Official Letter of Notification from the Estonian Defence Forces to the Esteemed Employer of the Reservist

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Official letter of notification from the Estonian Defence Forces to the esteemed employer of the reservist. Dear Sir/Madam, The reservist of the Estonian Defence Forces presenting this letter has been ordered by law to take part of the largest field training exercise of the Republic of Estonia since re-establishing its independence in 1991. For the latter to be a success, a great number of personnel, including reservists, conscripts, members of the Estonian Defence League, active duty personnel and allied troops have been called to arms. The overall aim of the exercise – named Siil 2018 or Hedgehog 2018 – is to test the mobilisation mechanisms of Estonian Defence Forces and to conduct manoeuvres all over the country. The exercise commences on the 2nd of May 2018 and concludes on the 14th of May 2018. The exercise consists of two main parts. During the first four days the abovementioned mobilisation mechanisms of the Estonian Defence Forces will be tested together with territorial defence of the whole of Estonia. The second part of the exercise will focus on tactical manoeuvres in the Southern part of Estonia. It is vital for the success of the exercise that everyone who has received their orders attends the exercise. Without personnel it is impossible to test the mobilization system or conduct tactical manoeuvres. Every person will fulfil the duties in accordance with their war time assignment, therefore every participant plays an important role in the national defence of Estonia. The person presenting this letter is one of the soldiers that the Republic of Estonia and the Estonian people count on in case of a crisis. His participation provides him with the necessary, up to date skills to defend his nation. Participating the exercise is mandated by law – it is not a choice, but an important duty of every citizen of the Republic of Estonia. We ask you to support the participation of your employees at exercise Siil 2018. Estonian Defence Forces and Estonian Defence League need their attendance. Your support is your direct contribution to the national defence of Estonia and the safe future of its people. Thank you for your understanding and contribution! As for the hedgehog - every quill matters! Riho Terras Meelis Kiili General Major General Commander of the Commander of the Estonian Defence Forces Estonian Defence League .

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