CLAIMING the EASTERN BORDERLANDS After the 1997
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CHAPTER SEVEN CLAIMING THE EASTERN BORDERLANDS After the 1997 Hargeysa Conference, the Somaliland state apparatus consolidated. It deepened, as the state realm displaced governance arrangements overseen by clan elders. And it broadened, as central government control extended geographically from the capital into urban centres such as Borama in the west and Bur’o in the east. In the areas east of Bur’o government was far less present or efffective, especially where non-Isaaq clans traditionally lived. Erigavo, the capital of Sanaag Region, which was shared by the Habar Yunis, the Habar Ja’lo, the Warsengeli and the Dhulbahante, was fijinally brought under formal government control in 1997, after Egal sent a delegation of nine govern- ment ministers originating from the area to sort out local government with the elders and political actors on the ground. After fijive months of negotiations, the president was able to appoint a Mayor for Erigavo and a Governor for Sanaag.1 But east of Erigavo, in the area inhabited by the Warsengeli, any claim to governance from Hargeysa was just nominal.2 The same was true for most of Sool Region inhabited by the Dhulbahante. Eastern Sanaag and Sool had not been Egal’s priority. The president did not strictly need these regions to be under his military control in order to preserve and consolidate his position politically or in terms of resources. The port of Berbera was vital for the economic survival of the Somaliland government. Erigavo and Las Anod were not. However, because the Somaliland government claimed the borders of the former British protec- torate as the borders of Somaliland, Sanaag and Sool had to be seen as under government control. This chapter will look at how president Egal has tried to create that semblance in the case of Sool region by attempting to get Dhulbahante clan elders and other Dhulbahante political actors on his side and under his control. 1 Mohammed Said ‘Gees,’ interview, Hargeysa 06/06/2002. 2 For a more elaborate discussion of the Sanaag case, investigated by Terlinden, see Renders and Terlinden (2010: 741). The discussion in this chapter will be focused mostly on Sool region where I carried out my fijield research. 178 chapter seven A. The Dhulbahante and Somaliland In Sool, popular support for an independent Somaliland has certainly not been unanimous. In part this is due to political tensions that have lin- gered since the war between the SNM and the Dhulbahante militia, which had sided with Siyyad Barre’s national army. While clan conflicts could be resolved by the elders of the concerned clans and without the interfer- ence of any state authority, conflicts like this, on the level of state politics, were not so easily resolved. The political relation between the SNM and the Dhulbahante became mediated by one of their most senior elders, but lacking the popular Dhulbahante mandate and the necessary leverage on the ground, his involvement did not bring the Dhulbahante in. 1.1. The Secession Visiting Sool in the Spring of 2002, I was told that the driver who would help me get around in Las Anod was actually one of Siyyad Barre’s former drivers. He was probably not the only one. As the clan of one of Barre’s sons-in-law, the Dhulbahante had been part of the MOD-alliance, the clan-based political stronghold of the former military regime. Some Dhulbahante had been part of the president’s inner power circle. For example, the head of the National Security Service, one of the most pow- erful men during the military regime, had been a Dhulbahante (Höhne 2006: 405). Sool region also boasted quite an impressive number of Barre’s ex-ministers, ex-ambassadors, ex-generals, ex-security service personnel and other former employees of the Barre regime who had had to flee Mogadishu under pressure of the Hawiye militia in 1991. During the war between SNM and Siyyad Barre, the Dhulbahante mili- tia fought alongside the SNM-aligned Isaaq militia. However, there was only one Dhulbahante national fijigure who joined SNM and gained some prominence within the guerrilla force: Yasiin Ahmed Hadji Nur, who, like the Gadabursi’s Abdirahman Aw Ali, became one of the rare non-Isaaq SNM leaders.3 When the SNM took over most of the northwest of Somalia, the representatives of the Dhulbahante agreed to maintain peaceful relations with the Isaaq. A particularly important role in this entente was played by the Dhulbahante paramount elder4, Garaad Abdiqani. 3 Matt Bryden, interview, Bur’o 07/04/2003. 4 The most senior of the ‘titled’ elders, (called garaad as is mostly the case in Sool or ugaas, sultaan or bokor)..