DOCSLIB.ORG

Somalia's Jubbaland: Past, Present and Potential Futures

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Somalia's Jubbaland: Past, Present and Potential Futures Rift Valley Institute Meeting Report Nairobi Forum, 22 February 2013 POLITICS NOW Somalia's Jubbaland: Past, present and potential futures an ‘ethno-state’ liKe Puntland, because it is not Key points populated by a single clan. Some view Jubbaland as a § Due to its natural resources and location, Darod clan state, but when the large number of non- Jubbaland has the potential to be one of Darod populations along the Jubba river and in east Somalia’s richest regions, but conflict has bank communities taKen into account, the Darod clan kept it chronically unstable for over two probably comprise 50-60 per cent of the total decades. population. He warned that, if Jubbaland is treated as a Darod state and power-sharing is institutionalized § The regions of Jubbaland are not linked by along those lines, then other residents of the region road and have no history of shared would feel disenfranchised and could turn to al- administration. As an administrative unit, Shabaab. Jubbaland is not likely to be functional. Is Jubbaland viable as a federal state? First, for § The Somali constitution provides no clear Jubbaland to succeed as such a state, it needs some guidance on how newly declared federal history of shared governance and cooperation—and states are to be created, or what their it does not have such a history. Distant Jubbaland relations with the central government communities are very unlikely to respect claims of should be. authority from Kismayo. § The environmental consequences of the charcoal trade are having a negative impact A second criterion for judging whether a region could on livelihoods and food security. become a functional federal state is its economy and specifically its infrastructural linKs. Although the River § Evidence from neighbouring countries is that Jubba appears to integrate the region vertically, its federalism and devolution, if not handled horizontal links to other regions are much stronger. carefully, can exacerbate communal and The economies of Gedo region and Middle and Lower political tensions over resources. Jubba share little in common. Roads are impassable § There is concern among Somalis that their during the rainy season, maKing it difficult for people neighbours are not intervening in good faith. and goods to move between these regions. MenKhaus added that the term ‘Jubbaland’ came into common use 10-15 years ago, reflecting an aspiration Participants for a regional polity in the trans-Jubba area. For the Cedric Barnes International Crisis Group (Chair) competing regional power-brokers, however, it has Ken Menkhaus Davidson College, US, and RVI Fellow always been a code for Kismayo, the region’s main Degan Ali Executive Director, Adeso city, control of which was the true ambition. Nikolai Hutchinson Pact Kenya MenKhaus cautioned against thinKing of Jubbaland as Matt Bryden Director, Sahan Research an administrative unit with authority centralized in Kismayo. Instead, it should be seen a series of municipalities with common systems of local Background governance. He stressed that insistence on Jubbaland Ken Menkhaus noted the perception shared by the as an overarching authoritative administrative unit international community and by neighbouring would generate conflict. It could, however, serve as a countries that Jubbaland is an emerging federal state viable source of regional representation at the in Somalia. But, he asKed, does Jubbaland have the central level. key features, like those of Somaliland and Puntland, that would enable it to become a functional administrative unit? Jubbaland is not, he suggested, Rift Valley Institute | Meeting Report | Nairobi Forum | Somalia’s Jubbaland | 19 March 2012 | Page 2 of 4 Jubbaland’s Environmental Crisis alternatives. Economic growth and environmental protection are hindered by the lacK of proper Degan Ali addressed the environment and specifically infrastructure. Some parts of Jubbaland, such as the charcoal trade, which has become a major Lower Jubba and Badade, are among the most political and economic issue in Jubbaland. The isolated parts of Somalia and are completely cut off charcoal trade in southern and south central Somalia during the rainy season for three to six months. This was once only a small part of the economy, supplying increases the prices of goods and services, which the household fuel. The trade grew over time, especially communities are unable afford. Another impediment after the fall of the Siyad Barre government in the to food security is the lacK of investment the fishery early 1990s, when environmental sector. Ali’s organisation, Adeso controls collapsed. General ‘Unlike in the north, where (African Development Solut- Mohamed Farrah Aideed the charcoal trade still ions), plans to conduct research imposed a ban on the trade in on the impact of illegal fishing the early 1990s, but his son, primarily supplies local on Somali fishing communities. Hussein Aideed, failed to sustain demand, the Kismayo trade She noted that NATO forces are this, giving rise to a large-scale feeds the demand from the now guarding the Somali seas, expansion of the trade. but their presence is also Middle East, essentially UnliKe in the north, where the causing fear among the fishing charcoal trade still primarily making it the new “black communities. supplies local demand, the gold” of the south.’ Finally, Ali discussed the Kismayo trade feeds the demand marginalization of communities from the Middle East, essentially Degan Ali who have been neglected in maKing it the new ‘blacK gold’ of Jubbaland’s brokered agree- the south. With a lacK of income-generating ments, namely the Bejuni, Boni and the various alternatives and no governmental structures to ‘Bantu’ groups.1 Their economic marginalization ari- enforce the ban, the trade has become the mainstay ses from the low level of remittances from the of the local informal economy in the south. Ali agreed diaspora and the consequent higher dependency on with MenKhaus that Kismayo is a coveted prize, due natural resources. It is these communities that bear to the revenue generated by the charcoal trade. It is the brunt of environmental degradation. estimated that US$ 25-50 million is earned annually by authorities who control the port from taxes on the trade. Cross-border Issues People, she added, do not understand the link Nikolai Hutchinson explained that Jubbaland does between environmental degradation and food not exist in isolation from its neighbours. Kenyan security. Land degradation border communities have strong interdependent relationships contributes to an environmental ‘Jubbaland does not exist in crisis that has a significant impact with communities in Gedo, as on humanitarian outcomes in isolation from its neighbours. well as Middle and Lower Jubba. Somalia, particularly in the south Kenyan border communities In periods of security trade and the Jubba regions. routes, towns and settlements have strong interdependent have proliferated. Pact, he said, In addition to the charcoal trade, relationships with supports cross-border the exploitation of wildlife in communities to engage jointly in Jubbaland is also a major communities in Gedo, as well as Middle and Lower Jubba.’ trade and to share access to problem. Jubbaland is among the services and rangelands during few areas with wildlife in the dry season. Somalia, primarily because of the Nikolai Hutchinson Boni forest. On the Kenyan side Over the last 20 years, of the border, the forest is protected but in Somalia it communities in Somali towns have experienced is a no-man’s-land with no regulations. numerous administrations. Pact has had to sensitize Somalis, Ali added, have no control over the external causes of environmental change but they can control 1 Somali Bantu has become a collective name for diverse internal causes such as the charcoal trade. subsistence farming peoples who live along Somalia’s Jubba Communities think that the economic benefits and Shabelle rivers, some of whom are descended from outweigh the costs, because they only consider the Bantu; Ken MenKhaus, ‘Bantu Ethnic Identity in Somalia’, short-term gains due to limited economic Annales d’Ethiopie 19 (2003): 323-39. Rift Valley Institute | Meeting Report | Nairobi Forum | Somalia’s Jubbaland | 19 March 2012 | Page 3 of 4 them, including al-Shabaab, on the relationships unresolved. If not addressed, the region will remain between the border communities and the ways in the most contested in Somalia. which they support the livelihoods, security and The IGAD process was initiated in an attempt to unite resilience of communities inside Somalia. From a various interests in Jubbaland, motivated by peace-building perspective, the aim has been to Ethiopian and Kenyan interests in cross-border prevent security incidents, such as theft, turning into security. Bryden agreed with MenKhaus that Kismayo clan conflicts. While there are many grassroots is a microcosm of Jubbaland, whose interests are opportunities to build upon, represented in the port city. there have also been negative These issues need to be trends such as the recent spread ‘The term “Jubbaland” came addressed holistically, to ensure of insecurity into Kenya. Kenyan into common use 10-15 years that Ethiopia and Kenya have elections and the devolution ago, reflecting an aspiration secure borders. Both countries process have intensified political have in the past been aligned competition, creating new for a regional polity in the with different armed forces, so tensions. trans-Jubba area. For the cooperation from the Ethiopian cross-border alliances competing regional power- governments in Addis Ababa and have also had an impact on brokers, however, it has Nairobi was necessary for any tensions between some Somali always been a code for successful move into Kismayo. clans in the Gedo region. Most The stabilization strategy had Somali communities in Jubbaland Kismayo.’ been initiated in February, are more affected by local Ken Menkhaus following the first meeting in insecurity and the local economy, May 2012, which agreed on a which need management, than commitment to engage in a by the Kismayo economy.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Kismayo Bubble - Justice and Security in Jubbaland
