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Continued:The Rising Profile of Russia's Military Police EURASIA EURASIA The Rising Profile of Russia’s Military Police OE Watch Commentary: As an institution, the Russian military police is a relatively new addition to the Russian Armed Forces, founded in late 2011. As the accompanying excerpted interview of Lieutenant General Vladimir Ivanovskiy, the Chief of the Russian Federation’s Military Police Main Directorate, in Krasnaya Zvezda indicates, Russia’s military police perform a wide range of tasks, similar to US military police. These include route security and traffic enforcement; facility and personnel security; law enforcement activities; promoting good order and discipline in the ranks; and expeditionary security. Russian military police units can now be found in each regiment and brigade of the military districts, the Northern Fleet, and Airborne Troops, as well as a few stand-alone units in the North Caucuses that were apparently created for the primary purpose of supporting the Syrian campaign. The accompanying excerpted articles from Nezavisimaya Gazeta and Interfax point out that Russian military police are a key component of Russian security forces in Syria, especially with regard to “humanitarian and peacekeeping issues.” According to Interfax, about 60% of Russia’s military police personnel have served in Syria. These articles make it clear that the military police are a growing and significant component in Russian’s deployable military capacity. End OE Watch Commentary (Bartles) “The military police battalion is, at a minimum, three companies (up to 100 servicemen each) plus operational and logistic-support elements.” Source: Aleksandr Tikhonov, “Уверенная поступь военной полиции (Military Police’s Confident Advance),” Krasnaya Zvezda Online, 18 February 2019, http://redstar. ru/uverennaya-postup-voennoj-politsii/ Vladimir Sergeyevich, the Southern Military District’s military police subunit recently returned to its permanent deployment center from Syria after carrying out difficult missions there. In their homeland -- Dagestan -- the military police officers received a heroes’ welcome. And I would like to begin our conversation with that subject. What kind of an account did the Russian Federation Defense Ministry military police officers give of themselves and what account are they giving in the Syrian Arab Republic? What tasks are they resolving there? …Military police troop subunits -- battalions -- and also territorial subunits -- the Humaymim, Tartus, and Damascus commandant’s headquarters -- are serving in the Syrian Arab Republic. As of today everything relating to safeguarding humanitarian and peacekeeping issues and a post-conflict settlement has been assigned to our guys -- to the military police. Military police subunits are serving at checkpoints and observation posts, monitoring the cease- fire regime. They are providing security for citizens’ passage to the de-escalation and de-confliction zones and are patrolling territory in the region of Manbij city, rendering aid to the local population and to the posts set up on the Syrian Arab Republic side. One of the military police subunits’ main tasks is to provide backup for humanitarian operations, including security for UN humanitarian convoys. Thus the military police recently escorted a convoy of this kind to the region of Al-Tanf, where the Rukban refugee camp is situated. The military police have been assigned the protection of medical brigades and mobile hospitals of the Russian Federation when they are rendering medical assistance to the population. They provide security for the work of the sapper subunits when they are mine clearing. The remit of the servicemen of the military commandants’ offices incudes controlling access to the territory of Russian bases and maintaining law and order and military discipline at the necessary level among the personnel of our contingent of troops in Syria. The Military Motor Vehicle Inspection Administration (VAI) personnel in the Syrian Arab Republic monitor Russian servicemen’s observance of traffic regulations and the rules for drivers’ operation of Russian Federation Armed Forces transport facilities. The VAI’s duties include state registration and record keeping of the Russian Federation Armed Forces transport facilities and the issue of registration documents and state license plates for transport facilities. In addition the VAI servicemen carry out the technical inspection of the Russian Federation Armed Forces transport, including with the use of diagnostic equipment. Finally, the VAI forces ensure the safety of traffic when military transport convoys carrying defense freight are on the move…. Russian Military Police in Khmeimim Air Base in Syria 2017. Source: Wikimedia Commons, http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56351/photos CC -4.0 OE Watch | May 2019 5 EURASIA Continued: The Rising Profile of Russia’s Military Police “At the present time, about 60% of military police officers have performed special duties in Syria.” Source: Aleksandr Tikhonov, “Уверенная поступь военной полиции (Military Police’s Confident Advance),” Krasnaya Zvezda Online, 18 February 2019, http://redstar. ru/uverennaya-postup-voennoj-politsii/ It is clear that it was this experience that led to an understanding of the need to improve the military police’s organizational structure. …As of last year we embarked on the creation of a new branch of the military police -- troop subunits. The first experiment was the creation of two battalions which are currently carrying out special missions beyond the Russian Federation. And now there is a military police subunit in each regiment and brigade of the military districts, Northern Fleet, and Airborne Troops. To coordinate the activity of the territorial organs (the commandant’s officer, the VAI, the disciplinary battalions) and the military police troop subunits, as of 1March 2019 the post of military district deputy chief of staff for the military police and chief of the regional military police administration is being introduced. He will be the point of contact for military police territorial and troop subunits. The military police troop subunit within a regiment will naturally be subordinate to that regiment’s commander. The military district deputy chief of staff for the military police will obey the Defense Ministry military police main directorate chief when it comes to special issues and on all other issues the district commander and chief of staff… On the basis of Syrian experience, have any additional decisions been made on equipping the military police officers with new models of weapons, military vehicles, and kit? First, the military police need to have vehicles with off-road capability. In this connection over the course of 2017-2018 over 250 UAZ Patriot and UAZ-3962 patrol vehicles were supplied to the military police subunits. The military police have started to buy quad bikes for service at training grounds. We are examining the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. buggy deliveries. Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nagorno-Karabakh_conflict#/media/File:Nagorno-Karabakh_Map2.png, CC 4.0 Second, we need armored vehicles. Considering their fulfillment of special missions beyond the Russian Federation, the military police subunits are being provided with Tigr and Tayfun armored vehicles. In 2018 they began to buy UAZ-394511-03 Yesaul armored vehicles and work is under way to acquire other armored vehicles like the Patrul and Tayfun 4x4. In addition the military police subunits are being equipped with UAVs, long-distance mobile communications systems, night vision devices, and modern thermal imaging devices. In connection with the formation of naval military police sections BL-680 ships are being bought to patrol water areas at navy basing centers under the control of the Defense Ministry…As for UAVs, they are mainly used in the VAI to monitor the observance of road traffic regulations… You mentioned road traffic accidents. Can you dwell on this important topic in more detail? What contribution do VAI inspectors make to reducing the accident rate? Is the number of road traffic accidents involving servicemen declining? Over the past five years we have observed a stable trend toward a reduction in the number of road traffic accidents involving military drivers. As a result of preventive measures aimed at owners of personally owned vehicles, in comparison with 2017 the number of road traffic accidents for which this category is to blame has declined by 7 percent. The number of road traffic accidents involving servicemen as passengers and pedestrians has dropped by 5 percent… This year we will start implementing the departmental targeted program beginning with accident avoidance training for our drivers. Source: “60% of Russian military police officers have Syria service record,”Interfax , 18 February 2019. Russian Defense Ministry military police officers have been performing their duties in Syria since the moment the Russian forces been deployed there, Lieut. Gen. Vladimir Ivanovsky, the chief of the military police main directorate, told journalists. “At the present time, about 60% of military police officers have performed special duties in Syria,” Ivanovsky said… “The military police officers have acquired priceless combat experience in Syria, which has now been included in the training program for both territorial military police bodies and military units that have been set up since December 1, 2018,” Ivanovsky said. Source: Vladimir Mukhin, “Вашингтон препятствует переговорам Дамаска, (Moscow Is Beefing Up the Military
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