether

23) The ‘Cursed Soldiers’ (or ‘Disavowed Soldiers’), applies to the armed resistance movement to Communism after the Second World War. This has taken on a strong significance for the right-wing in Poland, who honour all the ‚Disavowed Soldiers’, including those that killed an estimated 5,000 civilians (amongst them 157 children). 18

Figure 7

Aitudes Towards Historical Issues Report Mean 4 3 Group 2 leV-Wing Mean Voter 1 3.94 2.63 2.33 2.94 3.72 3.32 1.55 2.29 3.40 2.86 2.89 2.83 leV-Wing 0 NON-voter The Round Table The decisions The ‘Cursed It is neccessary Despite restricting During the protests and its decisions made at the Soldiers’ to fight in Poland sovereignty and in Poland (1956, should be Round Table should not be with the remanents having an 1970, 1976, 1980) the assessed positively benefited glorified as amongs of the Communist authoritarian form issue of changing mainly them were pepole system and symbols of goverment, the the system was a post-Comunist who carried out related to it and the Communist marginal compared and post-Solidarity commied ruling Polish United system in Poland with the fight to elite, whilst bring lile unjustifiable Workers Party (PZPR): achieved improve the benefits for violent acts changing street names, a large material situation ‘odinary people’ against civilians introducing laws civilisation step of citizens against forward for the ex members of the country state security forces (rebuilding the country, agri- Variables cultural reform, industrialisation, eradicating

these should be fought against, with left-wing non- significance for these non-voters, possibly as they voters tending to agree with this statement. had no influence on these decisions. The professionally active people interviewed not- B . Interviews ed that the centre-left governments introduced un- favourable policies such as liberalising the labour The next stage of our research was a set of in- law, promoting flexible forms of employment and terviews carried out with left-wing non-voters. The favoured more capital than working people. aim of this was to find out specifically why some Regardless of age, gender, professional and material people who define themselves as being left-wing do status, all the people interviewed highlighted the lack not participate in elections. Ten left-wing non-vot- of credibility of left-wing leaders and political parties ers were interviewed between September and De- active in Poland. It was emphasised that the failure to cember 2017. A convenience/snowballing sampling deal with its past and the wrong decisions made by method was used through finding respondents the left whilst in government (and those responsible through our own contacts and then these people for them) have impacted on their decision not to par- recommending others to be interviewed. The ano- ticipate in elections. In particular a number of respon- nymity of the respondents has been respected. Table dents pointed to the failure of the left to carry out its 11 displays the details of the interview respondents. electoral programme once it came into power. During the past few years, leaders of the Pol- The mistakes pointed out by the respondents in ish left have been trying to define the rea- the interviews included: the left-wing governments’ sons for their electoral defeats and remov- continuation of the policies of (re)privatisation and al from power. However, most attention has their joint responsibility for the liquidation of large been paid to the external factors for these de- parts of the country’s industry. Also it was noted feats, rather than looking at their own mistakes. that the left-wing governments failed to deal with From our interviews we found that left-wing non- the power of the Church and did not, for example, voters assess the situation differently. The previ- liberalise the abortion law. In general it was often ous successes recalled by some left-wing politicians emphasized that the left is increasingly moving (such as accession to the European Union) are of less away from its roots. 19

Figure 7 Table 11: Information about Interviewees Gender Age Place of Residence Education Profession Employed 1 M 75 WARSAW High Businessperson/teacher No (retired) 2 F 59 JÓZEFOWO Medium Printer/trade unionist Yes 3 M 38 LUBLIN High Social worker Yes 4 F 61 WARSAW Medium Optician Yes 5 M 26 WARSAW medium None No/retired sick 6 F 45 SZCZECINEK medium Administrative worker Yes 7 M 60 BIAŁYSTOK high Accountant Yes 8 F 24 MARKI high Shop Manager Yes 9 M 54 WARSAW high Builder Yes 10 F 32 WARSAW medium Chef Yes

