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Sõjateadlane 12/2019 SÕJATEADLANE Estonian Journal of Military Studies 12/ 2019 KAITSEVÄE AKADEEMIA SÕJATEADLANE Estonian Journal of Military Studies SERIES EDITORS: ANDRES SAUMETS AND KARL SALUM VOLUME VIII: ZAPAD 2017 INFOSÕJA VAATEPUNKTIST ZAPAD 2017 FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF INFORMATION WARFARE EDITED BY ANDREAS VENTSEL, VLADIMIR SAZONOV AND ANDRES SAUMETS SÕJATEADLANE 12 / 2019 SÕJATEADLANE ESTONIAN JOURNAL OF MILITARY STUDIES Peatoimetaja / Editor-in-chief: Andres Saumets (Estonia) Toimetuskolleegium / Editorial Board: Wilfried Gerhard (Germany) Claus Freiherr von Rosen (Germany) Ken Kalling (Estonia) Karl Salum (Estonia) Jörg Keller (Germany) Vladimir Sazonov (Estonia) Erik Männik (Estonia) Volker Stümke (Germany) Andreas Pawlas (Germany) René Värk (Estonia) Nele Rand (Estonia) Keeletoimetajad / Language Editors: Karen Kuldnokk (Estonia) Amy Christine Tserenkova (USA) Kaarin Piiskoppel (Estonia) Elle Vatsar (Estonia) Marju Randlane (Estonia) Termini- ja keelekonsultant / Language and Terminology Advisor: Reet Hendrikson (Estonia) Nõuandev kogu / International Advisory Committee: Enno Mõts (Committee Manager, Estonia) Tõnu Lehtsaar (Estonia) Raul Järviste (Estonia) Rain Liivoja (Australia) Hubert Annen (Switzerland) Gale A. Mattox (USA) Richard H. Clevenger (USA) Ago Pajur (Estonia) Angelika Dörfl er-Dierken (Germany) Robert Rollinger (Austria) Sharon M. Freeman-Clevenger (USA) Michael N. Schmitt (USA) Martin Herem (Estonia) Martti Turtola (Finland) Thomas R. Kämmerer (Germany) Zdzislaw Śliwa (Poland) Jakob Kübarsepp (Estonia) Ants Laaneots (Estonia) Sõjateadlane (Estonian Journal of Military Studies) on Kaitseväe Akadeemias väljaantav, eelretsen- seeritav ja rahvusvahelise toimetuskolleegiumiga sõjateaduslik ajakiri. Sõjateadlane (Estonian Journal of Military Studies), the journal of the Estonian Military Academy (EMA) is a peer-reviewed military journal with an international board of editors and open to international contributors. Väljaandja ja autoriõigus / Publisher and Copyright: Kaitseväe Akadeemia, 2019 Toimetuse kontakt / Editorial Contact: Riia 12, 51010 Tartu, Estonia Tel: +372 717 6421 E-mail: [email protected] Ajakirja koduleht / Homepage of the Journal: https://www.kvak.ee/sojateadlane/ Kaastööd / Submissions: [email protected] Kirjastus / Publishing House: Eesti Ülikoolide Kirjastus, www.eyk.ee ISSN 2461-4378 (print) ISSN 2461-4386 (online) SISUKORD SÄILITA HEAD JA AJENDA UUT ..................................................... 7 Andres Saumets RITUAALID SÕJAVÄES: ROLL, KOMISTUSKIVID JA JUHTIMISVASTUTUS ......................................................................... 9 Hubert Annen, Florian Schnugg SÕJAMÄNG UURIMISMEETODINA ................................................. 29 Lauri Teppo SÕJAAJA KOMPANIIÜLEMA ARVAMUSED VÄLJAÕPPE TÕHUSTAMISEKS LISAÕPPEKOGUNEMISE OKAS NÄITEL ...... 56 Robert Kase, Aivar Pilv, Svetlana Ganina RÜNDEKÜNNISE KONTSEPTSIOON VÄIKERIIGI KAITSESTRATEEGIAS ....................................................................... 91 Jaan Murumets EUROOPA LIIDU ALALINE STRUKTUREERITUD KAITSEKOOSTÖÖ (PESCO): KAS OHT VÕI VÕIMALUS EESTI VABARIIGI JULGEOLEKUPOLIITIKA JAOKS? .................. 