No. 257 Strategic Forum June 2010 Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University http://www.ndu.edu/inss
Somalia’s Endless Transition: Breaking the Deadlock by Andre Le Sage
the TFG to engage in political deal-making that craft political cooperation deals with the Key Points co-opts key subclans and elite actors, and lays regional administration in Puntland (north- the groundwork for effective security operations east Somalia) and other militias opposed to at a later stage. Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government the insurgency. (TFG) was given a second lease on life in Nonetheless, most of these efforts remain January 2009, after successful peace negotia- Government Performance on the drawing board and will do little to tions in Djibouti produced new TFG leadership extend the TFG’s political base of support or and yielded substantial international backing. In January 2009, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh area of territorial control. The TFG still does However, the TFG remains weak and has yet Ahmed succeeded Abdullahi Yusuf as pres- not have a functioning, cross-clan military to develop new political alliances or military ident of Somalia’s Transitional Federal force, let alone a capable police force or capabilities that provide traction against Government (TFG). Sheikh Sharif took office judicial system, despite continued foreign Islamist insurgent groups. The insurgents following the conclusion of United Nations efforts to train and equip Somali forces.2 themselves—including al Shabab and Hizbul (UN)–brokered peace negotiations in Djibouti Poor command-and-control systems, lim- Islamia—are also weak and internally divided. between a warlord-dominated TFG and mod- ited pay, internal clan divisions, and a lack Local and international efforts to end erate opposition forces that led the Union of willingness to fight continue to hamper the ongoing stalemate in Somalia have been of Islamic Courts (UIC) in 2006. It was TFG as a unified force. Furthermore, no civil frustrated, resulting in diverging strategic hoped that Sheikh Sharif would move for- service currently exists, and essential social prescriptions for the way ahead. On the one ward with the long list of transitional tasks services are not being provided by the TFG. hand, the TFG has proposed a military offensive required to establish a permanent govern- The parliament is able to achieve quorum but to gain control over a larger swath of Mogadi- ment for the country and extend control over meets infrequently, and many members have shu. On the other hand, the inability of foreign areas seized by al Shabab.1 To his credit, left Mogadishu for security reasons. In fact, military and governance support to advance the transition have led some analysts to argue Sheikh Sharif’s appointment led to the with- the very survival of the TFG depends on the for a strategy of “constructive disengagement.” drawal of Ethiopian forces from the coun- continued presence of peacekeepers from the 3 A detailed assessment of the current situation try, and eliminated al Shabab’s ability to African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). reveals opportunities for the TFG and its inter- use Ethiopian occupation as a rallying cry. In addition, the TFG is a divided national supporters to drive additional wedges TFG supporters also point to ongoing efforts institution. Sheikh Sharif has not emerged between the insurgent groups, degrade their ca- to reinvigorate the constitutional process, as a strong leader, and much of the power pabilities, and extend TFG control in Mogadishu draft a citizenship law, make senior-level in Mogadishu is wielded by his subordinates, and other parts of south-central Somalia. Rather appointments in a revived judicial system, including the new Speaker of Parliament than disengaging or rushing toward military establish an independent central bank, utilize Sharif Hassan, Minister of Interior action, this requires international pressure on port revenues for public service delivery, and Abdulkadir Ali Omar, and Minister of State