    CONFLICT RESEARCH PROGRAMME Research at LSE Conflict Research Programme Research Memo 26 March 2021 The Kismayo Bubble - Justice and Security in Jubbaland Nisar Majid and Khalif Abdirahman Overview The absence of a credible and functional government, in Somalia, since the late 1980s has been felt particularly strongly in the arena of the rule of law. Under President Siad Barre, the judicial system was resented for being corrupt, politically manipulated and for rejecting Islamic precepts, and many welcomed its demise. It was perhaps inevitable that in the absence of a system of state courts that Islamic law and courts would emerge. As Muslims, Somalis were able to call upon a well-formed body of jurisprudence and practice that enjoyed social legitimacy and historically validated practices, to establish courts. Islamic law has a particular advantage in this regard in that it encompasses a penal code, a civil code, and commercial and tax codes. All of these are essential for the conduct of everyday life. Recent analyses of the justice and security sector have highlighted its politicisation and, particularly in Mogadishu, a political economy centred around clan-based mobilization and conflict, ideological divisions between supporters of different versions of Islamic and secular law as well as rent seeking behaviour. At a practical level, although some significant developments are noticeable, government courts remain subject to high levels of corruption and manipulation, are slow, limited by poor security and a lack of enforcement capacity. The persistence of Al Shabaab as a credible actor in the provision of justice sits in stark contrast to that of the Government.
    [Show full text]
  • Countering Terrorism in East Africa: the U.S
    Countering Terrorism in East Africa: The U.S. Response Lauren Ploch Analyst in African Affairs November 3, 2010 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov R41473 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Countering Terrorism in East Africa: The U.S. Response Summary The United States government has implemented a range of programs to counter violent extremist threats in East Africa in response to Al Qaeda’s bombing of the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998 and subsequent transnational terrorist activity in the region. These programs include regional and bilateral efforts, both military and civilian. The programs seek to build regional intelligence, military, law enforcement, and judicial capacities; strengthen aviation, port, and border security; stem the flow of terrorist financing; and counter the spread of extremist ideologies. Current U.S.-led regional counterterrorism efforts include the State Department’s East Africa Regional Strategic Initiative (EARSI) and the U.S. military’s Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), part of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). The United States has also provided significant assistance in support of the African Union’s (AU) peace operations in Somalia, where the country’s nascent security forces and AU peacekeepers face a complex insurgency waged by, among others, Al Shabaab, a local group linked to Al Qaeda that often resorts to terrorist tactics. The State Department reports that both Al Qaeda and Al Shabaab pose serious terrorist threats to the United States and U.S. interests in the region. Evidence of linkages between Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, across the Gulf of Aden in Yemen, highlight another regional dimension of the threat posed by violent extremists in the area.
    [Show full text]
  • THE FAUNA of JUBALAND by JOHN N
    26 Oryx to see that the Serengeti Plains are still designated as a Game Reserve and not as a National Park, but this is said to be only until the final boundary of the Serengeti National Park has been fixed. Captain Keith Caldwell, whose knowledge of East African game is unrivalled and who has just returned from Tanganyika, was called into consultation during the framing of the draft bill under discussion. The Society is grateful to its very active member and welcomes the new Bill as a sincere attempt to put game preservation in Tanganyika at last upon a sound footing. THE FAUNA OF JUBALAND By JOHN N. WARD and DAVID S. SORRELL The object of these notes is to give a record of the wild life living in the Lower Juba area of Somalia, and to assist visitors to Jubaland in finding the haunts of the various animals described. The writers do not presume to lay down the methods of identifying these animals because more knowledgeable authors have already done this elsewhere. The Lower Juba is that area which was the Administrative District of Kismayu under the recent British occupation. It extends from Ghesgud to Dujuma on the left bank of the Juba River, and contains all the land between the right bank of the river and the Kenya border from Ras Ciamboni to Dif, lying south of a line Dif-Dujuma (see map). The area is approximately 20,000 square miles, and was held by the British from 1898 to 1925 when it was handed over to the Italians.
