AMMAN 1970, A MEMOIR By Norvell De Atkine*

This is the first in a series of memoirs on the Middle East in the 1960s and 1970s. Norvell de Atkine was one of the first Middle East experts trained by the U.S. military. He attended the American University in Beirut, became a U.S. military attaché in Jordan, and spent many years working in the Arab world.

I had just completed my studies at the own counsel, and the Shia Muslims kept American University of Beirut (AUB) in themselves as invisible as possible. In a 1970, as part of the US Army Foreign Area preliminary taste of events to follow there Specialist program, when Major Bob Perry, was also bitter antagonism between assistant U.S. army attaché in Jordan, was Palestinian and East Bank Jordanian murdered by Palestinian gunmen— students probably from the Popular Front for the An attentive student could receive a Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) at his home terrific education at AUB from such in front of his wife and children.(1) I was professors as Hannah Battatu, Zeine N. assigned to replace him. Zeine and my mentor Dr. Joseph Malone. I had already been prepared for the Battatu, a meticulous researcher and revolutionary situation I would encounter lecturer, was a Palestinian Marxist who, in Jordan by my three years as a student at despite my disagreement with his ideology, AUB, at the time nicknamed “Guerrilla U”. was a superb and objective lecturer. There were remarkably contradictory Although it did not sit well with the mostly aspects to the experience. On the surface, Arab students, who looked for affirmation the Middle Eastern students were united of their wish for a united Arab world, he around the need for revolutionary change never hesitated to point out that almost and support for the Palestinian cause. every secular ideological movement in the Underneath that surface, however, Arab world was in some way an attempt by conversations demonstrated a student body non-Sunni or non-Arab minorities to attain divided along ethnic lines, with many of a measure of equality with the Sunni Arab the groups despising (or at least distrusting) majority. Why, he asked, were each other. Ironically, the Western students Communists in the Arab world almost were often more pro-Palestinian than the exclusively Christians, Kurds, Jews, non-Palestinian Arab students. Armenians and Shia Muslims? The non-Palestinian Arabs, especially Zeine showed how the forgotten details the Lebanese Sunni seemed to resent the of Middle Eastern history were often the Palestinians for seizing the limelight. The key to understanding the big picture. He Maronite Christians and Greek Catholics also enraged some Arab students with his seethed with resentment. The Greek view that the Arab world had been more Orthodox students appeared obsessed with peaceful and enjoyed better living proving themselves Arabs, too, by their standards under the Ottoman Empire than militant rhetoric. The Armenians tried to during independence. stay out of the fray, the Druze kept their Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 4 (December, 2002) 75 Norvell De Atkine

Nevertheless, Beirut was a capital city country into a full-scale war with Israel. for the world’s then highly fashionable Another very different perception a short radical movements. New Left gurus from time later was that of the Lebanese everywhere came to observe and praise the Maronite villagers of Mount Lebanon, Palestinian movement. There were huge who, during a visit by myself with a British photos on the school’s walls of Israeli officer from the Trucial Oman Scouts of soldiers killed at the 1968 Karama battle in the Gulf Emirates, expressed admiration at Jordan. Pictures of the latest Palestinian the Israeli success in destroying 13 martyrs were on posters everywhere on the Lebanese airliners. Their opinions walls of Beirut buildings, replaced by their prompted my incredulous British guest to successors every few days. The most plaintively ask, “Are these people Arabs?” common slogan was the ubiquitous “this Ultimately, the stage was actually being generation shall see the sea,” referring to set for a Lebanese civil war in which the the presumably inevitable elimination of PLO was a major participant. In brief, but Israel and a Palestinian march to the bloody, battles in the south, the Lebanese Mediterranean coast there. forces actually won militarily but Nasser’s Among the fascinating characters pressure led to Beirut’s surrender in the shuttling in and around Beirut in those days 1968 Cairo agreement. The Lebanese was the carefully coiffured Leila Khaled, government agreed to let the PLO operate the world’s only two-time aircraft hijacker, against Israel under certain conditions, a PFLP activist wearing the latest London including a Palestinian agreement that their fashions, speaking in English to an soldiers would not carry weapons in admiring throng of students. Another Lebanese cities. Within a few months, visitor was Tom Hayden, the high priest of however, all the conditions were forgotten the American radical “New Left” making and fedayeen could be seen strolling along the obligatory pilgrimage to a Beirut Beirut’s main streets carrying AK-47s. refugee camp. My favorite character, In December 1967, while on a visit however, was the son of the Egyptian from Lebanon to the Ghor Valley, I ambassador to Lebanon. His father was witnessed first-hand the tinderbox known by everyone as the “high environment existing between Jordan and commissioner” of Lebanon, because, as Israel. Retaliating for a cross- river Gamal Abdel Nasser’s representative, he fedayeen raid, the Israelis strafed a column manipulated the country at will (or was of Jordanian troops killing several and perceived to do so). Nevertheless his son, knocking out an M-88 tank retriever in the who spoke in American slang and middle of the road. Soldiers and civilians associated almost exclusively with pointed toward the sky and talked about American students, spoke of the Arabs as if “American” airplanes, though I tried to they were an alien race. Among others explain they were French-made Mysteres. representing the bewildering and byzantine Since no one seemed ready to pick up the nuances of Arab society and politics was bodies left in the road, myself and a fellow our Christian Palestinian family doctor American officer loaded a couple of them who came early one morning in December, into our small compact car and took them 1968, to visit my wife suffering from to a nearby police station. hepatitis, and in a state of elation related All of this prepared me for my arrival in the details of an Israeli commando attack Amman in late June 1970. The first thing I on Beirut Airport conducted the night saw when the plane landed reflected the before, convinced that it would pull the current situation in that city. There were 76 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 4 (December 2002) Amman 1970, A Memoir