No. 257, June 2010 Strategic Forum 1 for Defense Indha Adde, in their discrete dangerous tendency to treat them as singular, clan. Despite his vociferous jihadi rheto- areas of operation. These and other TFG monolithic actors. ric, Robow’s governance agenda appears less officials operate independently in a manner Hizbul Islamia has always been an extreme than that of his al Shabab coun- reminiscent of clan-based warlords in years amalgam of four different movements, terparts. In fact, tensions have been high past. Squabbling between factions of the TFG including the Alliance for the Re-liberation between Robow and other al Shabab com- has brought transitional efforts to a stand- of Somalia (ARS)–Eritrea faction led by manders for some time.14 He came into still.4 The TFG also has a remarkably weak Hassan Dahir Aweis, the Somalia Islamic conflict with Godane, particularly after the clan base of support. The key Hawiye sub- Front (SIF) led by Aweis’s military protégés, December 2009 Shamo Hotel bombing, and clans that dominate Mogadishu (including the Ras Kamboni group in Lower Juba, there are rumors that Robow has reached the Abgal, Habr Geidr, and Murosade) are and the very small Anole faction led by out to the TFG as a potential first step away all split internally between those that sup- Darod:Harti clan interests in Lower Juba.9 from al Shabab. However, in the absence of port the TFG, those that support the insur- Aweis and the SIF have been marginalized a formal split with Godane and others in al gency, and those (probably the majority) that by al Shabab’s advances in southern Shabab, Robow has maintained his extremist are hedging their bets between the two and Somalia, the rise of ASWJ, and support credentials by allowing foreign fighter attempting to survive.5 for the TFG among many Habr Gedir:Ayr training camps to operate in his area of In the Juba Valley, Darod subclans, pri- leaders. The Ras Kamboni group has come control, appearing in al Shabab propaganda marily the Marehan and Ogadeni, are also under control of more moderate, clan- videos with al Qaeda operatives, and stating split between pro– and anti–al Shabab forces, based leaders—notably Ahmed Madobe and al Shabab’s support for al Qaeda in Yemen.15 with a clan-based struggle for the southern Ibrahim Shukri—since its main Islamist port city of Kismayo taking primacy over TFG- leader, Hassan al-Turki, fell ill. Beyond these insurgent struggles. The southern agricultural divisions, clashes between Ras Kamboni and squabbling between regions of Bay and Bakol are dominated by the al Shabab for control of Kismayo have left factions of the TFG has Rahanweyn clans that have done little to resist Hizbul Islamia so weakened that it no longer control by al Shabab. In central Somalia, a appears to function.10 brought transitional series of subclan-based militias and governance The most hardline and ideologi- efforts to a standstill initiatives have emerged, many using the name cally motivated al Shabab militias remain Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a (ASWJ).6 However, they those run by Ahmed Abdi Godane and have not thrown their full weight behind the Fu’ad Shongole around Mogadishu, and Al Shabab’s rank-and-file militia and TFG despite recent political agreements between Ibrahim Haji Jama “al-Afghani” around local clan partners evince even less loyalty the groups. Finally, the Isaq of the north- Kismayo.11 These individuals are seen as to the group’s overall cause. Many of these west and Darod:Majerteen of the northeast are the primary leaders of al Shabab’s foreign join al Shabab for parochial reasons and focused respectively on the internal political fighters (including the suicide bombers), the are not otherwise supportive of its radical competition for control of the Somaliland and strategists favoring al Shabab support for Salafist ideology. Some clans send militia Puntland governments.7 global jihadi agendas rather than a narrower and money to al Shabab as a political hedge focus on controlling Somalia, and those in uncertain times. Other clans agree to join Status of Insurgent Groups with the deepest ties to the East Africa al al Shabab as a means of gaining short-term Qaeda cell.12 On February 1, these al Shabab primacy in long-running struggles with other Al Shabab and, to a much lesser extent, leaders issued a statement proclaiming their clans for local control. Some individuals Hizbul Islamia control most of southern desire “to connect the Horn of Africa jihad join al Shabab for the financial incentives Somalia. However, these groups are facing to the one led by al Qaeda and its leader it offers ($200 to $300 promised at the time their own challenges, and are not operat- Sheikh Osama bin Laden.”13 However, similar of recruitment), or for offers of food and ing from a position of strength. Both groups statements have been made by al Shabab clothing. Other individuals are simply forced are split internally, and they are increasingly leaders in the past without a corresponding to join al Shabab as they impress youth into competing with one another. Since the death response from al Qaeda’s senior leadership to militia, often accompanied by threats to of Saleh Ali Saleh “Nabhan,” the future cement a merger between the groups. families not to resist.16 of the East Africa al Qaeda cell and its Al Shabab’s leader in the Bay and Bakol Nonetheless, some al Shabab militias relationship with al Shabab are uncertain.8 regions, Mukhtar Robow, has been able remain on the offensive. Al Shabab units Given confusion surrounding the structure to run local affairs from Baidoa without appear responsible for a growing number of and leadership of these groups, there is a substantial resistance from the Rahanweyn recent attacks in Puntland and Somaliland. Both regional administrations are facing governance crises—due to postponed Dr. Andre Le Sage is a Senior Research Fellow for Africa in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at elections in Somaliland, and increasingly the National Defense University. Comments or questions may be addressed to [email protected]. authoritarian rule in Puntland—and al