108 Philipp Ainso MEREDESSANT KUI TÕENÄOLINE OHT EESTILE ....................... 151 Grigori Gavrilov KAITSEVÄE AKADEEMIA ÕPPEJÕUDUDE ARVAMUSED PROJEKTI „VILISTLASE VARI“ MÕJU KOHTA ENDA PROFESSIONAALSELE ARENGULE ................................................ 168 Svetlana Ganina SUMMARIES ........................................................................................ 183 AUTORID ............................................................................................... 193 CONTRIBUTORS .................................................................................. 196 7 SÄILITA HEAD JA AJENDA UUT Head Sõjateadlase lugejad! Kust me tuleme? Kuhu me läheme? Kes me oleme? Need eksistentsiaalsed küsimused on saatnud inimkonda aegade hämarusest saati ja neile on antud erinevatel aegadel erinevaid, kohati lausa eriskummalisi vastuseid. Neid on endalt küsinud ka Eesti riik, kelle iseseisvuse ajalugu küündib sajandi taha. Vastustest koorub meie maa ja rahva poliitiline ning kultuuriline identi- teet. Kaitsevägi, kes on oma rahva teenistuses ja ühtlasi läbilõige sellest rahvast, peab oma identiteedi mõistmiseks ja sõnastamiseks seisma samade mõttekohtade ees ning neile vastama, lähtudes oma parimast tunnetusest ja teadmusest. Eelmisel aastal tähistas Kaitsevägi koos meie riigiga oma 100. sünnipäeva, sel aastal möödus sajand eestikeelse ja -meelse ohvitseri- hariduse sünnist. 3. aprillil 1919 asutati Eesti Vabariigi Sõjakool, et koolitada ja kasvatada noorele riigile uut sõjaväeliste juhtide põlvkonda. Täna kannab eestikeelse sõjaväelise kõrg- ja kutsehariduse järjepidevuse lippu Kaitseväe Akadeemia, mis sai oma uue nime ja struktuuri ametlikult 1. mail 2019. Põhjapanevad muutused on alati seotud ka eelnimetatud kolme eksis- tentsiaalse küsimusega. Eesti eelmine president Toomas Hendrik Ilves sõnastas 2014. aastal mõtte, mis jääb meie maad ja rahvast suunama veel pikaks ajaks: „Mis tõi meid siia, ei vii meid enam edasi.“ Muutused on tihti- peale valulised, sest meil tuleb vaadata peeglisse ning endalt ausalt küsida: mis on see, mis on ajaproovile vastu pidanud, tõeliselt väärtuslik ja mida endaga tulevikku kaasa võtta, ning mis on aegade jooksul kogunenud ballast, mille võib rahuliku südamega maha panna? Nii jõuame möödapääsmatult traditsioonide teema juurde. Traditsioon loob identiteedi ja seob ühte, täidab väärtussüsteemi tähtsa osana ülesandeid nii ühiskonna, institutsiooni kui ka indiviidi jaoks. Tradit- sioon kindlustab sotsiaalset korda, pakkudes muutuvas maailmas püsivaid orientiire. Traditsioon on indiviidile tema tegevust mõtestava ja identiteeti loova tähendusega, aitab tal ületada ebakindlust kindlakujuliste, sageli rituaalsete tegevuste kaudu. Traditsioon edendab ühtekuuluvustunnet ja insti tutsiooni püsimist. Saksa poeedi ja õpetlase Roswitha Blochi sõnul peaks traditsioon olema viis, kuidas midagi väärtuslikku alal hoida. Auväärse minevikuga sõjaväelisel õppeasutusel tuleb tõsiselt rõhku panna oma ajaloo- lise pärandi kaitsmisele ja säilitamisele. Üks taolisi pärandeid on eestikeelne sõjaväeline haridus ja sõjanduskultuur. Kaitseväe Akadeemia ülem kolonel Sõjateadlane (Estonian Journal of Military Studies), Volume 12, 2019, pp. 7–8. https://www.kvak.ee/sojateadlane/ 8 Enno Mõts on sõnastanud tabavalt selle nn võimatu missiooni: „Nii kaua, kui meil on eestikeelne sõjaharidus, on meil ka vaba Eesti riik.