Most of the respondents appreciated the contri- Women underlined the instrumental use by the bution of the Polish left to the process of joining the left of the issue of liberalising the anti-abortion law, European Union and Euro-Atlantic structures. But and its failure to support initiatives guaranteeing ac- they thought that the left was too focused on this at cess to artificial insemination (in vitro) or sexual edu- the expense of improving living conditions. They cation. They also drew attention to the moral conser- believed that Poland’s participation in military mis- vatism of the leaders of the Democratic Left Alliance, sions was too big, with one respondent noting that which hindered the implementation of socially im- it was surprising that Poland is more active in this portant problems. Another issue that was noticed field than Germany. was the relatively small proportion of women that Another issue that was noticed was the lack of a had participated in the left-wing governments. leftist vision for the future of the country and Eu- People who were out of work emphasised their rope, and the lack of a clear definition of who the difficult economic situation and at how they did not Polish left wants to represent. The weakness of the believe that voting would change their circumstanc- left in this area was emphasised in comparison with es. They also believed they had no chance of influ- the liberal and Christian Democratic parties (which encing what was happening in the country nor that know who they want to represent) and nationalist- their involvement in political and party life could Catholic parties (which have a vision of Poland in would have any positive effect on their lives. Europe and the world). The respondents also did not like the fact that Older people paid attention to the omissions and the Left accepted its limited influence in politics even capitulation of the left in defence of its his- and ceased to aspire to rule / co-govern the country. torical heritage of the left. Starting from the begin- They also pointed out that the divisions and dis- ning of the transformation, the centrist and rightist putes on the left are incomprehensible to them. They parties began to re-write history. The civilisational believed that the lack of unity and the ability of left- achievements of post-war Poland were systematical- wing parties and organisations to cooperate with ly erased, alongside and the left’s important contri- each other was a serious weakness of the Polish left. bution to regaining independence in 1918. Also, the When asked why they had stopped participat- progressive contribution of socialists in the field of ing in the elections, the most common answers civil rights (women’s electoral rights), progressive were: “because there is nobody to vote for”; “be- legislation in the field of the labour law and social cause I do not have any influence”; “because I felt security, and the contribution of the Polish left in the betrayed”; “I have voted too many times for the fight against Nazism were ignored. least worst option”, and “my absence is an ex- Younger people paid attention to the fact that the pression of opposition to what is happening on left has paid too much attention to itself, rather than the Polish political scene, including the left.” the problems of voters. Others pointed out that the When asked whether the respondents felt respon- major problem was the lack of a clear programme of sible for the failure of the Polish left, they answered the left alongside its and its lack of radicalism. They such things as: “no, the politicians and party activ- noted how the left had failed to develop an attrac- ists who have chosen them are responsible,” “no my tive program for their age group. voice does not matter much”, “a little yes, but I gave 20

them a chance too many times and they …”, I have in Poland. Below we present a summary of the an- voted too many times for the least worst option”. swers given by both Razem and the SLD (table 11.)24) When asked what the Polish left would have to The first question asks whether the parties have do to regain their trust, the respondents said such adopted any actions to win the support of non-vot- things as: “I do not know, it’s hard to say”; “ it should ers. Razem have answered that they have no specific become a real left”, “it should deal with real prob- campaign, although they try to engage with wide lems”, “it should be more visible and not be afraid sections of electorate and have a specific campaign of clarity”, “Compromised politicians should leave to activate women in politics. Meanwhile the SLD the political scene and be replaced by new people simply answered that yes they do have a strategy, with political potential “, “it should unite and not although gave no further details about this. compete with each other”. When asked about their future plans for mobilis- ing non-voters, Razem state they plan to do this and viii . Strategies of Polish left-wing that they will seek to win the support of those who parties towards non-voters have previously been under-represented in politics. Meanwhile the SLD listed activities aimed towards The final part of our research is to examine the voters in general – sending out newsletters, using strategies that left-wing parties in Poland are pur- traditional media, etc. suing to attract the support of non-voters. We sent The third question asked what are the main ob- three open questions to the main left-wing parties stacles to gaining the support of non-voters. Razem

