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Bibliography Publications 1991-2021 Inhaltsverzeichnis / Table of Contents Abkürzungsverzeichnis / List of Abbreviations….………………………………………...2 ÜBERSICHT DER BUCHREIHEN / OVERVIEW OF BOOK SERIES Institut Wiener Kreis Jahrbuch / Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook………….………..…3 Institut Wiener Kreis Bibliothek / Vienna Circle Institute Library………………….…….4 Veröffentlichungen des Instituts Wiener Kreis / Publications of the Institute Vienna Circle……………………………………………..….4 Veröffentlichungen des Instituts Wiener Kreis/Sonderbände / Publications of the Institute Vienna Circle/Special Volumes…:…………………………6 Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung und Kunst / Scientific World Conception and Art………………………………………………….…….6 Weitere ausgewählte Veröffentlichungen / Further selected publications……………..6 Editionen/Weitere Reihen / Editions/Further Series………...……………….…………..7 INHALT DER BÜCHER / CONTENT OF BOOKS Artikel / Articles……………………………………………………………………………...12 Rezensionsartikel / Review Essays………………………..…………………….…….....68 Rezensionen / Reviews…………………………………………………………………….69 Berichte/Dokumentation / Reports/ Documentation.…..…………………………...…...76 Veröffentlichte Wiener Kreis Vorlesungen / Published Vienna Circle Lectures………79 Impressum…………………………………………………………………………………...80 1 Abkürzungsverzeichnis / List of Abbreviations VCIYB – Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook (Springer Verlag) VCIL – Vienna Circle Institute Library (Springer Verlag) PIVC – Veröffentlichungen des Instituts Wiener Kreis (Springer Verlag) PIVCS – Veröffentlichungen des Instituts Wiener Kreis Sonderbände (Springer) WWK – Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung und Kunst (Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky) ONGS = Otto Neurath, Gesammelte Schriften in 8 Bänden (LIT Verlag) OPIVC – Weitere ausgewählte Veröffentlichungen EEK – Reihe Emigration – Exil – Kontinuität ESF – Reihe Proceedings of the ESF Research Networking Programme EPSA – Reihe The European Philosophy of Science Association Proceedings 650UW – Reihe 650 Jahre Universität Wien 2 Institut Wiener Kreis Jahrbuch / Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook (VCIYB) Stadler, Friedrich (Ed.): Scientific Philosophy: Origins and Developments. Wien und New York: Springer Verlag, 1993. (=VCIYB1) Pauer-Studer, Herlinde (Ed.): Norms, Values, and Society. Wien und New York: Springer Verlag, 1994. (=VCIYB2) DePauli-Schimanovich, Werner; Köhler, Eckehart; Stadler, Friedrich (Eds.): The Foundational Debate. Constructivity and Complexity in Mathematics and Physics. Wien und New York: Springer Verlag, 1995. (=VCIYB3) Nemeth, Elisabeth; Stadler, Friedrich (Eds.): Encyclopedia and Utopia. Otto Neurath (1882-1945). Wien und New York: Springer Verlag, 1996. (=VCIYB4) Köhler, Eckehart; Leinfellner, Werner (Eds.): Game Theory, Experience, Rationality. Foundations of Social Sciences, Economics and Ethics. Wien und New York: Springer Verlag, 1997. (=VCIYB5) Wolénski, Jan (Ed.): Alfred Tarski and the Vienna Circle. Austro-Polish Connections in Logical Empiricism. Wien und New York: Springer Verlag, 1998. (=VCIYB6) Greenberger, Daniel (Ed.): Epistemological and Experimental Perspectives on Quantum Physics. Wien und New York: