AMMAN 1970, a MEMOIR by Norvell De Atkine*

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

AMMAN 1970, a MEMOIR by Norvell De Atkine* AMMAN 1970, A MEMOIR By Norvell De Atkine* This is the first in a series of memoirs on the Middle East in the 1960s and 1970s. Norvell de Atkine was one of the first Middle East experts trained by the U.S. military. He attended the American University in Beirut, became a U.S. military attaché in Jordan, and spent many years working in the Arab world. I had just completed my studies at the own counsel, and the Shia Muslims kept American University of Beirut (AUB) in themselves as invisible as possible. In a 1970, as part of the US Army Foreign Area preliminary taste of events to follow there Specialist program, when Major Bob Perry, was also bitter antagonism between assistant U.S. army attaché in Jordan, was Palestinian and East Bank Jordanian murdered by Palestinian gunmen— students probably from the Popular Front for the An attentive student could receive a Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) at his home terrific education at AUB from such in front of his wife and children.(1) I was professors as Hannah Battatu, Zeine N. assigned to replace him. Zeine and my mentor Dr. Joseph Malone. I had already been prepared for the Battatu, a meticulous researcher and revolutionary situation I would encounter lecturer, was a Palestinian Marxist who, in Jordan by my three years as a student at despite my disagreement with his ideology, AUB, at the time nicknamed “Guerrilla U”. was a superb and objective lecturer. There were remarkably contradictory Although it did not sit well with the mostly aspects to the experience. On the surface, Arab students, who looked for affirmation the Middle Eastern students were united of their wish for a united Arab world, he around the need for revolutionary change never hesitated to point out that almost and support for the Palestinian cause. every secular ideological movement in the Underneath that surface, however, Arab world was in some way an attempt by conversations demonstrated a student body non-Sunni or non-Arab minorities to attain divided along ethnic lines, with many of a measure of equality with the Sunni Arab the groups despising (or at least distrusting) majority. Why, he asked, were each other. Ironically, the Western students Communists in the Arab world almost were often more pro-Palestinian than the exclusively Christians, Kurds, Jews, non-Palestinian Arab students. Armenians and Shia Muslims? The non-Palestinian Arabs, especially Zeine showed how the forgotten details the Lebanese Sunni seemed to resent the of Middle Eastern history were often the Palestinians for seizing the limelight. The key to understanding the big picture. He Maronite Christians and Greek Catholics also enraged some Arab students with his seethed with resentment. The Greek view that the Arab world had been more Orthodox students appeared obsessed with peaceful and enjoyed better living proving themselves Arabs, too, by their standards under the Ottoman Empire than militant rhetoric. The Armenians tried to during independence. stay out of the fray, the Druze kept their Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 4 (December, 2002) 75 Norvell De Atkine Nevertheless, Beirut was a capital city country into a full-scale war with Israel. for the world’s then highly fashionable Another very different perception a short radical movements. New Left gurus from time later was that of the Lebanese everywhere came to observe and praise the Maronite villagers of Mount Lebanon, Palestinian movement. There were huge who, during a visit by myself with a British photos on the school’s walls of Israeli officer from the Trucial Oman Scouts of soldiers killed at the 1968 Karama battle in the Gulf Emirates, expressed admiration at Jordan. Pictures of the latest Palestinian the Israeli success in destroying 13 martyrs were on posters everywhere on the Lebanese airliners. Their opinions walls of Beirut buildings, replaced by their prompted my incredulous British guest to successors every few days. The most plaintively ask, “Are these people Arabs?” common slogan was the ubiquitous “this Ultimately, the stage was actually being generation shall see the sea,” referring to set for a Lebanese civil war in which the the presumably inevitable elimination of PLO was a major participant. In brief, but Israel and a Palestinian march to the bloody, battles in the south, the Lebanese Mediterranean coast there. forces actually won militarily but Nasser’s Among the fascinating characters pressure led to Beirut’s surrender in the shuttling in and around Beirut in those days 1968 Cairo agreement. The Lebanese was the carefully coiffured Leila Khaled, government agreed to let the PLO operate the world’s only two-time aircraft hijacker, against Israel under certain conditions, a PFLP activist wearing the latest London including a Palestinian agreement that their fashions, speaking in English to an soldiers would not carry weapons in admiring throng of students. Another