2 Strategic Forum No. 257, June 2010 Shabab appears to be capitalizing on these to Somalia extend its operational reach.17 Backlash Against Al Shabab YEMEN Somali public support for al Shabab and Hizbul Islamia has dwindled rapidly. In fact, the group’s political ascent was never due to mass public support for its violent, extremist SOMALIA ideology. Until the rise of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in 2006, al Shabab was a small, DJIBOUTI GULF OF ADEN clandestine group engaged in destabilization Djibouti Bosaaso activities against warlords and the TFG, and they provided protection for the East Africa Erigavo BARI al Qaeda cell. Its fortunes changed because AWDAL Berbera SANAAG of al Shabab’s participation as the most Gardo effective security force of the very popular ICU Borama phenomenon, the group’s leading role against Burao Dire Dawa Ethiopian forces after the ICU fell, and its Hargeisa SOOL TOGDHEER subsequent political/military prowess against NUGAL Las Anod Garowe the remarkably weak TFG and clan-based forces in southern Somalia.18 Since late 2007, al Shabab has attempted to gain legitimacy by “liberating” villages MUDUG from nominal TFG control, punishing criminals who proliferated after the ICU ETHIOPIA Galkayo fell, holding reconciliation ceremonies among local clans, and turning control over to local groups under the guise of SOMALIA Islamic governance. Yet where al Shabab has Galgudud attempted to govern the territory it controls, local discomfort has become evident. There Beled Weyn are a number of different elements at work in Shabelle River Doolow the public backlash. Somalis chafe against al BAKOL Shabab’s draconian vice laws (for instance, HIRAN prohibitions against playing or watching Mandera Luuq football or listening to music) and hudud MIDDLE Baidoa INDIAN corporal punishments (including conducting El Waq Jowhar SHABELLE GEDO OCEAN amputations on thieves or stoning adulterers). Jubba River Balad BAY El Ma’an port Attacks by al Shabab, particularly the Afgoye Bardhere December 3, 2009, bombing of the Benadir Mogadishu LOWER University graduation ceremony at the Shamo SHABELLE Merka
Hotel, are seen as atrocities committed against MIDDLE the best and brightest youth in Somali society. JUBA Furthermore, al Shabab has disrupted Jilib LOWER international boundaries or forced the closure of international Dabaab JUBA regional boundaries humanitarian efforts, including limiting city/town UN and nongovernmental organization Kismayo presence resulting in the suspension of food Somaliland aid. The group has promoted nonlocal clan Puntland influences and leaders in southern Somalia; KENYA 150 miles Disputed area this includes the dominance of northern Ras Kamboni 250 km Somalis from the Isaq clan, including
No. 257, June 2010 Strategic Forum 3 Godane and al-Afghani in Hawiye areas of own strength, and more a function of the cal, military, or economic circumstances to Mogadishu and Darod areas of Kismayo, weakness of its opponents at the TFG, clan, fight with either the TFG or the insurgency respectively. Finally, al Shabab–led attacks and communal level. Overall, if the TFG is once the offensive begins. Without under- against Sufist shrines and religious leaders to succeed, al Shabab’s slow advance must standing and working to leverage the interests and the group’s Salafist interpretations be checked by a countermobilization that and capabilities of these nonaligned forces— of Islam are viewed as the product of an provides Somalis with an alternative for including subclan and business militia— unwelcome influence by foreigners.19 which they will truly fight. This requires there is a real danger that military planners Despite this growing backlash, the further efforts by the TFG and its potential are not taking into account all forces that will Somali public remains politically weak Somali partners to create a unifying political potentially be involved in the conflict. and fragmented, and al Shabab maintains vision and practical governance agenda, enter Third, there is a danger that building a monopoly on the means of violence in into negotiations to establish a network of key a strong TFG military capability will