    [Show full text]
  • Somalia: Al-Shabaab – It Will Be a Long War
    Policy Briefing Africa Briefing N°99 Nairobi/Brussels, 26 June 2014 Somalia: Al-Shabaab – It Will Be a Long War I. Overview Despite the recent military surge against Somalia’s armed Islamist extremist and self- declared al-Qaeda affiliate, Al-Shabaab, its conclusive “defeat” remains elusive. The most likely scenario – already in evidence – is that its armed units will retreat to small- er, remote and rural enclaves, exploiting entrenched and ever-changing clan-based competition; at the same time, other groups of radicalised and well-trained individ- uals will continue to carry out assassinations and terrorist attacks in urban areas, in- cluding increasingly in neighbouring countries, especially Kenya. The long connec- tion between Al-Shabaab’s current leadership and al-Qaeda is likely to strengthen. A critical breakthrough in the fight against the group cannot, therefore, be achieved by force of arms, even less so when it is foreign militaries, not the Somali National Army (SNA), that are in the lead. A more politically-focused approach is required. Even as its territory is squeezed in the medium term, Al-Shabaab will continue to control both money and minds. It has the advantage of at least three decades of Salafi-Wahhabi proselytisation (daawa) in Somalia; social conservatism is already strongly entrenched – including in Somaliland and among Somali minorities in neigh- bouring states – giving it deep reservoirs of fiscal and ideological support, even with- out the intimidation it routinely employs. An additional factor is the group’s proven ability to adapt, militarily and politically – flexibility that is assisted by its leadership’s freedom from direct accountability to any single constituency.
    [Show full text]
  • Refugee Status Appeals Authority New Zealand
    REFUGEE STATUS APPEALS AUTHORITY NEW ZEALAND REFUGEE APPEAL NO 76551 AT AUCKLAND Before: B L Burson (Member) Counsel for the Appellant: D Ryken Appearing for the Department of Labour: No Appearance Dates of Hearing: 28 & 29 July 2010 Date of Decision: 21 September 2010 DECISION INTRODUCTION [1] This is an appeal against the decision of a refugee status officer of the Refugee Status Branch (RSB) of the Department of Labour (DOL) declining the grant of refugee status to the appellant, a national of Somalia who has spent a number of years in South Africa as a recognised Convention refugee. [2] This is the second time the appellant has appeared before the Authority. He originally arrived in New Zealand in June 2008 and lodged an application for refugee status. He was interviewed by the RSB in respect of that claim on 31 July and 1 August 2008. By decision dated 21 November 2008 the RSB declined the appellant’s claim on the basis that having been recognised as a refugee in South Africa the appellant was entitled to the protection of that country. The appellant duly appealed to the Authority. By decision dated 4 August 2009 the Authority dismissed the appellant’s appeal. [3] On 12 October 2009, the appellant lodged proceedings by way of judicial review in the High Court. By decision dated 4 June 2010 the High Court quashed the decision of the Authority. Although the High Court was satisfied the Authority 2 had not committed any reviewable error itself, the appellant’s previous representative had failed to ensure that a letter from a witness confirming the appellant’s clan origins was not placed before the Authority and the High Court reached the view that the Authority should, as a matter of fairness, re-assess the appellant’s claim having regard to this evidence.