two visa control and customs checks: one roadblock and held in a cage for several by Jordanian officials and another by PLO days. representatives. There were indeed two Numerous American-owned governmental authorities coexisting in an automobiles had been stolen by the gangs uneasy, confrontational relationship. Most often linked to Palestinian political groups of Amman and a large slice of northern that did as they pleased in Amman. The Jordan were controlled by various usual technique was to come to the door Palestinian fedayeen factions. Their Toyota and demand the keys to the car. Every trip trucks with machine guns mounted in the to and from the embassy was an anxious back constantly patrolled the streets of the journey. We were constantly stopped at capital. fedayeen checkpoints. Young 14 and 15 While my Jordanian army colleagues year-old members of the Ashbal youth repeatedly told me in the following weeks group manned roadblocks and scrutinized that there was Palestinian-Jordanian our identity cards in a leisurely and antagonism, the officer who was my insolent manner before waving us on. counterpart explained he had to change into Though their weapons were loaded, they civilian clothes to go to his home in the obviously did not know much about how to Ashrafiyah district of Amman to avoid handle them. being harassed, or worse, by youths in his The behavior of the armed fedayeen mostly Palestinian neighborhood. angered the rank and file of the Jordanian Aside from the tumultuous political army and antagonized much of the civilian situation, the U.S. embassy was also in population, including a segment of the chaos. The previous U.S. ambassador, Palestinian residents. The disdain was Harrison Symmes had been declared mutual. Palestinian West Bankers referred persona non grata by King Hussein in May to Jordanian East Bankers as “al-hufa” (the 1970 and the embassy itself was leaderless. barefoot ones), to imply they were This action by the King was taken in vain backward and illiterate. For their part, attempt to placate the increasingly strident Jordanian officers blamed Palestinian demands of the Palestinian militants, much forces for the 1967 defeat and resented the in the same manner as the dismissal of PLO’s claiming the 1968 battle of Karama Glubb Pasha to placate Arab nationalists in as a victory when most of the fighting had 1956. Dependents had already been been done by the regular army. Referring evacuated. With little or no guidance to 1967, the director of Jordanian army coming from the embassy’s senior staff, a operations claimed, “The Palestinians ran few of us devised our own escape and like rabbits.” evasion plan should we be overrun. The Palestinian relationship was Every day there were rumors of the particularly bad with a small but vital part regime’s impending collapse and incessant of the Jordanian military structure, the threats against Americans in the Arab news Circassians and Chechens. These peoples media. There were months of intermittent of the Caucasus, though a miniscule warfare between the army and PLO forces. percentage of the population, constituted an Ceasefires were repeatedly made and inordinate percentage of the fighter pilots, quickly broken. Aside from the murder of Special Forces, and palace guard. They Major Perry, two American women were were fanatically loyal to the Hashemites. raped, an embassy official was abducted They and their families were also frequent and beaten, and a sergeant from the attaché targets of Palestinian harassment or office was taken from his car at a PFLP physical attacks. Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 4 (December 2002) 77 Norvell De Atkine