drive areas under its control. Moreover, Somali clan-based constituents, and show signs of nonaligned groups (clans, subclans, and key civil society groups have been intimidated success in order to mobilize public support. elites with their own militias) into a defen- by insurgent assassinations and remain Unfortunately, the TFG—with sup- sive posture that opposes TFG and interna- disenchanted with the TFG. As a result, their port from AMISOM and international part- tional interests. It is common Somali practice role in mobilizing the public against al ners, including the United States—has opted for such groups to band together across clan Shabab remains limited. In addition, neither to put a military campaign ahead of political and ideological divides to “strategically bal- the TFG nor the international aid community action. The TFG has publicly stated its intent ance” against any new military initiative has effectively utilized Somali anger over to organize a military offensive in Mogadishu of which they are not a part. After several either al Shabab’s recent atrocities or the within the coming months, most likely with decades of colonialism, military dictator- group’s role in denying relief assistance to the support of AMISOM forces.21 Furthermore, ship, and civil war, the main Somali experi- Somalis as a means of further delegitimizing Kenya is widely reported to be planning ence with any state has been predatory and the insurgents. an anti–al Shabab offensive into the Juba A number of new forces have emerged regions of southern Somalia, targeting the over the past year to counter al Shabab capture of Kismayo.22 There is serious and there is a danger that influence in southern and central Somalia. growing concern that these offensives are building a strong TFG Most notably, this includes multiple clan- unlikely to succeed. based ASWJ groups operating in Galgadud, First, given the TFG’s military weak- military capability will Hiran, and Gedo.20 There are also reports ness and divisions between subclans, it risks drive nonaligned groups of new groups emerging, including the engaging in a battle that, if unsuccessful, into a defensive posture “Galmudug” initiative linked to the Habr will cost the TFG the international and local that opposes TFG and Gedir:Saad subclan and the “Himan and confidence it has been able to retain thus Heeb” initiative of the Suleiman subclan. far. In Mogadishu, the insurgents are aware international interests There is also potential for the Ras Kamboni of TFG plans and are likely reinforcing their group under Ahmed Madobe and Ibrahim positions in the city with a focus on thwarting Shukri to defect from the insurgency into a AMISOM’s armored vehicle capabilities.23 negative. Building a strong TFG force that is position that is not a political challenge and The Juba offensive may actually drive more not widely negotiated and representative from that may end up supporting the TFG. These clans into the arms of al Shabab, including the start may foment more opposition to the are all positive developments, but they remain promoting an alliance of Marehan militia TFG. At the extreme, groups that currently fragile and local political ambitions over- with al Shabab to defend Kismayo against are nonaligned could join with elements of lap. There is serious potential for each to fall Ogadeni control. the insurgency. into the trap of “warlordism” and clan-based Second, it is unclear if the TFG, even Fourth, al Shabab and Hizbul Islamia competition for control of key locations and with AMISOM support, has sufficient forces are unlikely to confront TFG and AMISOM resources, which would further complicate to engage the insurgents effectively. Focusing forces in a toe-to-toe struggle to hold ground the quest for stability in central Somalia. on the current disposition of forces between in Mogadishu. Rather, the insurgents are the TFG and al Shabab is entirely misleading. likely to mount a limited resistance, but tem- A Military Solution? The TFG and al Shabab may each be able to porarily disperse their forces. Then, if the mobilize several thousand men under arms. TFG attempts to hold the territory it has While al Shabab appears to have the However, this represents only a percentage of seized, al Shabab and Hizbul Islamia will upper hand in Somalia today, both the TFG the number of armed militia in Mogadishu, be able to harass it with more hit-and-run and the insurgent forces are facing enormous let alone south-central Somalia. These other attacks, leading to a period of prolonged skir- challenges. To date, al Shabab’s success in militia can be considered “nonaligned” forces mishes rather than stronger TFG control (let southern Somalia is less an indicator of its at the moment, but may be forced by politi- alone governance) of the contested areas.