    [Show full text]
  • The Al Qaeda Network a New Framework for Defining the Enemy
    THE AL QAEDA NETWORK A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR DEFINING THE ENEMY KATHERINE ZIMMERMAN SEPTEMBER 2013 THE AL QAEDA NETWORK A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR DEFINING THE ENEMY KATHERINE ZIMMERMAN SEPTEMBER 2013 A REPORT BY AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT ABOUT US About the Author Katherine Zimmerman is a senior analyst and the al Qaeda and Associated Movements Team Lead for the Ameri- can Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats Project. Her work has focused on al Qaeda’s affiliates in the Gulf of Aden region and associated movements in western and northern Africa. She specializes in the Yemen-based group, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and al Qaeda’s affiliate in Somalia, al Shabaab. Zimmerman has testified in front of Congress and briefed Members and congressional staff, as well as members of the defense community. She has written analyses of U.S. national security interests related to the threat from the al Qaeda network for the Weekly Standard, National Review Online, and the Huffington Post, among others. Acknowledgments The ideas presented in this paper have been developed and refined over the course of many conversations with the research teams at the Institute for the Study of War and the American Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats Project. The valuable insights and understandings of regional groups provided by these teams directly contributed to the final product, and I am very grateful to them for sharing their expertise with me. I would also like to express my deep gratitude to Dr. Kimberly Kagan and Jessica Lewis for dedicating their time to helping refine my intellectual under- standing of networks and to Danielle Pletka, whose full support and effort helped shape the final product.
    [Show full text]
  • Somalia Terror Threat
    THECHRISTOPHER TERROR February 12, THREAT FROM THE TERROR THREAT FROM SOMALIA THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF AL SHABAAB CHRISTOPHER HARNISCH APPENDICES AND MAPS BY KATHERINE ZIMMERMAN FEBRUARY 12, 2010 A REPORT BY THE CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE THE TERROR THREAT FROM SOMALIA CHRISTOPHER HARNISCH February 12, 2010 Contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 IMPORTANT GROUPS AND ORGANIZATIONS IN SOMALIA 3 NOTABLE INDIVIDUALS 4 INTRODUCTION 8 ORIGINS OF AL SHABAAB 10 GAINING CONTROL, GOVERNING, AND MAINTAINING CONTROL 14 AL SHABAAB’S RELATIONSHIP WITH AL QAEDA, THE GLOBAL JIHAD MOVEMENT, AND ITS GLOBAL IDEOLOGY 19 INTERNATIONAL RECRUITING AND ITS IMPACT 29 AL SHABAAB’S INTERNATIONAL THREATS 33 THREAT ASSESSMENT AND CONCLUSION 35 APPENDIX A: TIMELINE OF MAJOR SECURITY EVENTS IN SOMALIA 37 APPENDIX B: MAJOR SUICIDE ATTACKS AND ASSASSINATIONS CLAIMED BY OR ATTRIBUTED TO AL SHABAAB 47 NOTES 51 Maps MAP OF THE HORN OF AFRICA AND MIDDLE EAST 5 POLITICAL MAP OF SOMALIA 6 MAP OF ISLAMIST-CONTROLLED AND INFLUENCED AREAS IN SOMALIA 7 www.criticalthreats.org THE TERROR THREAT FROM SOMALIA CHRISTOPHER HARNISCH February 12, 2010 Executive Summary hree hundred people nearly died in the skies of and assassinations. Al Shabaab’s primary objectives at TMichigan on Christmas Day, 2009 when a Niger- the time of the Ethiopian invasion appeared to be ian terrorist attempted to blow up a plane destined geographically limited to Somalia, and perhaps the for Detroit. The terrorist was an operative of an al Horn of Africa. The group’s rhetoric and behavior, Qaeda franchise based in Yemen called al Qaeda in however, have shifted over the past two years reflect- the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).
    [Show full text]
  • Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship Between Aid and Security in Kenya Mark Bradbury and Michael Kleinman ©2010 Feinstein International Center
    A PR I L 2 0 1 0 Strengthening the humanity and dignity of people in crisis through knowledge and practice Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship Between Aid and Security in Kenya Mark Bradbury and Michael Kleinman ©2010 Feinstein International Center. All Rights Reserved. Fair use of this copyrighted material includes its use for non-commercial educational purposes, such as teaching, scholarship, research, criticism, commentary, and news reporting. Unless otherwise noted, those who wish to reproduce text and image files from this publication for such uses may do so without the Feinstein International Center’s express permission. However, all commercial use of this material and/or reproduction that alters its meaning or intent, without the express permission of the Feinstein International Center, is prohibited. Feinstein International Center Tufts University 200 Boston Ave., Suite 4800 Medford, MA 02155 USA tel: +1 617.627.3423 fax: +1 617.627.3428 fic.tufts.edu Acknowledgements The report has been written by Mark Bradbury and Michael Kleinman, who take responsibility for its contents and conclusions. We wish to thank our co-researchers Halima Shuria, Hussein A. Mahmoud, and Amina Soud for their substantive contribution to the research process. Andrew Catley, Lynn Carter, and Jan Bachmann provided insightful comments on a draft of the report. Dawn Stallard’s editorial skills made the report more readable. For reasons of confidentiality, the names of some individuals interviewed during the course of the research have been withheld. We wish to acknowledge and thank all of those who gave their time to be interviewed for the study.