Table 12: Left-Wing parties’ strategies to mobilise non-voters Razem (Together Party) Democratic Left Alliance (SLD)

Do you take any action to try and mo- No specific action taken. Yes bilise non-voters to take part in elec- In our campaigns we try to reach a tions? If yes what? wide group of people, including those not interested in politics. One of our campaigns is ‘women to politics’ aimed at engaging this under- represented group in politics.

Do you plan any action to mobilise We will certainly run such actions Before any election we send a newslet- non-voters? during the election campaigns ter to those on our mailing list appeal- We will try to reach people previ- ing for them to participate in the elec- ously uninterested or not engaged in tions. We produce elections materials politics for them and appeal to the electorate We will try to convince people that through the traditional media. another type of politics is possible and that different groups should be represented (including those that had regularly been ignored such as workers)

What do you think are the main ob- Many people do not participate be- They are in general put off by politics. stacles preventing those who have cause they have an aversion to politics It is easier to convince someone to previously not voted to take part in and politicians. change the party they vote for than to elections? They are convinced that politicians do convince those who have never voted not represent their interests, that they before. are corrupt and that they are in power It is difficult to convince young people only to serve their own interests. to participate in elections as it is not They furthermore believe that voting allowed to campaign in schools and does not change anything signifi- therefore politicians cannot meet with cantly. pupils in schools.

24) The questions were also sent to the Movement for Social Justice (RSS) but we did not receive a reply. 21

ix . CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS “I have the impression that the political parties of the left do not care about winning lost voters, ● Polish politics has been blighted by the problem rather they want to take away of non-voting, since the formation of a demo- voters from the competition. cratic political system nearly three decades ago. Maybe they think it’s easier, This is compounded by large political instabil- but it’s probably short-term ity and low political party membership. thinking”. – Quote from the interviews ● Non-voters are made up primarily of those groups that are amongst the most disadvantaged in society. There is little evidence that noted that many people have an aversion to politics, people are abstaining from participation in that they believe politicians are corrupt and self- politics because they are satisfied or due to serving; and (as confirmed in our research) that pol- ‘post-materialist’ ideals of individualism. The itics does not change anything. The SLD state that primary task for political parties seeking to mo- it is harder to convince those who have not voted bilise non-voters is to win the support of social previously to vote and describe the difficulties of groups that are disadvantaged and feel exclud- reaching the young electorate in schools. ed from politics. In general both parties do not have a developed strategy for reaching out to non-voters. The Demo- ● The left vote collapsed at the beginning of the cratic Left Alliance is only trying to stop the decline 2000s after implementing a programme close to of its long-term electorate. The Party does not take third way style social democracy. The left has any action to convince non-voters to vote for the not recovered from this dramatic fall in sup- SLD and does not see the need to prepare a special port and remains weak and divided. Mean- campaign addressed this group of voters. while, left-wing supporters are primarily made Meanwhile Razem seems to be more aware of this up of those sections of society that are relative- problem and is conscious of some of the reasons that ly well-off (e.g. higher salaries and education). have led to large sections of the electorate abstain- When the left won over 40% of the vote in 2001, ing from politics. It is seeking to acquire new voters it was able to gain the support of many from the and build its electorate. This party has noted phe- more disadvantaged sections of society; and the nomena such as the unwillingness to vote for politi- subsequent decline in its vote was accompanied cal parties and the lack of confidence in the elites, by losing the votes from this section of society. etc. However Razem as yet has also not prepared a Therefore, the left has to look to how it can win strategy for the activation of eft-wing non-voters. the support of non-voters from social groups Thus, it can be stated that the political activities such as those on low incomes, with a lower ed- of SLD and Razem are more focused on maintaining ucation and living in small towns and villages. their existing voters and gaining the support of ac- Those who do not attend Church regularly are tive voters from other parties. also less likely to vote, which is a section of the Another left-wing party active in Poland is The electorate more traditionally drawn to voting Social Justice Movement (RSS), which unfortunate- for left-wing parties. ly did not respond to our survey. The party has no budget subsidies and party officials, which may ● Those who classify themselves as being left- have been the reason for their non-participation in wing tend to hold classical left-wing opin- our research. However, it should be noted that its ions and there is little support amongst them program and are addressed to people in a difficult for third way style social democracy nor for financial situation, a section of society that tends to socially conservative politics. However, left- remain at home on election day. Through the activ- wing voters hold stronger, ideological left-wing ity of its activists in the tenant movement, the par- opinions than those left-wing non-voters, party tries to mobilize them through and mutual as- ticularly on some social and political matters sistance. Unfortunately, these activities are usually where non-voters have more socially conserva- quite spontaneous and they have not as yet resulted tive opinions than voters. The immediate task in the RSS building a strong electoral base. for the left is to keep the support of those left- 22