Lebanese cities. Within a few months, visitor was Tom Hayden, the high priest of however, all the conditions were forgotten the American radical “New Left” making and fedayeen could be seen strolling along the obligatory pilgrimage to a Beirut Beirut’s main streets carrying AK-47s. refugee camp. My favorite character, In December 1967, while on a visit however, was the son of the Egyptian from Lebanon to the Ghor Valley, I ambassador to Lebanon. His father was witnessed first-hand the tinderbox known by everyone as the “high environment existing between Jordan and commissioner” of Lebanon, because, as Israel. Retaliating for a cross- river Gamal Abdel Nasser’s representative, he fedayeen raid, the Israelis strafed a column manipulated the country at will (or was of Jordanian troops killing several and perceived to do so). Nevertheless his son, knocking out an M-88 tank retriever in the who spoke in American slang and middle of the road. Soldiers and civilians associated almost exclusively with pointed toward the sky and talked about American students, spoke of the Arabs as if “American” airplanes, though I tried to they were an alien race. Among others explain they were French-made Mysteres. representing the bewildering and byzantine Since no one seemed ready to pick up the nuances of Arab society and politics was bodies left in the road, myself and a fellow our Christian Palestinian family doctor American officer loaded a couple of them who came early one morning in December, into our small compact car and took them 1968, to visit my wife suffering from to a nearby police station. hepatitis, and in a state of elation related All of this prepared me for my arrival in the details of an Israeli commando attack Amman in late June 1970. The first thing I on Beirut Airport conducted the night saw when the plane landed reflected the before, convinced that it would pull the current situation in that city. There were 76 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 4 (December 2002) Amman 1970, A Memoir two visa control and customs checks: one roadblock and held in a cage for several by Jordanian officials and another by PLO days. representatives. There were indeed two Numerous American-owned governmental authorities coexisting in an automobiles had been stolen by the gangs uneasy, confrontational relationship. Most often linked to Palestinian political groups of Amman and a large slice of northern that did as they pleased in Amman. The Jordan were controlled by various usual technique was to come to the door Palestinian fedayeen factions. Their Toyota and demand the keys to the car. Every trip trucks with machine guns mounted in the to and from the embassy was an anxious back constantly patrolled the streets of the journey. We were constantly stopped at capital. fedayeen checkpoints. Young 14 and 15 While my Jordanian army colleagues year-old members of the Ashbal youth repeatedly told me in the following weeks group manned roadblocks and scrutinized that there was Palestinian-Jordanian our identity cards in a leisurely and antagonism, the officer who was my insolent manner before waving us on. counterpart explained he had to change into Though their weapons were loaded, they civilian clothes to go to his home in the obviously did not know much about how to Ashrafiyah district of Amman to avoid handle them. being harassed, or worse, by youths in his The behavior of the armed fedayeen mostly Palestinian neighborhood. angered the rank and file of the Jordanian Aside from the tumultuous political army and antagonized much of the civilian situation, the U.S. embassy was also in population, including a segment of the chaos. The previous U.S. ambassador, Palestinian residents. The disdain was Harrison Symmes had been declared mutual. Palestinian West Bankers referred persona non grata by King Hussein in May to Jordanian East Bankers as “al-hufa” (the 1970 and the embassy itself was leaderless. barefoot ones), to imply they were This action by the King was taken in vain backward and illiterate. For their part, attempt to placate the increasingly strident Jordanian officers blamed Palestinian demands of the Palestinian militants, much forces for the 1967 defeat and resented the in the same manner as the dismissal of PLO’s claiming the 1968 battle of Karama Glubb Pasha to placate Arab nationalists in as a victory when most of the fighting had 1956. Dependents had already been been done by the regular army. Referring evacuated. With little or no guidance to 1967, the director of Jordanian army coming from the embassy’s senior staff, a operations claimed, “The Palestinians ran few of us devised our own escape and like rabbits.” evasion plan should we be overrun. The Palestinian relationship was Every day there were rumors of the particularly bad with a small but vital part regime’s impending collapse and incessant of the Jordanian military structure, the threats against Americans in the Arab news Circassians and Chechens.
Recommended publications
  • The Origins of Hamas: Militant Legacy Or Israeli Tool?