    [Show full text]
  • Forging Jubaland Community Perspectives on Federalism, Governance and Reconciliation
    RIFT VALLEY INSTITUTE MEETING REPORT FEBRUARY 2017 Forging Jubaland Community perspectives on federalism, governance and reconciliation The Interim Jubaland President, Ahmed Mohamed Islan, addresses the delegates during his inauguration ceremony in in Kismayu on September 12, 2015. Key points Participants • A peaceful settlement in Somalia is Joanna Crouch, Somalia Programme Officer, dependent on how a new system will be Saferworld implemented, rather than which new Peter Mackenzie, Somalia Country Director, system will be adopted. Saferworld (Chair) • The establishment of Jubaland has Hassan Dirye, SOSCENSA brought improvements in security and the delivery of public services, but the Abdi Al, Programme Adviser, Saferworld concentration of both authorities and Halima Farah, Somali Women’s Solidarity external assistance in the city of Kismayo Organization has created tensions with the peripheral areas. Idris Abdi Yarre, Saferworld Partner • In Jubaland, statebuilding—involving Ayaan Addulkadir Hared, Saferworld Partner elite bargaining—has been prioritized over social reconciliation, which has Introduction marginalized less powerful clans, youth On 22 April 2016, the Rift Valley Forum hosted and women. the launch of Saferworld’s report, Forging Jubaland, Community Perspectives on Federalism, Governance and • Surveys show there is public support Reconciliation. The creation of Jubaland state in for federalism as a mechanism to bring 2013 and the controversial appointment of Sheikh decision-making and service provision Ahmed Mohamed Islam (‘Madobe’) as President closer to the people. of its interim administration, supported by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), precipitated tensions and divisions in which has been especially weak in the Gedo, Somalia. In response, the Saferworld team in middle and lower Juba regions.
    [Show full text]
  • COVID-19 Update
    Series: 03 MINISTRY OF PLANNING, INVESTMENT AND Somalia as of 23rd June ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MINISTRY OF PLANNING, INVESTMENT AND 2020 COVID-19 cases: 2835 Directorate of National Statistics ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT Deaths: 90 Directorate of National Statistics Recoveries: 829 Recoveries: 486 Number of confirmed cases per state: Somaliland: 682 Puntland: 282 Hiirshabelle: 24 CORONOVIRUS (COVID-19) Update South West: 142 Reported period 10th June – 23rf June, 2020 Galmudug: 118 Jubaland: 176 Benadir: 1411 Key Summary Indicators There are 2835 confirmed cases in Somalia with 90 deaths and 829 recoveries 50% of the confirmed COVID 19 cases in the country are in Benadir Regional Administration 72% of the confirmed COVID 19 cases are Hotline Numbers for COVID-19 males, and 28% are females Please call if you are in: COVID-19 has claimed the lives of 3 persons for every 100 confirmed cases in Somalia Galmudug: 449 Somaliland:988 Puntland: 343 Jubaland: 466 Benadir: 449 Southwest:449 Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development Directorate of National Statistics Number of confirmed cases, FIGURE 1: COVID-19 EVENTS Actives cases, Recoveries, NUMBER OF CONFIR M ED CASES , ACTIVES CASES, and Deaths in Somalia RECOVERIES, AND DEATHS IN SOM ALIA As of 23rd of June 2020, the 2835 number of confirmed cases are 2835 with 829 recoveries and 90 deaths. In addition, 1916 the active cases are 1916 as shown in Figure1 829 90 CONFIRMED ACTIVE CASES RECOVERIES DEATHS CASES Percentage Distribution of COVID 19 Figure 2: Percentage distribution of confirmed cases by State Confirmed Cases by State Hiirshabelle Galmudug Jubaland 1% Approximately 50 percent of the confirmed 4% COVID-19 cases in the country are in 6% Banaadir Region whereas the remaining (24 South West percent) are from Somaliland, Puntland (10 5% percent), Jubbaland (6 percent), South West (5 percent), Galmudug (4 percent) and Hirshabelle State (1 percent) as shown in Benadir (Figure 2).
