NATO Force Integration Unit Estonia and NATO Enhanced Forward

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NATO Force Integration Unit Estonia and NATO Enhanced Forward COLLECTIVE DEFENCE NATO Force Integration Unit ESTOEstoniaN IA Enhanced Forward Presence by WING COMMANDER MARK ATTRILL Royal Air Force Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff NATO Force Integration Unit Estonia (NFIU Estonia) S we appRoach the second mania, established small headquarters-style anniversary of the declaration units, now known as NFIUs, to facilitate the of our Initial Capability, and the rapid deployment of a NATO force known as first anniversary of the arrival of the Very High Readiness Task Force (VJTF), the lead elements of NATO’s En- or any other Allied force. & hanced Forward Presence (eFP) The NFIU concept was formally ap- Enhanced Forward Presence hereA in Estonia, it is a good time to report on proved by NATO Defence Ministers in Feb- * NATO has enhanced its presence in the progress with the capability development of ruary 2015, and the original six NFIUs have eastern part of the Alliance, with four mul- these two relatively new NATO entities. As now been joined by two others, established in tinational battlegroups in Estonia, Latvia, many readers may know, the NATO Force In- Hungary and Slovakia. Less than a year after Lithuania and Poland. These battlegroups, led by the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany tegration Unit (NFIU) initiative formed part of the Wales Summit, on 1 September 2015, the and the United States respectively, are mul- requirement to improve Alliance responsive- North Atlantic Council (NAC) took the formal tinational and combat-ready, demonstrating ness to counter the threat from an emer ging decision to activate the first six NFIUs as part of the strength of the transatlantic bond. Their pre sence makes clear that an attack on one number of actors including Russia, and to the NATO Force Structure and by this time it Ally will be considered an attack on the whole form an integral part of NATO’s Readiness had also been agreed that the first waveN FIUs Alliance. NATO's battlegroups form part of the Action Plan (RAP) as it began preparations would be required to declare Initial Capability biggest reinforcement of NATO's Collective Defence in a generation. for the delivery of Graduated Response Plans in January 2016. The initial concept for setting (GRPs) to take account of threats to the NATO up an individual NFIU rested on the following * Approximate total troop number for all four Alliance and its constituent members. Several fundamentals: First and foremost, the NFIU battlegroups (as of November 2017) is 4,762. www.nato.int/factsheets frontline states of NATO, which included the was to act as a visible, permanent and persistent three Baltic States, Poland, Bulgaria and Ro- NATO presence within each of the nations. ►►► 78 The Three Swords Magazine 33/2018 COLLECTIVE DEFENCE Prime Minister of Estonia, Mr Jüri Ratas, and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at Tapa Army Base, Estonia. Opposite: enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) forces at Tapa manoeuvre camp in Estonia and Adazi military base in Latvia. Photos by NATO and Miks Uzans, NATO Channel Further, the NFIU should be joint in nature to reflect the role of each service (air/land/mari- time) in contributing to any VJTF, and it should be multinational to demonstrate NATO’s collec- tive responsibility for delivering security to each Member State. Since each of the NFIUs had been requested by the Host Receiving Nation, they should also be affiliated to their respective Defence Force Headquarters and tailored to lo- cal circumstances. In the case of Estonia, the adaptation has been particularly effective with the Unit attaining a very Estonian atmosphere where interoperability with our “parent” head- quarters, and the Ministry of Defence, in par- ticular, has been extremely effective. Every military organisation and entity has a mission statement and NFIU Estonia is no exception. In our case, the initial mission Wg Cdr Attrill, the author, at the main entrance of NFIU statement was, and remains, “to facilitate the Estonia headquarters. Photo by rapid deployment of the VJTF and additional SAC Edward Wright, MoD UK high readiness and assurance elements in or- ►►► The Three Swords Magazine 33/2018 79 COLLECTIVE DEFENCE NATO FORCE INTEGRATION UNITS * During the 2014 Wales Summit, NATO Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea and on- Heads of State and Government agreed going aggressive actions in eastern Ukraine. to implement the biggest reinforcement of NATO's Collective Defence, including an En- * The RAP includes "Adaptation Measures" hanced Forward Presence in the eastern and which are longer-term changes to NATO's southeast part of Alliance territory and a forces and command structure so that the Al- framework for NATO's adaptation in response liance will be better able to react swiftly and to growing challenges and threats emanating decisively to sudden crises. from the south. * Adaptation Measures include tripling the * To reinforce the readiness and the rapid de- size of the NATO Response Force (currently, ployment