Observatoire Friqu De L’ St Aenjeux Politiques & Esécuritaires
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Observatoire friqu de l’ st AEnjeux politiques & Esécuritaires Elections in Somaliland 2017 and their aftermath Markus V. Hoehne Institute of Social Anthropology, University of Leipzig Note analyse 5 Avril 2018 L’Observatoire de l’Afrique de l’Est (2017-2010) est un programme de recherche coordonné par le Centre d’Etude et de Documentation Economique, Juridique et Sociale de Khartoum (MAEDI-CNRS USR 3123) et le Centre de Recherches Internatio- nales de Sciences Po Paris. Il se situe dans la continuité de l’Observatoire de la Corne de l’Afrique qu’il remplace et dont il élargit le champ d’étude. L’Observatoire de l’Af- rique de l’Est a vocation à réaliser et à diffuser largement des Notes d’analyse relatives aux questions politiques et sécu- ritaires contemporaines dans la région en leur offrant d’une part une perspec- tive historique et d’autre part des fondements empiriques parfois négligées ou souvent difficilement accessibles. L’Observatoire est soutenu par la Direction Générale des Relations Interna- tionales et de la Stratégie (ministère de la Défense français). Néanmoins, les propos énoncés dans les études et Observatoires commandés et pilotés par la DGRIS ne sauraient engager sa responsabilité, pas plus qu’ils ne reflètent une prise de position officielle du ministère de la Défense. Il s’appuie par ailleurs sur un large réseau de partenaires : l’Institut français des relations internationales, le CFEE d’Addis-Abeba, l’IFRA Nairobi, le CSBA, LAM-Sciences Po Bordeaux, et le CEDEJ du Caire. Les notes de l’Observatoire de l’Afrique de l’Est sont disponibles en ligne sur le site de Sciences Po Paris. Coordination Jean-Nicolas BACH Roland MARCHAL Les notes de l’Observatoire de l’Afrique de l’Est sont disponibles en ligne sur le site de Sciences Po Paris. Table of contents 5. Introduction: Background to Somaliland 9. Formal democratisation process 11. The preparation of the recent elections 14. The contenders and the elections 18. The immediate aftermath of the elections 21. Remaining political problems 26. Conclusion: a brief outlook on the near future of Somaliland Abstract In November 2017, a presidential election was held in Somaliland. This report focuses on the technical and political aspects of the most recent voters-reg- istration and the election. For the first time in Somaliland’s history (and even world-wide), biometric technology in the form of iris scanners was used to diminish multiple voting. The use of this technology was successful, in the eyes of many, despite the fact that problems are remaining. This report also looks at the immediate aftermaths of the election. The result of the election was contested, which led to tensions and some violent confrontations between the supporters of the main opposition party that had lost and the govern- ment forces. Yet, calm returned to Somaliland in late November, two weeks after the elec- tion, and anew government was formed in December. The report concludes by outlin- ing the main political and economic chal- lenges currently existing in Somaliland. Note analyse 5 - Avril 2018 4 Introduction: Background to Somaliland Somaliland unilaterally declared its independence from collapsing Somalia on 18 May 1991. With 137.000 km², its size is similar to that of Greece. There are no reliable demographic data. Although an official record states that about 3.5 million people live in Somaliland today, a more realistic number would be around 2-2.5 million. More than half of the population today is below 30 years old. The average life expec- tancy is, according to Somaliland’s own official sources, around 51 years. The popu- lation is 100 percent Sunni Muslim. Northern Somalia: political divisions Note analyse 5 - Avril 2018 5 Until 26 June 1960, Somaliland was a British Protectorate. After five days of inde- pendence, on 1 July 1960, Somaliland united with the Italian administered territory in the northeast and the south of the Somali Peninsula to form the Somali Republic. The democratic government was overthrown in 1969 by a group of military officers headed by Maxamed Siyaad Barre.1 Between 1977 and 1978 Somalia engaged in the so-called Ogaden war with Ethiopia. After its devastating defeat, General Barre became suspicious of possible contenders. A failed coup-attempt in April 1978 trig- gered the period of guerrilla warfare. A group of Majeerteen officers established the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF). Shortly afterwards Isaaq officers estab- lished the Somali National Movement (SNM).2 Both groups had their bases in Ethiopia and also received military support from Somalia’s arch enemy. In revenge for their guerrilla attacks, the Somali government cracked down on Majeerteen civilians in the northeast (1979-1981) and on the