No. 257 Strategic Forum June 2010 Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University http://www.ndu.edu/inss Somalia’s Endless Transition: Breaking the Deadlock by Andre Le Sage the TFG to engage in political deal-making that craft political cooperation deals with the Key Points co-opts key subclans and elite actors, and lays regional administration in Puntland (north- the groundwork for effective security operations east Somalia) and other militias opposed to at a later stage. Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government the insurgency. (TFG) was given a second lease on life in Nonetheless, most of these efforts remain January 2009, after successful peace negotia- Government Performance on the drawing board and will do little to tions in Djibouti produced new TFG leadership extend the TFG’s political base of support or and yielded substantial international backing. In January 2009, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh area of territorial control. The TFG still does However, the TFG remains weak and has yet Ahmed succeeded Abdullahi Yusuf as pres- not have a functioning, cross-clan military to develop new political alliances or military ident of Somalia’s Transitional Federal force, let alone a capable police force or capabilities that provide traction against Government (TFG). Sheikh Sharif took office judicial system, despite continued foreign Islamist insurgent groups. The insurgents following the conclusion of United Nations efforts to train and equip Somali forces.2 themselves—including al Shabab and Hizbul (UN)–brokered peace negotiations in Djibouti Poor command-and-control systems, lim- Islamia—are also weak and internally divided. between a warlord-dominated TFG and mod- ited pay, internal clan divisions, and a lack Local and international efforts to end erate opposition forces that led the Union of willingness to fight continue to hamper the ongoing stalemate in Somalia have been of Islamic Courts (UIC) in 2006. It was TFG as a unified force. Furthermore, no civil frustrated, resulting in diverging strategic hoped that Sheikh Sharif would move for- service currently exists, and essential social prescriptions for the way ahead. On the one ward with the long list of transitional tasks services are not being provided by the TFG. hand, the TFG has proposed a military offensive required to establish a permanent govern- The parliament is able to achieve quorum but to gain control over a larger swath of Mogadi- ment for the country and extend control over meets infrequently, and many members have shu. On the other hand, the inability of foreign areas seized by al Shabab.1 To his credit, left Mogadishu for security reasons. In fact, military and governance support to advance the transition have led some analysts to argue Sheikh Sharif’s appointment led to the with- the very survival of the TFG depends on the for a strategy of “constructive disengagement.” drawal of Ethiopian forces from the coun- continued presence of peacekeepers from the 3 A detailed assessment of the current situation try, and eliminated al Shabab’s ability to African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). reveals opportunities for the TFG and its inter- use Ethiopian occupation as a rallying cry. In addition, the TFG is a divided national supporters to drive additional wedges TFG supporters also point to ongoing efforts institution. Sheikh Sharif has not emerged between the insurgent groups, degrade their ca- to reinvigorate the constitutional process, as a strong leader, and much of the power pabilities, and extend TFG control in Mogadishu draft a citizenship law, make senior-level in Mogadishu is wielded by his subordinates, and other parts of south-central Somalia. Rather appointments in a revived judicial system, including the new Speaker of Parliament than disengaging or rushing toward military establish an independent central bank, utilize Sharif Hassan, Minister of Interior action, this requires international pressure on port revenues for public service delivery, and Abdulkadir Ali Omar, and Minister of State No. 257, June 2010 Strategic Forum 1 for Defense Indha Adde, in their discrete dangerous tendency to treat them as singular, clan. Despite his vociferous jihadi rheto- areas of operation. These and other TFG monolithic actors. ric, Robow’s governance agenda appears less officials operate independently in a manner Hizbul Islamia has always been an extreme than that of his al Shabab coun- reminiscent of clan-based warlords in years amalgam of four different movements, terparts. In fact, tensions have been high past. Squabbling between factions of the TFG including the Alliance for the Re-liberation between Robow and other al Shabab com- has brought transitional efforts to a stand- of Somalia (ARS)–Eritrea faction led by manders for some time.14 He came into still.4 The TFG also has a remarkably weak Hassan Dahir Aweis, the Somalia Islamic