Springer Verlag, 1999. (=VCIYB7) Rédei, Miklos; Stöltzner, Michael (Eds.): John von Neumann and the Foundations of Quantum Physics. Wien und New York: Springer Verlag, 2000. (=VCIYB8) Heidelberger, Michael; Stadler, Friedrich (Eds.): History of Philosophy of Science – New Trends and Perspectives. Wien und New York: Springer Verlag, 2001. (=VCIYB9) Stadler, Friedrich (Ed.): The Vienna Circle and Logical Empiricism. Wien und New York: Springer Verlag, 2002. (=VCIYB10) Stadler, Friedrich (Ed.): Induction and Deduction in the Sciences. Wien und New York: Springer Verlag, 2003. (=VCIYB11) Galavotti, Maria Carla (Ed.): Cambridge and Vienna. Frank P. Ramsey and the Vienna Circle. Wien und New York: Springer Verlag, 2004. (=VCIYB12) Nemeth, Elisabeth; Schmitz, Stefan W.; Uebel, Thomas (Eds.): Otto Neurath's Economics in Context. Wien und New York: Springer Verlag, 2007. (=VCIYB13) Manninen, Juha; Stadler, Friedrich (Eds.): The Vienna Circle in Nordic Countries. Wien und New York: Springer Verlag, 2010. (=VCIYB14) McGuinness, Brian (Ed.): Friedrich Waismann – Causality and Logical Positivism. Wien und New York: Springer Verlag, 2011. (=VCIYB15) Creath, Richard (Ed.): Rudolf Carnap and the Legacy of Logical Empiricism. Wien und New York: Springer Verlag, 2012. (=VCIYB16) Maria Carla Galavotti; Elisabeth Nemeth; Friedrich Stadler (Eds.) European Philosophy of Science - Philosophy of Science in Europe and the Viennese Heritage. Cham: Springer Verlag, 2013. (=VCIYB17) Damböck, Christian (Ed.): Influences on the Aufbau. Cham: Springer Verlag, 2016. (=VCIYB18) Pihlström, Sami; Stadler, Friedrich; Weidtmann, Niels (Eds.): Logical Empiricism and Pragmatism. Cham: Springer, 2017. (=VCIYB19) Stadler, Friedrich (Ed.): Integrated History and Philosophy of Science. Problems, Perspectives, and Case Studies. Cham: Springer, 2017. (=VCIYB20) Brożek, Anna; Stadler, Friedrich; Woleński, Jan (Eds.): The Significance of the Lvov-Warsaw School in the European Culture. Cham: Springer, 2017. (=VCIYB21) Stadler, Friedrich (Ed.): Ernst Mach. Life, Work, Influence. Cham: Springer, 2019. (=VCIYB22) Schuster, Radek (Ed.): The Vienna Circle in Czechoslovakia. Cham: Springer, 2020. (=VCIYB23) 3 Fisette, Denis; Fréchette, Guillaume; Stadler, Friedrich (Eds.): Franz Brentano and Austrian Philosophy. Cham: Springer, 2020. (=VCIYB24) Ramharter, Esther (Ed.): Vienna Circle and Religion. Cham: Springer, forthcoming. Damböck, Christian; Tuboly, Adam Tamas (Eds.): The Socio-Ethical Dimension of Knowledge – The Mission of Logical Empiricism. Cham: Springer, forthcoming. Nemeth, Elisabeth; Romizi, Donata; Wulz, Monika (Eds.): Edgar Zilsel – Philosopher, Historian, Sociologist. Cham: Springer, forthcoming. Institut Wiener Kreis Bibliothek / Vienna Circle Institute Library (VCIL) Kampis, George; Kvasz, Ladislav; Stöltzner, Michael (Eds.): Appraising Lakatos. Mathematics, Methodology and the Man. Wien und New York: Springer Verlag, 2002. (=VCIL1) Bonk, Thomas (Ed.): Language, Truth and Knowledge. Contributions to the Philsophy of Rudolf Carnap. Wien und New York: Springer Verlag, 2003. (=VCIL2) Tranquillo, Nicholas (Ed.) Dream Consciousness. Allan Hobson’s New Approach to the Brain and Its Mind. Wien und New York: Springer Verlag, 2014. (=VCIL3) Stadler, Friedrich (Ed.): The Vienna Circle. Studies in the