Thus, Jordanian society was highly passengers were released. However about polarized and this situation intensified in 50, mostly Israelis, were kept by the PFLP the spring and summer of 1970, with and scattered around Amman for another frequent shootouts between Jordanian two weeks. Shortly thereafter Palestinian troops and various fedayeen factions. elements declared the area around Irbid in Inevitably, negotiations would follow and a northern Jordan as “Free Jordan.” It was truce or agreement would be announced on obvious that The Hashemite regime was Radio Amman in the morning with the losing control. government newspapers urging people to In the U.S. Embassy, the situation took get back to work. By late afternoon, firing a decided turn for the better when would break out again, panicking parents Ambassador L. Dean Brown arrived and to rush to school to pick up their children. took charge. A group of first-rate Foreign Both sides suffered from serious flaws Service personnel--including Hume Horan, in their leadership. Arafat did little or Pat Theros, and Bob Pelletreau—became nothing to control the various PLO factions the embassy’s core group. They were keen or to discipline his own men. He would observers who empathized with the Arabs claim control of the Palestinian movement without the gushy myopic idealization so when beneficial to do so and point to often found among American academics “renegade” organizations over which he and some Foreign Service officers. claimed he had no control when it suited At the same time, as Royal Guard him. The radical Palestinian leaders, like officers later told me, the army told the Nayif Hawatmah and George Habash, king that he must act or the armed forces openly called for the king’s overthrow. would move on their own to change the Yet King Hussein was also not always situation. Finally, on September 17, the the resolute and determined leader often cautious and reluctant king acted, ordering described by later accounts. Far from a massive military operation to clear looking for an excuse to defeat the Amman of the Palestinian organizations. Palestinians, he desperately sought an That morning, the Jordanian Army moved alternative to a showdown with the PLO. In into Amman in a sweep they confidently the end, his counterparts’ behavior forced expected would last at most a few days. him to act decisively. Their over-confidence was more than The final turning point was the seizure matched by their PLO enemies’ belief that of three Western airliners by PFLP the Arab world would come to their aid and terrorists on September 6 and 9, 1970. The the Jordanian monarchy would soon fall. hijackers forced them to land at Dawson’s In fact, the bloody conflict dragged on landing, a saltflat field that had been used for weeks. The Jordanian Army was not by the British air force during World War equipped nor trained for urban warfare. Two. The PLO hijackers renamed it The 60th Armor Brigade, which carried the “Thawra” (revolutionary) field. (After the brunt of the initial attacks did not civil war ended, the U.S. Air Force used it coordinate well with accompanying to land supplies and ammunition for the infantry and was ineffective. Moreover, Jordanian military. It was jokingly units from the two infantry divisions pulled nicknamed “reja’iya” (reactionary) field, off the Israeli front were composed of a after the radicals’ insulting name for their high percentage of Palestinians and small moderate rivals.) village East Bank Jordanians. Many of the After fruitless negotiations, the three Palestinians deserted and later constituted airliners were blown up and most of the several PLO battalion-size units in 78 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 4 (December 2002) Amman 1970, A Memoir