    THE ORIGINS OF HAMAS: MILITANT LEGACY OR ISRAELI TOOL? JEAN-PIERRE FILIU Since its creation in 1987, Hamas has been at the forefront of armed resistance in the occupied Palestinian territories. While the move- ment itself claims an unbroken militancy in Palestine dating back to 1935, others credit post-1967 maneuvers of Israeli Intelligence for its establishment. This article, in assessing these opposing nar- ratives and offering its own interpretation, delves into the historical foundations of Hamas starting with the establishment in 1946 of the Gaza branch of the Muslim Brotherhood (the mother organization) and ending with its emergence as a distinct entity at the outbreak of the !rst intifada. Particular emphasis is given to the Brotherhood’s pre-1987 record of militancy in the Strip, and on the complicated and intertwining relationship between the Brotherhood and Fatah. HAMAS,1 FOUNDED IN the Gaza Strip in December 1987, has been the sub- ject of numerous studies, articles, and analyses,2 particularly since its victory in the Palestinian legislative elections of January 2006 and its takeover of Gaza in June 2007. Yet despite this, little academic atten- tion has been paid to the historical foundations of the movement, which grew out of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Gaza branch established in 1946. Meanwhile, two contradictory interpretations of the movement’s origins are in wide circulation. The !rst portrays Hamas as heir to a militant lineage, rigorously inde- pendent of all Arab regimes, including Egypt, and harking back to ‘Izz al-Din al-Qassam,3 a Syrian cleric killed in 1935 while !ghting the British in Palestine.
    [Show full text]
  • The Foreign Policy of the Arab Gulf Monarchies from 1971 to 1990
    The Foreign Policy of the Arab Gulf Monarchies from 1971 to 1990 Submitted by René Rieger to the University of Exeter as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Middle East Politics in June 2013 This thesis is available for Library use on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement. I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for the award of a degree by this or any other University. Signature: ………… ………… 2 ABSTRACT This dissertation provides a comparative analysis of the foreign policies of the Arab Gulf monarchies during the period of 1971 to 1990, as examined through two case studies: (1) the Arab Gulf monarchies’ relations with Iran and Iraq and (2) the six states’ positions in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The dissertation argues that, in formulating their policies towards Iran and Iraq, the Arab Gulf monarchies aspired to realize four main objectives: external security and territorial integrity; domestic and regime stability; economic prosperity; and the attainment of a stable subregional balance of power without the emergence of Iran or Iraq as Gulf hegemon. Over the largest part of the period under review, the Arab Gulf monarchies managed to offset threats to these basic interests emanating from Iran and Iraq by alternately appeasing and balancing the source of the threat. The analysis reveals that the Arab Gulf monarchies’ individual bilateral relations with Iran and Iraq underwent considerable change over time and, particularly following the Iranian Revolution, displayed significant differences in comparison to one another.
    [Show full text]
  • Palestinian Forces
    Center for Strategic and International Studies Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy 1800 K Street, N.W. • Suite 400 • Washington, DC 20006 Phone: 1 (202) 775 -3270 • Fax : 1 (202) 457 -8746 Email: [email protected] Palestinian Forces Palestinian Authority and Militant Forces Anthony H. Cordesman Center for Strategic and International Studies [email protected] Rough Working Draft: Revised February 9, 2006 Copyright, Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. May not be reproduced, referenced, quote d, or excerpted without the written permission of the author. Cordesman: Palestinian Forces 2/9/06 Page 2 ROUGH WORKING DRAFT: REVISED FEBRUARY 9, 2006 ................................ ................................ ............ 1 THE MILITARY FORCES OF PALESTINE ................................ ................................ ................................ .......... 2 THE OSLO ACCORDS AND THE NEW ISRAELI -PALESTINIAN WAR ................................ ................................ .............. 3 THE DEATH OF ARAFAT AND THE VICTORY OF HAMAS : REDEFINING PALESTINIAN POLITICS AND THE ARAB - ISRAELI MILITARY BALANCE ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 4 THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY FORC ES ................................ ................................ .......... 5 Palestinian Authority Forces During the Peace Process ................................ ................................ ..................... 6 The
    [Show full text]
  • Israel, Palestine, and the Olso Accords
    Fordham International Law Journal Volume 23, Issue 1 1999 Article 4 Israel, Palestine, and the Olso Accords JillAllison Weiner∗ ∗ Copyright c 1999 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berke- ley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj Israel, Palestine, and the Olso Accords JillAllison Weiner Abstract This Comment addresses the Middle East peace process, focusing upon the relationship be- tween Israel and Palestine. Part I discusses the background of the land that today comprises the State of Israel and its territories. This Part summarizes the various accords and peace treaties signed by Israel, the Palestinians, and the other surrounding Arab Nations. Part II reviews com- mentary regarding peace in the Middle East by those who believe Israel needs to surrender more land and by those who feel that Palestine already has received too much. Part II examines the conflict over the permanent status negotiations, such as the status of the territories. Part III argues that all the parties need to abide by the conditions and goals set forth in the Oslo Accords before they can realistically begin the permanent status negotiations. Finally, this Comment concludes that in order to achieve peace, both sides will need to compromise, with Israel allowing an inde- pendent Palestinian State and Palestine amending its charter and ending the call for the destruction of Israel, though the circumstances do not bode well for peace in the Middle East. ISRAEL, PALESTINE, AND THE OSLO ACCORDS fillAllison Weiner* INTRODUCTION Israel's' history has always been marked by a juxtaposition between two peoples-the Israelis and the Palestinians 2-each believing that the land is rightfully theirs according to their reli- gion' and history.4 In 1897, Theodore Herzl5 wrote DerJeden- * J.D.