4 Strategic Forum No. 257, June 2010 Nonetheless, AMISOM, the United States, to develop a strategy in Somalia that goes and Hizbul Islamia are relatively weak and and European partners have tacitly supported beyond support for the TFG and conditions unpopular in Somalia today, even if they the TFG’s plans for military action, possi- political and military aid to Sheikh Sharif control more territory than the TFG. They bly out of frustration with the inability of the on his ability to build political alliances that are also spread thinly across the south of the TFG to gain momentum against al Shabab will translate successfully into security gains. country. With effective negotiations, it would through political negotiations or the provi- Negotiations, even with insurgent lead- be possible to forge a common platform for sion of good governance, social services, and ers, and diplomatic support from Arab and the TFG to cooperate with local actors to public security. Despite speculation that the African partners alike may be useful in this combat the insurgency. United States is preparing for its own military regard. On the other hand, in security terms, intervention in Somalia, U.S. officials have the call for constructive disengagement is Leading with clearly stated that they are only providing problematic. Foremost, this concept does not Negotiations military training, equipment, and funding address how the United States or neighboring to the TFG.24 However, in the absence of overt African countries will protect their national To build an effective political coalition countervailing pressure to emphasize negoti- security interests in Somalia. Adopting a that would increase the chances of eventual ations to build a stronger political base before wait-and-see approach in which al Shabab military success, the TFG needs to dramati- resorting to force, this amounts to interna- might collapse under its own weight due to cally improve its outreach to key Somali sub- tional approval and indirect support for the the challenges of governance in a clan-based clans and clan-based elites who are either TFG’s military course of action. system and its own internal leadership rival- supporting or acquiescing to the insurgency. ries is not sufficient. The group, along with If the TFG is not to follow the example of “Constructive the East Africa al Qaeda cell, already has its predecessor, the Transitional National Disengagement” substantial space to operate in Somalia and Government, in a slow slide to oblivion, this to plan for attacks on Somali, other African, requires the use of political and economic The ongoing stalemate in Somalia and Western interests. Moreover, al Shabab inducements, as well as the threat of military has led some analysts to call for the United has enough funds and savvy leaders that it sanctions, to win new supporters, expand the States and its partners to adopt a more radi- may be able to harness a sufficient coalition TFG’s base of support, and enable it to extend cal strategy called “constructive disengage- in the absence of the TFG to again solidify influence into new areas. ment.” According to a recent report published control over southern Somalia. Many different negotiation mechanisms by the Council on Foreign Relations, this Even if a constructive disengagement are available to Sheikh Sharif in his current would be “a modified containment strategy” approach is adopted, the United States, position, including both carrots and sticks. that includes limited and precise U.S. mili- European countries, and concerned African The carrots include the allocation of cabinet- tary strikes against al Qaeda operatives in neighbors would still need to be involved in level posts in government and public-private Somalia; tolerance of and dialogue with al Somali affairs to build effective liaison rela- sector partnerships to cooperatively manage Shabab if that group rejects al Qaeda’s jihadi tionships to disrupt al Shabab and al Qaeda. port revenues, introduce new currency, and agenda, refrains from regional aggression, The existence of the TFG today provides a share out postconflict reconstruction con- and allows foreign aid to flow; diplomatic political framework for such engagement tracts. Potential sticks would include threats engagement with Arab partners to support under the auspices of advancing the Djibouti negotiations and with Ethiopia to limit its peace process, and foreign partners will not support for Somali militias; and further sup- be accused by the Somali public of directly continued support for port for development and governance capac- supporting unpopular warlords—a situa- the TFG should not 25 ity-building efforts. tion that helped bring al Shabab to the fore. preclude engagement On the one hand, this strategy is To this extent, the transitional process and its grounded in a politically realistic assessment institutional structure—although not neces- with other anti-insurgency of trends in Somalia, and many of its com- sarily the individuals who currently hold seats and peacebuilding ponents should be taken seriously. Foremost, in the TFG—need to be protected. constituencies in it recognizes the weakness of the TFG and its Continued support for the TFG should the country inability to absorb foreign assistance to build not preclude engagement with other anti- its capacity at this time. As stated above, the insurgency and peacebuilding constituen- TFG remains deeply divided between compet- cies in the country. A robust approach to to target “spoilers” of peace efforts and sup- ing leaders. It also provides no real support countering the insurgency would see the porters of the insurgency with UN-backed to the Somali population at this stage, and United States and others simultaneously financial and travel sanctions against key remains ill prepared militarily to seize and undertaking dialogue with the TFG, ASWJ, actors, not to mention the potential for legal sustain control over territory from insurgent and other political, military, and economic sanctions or targeted military operations.26 and clan militias. Hence, it is reasonable actors throughout the country. Al Shabab Such “wheeling and dealing” may not be