southern Lebanon. The Second Division’s The attack columns would start out with commander Brigadier Bajahat Muhaisein, the infantry close behind but as the volume an East Banker who had married into a of fire from the Palestinian positions prominent Palestinian family, quit. In an increased the infantry would fall behind ironic turn of events General Zia al-Haq, and the tank would soon be isolated. Tanks then head of the Pakistani training mission would fire their main gun at individual to Jordan, basically took command and Palestinian snipers. Four or five Palestinian kept the 2nd Division operations going. fighters would fire upon advancing The East Bank soldiers, mostly from Jordanian troops, inflicting casualties, and northern villages or southern tribal groups, when finally located by the Jordanians, were not familiar with the city in which would simply move a hundred meters to they were now fighting. The situation another house and resume firing. seemed close to what T.E. Lawrence, better However, the volume of fire and known as Lawrence of Arabia, had explosions was being reported by the described in explaining the vast differences Western media as a near-genocide by between the urban and rural peoples of “enraged bedouin troops,” raping and Jordan over 50 years earlier. Amman was slaughtering as they moved into Palestinian an alien place to them. areas. In reality, the battle was fought with The Jordanian armored units, trying to very little hand-to-hand fighting and operate in narrow twisting streets filled usually subsided at night. Moreover, the with rubble, were easy prey. I saw a vast majority of the press was holed up in number of American M-60 tanks disabled the Intercontinental hotel, reporting on the by Soviet anti-tank missiles. After pulling war from infrequent glimpses through the back, the Jordanians resorted to unobserved windows and repeating rumors and stories artillery attacks using almost their entire related to them by the hotel staff, most of reserve of ammunition. Since the artillery whom were Palestinians. The telephone fire was not directed by observers exchanges were in the hands of the rebels pinpointing targets, it tended to be and telephonic communications were haphazard and counter-productive. sporadic at best. Palestinian civilians were often the The Western media was also far more casualties. They also brought in twin comfortable with the better-educated and 40mm anti-aircraft weapons manned by air politically savvy Palestinian leadership force personnel, which put on massive than with the Jordanian military, and the pyrotechnics displays while doing very reporting reflected that fact. A leader in little damage. championing the Palestinian cause was the Nor was the artillery fire particularly BBC Arabic service, which dwelled on well coordinated with infantry or armor alleged Jordanian atrocities and Palestinian advances. In fact, the heavy limestone “successes.” Nasser’s Voice of the Arabs structure of many buildings made them radio station from Cairo, which backed the vulnerable to only the heaviest of weapons. PLO, had a powerful influence on the large Even 106mm recoilless anti-tank rifles did numbers of Arabs who listened to it little damage to most of the buildings. faithfully. The heavy-handed approach of From my perch in the old American the Jordanian government also contributed embassy building in Jabal Luwaybdah, I to their “image “problem. They had made could clearly see the Jordanian attempts to very little, if any, provision or plans for root out the Palestinian guerillas from handling thousands of people locked into Jabal Ashrifiyah, one of their strongholds. an urban battle ground with no escape Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 4 (December 2002) 79 Norvell De Atkine

routes and, after a while, no water. The Liberation Army. At first, the Jordanians ubiquitous water tanks on top of the houses were being overwhelmed, losing a number were almost all riddled with bullet and of tanks from their premier armored unit, shrapnel holes and the city water mains the 40th Armored Brigade, and were forced were broken. to pull back. However under effective Meanwhile in other parts of Jordan, the Jordanian air attacks, the Syrians suffered Jordanian Arab Army was turning the tide. heavy losses. A senior fighter pilot in the Al-Salt, hometown of Christian DFLP Jordanian Air Force told me it was a leader Nayif Hawatmeh, was retaken; veritable “turkey shoot” with the Syrian gradually villages along the Ghor valley tanks being easily seen and hit in the gently were also regained by Government troops; rolling open terrain of northern Jordan. and throughout the conflict, the south However General Asad refused to put always remained in government control. his planes into the air to provide cover for There were two wild cards in the two reasons. One was his own dislike of Jordanian civil war and at first glance both Arafat, who he saw as a client of the rival seemed favorable for the PLO. Syria, Jadid faction. The other was Israel’s portraying itself as the paragon of Arab warning, made at Jordan’s request through nationalism, had always been hostile to the the U.S. embassy in Amman, that its forces Hashemites. Iraq, with a large military would intervene if the Syrian offensive force remaining in Jordan since the 1967 continued. The demoralized Syrian forces war, had also been outspokenly favorable dragged themselves home, towing dozens to Arafat’s forces. of destroyed tanks with them, and within a But these appearances were misleading. few weeks Asad seized power in The faction then taking over in Syria, led Damascus. King Hussein, always careful to by Hafiz al-Asad, was hostile toward look to the future, resisted Arafat while, in the end, Baghdad’s recommendations from the military to relatively new leader, Saddam Hussein, vigorously pursue the Syrians, and allowed decided that he preferred good relations the Syrians to evacuate in a leisurely with Jordan. His units withdrew, amid fashion, carrying back almost all their Palestinian charges that Iraqi units had destroyed equipment. He correctly decided coordinated their movements with the that any further damage inflicted on the Jordanian Army to make it harder for the Syrians might unite a Syrian government PLO seizing control of ammunition, bases coming apart. and areas. These two choices would As the Iraqis pulled out and the Syrians continue to affect decisions many years retreated in humiliation, the Palestinian later, with Asad always suspicious of leadership realized defeat was inevitable Arafat and Saddam generally enjoying and began negotiating. However, the Jordanian help (or favorable neutrality) Jordanians had concluded that they could including his 1990 invasion of Kuwait. not make a deal with Arafat that he would Arafat, however, did not hold any grudge implement faithfully. Urged on by the against Saddam who he worked with military leadership and Prince Hasan, King closely in later years. Hussein maintained his position, At the same time, though, Syria was still demanding the PLO’s full military mainly governed by Asad’s rival, Salah withdrawal from Jordan. Jadid. On September 20, Syria’s army An agreement was reached in Cairo, invaded Jordan using both regular forces under the supervision of the ailing Nasser, and PLO army units from the Palestine Arafat’s patron, who died the day after it 80 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 4 (December 2002) Amman 1970, A Memoir