    [Show full text]
  • Using a Civil Suit to Punish/Deter Sponsors of Terrorism: Connecting Arafat & the PLO to the Terror Attacks in the Second In
    Digital Commons at St. Mary's University Faculty Articles School of Law Faculty Scholarship 2014 Using a Civil Suit to Punish/Deter Sponsors of Terrorism: Connecting Arafat & the PLO to the Terror Attacks in the Second Intifada Jeffrey F. Addicott St. Mary's University School of Law, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/facarticles Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Jeffrey F. Addicott, Using a Civil Suit to Punish/Deter Sponsors of Terrorism: Connecting Arafat & the PLO to the Terror Attacks in the Second Intifada, 4 St. John’s J. Int’l & Comp. L. 71 (2014). This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons at St. Mary's University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Articles by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons at St. Mary's University. For more information, please contact [email protected]. USING A CIVIL SUIT TO PUNISH/DETER SPONSORS OF TERRORISM: CONNECTING ARAFAT & THE PLO TO THE TERROR ATTACKS IN THE SECOND INTIFADA Dr. Jeffery Addicott* INTRODUCTION “All that is necessary for evil to triumph is for good men to do nothing.”1 -Edmund Burke As the so-called “War on Terror” 2 continues, it is imperative that civilized nations employ every possible avenue under the rule of law to punish and deter those governments and States that choose to engage in or provide support to terrorism.3 *∗Professor of Law and Director, Center for Terrorism Law, St. Mary’s University School of Law.
    [Show full text]
  • Inconsistent U.S. Representation in Saudi Arabia: a Continuing Problem | the Washington Institute
    MENU Policy Analysis / PolicyWatch 789 Inconsistent U.S. Representation in Saudi Arabia: A Continuing Problem by Simon Henderson Oct 2, 2003 ABOUT THE AUTHORS Simon Henderson Simon Henderson is the Baker fellow and director of the Bernstein Program on Gulf and Energy Policy at The Washington Institute, specializing in energy matters and the conservative Arab states of the Persian Gulf. Brief Analysis he surprise announcement that Robert Jordan, U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia, will leave his post by mid- T October means that Washington will lack an authoritative voice in the kingdom at a crucial time in the war on terror. One State Department official has claimed that Jordan's resignation was for personal reasons and that "Saudi Arabia holds him in the highest regard." Yet, other reports suggest that Jordan's public and semipublic criticisms of the kingdom have annoyed Riyadh. Controversial Remarks In the months since May 12, 2003, when ten Americans were killed in attacks against three expatriate residential compounds in Riyadh, several of Ambassador Jordan's comments have created a stir. Analysts are accustomed to U.S. officials employing a cautious and laudatory approach when publicly describing relations with Saudi Arabia. Hence, many were astonished when, during an interview with CBS News soon after the Riyadh attacks, Jordan stated that Washington's previous requests for increased security at the compounds had been ignored. He made similar comments to the New York Times a day later, this time singling out Crown Prince Abdullah and Saudi foreign minister Prince Saud al-Faisal for praise. By implication, Jordan was pointing the blame in the direction of Interior Minister Prince Nayef, who is in charge of internal security and has a reputation for being difficult.