Isaaq civilians in the northwest (1981-1990) and perpetrated massive human rights violations. The seeds of the clan-based fighting, which should engulf all of Somalia after 1990, were sown back then. A peace-agreement between Ethiopia and Somalia in early 1988 forced the SNM (the SSDF had dissolved in 1985 after internal splits) to enter northern Somalia. The movement captured the two largest towns: Hargeysa and Burco. The government subsequently ordered the national army to bombard these towns, which caused enor- mous civilian casualties and produced hundreds of thousands of refugees. In early 1991, the SNM took over the central regions of the northwest (where mainly Isaaq resided); simultaneously, other guerrillas entered the capital Mogadishu in the south and ousted the military regime. However, the southern guerrillas started fighting among each other after their victory over Barre. Mogadishu descended into mayhem. The declaration of independence of Somaliland was a reaction to the extreme vio- lence people had suffered at the hands of state officials and state supporters in the decade before 1991. It also happened against the backdrop of the escalation of civil war in the south. This means that the independence of Somaliland was ill-prepared; many leading SNM figures were not supporting it. The international community ini- tially ignored it (Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the UN Secretary-General in the early 1990s was focusing on “peace-building” in Somalia; the secession of Somaliland was a disturbance in that regard). From the late 1990s onward, the international com- 1. Somali place and personal names in this text follow the Somali orthography (with the exception of ‘Mogadishu’ [Somali: Moqdisho], which is so well established in English orthography). The Latin ‘c’ stands for a sound close .ha), as in, e.g., Laascaanood or in Faarax) ’ح‘ ayn); ‘x’ denotes) ’ع‘ to the Arabic 2. Somali society is usually depicted as segmentary lineage society. Its hallmark is that individuals through reckon- ing their ancestors in the father’s line (patrilinear) situate themselves and are situated by others as members of clan-families, clans, sub-clans and lineages (in descending order) within the “total Somali genealogy” described initially by the British social anthropologist Ioan M. Lewis (Lewis, I.M. 1957. The Somali Lineage System and the Total Genealogy: A General Introduction to Basic Principles of Somali Political Institutions. Hargeisa: Somaliland Government; Lewis, I.M. 1961. A Pastoral Democracy. A Study of Pastoralism and Politics among the Northern Somali of the Horn of Africa. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1957 and 1961). In daily life, other orientations like attachment to a locale, adoption into a descent group, friendship, belonging to religious congregations etc. also have a strong impact on peoples’ identities (Luling, Virginia 2002. Somali Sultanate. The Geledi City-State over 150 Years. London: HAAN, Chapter 5). Still particularly in times of crisis, patrilineal belonging is the most important basis for solidarity among Somalis (Hoehne, Markus V. 2011: Political Orientations and Repertoires of Identification: State and Identity Formation in Northern Somalia. PhD Dissertation Martin-Luther Universität Halle-Wittenberg, p. 46). Note analyse 5 - Avril 2018 6 munity (particularly the European Union and some of its member states) began to deal with the regional differences in Somalia and tacitly accepted the special status of “Somaliland”. The problem, also from the perspective of the African Union (AU), was that officially recognising Somaliland’s secession could lead to conflicts between Somalia and Somaliland and also elsewhere in Africa (the Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, Mali). Nevertheless, even in the absence of formal recognition, large sections of the Isaaq clan-family – who roughly constitutes two thirds of the popula- tion of the country – celebrated independence (and hold on to it until today). The first decade of Somaliland was wrought with massive problems: 1 - Half of the population lived in refugee camps in Ethiopia or in camps for Inter- nally Displaced People (IDP) in Somaliland; 2 - the two major towns Hargeysa and Burco lay in ruins; 3 - the population was up in arms and the SNM began to fragment; clans and sub-clans within Isaaq fought each other over the very meagre resources of the country; 4 - with no natural resources, the backbone of the Somaliland economy was live- stock breeding and export to the Arab peninsula; state revenue was extremely small in the early years; many state-officials hardly received any salary; there were (and are) no social services; 5 - clans residing in the west and the east of Somaliland were reluctant about or even opposed to the secession from Somalia. Northern Somalia: distribution