conflict with Godane, particularly after the clan base of support. The key Hawiye sub- Front (SIF) led by Aweis’s military protégés, December 2009 Shamo Hotel bombing, and clans that dominate Mogadishu (including the Ras Kamboni group in Lower Juba, there are rumors that Robow has reached the Abgal, Habr Geidr, and Murosade) are and the very small Anole faction led by out to the TFG as a potential first step away all split internally between those that sup- Darod:Harti clan interests in Lower Juba.9 from al Shabab. However, in the absence of port the TFG, those that support the insur- Aweis and the SIF have been marginalized a formal split with Godane and others in al gency, and those (probably the majority) that by al Shabab’s advances in southern Shabab, Robow has maintained his extremist are hedging their bets between the two and Somalia, the rise of ASWJ, and support credentials by allowing foreign fighter attempting to survive.5 for the TFG among many Habr Gedir:Ayr training camps to operate in his area of In the Juba Valley, Darod subclans, pri- leaders. The Ras Kamboni group has come control, appearing in al Shabab propaganda marily the Marehan and Ogadeni, are also under control of more moderate, clan- videos with al Qaeda operatives, and stating split between pro– and anti–al Shabab forces, based leaders—notably Ahmed Madobe and al Shabab’s support for al Qaeda in Yemen.15 with a clan-based struggle for the southern Ibrahim Shukri—since its main Islamist port city of Kismayo taking primacy over TFG- leader, Hassan al-Turki, fell ill. Beyond these insurgent struggles. The southern agricultural divisions, clashes between Ras Kamboni and squabbling between regions of Bay and Bakol are dominated by the al Shabab for control of Kismayo have left factions of the TFG has Rahanweyn clans that have done little to resist Hizbul Islamia so weakened that it no longer control by al Shabab. In central Somalia, a appears to function.10 brought transitional series of subclan-based militias and governance The most hardline and ideologi- efforts to a standstill initiatives have emerged, many using the name cally motivated al Shabab militias remain Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a (ASWJ).6 However, they those run by Ahmed Abdi Godane and have not thrown their full weight behind the Fu’ad Shongole around Mogadishu, and Al Shabab’s rank-and-file militia and TFG despite recent political agreements between Ibrahim Haji Jama “al-Afghani” around local clan partners evince even less loyalty the groups. Finally, the Isaq of the north- Kismayo.11 These individuals are seen as to the group’s overall cause. Many of these west and Darod:Majerteen of the northeast are the primary leaders of al Shabab’s foreign join al Shabab for parochial reasons and focused respectively on the internal political fighters (including the suicide bombers), the are not otherwise supportive of its radical competition for control of the Somaliland and strategists favoring al Shabab support for Salafist ideology. Some clans send militia Puntland governments.7 global jihadi agendas rather than a narrower and money to al Shabab as a political hedge focus on controlling Somalia, and those in uncertain times. Other clans agree to join Status of Insurgent Groups with the deepest ties to the East Africa al al Shabab as a means of gaining short-term Qaeda cell.12 On February 1, these al Shabab primacy in long-running struggles with other Al Shabab and, to a much lesser extent, leaders issued a statement proclaiming their clans for local control. Some individuals Hizbul Islamia control most of southern desire “to connect the Horn of Africa jihad join al Shabab for the financial incentives Somalia. However, these groups are facing to the one led by al Qaeda and its leader it offers ($200 to $300 promised at the time their own challenges, and are not operat- Sheikh Osama bin Laden.”13 However, similar of recruitment), or for offers of food and ing from a position of strength. Both groups statements have been made by al Shabab clothing. Other individuals are simply forced are split internally, and they are increasingly leaders in the past without a corresponding to join al Shabab as they impress youth into competing with one another. Since the death response from al Qaeda’s senior leadership to militia, often accompanied by threats to of Saleh Ali Saleh “Nabhan,” the future cement a merger between the groups. families not to resist.16 of the East Africa al Qaeda cell and its Al Shabab’s leader in the Bay and Bakol Nonetheless, some al Shabab militias relationship with al Shabab are uncertain.8 regions, Mukhtar Robow, has been able remain on the offensive. Al Shabab units Given confusion surrounding the structure to run local affairs from Baidoa without appear responsible for a growing number of and leadership of these groups, there is a substantial resistance from the Rahanweyn recent attacks in Puntland and Somaliland.