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The Emergence of the Somali National Movement As a Clan-Supported Opposition Force

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The Emergence of the Somali National Movement As a Clan-Supported Opposition Force CHAPTER THREE THE EMERGENCE OF THE SOMALI NATIONAL MOVEMENT AS A CLAN-SUPPORTED OPPOSITION FORCE Since the mid-1990s Somaliland’s capital Hargeysa has ceased to be the theatre of large-scale fijighting. Yet, when I visited the city for the fijirst time in the Spring of 2001 remnants of war were still abound, despite the rapid pace of renovation, construction and redevelopment. Walls were pock- marked with bullet holes. The ruins of the National Theatre and the for- mer maternity hospital stand witness to the degree of destruction that struck the city. On the main road, just before entering the busy city centre, sits the fuselage of a Russian Mig fijighter jet mounted on a pedestal. A war trophy shot down by the guerrilla fijighters of the Somali National Movement (SNM) during armed conflict with the government of Siyyad Barre which lasted for much of the 1980s until the collapse of the Barre regime in 1991. The pedestal features mural paintings depicting scenes of the air bombardment on Hargeysa in the summer of 1988. Apart from its traumatizing efffects on the local population, the 1988 air bombardment marked the moment when the Somali National Movement fijinally succeeded in including and mobilizing the entire Isaaq population in northwestern Somalia. Success resulted from two factors: SNM’s involvement of the Isaaq clan elders on the ground and Siyyad Barre’s indiscriminate and brutal persecution tactics against the Isaaq, efffectively pushing their clan elders (and the entire population) in the arms of the SNM. In the previous chapter I have shown how the Somali state became defijined by clan-based patronage and political control. In this chapter I will show how the opposition against that increasingly violent and exclusive system became clan-based as well. As will become clear, this was not a matter of some sort of backsliding into ancient clan feuding. The SNM evolved from a diaspora-based guerrilla force led by elites and politicians sidelined by the Barre regime to a clan-based armed grass- roots movement dependent on the support of Isaaq clan elders. The SNM was not set up as an Isaaq movement as such. Several successful attempts were undertaken to broaden the clan base of its top leadership beyond the Isaaq. It became an Isaaq movement however, as it grew increasingly 60 chapter three hybrid, involving Isaaq clan elders in its operations and leadership. This hybridisation was the result of two things: fijirstly, as Isaaq politicians vied for top posts within the organisation supported by their clan constituen- cies, the organisation became threatened by these internal tensions. It was decided to involve the Isaaq clan elders to mediate. Secondly, the SNM needed the elders for their military operations inside Isaaq territory. The SNM had neither contacts on the ground nor the popular legitimacy to lead an uprising. Without the elders, SNM could not win the war. As the Isaaq elders grew to play an increasingly important role in the war and the SNM, the war became hybrid too. It became a war fought by militias on both sides, the Isaaq aligned with the SNM on one side and the clan militia of clans supporting Siyyad Barre on the other. In this context, clan elders became central power brokers and efffective political competi- tors to the original SNM leadership, consisting of expatriate professionals, ex-Somali military and ex-high ranking state offfijicials. A. Growing Oppositions in the Northwest As Siyyad Barre’s power circle tightened during and after the Ogaden War, its political and economic hold on the predominantly Isaaq- inhabited northwest of Somalia became increasingly sufffocating. First, the tightening of the power circle disenfranchised political, military and business elites that had previously shared in the spoils of the Mogadishu government. The disenfranchised elites would form the SNM in the Somali diaspora (notably Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom). Secondly, the total neglect of the social and economic needs of the local population in the Northwest, combined with political and military sup- pression, mobilized local protests. On the ground, inside northwestern Somalia, local urban intellectuals and professionals tried to address the population’s dire situation. Their actions attracted the wrath of the gov- ernment, leading to stand-offfs between the regime and angry citizens and violent military crackdowns of the regime against its own population. 1.1. Local Civil Initiatives: The Hargeysa Self-Help Group At this point in time however, the movement in the diaspora and the movement on the ground were unconnected. SNM focused on getting a share in the Mogadishu government by military force. The urban move- ment on the ground addressed a local situation, by civil means and unre- lated to SNM’s agenda or strategies. SNM lacked the organisational .
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