“1 Samas on traditsioonidel – nagu ka igal mündil – teine külg. Need võivad viia petliku rahuloluni ja pärssida loovat mõtlemist, piirata arenguvõimalusi ja takistada alternatiivide leidmist, innovatsiooni ja uute lahenduste katseta- mist. Sel juhul kannatab ka institutsiooni sobitumine uute, poliitilis-sotsiaal- setest muutustest tingitud oludega. Taolisest olukorrast väljatulekuks on vaja teaduslikele alustele tuginevat kriitilist refl eksiooni selle üle, kust me tuleme ja mida üleliigset endaga kaasas kanname, kuhu suundume ja mida väär- tuslikku kaasa võtame ning kes me oleme ja mis ülesandeid täidame. Vene fi losoof ja kirjanik Lev Tolstoi on targalt täheldanud: „Tähtis pole mitte koht, mida omame, vaid suund, kuhu liigume.“ Tulevikku vaatava ja oma traditsioone kujundava Kaitseväe Akadeemia ning ka Sõjateadlase oluliseks eesmärgiks on eelseisval, 2020. aastal pöörata senisest rohkem tähelepanu väärtuslike traditsioonide taasavastamisele ja ehk ka uute loomisele ning nende tutvustamisele ja hoidmisele. Täites demokraatliku riigi teenistuses vägivallainstrumendi ülesannet, tuleb relva- jõududel sageli silmitsi seista eksistentsiaalsete väljakutsetega oma tegevuse piirialadel ja täita keerulistes otsustusolukordades talle esitatud kõrgeid professionaalseid ja eetilisi nõudmisi. Selleks et nendele nõudmistele vastata, on vaja laialdasi teadmisi, mitmekülgseid kogemusi ja kindlaid aateid. Siin tuleb appi meie Kaitseväe ja sõjaväelise hariduse sajandipikkune ajalugu, meie ajalooline pärand koos säilitamist väärivate traditsioonide ja sõja- väeliste eeskujudega. Juhtides alluvaid, langetades otsuseid, koolitades aja- teenijaid ja õppureid, tegeledes võimearendusega ning üllitades sõjateadus- likke või populaarteaduslikke artikleid, arendatakse Eesti sõjateaduslikku mõtet, luuakse sõjanduskultuuri uut pärandit ning pannakse tõenäoliselt alus uutele traditsioonidele. Saatku meid siis teel uude, 2020. aastasse need kolm eksistentsiaalset küsimust. Olgu meil tahet ning tarkust otsida neile vastuseid ka Sõjateadlase lehekülgedelt. Sisukaid lugemiselamusi ja tarka järelemõtlemist soovides Andres Saumets Sõjateadlase peatoimetaja 1 Tartus tähistati eestikeelse ohvitserihariduse sajandat aastapäeva 2019. – Tartu Posti- mees, 5. aprill. https://tartu.postimees.ee/6562385/galerii-tartus-tahistati-eestikeelse-ohvitserihariduse- sajandat-aastapaeva (20.11.2019). RITUAALID SÕJAVÄES: ROLL, KOMISTUSKIVID JA JUHTIMISVASTUTUS Hubert Annen, Florian Schnugg ÜLEVAADE. Kui mõelda militaarvaldkonnas rituaalidele, meenuvad kõigepealt rivistused või tseremooniad, millel on kindlaks määratud, enamasti pidulik kulg ja mida peetakse avalikult. Need on kui ühtsuse ja jõu väljendus, mis paigutub makro- tasandile. Sõjaväelised initsiatsioonirituaalid seevastu paigutuvad mikro tasandile ega ole alati avalikud. Kui need tagantjärele siiski meedia vaatevälja satuvad, kõneleb see sellest, et nende algne eesmärk kaitsta identiteeti ja luua turvatunnet on jäänud täitmata ning inimlikke ja sõjaväelisi väärtusi on kahjustatud.
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