    [Show full text]
  • The Legal Exclusion of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon
    The Legal Exclusion of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon Janine Nassar RESEARCH QUESTION INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION GAP Why has the Lebanese government Palestinian refugees occupy a unique not improved the legal rights and status internationally protections of Palestinian refugees v since their entry into the country in Are the only refugee group that falls under the auspices of UNRWA 1948? vAre not protected by the 1951 Refugee Convention Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are Figure 1. Cartoon depicting a man being vUNRWA’s chronic financial crisis Figure 2. Photo of the Shatila Refugee Camp, unique: crushed by the word “displaced” published in affects vulnerable Palestinians who taken by Mohammed Asad, 2012 v Three-generations worth reside in Tele Liban rely entirely on its services refugee camps v Lack legal status and social, political, CONCLUSIONS and economic rights FROM SYMPATHY TO SCAPEGOATS DOMESTIC LAW & HUMAN RIGHTS v Their plight is neglected due to the v What was once the Palestinian influx of Syrian refugees cause evolved into the PRE-CIVIL WAR ERA Domestic mistreatment is a Palestinian problem vGovernment & citizens welcomed byproduct of the international LITERATURE REVIEW refugees protection gap v Solutions include increasing vAffluent Palestinians were naturalized donor funding for UNRWA Daniel Meier & Nur Masalha and contributed socially, economically v Palestinians are barred from buying and alleviating restrictions on vThe state weaponizes tawteen & culturally or transferring property, working in employment opportunities
    [Show full text]
  • Transcript Prepared from a Tape Recording.]
    1 THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION SABAN CENTER FOR MIDDLE EAST POLICY TOWARD A NEW IRAN POLICY A SABAN CENTER SYMPOSIUM Tuesday, November 23, 2004 The Brookings Institution 1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. MILLER REPORTING CO., INC. 735 8th STREET, S.E. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20003-2802 (202) 546-6666 2 [TRANSCRIPT PREPARED FROM A TAPE RECORDING.] MILLER REPORTING CO., INC. 735 8th STREET, S.E. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20003-2802 (202) 546-6666 3 A G E N D A Introductory Remarks Martin Indyk, Saban Center at the Brookings Institution Opening Address "U.S. Policy Toward Iran in a Second Bush Administration" Danielle Pletka, American Enterprise Institute Panel 1: Iran's Foreign Policy and Motives Moderator: Shaul Bakhash, Saban Center at the Brookings Institution Ray Takeyh, Council on Foreign Relations M. Hadi Semati, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Panel 2: The Lay of the Land: The Threat from Iran and the International Perspective Moderator: Martin Indyk, Saban Center at the Brookings Institution Daniel Byman, Saban Center at the Brookings Institution David Kay, former head of the Iraq Survey Group Philip Gordon, The Brookings Institution Lunch Address "An Alternative Approach to Iran" Ken Pollack, Saban Center at the Brookings Institution MILLER REPORTING CO., INC. 735 8th STREET, S.E. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20003-2802 (202) 546-6666 4 P R O C E E D I N G S INTRODUCTORY REMARKS MR. INDYK: Welcome to the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution and to the symposium that we are hosting today entitled "Towards a New Iran Policy." We've gathered a group of experts on Iran and on U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Lebanon's Palestinian Refugee Camps
    NURTURING INSTABILITY: LEBANON’S PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMPS Middle East Report N°84 – 19 February 2009 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION: THE PALESTINIAN PRESENCE IN LEBANON ..................... 1 A. MULTIPLICITY OF ACTORS AND CAMPS ........................................................................................1 1. Main political actors.................................................................................................................1 2. Palestinian refugees and camps ................................................................................................1 II. THE EVOLUTION OF LEBANESE-PALESTINIAN RELATIONS......................... 4 A. OPEN WARFARE (1969-1990).......................................................................................................4 B. THE POST-WAR YEARS (1990-2004).............................................................................................6 C. 2004-2005: TURNING POINT OR DEAD END? ................................................................................7 1. UNSCR 1559...........................................................................................................................7 2. The Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee........................................................................9 3. Nahr al-Bared: a difficult test case..........................................................................................11 D. THE REFUGEES’ PRECARIOUS
    [Show full text]
  • Library of Congress
    Library of Congress Interview with Brooks Wrampelmeier The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project BROOKS WRAMPELMEIER Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy Initial interview date: March 22, 2000 Copyright 2004 ADST Q: Today is March 22, 2000. This is an interview with Brooks Wrampelmeier being done on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and I am Charles Stuart Kennedy. Brooks, can we start at the beginning. When and where were you born? WRAMPELMEIER: I was born in Cincinnati, Ohio on September 27, 1934. Q: Can you tell me a little about your family? WRAMPELMEIER: My father's family was of partly German descent. His grandfather had come over in 1848 and settled in Cincinnati. His mother's family was of Irish and New England stock. My mother's family was primarily of New England, New York City, and Kentucky origins. They had come to Cincinnati in the mid-19th century. Q: Hence the Brooks. WRAMPELMEIER: Yes, my mother's maiden name is Brooks. In fact, her Grandfather Brooks had come to Cincinnati from Kentucky. My father was a third-generation painting contractor. He owned a business founded by his grandfather back in the early 1850s. My mother's father was a naval officer, a 1902 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, who Interview with Brooks Wrampelmeier http://www.loc.gov/item/mfdipbib001488 Library of Congress then left the Navy to marry his childhood sweetheart in 1907. They settled in the little suburb of Cincinnati called Wyoming where they were born. My parents lived a few years in Cincinnati and when I was three they also moved to Wyoming.