was signed on September 28. With Nasser scars of the civil war have not healed. It gone and Jordan’s Arab neighbors in marked the complex development of political disarray, King Hussein proceeded Palestinian-Jordanian relations in the 1970s slowly and surely to evict the remainder of and 1980s. The arrival of thousands of the PLO and other Palestinian armed Palestinians expelled from Kuwait in 1991, groups from Jordan. By July 1971, the last bringing with them considerable amounts remnant of the PLO was holed up in the of money, have reopened some old Ajlun hills. I watched one of the last wounds. I was told by a retired army Jordanian assaults on these PLO positions. general “They [Palestinians] build big It was an uneven contest with the villas on the hills and add nothing to this Palestinians replying to Jordanian artillery country.” Certainly it is true that few and tank fire with katusha rocket attacks Palestinian officers--or soldiers for that that were so ineffective that the Jordanian matter--serve in combat units today. In my soldiers did not even take cover. When most recent visit, I observed what seems to one exploded seemingly close by, I “hit the be a parallel process of modernization deck” as I had numerous times during Viet characterized by an emerging trendy, Cong mortar attacks, eliciting gales of upper-class youth with water pipes laughter from the soldiers nearby. installed in their Mercedes and young girls A few days later the Palestinians in a night club attired in tight body suits surrendered and one group of about 200 talking from table to table with cell phones, waded across the Jordan River to surrender developing alongside a very definite to the Israelis rather than face the wrath of Islamization of the society. For instance, the East Bank soldiers. But apparently my the dress of the young women of Yarmouk brief appearance at the battle site was University was decidedly conservative. enough to put me on a PLO “hit list.” It However, in neither case did I detect any was soon claimed that I had been erasure of the old Jordanian-Palestinian “directing” the Jordanian assault in Ajlun. fissure as some writers on Jordan have While most Palestinians and Jordanians described recently. did not directly participate in the war, to The 1970-71 fighting, though brief, was say that it was not a civil war is like saying a bitter conflict with all the earmarks of a that because most American southerners civil war based on ethnic division. It could and northerners did not participate in the be said there was no real difference in war of 1861 it was not a civil war. The language, religion, culture or history Jordanian conflict lives on with lingering separating the two sides; yet, even if one bitterness, split families, and neighbors. believes that the split did not exist before, People were dragged from their cars and the 1970 war clearly created one. killed based on their identity cards. The Jordanian soldiers of an armored unit told *Colonel (US Army retired) Norvell De me they pulled down the trousers of Atkine served in artillery units and middle Palestinian prisoners and sat them on the eastern political-military assignments over hot engine compartment of their tanks. a 26 years military career. In addition to There was looting and individual acts of Lebanon and Jordan he was stationed in murder on both sides. In the politically Egypt and traveled extensively throughout correct jargon of Arab politics it became the Middle East as a Foreign Area officer known as “the era of regrettable events.” and in his current position as Director of In my trips back to Jordan over the Middle East Studies at the John F Kennedy years it has been my observation that the Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 4 (December 2002) 81 Norvell De Atkine

Special Warfare Center and School, Ft Bragg N.C.

NOTES 1. Major Perry was most probably killed by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).

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