No. 257, June 2010 Strategic Forum 5 appetizing to would-be peacebuilders, but is on the future political dispensation in each and others to ensure that their ongoing sup- common in the Somali context. The point is region. Without a resolution of the immediate port for ASWJ and other Somali forces opposed to address how the material benefits of such problems in northern Somalia, al Shabab will to al Shabab falls in line with a broader, more deals are spread around in a strategic man- have an increasingly open field to penetrate coherent political agenda to build the support ner that can co-opt key subclans and elite Somaliland and Puntland, destabilize base of the TFG and ultimately transform the interests that are required to extend the TFG’s their security situation, ally with existing security sector in a strategic manner. base of support and undermine that base for opposition forces, and provide leadership to the insurgency. the disenfranchised. For instance, in North Mogadishu, the If Somalia’s Transitional Federal TFG would need to focus on key leaders Strategic Security Government is too fragmented to under- within the Abgal:Harti community. Those Planning take such negotiations and strategic plan- connected with El Ma’an port (including ning, international partners—particularly Abukar Omar Adane and Abdulkadir Enow) Once the TFG has established a suffi- the United States and European allies— are key power brokers with vested property cient base of political support, additional mil- need to resist the TFG’s impulse to seek a and business interests that they feel are itary support will be required. However, rather military solution without sufficient polit- threatened by the TFG. Their current support than focusing strictly on a short-term offen- ical preparations. They should increase for insurgents may be primarily driven by sive, it should be premised on longer term pressure on President Sheikh Sharif to these financial interests, which the TFG could planning to deepen clan-based alliances overcome factionalism within TFG ranks, offer to protect and even promote in return and support the country’s plan for a decen- to engage in negotiations with key clan for political support. Similar approaches tralized form of government.28 The TFG (or constituencies, and to broaden the TFG’s could yield fruit with other key subclans, whatever Somali authority follows) will cer- base of support. The TFG also needs to use including the Habr Gedir and Murosade, tainly require a well-trained, highly mobile, such efforts to take advantage of schisms whose key business and political leaders and effective security force controlled from within the ranks of al Shabab and Hizbul include individuals such as Mohamed Deilaf, the central level of government in Mogadishu. Islamia. If the TFG continues on its current Ahmed Nur Jumale, and others.27 However, that is unlikely to be the only secu- trajectory, it will have achieved little by the Further engagement with new anti– rity force the country requires, and the cur- time its transitional mandate ends in 2011. It al Shabab militias, such as the Ahlu Sunna rent approach to military support for the must be put on notice that even though the wal Jama’a groups in central Somalia, is TFG does not address this issue. A decentral- international community values the TFG’s also urgently required. This dialogue needs ized Somali system may include not only a transitional role, its leaders cannot expect to focus on improving TFG–ASWJ political medium-size national force, but also multiple continued international diplomatic, financial, and military cooperation. Developing better smaller forces at the regional level. Designing and military support without tangible international understanding of the groups is and supporting such a structure today could improvements in performance. also important so diplomats can work with help to absorb forces currently under the sway ASWJ to develop coherent political agendas of warlords or other power brokers outside the Notes and some degree of local representation. capital city. Allowing regional leaders to keep 1 Ken Menkhaus, John Prendergast, and Colin Thomas-Jensen, “Beyond Piracy: Next Steps to It is critical to ensure that their short- their forces under local command would also Stabilize Somalia,” Enough Project, May 2009, avail- term operations against al Shabab do not ease clan and elite actors’ tensions about the able at