    [Show full text]
  • Gedo Region – Situation Analysis
    Gedo Region – Situation Analysis Context Gedo Region, the second largest region in Somalia, lies on the Somalia borders with Ethiopia and Kenya, and shares borders with four Somali regions of Bay, Bakool and Middle Jubba and Lower Jubba. It has an estimated total population of 328,3781, with a 75/25 rural/urban divide.The region is home to 76,510 IDPs2. UNHCR estimates that 16,380 IDPs arrived in Luuq, 30,000 in Doloow, and approximately 18,000 in Belet Xaawo. Gedo has six administrative districts: Garbaharey, Baardheere (the capital), Ceel Waaq in the south and Belet Xaawo, Doloow, and Luuq in the north. Two major rivers run through the region, the Dawa and the Juba. The Dawa River runs along the border of Ethiopia into Somalia’s Gedo region. The Jubba River starts from Doloow, just north of Luuq district, and flows to Buur Dhuubo and Baardheere. The economy mostly depends on rearing livestock and farming, but also has strong inter-regional and international cross-border trade with Kenya and Ethiopia, to some extent. In the northern zone the pastoralists rear sheep, goats, camels and cows. The agro-pastoral zone extends from east to west below Guban. The riverine zone extends from east to west below West Golis and is mainly a farming area where crops such as sorghum are produced. The security and access situation in north Gedo, in particular to Luuq, has relatively improved for the United Nations and International NGOs. The area is controlled by the Somali National Army forces backed by Ethiopian forces. South Gedo is more insecure due to continued clashes and greater access for Al-Shabaab (AS) in the rural areas of Garbaharey, Buur Dhuubo and Baardheere.
    [Show full text]
  • Directorate of National Statistics COVID-19 Cases: 2409
    Series: 02 MINISTRY OF PLANNING, INVESTMENT AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT Somalia as of 9 June 2020 Directorate of National Statistics COVID-19 cases: 2409 Deaths: 85 Recoveries: 486 MINISTRY OF PLANNING, INVESTMENT AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT Directorate of National Statistics CORONOVIRUS (COVID-19) Update Reported period 26th May – 9th June, 2020 Key Summary Indicators Somalia is the third highest Horn of Africa’s impacted nations of COVID-19 There are 2409 confirmed cases in Somalia with 85 deaths and 486 recoveries 56% of the confirmed COVID 19 cases in the Hotline Numbers for COVID-19 country are in Benadir Regional Administration Please call if you are in: 72% of the confirmed COVID 19 cases are males, and 28% are females Galmudug: 449 Somaliland:988 COVID-19 has claimed the lives of 4 persons Jubaland: 466 Puntland: 343 for every 100 confirmed cases in Somalia Benadir: 449 Southwest:449 Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development Directorate of National Statistics FIGURE 1: COVID -19 EVENTS Number of confirmed cases, NUMBER OF CONFIRMED CASES , ACTIVES CASES, RECOVERIES, Actives cases, Recoveries, AND DEATHS IN SOMALIA and Deaths in Somalia 2409 As of 9 June 2020, the 1838 number of confirmed cases are 2409 with 486 recoveries and 85 deaths. In addition, the active cases are 1838 as shown in Figure1. 486 85 Confirmed Cases Active Cases R e co ve ri e s De at h s Percentage Distribution of COVID 19 Confirmed Hiirshabelle Galmudug Cases by State Jubaland 4% 7% Approximately 56 percent of the confirmed COVID- South West 19 cases in the country are in Benadir Region 5% whereas the remaining 44 percent are from Somaliland (19), Puntland (8), Jubaland (7), South Figure 2: Percentage distribution of West (5), Galmudug (4) and Hiirshabelle State (1) as confirmed cases by State shown in (Figure 2).
    [Show full text]