wingers who already vote (and win over those er than to try and gain the votes of those who left-wingers who have deserted to other more were more socially excluded and had abstained centrist parties), but gain the support of those from participation in elections. who are not voting in elections. There is not a large constituency of left-wing non-voters wait- ● The main left-wing parties in Poland do not ing for a new ideological party on the left to have a worked out strategy for winning over emerge with a ‘pure’ left-wing programme. the support of non-voters in Poland, although However, at the same time they do not believe Razem seems to be aware of the problem and that voting would change anything and would many of the reasons for non-voting in the coun- only vote if there were a party that they strong- try. If the left is to rebuild itself then it will have ly support. Left-wing parties therefore have to to gain the support of some of those who have try to find strategies and demands that meet abstained from elections in Poland. Many vot- the practical needs of left-wing non-voters. As ers are already committed to right-wing par- noted earlier, these people are normally com- ties, and whilst some of these could be won prised of the most disadvantaged groups in so- over to the left, left-wing parties have to con- ciety and the left needs to therefore develop an sider how to gain the votes of those who do not economic programme based upon such things vote. Left-wing non-voters are less likely to be as improving the living standards of these so- drawn to parties that primarily attack PiS due cial groups, reducing social inequalities and to their ‘authoritarian’ or ‘anti-democratic’ poli- protecting workers rights. cies. Left-wing parties need to start off by de- veloping policies that are directed towards the ● Over the past three decades, the Polish left has most socially disadvantaged in society and that not been able to answer the question of how seek to reduce the inequalities and economic to extend its electorate to people who stay at injustices that exist in society. It is likely that home. The largest parties of the left - primar- non-voters in general are less ideologically ily the Democratic Left Alliance - sought to ob- committed than voters and therefore practical tain new voters in the centre, which ultimate- policies that people believe will improve their ly saw their electorate decline. In response to material situation could help to also gain the this decline, the left has needed a strategy and support of non-voters that do not define them- programme directed towards those who have selves as being left-wing. stopped voting – primarily aimed at regaining the trust of left-wing non-voters. This has been ● The left needs to develop a programme specifi- made more difficult by the fact that conserva- cally orientated towards winning the support tive right have developed a more interesting, of left-wing non-voters. For those parts of the pro-social programme, which has mobilised a left (the SLD and UP) which have previously large section of the electorate. The demographic been in government, they should make a clear decline in the traditional leftist electorate has break from the mistakes of the past and own led to a change in its social structure. The work- up to their previous mistakes and failures. The ing class base of voters and party representa- left needs to articulate who it wants to repre- tives has been replaced by a class of profession- sent and develop a programme aimed specifi- al politicians and apparatchiks. Such people are cally towards these people. This should involve more inclined to believe that it would be better a vision for the future of Poland and its place to seek votes from the centrist electorate, rath- within the European Union.