6 Strategic Forum No. 257, June 2010 scholars and preachers in Somalia. Over the past 2 years, 28 For a detailed analysis of this potential, see Matt however, some leaders within this network have developed a Bryden and Jeremy Brickhill, “Disarming Somalia: Lessons militia capacity opposed to al Shabab in Central Somalia. in Stabilization from a Collapsed State,” Conflict, Security, The largest contingents are drawn from the Hawiye:Habr and Development 10, no. 2 (May 2010), 239–262. Gedir:Ayr and Hawiye:Abgal:Waescle subclans. 29 See Andre Le Sage, “Stateless Justice in Somalia: 7 Information on clan dynamics in Somalia is derived from Formal and Informal Rule of Law Initiatives,” Centre for the author’s field research in Nairobi, Kenya, in January 2010. Humanitarian Dialogue, January 2005. 8 Luis Martinez, “US Launches Military Strike in Somalia Against al Qaeda Target,” ABC News, September 14, 2009. 9 United Nations, “Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1811 (2008),” S/2008/769, December 2008. 10 “More Troops for Mogadishu,” Africa Confidential 51, no. 6 (March 19, 2010). 11 See BBC Monitoring, “Profile: Abu-Zubayr, the reclusive leader of Somalia’s Al-Shabaab movement,” May 20, 2009. 12 “Shabab’s Mixed Messages,” Jane’s Terrorism and Security Monitor, January 27, 2010. 13 Huma Yusuf, “Somali Militant Group Al Shabab Aligns with Al Qaeda,” Christian Science Monitor, February 2, 2010. 14 United Nations, “Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1853 (2008),” S/2010/91, March 10, 2010. 15 Mohamed Ibrahim, “Somali Rebels Pledge to Send Fighters to Aid Yemen Jihad,” The New York Times, January 1, 2010. 16 Sudarsan Raghavan, “Somali Refugees Recruited to Fight Islamist Militia,” The Washington Post, April 6, 2010. 17 See International Crisis Group, “Somalia: The Trouble with Puntland,” Africa Briefing, no. 64 (August 12, 2009), and Human Rights Watch, “Hostages to Peace: Threats to Human Rights and Democracy in Somaliland,” July 2009. 18 On the historical emergence of al Shabab, see Roland Marchal, “A Tentative Assessment of the Somali Harakat Al-Shabaab,” Journal of Eastern African Studies 3, no. 3 (November 2009), 381–404. 19 See Jeffrey Gettleman, “Somali Backlash May Be Militants’ Worst Foe,” The New York Times, March 23, 2010. 20 VOA News, “Somali Government, Religious Group Forming Anti-Rebel Alliance,” February 22, 2010. 21 Jane’s Intelligence Weekly, “Mogadishu Braces for Imminent Somali Government Offensive,” February 24, 2010. 22 Malkhadir Muhumed, “Kenya Vetoes Somali Wish for Troops in Mogadishu,” The Washington Post, March 30, 2010. 23 Agence France Presse, “Al-Shabaab Reinforces Mogadishu as Somali Government Readies for Offensive,” February 10, 2010. 24 Johnnie Carson and Ertharin Cousin, “Statement on U.S. Policy in Somalia,” U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC, March 12, 2010. 25 Bronwyn E. Bruton, Somalia: A New Approach, Council Special Report No. 52 (Council on Foreign Relations, The mission of the Institute for National The Strategic Forum series presents original March 2010). Strategic Studies is to conduct strategic research by members of NDU as well as other 26 The Obama administration has already taken a first studies for the Secretary of Defense, scholars and specialists in national security step in this direction with the imposition of an Executive Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and affairs from this country and abroad. The the combatant commanders, to support opinions, conclusions, and recommendations Order in April 2010, seeking to block the property of individu- the national strategic components of the expressed or implied within are those of the als “contributing to the conflict in Somalia.” See Associated academic programs at the National Defense contributors and do not necessarily reflect Press, “Obama Addresses Deteriorating Somalia Security,” University, and to provide outreach to other the views of the Department of Defense or any April 14, 2010. U.S. Government agencies and to the broader other agency of the Federal Government. Visit 27 Many of these individuals were identified in the national security community. NDU Press online at www.ndupress.edu. March 2010 UN Monitoring Group report cited above. For a history of deal-making by these individuals, see Andre Le INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES Sage, “Somalia: Sovereign Disguise for a Mogadishu Mafia,” Review of African Political Economy 29, no. 91 (March Christopher J. Lamb Phillip C. Saunders 2002), 132–138. Interim Director Interim Director of Research
No. 257, June 2010 Strategic Forum 7 Other titles from For online access to NDU Press publications, go NDU Press to: ndupress.ndu.edu
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Africa’s Irregular Security Threats: Avoiding a Crisis of Confidence in the Chatllenges for U.S. Engagement U.S. Nuclear Deterrent Andre Le Sage John P. Caves, Jr. (Strategic Forum 255, May 2010) (Strategic Forum No. 252, December 2009)
Nuclear Politics in Iran STAR–TIDES and Starfish Networks: Judith S. Yaphe, ed. Supporting Stressed Populations with (Middle East Security Perspectives 1, May 2010) Distributed Talent Linton Wells II, Walker Hardy, Vinay Gupta, and Misinterpreting Ethnic Conflicts Daniel Noon in Africa (Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Defense Horizons 70, December 2009) Clement Mweyang Aapengnuo (African Center for Strategic Studies, Africa Security Brief 4, April 2010) Navies versus Coast Guards: Defining Lessons Learned from Peace the Roles of African Maritime Security Operations in Africa Forces Paul D. Williams Augustus Vogel (African Center for Strategic Studies, Africa Security Brief 3, March 2010) (African Center for Strategic Studies, Africa Security Brief 2, December 2009) Strengthening the IAEA: How the To Build Resilience: Leader Influence Nuclear Watchdog Can Regain Its Bark on Mental Hardiness Gregory L. Schulte (Strategic Forum 253, March 2010) Paul T. Bartone, Charles L. Barry, and Robert E. Armstrong (Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Defense Horizons 69, November 2009)
8 Strategic Forum No. 257, June 2010