of these forces, NATO Allies set up 40,000 troops), the establishment of a Very eight NATO Force Integration Units (NFIUs) High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) able in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Po- to deploy at very short notice, and enhanced land, Romania, Hungary and Slovakia. Standing Naval Forces. * All eight NFIUs are part of NATO's Readi- * NFIUs play a major role in NATO's defence ness Action Plan, or RAP, that was agreed at and deterrence posture, ensuring the Alliance NATO Secretary General NATO's Wales Summit in 2014. remains ready, relevant and adaptive. Jens Stoltenberg visiting the headquarters of NFIU Romania with Prime Minister Klaus Werner * RAP, in turn, is part of NATO's response * The British Army is leading a battlegroup of Iohannis, and talking to staff, to the evolving security challenges following about 1,000 NATO troops in Estonia. 2015. Photo by NATO In developing the NFIU sponsibility, which includes the three Baltic SACEUR, and although it is envisaged that States, Poland, and more recently, Hungary we regularly work closely with Joint Force concept, much has and Slovakia. As the proclaimed “NATO cus- Command Brunssum through HQ MNC NE, been made of the todian of regional security”, HQ MNC NE SACEUR can also provide Direct Liaison Au- undertakes several tasks for which they rely thority with Joint Force Command Naples or RSOM task, which is heavily on the NFIUs. The HQ is under remit any other NATO Command Structure orga- often understood to be to maintain high levels of Joint Comprehensive nization as the early planning for a potential Situational Awareness (JCSA), and NFIU Es- NATO operation evolves. In order to conduct a logistics responsibility tonia has a key role to play in constantly up- its main mission, NFIU Estonia currently has with the perception dating a wide range of information relating to six main tasks, as directed by Allied Command Estonia, with extensive coverage across the six Operations (ACO)/SHAPE. These main tasks that the NFIU is a functional domains encompassing Political, are as follows: logistics unit. Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure and 1. Prepare and support the Reception, Stag- Information (PMESII). ing and Onward Movement (RSOM) of the This is not the case. The maintenance of JCSA for Estonia is VJTF, and other NATO Response Force a major part of our daily work and information (NRF) elements at high readiness levels. der to enhance Alliance responsiveness”. As is disseminated to HQ MNC NE via a num- 2. Support Article 5 operations, planning with any effective organization though, there ber of sources, including our regular reports and exercises, including fostering coher- is a regular requirement to review the mission, and returns, site surveys and reconnaissance ence with national defence planning. and as the NFIU has evolved over time and has reports, Key Leader Engagement readouts and 3. Support to Non-Article 5 operations, been exercised and evaluated, it has become video tele-conferences. Linked to this work is where appropriate, and agreed by Nations. clear that our mission may be subjected to a requirement to regularly update information 4. Coordinate and assist multinational some change if we are to remain relevant in an on ongoing and future NATO assurance mea- training and exercises in relevant nations. ever-changing world. sures and in-country bilateral or multilateral 5. Prepare and support the sustainment of In terms of Command and Control (C2), training or exercise activities. the VJTF, and other NRF elements. Headquarters Multi-National Corps Northeast In all of this, NFIU Estonia has played a 6. Support the ongoing assurance measures, (HQ MNC NE), home-based in Szczecin, Po- key role in filling information voids and then including preparing to receive and support land, is responsible for operational control of maintaining up-to-date situational awareness. the integration of forces into operational C2 the NFIUs within its nominated Area of Re- Ultimately, the NFIUs work for SHAPE and and to enable the sustainment of combat ►►► 80 The Three Swords Magazine 33/2018 COLLECTIVE DEFENCE SHAPE and the Host Receiving Nation in identifying the shortfalls or surpluses in Es- tonia’s enabling capabilities and capacities for the all important RSOM task in the widest pos- sible sense, taking into account a wide variety of factors to enhance and maintain situational awareness on a daily basis to higher authority within NATO. This task includes environmen- tal awareness to survey and report on the avail- ability of assembly and training areas, main de- ployment and supply routes (air/land/sea) and locations to facilitate other support activities. The successful outcome of this work relies on the establishment and maintenance of a suit- able network of contacts, whether these are with the Estonian Defence Forces, Ministry of Ambassador Tacan Ildem, NATO Assistant Secretary General for Defence, other Government departments or Public Diplomacy, shaking hands other bodies, such as airport operators or port with General Milan Maxim, the Chief of Staff of General Staff of authorities.
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