Origins, Development, and Influence of Logical Empiricism. Wien und New York: Springer Verlag, 2015. (=VCIL4) Collodel, Matteo; Oberheim, Eric (Eds.): Feyerabend’s Formative Years. Volume 1. Feyerabend and Popper. Correspondence and Unpublished Papers. Wien und New York: Springer Verlag, 2020. (=VCIL5) Von Plato, Jan (Ed.): Gödel’s Unfinished Book on Foundational Research in Mathematics. Wien und New York: Springer Verlag, forthcoming. Ramharter, Esther; Stadler, Friedrich (Eds.): Josef Schächter. Papers and Documents. Wien und New York: Springer Verlag, forthcoming. Cantu, Paola; Schiemer, Georg (Eds.): Logic, Epistemology, and Scientific Theories. Wien und New York: Springer Verlag, forthcoming. Veröffentlichungen des Instituts Wiener Kreis / Publications of the Institute Vienna Circle (PIVC) Kruntorad, Paul (Hg.): Jour fixe der Vernunft, Der Wiener Kreis und die Folgen. Wien: Hölder-Pichler- Tempsky, 1991. (=PIVC1) Haller, Rudolf; Stadler, Friedrich (Hg.): Wien – Berlin – Prag. Der Aufstieg der wissenschaftlichen Philosophie. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1992. (=PIVC2) Hegselmann, Rainer; Peitgen, Heinz-Otto (Hg.): Modelle sozialer Dynamiken. Ordnung, Chaos, Komplexität. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1996. (=PIVC3) Fischer, Kurt Rudolf; Stadler, Friedrich (Hg.): „Wahrnehmung und Gegenstandswelt“ Zum Lebenswerk von Egon Brunswik (1903-1955). Wien und New York: Springer Verlag, 1997. (=PIVC4) Stadler, Friedrich (Hg.): Bausteine wissenschaftlicher Weltauffassung. Vorträge. Wien und New York: Springer Verlag, 1997. (=PIVC5) Stadler, Friedrich (Hg.): Wissenschaft als Kultur. Österreichs Beitrag zur Moderne. Wien und New York: Springer Verlag, 1997. (=PIVC6) Stadler, Friedrich (Hg.): Phänomenologie und Logischer Empirismus. Zentenarium Felix Kaufmann (1895 – 1959). Wien und New York: Springer Verlag, 1997. (=PIVC7) Stadler, Friedrich (Hg.): Elemente Moderner Wissenschaftstheorie. Wien und New York: Springer 4 Verlag, 2000. (=PIVC8) Uebel, Thomas E.: Vernunftkritik und Wissenschaft, Otto Neurath und der Erste Wiener Kreis. Wien und New York: Springer Verlag, 2000. (=PIVC9) Jabloner, Clemens (Hg.): Logischer Empirismus und Reine Rechtslehre. Wien und New York: Springer Verlag, 2001. (=PIVC10) Heidelberger, Michael; Stadler, Friedrich (Hg.): Wissenschaftsphilosophie und Politik. Wien und New York: Springer Verlag, 2001 (=PIVC11) Hughes, Jon; Timms, Edward (Eds.): Intellectual Migration and Cultural Transformation. Wien und New York: Springer Verlag, 2002. (=PIVC12) Nemeth, Elisabeth; Roudet, Nicolas (Hg.): Paris – Wien. Encyclopädien im Vergleich. Wien und New York: Springer Verlag, 2005. (=PIVC13) Fischer, Kurt Rudolf; Stadler, Friedrich (Hg.): Paul Feyerabend. Ein Philosoph aus Wien. Wien und New York: Springer Verlag, 2006. (=PIVC14) Siegetsleitner, Anna (Hg.): Logischer Empirismus, Werte und Moral. Wien und New York: Springer Verlag. 2010. (=PIVC15) Máté, András, Rédei, Miklós, Stadler, Friedrich (Hg.): Der Wiener Kreis in Ungarn. Wien und New York: Springer Verlag, 2010. (=PIVC16) Brozek, Anna: Kazimierz Twardowski. Die Wiener Jahre. Wien und New York: Springer Verlag, 2011. (=PIVC17) Nemeth, Elisabeth; Stadler, Friedrich Die europäische Wissenschaftsphilosophie
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