    [Show full text]
  • Intelligence Report FEE5
    DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Intelligence Report ESAU L: THE FEDAYEEN (Annex to ESAU XLVIII: Fedayeen-- “Men of Sacrifice’y 1 NO 5 FEE5 . WARNING It is to be seen only by perso indoctrinated and authorized to receive// information within the Government to which#hsmitted; its security mwbe maintained in ac- cordance with1 1 \ I I egardless of the advantage d by the Director of Cen .. I A NOTE ON SOURCES This paper relies primarily on clandestine reporting, particularly for the internal structure and operations of the various fedayeen organizations. I The repostlng 1s quite guoa on poiiticdi as-wf the subject such as the maneuverings of the fedayeen groups, their internal disputes, and their ideological and tactical views. However, our information is more scanty on such important matters as the number of i armed men in each group, the sources and mechanics of funding, and details of the sources and methods of delivery of arms shipments to the fedayeen. I H TABLE OF CONTENTS Page FATAH AND THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) Fatah -- Background to February 1969, (I 1: 1 PLO -- Background to February 1969 c. 8 Fatah Takeover of PLO -- February 1969, ~ LI ,11 Fatah Attempts to Control the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) ~ , 15 Fatah Retains Its Identity, .20 Fatah Tactics and Operations, .24 Fatah Funding s 0 0 3 0 0 ' (I c 0 0 G 0 D 0 0 .26 THE A3IAB NATIONALIST MOVEMENT (ANMI AND ITS FEDAYEEN WINGS ANMo 0 f 0 0 c 0 0 0 c. 0 0 0 0 J li 0 9.0 c c .30 Background on the ANM's Fedayeen Wings, .32 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP 1 0 C U C 3 0 0 0 G u 0 u (I c c 35 Organization c 0 0 0 0 c 0 0 0 c c 0 3 c 38 Funding, 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 c 0 0 0 0 0 c p 0 42 Popular Democratic Front for Liberatlon of Palestine (PDFLP) Strategy ., .44 Organization ,, .45 Funding, .48 PFLP General Command, , .51 1- I 1- (Contents Con t) .
    [Show full text]
  • Boundaries and Political Agency of Palestinian Refugee Camps in Lebanon Zeinab Amiri Iowa State University
    Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Graduate Theses and Dissertations Dissertations 2016 Boundaries and political agency of Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon Zeinab Amiri Iowa State University Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/etd Part of the Architecture Commons, Islamic World and Near East History Commons, Near and Middle Eastern Studies Commons, and the Near Eastern Languages and Societies Commons Recommended Citation Amiri, Zeinab, "Boundaries and political agency of Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon" (2016). Graduate Theses and Dissertations. 15655. https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/etd/15655 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Boundaries and political agency of Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon by Zeinab Amiri A thesis submitted to the graduate faculty in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE Major: Architecture Program of Study Committee: Marwan Ghandour, Major Professor Ross Exo Adams Nell Gabiam Iowa State University Ames, Iowa 2016 Copyright © Zeinab Amiri, 2016. All rights reserved. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ......................................................................................................
    [Show full text]